

Appendices

APPENDIX I: MARSHALL AND PEARL HARBOR

Shortly after World War II a revisionist interpretation of the origins of the war evolved in which President Roosevelt's whole diplomatic policy in the later 1930s and early 1940s was seen as a great conspiracy to involve the United States in war with Germany. In its most extreme form, Marshall and Stark were described as willing pawns in this grand design. According to this view, the President finally despaired of his ability to get full American backing for aid to the Western Powers against Germany and decided to bring the United States into the war through the back door by goading the Japanese into making an attack. By placing the fleet at Pearl Harbor and refusing to make concessions to Japan, he would entice that country into an assault on Hawaii. An aroused and unified country would demand war and would then accept the conflict with Japan's ally, Germany, that was bound to follow. This took delicate handling as it was necessary to leave the Hawaiian commanders in ignorance of Japan's hostile movements lest they take action that would frighten the enemy away and spoil the plot. As a result President Roosevelt directed his Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff to withhold information and to remain where they could not be found in the last hours before the attack so that there would be no interference with Japan's planned attack. In leaving Pearl Harbor in ignorance of its fate the President took the calculated risk of suffering the complete destruction of the fleet on which he had lavished his attention and on which he had to depend for future aid to Great Britain as well as the protection of American interests in the Pacific. So runs the astounding argument, which also implies that Marshall and Stark would willingly permit the wrecking of an Army garrison and the backbone of the fleet.

In the summer and fall of 1944 the Army and the Navy, at the direction of Congress, conducted secret investigations into the background of Pearl Harbor. The Navy Board found no basis for further action against Admiral Kimmel and indeed implied that he was more sinned against than sinning. When the Navy's report was presented to Admiral King in 1944, he concluded that both Kimmel and Stark had indicated lack of superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and suggested that both men be relegated to positions in which this lack of superior judgment would not result in future error. In view of the fact that Kimmel was retired and Stark had been shifted to London early in 1942, the recommendation had the effect of closing the door to future punishment. After further investigations on certain points in the inquiry, Secretary of Navy James Forrestal confirmed King's recommendation.

The Army Board's findings were handled in a different manner. Inasmuch as Marshall's own actions were included in the investigation, he carefully refrained from any part in selecting members of the board and passing on its findings. "I gave no instructions about the Army inquiry except that there must be no friend of mine on the board."¹

The Army Board held that General Short had been remiss in his duties by failing (a) to place his command in state of readiness in face of a war warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only; (b) to reach or attempt to reach an agreement with Admiral Kimmel for implementing joint Army and Navy plans and agreements; (c) to inform himself of the effectiveness of long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy; and (d) to replace inefficient staff officers. On the basis of testimony, some of which was later seriously challenged and changed, the Board included in its criticisms various officials in Washington. It declared that General Marshall in his relations with the Hawaiian Command had failed (a) to keep General Short fully informed of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation; (b) to send additional instructions to Short when it was clear that he had failed to understand that the warning of November 27 extended beyond the alert against sabotage; (c) to warn Short on the evening of December 6 and the early morning of the 7th of critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan, although there was ample time to have accomplished this; and (d) to investigate the state of readiness of the Hawaiian Command between November 27 and December 7, 1941.²

When the report was completed General Handy warned the Chief of Staff that inasmuch as Marshall was criticized in the findings he should avoid reading it and leave the matter entirely in the hands of the Secretary of War. Stimson ordered additional investigations of points brought out in the testimony and had all the evidence carefully reviewed by the Judge Advocate General. In addition, he read the testimony carefully with the aid of a member of his law firm, who served as a special assistant, Allen Klots, and Harvey Bundy. On finishing his study he wrote a statement in which he concluded that General Short's errors of judgment were of such a nature as to demand his relief from command status and that this was sufficient action to be taken against a conscientious officer with a long record of excellent service. In the matter of General Marshall's responsibility for the failures of the War Department to take proper action in relation to the Hawaiian Command, he took complete exception to the board's findings. He ruled that the shortcomings could not "in any fairness be attributed to the Chief of Staff. On the contrary, throughout this matter, I believe that he acted with his usual great skill, energy, and efficiency."³

