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Memorandum for the President
July 9, 1943 [Washington, D.C.]
As a result of continuous investigation over the past eight months and the apparent strength of the Russian Army (as concerns U.S. divisions) the following reductions in personnel requirements up to December 31, 1943, have been ordered:
TroopsOriginal allotment for 1943Reduction
Corps and Army troops1,409,167 71,550
Service troops1,153,275 52,047 (increase)
Overhead (here and abroad)563,000 35,000
Trainees (college, privates,
officer candidates)508,000 45,000
General Donovan’s forces (OSS) 5,000 –
Emergency pool 271,640 (a) 46,887
Nurses 40,000 –
Total, officers and
enlisted 8,248,000 (b) 562,000 or a total
Notes: (a) This pool includes Air and other reserves to be reallotted later, to the Air, for example, or for new type units or to meet unexpected attrition.
(b) This figure of 8,248,000 includes 150,000 WAC’s, which were not included in original manpower estimates.
(c) Includes 150,000 in College Army Specialized Training, 7,000 in OSS and 150,000 WAC’s.
There is involved a reduction of 12 divisions, or at least their delay to the January-June, 1944 program, depending upon status of Russian Army.1
Document Copy Text Source: George C. Marshall Papers, Pentagon Office Collection, Selected Materials, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Virginia.
Document Format: Typed memorandum.
1. Marshall sent Admiral King a summary of the army’s proposed reductions. King replied that “at the present time the Navy has a shortage of personnel for manning new ships which is getting progressively worse,” and it was essential that the navy adhere to its authorized strength of 2,092,960 by December 31, 1943. The navy had to build its strength gradually, as it did not have “the housing and training facilities to absorb a large mass of men at one time, which would be necessary if authorization were delayed.” Marshall concurred. (Marshall Memorandum for Admiral King, July 10, 1943, King Memorandum for General Marshall, July 13, 1943, and Marshall Memorandum for Admiral King, July 20, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 320.2].)
At this time, the Roosevelt administration hoped that the army’s planned strength reduction would result in reduced draft calls during the last half of 1943. But on July 21 Marshall wrote to the head of the War Manpower Commission that shortfalls in spring inductions and higher than expected personnel losses meant that army inductions would have to continue to be about 140,000 per month to meet even the reduced requirements. (Marshall Memorandum for Mr. McNutt, July 21, 1943, GCMRL/G C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)
Recommended Citation: ThePapers of George Catlett Marshall, ed.Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens(Lexington, Va.: The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981- ). Electronic version based on The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 4, “Aggressive and Determined Leadership,” June 1, 1943-December 31, 1944 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 48-49.