5-402 Memorandum for General Hull from Colonel Lawrence J. Lincoln, March 22, 1946

Publisher: The Johns Hopkins University Press
Date: March 22, 1946

Subject: Postwar

Memorandum for General Hull from Colonel Lawrence J. Lincoln1

March 22, 1946 Washington, D.C.

Top Secret

1. Attached hereto are views expressed by General Marshall in a conference with Asiatic Section and Colonel Davis on Friday, 22nd March. Some of the points covered were not as clearly stated as the attached notes might indicate. The conference lasted over an hour during which General Marshall did practically all of the talking.

2. The following action is being taken pertinent to the points raised by General Marshall:

a. Radio to China to clarify total requirements under the reoccupation [reorganization] program and the training equipment program.

b. Radio to China in attempt to get a phased requirement in terms of divisions of the Peace Time Army Program.

c. Radio to CINCAFPAC instructing him to retain the 10 Division sets in Japan pending clarification of their disposition.2

d. Radio to CHINA, CINCAFPAC, etc. for information clearing up certain loose ends pertinent to the above subjects, as to nomenclature, etc.

e. Radio to China giving War Department views on MAG organization.

NOTE: All the above radios have been prepared or are in process of preparation.

f. G-4 has agreed to brief General Marshall on the surplus property picture with particular attention to the 10 Divisions in Japan. Actually, it doesn’t appear that G-4 can give a definite answer to the question in General Marshall’s mind as to whether the 10 Division sets are needed to meet U.S. Army requirements.

g. The JWPC [Joint War Plans Committee] are writing a paper on the inactivation of China Theater. Presumably, this will contain a proposed directive governing the set up in the post-inactivation period. Asiatic Section will convey the pertinent views of Gen. Marshall to the JWPC.

I. General Comments on Organization after Inactivation –

1. On inactivation of China Theater—give a very general directive about the U.S. Army organization in China. The relationships, etc. must be worked out on the ground. A C.G. [commanding general] of all the U.S. Army forces in China seemed OK.

2. MAG [Military Advisory Group] must be somewhat operational for about 18 months. (See Part II for details on MAG operations).

3. All U.S. activities vis a vis the Chinese Government in China will funnel through the Ambassador.

4. He didn’t favor Peiping for any overall administrative control (He was quite definite that MAG should do it). He said some logistical-administrative agency would be necessary in Shanghai.

II. Part II—Comments on MAG. –

1. Present staff in Nanking working on MAG matters are involved in a self-consuming operation and producing nothing. Their ideas are far too elaborate.

2. He violently disapproved of China’s suggested MAG organization as being too complex and over-staffed. He wants workers—not brass hats!

3. He violently objects to inflated rank as proposed by ASF [Army Service Forces] (3 stars to start with and two later on for head of group is OK)

4. The titles of the various sections should be such as to connote their advisory duties rather than the conventional terms (G-1, G-2, etc.) now used.

5. Except for schools the MAG’s big job won’t start for two years or more. (This relates to China Theater’s scheme of 40 Divisions (inactive), 10 (active) and any other major reorganization of Chinese Army.)

III. Equipment for Chinese Units.

1. National Units shouldn’t need much equipment to take care of their initial requirements under the integration and reorganization plan which reduces them to 50 divisions.

2. The Communists will need enough to give them “face”. The artillery now arranged for (11 Batteries) will be sufficient initially. The Infantry now arranged for (11 Battalions—ALPHA) will probably be insufficient. They must be given this several weeks before integrating with the Central Government Forces.

3. As regards the 10 divisions (U.S.) of equipment now in Japan, can it be sold to China as surplus or can it be delivered prior to 30 June under Lend-Lease?3 He was doubtful of the political acceptability of the latter. He was quite definite in his desire to have all or part of this available for the Communists unless it cut across U.S. Army requirements.

L. J. L.

Document Copy Text Source: Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs (RG 165), Records of the Operations Division (OPD), 384, Section 1, Case 14, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

Document Format: Typed memorandum signed.

1. Lincoln (U.S.M.A., 1933) was head of the Operations Division’s Asiatic Section.

2. A “division set” was the equipment needed to outfit a division under the T/O&E (Table of Organization and Equipment).

3. The legal authority to transfer material under the Lend-Lease Act would cease as of June 30, 1946, unless a purchase agreement had been negotiated with the recipient nation. At this time, there were efforts in Congress to pass legislation granting the government authority to transfer equipment for the peacetime Chinese Army program. (Operations Division to CINCAFPAC, Radio No. WARX-84657, April 16, 1946, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS, 452 China, Sec. 6].)

Recommended Citation: ThePapers of George Catlett Marshall, ed.Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens(Lexington, Va.: The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981- ). Electronic version based on The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 5, “The Finest Soldier,” January 1, 1945-January 7, 1947 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), pp. 511-513.

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