

# TAPE 6

*Recorded April 5, 1957*

*General Bell seems to have been a very fine person. Any comments about your service with him?*

General Bell. My first contact with him, as I have explained, was at Leavenworth, where I really didn't know him personally, but he took some action in connection with my affairs. Then later on in the Philippines, when I was left in command of the larger portion of troops—I say “in command,” it was all done indirectly, of course. Now when I came back from the Philippines [July 13, 1916] and he made me his aide in order to retain my services in connection with the two training camps for the West Coast, I came to know him very much better. But when I was first made his aide, I was not with him at all until the close of the camp at Fort Douglas, Utah, which was in the early fall [August 21–September 16, 1916].

General Bell was a very remarkable character. As a fighter I don't think he had many equals. He held the Medal of Honor and should have been awarded it on several occasions. He was attacked by many older officers, particularly when he won preferment and promotion over their heads, but actually he was so far ahead of them in ability that there was no question about it. He fortunately came into the service under the present General MacArthur's father, General Arthur MacArthur, who admired him greatly and who recommended him for the promotions, first as a general officer in the Volunteers and then as a general officer in the Regular Army when he was in his early forties (that is, General Bell).

As I say, he was a superb fighter. In time he came to tell me, through my questioning, of a number of performances which were always referred to as being foolish, crazy things, and actually they were very, very clever, as well as tremendously courageous. He won his great fame through the command of a regiment which was organized in the Philippines by General Bell, and the men were selected from the National Guard volunteers, and it was a superb regiment of all selected men admirably suited for the sort of campaign that developed. I had great admiration for General Bell's fighting qualities and his aggressive leadership. I don't think that he was a success as chief of staff [April 1906–April 1910]. He tried to handle things too much by personal association and by letters. He was having a hard battle with General Ainsworth, which was the preliminary to the final battle which took place between General Wood

and General Ainsworth. All of General Bell's efforts to modernize the army were being ruthlessly attacked by those who were opposed to anything of that sort, largely because they didn't want to do it themselves personally.

When I met General Bell, he had already been chief of staff. He had already been in command in the Philippines. He had returned from the Philippines and had been given the command out on the West Coast with his headquarters at San Francisco. His trouble (if I could so characterize it at this time) was that he was too apt to engage in lengthy speeches. He had made a very successful one on one occasion, at the request of Secretary of War Taft to take his (Taft's) place on a train trip they were going on when Taft had to make a speech at some point, and General Bell went out and made a top-line speech. The trouble was that started him on making speeches and he overdid it very badly, but nobody could tell him so. When I became his aide—I was getting pretty well along in years for that sort of duty—with some hesitation, but nevertheless with a firm intention, I made it plain that I thought he was making a great mistake in making these speeches. Mrs. Bell was shocked that I, a comparative unknown, should dare to make such a criticism of General Bell. But I was convinced that that was the trouble and I thought that was my duty to tell him, and if he didn't like that he could relieve me as an aide, because I wasn't after that kind of a job. But we got along. Mrs. Bell didn't like me at all at first and afterwards we became devoted friends.

In our San Francisco associations, it was the opening moves which finally led up to the declaration of war, and we were in San Francisco when Wilson made his famous speech, whereupon General Bell was ordered to the East Coast to replace General Wood, who was relieved from command of the Eastern Department and assigned to the command of a former fraction of it with headquarters at Charleston, South Carolina.

I have already described, I think, my arrival in Governors Island and General Bell's placing me in a pretty strenuous position while he went off to the hospital. I remember then I would go up to the hospital every other day to see him. It was quite a long drive and took quite a lot of time. And the visit there always took time because he was intensely interested in everything that was going on, and I tried to tell him exactly what it was and particularly to tell him of the displeasure of his senior staff officers with the fact that I was doing several things.

One thing at this time was very interesting. His other aide [Captain John B. Murphy] had taken all of the supply estimates for these training camps of twenty-five hundred candidates each and boiled it down until he had it on the basis of one hundred men, everything down to the sheets of paper you had to have, pads, pencils, mattresses, pillows, kitchen stoves, everything was included in it. Ordnance, rifles, uniforms—nothing was left out. Well, it was really a very valuable work. When we came into this

Eastern Department, we were quite certain that the thing wasn't heading up right, because there were so many complaints coming in right away about the lack of this and the lack of that. When we went to ask the staff about it, these older staff officers, these senior colonels, they just turned us down as not knowing anything about the thing. So I had the aide with the list visit each camp, see what they had and then telegraph me what was lacking. They could calculate it on this business of what was needed for a hundred men. We found the lacks were very, very serious.

The first one that required immediate attention was there was not enough blankets, not enough mattresses, and not enough pillows for the candidates that arrived up at Plattsburgh where there were two camps, twenty-five hundred each, which lacked all of these things to keep a man warm. He had no pillow on his bunk, many of the bunks had no mattresses, and they all lacked the necessary number of blankets. Well, by multiplying it out on this list we had, he could telegraph me exactly how many to send. Then we began to experience the first knowledge of what the war shortages were really going to be, which started in this very small way. We found we couldn't get the blankets. First the Quartermaster didn't have them, and next the shops in New York didn't have them, and we were getting mattresses and blankets and pillows from as far west as Chicago in order to provide for this first camp up at Plattsburgh. There were camps all scattered about the country. Maybe they were all similarly short, but we didn't know at the time. So these telegrams would come in with great frequency, about an hour apart, really, telling of these new lacks and these particularly serious lacks which affected their health in that they couldn't keep warm and would stir up a terrific reaction.

I found that trying to get these things, I wasn't making much headway with the staff. And I directed that everything be sent by express, and that raised a racket right away because that would be very expensive. Well, I didn't think the expense was going to mean so much here with these men freezing up there. The reaction, the public reaction, was going to be very severe. And the men would probably all get colds and things of that sort, and pneumonia. So I would direct these things be sent by express. Then when we couldn't buy them around New York, I had them buying them out in Chicago. And I, as a matter of fact, personally sent out there to locate where we could buy blankets, where we could buy mattresses and buy pillows and things of that sort. Then I would send a note over to the quartermaster, this old colonel, to buy these and ship them by express. Finally, he came over to see me and told me that this was very expensive and he knew what General Bell's orders were, but he wanted to bring to my attention what I was letting the government in for. I tried to make clear to him what he was letting the government in for if he didn't have the proper things there for those men. Finally, he said to me, "Well, you must

understand that we have been here, I, myself, for several years, and we originally supplied these camps with what we thought was necessary. Now you come in with definite amounts of all sorts of things and about every hour you have a new amount. So how can you possibly believe that you are right?"

Well, I pulled him out this list, which was based on a hundred units, and told him that the other aide had the other end of the list and he was visiting each post. Well, he had never seen such a thing and, of course, it was a gold mine of information, and he asked me if he could borrow it. I said, "Well, you can take it over there and type it and then send me back my copy. But that's where this is coming from and we know what we are talking about."

Well, that made quite a change in him right away, because he saw that we really had something he didn't have. He was very much reassured and went ahead from that time on filling the orders that came in over my desk.

You see, I had to give the orders in General Bell's name. I tried to tell him a little of this when I went to the hospital, and he got excited and proposed all sorts of peculiarities to the thing which we couldn't manage. I just didn't answer those and when the time came around, went ahead the way we were doing until we finally got out of our jam, because we had to do this for the camps around near Washington and down in the south and all over the Eastern Department.

This was my introduction to the office there, and along with that, as I have already referred to, came the terrific pressure to be accepted in these camps. Everybody who was anybody, in a sense, was trying to get in, and each of them seemed to feel that political pressure was necessary and I was trying to demonstrate that it wasn't necessary. We'd go at these things just on their face value and without any reaction to pressures. I found myself then up against the ex-President, Mr. Taft, for example, and one of his constituents (maybe it was his son Richard—I think it *was* his son) and others, particularly from the wealthy of New York. J. P. Morgan and Company and offices of that power all seemed to think they could get what they wanted right away just by the stating of their desire. I guess I probably stood this off, stood it off better than General Bell could, because I didn't know them and they didn't know me and I could go right ahead. But it was a very, very strenuous procedure.

As I say, I was using three phones at the time, and I was being seen by everybody that came to the Island, so it was exceedingly hectic and I had to learn how to do business very quickly. I had had this in San Francisco just before we left. As a matter of fact, I had gone ahead on my own and rented office buildings across the street from us, because I could see right away what was coming, and I put a lot of Reserve officers on duty there and we got started for the flood which was about to break.

Now I would like to recite some little thing that happened that always gave me much pleasure afterwards. Before I left San Francisco, I very hurriedly dictated a number of letters to the various people around headquarters, thanking them for their courtesy or whatever it was they had rendered for me, and I did it in about an hour in the late afternoon. And then I remembered the telephone operator, that she had been very efficient, and when I called to get anybody, she'd get them if they were anywhere in San Francisco. She would locate them in the barber shop or wherever it might be. So I dictated the letter to her and told her that I had never experienced such high efficiency from a telephone operator. I had never seen her. Didn't lay eyes on her then. I dictated this letter to her and signed it and then sent it down that afternoon, and then I went home.

Well, a West Coast rain came up that night and it was raining very hard. And I was out at Fort Mason at the foot of Van Ness Avenue, and there was a knock at the door and I went to the door, and here was this little woman. I guess she was about forty-five, fifty, and she was wrapped up in a raincoat. It was a terrible night out, a very hard driving rain. I brought her inside and I discovered that she was the telephone operator. She said she had been there, I don't know how many years, I think maybe, oh, I would say, twenty-five years, and that was the first time anybody had ever thanked her for what she had done. So she came out in the rain to thank me. That made quite an impression on me, and it controlled a great many thanks to people like that in future years in my dealings.

