

John G. Thompson











# The Papers of George Catlett Marshall



The Papers of  
George Catlett Marshall

Published under the auspices of  
The George C. Marshall Foundation

*To Maurice Matloff, 1915-1993*  
*Mentor and Friend*

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# The Papers of George Catlett Marshall

Volume 4

“AGGRESSIVE AND DETERMINED LEADERSHIP”

JUNE 1, 1943–DECEMBER 31, 1944

Larry I. Bland, Editor

Sharon Ritenour Stevens, Associate Editor

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS

Baltimore and London

1996



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Printed in the United States of America

The Johns Hopkins University Press  
2715 North Charles Street  
Baltimore, Maryland 21218  
The Johns Hopkins Press Ltd., London

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of  
American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence  
of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48–1984.

*Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data*

(Revised for volume 4)

Marshall, George C. (George Catlett), 1880–1959.  
The papers of George Catlett Marshall.

Includes indexes.

- Contents: v. 1. "The soldierly spirit," December 1880–June 1939.  
v. 2. "We cannot delay," July 1, 1939–December 6, 1941.  
v. 3. "The right man for the job," December 7, 1941–May 31, 1943.  
v. 4. "Aggressive and determined leadership," June 1, 1943–December 31, 1944.  
1. Marshall, George C. (George Catlett), 1880–1959.  
2. United States—History, Military—20th century—Sources.  
3. Generals—United States—Correspondence.  
4. United States. Army—Biography.

I. Bland, Larry I. II. Ritenour, Sharon R. III. Title.

E745.M37 1981 973.918'092'4 81-47593

ISBN 0-8018-2552-0 (v. 1)

ISBN 0-8018-2553-9 (v. 2)

ISBN 0-8018-2967-4 (v. 3)

ISBN 0-8018-5368-0 (v. 4)

*The preparation and publication of this volume was made possible in part by grants from the National Historical Publications and Records Commission, an independent agency of the United States government, and from the Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft of Essen, Germany.*

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# Preface

## THE MARSHALL PAPERS

The George C. Marshall Research Library is the repository for General Marshall's personal papers. Since 1956 this collection has been supplemented by contributions of documents by the general's friends, associates, and admirers and by the Marshall Foundation's program of copying relevant documents in other repositories, primarily the National Archives. The core of this volume was drawn from nearly fifty linear feet of material in the Pentagon Office subgroup of the Marshall papers. A detailed description of this and other series is given in John N. Jacob, *George C. Marshall Papers, 1932-1960: A Guide* (Lexington, Va.: George C. Marshall Foundation, 1987). Collateral collections are briefly described in *Historical Materials in the George C. Marshall Foundation* (Lexington, Va.: George C. Marshall Foundation, [1995]).

This volume represents a selection from the Marshall material available to the editors. Of course, these documents do not indicate the complete scope of the army chief of staff's concerns. For example, key War Department personnel had offices near his and they frequently visited or talked on the telephone with Marshall. For a more comprehensive view of Marshall's activities, consult Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall*, 4 vols. (New York: Viking Press, 1963-87) and volumes in the series *United States Army in World War II*.

Of this volume's 598 documents, over 90 percent were dictated by General Marshall to a secretary, usually Mona K. Nason. On occasion, however, Marshall so substantially modified a staff-produced draft that the editors have considered it Marshall's. The texts of most documents published herein were taken from carbon copies in Marshall's files. On these the drafter's initials usually appear in the top right corner of the carbon copy and the typist's initials in the bottom left corner.

As the head of a large bureaucracy, Marshall signed numerous documents which he had not drafted. For example, many important staff-drafted radio messages from the War Department to field commanders were sent over the chief of staff's signature (rather than The Adjutant General's) to emphasize their importance. Scholars are often less concerned about who actually drafted a document than with who authorized or signed it. Thus there are numerous citations in the secondary literature to important documents emanating from Marshall's office and bearing his name that have not been included here. This volume does not seek to publish the papers of the Office of the Chief of Staff but only those created by the chief of staff himself. Regardless of their importance, staff-written documents



are not usually included. Nevertheless, the chief of staff carefully oversaw the contents of documents produced for his signature. Colonel William T. Sexton, an assistant secretary of the General Staff, informed Colonel Cyrus Q. Shelton of the Organization and Training Division (G-3): "When writing letters for General Marshall's signature, brevity should be the key note. The conversational style is always appealing to him, and all stereotyped expressions should be avoided, as well as all superlatives, except where obviously appropriate. His style is frank, warm, and polite regardless of the individual involved. Where a 'turndown' is involved, he is regretful. He dislikes such expressions as 'I am pleased to advise' and 'this will acknowledge receipt of.' He definitely does not like certain words which are used in typical letters written by the AGO such as 'therein,' 'thereupon,' and 'therefore.'" (Sexton Memorandum for Colonel Shelton, December 8, 1942, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 310].) In this volume (p. 594), see Marshall's comment regarding trite wording in documents written for his signature.

#### ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Sharon Ritenour Stevens, associate editor, was responsible for chapters "Aggressive and Determined Leadership" and "A Battle to Victory" as well as for the photographs, their captions, the list of illustrations, and the chronology.

Joellen K. Bland keyed part of the volume into the editing terminal-typesetter, produced the galleys, and performed other essential technical and proofing duties.

The members of the Marshall Papers Advisory Committee offered valuable advice on the entire volume, and they deserve special thanks for their work. The committee consisted of Ronald F. Marryott (Marshall Foundation president), Edward M. Coffman (emeritus professor of military history, University of Wisconsin-Madison), Richardson Dougall (former deputy director, Historical Office, Department of State), William M. Franklin (former director, Historical Office, Department of State), Maurice Matloff (former chief historian, Center of Military History, Department of the Army), Forrest C. Pogue (General Marshall's authorized biographer), and Edwin A. Thompson (former director of the Records Declassification Division, National Archives and Records Administration).

The National Historical Publications and Records Commission and its staff have given the editors vital moral and financial support since the Marshall papers project was initiated. Without this support, the project very likely could not be done.

The Richard Gwathmey and Caroline T. Gwathmey Memorial Trust contributed significantly to funding this volume.

The project has enjoyed close and beneficial relations with The Johns Hopkins University Press, and for that the editors would like to thank

Barbara Lamb, managing editor, Henry Y. K. Tom, executive editor, and Robert J. Brugger, acquisitions editor.

Assistance in illustrating this volume was given by William H. Cunliffe, director of the Special Archives Division of the National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.; Dale Connelly and Sharon Cully, Still Picture Branch of the National Archives; and James E. Dedrick of the Lexington (Virginia) *News-Gazette*.

Without the assistance of historians and archivists from many repositories, no work such as this would be possible. The editors would like to express their appreciation for the help they received from the following persons: Dwight E. Strandberg of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; Timothy D. W. Connelly, William H. Davis, Donald L. Singer, and John E. Taylor at the National Archives; Don Carter at the U.S. Army Center of Military History; and Anne S. Wells, Department of History and Politics, Virginia Military Institute.

The editors wish to thank especially Edwin A. Thompson for his research assistance. Thanks is also due to the staff of the Virginia Military Institute's Preston Library, particularly Elizabeth S. Hostetter and Janet S. Holly. Also helpful at the George C. Marshall Foundation's library and archive were the librarian-archivist, Thomas E. Camden, and his assistant, Martha S. Gansz.

The editors gratefully acknowledge the permission of the following publishers and institutions to reproduce materials: Yale University Library, for the numerous quotations from the diary of Henry L. Stimson; Associated Press/Wide World Photos; Keystone Press Agency, Inc.; Time Inc.; and Woodfin Camp and Associates.





# Guide to Editorial Policies

## STYLE

Document texts and quotations in the annotation follow the writer's style, except as noted below. The editors' style generally conforms to that prescribed by *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 14th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).

## TEXTUAL CHANGES AND INSERTIONS

*Document Heading.* The organization, sequence, and sometimes the content of the document heading have been supplied by the editors. This heading consists of between three and seven elements: addressee, date, originator, place of origin, message designation, security classification, and title.

The addressee for letters, telegrams, and radio messages is always in the form TO HARRY S. TRUMAN. Civil titles (i.e., Senator, Dr., The Honorable, Judge, etc.) are not included in the document heading. If the recipient was a married woman, Marshall usually used "Mrs." with her husband's name, if he knew it (e.g., Mrs. James J. Winn rather than Molly B. Winn). The editors have used the form Marshall indicated. For military personnel, including retired professionals, the rank used is that correct as of the date of the document. No distinction is made between permanent and temporary ranks in the annotation.

The addressee for memorandums is usually in the form MEMORANDUM FOR \_\_\_\_\_. The form of address Marshall used is followed, but abbreviations (e.g., A.C.S., Col., etc.) have been spelled out. If the memorandum is to an addressee's title only, that officer's last name is usually supplied in brackets or explained in a footnote (excepting the president and the secretary of war). A list of high-ranking War Department officials and theater commanders is printed in the Appendix.

*Salutation and Complimentary Close.* When present, these elements have been printed with the first and last lines respectively of the document text rather than on separate lines as they appear in the original. The capitalization and punctuation of the original have been retained.

*Signature.* Most documents in this volume have been reproduced from file (i.e., carbon) copies in the Marshall papers or in various War Department records. A name or initials at the end of a document published herein indicates that the editors have used the signed original as the source text.

*Silent Corrections.* In making silent corrections, the editors distinguished between documents physically produced by the author and those produced



from dictation by a secretary. No silent changes have been introduced into author-produced documents. In documents typed by a secretary, the original capitalization and punctuation have been retained, but the occasional spelling errors have been silently corrected. Marshall sometimes made minor corrections to documents prior to having them sent; these changes are accepted as the final version of the source text. (See *Radio, Telegraph, and Cable Messages*.)

*Brackets.* All information within brackets in the document texts has been supplied by the editors. If the bracketed material is in italic type, it is to be read in place of the preceding word or letter (e.g., “fixed up for these four [*three*] divisions”). If the bracketed material is in roman type, it indicates additional rather than substitute information (e.g., “Wednesday afternoon [August 1] General Pershing”). In annotation source citations, when a document bearing Marshall’s name as author was actually written by someone else, the drafter’s name is given in brackets (e.g., Marshall [McCarthy] Memorandum for the President, or Marshall [OPD] to Eisenhower).

*Italics for Emphasis.* Except where used in brackets, italic type appears in the text of a document or in a quotation only if the emphasis was in the original—indicated on the source text by underlining.

*Cross-references.* Citations to previous volumes in this series are usually given as: *Papers of GCM*, 1: 000. References to documents within this volume are in the form: (a) letters: Marshall to Embick, date, p. 000; (b) memorandums: Marshall Memorandum for the President, date, p. 000.

*Security Classification.* The security classification is given in italic type beneath the sender-recipient line. War Department procedures regarding classification were not clarified and coordinated until 1944; consequently it is not uncommon to find copies of a document marked with different classifications in different files.

*Radio, Telegraph, and Cable Messages.* For many messages it is impossible to establish the precise methods by which they were transmitted; the need for speed, the existence of transmission lines, atmospheric conditions, or simply the message center’s convenience sometimes influenced the selection of a transmission medium. The term “Radio” is used to designate messages whether sent by radio, telegraph line, submarine cable, or some combination of these.

When such a message is addressed to an agency, office, official, or specific person for transmission to a designated addressee, the ultimate recipient is given in the document heading (e.g., TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER rather than TO THE ADJUTANT GENERAL). The sender’s message number is included if known; when this number has been determined from a document other than the source text, the message number appears in brackets.



As prepared by the sender's office, radio messages usually included at the top as the address line certain instructions to the recipient's message center, e.g., "For General MacArthur's eyes alone." To inhibit cryptanalysis by the enemy, the transmitting agency usually buried these phrases within the transmitted text. Thus the location of address line will vary on different versions of the message. If the internal address on the source document is at the beginning, it is indented; if the editors have *moved* the internal address from the document text to the beginning, there is no paragraph indentation.

Depending on the version used as a source text, radio messages may be in standard form (i.e., upper- and lower-case letters with punctuation marks) or in all capitals with spelled-out punctuation. In the latter case, the editors have silently converted the text to standard form, including converting spelled-out numbers, dates, and names (e.g., B-17).

#### DOCUMENT SOURCE CITATIONS

*Source Line.* At the end of each document and prior to the footnotes, the source of the document is listed in the following format: Repository/Collection (Main entry, Subentry). Several copies may exist of certain documents, and these may be found in different repositories or collections. The version used by the editors as the source text is the one cited. The abbreviations used in the source citations are listed in the Glossary.

*Manuscript-type Notation.* With rare exceptions, the source texts for documents printed in this volume were typewritten by a clerk or secretary from dictation, notes, or a draft. Holograph documents are designated by an "H" at the end of the source line.

#### ANNOTATION

In the annotation the editors have attempted, insofar as possible, to explain all potentially obscure references, to provide cross-references to important related material, and to summarize the key parts of incoming or outgoing documents of relevance. The Marshall papers project is intended to provide a cohesive, intelligible story of Marshall in his own words, not to provide a detailed discussion of every facet of the general's life or to examine numerous questions not mentioned in Marshall's documents.

In the annotation, the editors have sought to avoid using secondary sources, which would date the edition. An exception to this policy has been made for certain official military histories, particularly the indispensable series *United States Army in World War II* (Washington: GPO, 1947- ). Whenever appropriate and feasible, quotations from Marshall documents not selected for publication or from other primary sources have been used to annotate the published documents.

The editors have not cited individual uses of certain reference works: *Official National Guard Register*; *Official Army Register*; *Army Directory*; *Cullum's Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy*; *The 1989 Register of Former Cadets of the Virginia Military Institute*; *Who's Who in America*, and Shelby L. Stanton, *Order of Battle: U.S. Army, World War II* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1984).

Graduates of the two federal service academies and the Virginia Military Institute have been identified by school and year of graduation (e.g., V.M.I., 1901) the first time that person is cited in the Marshall papers volumes. Initial personal identifications include only the status, rank, or role at the time of the citation. Subsequent citations usually give the changes since the previous citation. The index to this volume will enable the reader to follow a particular individual's development or relationship to Marshall.



# Illustrations

The following are the sources for the illustrations used in this volume.

## *frontispiece*

General George C. Marshall, April 1944. Copyright © Karsh; GCMRL/Photographs (3037).

## *page 165*

Cartoon, "Doesn't Hold Water," Philadelphia *Bulletin*, October 22, 1943. GCMRL/Research File (Cartoons).

## *page 198*

Document, From the President to Marshal Stalin, [December 6, 1943]. GCMRL/Museum.

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1. Generals Eisenhower and Marshall hold an informal press conference at Allied headquarters, Algiers, on June 3, 1943. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 175179; GCMRL/Photographs (973A).
2. Allied chiefs meet during the Algiers Conference, June 3, 1943. GCMRL/Photographs (973B).
3. & 4. General Marshall enjoys a fishing trip while vacationing at Sainte Anne des Monts, Quebec, June 22-24, 1943. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photos 317934 and 317933; GCMRL/Photographs (310 and 221).
5. General Marshall was present when Director Oveta Culp Hobby took the oath of office as a colonel on July 5, 1943. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 176894; GCMRL/Photographs (3680C).
6. Admiral Leahy, General Henri Giraud, and General Marshall pose for a photograph with President Roosevelt at the White House, July 7, 1943. *Life Magazine* © Time Inc.; GCMRL/Photographs (3257).
7. Principal participants gather for a photograph during the Quebec Conference, August 18, 1943. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 178038; GCMRL/Photographs (348).
8. The Combined Chiefs of Staff meet at the Château Frontenac, Quebec, August 23, 1943. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 178135; GCMRL/Photographs (4872).



9. General Marshall sits at his desk in front of a portrait of General Pershing, November 1, 1943. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 180275; GCMRL/Photographs (997).
10. General and Mrs. Marshall during a visit at Hot Springs, Virginia, November 1943. GCMRL/Photographs (771).
11. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President Roosevelt, and Prime Minister Churchill sit for a group picture with their military staffs during the Cairo Conference, November 25, 1943. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 183103; GCMRL/Photographs (1153).
12. General Marshall watches as photographers take pictures of Marshal Stalin, President Roosevelt, and Prime Minister Churchill during the Teheran Conference, November 28–30, 1943. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 183009; GCMRL/Photographs (346).
13. General Marshall visits General MacArthur, December 15, 1943. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 183950; GCMRL/Photographs (1154).
14. General Marshall stops at Guadalcanal to visit with Lieutenant General Harmon and Vice Admiral Fitch. GCMRL/Photographs (7702).
15. General Marshall inspects the Jungle Training Center in Hawaii, December 20, 1943. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 301990; GCMRL/Photographs (7701).
16. General Marshall visits Admiral Nimitz at Pearl Harbor on December 20, 1943. U.S. Navy Photo; GCMRL/Photographs (2925A).
17. General Marshall appears on the cover of *Time*, January 3, 1944. Copyright © 1944 Time Inc. Reprinted by permission.
18. General Marshall greets a wounded veteran at the American Legion dinner, February 3, 1944. Associated Press/Wide World Photos; GCMRL/Photographs (1032).
19. General Marshall confers with Captain Newsome in his Pentagon office. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 188032-S; GCMRL/Photographs (3264).
20. General Marshall inspects troops training at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, March 5, 1944. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo; GCMRL/Photographs (4654).
21. General Marshall inspects a Women's Army Corps Training Center at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, April 30, 1944. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo; GCMRL/Photographs (2047A).
22. Major General Almond discusses training exercises during General

- Marshall's inspection tour of Fort Huachuca, Arizona, May 2, 1944. GCMRL/Photographs (2845).
23. During an inspection tour at Camp Adair, Oregon, May 4, 1944, General Marshall discusses a training exercise with a noncommissioned officer of the Seventieth Division. GCMRL/Photographs (1303).
  24. Second Lieutenant Allen Tupper Brown. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo; GCMRL/Photographs (1237).
  25. Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko presents the Order of Suvorov, First Degree, to General Marshall, June 5, 1944. GCMRL/Photographs (1037).