The Secretary believed that his lengthy statement, going into the ramifications of the hearings, should be released. The Navy Department held that this was not wise, and the President held that the less said while the war was in progress the better. Stimson therefore prepared a shorter statement, which was issued in December 1944. Before releasing it he showed the text of the longer statement to General Marshall. "And he, the person who has most to lose by the publicity which would come out of it, favored mine as altogether the wisest thing. He was very sorry, he said, that I had been forced out of the longer one which I had drawn . . . by the President's deciding with the Navy. . . ." ⁴

A short time earlier, when the Chief of Staff had been told of the Army Board's report, he discussed the findings with Stimson. "As usual he was so modest that he admitted to me that he thought his usefulness to the Army had been destroyed by this Board's report that had come along," the Secretary wrote in his Diary. "I told him that was nonsense, to forget it. But he was very grateful for the work I had done on it and the fight that I was making for him." ⁵

The full-dress inquiry conducted by a distinguished Joint Committee of Congress, consisting of five senators and five representatives, six of whom were Democrats and four Republicans, presided over by Senator Alben W. Barkley, conducted hearings from mid-November 1945 until the end of May 1946. General Marshall and Admiral Stark found that with President Roosevelt dead, it was inevitable that his subordinates should be caught in the cross fire. To his amazement, the former Chief of Staff discovered that what he had assumed would be an inquiry into his exercise of proper military judgment and the efficient functioning of his staff was marked by attacks on the policy of the former President and that his own personal actions, which he was prepared to defend on military grounds, were to be examined for sinister political implications. "Remember that the investigation was intended to crucify Roosevelt," he told the author in 1956, "not to get me. There was no feeling in the War Department that we had anything to hide."⁶

Some of the more lengthy discussions pertaining to General Marshall's role revolved around the alleged delivery of the thirteen-part message to him on the evening of December 6, the receipt of a genuine "winds" message in the week before Pearl Harbor, and his whereabouts on the evening of December 6 and the morning of December 7.⁷ [The last question has been discussed in Chapter X. The others have been reserved for this appendix.]

The Army Board's grounds for criticizing General Marshall and members of his staff for failure to send information of an impending attack on Pearl Harbor rested in part on the testimony of Colonel Rufus Bratton, a member of the War Department Intelligence Division charged with delivery of PURPLE intercepts to Secretary of State Hull, Secretary Stimson, General Marshall, General Gerow, and General Miles. Bratton declared in 1944 that he had delivered the intercept of the first thirteen parts of the Tokyo message to offices of all individuals on his list on the evening of December 6. In so testifying, he followed a pattern almost universally observed during the investigations by witnesses who had had a set duty to perform. Relying on their memories as to their actions several years earlier, they all tended to describe their normal routine and to say that was what they had done. When pressed, for example, on the details of delivering the intercepts to General Marshall's office, Bratton spoke of handing the locked pouch with MAGIC material to General Smith, Secretary General Staff, with the admonition that it was important to get the information to General Marshall.⁸ When confronted later by Smith's testimony that Smith was not in his office after 10 p.m. on December 6—at a time before Bratton said he began his deliveries—by other officers' statements that they had not received the intercepts that evening, and by the reminder that his own testimony was contradicted by that of his chief assistant, Colonel Carlisle Dusenbury, Bratton assumed that his memory was at fault. He then concluded that Dusenbury had delivered all the intercepts except those to Hull's office, adding that Dusenbury had dropped the intercepts off for General Marshall on his way home to Virginia. The assistant denied delivering intercepts to anyone that evening, saying that Bratton had said that there was no need of delivering the first thirteen parts until the final one came in. Bratton himself later admitted that he did not become concerned, even on the morning of December 7, until a message arrived setting the time for the delivery of the fourteen-part message to Hull.

General Smith in 1958 told the author that, after reviewing the situation, he believed that Bratton or his assistant had delivered a pouch to him either in the afternoon of December 6 or before he went home later that evening.

Since Smith was not one of the officers permitted to read the PURPLE intercepts, he had no knowledge of what was in the locked pouch or its importance and had to depend entirely on the intelligence officer's advice as to the necessity of sending the message out to General Marshall at Fort Myer. He insisted that the officer who had delivered the message had said only that the pouch contained something that was being decoded and was not "all in yet." Smith therefore locked the pouch in the safe for General Marshall to read when all the message had arrived.⁹

Smith's testimony is of interest for the postwar admission that he had received something from the G-2 Division at some time on December 6. Unfortunately he was not certain of the time of receipt or the nature of the message. It could therefore have been either the pilot message or the first thirteen parts. Whatever it was, he did not deliver the message to General Marshall, who became aware of it only after 10 a.m. the following day.