However, when the future years began to come around, after the First World War was over, General Pershing and myself were in San Francisco and staying with the commanding general out at Fort Mason, just next door to where I had been living on this other occasion. The commanding general's wife (and, incidentally, he had married rather late in his career) was a great friend of my sister's back in Pennsylvania, so that threw us together in this momentary time we were there, which, incidentally, was at the time of the death of President Harding. He died in San Francisco, if you'll recall, in the Palace Hotel [August 2, 1923]. I was involved in that very heavily in the arrangements.

So I told at the table this story of the telephone operator which had occurred at the outbreak of the First World War, which was now over. The general's wife was very much interested in it and she said, "Let's go up and call on her." So she and I walked up. I had never seen the woman since that night, never heard of her since that night. We found these two elderly women at the telephone switchboard and, of course, the particular one was very much gratified to have the commanding general's wife call on her and to see me again. But she told me they were in a bad way. There was a new lieutenant in the Signal Corps just come on duty, and he was going to get rid of all the women and that meant that she and her old friend were

going to lose their jobs, she after some twenty-odd years. Well, the commanding general's wife was much excited, so we went right back to the house and found the others still at the table, General Pershing and the general talking there. She told this story to the commanding general who immediately issued an order, through his aide, that these women should never be discharged except with his personal approval, and that was to be by voice and not by paper. So then we went back up again and saw them again and assured them that their jobs were secure. That was the end of the story so far as I am concerned. I never heard of her afterwards. But it was always a satisfying memory, that little incident.

However, I left San Francisco that morning after the call on the telephone operator [here Marshall is referring to his 1917 departure] and went directly to Governors Island. General Bell, as I said, came up from Kentucky and just paused long enough to arrange that I should exercise command in his name and then went to this hospital, though no one knew where he had gone. They thought he was off on some trip, though actually he had a developing case of flu. I have already described what was going on.

*1a. How did you come to be picked for the first contingent which went to France?*

The next thing of excitement that occurred was that General Pershing arrived, headed for Europe. I found out that he had asked for my services. He didn't do it personally, but his chief of staff did—his new chief of staff, General Harbord. But when General Pershing found that I was with General Bell, he had them drop the request and, therefore, I didn't go, though I didn't know of it at that time.

*1b. What was your impression of General Pershing on your first meeting with him?*

General Pershing arrived in civilian clothes and straw hat. We put him on the ferryboat at Governors Island at a secluded dock and sent him over to the *Baltic* which he boarded for his trip to Europe [May 28, 1917].

Then I received a telegram that my services were requested by General Sibert, the man who had built the Gatun Dam, the man whose camp I had been required to inspect out in Del Monte, California. He had asked for me to go and I was to report to him. Actually, I didn't find him where they told me to report to him, and he came in on a train later. He had paused long enough to get married, which had mixed up the appointments, and as I had the only desk around the neighborhood, he made my desk, my services, the headquarters for troops just coming in to go to Europe in the first convoy, which was to be the First Division.

They had called on the training camps. I think each camp was to send two hundred candidates, let's say—I don't know whether it was twenty-five or two hundred, but anyway a very small number—and these were to be

the needed second lieutenants for this first unit which had very low officer strength, and we wanted to go with full war strength. All of these lieutenants were directed to report to me at Governors Island, these fine looking young men, the pick (about 2 percent of twenty-five hundred from each selection) and they were perfectly splendid looking men.

I remember the first ten that came in. Every one of them had gotten married the minute they got the note. They came to New York and reported to my desk, and I gave them directions as to when to report back to me because their unit was not sailing yet—and I was going to sail with it—which gave them two or three days of liberty in New York with their brides. Of the ten I lost track of two. The other eight, every one was killed in the First Division. I might say they all had their brides with them when they came to Governors Island.

I was only able to find about three hours of clear time to go to New York, and my purchases and my actions there have always, I don't know whether you would say interested me or have been a satisfaction to me. I first went to the Jaeger store and bought a Jaeger blanket which I still have, which took me through France very warm. It was soft, like silk almost. I bought three suits of Jaeger underwear which almost bankrupt me and two suits of Jaeger pajamas. Both the underwear had a very peculiar history because it began to shrink from very bad washing in France, and finally it would always get to the point where unless they put a big V down there in the shoulders, I would have my chin on my knee cap. These things got so shrunk that I finally had to give them up and couldn't wear them any longer. But it enabled me to go entirely through the First World War without a cold. I think I was about the only one out of two million that didn't cough every morning with a cold.

1c. *Were there any incidents of interest on your trip over in June 1917?*

We got on board the *Tenadores*, and I was in the same stateroom with Lesley McNair, for whom the old War College site is named and who was killed by a bomb in France, and who was wounded on a reconnaissance in Africa before that, and who I had put in command of all the ground troops in the United States, their training and organization, with General Mark Clark as his assistant. Also there was General Frank McCoy, who I got on a more intimate basis of acquaintance with at that time. He had just come out of Mexico as attaché, and General Pershing had sent for him. So he was on this boat, going over to join General Pershing who was a ship or two ahead of us.

The men, we found, had been given their arms on going to the train. They were about 20 percent of the original regiment. The rest of the regiment had been taken to form new regiments. So all but 20 percent of these regiments were recruits and it was quite a messed-up affair when they

arrived in Hoboken. They had no knowledge of how to drill, no knowledge of how to handle their rifles, and they were twenty percent of the strength of the companies. Together with the fact that all the men loading the ships seemed to be bull-necked Germans, it wasn't a very encouraging outlook as we loaded at night there into the next morning, and finally got underway on this "secret" departure. We were taken up the Hudson and anchored right off the Grant Monument and visited by excursion boats the two days we remained there.

Finally, we started out and I felt the ship moving [June 14, 1917]. So I thought I would get up and see this affair. It was certainly historic, our troops going to Europe. I got out on deck and it was about half past four in the morning or thereabouts. Anyway, it was just dimly light. We got down the river and anchored, apparently. Anyway, we stopped opposite Governors Island. We had to wait there. I discovered they were waiting because the chain that was being put across the harbor to check the submarine entrance was either being unfastened or fastened, I don't remember which. But I know something occurred there that I never forgot, because it was about as significant an indication of our complete state of unpreparedness as I have ever seen.

I was standing up under the bridge and they had mounted a three-inch gun on a pedestal mount on the forward part of the deck, and these trim-looking naval files under a naval noncom were rigging up the gun. Having dealt with this multitude of recruits in this regiment as we had and their complete ignorance of their weapons or anything, I thought to myself, "Well, thank goodness, there is one thing that's organized, the Navy." Just then the captain called down to this yeoman, or whatever he was, in charge of this detail and said to him in a very strong voice, he said, "Have you your ammunition?" And this fellow in a rather offended voice replied, "No, sir, we haven't any ammunition." Well, I thought, "My God, even the naval part isn't organized here and we are starting off to Europe." It was altogether a terrible exhibition of our paucity of means with which to go to war.

It cost General Pershing, aside from the fact that the men were hard to handle in their lack of training and all, but it made a terrific impression on the French command when they saw these recruits in the First Division, because they had been told that the First Division was a seasoned division of Regular soldiers. Well, you'd have to go around there with a microscope to find a Regular soldier in the First Division—so that the impression that they all got of what General Pershing would have to offer them was colored by this terrific showing of unpreparedness of the troops of the First Division.

We were given as we sailed—in fact, we didn't get to open the things until we had gone to sea or at least gone down the harbor. We discovered that we had units on paper that we had never seen or never heard of. I



remember the trench mortar units, the 37-mm units, and several others. We had never heard of them, and there they were on papers. But there were no weapons and there was no unit. We were organizing on the ocean. We had no knowledge of whether we had any of these weapons on board, and actually, we didn't. It was certainly a demonstration of complete and utter unpreparedness such as I had never dreamt of in my life.

I had found out in the records that the first expedition going to the Philippines before the fall of Manila only had 150 rounds per man and were going seven thousand miles from home, when the battlefield allowance on the wagon trains and other things, and on the soldier and all, was something like 600 rounds. And here they were going to the Philippines with 150.

Now I have just recited the exhibition that we had to give in the First Division in going to France. And I repeat again that this cost General Pershing a great deal because it shook French confidence terribly, as they thought that was the American army, and nothing we could tell them made any impression. We described how we were getting these officers in this six-months course and starting new camps all the time with those officer camps. That made no impression on them. They couldn't conceive of an officer in six months' training. And some of these were only three months' training. Altogether anybody who went through that first affair got a dose of unpreparedness such as he would never forget. I didn't realize then I was going to have one after another and several when I was in responsible position for all this affair, and yet I would have to find some way to crawl out of the difficulties.

*2b. Could you give a description of St. Nazaire at this time?*

The same thing went on when we got to France. By a fortunate coincidence I was the second man ashore. I was just behind General Sibert on our first expedition when we landed at St. Nazaire [June 26, 1917]. When we finally got permission to go ashore that evening, some of the officers, and walk about the town, it was very depressing. They had just gotten the news of the terrible losses on the Somme when the Germans had thrown back this offensive. Every woman seemed to be in mourning, and everyone seemed to be on the verge of tears. The one thing we noticed most of all was there was no enthusiasm at all over our arrival. The Canadians had come and were going to settle the war in a month or two and nothing happened. Now the Americans had come and were going to settle the war right off and nothing happened. The whole thing was a very depressing affair.

The surroundings, everything about it, our first taste of the effect of war, particularly on the rear areas, left a lasting impression on my mind and a deep sympathy for the French and, I think, an understanding such

as other officers in high staff positions had not gone through that affair did not comprehend, and were rather intolerant of the French in some of their peculiarities, which were not peculiarities to the French, but they were to us. I might say that everything in the way of large war measures were a peculiarity to us.