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26. Generals Arnold, Marshall, and Eisenhower inspect invasion progress on a Normandy beachhead from offshore, June 12, 1944. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo ETO-HQ-44-5035; GCMRL/Photographs (2885).
27. Generals Marshall and Eisenhower and Admiral King stand in an amphibious DUKW as they tour Allied beachheads in northern France, June 12, 1944. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 190157; GCMRL/Photographs (3210).
28. During his inspection of American troops on a beachhead in northern France, General Marshall stops to talk with a soldier, June 12, 1944. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 190720; GCMRL/Photographs (3217).
29. Generals Eisenhower, Marshall, and Arnold leave an amphibious vehicle to visit American installations on the invasion coast of France, June 12, 1944. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 190721; GCMRL/Photographs (340).
30. Lieutenant General Bradley greets Generals Marshall and Arnold during their visit to the Normandy beachhead, June 12, 1944. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 206439; GCMRL/Photographs (204).
31. Lieutenant General Clark accompanies General Marshall on his tour in the Grosseto area of Italy, June 18, 1944. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 191518; GCMRL/Photographs (201).
32. During his tour of the Fifth Army front, General Marshall talks with soldiers in the Grosseto area of Italy, June 18, 1944. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 191520; GCMRL/Photographs (337).
33. General Marshall greets General Charles de Gaulle at Washington National Airport, July 6, 1944. Photo by Abbie Rowe; GCMRL/Photographs (729).



34. General Marshall relaxes with his family at Dodona Manor in Leesburg, Virginia, September 1944. Thomas McAvoy, *Life Magazine* © 1944 Time Inc.; GCMRL/Photographs (1535).
35. General Marshall arrives at the Quebec airport for the Second Quebec Conference, September 12–16, 1944. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 194455; GCMRL/Photographs (323).
36. The heads of government and their military advisers at the Second Quebec Conference gather for a photograph, September 16, 1944. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 194469; GCMRL/Photographs (2423).
37. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff hold a meeting at the Second Quebec Conference, September 1944. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 194481; GCMRL/Photographs (353).
38. During a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Second Quebec Conference in September 1944, General Marshall explains an issue as Brigadier General McFarland listens. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 194486; GCMRL/Photographs (323B).
39. Arriving in France on October 6, 1944, General Marshall and James F. Byrnes are greeted by General Eisenhower and Lieutenant General Bradley. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo ETO-HQ-44-16809; GCMRL/Photographs (3201A).
40. Soon after his arrival in Paris on October 6, 1944, General Marshall confers with General Eisenhower. Keystone Press Agency, Inc.; GCMRL/Photographs (2067).
41. French children greet General Marshall during his visit to France in October 1944. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 195355-S; GCMRL/Photographs (8A).
42. During his inspection trip in France on October 10, 1944, General Marshall talks with Major General Walker; standing in the background are Lieutenant Generals Handy and Patton. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo ETO-HQ-44-17518; GCMRL/Photographs (6366).
43. General Marshall listens as Major General Irwin describes the surrounding French terrain, October 10, 1944. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo ETO-HQ-44-17517; GCMRL/Photographs (203A).
44. General Marshall talks with soldiers in Belgium on October 11, 1944; standing in the background are Major Generals Middleton and Stroh. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo; GCMRL/Photographs (1950).
45. Major General Cota greets General Marshall in Belgium on October

- 11, 1944. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 194926; GCMRL/Photographs (3651).
46. An informal portrait of General Marshall taken somewhere in the European Theater of Operations, October 1944. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 197543; GCMRL/Photographs (3221).
47. General Marshall talks to soldiers in the vicinity of the Siegfried Line, Germany, October 11, 1944. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 195324; GCMRL/Photographs (342).
48. General Marshall, Major General Collins, and Lieutenant General Handy inspect a Siegfried Line sector. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 194924; GCMRL/Photographs (320).
49. General Marshall talks with Brigadier General Tupper during his visit to France in October 1944. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo; GCMRL/Photographs (1325A).
50. Brigadier General Palmer meets with General Marshall in the chief of staff's office, November 1944. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 243429; GCMRL/Photographs (220).
51. General Marshall watches a combat demonstration staged at the Fort McClellan, Alabama, Infantry Replacement Training Center, December 13, 1944. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo; GCMRL/Photographs (3031).

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Document, Marshall to Merrill Pasco, September 19, 1944. GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General).

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Map, The Western Front and Allied Headquarters Marshall Visited, October 7–13, 1944.

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Map, U.S. Army Theaters and Commands, 1943–1944.

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Map, Pacific Landings by U.S. Forces, June 1943–December 1944.

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Map, Allied Operations, Western Mediterranean, 1943–1944.

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Map, Southeast Asian Operations, June 1943–December 1944.

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Map, Normandy Landings and Breakout, June 6–September 25, 1944.



# Chronology

June 1, 1943–December 31, 1944

The following is a list of the more important events of General Marshall's life (in roman type) and of influence on his job (in italic type) during the period covered by this volume. All events involving Marshall (GCM) took place in Washington, D.C., Fort Myer, Virginia, or the Pentagon Building unless otherwise noted. During the warmer months, Marshall spent some weekends at his home (Dodona Manor) in Leesburg, Virginia. Marshall's secretaries kept diaries of appointments, conferences, and trips, but these usually omit his office routine—i.e., his frequent meetings with the secretary of war and his personal staff and the visits of the General Staff. (GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Engagement and Visitor Records].)

The following chronology omits most of the numerous social and diplomatic luncheons, receptions, and dinners that Marshall attended, but it includes all White House meetings. This list does not include the weekly Joint Chiefs of Staff (J.C.S.) meetings, which were usually held on Tuesdays at 2:15 P.M. and often preceded by a J.C.S. luncheon at 1:00 P.M., and the weekly Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S.) meetings, which were usually held on Fridays at 2:30 P.M., unless a special meeting was called on a day other than the one normally scheduled.

## May 1943

- 26 Departs with Churchill for Algiers Conference (arrives 28th).

## June 1943

- 4 Departs Algiers for Washington, D.C., via Accra (Gold Coast), Ascension Island, Recife and Belem (Brazil), Antigua, and Bermuda (arrives 7th).
- 8 White House meeting, noon. Off-the-record press conference, 5:00 P.M.
- 16 Meeting with Colonel Hobby and WAAC staff regarding "slander campaign," 3:30 P.M.
- 21 Speech at the Governors Conference, Columbus, Ohio.
- 22 Departs for vacation at Sainte Anne des Monts, Quebec (returns 25th).
- 30 *Operation CARTWHEEL launched in the Southwest Pacific.*

## July 1943

- 5 Travels to Boston with Admiral King (returns 7th).

- 7 *General Giraud arrives in Washington, D.C. (departs 16th).*
- 8 Special C.C.S. meeting, 11:00 A.M. White House luncheon for Giraud, 1:00 P.M.
- 10 *Sicily invaded (Operation HUSKY).*
- 16 White House meeting, 9:30 A.M.
- 23 White House meeting, 9:30 A.M. Special J.C.S. meeting, 2:00 P.M.
- 25 *Mussolini's resignation announced.*
- 26 Special J.C.S. meeting, noon. Special C.C.S. meeting, 2:00 P.M.
- 28 *FDR broadcasts Italian surrender terms.*

#### **August 1943**

- 4 War Council meeting, 11:30 A.M.
- 6 Special J.C.S. meeting, noon.
- 7 Special J.C.S. meeting, 11:45 A.M.
- 9 J.C.S. approves OVERLORD as primary U.S.-U.K. effort in Europe. White House meeting regarding U.S. strategy and Quebec Conference, 2:00 P.M.
- 10 Special J.C.S. meeting, noon. White House meeting, 2:00 P.M.
- 14–24 At Quadrant Conference, Quebec.
- 25 Press conference, 2:30 P.M.
- 30 White House meeting regarding postwar disposition of U.S.-built airfields in North Africa, 2:00 P.M.

#### **September 1943**

- 2 White House meeting (including Churchill and Ismay) concerning the Italian campaign, 11:00 A.M.
- 3 *Secret armistice signed ending Italian participation in war (made public September 8; final surrender agreement 29th).*
- 8 White House meeting (including Churchill), 10:50 A.M.
- 9 *AVALANCHE: 5th Army lands at Salerno.* White House meeting with Churchill, regarding Italian political-military situation, 12:30 P.M. Special J.C.S. meeting, 4:15 P.M. White House meeting, 5:00 P.M.
- 10 *German troops seize Rome.* Special C.C.S. meeting, 11:00 A.M. Luncheon with Churchill at White House, 1:15 P.M.
- 11 White House meeting, 11:00 A.M.
- 14 Departs for Mexico City, 2:45 P.M. (returns 17th, 11:00 P.M.).
- 18 Meeting with Justice Byrnes (and Admirals Leahy and King) at White House, 10:00 A.M.
- 20 Testifies before Senate and House Military Affairs Committees (jointly) regarding fathers draft bill, 10:30 A.M. Departs from Hill c. 3:00 P.M. for American Legion Convention, Omaha, Nebraska.
- 21 Speaks on radio from American Legion Convention, Omaha, 12:30 P.M. (returns 10:00 P.M.).



- 23 Aberdeen Proving Ground, noon. Speaks on Blue Network regarding "Back the Attack" campaign, 9:34 P.M.
- 27 Address to industrialists in Signal Corps Projection Room, 10:00 A.M.
- 28 Lunch with Hopkins, 1:00 P.M., then appointment with FDR. Departs for New York City (4:00 P.M.) for Veterans of Foreign Wars dinner (returns 29th, 8:30 A.M.).

#### October 1943

- 1 American Society of Newspaper Editors luncheon, Statler Hotel, 1:00 P.M.
- 3 *Japanese army opens broad-front offensive in central China.*
- 13 *Italy declares war on Germany.*
- 20 Speaks to House members at Library of Congress, 8:30 A.M.
- 21 White House meeting, 11:00 A.M. Speaks to Senate members at Library of Congress, 2:00 P.M.

#### November 1943

- 5 Departs for White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, and Hot Springs, Virginia, 4:30 P.M. (returns 7th, c. 3:00 P.M.).
- 8 At White House with General Arnold, 2:45 P.M.
- 9 At White House for formal signing of United Nations for Relief and Rehabilitation Administration agreement, 11:45 A.M.
- 11 Departs for Cairo-Teheran Conferences, noon. Aboard the USS *Iowa* with FDR and the Chiefs of Staff (11th-20th).
- 20 Arrives Oran, Algeria; departs for Tunis.
- 21 Departs Tunis for Cairo (Mena House Hotel).
- 22-26 First Cairo Conference; departs for Teheran, 27th.
- 28-30 Teheran meetings; departs for Jerusalem (1st) and Cairo (2d).

#### December 1943

- 3-7 Second Cairo Conference.
- 6 *Eisenhower named to command OVERLORD.*
- 8 Departs Cairo for Luxor; visits Valley of the Kings. Departs for Karachi, India (9th); departs for Colombo, Ceylon (10th); departs for Exmouth Gulf, Western Australia (11th); departs for Darwin (13th); departs for Port Moresby, New Guinea (14th).
- 15 Visits Alamo Force (Goodenough Island); meets with MacArthur.
- 17 Returns to Port Moresby; departs for Guadalcanal.
- 18 Views from the air various Solomon Islands sites; visits New Hebrides.
- 19 Visits Fiji Islands and Canton Island; departs for Hawaii; arrives at Honolulu.
- 20 Arrives in Los Angeles (arrives in Washington, D.C., 22d, 6:30 P.M.).
- 23 White House meeting regarding coming railroad strike, 10:30 A.M.



- 31 GCM's birthday party in Secretary Stimson's office, noon. Off-the-record press conference, 3:45 P.M.

### **January 1944**

- 3 Hosts dinner for Eisenhower and other visiting officers to meet with top members of Congress, 7:30 P.M.  
7 Departs for Miami, Florida, 3:30 P.M. (returns 16th).  
11 *Allied strategic air forces in England commence Operation POINT-BLANK.*  
22 *Allied forces land at Anzio, south of Rome.*  
24 American Society of Newspaper Editors luncheon, Statler Hotel, 1:00 P.M. Dinner for Admiral Halsey aboard Admiral King's flagship, 8:00 P.M.  
26 Views exhibit of jet aircraft at Bolling Field, 4:00 P.M., then departs for New York City with General Arnold; sees film "Winged Victory."  
27 Returns to Washington, D.C., morning.  
28 President's birthday ball dinner, Mayflower Hotel, 8:00 P.M.  
31 Address over C.B.S. radio network, 8:00 P.M. *U.S. forces land on Kwajalein and other islands in the Marshall Islands.*

### **February 1944**

- 3 Speaks at American Legion dinner, Mayflower Hotel, 7:30 P.M.  
4 *Japanese launch major offensive in Burma.*  
11 White House meeting, noon.  
16 Departs for New Haven, Connecticut, with Sir John Dill and Admiral King, 11:00 A.M. Makes remarks at Yale University regarding Dill (returns Washington, D.C., 6:00 P.M.).  
21 Special J.C.S. meeting, noon. White House meeting on ANVIL, 2:00 P.M.  
22 Speaks at Civilian Agencies luncheon, 12:30 P.M., followed by weekly J.C.S. meeting, 2:15 P.M.  
23 Appears off-the-record before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 10:30 A.M. Trip to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, 12:15 P.M. (returns 5:00 P.M.). Reception at Soviet Embassy, 6:00 P.M. Masonic dinner at Willard Hotel, 7:00 P.M.  
25 Departs for Georgetown, South Carolina, with Bernard Baruch, 3:30 P.M. Spends the weekend at Hasty Point (returns 27th, 6:00 P.M.).

### **March 1944**

- 1 White House meeting, 2:00 P.M.  
3 Special J.C.S. meeting, 2:00 P.M., and weekly C.C.S. meeting, 2:30 P.M.  
4 Departs for inspection trip to South and Southwest, 9:00 A.M. Inspects Eglin Field, Florida; arrives in Mississippi.

- 5 Inspects troops at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, and at Louisiana maneuver area; arrives in San Antonio, Texas.
- 6 Inspects Air Corps training schools at Randolph Field, Texas. Inspects tank destroyer camps at Camp Hood, Texas; arrives in Oklahoma.
- 7 Inspects Fort Sill, Oklahoma; arrives in Kentucky.
- 8 Inspects Camp Campbell, Kentucky; arrives in Washington, D.C., 3:30 P.M.
- 10 Special J.C.S. meeting, 2:00 P.M., and weekly C.C.S. meeting, 2:30 P.M. Dinner hosted by Lord and Lady Halifax at British Embassy, 8:00 P.M.
- 11 Special J.C.S. meeting, 10:30 A.M.
- 12 Special J.C.S. meeting, 10:00 A.M.
- 13 Press conference, noon. White House meeting, 4:45 P.M.
- 25 Departs for Bermuda with Dill, 7:45 A.M. (returns morning of 28th).
- 29 Luncheon for General de Saint-Didier, 1:00 P.M.
- 30 Visits Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, noon.

#### **April 1944**

- 3 Departs for Williamsburg, Virginia, with General Arnold and Sir John Dill, 9:00 A.M. (returns Washington, D.C., 3:00 P.M.)
- 8 Special J.C.S. meeting, 11:00 A.M. Special C.C.S. meeting, 11:30 A.M.
- 9 Attends sunrise Easter service at Arlington Cemetery.
- 21 Speaks off-the-record at American Society of Newspaper Editors luncheon, Statler Hotel, 1:00 P.M.
- 22 Attends American Society of Newspaper Editors dinner, Statler Hotel, 7:00 P.M.
- 24 Special C.C.S. meeting, noon.
- 25 Departs for New York City, 3:00 P.M. Speaks off-the-record at American Newspaper Publishers Association dinner, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel.
- 28 Special J.C.S. meeting, 2:00 P.M., and weekly C.C.S. meeting, 2:30 P.M.
- 30 Departs for inspection trip to the South and West Coast, 2:30 P.M. Visits military installations in Georgia, Texas, Arizona, California, Oregon, and the Boeing aircraft plant at Seattle, Washington. Returns May 10, 3:00 P.M.