The only points in Bratton's testimony that were corroborated as to his delivery of messages on the evening of December 6 were his statements that he left a copy at the State Department and that he spoke with his superior, the Chief of the Intelligence Division, General Miles, that evening and found that he had seen the message while visiting the Chief of Naval Intelligence. It was Miles's belief that there was no necessity for disturbing General Marshall with the message at that late hour in view of Bratton's statement that the message was incomplete. His lack of any feeling of urgency may have been partly inspired by the attitude of Colonel Bratton. Although Bratton was the expert on Japan in the Intelligence Division and the officer most concerned with impending difficulties with that country, he later conceded that he attached no undue importance to the first thirteen parts on the evening of December 6. No one to whom he talked was impressed by any sense of urgency.¹⁰

The controversy over the receipt of a "winds" message was even more muddled. Tokyo had advised its representatives several days before Pearl Harbor that in the event of a break in diplomatic relations or a serious emergency with the United States, Great Britain, or the Soviet Union, there would be included in regular weather broadcasts a statement or statements concerning "winds" from various directions that would indicate a crisis. There were no indications that the messages would actually mean the immediate outbreak of war or would specify the place or date of attack. In its 1944 inquiry the Army Board had given special weight to the testimony of a naval intelligence expert, Captain Laurence F. Safford, that an authentic execute of the "winds" message had been received several days before Pearl Harbor and that its contents had been shown to various admirals in the Navy Department and were known to several officers in the War Department, including Colonel Otis F. Sadtler, operations officer of the Signal Corps. In his first statement Captain Safford suggested that the message definitely meant war and indicated that it would come at Pearl Harbor. Although he never conceded that he was mistaken about the receipt of the message, he did admit later that nothing in the intercepts specified an attack at Pearl Harbor.

Before the congressional hearings opened in the latter part of 1945, earlier investigations had thrown doubt on the likelihood that a genuine "winds execute message" had been received. It was considered significant that Captain Safford, the one Navy officer who never ceased to maintain that the message had arrived and that war would come on December 6 or December 7, had left his office while the first parts of the Japanese message were coming in on

the afternoon of December 6 and did not come to his office at all the following day.¹¹ One of the few Army witnesses to testify that he had heard of the receipt of the "winds message" by the Navy, Colonel Sadtler, declared that he had never seen it and that it had never come to the War Department. He also admitted that although he had believed as early as December 4 that war would come within forty-eight hours, he had not come to his office on December 7.¹² All Army witnesses denied any knowledge other than hearsay of the receipt of the message, and all agreed that no information on such a message had been delivered to General Marshall.

In the course of his earlier testimony Captain Safford indicated that he had heard that General Marshall had ordered the burning of Army files containing the "winds" message. When pressed, he gave as his source Lieutenant Colonel William F. Friedman, the War Department expert who had broken the Japanese code. Friedman testified that he had never given any credence to the statement and attributed it to Colonel Sadtler, who had picked it up second-hand. Sadtler categorically denied that he had made the statement, since the "winds" message had never been sent to the War Department and he had never heard anyone say that Marshall had ordered it destroyed. He admitted that he might have mentioned hearing Brigadier General Isaac Spalding say that he had been told by Colonel J. T. B. Bissell, formerly of the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, that everything pertaining to Pearl Harbor was being destroyed or had been destroyed. When questioned, Spalding declared that some mention had been made of papers being burned on Bissell's initiative but that General Marshall's name had never been mentioned. Bissell, in turn, denied the statement attributed to him.¹³

One rumor that was alluded to in passing in the hearings and quickly dropped has proved to have a healthy constitution. It was repeated on a national television hook-up as late as December 1962 by a highly reputable historian, who later explained that he had been misled by false sources handed him by an informant on whom he thought he could rely. The story, initially given wide currency by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, suggested that General Marshall could not be found on the morning of December 7 because he had gone to the National Airport to welcome Soviet Ambassador Maxim Litvinov, who was arriving that morning. The Senator gave as his source a biography of the Russian envoy by Arthur Upham Pope. Pope later made a special effort to correct the account, saying that he had based his statement on incorrect information. His correction was made public in 1952 during a heated session of "Author Meets the Critics," a television program, in which Senator McCarthy's book attacking General Marshall was reviewed. Apparently no one who repeated the story troubled to check various Washington and New York newspapers, which listed the names of those who welcomed Litvinov and published photographs of the reception at the airport. In no case was Marshall's name listed, nor did he appear in the photographs.¹⁴