As long as I am on the trail going to France, I might continue with that. On the ship, of course, the submarine war was at its worst. I think they were sinking a hundred thousand or a million tons a month—something like that. I think it was a million tons. The ocean was just full of German submarines and they didn't have the proper protective measures at that time, so it was a perilous trip.

We had a cruiser leading us, the *Kearsarge*, and two others as the wings of the convoy. Finally, one night the ships opened fire on a supposed approaching torpedo, which had everybody very much stirred up. I wrote in the War Diary about this. Then I wrote in the War Diary the next day that they determined it was a porpoise and not a torpedo. Then I found that this had been radioed home from the ships and had stirred up a grand to-do in the United States. So when we pulled into St. Nazaire, the place was full of rumors from the United States side on what had happened to us and what was happening to the other convoys. One of them right after that was struck by a torpedo, which had troops on it, and that, of course, stirred up a grand to-do. Fortunately, they didn't have any major troop sinkings during the war, though they had tremendous sinkings of cargo boats. I think that was the principal happening on the ship going over.

One thing was we were trying to study up what we were in for, and we found that there were practically no textbooks of any kind on this trench warfare that we could get our hands on. Finally, one Englishman on board—I think he was an attaché—he had something they had printed at the last minute and everybody wanted that at once. It was entirely on trench warfare, which later became the great argument between the French and General Pershing because he didn't want to specialize in trench warfare. He wanted to get into the warfare of maneuver. The French felt, of course, that he, not knowing anything about the situation at the front, was hazarding something that there was no chance of putting into effect.

The same thing came up in regard to target practice. They had only short range target practice, and I had to arrange the target ranges for this purpose. There were no long-range target fields that I could get my hands on. They didn't have big reservations like we do. They had a much more economical and, I thought, fine arrangement whereby you could take over an area for maneuvers by certain advice and arrangement through the political set-up.

*2a. Were things confused at St. Nazaire and at Gondrecourt at this time?*

When we got to St. Nazaire, as I say, there was a state of considerable confusion. But the first thing that happened to us was they began to taking men away from the First Division, because General Pershing's staff had gone over there with fifty men, and I understood that they said in the United States that that was all they needed. But he had to get men for all the various things and setting up offices and all, and the only place where he could get them was the First Division. The only place he could get additional officers was the First Division.

Now I am very hazy on the figures, but they told him, I think the first that forty men was sufficient, actually fifty, and actually at GHQ down at Chaumont it was something like two thousand officers or maybe more. There were similar other groups at other places scattered over France. Now they were trying to start out with forty, so they took them from the First Division until the First Division was literally stripped of all officers. They took the men. They were doing port service in England and all up and down the coast of France. And the strength of the First Division was getting lower and lower all the time.

*2c. Were you in Paris for the Bastille Day parade in 1917?*

I went up to Paris in time to arrive there for the Bastille Day parade. I remember General McCoy, Frank McCoy, got me my first Sam Browne belt which I wore for many years, longer than I should have, out of sentiment. I finally put this on for the Bastille Day parade. We were only in Paris a few days, when we started out by motorcar for Gondrecourt south of Bar-le-Duc—I have forgotten now how far—and north of Chaumont, which later became the headquarters, and that was north of Langres which became the great school headquarters.

*3. Colonel Marshall was everywhere in these early days. He got many ideas from the French. The 18th French Division was located nearby. Please describe your efforts to get the first units into shape for battle.*

I became very much involved with all these things at the start. And I was also involved in locating the first four divisions to arrive in France. I was just given the job of locating them and seeing what they needed. So I had to figure out what was required in the way of mess halls and bunkhouses and headquarters and hospital buildings and everything of that sort. Nobody advised me. They didn't have time. They just told me to do it.

One of my old friends, a student officer from Leavenworth, John Palmer, who was one of the fine intellectuals of the army, was G-3 at that time and he just sent me a telegram that they could give me no advice—

just go ahead and do what I thought was wise. So I had a pretty large order for a young officer there, and I proceeded to undertake it in as large a way as I could. The only trouble was I got everything fixed up for these four divisions and I didn't realize that nobody fixed up anything for the First Division. So my own division was behind all the others in getting the necessary things. They had to do greater work for themselves. The training program was intense and that made it very hard to conduct the work. I know they ate in the rain and the mud for a month or two under miserable conditions, because they didn't have anything to even put a shelter up for a roof in which to serve the food. Kitchens were out in the weather, and the men were out in the weather, except as to their billets which were largely in barns.

We had all of this to learn. I got a pretty heavy dose of it, because, as I say, I was not only G-3 and then for a time acting chief of staff in the First Division, but I was dealing with this French division whose headquarters was quartered with us, and it was trying to take up our training in trench warfare when we hadn't even been trained in squads left and squads right, and we were trying to get organized in the way of supply and things of that sort. We had two automobiles, I think, for the entire division, and they came from the Marine Corps. This regiment, the Fifth Marines, came in with us and was attached to the First Division at the start, so, of course, it lost its two open Cadillacs and it was a long time before the First Division got any motor cars at all.

It made it very difficult, because the telephones—we had to use the French telephones—and of course they were overloaded right away and were not built for any such service as we inflicted on them or for such tirades as they heard. We called it the “pas fini” service, because that's about all we used to get over the phone. Altogether these various affairs were very instructive and very trying.

The trouble was the GHQ, never having dealt like this before, never having dealt with anything with a mobile division in such a way, except when it was camped down in Texas, imposed demands on us that we couldn't possibly meet. I remember one occasion General Pershing was suddenly coming up with Joffre for a review of the division, and the secretary of the General Staff, who happened to be General McCoy, who was a colonel then, called me up and said General Pershing and Marshal Joffre would be there at eight o'clock in the morning and to have a review of the division. General Pershing sent word that he wanted the division to pass in the shortest possible time.

Well, the division at that time was scattered over a strip of the country about thirty miles long and about twenty miles wide. There were no motor vehicles of any kind. Two units I found—one of them was a Marine unit—had been marching all day to get back to their billets before dark. I

managed to catch them on the road at the end of the march and they had to march all night to get back to the place for this review. I made a guess at that. I didn't have time to go out and look at one, and I had to get orders to all of these various units by horseback any way we could get out to them, and this telephone service, which was abominable, so as to get them all started back, all started in, and they had to march all night. A great many of them had been sent down to this exercise, whatever it was, and they were in the process of marching home, as the Marines were, so they were very much exhausted. But they had to start right back. During the night they got back to this place that I had selected by guesswork. And I got out there and found that it was on a hilltop, but that the ground was so soggy you went in to it up to your ankles every step and some places you couldn't get over. Along with this I had General Pershing's instructions that this was to be a maneuver in the shortest possible time.

So I arranged the division so that the preliminary review took place in one formation with the reviewing officers at one place, and the march-by took place with the reviewing officers at another place. That made it possible for the division to move into review formations from where it was standing without marching around at all. With a large body of troops that saved a lot.

We didn't have the artillery with us then. It was training in the south of France. But we did have a lot of horse vehicles—all the machine guns were hauled by mules, all the 37-mms—and there were a number of horse transports involved in the thing and all the wagon trains we had to get into it. I fixed it so that after presenting the division and going down the front of it, if he wished to, which he did, that all they had to do then was, if I moved the reviewing party to another spot, was to have the division perform what was in effect squads left and march by in review in column of squads in mass formation. That didn't take very long. Well, it took quite a while with this large body of troops. I think there were about eighteen thousand, twenty thousand. I guess the only thing missing was the artillery.

General Pershing was stunned with the rapidity of the affair, because they just marched right by and the thing was over. He turned to me and said, "What is this?" I said, "That's the end of the review, General." General Sibert didn't answer him because he didn't know. I didn't have time to consult him on any of these things, and besides, he was having a very hard time with General Pershing, which later led to his relief.

General Pershing said, "How could they march by this fast?" I said, "Well, they were stationed in position up there and they executed 'squads left' and came down here. The machine gun carts were all in the rear of them and could turn that way and there was no other way to do it. And that was the shortest way that the review could be managed and those were the instructions that I got from the secretary of the General Staff."

Well, General Pershing was in a thoroughly evil humor then. He couldn't do much to me, because I had merely done what they said, and he was taking it out on General Sibert.

[Begin cassette side 2]

He came back in a few days, again on short notice, to see an exercise in trench warfare where they used the short range bombs, not the offensive bombs, and so you can throw them and still, if you could dodge behind the trenches, you could get out of the way. Roosevelt's battalion had just been down there and performed such an operation, which they had worked out themselves—which was the custom for that sort of thing—and was the first one to do it. He was quite a distance off and I called him up by telephone if he could get his men down there to do this for General Pershing. It meant they had to march all night. His enthusiasm was very great. Archie was in this, too. So he and Archie and their outfit came down, this battalion, to put on again this exercise in trench warfare.

I am telling this because it had quite an interesting sequel to it. I'll have to be forgiven for the very personal phase of the thing, because it affected me personally very much. It was a triumph to have anybody ready to do this because as a rule these things, like a trained chorus, took a week or more to organize for, and here we had only during the night and the night was spent in marching. Theodore got down there with his troops. General Pershing came in on the train. General Sibert was late in getting to the train, so I received General Pershing at the train, and General Pershing was furious that General Sibert wasn't there and I didn't know what to say. General Sibert gave me hell for going to the train ahead of him, so altogether I was in very bad odor for trying to do my best under the circumstances.