#### **May 1944**

- 11 *Allied forces in Italy launch major offensive against German Gustav Line.*
- 12 Appears before Military Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, c. 10:30 A.M.
- 16 Meets with General de Saint-Didier, 10:30 A.M.



- 18 *Allied forces occupy Monte Cassino, Italy. U.S. campaign ends in the Admiralty Islands.*
- 24 Departs for New York City, 2:00 P.M. Speaks at National Institute of Social Sciences dinner, Waldorf-Astoria, 7:00 P.M.
- 26 Attends National Research Council Committee luncheon, 12:15 P.M. Special J.C.S. meeting, 2:00 P.M., and weekly C.C.S. meeting, 2:30 P.M.
- 29 Capitol building, 10:30 A.M. Speaks off-the-record at Governors Conference luncheon, Hershey, Pennsylvania, 1:00 P.M. Second Lieutenant Allen T. Brown, GCM's stepson, killed near Anzio.

#### **June 1944**

- 2 Special J.C.S. meeting, 2:00 P.M., and weekly C.C.S. meeting, 2:30 P.M.
- 4 *U.S. 5th Army enters Rome.*
- 5 Receives Order of Suvorov from Soviet Ambassador Gromyko at Soviet Embassy, 8:00 P.M.
- 6 White House meeting, 11:30 A.M. *Allied forces commence the amphibious assault of northwestern France over the beaches of Normandy.*
- 8 Departs for England, 9:00 A.M. (arrives 9th), to meet with Allied commanders and tour Normandy beaches (returns 21st).
- 10 Meets with Churchill at Chequers.
- 11 Departs in evening by train for southern English coast to embark on morning visit to the Normandy beaches.
- 12 Visits American beachheads in Normandy, Omar Bradley's headquarters, field hospitals, and troop units; returns to London.
- 13 Visits U.S.A.A.F. bases in England. *First German V-1 rockets launched against England.*
- 15 *U.S. Marines land on Saipan in the Marianas and U.S. B-29s make first strategic bombing raid on Japan from bases in China.*
- 16 Visits Eisenhower's headquarters; dines with Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill; departs for Italian front.
- 17 Arrives in Naples with General Arnold in evening.
- 18 Observes Anzio and Salerno battlefields from air; visits the grave of Allen T. Brown; visits Mark Clark's 5th Army headquarters near Tuscania.
- 19 Visits Rome and Viterbo with General Arnold by car; attends conference of senior Allied Mediterranean commanders. *Decisive naval and air battle of the Philippine Sea (19th and 20th).*
- 20 Departs Italy for the United States with General Arnold.
- 21 Stops at refueling base at Stephenville, Newfoundland, and goes on fishing expedition; arrives in Washington, D.C., late evening.
- 22 White House meeting, noon.

- 26 Press conference, 3:00 P.M.
- 29 Special C.C.S. meeting, 2:30 P.M.

#### July 1944

- 3 Lunch with General Pershing at Walter Reed Hospital, 1:00 P.M.
- 5 War Council meeting, 11:00 A.M.
- 6 Meets General de Gaulle at Washington National Airport, 4:00 P.M.
- 7 Attends White House luncheon for de Gaulle, 1:00 P.M., and War Department dinner for de Gaulle, 8:00 P.M.
- 9 Attends General de Gaulle's dinner, 8:00 P.M.
- 10 With General Arnold, attends departure of de Gaulle at airport, 11:40 A.M. Special J.C.S. meeting, 1:30 P.M.
- 18 *Tojo removed from power as Japan's premier, war minister, and army chief of staff.*
- 19 War Council meeting, 11:00 A.M.
- 21 *U.S. forces land on Guam.*
- 25 *U.S. forces launch major offensive in the Saint-Lô area.*
- 28 Special J.C.S. meeting, 2:00 P.M., and weekly C.C.S. meeting, 2:30 P.M.

#### August 1944

- 2 War Council meeting, 11:00 A.M.
- 3 *Myitkyina, Burma, captured by Allied troops.*
- 7 Army Pearl Harbor Board testimony, 11:00 A.M. Special J.C.S. meeting, 2:00 P.M. Special C.C.S. meeting, 2:30 P.M.
- 9 Departs for Adirondacks, 10:00 A.M. (returns 15th, noon).
- 13–19 *Falaise Gap battle.*
- 15 *U.S.-French forces land in southern France (Operation DRAGOON).*
- 17 White House meeting, noon. Special J.C.S. luncheon, 12:30 P.M.
- 18 Special J.C.S. luncheon, 12:30 P.M.
- 21 *Dumbarton Oaks International Peace and Security Conference opens in Washington, D.C. (ends October 9).*
- 22 Departs for California fishing expedition with General Arnold, 9:00 P.M. (returns 30th, 1:15 P.M.).
- 25 *Germans surrender Paris.*

#### September 1944

- 1 Special J.C.S. meeting, 2:15 P.M.
- 2 Navy Pearl Harbor Board testimony, 10:30 A.M.
- 7 Dinner honoring GCM by "Off-the-Record Newsmen," 7:00 P.M.
- 8 White House meeting, 11:00 A.M. *First V-2 rockets hit England.*
- 11 Departs for Quebec Conference, 2:00 P.M. (returns 16th, 6:00 P.M.).
- 12–16 Second Quebec Conference (OCTAGON).
- 17 *Operation MARKET-GARDEN launched in the Netherlands (ends 28th).*
- 18 Trip to and from Chicago to speak at American Legion Convention.



- 28 Addresses Women's Advisory Council, 9:00 A.M.
- 29 Grunert Army Pearl Harbor Board testimony, 10:30 A.M.

**October 1944**

- 2 Grunert Board comes to GCM's office, 2:00 P.M.
- 4 War Council meeting, 11:00 A.M. J.C.S. meeting with FDR, 3:30 P.M.
- 5 Departs for France, 8:45 A.M. (returns 14th, 7:30 P.M.).
- 18 War Council meeting, 11:00 A.M. *Stilwell relieved of China command.*
- 20 *U.S. landings on coast of Leyte in the Philippines.* Special J.C.S. meeting, 2:00 P.M., and weekly C.C.S. meeting, 2:30 P.M. (closed session).
- 23-26 *Battle of Leyte Gulf.*
- 27 Navy Day dinner in New York, 8:00 P.M.

**November 1944**

- 1 War Council meeting, 11:00 A.M.
- 3 Departs for Hot Springs, Virginia, 11:25 P.M. (returns 5th, 11:00 A.M.).
- 6-7 GCM out of office, ill with cold.
- 8 *Sir John Dill's funeral*, 2:00 P.M.
- 15 War Council meeting, 11:00 A.M.
- 17 Special J.C.S. meeting, 2:00 P.M. Departs on inspection trip to Southeast, 3:30 P.M. (returns 21st, 6:05 A.M.).
- 24 Departs for Baltimore with General Arnold, 2:30 P.M. (returns 26th).

**December 1944**

- 2 Attends Army-Navy football game, Baltimore, Maryland.
- 4 Departs for Camp Butner, North Carolina, 12:30 P.M. (returns 5th, noon).
- 8 Special J.C.S. meeting, 3:00 P.M., and weekly C.C.S. meeting, 3:30 P.M.
- 12 Departs for Chicago, 2:30 P.M., to speak at Illinois Manufacturer's Association dinner, 8:00 P.M.
- 13-14 Inspects Replacement Training Centers in Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina.
- 16 *Germans launch Ardennes offensive (Battle of the Bulge); Bastogne siege, December 21-26.*
- 20 War Council meeting, 11:00 A.M.
- 22 Special J.C.S. meeting, 2:00 P.M., and weekly C.C.S. meeting, 2:30 P.M.
- 29 Special J.C.S. meeting, 2:00 P.M., and weekly C.C.S. meeting, 2:30 P.M. J.C.S. New Year's party for British members of C.C.S., 3:00 P.M.

# Pattern for the Future

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June 1 – August 31, 1943

*We have passed through the period of military adolescence, our initial deployments have been completed and lines of communications solidly established. . . . Tunisia gave us an invaluable pattern for the future. But the tasks will be increasingly difficult, usually with the great hazard of an overwater approach and a heavy battle to be maintained beyond the beaches. The way will be far from easy, the losses heavy, but the victory certain.*

—Speech Prepared for the Governors' Conference  
June 21, 1943

1. [Illegible]

2. [Illegible]

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38. [Illegible]

39. [Illegible]

40. [Illegible]



AT the May TRIDENT Conference in Washington, British and American leaders had, on numerous issues, reiterated the general arguments they had made at the Casablanca Conference in January—the main Europe-Mediterranean theater issue being the relative proportion of Allied resources committed to the buildup for a cross-Channel invasion of France and to opportunities in the Mediterranean. As the conference was ending on May 25, Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill persuaded President Franklin D. Roosevelt to direct U.S. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall to accompany him to visit General Dwight D. Eisenhower and Allied Force Headquarters in Algiers to discuss operations subsequent to the invasion and conquest of Sicily (Operation HUSKY). (See *Papers of GCM*, 3: 705–8.)

Marshall reluctantly accepted the assignment, but until he had had a chance to discuss Mediterranean operations with Eisenhower, they were the last subject he desired to discuss in the confines of a small, noisy airplane with the persuasive and determined prime minister. By various stratagems, Marshall contrived to avoid sensitive subjects during the lengthy trip to Algiers, May 26–28, 1943. (*George C. Marshall Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue*, rev. ed. [Lexington, Va.: George C. Marshall Research Foundation, 1991], pp. 552–54.) Churchill was not secretive about the purpose of his mission, which was to convince Eisenhower to invade the Italian peninsula immediately following HUSKY; the evening he reached Algiers the prime minister began to press his case on Eisenhower. Commander Harry C. Butcher commented in his diary: “The PM recited his story three different times in three different ways last night [May 28]. He talks persistently until he has worn down the last shred of opposition. Ike is glad to have General Marshall on hand.” (*My Three Years with Eisenhower: The Personal Diary of Captain Harry C. Butcher, USNR, Naval Aide to General Eisenhower, 1942 to 1945* [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946], p. 316.)

In addition to participating in numerous informal conversations, Marshall attended three formal meetings at Eisenhower’s villa in Algiers—May 29, May 31, and June 3; between meetings he inspected various units and visited Carthage and Tunis. The prime minister and his advisers—including Churchill’s chief of staff, Lieutenant General Sir Hastings Ismay, and chief of the Imperial General Staff General Sir Alan Brooke, who had made the trip over with Churchill and Marshall, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, General Sir Harold Alexander, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, Mediterranean commanders of Allied naval, ground, and air forces respectively—insisted that: (1) Italy must be knocked out of the war as soon as possible, and thus the Allies should invade the Italian peninsula immediately after securing Sicily; (2) the Germans would be forced to shift troops into Italy and the Balkans to replace Italian forces, and this was the only effective method available to the Allies for drawing off German forces



from the Russian front; and (3) the Allies could not, for morale and political reasons, keep their ground forces largely idle during the months between the end of HUSKY in mid-summer of 1943 and the cross-Channel invasion in the spring of 1944. (The minutes of these meetings are published in *Papers and Minutes of Meetings of Principal World War II Allied Military Conferences, 1941-1945*, National Archives and Records Service Microfilm Publication M995, Roll 2, Trident Conference book, pp. 467-503. Churchill's account is largely based upon these minutes; see *The Hinge of Fate*, a volume in *The Second World War* [Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950], pp. 817-30. See also Arthur Bryant, *The Turn of the Tide: A History of the War Years Based on the Diaries of Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff* [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1957], pp. 519-25.)

Churchill asserted that there were plenty of troops available in the Mediterranean, but that he was willing to send eight additional divisions, if they were needed, to capture Rome and to force Italy to capitulate. Eisenhower was willing to concede that if the Sicilian campaign were quick and easy, he would be willing to land troops in Italy immediately. Marshall, however, refused to commit himself to support such landings until he had an idea of how long and costly the HUSKY campaign would be—i.e., until about the end of July.

Shipping, including landing craft, was a key limiting factor, and during the May 31 meeting, Marshall asked Eisenhower's chief of staff, Major General Walter Bedell Smith, how many additional antiaircraft, service, and signal troops would be needed to support an attack on the mainland. Smith estimated that thirty thousand United States and thirty-three thousand British troops would have to be landed for those purposes and that they would have to come from outside the North African Theater. Marshall observed that this involved a significant new shipping commitment that might upset the careful planning and the decisions made at the TRIDENT Conference regarding the cross-Channel invasion. The prime minister asserted that he would remove troops from Britain and cut civilian rations again if necessary to gain the extra shipping. Marshall continued to insist that he was not opposed to the broad aim of eliminating Italy from the war, but only that the Allies needed to exercise great discretion in deciding what to do after HUSKY. The minutes of the final meeting on June 3 record that the prime minister—ignoring Marshall's reluctance—"expressed his satisfaction at the great measure of agreement which he had found in these meetings." (Trident Conference book, p. 502.)

The chief of staff left Algiers at 5:45 P.M. on June 4. Flying home by way of Accra (Gold Coast), Ascension Island, Recife and Belem (Brazil), Antigua, and Bermuda, Marshall arrived in Washington at 6:00 P.M. on June 7, having traveled more than fourteen thousand miles since May 26. ★



MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MCNAIR<sup>1</sup>

*Restricted*

June 8, 1943

[Washington, D.C.]

A copy of the attached mimeograph was sent you, I was told, by Eisenhower. If so please return my copy.<sup>2</sup>

General Alexander told me that the most impressive training instruction he had seen was the brief pamphlet gotten out embodying the notes taken by Colonel Reeder on Guadalcanal.<sup>3</sup> Alexander referred to this two or three times as the sort of stuff the soldiers will read, whereas the ordinary instruction bores them.

Now I think this paper by Private Sargent of the 34th Division is along the same lines. The fact that it was written by him, that it was noted by his Division commander, by General Eisenhower and by me personally, if stated in the pamphlet, would fasten the attention of the enlisted man to a degree not possible by ordinary instructional methods.

If you agree please have such a pamphlet prepared, see that they do it promptly, and see to it that it gets the necessary distribution. Have it put up as being mainly for enlisted men.

I suppose some comments pro or con might be included in italics in parentheses if you see fit and if it seems wise to do so.<sup>4</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair was head of Army Ground Forces.

2. The Training Section at Allied Force Headquarters in Algiers had distributed 475 copies of an eight-page paper written by Private Frank B. Sargent of the Thirty-fourth Division concerning the lessons of the North African fighting, especially as they applied to training intelligence personnel. (Brigadier General Lowell W. Rooks Memorandum, May 20, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 353].)

3. Concerning the pamphlet *Fighting on Guadalcanal*, see *Papers of GCM*, 3: 526. Russell P. Reeder, Jr., had been promoted to colonel on January 29, 1943.

4. McNair replied that he was having Sargent's remarks prepared for distribution and that he had personally written a foreword for the pamphlet. (McNair Memorandum for General Marshall, June 15, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 353].) See Marshall to Krock, February 17, 1944, p. 308.

TO RALPH C. KENNEDY

June 8, 1943

[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Ralph, I returned from Africa last night to find your note of May twenty-sixth with its tender from the Lafayette Post of the American Legion of a life membership card.<sup>1</sup> I shall be honored to accept this membership, and I hope some day to thank the men in person.

Incidentally, I congratulated the commander of a platoon in Africa a few days ago on a thrilling exhibition of village fighting which his platoon was staging for the instruction of others. He gave me his name, which I have



forgotten, but when I asked him where his home was he told me Uniontown—that he lived near the Leith coal works! Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Lafayette Post No. 51 was in Uniontown, Pennsylvania, Marshall's childhood home.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN L. DE WITT  
*Secret*

June 8, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

Dear De Witt: On my return from Africa last night I found your letter of May thirty-first. While in Algiers I confirmed General McNarney's message to you delaying your reporting to Washington to June fifteenth.<sup>1</sup>

I have read very carefully what you have to say. As to your comments on the fact that you were not notified at the time others were, that is merely unfortunate. There was no skullduggery about the matter whatsoever. You were in Alaska, busy with an operation. General Richardson was heading for Hawaii as the first step in a three-cornered move. That was all. Mr. Welch's comments are to be deplored; they had no relation whatsoever to the decisions in the matter.<sup>2</sup>

After a hard struggle I succeeded in offsetting the Navy's strong effort to have a joint Army-Navy War College opened at Newport under Admiral Pye, by reaching an agreement for its location in Washington with you as the head of it. Strong objection at the time, the end of April, was that you would not be available, as I stipulated that you were to continue on until the Attu operation was clearly successful. Now to meet your request with further delay would be most unfortunate.<sup>3</sup>

I am sorry not to accommodate you in this matter but the course is clear in my mind. I want you to come on here to Washington and undertake this new job.

