Questions 1 and 2: Is it possible that the Prime Minister's strategy in 1942 was based mainly on the fear that we wouldn't develop large ground forces and that Britain would have to carry the burden of the operations?

All through the early part of the build-up of our army, the British did not think we were capable of producing workmanlike divisions, and they were very astonished when our divisions went into the field. The first divisions we sent did very poorly. Their training had not been completed and their performance was quite understandable. Our first good divisions went into action in Italy about May 14, 1943. Then it became evident that they were tremendously powerful and stable and capable of long advances.

One of the most interesting aspects of the war to me is that the two divisions that got into Italy were put on the left in the mountains, expecting that they would make only a holding operation, but they were superb and went far. The Germans did not have an opportunity to evaluate the power of our divisions before they were struck in Normandy. Patton's army divisions were in battle for the first time and they behaved remarkably, and that was a total surprise to the British. The British thought we would not be able to get battleworthy divisions, whereas they actually did superb work. That is accountable for the British opposition to ROUNDUP plans in large measure. Our navy was opposed to our doing it, also. I had bitter opposition from the navy in getting steel for our tanks, etc. I was opposed by the British, our navy, and by the Congress.

I used to have in a group of twenty-five or thirty correspondents and columnists—the top men in the profession—about every two or three months, and always when I came back from one of my trips. Once one of them brought up a question in regard to what he had heard about the British being opposed to what we were doing. It was Eugene Meyer of the Washington Post, and he went to Mr. Stimson and complained about me. Mr. Stimson asked him to see me. When I saw him, he said I had hurt his feelings, and I told him he had done worse than that to me. [See Papers of George Catlett Marshall, 3:398-99.] He said he had his advice and the story from a lieutenant commander in the navy, and I asked him if he was
willing to base his opinions on such an authority. The navy pressure was working the way the English pressure was working, but they were working against each other. I was in the middle trying to build up this force. Later he became my good friend.

*Question 3* General Morgan once told me that at times he felt that the British were trying to make him the goat; that they did not intend to do the cross-Channel operation. Did you have this view at times?

On the Frederick Morgan question, the answer is yes.

*Question 4:* Do you feel that the deciding factor in the prime minister's reluctance to cross the Channel was due to his reactions to heavy losses (British) in World War I in Belgium and France?

Number 4 is absolutely correct. His personal physician [Lord Moran] was a great friend of mine and told me in confidence that one factor was the losses in the battle of the Somme. Along with that was their feeling that we could not create the troops. In an effort to show them, I took them all over the country. Churchill and others were at Columbia, South Carolina, on one occasion, and he nearly dropped when he saw how good the troops were. But he thought that was all we had.

*Question 5:* Do you believe that Prime Minister Churchill's initial insistence on Mediterranean operations was due to a desire to vindicate his World War I views relative to Gallipoli?

No. I think it was not Gallipoli, but the fact that he was opposed to the Channel crossing. He had a horror of bodies floating in the Channel. I told Stimson why Churchill was opposed. Once we got in Italy, he was swayed. The dominant thought is that they didn't think we were capable of manufacturing the troops. Churchill actually has stated that. In the performance in Normandy they shifted troops terrifically. De Witt was almost paralyzed at it. Our fellows handled these maneuvers, and the British couldn't do that sort of thing. The British didn't have large spaces for maneuver. Our troops lost much time in training when they got to England because the English said they would destroy their crops.

I made our people change bases. During the maneuver that Eisenhower was in [1941, when Eisenhower was chief of staff, Third Army], I told them to move their base. They said it would take ten days and be too expensive. I said go ahead. It took two days and cost $25,000.

I also had them go to the desert to train. There was lots of room. I decided to go ahead and transfer the troops to the desert in southeastern California in spite of the great cost involved. We had them leave their weapons behind and get others there. They didn't like it, but it cost too much to take the weapons with them. It was in a great measure responsible for their remarkable mobility and celerity of movement, particularly in the
latter phases of the Normandy invasion. They moved corps like regiments.

Don't quote this. I became very much concerned about their tank practice. It was all desert stuff, and they were going up into northern Europe, into a different kind of terrain. We didn't know we were going to hit such rough country. I objected to what was going on and they began to moderate on it. G-2 let me down every time in everything. They never told me what I needed to know. They didn't tell me about the hedgerows, and it was not until later, after much bloodshed, that we were able to deal with them.