So we went out to this place where the exercise was to be conducted. There was a trench system out there which the French had dug for us. They called it "Washington Center." Roosevelt was trained on that and the men were familiar with it. So he was ready to go through this exercise and quite thrilled that he was to put this on for General Pershing, and he had gotten his men all thrilled. He knew how to stir up morale all right and he did it very well this time. So when General Pershing got out there, he had his chief of staff, and he had several new staff officers who later occupied very important positions there who had just arrived. This was their first visit to anything of this kind and their first exhibition of anything like this trench affair. The rest of this I might get some of the details wrong, descriptive terms which played quite a part in it, but I will do the best I can. The men went through the exercise. There was a lot of shooting, of course, and a lot of dashing around from trench to trench and a lot of grenade throwing and general hullaballoo, and then it was all over.

Then General Pershing said, "Assemble the officers." So they assembled the officers and he turned to General Sibert and said, "Conduct the critique." Well, General Sibert had not had a chance to even see the exercise, and he started to say two or three things and it didn't go fast enough for General Pershing, so he directed a young officer who was in charge of the exercise with Roosevelt to give some of the critique, and he made a pretty good stab at it, but it still wasn't satisfactory to General Pershing. He just gave everybody hell. He was very severe with General Sibert, very severe, in front of all the officers.

Among other things, he said that we didn't show an awareness of the things and he said you have changed the names of things. You call a dump—which was a supply thing for either supplies but generally ammunition—you have given a new name for dump and you have given a new name for two other things, I've forgotten what they are now, and he generally just scarified us. He didn't give General Sibert a chance to talk at all. Our chief of staff, who had succeeded me, was a permanent colonel, and he had just arrived and he was rather deaf and he hadn't heard all this. And when General Pershing dismissed General Sibert, in a sense, with a word and turned to the chief of staff and began questioning him, he wasn't quite aware of what had happened. He hadn't heard it all. He hadn't been there but about two days. He didn't know what the devil was going on, and he got pushed out of the way in a hurry.

So I decided it was about time for me to make my sacrifice play. While this sounds like much of a personal thing for me to put in here—I do it with apologies—it's the only way I can tell it. But I heard of it many, many times from various officers in the division.

I went up and started to talk to General Pershing, who dismissed the chief of staff rather contemptuously and was going off. I came up to intervene, to intercede, as it were, to explain some of the things. He didn't want to talk to me. He shrugged his shoulders and turned away from me. And I put my hand on his arm and practically forced him to talk. I said, "General Pershing, there's something to be said here, and I think I should say it because I've been here longer." And he stopped and said, "What have you got to say?" "Well," I said, "to start with, we have never received anything from your Headquarters. When I was down there two months ago, as a matter of fact, three months ago, I think, I was told about this Platoon Chiefs' Manual that was coming up. It's never come out yet." He turned to one of these officers and he said, "What about that, So and So?" And So and So said, "Well, General, we've had trouble with the French printers. You know they are very difficult to deal with."

General Pershing turned to me and said, "You know we have our troubles." I said, "Yes, I know you do, General, I know you do. But ours are immediate and every day and have to be solved before night. Now we

never have gotten the Platoon Manual. We have made the best we can of this thing. The only thing you've gotten out was to change the names of the dump and everything and now you are criticizing us for using the names you changed."

And he turned to the chief of staff and said, "How about that, So and So?" And So and So said, "I'll look into it." I said, "You don't have to look into it. It's right here in the orders. It's a fact. It's here. That's the only thing we've gotten from you and now we are being harassed for that." I said, "We've had a very hard time. We've worked very, very hard. The men have had no advantages of any kind and they don't expect any. But," I said, "they ought to get a fair deal at any rate." I was just mad all over. I thought I had gotten in it up to my neck—I might as well not try to float but to splash a little bit.

I've forgotten all that I said, but I had a rather inspired moment. The others were horrified, and General Pershing walked away from me by saying, "Well, you must appreciate the troubles we have." I said, "Yes, again, General, but we have them every day and many a day and we have to solve every one of them by night." Then I left. Then everybody bade me farewell. I had to be relieved. They all came to me really very seriously. General Sibert was very regretful that I had done this, and some of my bosom friends came up to me and said, of course, I was finished and I'd be fired right off. I said, "All I can see is that I may get troop duty instead of staff duty, and certainly that would be a great success."

General Pershing never mentioned this thing to me until years afterwards, and then he recalled it and his comment on me was that I was pretty hot. Well, as a matter of fact, it made quite an impression on me, because instead of ruining me, he sent for me quite frequently. When he would come to the division, he would get me off away from the others and talk to me about the condition of affairs, particularly when he thought the Germans were going to attack us up near Cantigny in order to administer a damaging blow to American morale. So far as I could see, it helped me rather than harmed me. It gave me a key to General Pershing's character which I found held good all the way through. I have never seen a man who could listen to as much criticism, as long as it was constructive criticism and wasn't just being irritable or something of that sort. You could talk to him like he was discussing somebody in the next county and yet you were talking about him personally. It might be about a social thing, certainly about an official thing. You could say what you pleased as long as it was straight, constructive criticism. He did not hold it against you for an instant. I never saw another commander that I could do that with. Their sensitivity clouded them up so it just wouldn't work. I've seen some that I could be very frank with, but I never could be frank to the degree that I could with General Pershing.



I know the members of Congress were so astonished, when he was having his hearings [October–November 1919], that I sat next to him with General Fox Conner on the other side, that I could interrupt him and talk to him and tell him about something and he could turn around and tell them. He had no hesitation at all of receiving suggestions or advice from me or from the others about him. It was one of his great strengths that he could listen to these things. You might get irritated because he didn't do them right away. He always seemed to be very sluggish in finally taking action. But it would appear afterwards that he was just about right as to the timing. The fact that you could talk to him with such frankness meant everything in the world in getting along in such a difficult situation.

Now the remarkable part of this was, I was a comparative stranger to him, because he never called me in to be his aide until after the fighting was over. He called me in to GHQ just about the time of the Soissons fight and put me in the Operations Section under General Fox Conner [June 13–July 12, 1918]. General Eltinge sat in a good bit. He was deputy chief of staff. That was my introduction to GHQ. I left that and went back to the First Army and became chief of operations of the army and later chief of staff of the Eighth Army Corps, and then General Pershing's aide. I've digressed considerably here, but I guess it's all right. That, in a way, is the way we started in France.

The soldiers were immediately inflamed against the YMCA. The poor YMCA couldn't get the people. They had to have a great deal and it had to be sent from the States in large measure, and it seized whoever it could get in France. I remember the son of the ambassador was there and they drew on him to help them there in their YMCA huts, and he immediately stirred up great criticism because they thought he ought to be in the ranks. They were utterly unreasonable about this. But that's the way soldiers go. I found the same thing later on in the Second World War, and I found the same thing when I came in as secretary of defense in the Korean War. They are very quick to get worked up to something that they think is not quite as it should be or is to their disadvantage in particular, of course. This was very pronounced over there with the YMCA. It undertook the contract to do all these various things and was given a certain allowance of tonnage, which I think was something like—I think it was 130 tons a day and it was cut down to 30 tons very shortly after that. But its obligations were not cut down at all.

To show you how these things went, the Red Cross ran a couple of plays which were very good. The Salvation Army put on one play only, beautifully put on, cost them quite a lot of money. And I think the YMCA had to put on 260 or 620, I've forgotten which, and was responsible for all of them and had this reduced tonnage and everything to battle with. It was for the reason of the feelings stirred up by these various organizations, the

Red Cross, the Knights of Columbus, the Salvation Army, one or two others, I believe, that General Pershing made the recommendation which was followed, that there would be only one organization in another case of that kind, and this would be the Red Cross.

Well, I was interested to find, when I came into the presidency of the Red Cross [September 1949], exactly the same reaction against the Red Cross that there had been against the YMCA and for exactly the same reason, because they had undertaken all the obligations and, of course, they had all kinds of difficulties in carrying them out. So they were turned on. And I found when I became president of the Red Cross, I had quite a battle with the reporters who were all violently against the Red Cross, particularly if they had been servicemen, and it was unjustified in the extreme. But it was exactly the same reason that had turned them on the YMCA and favored the Red Cross in the First World War, and the Salvation Army and the Knights of Columbus—they were all the favored fellows. Whoever is put in that position is bound to catch a very bad reaction. Quartermaster generally gets it, Commissary sometimes gets it, the staff at Headquarters always gets it. That's one reason I constantly changed the staff officers and brought staff officers from outside in from overseas into the Pentagon and sent the others, a third at a time, out to the other staffs in the field.

I think I've given a fairly good account of our arrival over there in France and some of the conditions with which we had to contend.

I went up for my first experience in a battle with the Foreign Legion of the Moroccan Division, and I saw them in their fight just west of Verdun, the western Verdun defenses. It was the time of the great attacks in August, August 20th and 21st, I think. The artillery preparation was five days long beforehand, which was considered the greatest artillery preparation in the history of warfare at that time and the greatest concentration of guns. I was with the headquarters of the Moroccan Division. During its advance later on, I managed to get away from headquarters and to follow it up and to have a most interesting day in following through after the fighting in which it received its third citation, which gave it the *Medaille Militaire*. It was the first division to receive that, as I recall, in the history of the French army. I may be off about this.

I am going to jump way back now to a note I see I haven't touched on. It was the training camp at Fort Douglas, Utah. I was taken away from the camp at Monterey and sent out to Fort ...

[Begin reel side 2]

I am now going back to the questions on the period I was with General Bell and the training camps of that period.

3. *What were your reactions then and later to the Plattsburgh experiment?*

I think Plattsburgh had two or three sides to it. One was the political significance when the president, as it were, was opposed to all preparations in order to preserve a neutral front and General Wood's and Theodore Roosevelt's actions in order to stir up preparations. Of course, Plattsburgh was the answer to this. Of its kind, it was inspirational and had a great effect on the men that were in it—affected all their later lives, as a matter of fact. It did a wonderful job in a very brief time. It was all we had to reach for. Under the circumstances, a very, very fine job was done.