This is a very hurried note as I have just gotten into a mass of business, a meeting with the President, one with the Joint Chiefs of Staff,<sup>4</sup> and my departure tonight. Therefore please pardon the brevity of my reply. Understand clearly that your transfer here has nothing to do with the Japanese situation on the West Coast; that it was based purely on your knowledge of combined operations, your previous leadership of the War College and the fact that your Naval deputy, Foy, was with you at the War College.<sup>5</sup> Hastily,

G. C. Marshall

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. De Witt commanded the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army. Concerning his comments regarding the manner and timing of the announcement of his new assignment as commandant of the Army and Navy Staff College, see *Papers of GCM*, 3: 703-4. Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney was deputy chief of staff.

2. De Witt's lengthy May 31 letter described his dismay with the timing and handling of his change of assignment. When Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, Jr., new



commanding general of the Hawaiian Department, visited California, he had publicly mentioned it. Representative Richard J. Welch, a San Francisco Republican, had told the press of De Witt's relief, implying that the general's opposition to the return of Japanese Americans to the West Coast from their detention camps was the cause. (De Witt to Marshall, May 31, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. Army Air Forces headquarters had suggested establishing the first truly joint service school in the United States, and by mid-March 1943 the Navy Department had endorsed the concept. The navy wanted the school to be an adjunct of the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, which was commanded by Rear Admiral William S. Pye (U.S.N.A., 1901). Marshall insisted that the facility be in or near Washington, D.C. Moreover, he did not like the proposed curriculum. He told the head of the Organization and Training Division: "It did not appeal to me because it was the old tactical stuff, whereas the most important factor in Army-Navy Joint Staff work lies in non-detailed consideration of tactical employment for air, ground and naval vessels, with emphasis on air and logistics. Probably the latter is the most important consideration of all, and the issue least understood. The air battle is debated back and forth continuously, the comparative merits of planes, manner of employment and the record of performances are subjects of continual discussion on the ground and at the headquarters; the logistical factors are rarely ever discussed and practically never understood." (Major General Idwal H. Edwards Memorandums for the Chief of Staff, March 13, April 2, and April 9, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 352]; Marshall Memorandum for General Edwards, April 9, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Marshall's ideas concerning location and curriculum were adopted and the Army and Navy Staff College, under the supervision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was activated in June 1943.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff committee was composed of its chairman, the chief of staff to the commander in chief, Admiral William D. Leahy; Marshall; Admiral Ernest J. King, chief of naval operations; and General Henry H. Arnold, chief of the Army Air Forces.

5. De Witt became commandant of the college in mid-September. Commodore Edward J. Foy (U.S.N.A., 1908), who became deputy commandant, had graduated from the Army War College in 1932 and had served as naval instructor there between 1937 and 1940.

NOTES FOR CONFERENCE WITH ADMIRAL KING

June 8, 1943

*Secret*

[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Anti-submarine warfare.<sup>1</sup>

I have had a brief opportunity to go over your note to me of June 5th. I am sorry to find on my return from Africa that this matter is still one of apparent complete misunderstanding.<sup>2</sup>

It seems to me that the first step in reaching a solution is to determine whether or not joint Air command in this matter, regardless of whether it is an Army or Navy officer, is to be operated throughout the echelons under the provisions of JCS 263/2/D.<sup>3</sup> My view is that it should be so operated. If this is not acceptable then it appears that the matter should be taken to the President.

Apparently the portion of JCS 263/2/D on which an agreement can be reached is the following:

"Normally in operations, this will consist of the assignment of their respective missions. In carrying out its mission the tactics and



technique of the force concerned are the responsibility of that force.”

As to paragraph 3 regarding training it would seem that tactics and technique should be developed along uniform lines. However, as I understand it, Naval training now in progress for very long-range aircraft is quite similar to Army training. If this is correct no material dislocation will occur.

With further reference to the question of concept of command as discussed in paragraph 4: it seems to me the difficulty has been that details of operations which are to be carried out by aircraft alone are covered in the orders of commanders who are not technicians as to the particular weapon involved. For example, the issue of dropping bombs in train rather than by salvo, which occurred in the Caribbean Arch. It required the cumbersome procedure of a Board. It seems to me that such operational details should be a function of the higher Naval command, meaning in this particular case the Sea Frontier commander.

I have spoken to General McNarney regarding the system of command and it is his view that no reorganization of Naval command whatsoever in the Atlantic is required or was implied in his statements to Admiral Edwards.<sup>4</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The control of aerial antisubmarine warfare had been debated by army and navy leaders for a year. See *Papers of GCM*, 3: 241–42, 651–52. See also Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK, August 1942 to December 1943*, a volume in *The Army Air Forces in World War II* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 384–92, 402–6; and Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), pp. 508–17.

2. On June 5 Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest J. King sent Marshall a memorandum regarding his understanding of the current army position on the aerial antisubmarine warfare issue. Paragraph 2 stated that Deputy Chief of Staff McNarney had given the navy the impression that an army officer should command all the long-range bombers used in antisubmarine warfare and that he proposed a command system that would require the navy to reorganize its Atlantic command structure in order to create an air command separate from other navy arms. In paragraph 3 King insisted that he could “not assent to any such scheme” involving disunity between air and surface forces. Moreover, he was unwilling to shift responsibility for tactics, technique, training, and operational use of naval aircraft to an Army Air Forces commander who “might be expected to modify all that the Navy has so far done.” Regarding which concept of airpower command—army or navy—would be followed, King stated in paragraph 4: “In view of the fact that I am responsible for anti-submarine operations, and that Army aviation, if it comes into the picture, is to be added to a naval force already in being, it seems to me not unreasonable that naval principles of command organization be followed.” (King Memorandum for General Marshall, June 5, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 560].)

3. Joint Chiefs of Staff Serial 263/2/D was dated April 20, 1943, and titled “Unified Command for U.S. Joint Operations.” Under this decision, command of joint forces would be determined by the nature of the mission to be performed. (See Minutes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, April 20, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS 334, JCS Minutes].)



4. Vice Admiral Richard S. Edwards (U.S.N.A., 1907) was deputy chief of naval operations. He had been responsible for directing antisubmarine operations from January 1942 until May 1943, when the Tenth Fleet was created to do this. For further developments in the control of antisubmarine activities, see Marshall Memorandum for the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, June 15, 1943, pp. 14–15.

TO MAJOR GENERAL ALVAN C. GILLEM, JR.<sup>1</sup>

June 11, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Gillem: I received your note of June third this morning with reference to the graduation of my stepson, Allen Tupper Brown, on June nineteenth, with the invitation for me to address the graduating class.

I appreciate the courtesy of your note and proposal as well as that of General Holly and I am sorry that I cannot accept.<sup>2</sup> The fact of the matter is, I had very much hoped that Allen could get through the School without his identity being disclosed, and I ask you now to see that his graduation bears no comment on his connection with me. The fact that it is known that he is my stepson denies him a good bit of the credit for earning his own way and I am distressed that it has become public.

Please ask General Holly to do his best to see that there is no public comment regarding Allen's connection with me. I hope you do not misunderstand my feelings in this matter.

I think I shall see you Monday morning but I am sending a copy of this letter to you by air mail direct and a copy to General Holly. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/Research File (Family)

1. Gillem had been commanding general of the Armored Force, Fort Knox, Kentucky, since May 17, 1943.

2. Brigadier General Joseph A. Holly (U.S.M.A., 1919) had been commandant of the Armored School at Fort Knox since March 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SOMERVELL  
*Confidential*

June 11, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

I had a lengthy talk with General Olmstead. He expressed a willingness to accept our decision in a soldierly manner.<sup>1</sup> He is concerned to be eliminated from further military consideration during the progress of the war.

I told him that the decision was taken for his relief and General Ingles' appointment in his place at the head of the Signal Corps.<sup>2</sup> He told me that

there had been a proposition made to him as Chief Signal Officer by the State Department to provide someone to head a board in relations to matters concerning Fly<sup>3</sup> and similar international communication matters. He would like that job for himself.

I told him to have a memorandum for me by Monday morning stating exactly what the proposition was and of what nature the appointment would be.

Please look into the legal status of matters for me. My understanding is, based on how we disposed of the Chief of Coast Artillery and the Chief of Infantry, that we can assign chiefs of branches any way we choose. If this is the case, and the State Department affair appears a suitable proposition, we could assign Olmstead to this job and allow him to remain on active duty at least for the time being. He could be relieved in a letter order from the active duties of Chief Signal Officer and Ingles, who is already a Major General, assigned as Acting Chief Signal Officer.

Please look into this and let me know.<sup>4</sup>

I am attaching your draft of a letter for him to sign which I did not use, pending consideration of the State Department affair.<sup>5</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Major General Dawson Olmstead had been chief of the Signal Corps since October 1, 1941. Problems with army communications had prompted the creation of the Board to Investigate Communications, which took testimony between May 11 and June 8, 1943. Olmstead's relations with his immediate superior, Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, head of Army Service Forces, had deteriorated steadily since early 1943, to the point where Somervell had told the investigating board on June 4 that Olmstead had to be replaced. (George Raynor Thompson et al., *The Signal Corps: The Test*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1957], pp. 561-62.)

2. Major General Harry C. Ingles (U.S.M.A., 1914) had served as chief signal officer and then chief of staff of the Caribbean Defense Command during 1942, then briefly as head of the Panama Mobile Force and deputy commander of the European Theater of Operations.

3. James L. Fly (U.S.N.A., 1920) was chairman of the Federal Communications Commission and of the Board of War Communications.

4. Somervell opposed reassigning Olmstead and appointing Ingles as acting chief signal officer. "As long as any one is 'acting' he lacks proper prestige and authority, is not in a strong position to make the reforms which are needed." (Somervell Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, June 13, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 201 Olmstead].)

5. Somervell had prepared a letter of resignation for Olmstead to sign; despite Marshall's comment, Somervell succeeded in getting Olmstead to sign it on June 11. Olmstead was relieved and retired on June 30, 1943. He was immediately recalled to active duty and spent several weeks during the summer serving on the Interdepartmental Telecommunications Committee, a State Department initiative. He retired permanently in January 1944. (Thompson et al., *The Signal Corps: The Test*, pp. 562-63.)



MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT U.S. CHIEFS  
OF STAFF  
*Secret*

June 14, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Air operation against German Navy.

At the present time a small German Naval force successfully contains in home waters a large proportion of the British Royal Navy. It is assumed that the British Air Force has considered the problem of an air attack against the German fleet elements. However, except for the new Mosquito aircraft, the British have not specialized on daylight bombing.

Under the circumstances it is proposed that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a directive initiating immediate study of the problem of operating against the German North Sea capital ships with American four-engine bombers.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. One of the army's chief planners, Brigadier General Albert C. Wedemeyer of the Operations Division had brought the operation to Marshall's attention. (Wedemeyer Memorandum for General Marshall, June 8, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 381, Case 168].) The Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed a proposed directive (J.C.S. 362, "Air Operation Against the German Navy") at their June 15 meeting. They agreed to expand the proposal to include a study of the feasibility of precision bombing against the French fleet in Toulon and referred the paper to the British Chiefs of Staff for study. The British objected that the targets in northern Norway were out of range, but Arnold and Marshall argued that the B-17s could be specially fitted and permission obtained from the Soviet Union for them to land at Murmansk bases, refit, and strike again on the return trip to Britain. On July 2, however, the J.C.S. accepted British objections and dropped the project. The Royal Navy was planning to attack the German ships (*Tirpitz*, *Scharnhorst*, and *Lützow*) with midget submarines in late September. (Supplementary Minutes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Meetings, June 15 and 22, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS 334, JCS Minutes]; Supplementary Minutes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Meetings, June 18 and 22, 1943, *ibid.*, CCS Minutes; S. W. Roskill, *The War at Sea, 1939–1945*, volume 3, *The Offensive*, part 1, *1st June 1943–31st May 1944*, a volume in the *History of the Second World War* [London: HMSO, 1960], pp. 64–66.)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL STRONG<sup>1</sup>  
*Secret*

June 14, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

I have read your memorandum of June 14th regarding "Control of Dangerous Publicity" in the matter of atomic energy. It seems to me the

procedure you propose is rather dangerous—too much of detail and too many people involved.

I suggest that you personally speak to Mr. Elmer Davis and Mr. Byron Price, requesting them to suppress any publicity or investigations regarding atomic matters. I shall undertake to reach Senator Truman and have him instruct his counsel to drop any investigation of the Pasco plant.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Major General George V. Strong was assistant chief of staff for intelligence (G-2).
2. Davis was director of the Office of War Information and Price was director of the Office of Censorship. In early 1943 the army and E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company had agreed to acquire 670 square miles along the Columbia River in south-central Washington near the town of Pasco, to construct the Hanford Engineer Works, which was to produce plutonium for the atomic bomb project. Problems arose during the spring over land acquisition and compensation to local farmers, who were protesting to their representatives in Washington, D.C., and to the Senate Special Investigating Committee headed by Harry S. Truman. (Vincent C. Jones, *Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1985], pp. 110–11, 334–37.)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL PERSONS<sup>1</sup>

*Personal and Very Secret*

June 14, 1943

[Washington, D.C.]

I wish you would see Senator Truman and tell me [*him*] *for me* that I should appreciate his instructing his counsel to ask no questions whatsoever regarding the DuPont plant under construction near Pasco. Also, request him to suppress any discussion of the matter so far as possible.

This is a matter of great importance and one in which I am exercising a direct personal supervision.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Brigadier General Wilton B. Persons was head of the Legislative and Liaison Division of the General Staff.
2. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson also asked Senator Truman to trust him that the project was necessary but that he could not discuss it. Truman "said that was all he needed to know." (June 17, 1943, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 43: 122].)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JACOB L. DEVERS<sup>1</sup>

Radio No. R-9529. *Secret*

June 14, 1943

Washington, D.C.

For General Devers for his eye only from General Marshall. Reference Eaker's recent statement regarding rapid growth of the Bomber Command in England: put him on his guard against such statements because the immediate result was a heavy drive for more planes for the Pacific. Dr.



Evatt made an assault on us the following day. If Eaker understands that he is selling out his organization he will be more discreet.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-5614])

1. On May 10, 1943, Devers had become commander of the U.S. Army's European Theater of Operations, which put him in charge of U.S. ground and air forces—and operational planning for them—in the British Isles.

2. Major General Ira C. Eaker stated at a press conference at his headquarters in Britain that the Eighth Air Force had doubled in size since March 1943 and would double again by October. (*New York Times*, June 11, 1943, p. 1.) Australian Minister for External Affairs Herbert V. Evatt had been pressing the United States to increase aircraft allocations to the Royal Australian Air Force. See *Papers of GCM*, 3: 702.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
*Secret*

June 14, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Operations of Red Air Force Subsequent to SOAPSUDS.<sup>1</sup>

Assuming that operation SOAPSUDS is successful, continued efforts to insure the destruction and/or to preclude the repair of damage of this objective should be made. The Red Air Force has bombers (Type TB-7) capable of undertaking a special operation similar to SOAPSUDS. If the situation on the eastern front is favorable in July, it would be of great assistance to the Allies if the Red Air Force were to follow up this operation and strike the same objective with force at a propitious time subsequent to SOAPSUDS.

It therefore appears desirable that at the proper time (subsequent to SOAPSUDS) the President and the Prime Minister should jointly request Premier Stalin to have the Russian Air Force undertake this mission.

It is recommended that this matter be placed before the Combined Chiefs of Staff for consideration.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. SOAPSUDS was the planned operation to bomb the oil refineries around Ploesti, Romania. For Prime Minister Churchill's opinion of this code name, see Marshall Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, September 1, 1943, pp. 109–10.

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed a proposed directive on this subject (C.C.S. 255/1) on September 10. An amended version (255/2) was presented to Churchill the following day, and he said that he would discuss it with Roosevelt. Admiral Leahy thought the proposal politically inadvisable, because the Soviet attitude might be that Britain and the United States had failed to respond to many of their requests, especially for a "Second Front," and now the Soviets were being asked to finish an operation the Allies had initiated. (Supplementary Minutes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Meeting, September 10, 1943, and Minutes of Meeting Held by the Prime Minister with the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the White House, September 11, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS 334, CCS Minutes].)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL McNARNEY

June 15, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Distinguished Service Medals and Legions of Merit.

I am prepared to approve the attached with the following reservation:<sup>1</sup>

I don't want the awards made to men who are still in the War Department or in this country. For those who are overseas in active theaters the awards are OK for being passed out gradually as proposed in this paper.