Question 6: Lord Alanbrooke, with whom I talked in 1947, suggested that we insisted on the cross-Channel attack mainly because we had created a large army and that was the only place where it could be impressively used. Any comment on this?

I didn't know Alanbrooke felt that way, and that wasn't true.

Question 7: To what extent was there political pressure on the president to get a second front open? I recall mass meetings and petitions to get help for Russia. Was it possible to distinguish between those who wanted to help a country on our side and those who wanted to help the Russian experiment survive? Here we get into something the McCarthy people were talking about.

I don't know how to answer that about the pressure on the president. The pressures on him operated in dispersing our effort. There is no question that we reacted to the intense desire of the Russians to get a second front started. SLEDGEHAMMER was to get Russia on its feet again. The McCarthy thing was all twisted. We were straining everything we could at the start to get something to relieve the pressure on Russia. But once they had their success at Moscow and later at Stalingrad, it was then merely a question of how best to end the war in Europe.

Watch the balance of power between us and the British. For a long time they had supremacy and we had a minimum of divisions either organized or overseas. The apex of British supremacy was the victory of the Eighth Army in Africa. Later, their strength dwindled until in the Italian campaign some British units wouldn't fight. We had to turn three of our divisions over to the commander there. They had simply lost all their fight. We didn't blame them a bit, because they were completely exhausted and under strength.

Question 8: To what extent was the American strategy (BOLOER-ROUNDUP) mentioned above based on your views, on those of the president, those of Admiral Stark, on views of the planners? Were you influenced by views of General Pershing on this subject? Did your World War I experience influence your thinking?

Stark had very little influence on planning the war in Europe. The navy was mainly interested in the Pacific and getting steel for ships. Their Yards and Docks—or construction—people were very powerful.
We were largely trying to get the president to stand pat on what he had previously agreed to. The president shifted, particularly when Churchill got hold of him. Mr. Stimson was very helpful in keeping the president on the track. The president was all ready to do any side show and Churchill was always prodding him. My job was to hold the president down to what we were doing. It was difficult because the navy was pulling everything toward the Pacific, and that's where the Marines were, and they got a lot of publicity. The president's tendency to shift and handle things loosely and be influenced, particularly by the British, was one of our great problems. We would have been lost in the Balkans.

As to strategy, Admiral Stark was not able to influence his own people much. He would more or less go along with me, but he virtually could not control his own people. Don't advertise that.

I would say that initially the planners came up with these things. It was merely a question of how we could get the men and materiel to England and how we could get the British to go along with us. When we got to Rome, Alexander wanted to go up in the Balkans where he would be in command. Clark said something about favoring it in his book. Like the others, he wanted something in his sphere. But he never said a word at the time. He was a very good soldier and very loyal, and he took a terrible beating. Churchill wanted the Balkan operation, too, and then for a time he was insistent that we go around to the west coast of France and land there. (These are two divergent times, but the general realized I understood what he was talking about.) Churchill tells about it in his book.

Did you ever see a paper called the Demolition of Churchill? [Castigation of ANVIL] That isn't exactly the title, but it was a paper giving Churchill's opposition to the landings in southern France and what happened. The differences were so great that it was almost facetious. (I asked if this was the one General Lincoln helped write, and the general said he thought so. He then added that he wanted that information for the conference at Malta, but couldn't use it because it was so terrible.)

The big break [regarding the final decision to get away from Mediterranean strategy to cross-Channel strategy] came when I insisted on sending five divisions out of Italy to England. Then we began to solidify on a practical basis for the landings in Normandy. I have a great sympathy for the British in their situation. First, they thought we couldn't create these divisions. Then there was the fact that I hadn't commanded troops. Alanbrooke had commanded two corps in France when he was sent over after the first withdrawal to establish a line to defend the Brest Peninsula. He had done all these things and, while I had been chief of operations in an army in the first war, I had done nothing like it. So they felt I didn't understand the problems.
Question 9: Did you have the feeling in the early days that it was important from the standpoint of later world peace for the United States to play a commanding role in the war with large bodies of troops in various parts of the world?