Even if one could accept the argument that President Roosevelt was capable of issuing an order to his Chiefs of Staff to withhold information of a Japanese attack from their commanders overseas, the character and public record of Marshall and Stark constitute their strongest defense against the truth of the allegation that they carried out such a directive. No reward the President could offer them in the way of promotion would have been sufficiently alluring to sway men who already stood at the peak of their professions. Nothing in their careers suggests that even at executive command would they stifle all

the instincts of forty years of service to plot deliberately to allow their forces to be attacked without a chance to defend themselves. On the contrary, the record shows that they made numerous attempts to alert all of their commanders to approaching danger. One can argue that they might have done even more, but it is impossible to say that they did not cry warning.

For the record, it is worth saying that both General Marshall and Admiral Stark categorically denied the existence of a conspiracy. After the appearance of Admiral Robert A. Theobald's *The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor* in 1954, suggesting that they had been prevented by President Roosevelt from sending information to Pearl Harbor, Hanson Baldwin of *The New York Times* asked them separately two questions: (1) "Did you ever receive from President Roosevelt, or any other source, direct or indirect orders or intimations directing you to withhold intelligence information from the commanders in Hawaii or from our commanders in any other areas?" and (2) "Did you ever gain any direct or indirect impression that President Roosevelt or anyone else in the United States Government planned deliberately to expose the United States Fleet at Pearl Harbor and our military installations in Hawaii to Japanese attack? In other words, was our fleet used as a deliberate decoy in order to incite the Japanese to attack?" At a period of their lives when men begin to put their final accounts in order, Marshall and Stark left no doubt on the points raised by the newsmen. In his response General Marshall answered, "No, emphatically," to both questions, and Admiral Stark said, "The answer to both your questions is no."¹⁵

In the matter of responsibility, the majority report of the congressional inquiry repeated a number of charges assessed against the Hawaiian commanders by earlier boards of inquiry but declared them to be errors of judgment and not derelictions of duty, thus softening the findings of the Roberts Commission. They blamed the War Plans Division for failure to advise General Short that he had not carried out the War Department directive; the Intelligence and War Plans Divisions of both Army and Navy Departments for failure to give proper attention to intercepted messages from Tokyo to Honolulu in September and November, asking for information on the Pacific Fleet's base, and for failure to be on the alert to receive the "one o'clock" intercept and to recognize the fact that some Japanese action would probably occur somewhere at that hour on December 7; and the War and Navy Departments for not being sufficiently alerted on December 6 and December 7 in view of the imminence of war. These conclusions were signed by the six Democrats and two Republicans, including one who submitted additional critical remarks.¹⁶

The minority report (signed by Republican Senators Homer Ferguson and Owen Brewster) concluded that "the tragedy of Pearl Harbor was primarily a failure of men and not of laws or of powers to do the necessary things, and carry out the vested responsibilities." They felt that the members of the High Command both in Washington and Hawaii were at fault and listed among the culpable Roosevelt, Stimson, Knox, Marshall, Stark, Gerow, Short, and Kimmel.

On the broader matter of conspiracy, there remains for the record thirty-nine volumes of testimony and contradictory statements. When the committee of inquiry had completed its hearings in 1946, the six Democrats and two of the four Republicans (one of whom submitted more critical additional views of his own) stated that there was no evidence to support the charges that American officials "tricked, provoked, incited, cajoled, or coerced Japan into

attacking this Nation in order that a declaration of war might be easily obtained from the Congress." Although the minority report by the two Republican senators, as well as the additional remarks by the House Republican member, who had voted with the majority, was highly critical of President Roosevelt's diplomacy and of the failure of the administration to supply the committee with everything pertinent to the background of the war, it made no effort to dispute the basic conclusion.