As to its effects, it rose up later to make things very difficult for me in the preparations for World War II. It was the best we could do for World War I under the circumstances, with the president's attitude, with no money from Congress, with the general staff cut down to sixteen. I believe that was the pressure of the chairman of the military committee to get everybody that had any experience in Washington out of Washington, to get rid of the staff. We run an army without any staff, of course. The fact that you had two or three thousand on the same staff later on was no proof you should have had more than sixteen at that time. There were terrible things that were done because of political twists. I suppose they always will be done.

So I had quite a difficult time at the start of World War II, because I was determined that we would train our officers thoroughly. Presumably, we were going to have time to do it, and I intended to do it. Of course, we started off with a great shortage. Until the first reserve officers had had about a year's experience, they were not successful, really, as teachers of an intense course of training. They didn't know assuredly enough themselves—fine men and all, but not enough of that. So it was quite a period before we had practically anybody to conduct this training, because the Regular Army was now scattered so thinly that people weren't available.

I was opposed to the inception of the draft as early as it went into effect—violently in favor of it—but I wanted the thing to be approached in a little better ordered way. I was told that politically it was essential to go right ahead with it at top speed, that otherwise I would lose it. The trouble with that was we didn't have instructors, and I remember finding the now head of the Federal Reserve Board and then president of the Stock Exchange [William McChesney Martin, Jr.], who had been drafted in one of these earliest drafts, and I found him being instructed by a corporal who had only been a corporal a month and who had been in the army thirteen years and never even made the grade of corporal. Well, of course, his instruction was an absurdity so far as the quality of the man he was trying to instruct. That was our trouble all around.

Now the pressure was terrific to increase the size of the early training camps, particularly because of what we had done in the First World War,

and the fact that Australia was doing it again at the present time. The whole staff combined were violently opposed to this because we didn't have the instructor materiel and we wanted to make a much slower start and work up to it. The others maintained that there was not time for that and public opinion demanded it, and I had a very difficult fight.

When Mr. Stimson became secretary of war, before he came to his first office, I went to Long Island to see him and that was the first thing he talked to me about, and he was interrupted twice during the talk by telephone messages from previous Plattsburgh Camp men. Grenville Clark was being one of the leaders who wanted him to change things instantly the minute he got in position as secretary of war. When he came down to Washington, he was still of that temper and the new under secretary of war [Robert P. Patterson] was a Plattsburgh graduate and was now a judge and has since died in an airplane crash. The whole set-up then was to restore the Plattsburgh movement immediately and in quantity. Everybody in the staff was opposed to it because we knew perfectly well we didn't have the people to conduct the training, and I was determined that we were going to do this thoroughly and it had to be thoroughly for the kind of war we were going to fight. We had to turn out trained divisions that could fight their first battle—not a learning battle, but a battle to the death—which they later did with great triumph at the time of Patton's and the First Army's moves in Northern France, and the army that moved up about May 14th in Italy with these new divisions, the first of the new divisions to get in the war. I'll talk about them more later on because it's something that's been overlooked, and I think it was a very wonderful exhibition.

So I had a very difficult time. Here was the new secretary of war, a man I greatly respected, who had asked me to go with him to the Philippines in order to make me a brigadier general of Philippine Scouts or constabulary or something of that sort, and I declined to go [December 1927]. I wanted to get away from staff duty. I had the greatest respect for him, and yet he was obsessed with this. He was a Plattsburgh man and there wasn't any question about the great benefit of the camps at the time of the First World War. But this was a totally different situation and I was determined that we were not going to get into that. This was going to be a thoroughly done thing. We succeeded, but we had to go very slowly. I had difficulties in my own staff where I tried to give a little in order that the thread wouldn't break. They didn't want to give a darned inch. I would have to make a slight concession, as I say, in order to keep the thread from breaking, but they were violently opposed to it.

There wasn't anybody on the staff in favor of this, and they were traveling all over the country because we had gotten into a minor mobilization right away when we tried to bring five divisions of the army, the only existing divisions, together, and they varied from about 60 percent com-

plete (one) down to about 10 percent complete. They were just little sketchy things scattered all over the country. You'd find one company belonging to a division out in Seattle or thereabouts, and the other companies here in the East, and altogether it was just a ridiculous setup for an army. That's what I had to dig it out of to get ready to organize this army for the Second World War.

So I was determined not to be pushed into this, and it was a very difficult thing with both the secretary and under secretary, splendid men, both of them ex-Plattsburgh men and strongly in favor of it, and the ex-Plattsburgh leaders, Grenville Clark and the others, holding up Australia to us as an example. Well, I won't go into what happened to Australia, but we had a very difficult time. Fortunately, I had an absolutely united staff on this. They were all together very fine men. We were doing the best we could. It finally got to a showdown and this was one of the few times—I think there was only one other time I did this—but it looked like it was a lost cause. I told the secretary that if that was the case, I would resign as chief of staff and he'd get somebody else. I think I got a little sarcastic and said, "You get a Plattsburgh man and run it to your own satisfaction." Well, he didn't want to have that happen, and I didn't want that to happen either, and we finally got compromised around and began to get the classes started.

Next thing, we didn't have the textbooks. I've explained once, I think, how I managed to get that done by holding Leavenworth instructors over for a period and putting them into the preparation of, I think it was fifty-two textbooks, and doing the same with a certain number that I held down at the War College of the ex-instructors, and when I suppressed the school in its ordinary routine. But one way or another, we were gradually getting this thing out of the kinks. But it was a very difficult time and a very tortuous time, and one in which I was treading on very delicate ground.

I didn't have the confidence of the president. I don't mean I lacked his entire confidence, but he didn't know me. He had made me on the recommendations of other people and now, with all of this coming up and they were coming to see him, even one of my—well, I better not get into names here—very high government official who was seeing the president, and they told me this—he was having great influence on him—he has a very, very high position in this country and I think I did a very wise thing, but it was a very difficult thing to do. I made his acquaintance and I won him over, not by arguing about that at all. I did not even mention it. I won his respect. He thought I knew what I was doing and after that he was advising the president to follow my advice, and he remained my supporter for many years.

All of this was the struggle which was the back kick on a very fine thing, the Plattsburgh camps. Our great struggle, as I say, was to find instructors.

Everybody was on a job. A tremendous expansion was underway and that was coming much faster than I wanted it, and, as I say, I couldn't slow it down because they told me I would find the Selective Service Act—the "draft act" as they called it—revoked if I in any way delayed its procedure. The divisions were organized way ahead of the rate I wanted them to be organized.

*4. Any comments on the army of the 1916 period and its preparation for warfare?*

Most of all these things occurred in 1916. That was when I was having some of my greatest problems, my most instructive problems, my most difficult problems, and my broadest experience preliminary to the actual going to France.

*5. Any comment on the tour at Governors Island?*

I have no particular comment on Governors Island except for my own experiences there, which I have already described.

*6. When did you first begin to feel that war with Germany was inevitable?*

When it comes to the question was war with Germany inevitable, I didn't get into that. I was so busy with the army itself and the national defense, you might call it, that I didn't cogitate much over the political significance of things, and whatever momentary opinion I had at the time, I couldn't put into words at the present time. But I was so intense on the thing I was doing, that I wasn't going off and trying to advise the president and the American public how to handle their international diplomatic troubles. I knew if they went to Europe what they had to have, and I was prepared to try to give that to the best of my ability.

*7. Did you feel that we should have given up neutrality earlier?*

These various questions here, 5, 6, and 7, on the neutrality and whether we should have first gone to war and all, I won't go into at all because I didn't have in my own mind a very strong stand in regard to them. I did have a strong stand in regard to Mr. Wilson's neutrality program. Neutrality, yes, if that's what he wanted. But to prevent us from making any measures at all to get ready was terrible. He didn't have any comprehension of what a pathetic—that isn't the real word, it goes way beyond "pathetic"—situation we were involved in. Only time can cure that, and if you've lost the time you never can get it back. My only observations in regard to that, which would refer to Question 7, is that we could have gone ahead and done these things and still have been neutral. But we would have been treated with greater respect.

8. *In the 1939–41 period, did you have the feeling that you were seeing 1915–1916 all over again?*

In 1939–1941 I saw very much reflections of the things of '15–'16 all over again. In fact, in some ways very little occurred that didn't seem to me was a repetition, but what disturbed me most of all was to find the army, the War Department, and the country in the same shape again. In the same shape again! I was getting rather hardened to coming in when everything had gone to pot and there was nothing you could get your hands on, and darned if I didn't find the same thing when I came into the Korean War. There wasn't anything. We had a terrible time getting ourselves together.

On the heading "World War I," questions and subquestions to my first contingent to France and General Pershing and his first appearance, and points of interest on the trip over, I've already referred to all that. Question 2, the American landing at St. Nazaire, I've covered that. I have answered the question about being in Paris, not for the 4th of July Parade, but for the Bastille Day parade, I think. I have also described St. Nazaire at that time. Question 3 I've pretty largely answered.