I didn’t want as large a force as the planners did. Our planners were very rash in their talk. I had to temper the thing down a great deal. When the Russians didn’t come forward rapidly in January 1945, Mr. Stimson became convinced they were going back on us. Eisenhower wanted the Russians to help him in the battle of the Bulge, but they couldn’t go in because of their roads, etc. Mr. Stimson gave orders to start work on ten new divisions on account of what he thought was the Russian failure. I told Mr. Stimson that I opposed this to the point of resigning, and asked him to tell the president this. I said it wasn’t a nice thing for an army officer to do in time of war. It would mean robbing us terribly and the thing wouldn’t be in being before a year.

It took us almost twenty-two months to get a division ready to go overseas and our early replacement system was not good. The Congress passed laws on rotation and leave that we had to rob divisions in Europe so they were under-strength and, consequently, they lost morale. With every man we took away, we were ruining divisions. The final climax was Stimson’s proposal for ten divisions. I told him I had to stop it if I could. Then he dropped it. About that time the Russians showed up [their attack began January 12, 1945]. The Russians did not turn us down on plans they were committed to.

(At this point General Marshall went back to a part of Question 7, in which I asked about the influence of General Pershing on his strategy.) With regard to what extent I consulted with General Pershing: Don’t say this, but virtually not at all. He mostly could not understand what I was talking about. But I went to see him about every ten days. It was a terrible drain on my time. Also, I went to see General Craig, who was also at Walter Reed, paralyzed. I went to see Pershing probably the night before and the night after I got back from my trip to Cairo, Tehran, India, Australia, and some of the Pacific. I had been gone thirty-five days. After I got back, I could tell him where I had been. He said to me that he didn’t see me much any more, and I repeated to him where I had been. Still, his only comment was that he didn’t see me much any more. I had to just give up then. He simply didn’t understand.

The publisher of the Army-Navy Journal [John C. O’Laughlin] reported that I wasn’t doing this and wasn’t doing that. The whole thing was that my strength and endurance were being taxed tremendously, and every hour with me was vital. I was at my desk at 7:30 in the mornings. General Pershing moved in very actively at the time the question came up as to whether I would take command in Europe. I was fearful that if I left this
end, things would lag here. Every existing Crown Head in Europe was after me for everything. I knew my dealings with Congress and everything here would be in a very weak position if I left too early. Finally, the president changed his mind, and General Pershing went to him then actively and protested my being taken away from Washington. O'Laughlin was his advisor, but Pershing did it on his own. Don't tell that to anybody. I told Pershing as much as I dared, but he rarely commented. Eventually, his brain didn't work clearly. I think that started in about 1943.

The feeling we had about large bodies of troops was that we had to meet a very tremendously powerful force, and that the British power was vanishing. The Eighth Army thing is the last thing they showed up in. We visualized their dwindling because they could not keep their troops up to strength.

It is essential in the air, for instance, that there be no vacant chairs at a mess. It made them very despondent. We figured the length of time a pilot would fight in the Far East and Southwest Pacific. We assumed the ground crews could stay out twice as long as the pilots. This was wrong, mainly because the ground crews worked night and day, with lights on at night, and we couldn't protect them from the mosquitoes. The men took atabrine to such an extent that they became too groggy to work on the planes. They had to be replaced first.

Morale was very important. The pilots out there (Pacific) were admiring the Japanese Zero plane and criticizing ours. I investigated and found that to get the features they admired, we would have to strip our planes of any protection. They would not have the planes stripped. I wanted the pilots to feel that they could have any kind of plane they wanted and that they had a direct part in the whole matter. They wouldn't buy the stripping of the plane. It was very important to make these men feel that they were not just put out there and then forgotten.

Claire Luce went out there and also to Italy, writing for *Time* and *Life*, and called them forgotten divisions. (The men in the Pacific had been saying that those in Italy got everything and they were forgotten.) She ruined morale terribly. Corps commanders said after that they couldn't do anything with their troops. Her episode, particularly in Italy, was very serious. The magazines, you know, went directly to the men, and it was very difficult to deal with.