APPENDIX II: RELIEF OF GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT

Shortly after the news arrived in Washington of heavy losses in ships and lives at Pearl Harbor, wild rumors—subsequently proved false—multiplied that Army and Navy commanders were at odds, that most of the troops and crewmen were drunk, and that no effort had been made to carry out orders from Washington. Inasmuch as the Navy had been hardest hit, President Roosevelt sent Secretary Knox to make a preliminary investigation.

The Secretary of Navy reported his findings to the President on December 15. On leaving this conference Knox informed Secretary Stimson that the Chief Executive wanted an investigation by a special commission consisting of a civilian chairman and two officers each from the Army and Navy. He proposed Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves and Rear Admiral William H. Standley as the Navy representatives and Federal Judge Philip L. Sullivan of Chicago as the civilian member. Secretary Stimson accepted the Navy officers but objected to the civilian nominee as not sufficiently well known nationally, and he suggested instead Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, who had won fame as an investigator in the Black Tom and Teapot Dome cases before being appointed to the Supreme Court by President Hoover in 1930. The Secretary was also dissatisfied with a list of Army members suggested by General Marshall and said that he wanted Major General Frank R. McCoy as one of the panel members. At Stimson's request for an air member, General Marshall proposed Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, who had recently returned from duty in Great Britain and was, therefore, not directly concerned with events leading up to Pearl Harbor.¹

The Roberts Commission reported its findings in January 1941, declaring that "in the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate action, transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December 7, and the obligation under the system of coordination then in effect for joint cooperative action on their part, it was a dereliction of duty on the part of each of them not to consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings, and the appropriate measures of defense required by the imminence of hostilities." The commission made clear that the War Department had failed to note that General Short was taking precautions only against sabotage and that his failure and that of Admiral Kimmel to take all

the defensive actions required under the messages received "resulted largely from a sense of security due to the opinion prevalent in diplomatic, military, and naval circles, and in the public press, that any immediate attack by Japan would be in the Far East. The existence of such a view, however prevalent, did not relieve the commanders of the responsibility for the security of the Pacific Fleet and our most important outpost." ²

The release of the Roberts Commission findings on January 25 reached General Short at his home in Oklahoma City. He was stunned by the charge that he was guilty of dereliction of duty and telephoned General Marshall at once to inquire what action he should take, asking if he should retire. The Chief of Staff, who had just returned from New York, replied that he had not read the report and had not discussed the matter with anyone. He advised him to stand pat, adding that he would use the telephone call as an application for retirement if that should be necessary. In a memorandum for record made at the time, General Marshall added that he would withhold acceptance pending consideration of the matter with the Secretary of War. After leaving the telephone, General Short prepared a formal application for retirement and sent it to Marshall later the same day. In recalling the conversation in 1946, however, he implied that General Marshall had left him with the impression that he did not intend to accept the application and thus trapped him into submitting the request, which was promptly accepted.³

On the following morning General Marshall discussed the situation with Admiral Stark, who suggested that if Short retired it would be possible to use this action to persuade Kimmel to do the same. At the moment, as a result of the finding of dereliction of duty, speedy retirement seemed a means of barring unjust punishment for the two officers. This obviously occurred to Stimson when General Marshall discussed with him Short's call and Stark's suggestion. The Secretary at once warned that they must not permit the retirement to be made too hastily lest it appear that they were trying "to let off these people without punishment because we felt guilty ourselves." At the same time Stimson hesitated to hold a court-martial because he feared that Congress and the press were showing signs of going through "a ghost hunt" and that the men might be excessively punished as a result of the great excitement being generated by the disaster and the Roberts Commission report. He related to Marshall how as a young United States District Attorney in New York he had once delayed the trial of a banker until the hot public temper, fanned by a bank failure in which the man was involved, had been allowed to cool.⁴

After talking with Stimson and checking with the Judge Advocate General, Major General Myron Cramer, on the action that could be taken against Short on the basis of the Roberts Commission charges, Marshall told Stimson that he now believed they should accept Short's application for retirement and "do this quietly without any publicity at the moment."⁵ Cramer's memorandum of the following day, apparently spelling out in detail what he had outlined earlier, reported that Short could be tried by a general court-martial or dismissed summarily by the President under the articles of war. Cramer argued in Short's defense that his derelictions were those of omission rather than commission and that his failures to take action were based on an estimate of the situation shared "by all those officers in Hawaii best qualified to form a sound military opinion." He warned (1) that if a trial was held and Short was found guilty, anything less than dismissal would bring the accusation that the War Department was engaged in whitewashing the General, and if he was acquitted

the same charge would be made; and (2) that the trial would have to be in open court or the War Department would be charged with whitewashing if he was acquitted or with persecuting if he was found guilty. If an open trial was held, however, some secret plans and orders would have to be introduced, which would clearly be opposed to public interest while the war was in progress.⁶

