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Editorial Note on China-Burma-India Theater
The China-Burma-India theater remained a complex military problem for the Allied armies in the spring of 1944. The Japanese began a major offensive along the Imphal front with three divisions and some Indian nationalist units on March 8, 1944. The situation worsened for the Allies in April, but by June 22 they broke the Japanese blockade of Imphal. British resistance and major Japanese supply problems, as well as exhausted and disease-stricken soldiers, forced the Japanese to discontinue the offensive in July. (Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Command Problems, pp. 172-74, 192-95.) The Chinese high command adopted on April 12, 1944, a plan for an offensive across the Salween River, designed to drive from east to west on Myitkyina in Burma. (See Marshall to Ho Ying-chin, April 15, 1944, Papers of George Catlett Marshall, #4-354 [4: 413-14].) The Salween campaign was conducted from May 11 to June 30, 1944. The Chinese crossed the Salween River, but determined resistance from the Japanese Fifty-sixth Infantry prevented productive Chinese advances into Burma. Meanwhile Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell decided in April to commence a major effort in Burma, with Myitkyina and its key airfield as the objective. Stilwell intended to assault from west to east, counting on Chinese support in the Salween River offensive. Stilwell’s offensive punch was centered around Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill’s 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), led by Colonel Charles N. Hunter (U.S.M.A., 1929) as a result of Merrill’s recurring health problems, backed by Chinese regiments. The airfield at Myitkyina, important for the support of Hump air transport, was taken on May 17, although Japanese resistance continued and Myitkyina itself was not declared secure until August 3, 1944. (Ibid., pp. 329-60, 226-28, 253-54; The Stilwell Papers, ed. Theodore H. White [New York: William Sloane Associates, 1948], pp. 287-88, 295-99.)
The military situation in China deteriorated rapidly in the spring of 1944. The Japanese high command intended a major offensive for China in 1944: Operation ICHIGO contemplated the Japanese Twelfth Army attacking south into Honan Province, across the Yellow River, while the Japanese Eleventh Army advanced north from Hankow to meet it, pinching off a salient in the process. Other elements of the Japanese Eleventh Army would advance south into Hunan Province to meet the advance from Hong Kong of the Japanese Twenty-third Army. The Japanese offensive began between April 17 and 19. Feeble Chinese resistance led to massive Japanese advances. (Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Command Problems, pp. 316-28, 371-74.)
Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Stilwell on May 2, 1944, that his primary responsibility was to provide air support from Chinese bases for the major Allied offensive against Japan toward Formosa from the Marianas-Palau-Mindanao line. Stilwell was charged with the responsibility for air support from China against Formosa, the Ryukyus, the Philippines, and the China coast prior to and during the advance on Formosa. Without prejudice to his current operations, he was also charged with providing indirect support for the attack on Mindanao. “It is recognized,” the Joint Chiefs told Stilwell, “that major curtailment of ‘HUMP’ support to Ground Forces in China and to such other activities as do not directly support an air effort will be required.” (Joint Chiefs of Staff to Stilwell, Radio No. WARX-31202, May 2, 1944, NA/ RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-31202)].)
Stilwell desired that his objectives be more precisely delineated. On May 24 he informed General Marshall of his understanding of his tasks, in an effort to see if that mirrored the chief of staff’s vision of the American position in the C.B.I, theater. “My mission vis a vis the British is to cooperate in furnishing the War effort, using all available US resources in the present Campaign,” wrote Stilwell. “My mission vis a vis the Chinese is to increase the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army.” Stilwell considered his mission was to create a combat-efficient Chinese army, ultimately of sixty divisions. He pointed to his difficulties in this regard, particularly concerning his relations with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Stilwell also reported that the record of British Commonwealth ground forces in Burma was disappointing. “The British simply do not want to fight in Burma or reopen communications with China,” wrote Stilwell. “In short, I do not believe the British help is worth what we are paying for it.” As for the Chinese, “the choice seems to be to get realistic and insist on a quid pro quo,” advised Stilwell, “or else restrict our effort in China to maintaining what American Aviation we can, the latter course allows Chiang Kai-shek to welsh on his agreement. It also lays the ultimate burden of fighting the Jap Army on the USA. I contend that ultimately the Jap Army must be fought on the mainland of Asia.” He added that if this was not what was envisioned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then perhaps all Allied efforts in the C.B.I. theater should be eliminated except those designed to support air operations. Stilwell thought he could hold the Myitkyina area as an air base. “To insure the reopening of communications with China,” wrote Stilwell, “I still need an American corps and more Engineers.” (Stilwell to Marshall, Radio No. DTG-240240Z, May 24, 1944, ibid., [CM-IN-18256].) General Marshall replied to Stilwell on May 26, 1944 (see Papers of George Catlett Marshall, #4-395 [4: 466-67]).
Recommended Citation: ThePapers of George Catlett Marshall, ed.Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens(Lexington, Va.: The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981- ). Electronic version based on The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 4, “Aggressive and Determined Leadership,” June 1, 1943-December 31, 1944 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 464-466.