On the large army thing: This was the army we felt we needed to fight the battles. We did look at Great Britain with suspicion all the time. On one occasion our people brought in an objection to something the British wanted. I didn't see anything wrong with the British proposal, but our planners (Wedemeyer, Hull, etc.) explained that there was an ulterior purpose in this thing. So I was going to a meeting in England and I had our rebuttal to the proposal. Portal (the brightest one of the lot and the most
difficult to negotiate with for that reason) read this memorandum from my planners. Portal said he drafted the proposal and that it was taken from a memorandum of ours. And it was a fact. He showed it to me. I told him that I would do anything in the way of reparation. Our own paragraph was the key of our objection.

I had trouble with King because he was always sore at everybody. He was perpetually mean. I made it my business to be on a very warm and understanding basis with the British, and they were appreciative of that. We were more suspicious of them than they were of us. This may not have been a compliment. I think they just thought we didn’t know enough. I could never tell who I was fighting with because Churchill gave them direct orders.

**Question 10:** How seriously did you and the American chiefs of staff consider going all out in the Pacific as an alternative to beating Germany first?

In my own case, it was bluff, but King wanted the alternative. The president opposed the Pacific alternative.

**Question 11:** Did you or any member of the American planning staff have political objectives in supporting the BOLERO-ROUNDUP idea; that is, in hoping to beat the Russians to Central Europe? This was suggested by General Wedemeyer in the MacArthur hearings.

If they did, I didn’t know it. I was trying to get the Russians to work with us. Wedemeyer, in his stuff, got way off. He has become obsessed with this thing.

**Question 12:** To what extent was the president influenced by the effect of the opening of action on the 1942 elections?

In defending the president on the 1942 political thing, I can say that when I went to him with TORCH, he put up his hands (General Marshall elevated his hands in an attitude of prayer) and said, "Please make it before Election Day." However, when I found we had to have more time and put it after election, he never said a word about it. Steve Early, who was told only an hour before the attack, blew up about it because it wasn’t before election. We just couldn’t do it before election. The president was very courageous about that. I said so in my report.

The reversal of the April decision about ROUNDUP was due to the navy, particularly its construction department, and to the British chiefs of staff. Mountbatten came over here and that is when the president seemed to concede the point, although Mountbatten himself was in favor of it. It was a combined affair: the British on one slant and the navy on another slant. I don’t mean that it was King. It was the Yards and Construction people. They were so dominant that they told me, when we were talking about
making a mountain division with different equipment and numbers of men, that they would only carry a standard type division. I ignored them and went ahead. They poured icewater on everything about an army in Europe.

They got it into Congress and it was very hard to deal with. I tried not to get into a fight within the team. Finally, I got enough power with Congress that I could say what it was and that was it. I could have, upon occasion, come out and demolished them, but I didn’t do it.

I couldn’t get Congress to appropriate the money we needed just before election, and I decided at the last minute, I think about June 25, that the only way I could get action, without appearing to be pulling a Smedley Butler, was to make a biennial report. I thought that would appear perfectly regular. So we made the report in five days. I made the mistake of feeling I must get it out on July 1, which didn’t allow us to get it to the press prior to the release date, which resulted in their jumping on it. It did, however, result in a meeting with the president two days later. He let me do all the talking for a change, and we got it all straightened out. Rayburn got so angry, he walked out and was angry with me for a while. Now he is a good friend. The president was having trouble dealing with the Bible Belt, out there in the Middle West, politically.

In all the considerations dealing with BOLERO, there is the aversion to a long period of preparation. I made several talks at the War Department in relation to this, because the teaching of prospective staff officers lacked touching on that matter. Our trouble was that we couldn’t start in England for a long period of time, and the main thing about the Mediterranean operation was something occurring at an early date, and that was the only thing we could think of that could be done at an early date. It was the only thing the British could do and they had to furnish the bulk of the troops.

When the president heard about Montgomery starting his operation on October 26, he said not to let him do that because they always got licked. Montgomery did start it on the 26th, however. (Apparently the president feared the effect of a defeat just before the TORCH operation or perhaps just before the election.)

Question 13: Would you comment on the Sherwood statement that you and Eisenhower apparently changed the SLEDGEHAMMER operation from an operation in which they went in and then came out to one where they went in and stayed?