I wish you would charge yourself with a general supervision of this matter of awards in order that we shall not develop a situation where the men in the field will feel that favoritism to the staff officers at headquarters exists.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. McNarney had sent the chief of staff a list of persons to be awarded decorations.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER  
IN CHIEF, U.S. FLEET AND CHIEF OF  
NAVAL OPERATIONS [KING]  
*Secret*

June 15, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

The action proposed in your memorandum of 14 June 1943 on the anti-submarine air question appears to offer a practical solution to this problem.<sup>1</sup>

Any agreement arrived at with respect to this matter will undoubtedly serve as a guide for the committee charged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with determining the proper missions for the Army and Navy air, surface and amphibious forces. Accordingly I believe it highly desirable to formalize, at this time, the entire statement made by Generals Arnold and McNarney to Admiral McCain.<sup>2</sup> I understand this statement included matter contained in subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d) of par. 1 of your memorandum and also the following: that

a. The Fleet Air Wings which the Navy proposes to station along the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts will contain no striking forces but will be restricted to airplanes capable of undertaking such offshore patrol as is necessary, in addition to pure anti-submarine operations.

b. The Navy agrees that all long-range striking forces for the defense of the Western Hemisphere and for active operations in other theaters will be assigned as an Army responsibility.



c. Long-range patrol planes assigned to Fleet Air Wings of any type are for the primary purpose of conducting offshore patrol and relieving the Army strategic striking forces from this duty.

Before taking up with the Secretary of War the matter of turning over of the Army B-24's to the Navy as outlined in your memorandum, I should appreciate your comments on the points referred to in sub-paragraphs *a*, *b* and *c* above.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Concerning the control of aerial antisubmarine warfare, see Marshall Notes for Conference with Admiral King, June 8, 1943, pp. 7–9.

2. Marshall and King had established an interservice committee to draw up an agreement on aerial antisubmarine warfare. On June 10, 1943, General Henry H. Arnold, Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney, and Rear Admiral John S. McCain met to propose a settlement. The official Army Air Forces history states that the agreement “constituted a radical division of responsibility in the employment of long-range aircraft. In return for unquestioned control of all forces employed in reconnaissance, offshore patrol, and for the protection of shipping, the Navy agreed to relinquish all claims to control of long-range striking forces operating from shore bases.” (Craven and Cate, eds., *Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK*, p. 407.)

Paragraph 1 of Admiral King's memorandum for Marshall listed the following: “(a) the Army is prepared to withdraw Army air forces from anti-submarine operations at such time as the Navy is ready to take over those duties completely; (b) Army anti-submarine airplanes would be continued in that service as long as the Navy has need for them; (c) Army anti-submarine B-24 airplanes would be turned over to the Navy in such numbers as they could be replaced by Navy combat B-24s; (d) The Navy is requested to submit a schedule on which the Army can turn over their planes to the Navy and draw Navy replacement B-24s.” (King Memorandum for Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, June 14, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 384 AAC Bulky, Serial 33].) King did not mention that part of the quid pro quo that Marshall restates in his subparagraphs *a*, *b*, and *c* printed here.

3. For further developments on this issue, see Marshall Memorandum for Admiral King, June 28, 1943, pp. 33–36.

TO DIRECTOR OVETA CULP HOBBY

June 15, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mrs. Hobby: On my return from Africa I learned of the attack which had been directed against the integrity of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps. The Secretary of War has already stated in forcible terms the views of the War Department in the matter, but I wish to assure you personally of my complete confidence in the quality and value of the organization which has been built up during the past year under your leadership.<sup>1</sup>

To me one of the most stimulating aspects of our war effort has been the amazing development of the WAAC organization in quality, discipline, capacity for performing a wide variety of jobs, and the fine attitude of the

women themselves. Commanders to whom the WAAC's have been assigned have spoken in the highest terms of their efficiency and value. The best evidence in the matter are the demands now being made on the War Department for increased allotments of WAAC organizations, which total, I believe, some 600,000.<sup>2</sup>

I wish you would assure your subordinates of the confidence and high respect in which they are held by the Army. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Rumors and accusations of immoral conduct against unspecified members of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps had been rising during early 1943, hitting a peak in June with the publication of newspaper stories alleging that the army was issuing contraceptives to all W.A.A.C. personnel. President and Mrs. Roosevelt both issued denials, as did Secretary Stimson, W.A.A.C. Director Hobby, and other high-ranking army officials. This "slander campaign" is examined in Mattie E. Treadwell, *The Women's Army Corps*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1954], pp. 191-218. See Marshall's comments in his Speech Prepared for the Governors' Conference, June 21, 1943, pp. 27-28.

2. In May Secretary Stimson had announced that the army needed five hundred thousand new recruits for the W.A.A.C. (*New York Times*, May 14, 1943, p. 5.) The press was reporting that the War Department had requests on file for six hundred thousand women. (Treadwell, *Women's Army Corps*, p. 227.)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SURLES<sup>1</sup>

*Secret*

June 16, 1943

[Washington, D.C.]

With relation to the publicity regarding the heavy losses sustained by our Flying Fortresses on June 11th (see editorial in the Post today)<sup>2</sup> the following message has just been received from General Devers:

"Final account of enemy casualties during bomber mission of June 11th shows 85 enemy fighters destroyed, 20 probably destroyed and 24 damaged."

This is a total of 125 enemy planes "shot out of the air" in MacArthur terminology. It seems to me you should get some publicity on this in relation to the excess of publicity over the loss of planes. Along with it you should dig up what you can on the destructive results of the bombing. About all the American public knows is that we bombed a certain place \* and lost 26 planes.

\* Gen. Surles: I find that in the raid of June 11th we only lost 8 planes. The loss of 26 was on June 13th.



GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Major General Alexander D. Surles was director of the War Department Bureau of Public Relations.

2. The editorial commented on the effectiveness of Army Air Forces raids on Germany on June 11 and 13. "This advantage of precision which characterizes the American method has always been acknowledged by the critics of daylight bombing. What they object to is its high cost. And last Sunday's [June 13] raid, it must be confessed, gave them a handle, for out of an unspecified fleet we lost no fewer than 26 bombers. . . . Our losses amounted to 10 per cent, as compared with the average 4 per cent of loss in the R. A. F.'s night raids. This is a sobering factor." (*Washington Post*, June 16, 1943, p. 16.)

TO PRIVATE ALLEN T. BROWN

June 16, [1943]  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Allen, I am sorry I cannot see you get your commission but I imagine your interest will be completely engaged with the presence of Madge.<sup>1</sup>

I shall be greatly interested to hear how you actually came out in your stand [*class standing*], as I have followed the grades you have given your mother. Quite evidently you have put your heart into this business and worked to the limit.

Now that you are entering into a new status, accept my caution to organize for the long pull and do not permit yourself to be upset by irritations, misunderstandings, disappointments, and so forth, en route. These are all normal to an Army career in time of war and one must keep his head well above water and cultivate a certain philosophy along with a tenacity of purpose.

I saw your note to your mother—she sent it up from Leesburg—regarding the 3rd or 5th Armored Divisions. I shall look into the matter. If you would care to get an immediate assignment to an Armored Division in Africa I possibly could arrange that. Anyway, let me know your reaction.

I am pretty busy trying to catch up with an accumulation of work which occurred during my absence in Africa.

Let me know a few days in advance of your time of departure from Knox on leave. Possibly I may be able to get you an airplane ride as far as Washington and maybe from here to New York.

With my congratulations on your work of the past six months and my love, Affectionately,

GCMRL/Research File (Family)

1. Brown's wife, Margaret.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
*Secret*

June 17, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Reduction in Army strength in 1943.

In the light of the strategical situation, the apparent strength of the Russian Army and the quality of the French divisions in North Africa, it has been thought permissible to delay the organization of 12 Armored or Infantry Divisions scheduled for the latter part of 1943. The primary purpose of passing these divisions into the 1944 program is to relieve the existing divisions of the necessity of furnishing further cadres and therefore to permit a more intensive effort to improve their quality.

Since last fall we have had an exhaustive examination made throughout the country to see what economies could be developed in the employment of soldiers engaged in the Supply services, the maintenance personnel of posts, headquarters staffs, etc. A "yardstick" has been developed which is susceptible of rather accurate application to any garrison which should result in considerable economies. Already we have determined on a reduction of approximately 125,000 men, civilians and soldiers, in the Army Service Forces.<sup>1</sup>

As the Army program approaches completion we are finding it possible to cut down on training establishments, and in due time can eliminate completely a number of these set-ups. At the present moment formal decision has been taken which reduces the training schools for specialists (such as mechanics, drivers, gunners, communications men, etc., etc.) by 50% in the Air Forces, 25% in the Ground Forces, and 33% in the Army Service Forces. The exact numbers involved I have not available at this moment.

A cut has been determined upon of approximately 100,000 men heretofore scheduled in the program for combat troop units other than divisional such as Antiaircraft, Field Artillery, Tank Destroyer units, etc.

The Air Forces are now studying the possibility of delaying somewhat in the activation of squadrons in the latter part of 1943, carrying these units over into the 1944 program. Whether or not this will prove advisable cannot be stated at this time. The point is, we are considering two factors, the more rapid development of highly trained surplus combat crews and at the same time the better training of the new units created.

It appears at this time that the minimum reduction in Army strength in the 1943 program will be between 500,000 and 600,000 and there is a possibility that a maximum of 750,000 will be reached.

The Selective Service has been notified of the reduction requirements for August, from 215,000 to 175,000. Notification will probably be given the Selective Service in about two weeks of the reduction in the September



Army quota from 215,000 probably to 130,000. It is our intention not to take final decision as to the elimination from the 1943 program of the October to December divisions until the situation of the Russian Army can be estimated in the latter part of August. Incidentally, this reduction in divisions makes it conveniently practicable to provide the agreed upon equipment for the French divisions without embarrassment to our own units.

It is my opinion that no publicity whatever should be given to these reductions, that as a matter of fact the matter should be treated with great secrecy. Any announcement could be seized upon by the Axis propaganda agencies as an indication of our failure to make good on our program. Furthermore, it would probably give rise to a wave of unfortunate optimism in this country which would result in a relaxation of effort particularly in the production field. Probably the most important factor which permits us to make the reductions in combat strength is the status of the Russian Army and it would seem highly inadvisable to discuss the possibility of its destruction or defeat which would have a very definite bearing on our decision in August as to further increments in the 1943 program. Mr. McNutt and Mr. Donald Nelson have been informally advised of these prospective reductions and of the secrecy believed necessary in the matter.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The debate over the size of the armed forces, especially the army, in view of agricultural and industrial labor demands, had been going on since the autumn of 1942 and had delayed the preparation by the army of its 1943 and 1944 troop basis. This subject is discussed in Byron Fairchild and Jonathan Grossman, *The Army and Industrial Manpower*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* (Washington: GPO, 1959), pp. 45–56, and Maurice Matloff, “The 90-Division Gamble,” in *Command Decisions*, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington: GPO, 1960), pp. 365–74. For an example of the chief of staff’s efforts to economize on army personnel, see *Papers of GCM*, 3: 443–44.

2. Paul V. McNutt was chairman of the War Manpower Commission, and Donald M. Nelson was chairman of the War Production Board.

SINCE the Casablanca Conference, negotiations had continued between Charles de Gaulle, head of the French National Committee in London, and Henri Giraud, French commander in chief in North Africa, over the unification and political control of all anti-Axis French forces. On June 3 they announced the formation of a French Committee of National Liberation with themselves as co-presidents. De Gaulle, however, insisted that ultimate control of the committee’s armed forces be left to him as minister of war, and when this was not approved, he submitted his resignation to the committee on June 10. This turmoil, which involved not only French domestic politics but military arrangements with the Allies, immediately



created for Allied Force Headquarters and Eisenhower difficult diplomatic issues, especially as President Roosevelt was determined that de Gaulle should not gain control of Dakar or of French forces in North Africa. (Information on these events is in Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943*, 7 vols. [Washington: GPO, 1957-65], 2: 132-52; *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, ed. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., et al. [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970- ], 2: 1184-85, 1188-90.)

On June 16 Robert D. Murphy—who was “Operating Executive Head of the Civil Affairs Section and Advisor for Civil Affairs under General Eisenhower . . . with access to all military information” (see Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1964], p. 106)—reported that he had just discovered that General Giraud had signed a number of decrees on June 7 that increased the French committee’s membership from seven to fourteen and that “in our opinion insures supremacy to de Gaulle.” Giraud insisted that his own understanding of the decrees had been different and that Jean Monnet, the committee’s minister of armaments, supplies, and reconstruction, had “betrayed” him by urging him to sign the documents. Murphy observed that it was “obvious to us that things have gone to Monnet’s head and that he feels as strongly as possible like de Gaulle that French rights and sovereignty must be more aggressively asserted in respect of the Allies. He also seems to feel he can control the Committee whereas it is increasingly clear that he is being used by de Gaulle and will probably later be discarded.” De Gaulle had withdrawn his resignation, but Giraud was now threatening to retire. (Murphy’s Radio No. 1108 in *Foreign Relations, 1943*, 2: 152-53.) Murphy’s Radio No. 1109 of the same day described Giraud’s proposals for a French high command organization that would permit him to retain control of the military forces. (Ibid., pp. 153-55.) ★

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
[Radio No. 492.] *Secret*

June 17, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

For General Eisenhower’s eyes only from General Marshall. Mr. Hull<sup>1</sup> is most seriously disturbed over Murphy’s 1108 and 1109 of June 16th reference the French Committee. He feels that vital ground has been lost and that we may be confronted by a tragic situation in relation to the French Forces in North Africa. The Secretary of War is similarly disturbed but has more confidence in Monnet than is indicated in Murphy’s messages. I have proposed to the President the following and will inform you as soon as possible of his decision:



That General Eisenhower should be directed by the President to exercise his direct influence as Commander in Chief in Africa, over the developments on the French Committee; that he be authorized to inform the Committee, if he sees fit, that in view of its action or proposed actions the United States will reconsider the matter of the armament, equipment, payment, etc., to the French Forces; that the President consult with the Prime Minister with a view to authorizing General Eisenhower to use the necessary pressure to prevent the control of the French Army from falling into the hands of de Gaulle.

The President undoubtedly will feel that he must coordinate his action with that of the Prime Minister and will probably send a message to the Prime Minister on the subject.<sup>2</sup> Meanwhile I wish you to know of our attitude here, particularly Mr. Hull's, who is extremely worried that you are not now in Algiers.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Secretary of State Cordell Hull.

2. Roosevelt told Churchill: "We must divorce ourselves from De Gaulle because, first, he has proven to be unreliable, uncooperative, and disloyal to both our Governments. Second, he has more recently been interested far more in political machinations than he has in the prosecution of the war and these machinations have been carried on without our knowledge and to the detriment of our military interests." He enclosed a telegram he had sent to Eisenhower in which the president stated that the United States would "not tolerate the control of the French Army by any agency which is not subject to the Allied Supreme Commander's direction." Moreover, Eisenhower was to make it "absolutely clear that in North and West Africa we have a military occupation and, therefore, without your full approval no independent civil decision can be made." (*Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, ed. Warren F. Kimball, 3 vols. [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984], 2: 255–57.)

3. Eisenhower had been visiting Mark Clark's Fifth Army in Morocco. His responses to Marshall's and Roosevelt's messages are in *Papers of DDE*, 2: 1192–95.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Secret*

June 17, 1943

[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: DeGaulle-Giraud controversy.

Attached is a message which I have dispatched to General Eisenhower.<sup>1</sup> It is self-explanatory, and contains my recommendations to you regarding the DeGaulle-Giraud controversy.

I have shown the message to the Secretary of War and he is in agreement with me.

The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, telephoned me early this morning and urged that some action be taken from Washington to prevent an unfortunate situation developing in Africa.

Also attached are the two messages referred to from Murphy to Mr. Hull.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See the previous document.
2. Murphy's messages 1108 and 1109 are described in the editorial note on p. 20. Eisenhower met with de Gaulle and Giraud on June 19. Three days later he reported to Marshall that the French Committee of National Liberation had adopted a decree making Giraud commander in chief of all French forces in North Africa. De Gaulle could not obtain control of these forces—and Eisenhower asserted that he would “constantly watch to see that this condition is not changed by subterfuge”—but he retained control of all French forces elsewhere. (*Papers of DDE*, 2: 1200–1201, 1207.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

June 21, 1943

*Secret*

[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Message from Ambassador Winant regarding General Devers.<sup>1</sup>

I received your note of June 18th with Ambassador Winant's radio attached stating that,

“It would greatly help General Devers' standing here if our Chiefs of Staff made known to the British Staff that we wanted him to be informed on total global strategy rather than having his information limited to plans in the European Theater only.”

I took the liberty of communicating directly with Ambassador Winant in order to get a more exact idea of his views. General Devers had already been furnished copies of TRIDENT so that he was familiar with global strategy. I asked Mr. Winant if what he had in mind was General Devers being placed in the position of discussing with the British Chiefs of Staff *details of operations* in other theaters than the European theater; that if that was his thought I did not think it a good practice.<sup>2</sup>

The main point was that General Devers had been made aware of global strategy.