Cramer added a final plea for permitting retirement to close the books against General Short in his statement: "The career of General Short as an active Army officer is finished and closed. Because of the lack of confidence which the public now has in him, which lack of confidence would no doubt be shared by his future subordinates, it is unthinkable that any command should again be entrusted to him. General Short knows this. That in itself is a severe punishment. Furthermore, General Short has been relieved of his command which reduces him from a lieutenant general to a major general. The addition to that punishment of any punishment other than dismissal, such as a reprimand, loss of files, forfeiture of pay, or suspension from a command, would be inappropriate."⁷

Two days later Secretary Stimson consulted with the President about the action that should be taken in the face of the findings of the Roberts Commission in regard to Short and Kimmel. Roosevelt suggested that the Army and Navy act on parallel lines, first announcing that the officers had applied for retirement and then, after a week, adding that the applications had been approved but that this action would not be a bar to later court-martial if that proved necessary. Stimson warned that it was essential to postpone any such action in the interest of giving the men a fair trial and of avoiding disclosures of secret information.⁸

On February 17 the War Department informed General Short that he would be retired at the end of the month. In the three weeks that had passed since his talk with the President, Stimson had worked out a phrase that would satisfy the President that there would be no attempt to dodge a later court-martial. The order for retirement contained the statement that Short was retired "without condonation of any offense or prejudice to any future disciplinary action." Short considered this wording unnecessarily damaging and incorrectly attributed it to General Marshall.⁹

Having worked out a formula that he believed would be fair to General Short and avoid a controversy over a future court-martial, Stimson was startled a week later when the President informed him and Secretary Knox that the temper of the people demanded a court-martial in view of the Roberts Commission's findings. He proposed that the two officers request a court-martial but that the hearings be delayed until they could be held without damaging public interest. Concerned once more over the imposition of excessive punishment, the Secretary reminded the President that the two officers had merely reflected the general attitude of the country in not expecting an attack. Roosevelt replied that he realized this fact and that they should not be severely punished, adding that he would have final control over any sentence that was imposed. Stimson concluded that the President was thinking of a severe reprimand for the two men but was still troubled about "the situation of doing justice." On the way home Stimson stopped at the War Department to tell General Marshall of the developments and found him also "rather staggered by the President's change."¹⁰

Still disturbed over the situation, Stimson discussed the court-martial with

Marshall, Cramer, and Major General Hildring, the G-1 of the War Department, on February 26. They suggested that the Secretary rather than the President handle Short's court-martial, since it would appear that Roosevelt was guilty of bias if he acted as reviewing officer in the case. Later in the day, when Secretary Knox reminded Stimson that the President wanted the officers to request a court-martial, the Secretary of War warned that if such action was taken it would appear either that a bargain had been struck with them or that they had been dragooned into it. He pressed on the President instead the arrangement that was finally approved on February 28. Explaining that he was having charges drawn for the trial of General Short, based on the Roberts Commission findings, he specified that the trial would not be held until such time as the public interest and safety would permit. Stimson then asked Marshall to call Short so that Short would not first hear the announcement from the press, tell him what had been proposed and the reasons why.¹¹ This was apparently the basis for Short's conclusion that Marshall had engineered the whole affair.

From the entries in Stimson's Diary of this period and the opinions of the Judge Advocate General rendered at Marshall's request, it is evident that General Short had the sympathy of the officials of the War Department and that they were prepared to protect him, so far as it was possible, against a damaging court-martial. In view of the inflamed state of public opinion, it must have appeared to Short, temporarily at least, that this was a satisfactory way out of a difficult situation. Later when he and Kimmel were told that vital information had been withheld from them, they concluded that they had been rushed into retirement and their careers untimely ended. In an indignant statement to the Pearl Harbor Inquiry in January 1946, General Short charged that the War Department had "singled him out as an example, as the scapegoat for the disaster."¹²