It was an “in” operation all the time. I don’t remember the “in and out” part.

In connection with the unity of command, I got the unity out of that statement you have. The chief of the naval planners rushed to the door to shake hands with me and put his arm around me, which surprised me. And Dill followed me and threw his arms around me, and still another one
acted explosively [at the Washington Conference in late December 1941 regarding creation of the ABDA Command]. The prime minister was not in agreement. So Hopkins told the president to get me over there (Churchill was staying in the White House). I went over there the next morning.

He [the prime minister] was in bed and propped up. I didn't want to sit down and look up, so I stood up and looked down, and he got off quite a spiel. The implication was that it was inconceivable for an army officer to have anything to do with the navy. He said a ship was a very special thing and that it was difficult to put the navy under an army commander. I told him I was not interested in Drake and Frobisher, but I was interested in having a united front against Japan, an enemy which was fighting furiously. I said if we didn't do something right away, we were finished in the war.

I remember he went into the bathroom and came out with only a towel around him, and said I would have to take the worst with the best. He sent for the chiefs of staff. I then left, and when the chiefs saw me leaving, Pound and Portal had a gloomy expression.

We had a meeting right after that, in which Churchill agreed to the unity of command. It covered a region from Burma and India down to Australia, the Philippines, etc., and one man couldn't possibly get at it very well. But we had to do something. I picked the Britisher [Sir Archibald Wavell] to be the commander because he was there and he was going in to see Chiang Kai-shek. We stopped trying to deal with a lot of different agencies. The interesting part of it is that in this statement I made, which is in the Hopkins book, I say that I hadn't consulted my own people or the navy, and went on to say what it had to be. The navy made no opposition to that, which practically meant that the navy was with me on the unity of command. There was never any dispute after that that we would have unity of command.

I wanted to give the navy command of everything in Hawaii and Alaska. They didn't want to take it. Another thing was that we were still sitting without an air chief of staff, so the president got off a message, and his secretary (McIntyre) showed me a draft of the message that was going to be sent to Congress. The president's reference to the armed forces was merely to say he had the support of preeminent leaders of the army and navy, Marshall and King. I asked the secretary to include General Arnold so that it would be the three services. He put it in. That is all the action taken on it. The president referred to us as his chiefs of staff, and that was it. Three or four directives were drawn up on the chiefs of staff, but I wouldn't agree to them because we already had it working in effect.

On a simple thing like the Intelligence Service, there was terrible opposition. They opposed any unity. The Strategic Service Committee was opposed by the navy, and not until they proposed the name and I accepted it, did we get it. Now they have got the scientists mixed up in it,
and it has become practically unworkable.

Don't use this, but Vannevar Bush is a germ and a fourflusher. Incidentally, he took terrible advantage of me when he had a note I sent him on his book put on the cover with my photo. His book was okay, but I hadn't written anything for Eisenhower or Bradley.

Question 14: Would you comment on the conflict in dates relative to the fact that one source shows you telling Eisenhower on July 25 that he is to command TORCH, and that Churchill cabled on July 31 that they are willing to have you as supreme commander and Ike as your deputy?

I can't answer that. So far as I know, Roosevelt never replied to Churchill, and I had no concern about commanding the TORCH operation.

Question 15: Would you comment on the statement that you still debated the TORCH decision into late August or early September and did not consider it final?

I don't remember holding up that decision at all. Unless they have it in writing from me, I don't get that at all.

Question 16: Did anyone on the American side wholly approve of TORCH?

Except for the Pacific fellows, we were all hesitant about TORCH.

Question 17: Will you give an estimate of the risks involved in TORCH?

The risks were very great in moving those huge convoys into the Mediterranean. There were one hundred submarines off Gibraltar. The sinking of one of those big troop ships with everybody on board would have been a terrible thing. We were putting in 106,000 on a six hundred mile front. British at first were strong for going in there and taking Casablanca. Now they said we couldn't do it because of the rough surf. I said no. They hadn't said a word about the rough surf when they originally pushed Casablanca. I refused to go inside without having a firm hold outside. We were very uncertain about Spain. Two great hazards: rough surf at Casablanca and being cut off by Germans at Gibraltar.