4. *American units moved into the line near Luneville at Sommervilliers in November 1917. Shortly thereafter they suffered their first casualties. Colonel Marshall was directed to report on the attack. He also attended the funeral of the three men near Bathelemont. Any comment on this?*

Question 4: I was starting out to inspect the American battalions that were included in French regiments in the line in that Luneville sector, and I was leaving at four in the morning. The French division commander [Paul E. J. Bordeaux] was very sensitive to having any American interference possible with his control, and he didn't want me to go out. When he found that I was going out that morning, he had my car stopped at his headquarters and I had to wait until he came out. Then he told me "les premiers Americains sont tues"—the first Americans have been killed. That was the first notice we had of the deaths of these men and the capture of fourteen, although that hadn't yet been reported. So we went out and he went, of course, to the brigade commander's headquarters, and that was a loss of time which I didn't like. But that was the formality and they always went through it and then he went from there to the French regimental commander's headquarters in which these battalions were scattered. And that was a loss of time. However, just as we were leaving there, the adjutant of the regiment, a captain, ran after us down the field and said there had been a raid. They had proof positive that there had been a raid, because the Germans had announced the capture of North Americans north of the Rhine-Marne Canal, so we knew we had been raided. But at that time they didn't know it.

We went on up and came to the headquarters of the battalion commander which was in a stone quarry, as I recall, and he didn't know there had been a raid then. There had been a heavy artillery bombardment, but he wasn't aware of the fact there'd been a raid. He didn't go forward with me, incidentally. I didn't ask him to, didn't say anything about it. He just didn't go. So I started forward with Jean Hugo, who was my interpreter and liaison officer and a very fine fellow, and the French general. I had to go the way he went. But we went up this communications trench that had been splattered with fire all the way up—beautiful target shooting—and then we got into this deep front line trench. In those days the front line trenches were very deep and the principal dugouts were under the frontline parapets. Later on, that was changed, of course. The principal line was in the rear of this first line. Then, it was not only in the first line but under the parapet of the first line—large dugouts that would hold fifteen, twenty men.

We met a French officer who had been assigned to this battalion which had just gone in the night before, and the French had left a few officers there to help them. He told us there had been a raid and there had been Americans killed, and he thought Americans captured, but he didn't know. The battalion commander was still under the impression that there hadn't been a raid, and we told him to go on back and tell the battalion commander. Then we went forward till we came to a place where the trench was caved in. I remember climbing up on top of the trench. Everything was very quiet. No Man's Land was almost a half mile wide there and I got up on top, and here down below me, just a little to my right front, was the blasted gap in the wire which was about sixty yards wide there, the white tape to guide the raiding party right through the wire leading up to the front trench. Here was the scene of the raid, no question about it now. We had a hard time to get up to the part of the trench where this tape came in and where the defenders had been surprised. We went down into this dugout where there was quite a bit of blood about, where some had been killed or wounded, and then we came up and found the dead on the ground and the wounded had gone back.

There were quite a few wounded. I say quite a few; it was something like fourteen captured and eighteen wounded, or something of that sort. Most of the wounded had been wounded by the artillery bombardment. I went back with the general and we met some of the wounded and he questioned them quite a bit. And then Jean Hugo whispered to me that the general was trying to find whether the Americans showed fight. So I interrupted him and said, "General, I understand you are trying to find whether the Americans showed fight or not. I don't think there is any necessity for your questioning that. They'd been surprised and they probably put up a disordered fight. Most of them were trapped in a dugout. But



I don't think that is the thing to investigate. I think it would be very much more to the point if you look into the fact that you forbade the Americans to go beyond the wire in any reconnaissance, and now they are surprised by the assault right through the wire. I think General Pershing is going to be very much interested in that reaction of a French commander to American troops." This went on. I mention this here because it went on to quite a serious matter later on, as I will explain.

The French commander was getting very stiff and I was getting very anxious to get back. I went first to the *triage* or first-line hospital, and there I found these wounded men being treated. But the principal thing I noticed was a large typewriter of a size that'll take a big form. The principal sergeant had this form in the typewriter and was typing away and when I looked to see what it was, it was what was called the sick and wounded report. He had gotten through, I think, one name, maybe two. It was a very lengthy thing and it might be as carefully done as your description for the doctor of your situation in pneumonia or something of that sort. I could see from the number of wounded he had and the progress that he had made on this thing, it was going to take him about all day long to complete that form. So I said, "What the hell are you going to do if you have a battle with a thousand casualties? This is absurd." I said, "Just drop that for the present and get to work on these men." So he was very uncertain about doing this thing that I was so freely ordering. But I bluffed him out of it, and then I took this typewriter and there I wrote the report that's on file regarding the raid. [The November 3, 1917, report is in *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 1:123-25.]

I met right after that, still on the field, a colonel of the Surgeon General's Department, over in France making an inspection. And, of course, as this was the only place where there were men in the field, he came there. He was very anxious to come up there to the hospital where the first wounded were in. I told him then the first thing he might report was to change that sick and wounded report so there was some possibility of getting it out if there was any more than fifty wounded men in a day. It was a ridiculous thing the way it was now, and I had forbidden the man to finish it until he went about his regular duties. He did do that. I think he changed it after he got home. It was an absurdity the way it was arranged. It was all very well for an investigation after the war, but it wasn't at all a practical proposition if you really got into a first-class action.

To go on with this thing—I might as well finish it up while I'm at it. When I got back to headquarters, I wanted to go and see the corps commander. The idea of a captain (I don't think I was yet a major [Marshall had been promoted to major in August 1917]) going to see the corps commander was unheard of. But I was representing the division commander who was a hundred or more kilometers away, so my rank didn't

out any figure with me as far as I could see. My job was to represent him and his interests, and his interests were very heavily involved here. This was the first American action and we had been surprised and prisoners had been taken, and the Germans were advertising it. And we had our first dead and we had our collection of wounded. So I had written my first report of the affair on the typewriter of the sergeant I had displaced in getting the sick and wounded report out, and now I wanted to do another one for General Sibert in explaining the situation in which they were forbidden from going beyond the wire in any reconnaissance, and then were surprised through the wire with this blast of a bangalore torpedo and the rush of the men.

The [French] division commander sent for me, asked me, said he understood that I was going to see the corps commander and he wanted to know what I was going there for. I told him exactly. Well, he said he would prefer that I restrain myself and not do that. He said, "You are a very young officer and this is a very serious matter." I said, "That's the reason I am going there, General. It is a very serious matter and I'm representing the division commander. I have got to consider him and his rank and his position, and the fact that this is the first unit and the first engagement. Just then the corps chief of staff, I think, arrived. He was very much exercised when he found what I was going to do, and he begged me not to embarrass the corps commander at this particular moment. Well, I said, "I'm going to report it to General Sibert and he will report it, of course, to General Pershing."

Meanwhile, a message had come in from General Pershing's headquarters, wanting a report direct from me. Of course, they were still in the business of trying to command minor units. I explained that I would have to go ahead and report to General Sibert and I was going to say this because, I said, "it is a very, very serious matter and I don't have to be a general to see that." I said, "I wish you would tell your corps commander so he can interest himself in it right away, because the order still stands and General Pershing, I know, would want to know about it right away, and General Sibert must know about it right away." We had quite a scene there. I reported this to General Sibert and I reported it to General Pershing.

Then they arranged the funeral of these three men, and I have always been sorry since that they didn't allow them to remain buried right there because that was very historic. This division commander that I had been arguing with and had been so strict with me made a very beautiful talk at their grave which is in this little town, I think, of Bathelemont. It was in the rain, mud. The town was just a crossroad in a manure pile. That's about what it amounted to, and a haystack or two around. The French sent up a battalion of infantry, a troop of cavalry (I don't think they had their horses

though—not certainly at the funeral), some artillery, some engineers, some signal corps. They had every unit of this corps (as I recall) present and they made it quite a significant occasion. The first Americans were buried there.

I took the division commander into a dugout with Jean Hugo and had him repeat his remarks at the grave, and Jean Hugo wrote them down. They are on record in the War Department now. I was questioned the other day from France as to what would be the proper inscription on the monument they were putting up there. I suggested the best thing they could do was this paragraph out of this speech. I think they adopted that. It was their own division commander's speech.

This division commander was transferred to a mission to Greece immediately, and he disappeared from the scene at that time. I was very much gratified when I went to a church service in Paris. I have forgotten for what—it was of military significance and a number of French commanders were there to walk with me to the church. This was when I was secretary of state, and this particular general [Bordeaux] had come up from the provinces to attend the service and came up and spoke to me and was very cordial and very generous in his comments.

[Begin cassette side 3]

When I came over later to attend the United Nations, he communicated with me again. He has since died.

I had another thing that taught me quite a lesson there. We had no transportation and the French had to loan us the trucks, or lorries as the British called them. I don't know what the French called them—I've forgotten that—but they loaned us the trucks. We didn't have enough. The First Battalion hadn't had enough for their battalion headquarters, and in this battalion that was coming up next was also included the regimental headquarters. It was going to require some delicate shuffling to be able to haul them up. So I had to get into a discussion with the French staff about loading of these trucks, what we should put in them. They would come up with this relief and the additional unit of the headquarters, and they would go back with the troops that had had their first experience in the trenches. Well, we agreed on something in principle (*en principe*), and there I learned my lesson which served me well in after dealings, particularly with the French units in the Meuse-Argonne battle and other places.

*En principe*, in my mind, applied to one thing only. To the French it applied to everything. The result was that all the machine gun units were grounded and not loaded on the trucks and didn't get off to Gondrecourt and were left up there without any transportation. We were short in the first place and this thing occurred, and I discovered it all hinged on the translation of the full meaning of *en principe*. So after that whenever a

Frenchman brought up something and would summarize *en principe* so and so, I'd stop him right there. I'd say, "Now you write that out. You write out exactly what you mean." They all got to laughing at me later on. When I had several French corps—three or four French corps in the First Army—and they would send back their chief of staff or somebody to make arrangements, and he would come to the usual French expression *en principe*, and I would say, "Wait a minute, wait a minute. Take a pencil and write out exactly what you are talking about." So I never had any more accidents of that sort, and it was a very valuable lesson.