I am very glad that Mr. Winant is so interested in building up Devers' prestige, because this is a matter of great importance to us as it was in the case of Eisenhower and Smith and later of Frank Andrews.<sup>3</sup>

I had previously requested the British Chiefs of Staff to call in General Devers in relation to all matters of the Combined Chiefs of Staff that relate to his theater and they have promised me to do so.

I can only suggest now that in some message of yours to the Prime Minister you express the hope that he has met General Devers and that he will give him the same fine support he gave General Eisenhower and General Andrews.<sup>4</sup>



GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. John G. Winant had been appointed United States ambassador to the United Kingdom on February 11, 1941.

2. Marshall had received a copy of Winant's message and had replied directly to the ambassador. (Winant to the President, Unnumbered, June 14, 1943, and Marshall to Winant, [Radio No. R-9602], June 14, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. Lieutenant General Frank M. Andrews had been commanding general of the army's European Theater of Operations from February 9, 1943, until his death in an air crash on May 3.

4. On June 28 Roosevelt told Churchill: "If you have not already met him I hope you will see General Devers. I know he will give the fine same support to you as did General Eisenhower and General Andrews." Three days later Marshall told Winant: "The President requested Prime to see Devers personally and Prime later replied that he had already done so and was much impressed. I am taking measures to assist in his relationship with British Chiefs of Staff. Your interest in all of this is genuinely appreciated by me as well as your consistent attitude of great helpfulness toward our military effort and procedure." (*Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, 2: 281; Marshall to Winant, [Radio No. R-156], July 1, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

June 21, 1943

*Secret*

[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Secret Demobilization Studies.

I wish to bring to your attention certain work on the above subject that has been going on in the War Department since last November, not because it has been completed, but because I fear one of the usual leaks into the press which might give you concern if not irritation. The purpose of this memorandum is merely to bring the matter to your attention so that you will know what is going on. I have talked this over with the Secretary of War and he agrees with me that such a note as this appears desirable.

Last November I selected a retired officer with a very broad comprehension of military requirements and had him secretly consider some major factors from the purely military point of view that would inevitably be concerned in the demobilization of the Army.<sup>1</sup> Later he had the result of his views considered by the G-3 section of the War Department in order to consider some of the broad matters of policy involved.

As practically every detail concerned with policies immediately involved matters of shipping, materiel, transportation, etc., under the control of the Army Service Forces, for convenience I had a select board secretly organized under General Somervell to survey the various military involvements.

My desire was to determine as nearly as practicable what would probably be the broad policy so far as military requirements are concerned of the

demobilization and after this had been whipped into fair shape to have the Secretary of War take up the matter with you. In this way I hope to reach a point where we would be ready whenever you so directed to submit this data to whatever civilian agencies were coordinated to meet the general problem.

In all of this I insisted on the utmost secrecy for several reasons.

First, to avoid publicity which would lead to a relaxation of the war effort.

Second, to avoid the inevitable tidal wave of proposals and debates which are bound to be concerned with the great problems immediately concerned with the demobilization policy.

Third, to have at least the nucleus of the military requirements in a fair state of preparation before the larger aspects of the demobilization questions were undertaken.

My purpose in submitting this memorandum is merely to tell you what is going on. Admiral Leahy is familiar with all of the foregoing.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall had had his friend Brigadier General John McA. Palmer, whose 1940 book *America in Arms: The Experience of the United States with Military Organization* had been widely praised, recalled to active duty in November 1941 as a special consultant to the War Department on issues related to the citizen-soldier. See *Papers of GCM*, 2: 672-73, 3: 633-34.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT<sup>1</sup>

*Confidential*

June 21, 1943

[Washington, D.C.]

General Robert E. Wood, as you know, in an unofficial status assisted me in the reorganization of our air depots and supply services in the United States. More recently he has been through the Pacific Theater and has come back with an invaluable report on requirements. I would like very much to make him my number two man at Dayton.

Will you give me an opportunity to discuss this with you personally? I have talked this over with General Marshall and he is in accord with me in the matter.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall wrote this memorandum for Lieutenant General Henry H. Arnold's signature.

2. Marshall had previously sought to get Wood, former head of the America First Committee, returned to active duty. See *Papers of GCM*, 3: 471-72. Roosevelt again did not approve Arnold's proposal regarding Wood.



SPEECH PREPARED FOR THE GOVERNORS'  
CONFERENCE<sup>1</sup>

June 21, 1943  
Columbus, Ohio

It has seemed advisable as the war develops that public statements by the Chief of Staff of the Army should be restricted to a few special occasions. A conference of the Governors, the leaders of the various States, is such an occasion. Furthermore, this is a most critical summer both for us and in the history of the world. We have passed through the period of military adolescence, our initial deployments have been completed and lines of communications solidly established. Quantity production of both men and materiel, the former in as exact a pattern as the latter, is now in full blast, the enemy's initial advantage in men and guns, and in ships and planes, has been overcome. We have seized the initiative, the most vital factor in war.

The past two years of preparation have been a trying period, especially the prolonged strain of German and Japanese successes during which we struggled to meet the surge of power which they had carefully accumulated during the past decade. The change in the attitude of the public essential to the furtherance of the necessary legislation and appropriations presented many complications. The establishment of our industries on a full war basis had its multiplicity of troubles, and the building of the full war military machine entailed a stupendous task of a wide variety of problems, invariably arousing pronounced individual reactions of our people.

Today we stand squarely on our feet in all these respects. Initial strategic problems involving hectic application of piecemeal tactical actions—anathema to a soldier—are things of the past.

Furthermore, and probably most important of all, we have secured a basis for unity of action as to strategy, operations, shipping, materiel, and virtually every phase of this warfare, in a manner without precedent in history.

The pattern for victory is clear. If we had set the stage we could not have provided a more sharply defined picture than that offered by the battle of Tunisia. There we had:

A perfect example of coordinated leadership for Allied action.

An assemblage of overwhelming military power, air, land and sea.

The explosive effect of the skillful application of that power.

Incidentally, the psychological by-products of that battle are proving of immense importance. There has been a rebirth of the French Army with a splendid example of courageous and aggressive fighting power. The observing nations have seen selected German troops humbled by an extension and improvement of the technique that brought about the downfall of France. The Allies have gained great confidence in each other, and in the Allied fighting men, and the scales have so tipped that those nations who



have been maneuvering merely to be on the winning side can no longer escape the conclusion that there is no victory in prospect for Germany. The superman has had his day. The democracies have called his bluff.

Tunisia gave us an invaluable pattern for the future. But the tasks will be increasingly difficult, usually with the great hazard of an overwater approach and a heavy battle to be maintained beyond the beaches. The way will be far from easy, the losses heavy, but the victory certain.

The recent battle in Attu has special significance. There we encountered probably the most difficult of fighting conditions. An amphibious operation in uncharted waters over a stormy sea, deep snow and high mountains, with a complete absence of roads and trails; an enemy dug in with complete cover and communications and our own troops transferred through necessity directly from the pleasant climate of California to a battle with the elements over extremely difficult terrain, against a desperate enemy. It was a severe test of the American soldier, but today we hold Attu, with more than 1900 Japanese graves as a memento of their previous occupation. More than three Japs were killed for each American soldier lost.

The fighting in the tropics of the South and Southwest Pacific has also presented great difficulties of climate and terrain. It has been vicious throughout but we have been successful in each operation since the initial offensive move into the Solomons.

One of our great puzzles is how the Japanese can stand the beating they are taking in the air—no other word adequately describes the situation in this respect. Judging from our own reactions, particularly those of the press when we have a moderately heavy loss in planes, it is hard to visualize the state of mind of the Japanese command when their ordinary air losses run from 30% to 75%, with very moderate losses on the part of the American pilots. In the recent air battle in the Solomons we destroyed 94 out of 120 planes and lost but 6. Furthermore, the Japanese suffer continuous losses of planes on the ground. We find the usual average is one destroyed on the ground for every one lost in the air, and in addition probably a training or operational loss outside of combat at the same rate. Evidently our equipment is excellent, and our pilots, gunners, bombardiers and navigators are superb.

The daylight precision bombing out of England has had a tremendous effect on the air operations of the German Army. The losses inflicted on German fighter planes during these daylight bombing expeditions had a direct and important bearing on the victory in Tunisia and a similar bearing on the German air power on the Russian front. The fact of the matter is, the Germans must check this precision bombing and they have assembled their best pilots in large numbers in an endeavor to halt these



staggering blows at vital installations, delivered with constantly increasing frequency and mass.

Measured by the losses in planes and installations suffered by the enemy our own losses have been surprisingly small.

While on this subject I think it proper to express a word of caution against hasty conclusions or impromptu conceptions regarding the utilization of air power or any special weapon in the conduct of this war. I am convinced more and more each day that only by a proper combination of war-making means can we achieve victory in the shortest possible time and with the greatest economy in life. Pantelleria was an experiment, for which there appeared to be, and proved to be, a sound logical basis. However, the situation there was unique as to the character of the Island, the quality of the garrison, the complete naval control of the surrounding waters and the proximity of Allied airfields.<sup>2</sup> The victory of Tunisia was favored by overwhelming air power, but the result would have been a stalemate without aggressive ground and naval action.

Your adversary may be hammered to his knees by bombing but he will recover unless the knockout blow is delivered by the ground Army, with infantry and artillery as important as tanks and antiaircraft, and engineer and signal troops vital to the whole.

The encouraging aspect of the situation today is the fact that we have the men trained, the guns and tanks, the ships and planes in constantly increasing numbers; that the Russian forces grow steadily more formidable and present a constant and terrible threat to the bulk of the German Army; and that there is a steady improvement in the equipment and training of the Chinese forces to sustain them in their fixed determination to expel the Japs from China. There can be but one result unless the enemy succeeds in creating internal frictions among the Allies, divisions of one against the other and misrepresentations leading to public loss of confidence in our war effort.

We are engaged in this war to maintain the democratic form of government. We fight to destroy dictatorships, to guarantee freedom of speech and of the press. Yet sometimes I am discouraged by the democratic processes in a great and critical emergency like that of today.

For example, I returned from Africa two weeks ago to find the most atrocious, if not subversive, attack being directed against an organization of the Army, one of the finest we have ever created. I refer to the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps.<sup>3</sup> There was no foundation for the vicious slander, though it was given wide publicity. Some seem to be intent on the suicide of our own war effort, not to mention the defamation of as fine an organization of women as I have ever seen assembled. Such a procedure to me appears inexcusable. If we can't be decent in such matters we at least



should not be naive enough to destroy ourselves. I very much hope you gentlemen will take the lead in building up a public opinion which will suppress actions of individuals who abuse our liberties by propagating such outrages.

There is another phase of the present situation for which I would solicit your strong support, and that is a check against sudden waves of optimism leading the public to feel that we have made our great effort and the end is in sight. This is far from the case. We are just getting well started. The great battles lie ahead. We have yet to be proven in the agony of enduring heavy casualties, as well as the reverses which are inevitable in war. What we need now is a stoic determination to do everything in our power to overwhelm the enemy, cost what it may, to reduce him to a suppliant under the impact of aroused and determined democracies.

The failure today to surge forward with every ounce of power and effort we possess would be to write a tragic page for history. The temptation to ease up after initial and relatively minor successes seems difficult to resist. The Axis nations probably count on this as a weak element of Allied psychology. Their opinion has been contemptuous of our soft way of living, of our toughness and our military stamina. The most forbidding prospect with which we can now confront the enemy is the continuation in full measure of methodical, ruthless preparations to overwhelm them in the same manner that the Army of von Arnim was eliminated in Tunisia.<sup>4</sup> The Allies have unified their military effort. We must all do the same at home.

Two things we must guard against:

There must be no divisions among the Allies.

There must be no let-up in our preparations.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)

1. Marshall prepared this address for the opening day's dinner of the thirty-fifth annual conference of state governors in Columbus, Ohio. He was the featured speaker, and this address was released to the press at the conclusion of the dinner. While this speech was quoted in the newspapers (see the *New York Times*, June 22, 1943, p. 10), it seems likely that he departed considerably from this text; see the following document.

2. The island of Pantelleria, strategically located in the Sicily strait, since the 1920s had been converted into what the Italian government called its "Gibraltar." The potential threat it posed to Allied shipping and to the landings planned for Sicily caused Eisenhower to decide in mid-May to capture the island. The aerial offensive against Pantelleria began in earnest on May 18 and continued until the assault troops were launched on June 11. The island surrendered without ground fighting that same day. The Army Air Forces history notes that "the conquest had been accomplished almost exclusively through air bombardment," which encouraged "some enthusiastic airmen to affirm that the operation offered proof that no place and no force could stand up under prolonged and concentrated air bombardment." (Craven and Cate, eds., *Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK*, pp. 419-31, quote on p. 431.)

3. See Marshall to Hobby, June 15, 1943, pp. 15-16.

4. General Hans Jürgen von Arnim had surrendered German Army Group Africa on May 12, 1943.



TRANSCRIPT OF OFF-THE-RECORD REMARKS TO  
THE GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE<sup>1</sup>

June 21, 1943  
Columbus, Ohio

With your permission, I would like to talk for a few minutes “off the record” as they say.

And while it is difficult to talk to so many people even semi-confidentially, I would like to depart from a written script and say a little bit of what is in my mind and on my heart. In the first place I discussed with my two associates here at the table, the Governor of Texas and the Governor of Maryland, what they were particularly interested in and didn't understand. Of course we barred the question of a second front, whatever that is. But I wanted to know what was troubling them; what seemed beyond their understanding. I am surprised—frequently—continuously surprised—among our own officers when I visit various parts of the United States, and particularly other theaters, how much alone they feel and how much in a single street, and how little they know of what is going on elsewhere. We bring them in to Washington as frequently as we can from the Pacific and from Africa and from England and other places, from China and India and we keep a continuous stream of officers from the Operations Section of the War Department, as well as other sections of the General Staff, traveling all the time to the four corners of the world, and I am speaking accurately. Incidentally, we've had quite heavy losses among the members of the War Department, General Staff, who've been lost in bombing expeditions and in ordinary air travel. But we're always surprised at how restricted the view is of the various operating centers and the same in the United States and I assume of course, among the members of the civil community who can only learn what they read in the paper and what, maybe, they hear from their young men, or husbands, in the various training or operative commands of the Army and Navy. I would like to say this, that in the first place, so far as the War and Navy Departments are concerned, and I hope the State Department, we must be factual and never emotional. That must go to the Administration, to the Congress and to the people. But we have no right to emotions. We want it among the soldiers. You have to have it in the leaderships down in the ranks and in the divisions, but you have no right to it in the War Department. Ours has to be factual. We have to view these things with all the data we can possibly secure. Accurate regarding our own affairs and as nearly as we can determine it, accurate regarding the enemy situations. And then we have to make a decision and we have to bring in to relation to that all the other affairs that bear on it the interest of all the other nations that are involved with us and they are many and frequently diverse, as is quite natural they should be. Then we have to calculate the hazards and decide whether we will accept this hazard, or that



hazard and I might say that war consists in trying to do with a few here, successfully, so that a large number here can carry through and make the crash that brings down the entire building.

When I was a young officer, when I was being educated in the military profession, along in my early career and up through middle age, we thought of strategy more or less as a diagrammatic proposition. We figured it out in relation to logistics, as to rivers and railroads. In the main, and when we got down to the tactics of it, as you might say, which side of the hill you went up—and matters of that kind—as sometimes you read in connection with the battles in the Civil War. Gettysburg, for example—operations of that kind.

My education was sadly neglected. I find now I am more—far more—deeply concerned over matters of ship-building, over matters of landing craft, over matters of engines for them, over matters of octane gas and the means of producing—over all those thousands and one details that are necessary in order that we may bring out great forces to bear. We have been in the past in a situation feeling very secure behind oceans. We are now in a position that we have to cross those oceans, to carry the war to the enemy lest he carry the war to us. That involves all the great factors of logistics until we have reached the ultimate. I assume, unless it is that sooner or later we get to the North and the South Pole, because otherwise we circle the earth not once but almost many times in the number of lanes and traffic lanes of air transport of ships and otherwise. So that each thing we do has to be calculated far in advance. The allocations have to be made with great exactitude. You're committed to this thing. You must carry it through and what is most difficult of all in this country, you must keep it secret—if we do not want our young men to die on some beach or be sunk at sea by a concentration of submarines. All of that has to be calculated. It isn't inspirational, it isn't the spur of the moment. It's a carefully thought out thing months and months and months in advance. Goes back to production in certain things sometimes a year in advance, and all of that must be brought to a head in due course and due time having all of these various interests of various countries and sovereign powers we're dealing with, brought into accord and agreement. Now we have succeeded in this war starting with our entry of the war in December of 1941, in organizing a basis for securing unity of action. We don't talk about it, ladies and gentlemen we do it.