I had arranged to go duck shooting with Bradley on the first day of the season, and the night before Mrs. Marshall heard the War Department telephone ring in my bedroom. So she came into my room and asked if I could still go shooting in the morning. I told her I could not, and she was very angry and accused me of letting every little thing interfere with my pleasure. A message had come from Murphy, our representative in Africa, saying that General Giraud had insisted that if we went ahead without a delay of two weeks, it would end in a disaster. These convoys were already at sea and I sent word right back that we would go ahead, but I had to see the president and tell him what I had done. Then Mrs. Marshall was at a ball game when they announced the landing, and when she came back,
she woke me up to ask if that was the little thing we had been talking about. I told her it was.

Question 18: To what extent were you drawn into negotiations with the French?

I was involved in seeing that de Gaulle was not told until the last, before he had given the whole thing away. Giraud came in and didn’t prove to be at all what we expected. I liked Giraud and knew him pretty well, but he didn’t have any power over the other Frenchmen at all, particularly Juin. Juin had those three French divisions in Italy and did a fine job. I was there when they were about to relieve him and decided to decorate him. Only the president had the power to give the award, but I borrowed someone’s medal and put it on him. Later told the president. In the French deal, Bill Bullitt, a Philadelphia lawyer who got himself made a major, was not very profitable for us.

Question 19: What was your view on the Darlan episode?

I don’t know how else they could have handled it. I headed that off by bringing the leaders of the House and Senate to the Munitions Building to explain the thing, and read the message from Eisenhower that had just come about thirty minutes before.

Question 20: What were the main issues from the TORCH operation?

The main lesson was that everything was improvised and put together at the last minute. Everything was dispersed in England and we didn’t know where it was stored, and we ended up by having to send everything again from the United States.

Additional comments on General Marshall interview at Leesburg, October 5, 1956. (Miss Mary Louise Spilman took most of this interview in shorthand, but I took some in longhand in case she missed anything. This is to supplement and not to stand in place of her account.)

The G-2 never told me anything I needed to know during the war. Didn’t tell me about the hedgerows until it was so late we had to pay in blood for our lack of knowledge. Don’t print that.

Doctor, watch the balance in power between us and British. For a long time they were supreme and we had a minimum in units. Apex of British predominance was the Eighth Army victories. Later their strength dwindled until in the Italian campaign some British units wouldn’t fight. They were exhausted and under strength.

Part of British reluctance over ROUNDUP was that they didn’t believe we could train the effective troops. At first they were not well trained, but after
a time they were excellent. Two divisions we sent into Italy were superb. They did fine work to Rome and beyond. General De Witt was paralyzed when he saw what we could do with these people, and he was a senior officer. They learned mobility in maneuvers in the Desert Training Center. I insisted on this. Mustn’t be immodest, but I pushed this even though it meant costly movements. Made them leave their weapons behind and pick up others so it would cost less. On the earlier maneuvers—when Eisenhower was with Third Army as chief of staff—I insisted on movement of units. They said it would be ruinously expensive and take ten days; took only two and cost only $25,000. I showed Churchill three divisions on one trip. He nearly fell down when he saw the fine shape they were in, but he thought that was all we had.

Up to Moscow and Stalingrad battles we had to figure on how to help Russia stay in the war; after that it was what was the best way to end the war in Europe.

Stark had little influence on planning war in Europe. Navy was interested in the Pacific and getting steel for ships. Their Yards and Construction people powerful (told me this three times); overrode Stark and King. Always saying they couldn’t build landing craft. Even told us once they could only carry a standard type division—couldn’t carry a mountain division. I said the Germans have about eight times [kinds]; let us keep up to date.

Our job was to keep the president off sideshows.

Stark didn’t influence his own people.

Initially, the planners came up with the ROUNDUP plan. We worked together, but I made a rule never to give them my tentative idea; preferred that they work out something.

Clark, like others, wanted something in his own sphere. That is why he wanted the Balkans. But he was a good soldier; he didn’t fight the idea.

I had great sympathy with the British problem. (1) They felt we couldn’t create a fighting force and the chief burden would be on them; (2) second, there was the fact that I hadn’t commanded troops. Brooke had commanded two corps in France. I had been chief of operations of an army in First War, but not in this.