It also brought up another thing which shows how difficult it is for armies of different nations to work with full harmony, though its their best effort to do so, and that even was the occasion with the British when we thought we spoke the same tongue. But we discovered afterwards that the meaning we gave a word was not all the same in many instances, and we had to be very careful in what we said. The only place I ever got this right was over in China, because when the Communists met with the Nationalists and I sat in as the middle party, they used my translation—of my interpreter—as the guiding rein in this thing, and the thing was translated according to that. It was safer to translate the English to Chinese, together these two, than it was to use either one of the Communists' or Nationalist Chinese record of what was said. They always wanted my English one in order that together they might translate that, so that the significance of each term could be fully understood. I started to refer back to something that occurred of that nature, and I think it was in connection with the British, but my memory has played me false and I have forgotten it already.

5. Bullard took command of the First Division in December 1917. In January 1918, the Division took over the Ansauville sector of the line. Frank Parker and B. B. Buck commanded the brigades. Colonel Fuqua was chief of staff. Colonel Marshall was G-3. Division headquarters was at Mesnil-la-Tour between St. Mihiel and Pont-a-Mousson. Seicheprey was on the right and a lake on the right.

General Sibert was relieved and General Bullard sent up to take command. In your question 5, or statement 5, you say Colonel Fuqua was chief of staff. He was not chief of staff. He did not become chief of staff until practically the end of the Meuse-Argonne battle. He had been under me before that in the G-3 section of the staff, looking after the troop movements and things of that sort.

A very interesting thing took place in my career here. I learnt afterwards that General Bullard, when he came to the division, had been rather tipped off. I had met him before and he had been temporarily in command of a brigade before which I was dealing with when I was acting chief of staff, and he complimented me on the way I was doing it, I remember.

So when he came up from wherever he was to become the new commander of the division—I learnt much later, almost at the end of the war, as a matter of fact—the intention was to make me chief of staff. Campbell King, a very dear friend of mine, was adjutant, who had been temporarily at Chaumont with the General Staff. He had come up there and gone back to his original post as adjutant of the First Division.

When General Bullard came to the division, we were infuriated by the misunderstanding of our situation which culminated with the relief of General Sibert at GHQ. These fellows at GHQ were almost all my close friends and associates at Leavenworth, and most of them had been student officers under me at Leavenworth. They were some of my dear friends, but we were wholly out of sympathy with each other and I felt that they didn't understand what they were doing at all. They had become very severe and they didn't know what they were being severe about. I would explain it just that way. General Pershing was severe, so they modeled their attitude on him. I was so outraged by this that I talked a great deal, and I made a great mistake which held—I learnt the lesson then I never forgot afterwards.

But when General Bullard came to the division, all of us were airing our views and being very vitriolic because it was very difficult what we were trying to do. It was almost impossible and we were bitter. What I did was, I demonstrated to General Bullard I had no business being made chief of staff in that state of mind, and he didn't make me chief of staff. He made Campbell King chief of staff, who was a much more moderate person and didn't get "het up" to the extent I did. I learnt my lesson. Nobody ever told me that, but I could see perfectly well what it was. I agreed with it thoroughly. I never made the mistake, I don't think, again.

I've often commented on how in the world I ever kept my temper through all the vicissitudes which I had to go through, political and otherwise. This was the lesson that I got right there and I never forgot it. I think I delayed myself a great deal. I think I'd have been chief of staff of the division, and I would very quickly have been made brigadier general. As a matter of fact, I wasn't recommended for a brigadier general until in the Meuse-Argonne battle. And while it was approved by the secretary of war, General March never sent it to the Senate for confirmation.

You mention Seicheprey of this description on 5, and that was quite a difficult time because it was down in a hollow and very difficult to defend. We had to build up the trenches, weaving these sticks together in order to hold up the dirt wall to screen us from the view of Mont Sec on which now is a very beautiful monument, and observation stations all over the battle-field, of which I am somewhat in charge as chairman of the Battle Monuments Commission.

I don't care to make any comments about General Sibert and General Bullard.

*5b. Would you give a description of the sector into which the First Division went?*

The best I can say about this section is, we took over a very large section because our division was about twice the size of the French division, and the whole sector was under observation. It was dominated by these heights on the other side and particularly by Mont Sec.

*5c. What was the situation with French troops which you relieved? Many of these units had low morale, didn't they?*

I didn't see much of the French troops that were relieved, as they went out very quickly. They were there for a rest and were very much opposed to our stirring up the sector and making it active in a battle way. We were very proud of it and we were very foolish. Though, as a matter of fact, I suppose with new troops it was rather important that they get that much experience to make them battle worthy.

The French morale at that time was all right. It had suffered, of course, by the Verdun fighting and the terrible losses they had there, and by the reversal along the Somme. It had suffered very much from that. But the great disaster was impending, which came on March 21, 1918, just as we were moving from that sector.

*5d. Were you actually called G-3 at this time?*

I think I was actually called G-3 at this time. We made up the proposal for how the staff should be formed, and I don't remember whether we proposed G-3. I think that was proposed down at Chaumont. Incidentally, that 1, 2, and 3 that you had in the division then, I organized without knowing anything about this thing in the Philippines with this force that I was dropped into a sort of peculiar command of. I didn't have a G-2 much. I had a man who did something like that, but I specifically had a G-1 and specifically a G-3, though I didn't call them that. And it worked like a machine. They were very excellent officers. I know the main thing I used to insist upon, after we got through the tactical deployments, was to see that the troops went into bivouac without halting, that they shouldn't be waiting on the road to find out where they were going to camp, that all should be decided ahead of them and they should come up and be shown where to wheel into line and stack arms and bivouac, which this impromptu staff I had designed—I had organized it accidentally, you might say—always did.

*6. In April 1918, the Division was attacked by the Germans, but the enemy was beaten back. In the middle of the month the First Division went to Montdidier to aid in meeting the German offensive in that area. Colonel Marshall reported to General Debeney—another writer calls this Dubonnet—which is right? In May the Division*

*attacked Cantigny and took heavy casualties. Bullard praised the plans drawn up for the action.*

"Debeney" is the correct name for General Debeney, and I knew him very well because his son was with the French division that had the same headquarters we did. He and I became very close together. He had had one arm shot off and I knew his father for that reason. He commanded the First French Army and I thought he was a very fine man. I met him again when we all moved to the west to fill in. He was given the job of command there. The British Fifth Army was destroyed and the Germans almost broke through. The end of the point of that thing was Montdidier. So I saw General Debeney very often and he was always very nice to me. So far as I could tell, I thought he was a very fine army commander. At least about the Americans—he knew something about them—and whether he admired them or not, he knew about them and could act very intelligently in his handling of them. That came out later when we were in the middle of a counterattack and the end of the German great action.

*6a. Bullard in June recommended that Colonel Marshall be promoted, but the War Department said it was opposed to policy regarding line officers detailed on staff duty.*

The recommendation went through that I be promoted. I had already been advanced on Christmas Day to lieutenant colonel, but when the recommendation came up that I be made colonel, they had already gotten out a rule at Washington that you couldn't promote these men on staff duty until they had served a certain line. Of course, that had been made up for staffs in the United States and not at all for the staffs over there in Europe, and there weren't very many over there. We were mixed up in the fighting right and left, as you can tell by my descriptions, and yet we were barred from promotion. I came into circumstances somewhat similar to that in the next World War, and I knew perfectly well what lines of action to try to take in order to correct it. I was finding very rapid promotions over here in the new divisions being assembled and the big training camps, and over in Africa they were only promoting the men who had been very special in action or wounded. This restriction on my promotion continued until the time of the Meuse-Argonne battle almost a half a year later.

*7. Frye mentions that on July 4, 1918, you attended a party at French corps headquarters and made a speech in French. (This was reported by Hagood.)*

The speech in 7 that you refer to was when I was first sent into the region when the First Division was coming up, and I was ordered to provide the arrangements for the reception of the four divisions that were coming later. One was the Second Division, one was the Forty-second

Division. I've forgotten the other two, but they were all to be scattered around that region. I came into Neufchateau. I was the first American officer to come there. Neufchateau is probably identified better by being southwest a short distance from Domremy, Jeanne d'Arc's home.

Well, anyway, when I came into town, there was very great excitement and the prefect had a luncheon for me that was very hurriedly organized, but it was a very delicious luncheon. All the schools let out and then there was a jam of people around this place where we were having lunch. The sergeant who drove the Marine Cadillac that I had, he was at the table with me. He and I were called out and I was introduced by a very bombastic speech in French (I said a bombastic speech—a very enthusiastic speech—in French) which I couldn't understand but very little of. Then I was introduced and, under the spur of the moment, under the pressure of the moment, I made a speech which was received with tremendous cheers and great enthusiasm, and as far as we could figure out, there wasn't a verb in it. But it went all right. I was always amused at myself when I got involved in this affair there at this time. I've already forgotten the name of the place.

I might mention something about Domremy. I had to go by Domremy very frequently in my trips back and forth through this region and, of course, it always appealed to me because of its historic significance. But what made quite an impression on me was there seemed to be so little change in the town. As far as I could see, it was the same old town it had always been, and Jeanne d'Arc's home—it looked like just all the rest of them. It didn't look like something that had been kept in repairs through the years and all the rest were new in the village. There didn't seem to be anything new and they all looked about alike. And while I was standing in the church next to Jeanne d'Arc's house and looking at this groined ceiling, I commented to my interpreter, whose name was Crocker, of the well known Crocker family up in Massachusetts, the paper mill people, and he had been at the Sorbonne and was drafted as an interpreter and was very good—had him with me. And I asked him what he thought the age of that church was. And his reply was very significant to me. It conveyed years in a way I had never heard before. He looked at it a long time and said, "I think this church was built about as long before Jeanne d'Arc as we are living after Jeanne d'Arc." Well, that was one way to grasp it because Jeanne d'Arc was in the dim and distant past to me and I imagine to all the rest of us.