And I think the greatest thing we've done, the greatest thing we've accomplished, the most potent factor in this war today is the fact that we have secured a method of arriving at unity, of operations among the Allies. That is extraordinarily difficult as you know in your own affairs and in your own political organizations. (Laughter.) I don't know whether I mean what you mean or not. (Laughter.)



I might give you some idea of the intricacies of these problems if I tell you how one of these conferences that you read about, like Casablanca, or the recent one in Washington, or some of the earlier ones, go about it—we've gradually, of course, evolved into pretty well determined procedure. It generally takes us about a week, sometimes a day or two less, to arrive at a tentative idea of what we think we might do, which we all agree about. But that's only a tentative affair and it takes about a week to arrive at that because it covers the entire world. Then it takes us almost a week longer, having arrived at a tentative agreement on that, to calculate whether that can be done. You are now involved in ships, cargo, dry cargo, wet cargo, troop lift. You're involved in escort vessels because for every movement you require so many escorts. They're just so many and no more. The security of these convoys depend on that. You're involved in most operations in landing affairs, that means landing crafts, special landing crafts, that means so many engines, so many this, so many that. That means the transportation of these awkward crafts to this place or that place. You can't ship them around, change your mind at any minute—that thing all has to be calculated far in advance. You get all the compromises, you figure the turn around in the boats. They're so long to this place, and they're so long in that.

I'll give you one idea of how complicated that is, when we were in the middle of the great crises of the Eighth Army—when it was driven almost to Egypt—did get up to the Alamein line and the question was we might send troops there—or would we send equipment there—which was the quickest. There were certain troops there without any equipment. Should we try to get the equipment in or should we send the troops in. We then arrived at the tonnage proposition which involved a great many delays. We had to calculate which was the quickest thing. We decided to send the equipment and we ripped into our own organizations, took it away from the troops—could give them no explanations. I know in some cases they'd only had the equipment two days and it had been developed personally by the commander of those troops going right down to industry to get it done. Just as he got it all, we took it all away from him. I am referring to the self-propelled mounts, 105 cannon. The new tanks had just gotten to the Division. We took that away. No explanation whatever. But in the Army we say "do it" and he does it. We don't hear as a rule anything about it. (Laughter.) Which is a great convenience. (Laughter.)

In those calculations it developed that in sending troops to the Middle East where we sent—we'll say—18,000 to be exact—there, we could send 85,000 east [i.e., across the Atlantic rather than south around Africa]—there was that great a difference in the turn around of freighters. So you can see how much of a calculation. Now when you get into the far Pacific, to the Far East, and those things, you can see to what extent your



calculation leads you. And you can't multiply it out by the distance because some places you can unload rapidly, the next place you can't unload rapidly. You have to figure how long it lies in port. How much time is going to be absorbed there. Have you got to send the engineers there first to set up all of your unloading facilities. It's extremely complicated. You can settle it sometimes in the paper in the morning but we can't settle it in 3 or 4 months. (Laughter.)

I am reciting some of these intimate details of behind the scenes so that you'll be helpful supporters of some of our troubled times when we come to them. Because in a war of this nature which literally covers the globe the complications are beyond description. But we've developed an orderly precision, orderly method for doing this thing. We know each other well, know each other intimately. One of the most surprising things of all, if you go out there to Africa and find this combined staff, you can hardly tell, unless you look at the uniform closely which service, which nation, the officer represents. You will find in General Eisenhower's home a British Planning Officer living there with him. You will find next door to him Admiral Cunningham living there. All these people close together—this staff all combined—with just one single idea, with one purpose; the whole thing integrated and developed to the point where they can get by the vicissitudes which always occur in a campaign and I might say in any fight, we have a fixed—we have a—not a fixed rule—but there's an axiom almost, that no division ever admitted that the division on its right or left were abreast of it and if it happens to be from another country why that makes it very much worse. They're always still further behind. And that produces a reaction which troubles morale and which you have to defeat. So we've succeeded in bringing about a great unity of purpose. And I can't emphasize too much of what vast importance that is. I'd like to say something else about the development of our military power. We've gotten to the present time in the training to what you might call the normal phase. We've struggled through the great departures and they were very difficult. Some of our outfits, like the air, for instance, were increased by over 4,000%, the engineers by 4600%—you can visualize what that means in new officers, new non-coms, new units—everything new—to what extent you have to spur out to manage that. We found the Ground Services for the Air, which have all the mechanics, the field guards and the multitude of people that go along to keep the plane in the air—had that be expanded by 14,500%. Other things in like measure.

Now in spite of that tremendous expansion—in spite of that—we've gotten a well-ordered, a highly organized, a splendidly equipped and a disciplined—and a *disciplined*—force. They are beautifully trained. It was very difficult in the early days to get the training because we had to develop the instructors and until we had a large number that had had at least a



year—we didn't have the seasoning that goes with it—although even that was a remarkably short time. But now the training in this country was immeasurably better than it was a year ago and on top of that we are bringing back in an orderly way the men from the fighting fronts in certain percentages and putting them all through our units, all over the country so they give them that invaluable veteran touch.

The pilots came back. I met one tonight from New Guinea. We bring them back from long experience. After certain number of missions they come in and carry the exactitude of how you really do it—into these training units. We've carried the difficulties, the firing, the customs and the excitement which expose them to battle, to a point where the men, I think, will not suffer from the first shock of battle.

We have the most wonderful materiel and personnel in the world. The most splendid looking men in these new units that are going out now. We have no complaints of any kind to find with our equipment. It really, on the average, is superb. We have tried in every conceivable way to produce leaders. We have been perfectly ruthless about it. Quiet so far as we could, *but the man has to have it or he doesn't stay*. And we listen to no excuses of any kind. Because, as I put it, a division being 15,000 men my vote is all for the 15,000 and not for the individual. We must have the very best leadership we can possibly give these men and we've stopped at nothing to produce that leadership. So it remains but to get them in contact with the enemy. They have the confidence. We have no disciplinary troubles, virtually, at all. It's almost, to a large extent, self-imposed. We've got, I think, a perfectly wonderful army. It's a great problem to bring it to bear against the enemy. We are in the process of doing that. Things are developing as you know from the papers as you read every day. We've had great good fortune recently. I hope we'll have greater good fortune in the near future. We will have our troubles, we will have our tribulations, but we have the means, the men, and the materiel. And with the people with necessary determination behind them, nothing in the world can stop them.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)

1. This is a relatively unedited stenographic report of Marshall's actual remarks. The previous document was the text that was released to the press.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING  
*Secret*

June 28, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

The question of responsibility for offensive operations against submarines and that of responsibility for long-range air striking forces are so closely related that a proper solution of one, in my opinion, involves



consideration of the other. The tentative Arnold-McNarney-McCain agreement appeared to offer an acceptable solution to both of these issues and solely on that basis I stated to you in my memorandum of June 15 that your proposal to take over anti-submarine air operations appeared to offer a practical solution to a vexing problem which has adversely affected the efficiency of our aerial war effort.<sup>1</sup>

I should state here that in all of these Army and Navy air discussions I have tried very carefully to hold myself to a position from which I could consider the problems from a somewhat detached and I hope, purely logical basis. As I remarked in the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the other day I feel that the present state of procedure between the Army and Navy is neither economical nor highly efficient and would inevitably meet with public condemnation were all the facts known. I have been hopeful that during the actual war effort we could manage our business in such a manner as to be spared the destructive effects of reorganizational procedure. But I am becoming more and more convinced that we must put our own house in order, and quickly, in order to justify our obligation to the country. I feel this very strongly because it is plain to me, however it may appear to others, that our present procedure is not at all what it should be.

Feeling as I do that the two questions involved are part and parcel of the same problem I believe that the Committee on Missions of the Army and Navy should be given both questions in their entirety for appropriate recommendation, or that we should formalize the entire Arnold-McNarney-McCain agreement. The latter procedure promises earlier, and I believe, more satisfactory results as it appears rather likely that the Committee may reach an impasse in the matter as the result of past strong prejudices and bitter discussions.

There is a further and most important consideration involved. The Secretary of War has declared himself emphatically in a letter to General McNarney that unless the entire Arnold-McNarney-McCain agreement is accepted by the Navy he is unwilling to consent to the transfer of Army anti-submarine airplanes to the Navy and that if the matter is taken to the President he desires to be heard by him on the subject.<sup>2</sup>

Under the circumstances I propose that you and I endeavor to reach an agreement along the following lines (which I believe represent the substance of the Arnold-McNarney-McCain agreement), to be made available to the Committee:

- a.* The Army is prepared to withdraw Army air forces from anti-submarine operations at such time as the Navy is ready to take over those duties completely.
- b.* Army anti-submarine airplanes would be continued in that service as long as the Navy has need for them.



c. Army anti-submarine B-24 airplanes would be turned over to the Navy in such numbers as they could be replaced by Navy combat B-24s.

d. The Navy is requested to submit a schedule on which the Army can turn over their planes to the Navy and draw Navy replacement B-24s.

e. The Fleet Air Wings which the Navy proposes to station along the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts will contain no striking forces but will be restricted to airplanes capable of undertaking such off-shore patrol as is necessary, in addition to pure anti-submarine operations.

f. The Navy agrees that all long-range striking forces for the defense of the Western Hemisphere and for active operations in other theaters will be assigned as an Army responsibility.

g. Long-range patrol planes assigned to Fleet Air Wings are for the primary purpose of conducting off-shore patrol, relieving the Army strategic striking forces from this duty.

This agreement to the transfer of long-range aircraft for antisubmarine operations makes it clear that such transfer does not establish a basis for the duplication of the long-range air striking force now in being in the Army. Such duplication, if permitted, would be patently uneconomical and would result in an unavoidable drain on our resources.

Meanwhile the Army Anti-Submarine Command will continue to function as at present, insuring that no detriment to the war effort will occur as a result of any delay which may accrue while this matter is being properly settled.

In all of this matter I am inclined to the belief that it bears a marked similarity to the Army problem of divisional organization. A division commander knows, for example, that he can handle the artillery and engineers more efficiently if they are all organic parts of the division and do not include elements attached for a particular operation. Practically every division commander therefore presses for a larger artillery and engineer permanent complement and resists the policy of providing reinforcements for particular operations from Army Corps and Army troop pools. We recognize the division commander's point of view as to efficiency, but we also must recognize that such an arrangement is wasteful in the extreme because it involves the immobilization, as it were, of large bodies of troops in order that each division commander may have all of the units that he may require on a particular occasion, always under his control.

The same applies to anti-aircraft and to anti-tank guns, and considerable feeling is constantly displayed regarding these units by the interested commanders. But it requires only a little arithmetical calculation to determine that such a procedure would be so wasteful of manpower and also would



so increase the burden of logistical requirements that the gain in divisional efficiency would be heavily offset by the losses in other directions. This has been a continuing problem in the Army since 1917 but I think the Navy has had little of it to contend with until this question of air striking forces has arisen and virtually another Army, in the shape of Marines, is in process of being established. Naval commanders will feel that they can work more efficiently if they have Naval, Air and Marine units, as a homogeneous force, and undoubtedly they can. But on the other hand if this argument is carried to its ultimate conclusion it means the consolidation of the Army and Navy.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall's previous communication on this subject is Marshall Memorandum for the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, June 15, 1943, pp. 14-15. King replied to this on June 19 that the crucial issues were the ones he had raised in his June 5 memorandum to the chief of staff regarding the navy's control of aerial antisubmarine warfare and that Marshall's "more general proposals" could be handled later. Arnold wrote that King's response "appears to be a transparent effort to obtain unilateral benefits from the agreement without settling the fundamental conditions on which the Chief of Staff's proposal was based." He recommended that Marshall tell King that his memorandum of June 19 was unacceptable. (King Memorandum for Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, June 19, 1943, and Arnold Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, June 21, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 560].)

2. Secretary of War Stimson had accepted the Arnold-McNarney-McCain agreement reluctantly as a means of eliminating army-navy friction. He remained unconvinced that eliminating the Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command constituted an improvement in the war effort. "It now appears by his letter of June 19th that Admiral King, while proposing to accept our relinquishment of the anti-submarine work, is quite unwilling for the Navy to turn over to us the quid pro quo by which that concession was to be obtained. In this letter he proposes to leave quite unsettled the Army's right to conduct all other long range striking operations by land-based planes. Under such conditions I see nothing in the future but further trouble between the Army and the Navy over these vital problems of jurisdiction." Neither was the secretary impressed with the proposed navy antisubmarine warfare establishment, believing that it lacked elasticity and left too little room for initiative. "Under these circumstances I am quite unwilling to give my consent to the proposed transfer to the Navy of our present anti-submarine activities. I feel that such a transfer under the conditions revealed by the letter of June 19th would not be at all in the interest of an effective preparation for the safety of our great Army movement next year. If this matter goes to the President, I shall desire to be heard by him on that subject." (Stimson to McNarney, June 25, 1943, *ibid.*)

3. King replied that he accepted Marshall's points *a* through *g*, with minor changes, and proposed a point *h* stipulating: "Nothing in the foregoing sub-paragraphs is to be so interpreted as to limit or restrict a commander in the field, Army or Navy, in his use of all available aircraft as weapons of opportunity or necessity." Marshall notified King that he accepted these changes and that Secretary Stimson concurred. (King Memorandum for Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, July 3, 1943, and Marshall Memorandum for the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, July 9, 1943, *ibid.*) In August the Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command ceased to exist, and by October seventy-seven army antisubmarine-equipped B-24s had been exchanged for an equal number of combat-equipped B-24s from navy allocations. (Craven and Cate, eds., *Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK*, p. 409.)



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
*Secret*

June 28, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: U.S. troops in Detroit.<sup>1</sup>

Pursuant to your instructions, the 9th Infantry will be retained in Detroit until July 6th. If all continues calm your approval will be requested for its removal at that time. Information from the Governor of Michigan, in a telephone conversation with General Somervell, is to the effect that the remaining M.P. Battalions and the garrison at Selfridge Field should be able to take care of the situation at once. As a matter of precaution, however, it is proposed that the 9th Infantry will be retained as above indicated.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On June 21 the racially tense and overcrowded city of Detroit witnessed a bloody race riot. Twenty-five blacks and nine whites were killed, six hundred people were injured, and several manufacturing plants ceased or curtailed production until U.S. Army troops arrived to restore order. (Fairchild and Grossman, *The Army and Industrial Manpower*, pp. 161; *New York Times*, June 22, 1943, pp. 1, 7–8, and June 27, 1943, sec. 1, p. 13.) Although the primary riot was over in twenty-four hours, tensions and minor outbreaks of violence continued for several weeks.

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT  
TO THE PRIME MINISTER<sup>1</sup>  
*Secret*

[June 28? 1943]  
[Washington, D.C.]

The circumstances of our peaceful occupation of the AZORES and the attitude of cooperation and common endeavor of the Government of PORTUGAL in my opinion, place an obligation upon us to furnish military assistance to PORTUGAL. Under these circumstances, I believe that Salazar should be assured that military forces will be sent to PORTUGAL.<sup>2</sup>

The AXIS thus far has avoided commitment in the IBERIAN PENINSULA under very favorable circumstances, and even though the movement of UNITED NATIONS' forces into PORTUGAL might precipitate an AXIS invasion of SPAIN, that action appears unlikely. However, we must expect GERMANY to launch concentrated air and submarine attacks upon PORTUGAL as retaliation and in order to impress neutral nations. It is inevitable that grave consequences would result if adequate provision were not made by the UNITED NATIONS to meet this contingency.

A defensive force capable of providing the necessary initial assistance might include one infantry division, plus strong air defense elements con-

sisting of 26 anti-aircraft battalions, ten day and two night fighter squadrons, two anti-submarine squadrons, together with supporting and service troops. Combat elements (less anti-aircraft troops) and possibly, though not probably, a part of the service units for this force could be obtained from the MEDITERRANEAN area with, however, a limiting effect on the scope of PRICELESS. The anti-aircraft and the remainder of the service troops must be secured elsewhere, with a resulting effect on OVERLORD.<sup>3</sup>

A preliminary examination indicates that the provision of shipping for this force would limit the scope of PRICELESS and would cost OVERLORD from two to four divisions.

My proposed action in these circumstances will cause certain delays in operations agreed to in TRIDENT. However, I believe that we must accept this interference.

I should appreciate having your views on the foregoing.<sup>4</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 1, Item 26)

1. This document was Appendix A to a memorandum addressed to the president concerning "Operations to Assist Portugal." The memorandum and attachments had been written in the Operations Division, but Marshall redrafted Appendix A. Appendix B was a brief of a strategic plan for an Allied campaign in the Iberian Peninsula in the event of a German invasion. The memorandum was sent to Admiral Leahy on June 30. (NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 1, Item 26].)

2. Acquiring bases in the Azores to further the Allies' antisubmarine campaign was discussed frequently during the mid-May TRIDENT Conference in Washington. Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to seek a diplomatic agreement concerning bases with the Portuguese government, which was headed by António de Oliveira Salazar, but they were prepared to occupy the islands by force if necessary. Negotiations and planning were left to the British, who had a long-standing treaty of alliance with Portugal. (Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943* [Washington: GPO, 1970], pp. 304-12.)