Our planners were rash in their judgments of the British.

Says Wedemeyer a good man, but he developed an obsession about the Russians until he isn’t rational on the subject. Got into politics.

On number of divisions. In January 1945, when Russians didn’t come forward (was because of the bad weather and terrain; they did their best), Stimson felt we must train ten more divisions. He feared Russians had stopped or would go back. I told him I would oppose his idea to the point of resigning. It took nearly twenty-two months to get a division ready to go
overseas. We would have had to tear up divisions to get cadres. Didn’t see it; Stimson gave way.

Early congressional efforts to rotate troops bad. Had to rob divisions to provide fighters in Europe. Would have ruined divisions.

He said he went to see Pershing often after the war began, but didn’t get much from him. Often he didn’t grasp what was being said. Went to see him once before leaving for a round-the-world trip. Was gone thirty-five days, went thousands of miles. When he went back to see Pershing, the latter said, “You don’t come to see me anymore.” Marshall explained where he had been. Pershing’s brain didn’t take it in; said, “You don’t come to see me any more.” Says O’Laughlin kept alive the notion that Pershing was giving him ideas. Marshall also went to see Craig at Walter Reed. Great drain on his time and energy. Pershing did get in on the command for Marshall deal.

Marshall spoke of odd mistakes they made. Said they figured that they would have to replace airmen in Pacific twice as fast as ground crews. Was other way around. Ground crews worked night and day, couldn’t safeguard them from mosquitoes at night. They were attracted by lights. Ground crews so full of atabrine they weren’t much use after a while; had to be brought back.

Our people always ready to find Albion perfidious. Once, when I protested at the planners’ request something in Portal’s memo, he said the thing you are protesting was taken from your own memo to keep you people from protesting. I had to admit we were caught. I said anything you say I will agree to; you have caught us out.

King was perpetually quarrelsome, ready to fuss with them or us. I tried to keep on a warm basis with Portal. He thinks that the British were not as suspicious of us as we of them. This may not be a compliment, because they may have just felt we weren’t smart enough to cause them trouble.

Roosevelt had a habit of tossing out new operations. I called it his cigarette lighter gesture. (Marshall made an expansive move of his hands.)

Politics in North African operation. When I went in to see Roosevelt and told him about TORCH, he held up his hands in an attitude of prayer (Marshall made motions) and said, “Please make it before Election Day.” However, when I found we had to have more time and it came afterwards, he never said a word; he was very courageous. Steve Early, who was told only an hour before the attack, blew up about it because it came after the elections.

Interesting story about TORCH. About the first of November 1942, a late call came to my room. Mrs. Marshall knew that they were not supposed to bother me late unless it was important. She came into the room and said, “Are you going to let whatever it is make you miss your hunting in the
morning with Bradley?” I said, “Yes.” She said, “You always let some little thing keep you from having some recreation.” I didn’t say anything, but it had to do with preparations for TORCH—was Giraud’s request to change from North Africa to France. On the day of the landing, Mrs. Marshall was at a ball game (she has the story in Together) and the announcement was made of the landings. When she came home, she woke me up and asked me if I knew about the landings. I said, “Yes.” She thought a minute and said, “Was that the little thing that kept you from hunting?” I said, “Yes.”

(Something I left out earlier. Congress later gave me anything I wanted. Once gave me $25 millions and later $100 millions to be spent as I wanted without account. Roosevelt angry because they wouldn’t give him any.)

Reversal on BOLERO in 1942 due in part to navy construction people. Not to King, but Yards and Construction people. They threw water on everything concerning taking army to Europe. I said they wanted a horse and buggy army.

For a long while I had to fight with what I could get. Finally, I had Congress with me and could demand. (Must be clear that none of this is said in an egotistic way. Often he deprecates the use of “I” and his role.)

Not always easy. I remember being the subject of a censorious resolution when I made a speech and said, “War had been possible; now it was probable.”

I think I told you about having trouble getting money we needed. Finally made a biennial report to use as a lever. Put it out too soon, so didn’t give press time to read; put it out in five days so we could have it out by July 1st. Made many congressmen mad. Rayburn angry at me then; later and now my good friend. President had meeting at White House and let me do the talking. (This was unusual.) President had his troubles with the Bible Belt (the Middle West).