*7a. At this time, Marshall moved to GHQ under Colonel Fox Conner. "Marshall went through Beauvais a disappointed and bitter man." He tried to get duty with troops but Bullard turned him down. He did agree, however, for him to go to GHQ. Any comment on this? Were you bitter?*

The next part of 7 is a little bit out of place. It speaks of my bitterness



in going through Beauvais, disappointed in not getting duty with troops. I was ordered away from First Division just as it was going into the Soissons fight and just after we had gotten out of quite a fight in the Beauvais sector, as we called it, I think, south of Amiens and north of Beauvais. It seemed to be hopeless. There were very few graduates of the staff college and they were all older than I was. They were given divisions but I wasn't given a division. I was jerked off to Europe before they organized these divisions. When I was made acting chief of staff of the division, I was a captain. The temporary promotions had started in the United States but they hadn't reached to Europe, so I didn't get in on that and these other fellows were made colonels and lieutenant colonels and chiefs of staff of divisions. I was still a captain, lingering over there with the First Division in France—great opportunity to be with a division and get into its experiences, but it was developing into a great blockade of any promotion chances for me until I got this one Christmas. And then I found that there was an order which prevented me from being promoted at all until the time of the Meuse-Argonne battle, and they changed the order or I couldn't have been promoted then, though I was being recommended by General Pershing to be a brigadier general. I think I went in on the first recommendation for general officers succeeding from the St. Mihiel battle on into the Meuse-Argonne battle.

They finally got an order out, signed by the chief of staff at Chaumont, that under no circumstance would I be detailed away from the General Staff. Well, that was the final blow. They had me pinched then. I suffered all the way from lack of promotion in my early days. I had to do a great deal of work as an aide, because if I wasn't an aide, I was merely a lieutenant in a company. That lasted for pretty nearly fifteen years. They couldn't give me these things they wanted to, because I didn't have the rank to take them. So I would always have to operate in the general's name as a lieutenant, and then finally, when I became a captain, it was just when we started to begin the concentration for the First World War and we moved on to Governors Island. I think I got my captaincy at Governors Island, I'm not certain. But it affected my entire career in getting started, because I was held back all the time and having to be an aide all the time, purely for the reasons that the general could use my services as an aide by having me act in his name. I never was an aide as a young officer.

8. Colonel Marshall now came into closer contact with General Pershing. He had first met Pershing at Bell's headquarters in New York in 1917. He next saw him during some training exercises in France. Pershing was strong in his criticisms of the men and Colonel Marshall said he was expecting too much of the men. Pershing later came to discuss plans for the attack on Cantigny in 1918. He had a long discussion with Marshall. Are these statements correct?

You got a question 8 down here about General Pershing. I've told several things about General Pershing. I didn't say to him he was expecting too much of the men. I commented on the fact that he was ordering things from there in the evening that required a twenty mile march in the morning and during the night, and some arrangements none of which could be made. They were losing track of the distances entirely down in Chaumont and we had no motors.

I think I have told enough about this sort of thing of General Pershing at the present time.

*9a. In his new job, Marshall was to work on plans for reducing the St. Mihiel salient. The First Division moved up to the Foret de Compegne. The First and Second divisions were put into the line near Soissons and took heavy losses. Foch became Supreme Commander in July 1918. A firm decision for an American attack was made at St. Mihiel on August 9th. First Army was being organized at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre. Drum was chief of staff. Marshall and Walter Grant joined G-3. I notice that a number of these places were in the area where Patton's troops fought in World War II. Did you revisit any of these places in 1944-45?*

I did not visit any of these fields in '44 and '45.

*9c. What was your view about the establishment of the Supreme Command in 1918? Did recollections of the tardiness in establishing that overall command affect your views in World War II?*

I was not in a position to express myself about the Supreme Command and all that was concerned with it, and what powers the British government would have to resign to the French and the same thing for our government. I knew General Pershing was for unity of command, but it's hard for me to tell when I knew it because I heard so much of it afterwards. Of course, there was tardiness in deciding on a supreme commander. Only a disaster would have brought it to a head because the governments themselves had to give up too much.

That's an extraordinarily difficult thing to do, and it was only through the actions of Churchill that we were able to get adjustments on everything at that time, and also the fact that so much was to be expected from America at the start [of WW II], and also these early arguments with the British staff officers, which now you see reflected in some of their books, was when we had virtually no army in trained existence and they had all the troops.

Of course, that all changed decidedly till we had tremendous numbers of divisions, comparatively speaking, seventy-nine, I think in all, of ground divisions alone and very large numbers of special troops and special brigades, artillery, and tanks, and engineers, and things of that sort, and the Marines in addition and a terrific Air Force in numbers. None of that was available for argument or pressure or anything. It was all problematical.

Nobody had ever dreamt of Patton being able to go over Europe at the rate he did or our troops to go through the line at St. Lô the way they finally fought out in First Army and then virtually surrounded the Germans at the outbreak from the first European entry, the Normandy beachhead. The later moves of the First Army, which was the initial army to move in, were very spectacular. But Patton was moving at such a rate, the attention went to him and he was himself, of course, very dramatic and that focused attention on him.

But some of the First Army's performances there were magnificent, notably in making the Avranches Gap for Patton to go through. That was made by the First Army and then the counterattack that Hitler ordered himself—I've forgot, the Cantain or something like that [Mortain]—counter-attack which Bradley chose to in a sense ignore, to fight off while he was going on with the German Army, and I think that's where General Eisenhower tells afterwards of seeing a large area [i.e., the Falaise Gap] where you could step from body to body. All those things were done by the First Army, and then their eventual move out of the sector and wheel to the left and final battles up on the Belgian border and into the Hindenburg line.

I might tell one thing about General Patton. South of Bar-le-Duc, I guess about thirty miles, was a small town called Gondrecourt. That's where I first went to and was the seat of the First Division schools and corps schools afterwards, officer schools. I lived with a very interesting landlady. She was a very amusing woman; ran a wonderful mess for me, and I had three other fellows in it, one of which was Jean Hugo. We had a very relaxing time in that mess. It saved me from the terrific strain we were going through in our other situations at that time. So Mme Jouatte became very much endeared to me and I to her, I think. I stayed there six months and had a little, tiny room with a sort of Napoleonic-looking bed, and she looked after me in every way she could. When I left there, she kept in touch with me all the time, though I didn't see her again. She wrote to me. First used to write to me each season, winter, summer, fall, and spring. Then she got so she would write twice a year. Her boy had been a prisoner in the woods that I had gone through with the [French] Foreign Legion which recaptured it. I brought some of the things back from that woods, machine guns and things, which I gave to her and which she treasured highly. Then this next war came and, of course, she couldn't write to me after that because she was in the occupied zone.

Finally, Patton's troops drove through there and into the vicinity of Metz. So I sent him a message and told him that I thought Gondrecourt was in his rear zone, that is, the zone he'd be responsible for, and if he got down there on one of his inspections, to look up my dear friend Madame Jouatte, 2 Rue Saussi, and the next I heard of it, he sent me the photographs and a description by a staff officer. Patton arrived there with five thousand

armored troops, two revolvers on, a whole truckload of supplies for Madame Jouatte. The town turned out in fear and trembling. The mayor and town council, whatever they called them, came to him, trembling, and Patton growled at them in his best rough French, "Where is Madame Jouatte?"

Well, they'd never heard of Madame Jouatte. He turned over to her a whole truckload of supplies, enough to last her family a long, long time, and made quite an impression in Gondrecourt of the importance of Madame Jouatte.

I came along while I was secretary of state and was at the United Nations, and on one weekend I went to Metz and went over the northernmost Meuse-Argonne battlefields and came on down through Tours and Gondrecourt. I had my aide go ahead of me in another car and find out if Madame Jouatte was there, but not tell her that I was coming. When I got there, he told me she had moved and that she was at such a place in the main square of the town. So we drove there and Mrs. Marshall didn't get out of the car, and I told her to stay in a second. I wanted to go up and surprise Madame Jouatte. But the square was pretty full of people going to church. The church bells were ringing. It was a peaceful Sunday. But the fact of these two limousines there in the courtyard attracted all their attention. When I got out of them, they all stopped and stared. Madame Jouatte's curiosity had been aroused. She came out of her doorway in an old wrapper and carpet slippers. She wasn't a very dressy old lady anyway, and she looked pretty slack in these clothes. But she was unchanged otherwise. And she came out and I had crossed about half the distance when she looked up and recognized me. And she dashed at me and threw her arms around my neck and kissed me on both cheeks. So I embraced her and I kissed her, and we had a great scene out there with all the people in the square cheering.

Then Mrs. Marshall got out and came out and we went into the house. We'd gotten some things for her at Nancy which Mrs. Marshall gave to her, and a present of something, I have forgotten what, of a waiter or tray or something to go on. I don't remember what it was. But anyway, her excitement was intense and it was a very joyful occasion, and I got great satisfaction out of it, and Mrs. Marshall got particular satisfaction out of it. And as we were driving off—we had to hurry to get back to Paris—Mrs. Marshall began peeling out of her only fur coat. When we had gotten down the street about a block, I said, "What are you doing?" She said, "I am going to give this to Madame Jouatte."

I was sorry afterwards I didn't, but the fact was I didn't have enough money to do that. I went through the war when my responsibilities ran up to eight and a half to almost ten million troops and nine fighting sectors. My salary was \$10,000 a year. I spent all my savings. That didn't meet my bills and I had a very, very hard time all the time I was chief of staff. Then when I was secretary of state, all I got was \$15,000 a year.