Mediterranean decision made because of aversion to long period of waiting. We lacked stuff for ROUNDUP. It was something we could do at an early date. British willing to act there.

When Roosevelt heard that Montgomery was going to attack on October 26, he said stop it; the British always get licked. Didn’t want it to spoil effect of TORCH (or perhaps hurt the election chances—Marshall didn’t say).

A most dramatic thing of July 1942 meeting in London [December 1941 Arcadia Conference in Washington (see pp. 357–58)] was the reaction to my speech favoring unity of command. When I finished, the session was at an end. A British admiral rushed up and put his arm around me. Then Dill came along and threw his arms around me. And then still a third. Prime Minister not in agreement, so Hopkins told him to get me over. He was in bed, so I stood up over him. He was opposed to army
controlling navy. Said a ship a very special thing; difficult to have it under ground commander. I told him I wasn’t interested in Drake or Frobisher, but in a united front against an enemy which was fighting furiously. Churchill went into bathroom and came out in a while clad only in a towel. Gloomy faced. Later discussed it with his people. Portal wanted to be free of navy; Pound not opposed to unity; Churchill finally agreed to unity of command. Disadvantage of command set up in East was that it ran from Burma to New Guinea. I favored British commander because he was there. Was never able to cover the whole thing.

In my speech I said I hadn’t consulted my people. The navy made no opposition. Meant they were with me. Never any dispute on unity of command after this. I wanted to give them everything in Hawaii and Alaska.

Initially, we were sitting without an air chief of staff. McIntyre at White House was a good friend of mine. Once, when the president was drawing up a statement about meeting of CCS, there was added a statement “and General Arnold as air chief of staff.” All the action that was ever taken, but after that Arnold made up the trio.

Risks of TORCH. There were one hundred submarines off Gibraltar. Sinking of one troop laden ship would have been terrible. Giraud sent word that if we didn’t postpone for two weeks, there would be disaster. I said go ahead, but would have to call president. (This message from Murphy.)

All of our planners feared that TORCH not only put off ROUNDUP, but would disperse forces.

We were putting in 106,000 on a six hundred mile front. British at first wanted to take Casablanca; then they changed and wanted to go in on the inside only because of heavy surf at Casablanca. I said no. I refused to go inside without having a hold outside. Two great hazards—(1) rough surf at Casablanca and (2) being cut off by Germans through Spain at Gibraltar.

On negotiations with French. I was involved in seeing that de Gaulle was not told until the last. Couldn’t afford to let him mix things up. Giraud came in and didn’t turn out the way we expected. I liked Giraud and knew him pretty well.

Juin did fine in Italy. I gave him a medal which only the president could give when I went to Italy, and then explained why I did it.

In the French deal, Bill Bullitt, a Philadelphia lawyer who got himself made a major, was not very profitable for us.

Had difficulties with Eugene Meyer early on. I said, “my good God.” He was angry for a time and then became a good friend. (Check her text. I had a feeling she wouldn’t take down the expletive.)

Said yes to my question that he had view at times that British never intended to do cross-Channel. Said was absolutely correct that prime
Says it is not true that they picked cross-Channel because it was best place to use the large force which was trained. Didn't know Brooke said it.

On Matloff's statement that Churchill was profoundly skeptical of the ability of American troops to compete with the Germans in ground warfare on a massive scale, the general said this was the basis of their whole opposition. He said that talk of going to the Pacific was "bluff on my part" but not on the part of King.

He said he never had any idea of trying to beat Russians to Central Europe with ROUNDUP. This was when he said the whole business was an obsession on the part of Wedemeyer.

He says he had no recollection of the Continent operation ever having been planned on in and out basis; always was intended as in and stay by the U.S. people.

Says he doesn't remember about the conflict of dates between time he told Ike about his appointment as commander and idea that Marshall was to command. Says never was any intention that he would command TORCH.

Says he doesn't remember postponing decision on TORCH until September. May be something with his name on it. Does remember Admiral (thinks it was Cooke) saying that the decision to go would be over his dead body. I said then you are dead now.

Says he accepted title Strategic Service Committee in order to get the thing set up.