3. Operations in the Mediterranean subsequent to the capture of Sicily were designated PRICELESS. OVERLORD had recently been designated the code name for the Allied cross-Channel invasion projected for mid-1944.

4. The president added a final sentence: "I think there is something to be said for the thought that a peninsular campaign would be very difficult for the Axis and that secure landing places for us are not to be laughed off." This message was sent on June 30, 1943. The British successfully concluded their negotiations on August 17, and the Portuguese agreed to permit them to begin landing forces in the islands on October 8 for the purpose of preparing military bases. (*Foreign Relations, 1943*, 2: 534-35, 543.)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR HASTINGS ISMAY  
*Secret*

June 28, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Ismay: I have a peculiar request to make of you.

On the flight to Africa the Prime Minister talked quite a bit about the new Stars to be authorized for the Eighth Army Campaign and for the



First Army battle in Tunisia. He further discussed the matter in Algiers, and finally I heard some comments on the subject by Tedder and young Randolph Churchill with the Prime Minister on our plane flight to Tunisia.<sup>1</sup>

I would appreciate your sending me the regulation or announcement on the subject, but I would even more appreciate having the benefit of the Prime Minister's approach to this decision. I recall some of the points he made but I find I am very hazy on his views regarding clasps.

Would it offend him to ask that he dictate, very roughly, about a page statement of his reasons for selecting a point west of Cairo and for requiring that the men should have been attached to the combat army, etc.

Please don't be embarrassed in this matter. You thoroughly understand his probable reactions and I will equally understand your decision not to speak to him on the subject.<sup>2</sup>

With warm regards, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder had been commander in chief of the Mediterranean Air Command since it was formed on February 17, 1943. Randolph F. E. S. Churchill was the prime minister's son and a staff officer with the British Army in North Africa.

2. Ismay replied that the prime minister had "considerably modified the views about decorations" since returning to Britain, and as the issue was still being considered, Ismay had not asked him to repeat his original thoughts. But "for your eye alone," Ismay said that the government was planning to issue an "Africa Star" and a "1939–43 Star." (Ismay to Marshall, July 7, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Churchill announced these decorations on August 3. They are described in H. Taprell Dorling, *Ribbons and Medals: Naval, Military, Air Force and Civil* (London: George Philip and Son, 1946), pp. 87–89.

TO MAJOR GENERAL ALEXANDER M. PATCH  
Radio. *Secret*

June 29, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

From General Marshall for General Patch's eye only. Reference your pencil note to me via Colonel Clarke:<sup>1</sup>

Except for the first line "Paragraph 2 is correct in every particular" there is nothing in the statement that bears on the issue which is your alleged indiscretion. Our concern is not over who receives the credit for the enterprise but solely the fact that a secret so dangerous to our interests should be publicly discussed.

If you have any statement to make to me regarding the foregoing send it by air mail. The subject under discussion should not be mentioned except inferentially in the statement in order to avoid further compromise or disclosures.<sup>2</sup>



GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief of Japan's Combined Fleet, was killed April 18 on Bougainville in the northern Solomon Islands, when his plane was shot down by Army Air Forces P-38s acting upon information received from a Japanese naval code broken in 1942. The Japanese government announced his death on May 20, and there followed in the United States several press stories concerning the operation. The Japanese later changed the code that had supplied the Yamamoto information, and the Navy Department launched an investigation to determine whether rumors and press leaks had prompted the change. Investigators discovered that Major General Alexander M. Patch, who had commanded all U.S. forces on Tulagi and Guadalcanal between December 1942 and April 1943 and who had subsequently taken command of the Fourth Corps at Fort Lewis, Washington, had discussed the operation at a luncheon in Washington, D.C. (King Memorandum for General Marshall, June 21, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Marshall sent Colonel Carter W. Clarke, who was in charge of code-intercept handling in the War Department, to get Patch's explanation of the events. Patch replied with a description of his role in the Yamamoto affair and stated that paragraph 2 of the navy's report of the luncheon incident was correct except in its statement that Patch had taken credit for ordering the P-38 strike. (Patch to Marshall, undated, *ibid.*)

2. Patch's reply, delayed by his treatment for pneumonia, stated that there was "little or no secrecy" in the South Pacific regarding the use of messages based on code-intercept information and that he "was unaware or unconscious that there was any further need for absolute secrecy regarding an enterprise which had occurred many weeks previously" and which was widely discussed in the South Pacific. Marshall sent King a copy of Patch's replies and of the document printed here, noting: "Disciplinary action in the case of a corps commander inevitably involves publicity which would make matters worse. Without publicity the deterrent effect on others, which is desired, would be lacking. I am puzzled as to the course to follow. However, it is clearly evident that additional instructions are necessary regarding secrecy in such matters." (Marshall Memorandum for Admiral King, July 28, 1943, *ibid.*)

TO SECOND LIEUTENANT ALLEN T. BROWN

June 29, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Allen: I received your letter last night and telephoned its major contents to your mother at Leesburg.<sup>1</sup> I have Colonel McCarthy<sup>2</sup> this morning looking into ways and means to change your assignment and seeing if he can pick up a ride for you from Knox to Washington. It will be easy enough to arrange a flight from here to Mitchel Field, New York.

I think in all probability you will be ordered here for some sort of temporary duty and your leave arranged from this end, and your departure for the new assignment controlled from here. I hope that McCarthy can arrange things in an unobtrusive manner, but I feel quite differently about intervening in this way when it is a move to the front rather than the opposite, or a favoritism in gaining an appointment. However, with this start the rest of the course will entirely lie with you.

I congratulate you on the fine grades you made and reports you got. Also I was impressed with your comments regarding self restraint, particu-



larly the fact that you had only recently become fully aware of what I was talking about. If you got this point everything you did, regardless of the reason, was well worth while.<sup>3</sup>

Tris has apparently fallen on his feet, with a very responsible and interesting job in England.<sup>4</sup> I hope he does not commit the error of working beyond his strength and folding up, or allowing discouraging complications to wilt his morale.

With my love, Affectionately,

GCMRL/Research File (Family)

1. The editors have not found this letter.

2. Lieutenant Colonel Frank McCarthy, Jr., was an assistant secretary of the General Staff.

3. For Marshall's previous advice to his stepson, see Marshall to Brown, June 16, 1943, p. 17.

4. Colonel Tristram Tupper, Mrs. Marshall's brother, was the public relations officer at Headquarters, European Theater of Operations.

TO BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN MCA. PALMER

July 1, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear John: I returned to the city to find your gracious little note of appreciation regarding your present duty assignment.<sup>1</sup> I am glad that you feel as you do about it, but I want you to know that it is a source of reassurance to me that we are drawing on your wisdom in connection with these difficult decisions.

I am very sorry I did not realize that you and Maude were celebrating your Golden Anniversary. Katherine and I should have wanted very much to make tribute to the occasion. She is spending the summer at Leesburg rather than stewing at Myer with me absent most of the time and not getting home until late in the evening at best. Down there her daily interests are stimulated by the opportunity to work on the place. It looks lovely this summer. Her sister Allene is with her.

I want you to let me know when you would like to go to New Hampshire, which you certainly should do sometime this summer. You will be ordered up there for duty—meaning for calm contemplation of the various problems the War Department has put up to you in the cool atmosphere of that region, not to mention an occasional deliberation on the bank of a trout stream. Knowing your over-conscientious attitude I might tell you that my best thoughts regarding Army organization and operations have usually occurred while I was riding horseback. It is probable that yours will similarly flow from a fishing stance, certainly rather than from the heat and humidity of Washington. Hastily yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Palmer had assisted the Army Service Forces' Project Planning Division in drawing up a "Survey of Demobilization," which was submitted to the chief of staff on June 18. (See Marshall Memorandum for the President, June 21, 1943, pp. 23-24.) As a result of the report's recommendations, the War Department was creating a Special Planning Division as part of its Special Staff. Palmer was to advise the division on developing plans for demobilization, universal military training, a single department of defense, and the postwar organization of the army. The division was formally established on July 22, 1943. (James E. Hewes, Jr., *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963* [Washington: GPO, 1975], pp. 131, 402.)

TO MAJOR GENERAL WALTER BEDELL SMITH  
Teletype. *Secret*

July 1, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

Colonel Thomas North who has been in charge of my personal General Staff School providing you with selected and trained officers, is due to arrive in North Africa about July 7th.<sup>1</sup> I sent him out, without request from him, in order that he could learn a little at first hand of the character of the work being done by your various operational staffs in the field and by his graduates. Also I wished him to have a little reward for a very fine performance of duty.

I wish you would honor him with a personal interview and give him any opportunity that seems practical for a closeup of what is going on.

He was Fox Conner's immediate assistant at GHQ in France, was the flash and range sound expert for artillery for years over here, and he has carried out several important jobs for me. Lack of rank has previously prevented a proper acknowledgement of his talents. He is an extraordinarily able man and goes through to the finish despite all obstacles and knows nothing but work. He has never made any request to me of any kind, therefore the foregoing is inspired only by my personal opinion.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. North had become head of the Operations Division's Current Section (Logistics Group) on June 16, 1943. His chief function there was to keep the War Department informed of its own activities. To help familiarize officers who were preparing for overseas assignments with current War Department views, plans, and procedures, Marshall had directed that North establish the Task Force Officers School. (Ray S. Cline, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1951], pp. 131, 291, 369.)

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY  
*Secret*

July 4, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

I recommend that the second point (numbered 2) in the President's



proposed message regarding the “fairly large training force” be eliminated.<sup>1</sup> It may give the DeGaullists the ammunition they apparently seek to advertise United States efforts to dominate French affairs. In view of the imminence of impending operations and the effect of a strong DeGaullist reaction at this particular moment, including the possibility it would offer Axis propagandists to offset our Italian propaganda, the inclusion of the second point appears inadvisable to me.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. President Roosevelt proposed to send Eisenhower and Robert Murphy a message stating that he concurred in the French Committee of National Liberation’s appointment of a new governor for French West Africa. Due to Dakar’s importance to Western Hemisphere defense, however, he wanted the French told: (1) that the United States could, at any time during the remainder of the war, have the governor replaced by “a man totally agreeable to the United States. (2) That the United States is contemplating sending to Dakar a fairly large force for training purposes in connection with the protection of the air fields and also for the protection and use of the port facilities and harbor.” (Draft message attached to Rear Admiral Wilson Brown to Marshall et al., July 3, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. The change Marshall suggested was made. See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, 2: 169.

TO ROBERT R. MCCORMICK

July 5, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear McCormick: I owe you a very broad apology for my delay in replying to your letter of May twelfth.<sup>1</sup> The truth of the matter is that it evidently became attached to some paper here in the office and ended up in a safe for my private correspondence. It was addressed to General R.H. Marshall which might in part account for this regrettable error. However, the address included “Chief of Staff” so the mix-up is not excusable.

As to the subject of your letter, I am not in agreement with you concerning the Army’s use of the high caliber civilian talent that is available. I am inclined to think that you must have seen at the First Division dinner a majority of men who were not with combat units, which was very likely to be the case. There is a marked difference in our approach to the commissioned officer between those for duty with combat troops and those who are being used elsewhere, in the New York Corps Area, for example.

The selection of officers for the combat units is carried out under most strenuous, even dangerous, procedure, and we have had very convincing proof of the quality of leadership obtained in this manner. Utilizing the men of previous war experience has been one of our greatest problems, because, as you know, men change a great deal during a long period of years. Some grow stodgy in the middle forties, others are still active and aggressive mentally in the fifties, and a few others into the sixties, of which



I hope I am one but I am none too certain of that. At the same time when we endeavor to deal with a man who has severed all technical military contact for a period of twenty or more years we find ourselves involved in a very difficult readjustment. The British had a bitter experience with this factor and our experience we found paralleled theirs.

In the matter of leadership we have let nothing stand in the way of a proper choice—previous status, civilian, Reserve, National Guard, or what-not, West Pointer or non-West Pointer. The operations in North Africa have furnished conspicuous examples of this policy. I believe one enlisted man landed in Africa in the grade of sergeant and is now a lieutenant colonel through a succession of promotions resulting from efficiency in action. I am not quite certain but the last information we had on this man was that he was a casualty, killed I fear. I find everybody solely intent on getting a capable man. They are not interested in where he came from. They are only interested in what he can deliver.

This is true here in the War Department to a large degree. My principal advisor on personnel matters, an Assistant Chief of Staff, is a National Guard officer. The Chief of the Operations Division is not a graduate of West Point. The G-3 of the War Department is a non-West Pointer. General Somervell's Army Service Forces of over a million men include a large number of brigadier generals and major generals, picked men from civil life, the finest talent we could get our hands on. So far as the troops are concerned we have been utterly ruthless in eliminating the weak and in selecting the strong. We do not advertise the reliefs from command, the reductions in rank, because this would only humiliate people and stir up unfortunate publicity, but it proceeds without favor, purely on the basis of obtaining the most adequate leadership for the men. I feel very certain that if you saw our units rather than a Corps Area assemblage you would be profoundly impressed.

Incidentally, I was with the First Division in Africa the other day. It is the same hardbitten crew now that it has had a series of battle actions. They were engaged in the old procedure of filling up the ranks, of replacing the casualties, and engaging in very strenuous training in preparation for the next show, whatever that is to be. The Division had the same difficulties of approach that the old First Division had, highly abnormal, and extremely difficult. It is solidly on its feet now and has won the respect and admiration of all who have seen it in action.

Again with my regret for the delay in answering your letter, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. The *Chicago Daily Tribune* publisher had served with the First Division during World War I. He had attended the division's annual dinner on May 8 and reported that he was not impressed with some of the active duty general officers he met there. "I am sure they do not



compare in ability with a number of non-commissioned men I know who were taken by the draft in their late thirties, after they had proven unusual and sometimes extraordinary ability. . . . The men I speak about are not allowed to do anything for the army. At most they are clerks. . . . They see around them younger and less able men who knew how to pull the ropes to get commissions. Their previous achievements must be on their induction records and speak much more loudly than marks which may have been given to them by a man of much less stature. The men I speak about will be among the most influential citizens after the war. It seems to me that the welfare of our country today and in years to come will be profoundly affected unless suitable occupation can be found for men of this kind, or unless they can be taken back to civilian life where their talents are needed, and wanted, and they are not used in the army." (McCormick to Marshall, May 12, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. 1759. *Secret*

July 5, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

In going over the request of your planners for additional antiaircraft, service troops and so forth, I am wondering whether or not the figures submitted have not been somewhat based on a policy of getting whatever it is possible to obtain rather than being conservative in order to assist us in the over-all problem with which we are now confronted. Also I am in doubt as to whether or not careful thought has been given to the possibilities of using French troops for many of the duties involved. It is much easier now to send equipment, if not available in Africa, than to send troops which necessitate fast convoys, heavy drafts on our escort requirements, etc.

I am not attempting to go into these details. I merely wish to make certain that your people are doing everything they can, within the requirements of your theater, to assist us in meeting the world requirements. The present demands for these troops seriously throws out of gear many of our schedules. During the battle of Tunisia and in preparation for HUSKY we have strained every resource to meet your requirements. We cannot continue to sacrifice all other theaters on such a basis of priority.

This is to you personally to make certain that your people fully recognize the general situation. You may be completely frank with me in expressing your reactions to this message.<sup>1</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-1894])

1. Major General Walter Bedell Smith, replying for Eisenhower who had left for the HUSKY Advanced Command Post after drawing up an outline of his views, wrote that Eisenhower "appreciates so thoroughly the serious problems that confront the War Department that we would take long chances here rather than have it thought that our estimates of personnel requirements were based on any consideration except that of the minimum estimated needs." He described the difficulties facing Allied Force Headquarters and noted that French troops could not be used because of the political situation and because of a



shortage of transportation. (Smith to Marshall, Radio No. W-4249, July 6, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 3, Item 5].) For Marshall's response, see Marshall to Smith, July 10, 1943, pp. 53-54.

PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT  
TO THE PRIME MINISTER  
*Secret. Personal*

July 7, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

With reference to your 332 and 345 and my 293 regarding Sholto Douglas, the following is a frank summary of views:<sup>1</sup>

In the first place General Eisenhower has not been involved in this matter and we are unaware of his opinion. I have been advised that of a number of general officers who have been thrown in contact with Douglas all have gotten the same reaction which is unfavorable to the prospect of success in Allied command. The Burma problem will be one of exceeding difficulty not merely in the character of the fighting but more because of the complications and ramifications of the situation. It therefore requires, in our opinion, a man of unusual breadth of vision, moral courage, and personal characteristics that lend themselves to coordinating actions of diverse peoples. It was for that reason that I proposed, with complete and spontaneous unanimity of opinion on the part of all of my advisors, the name of Admiral Cunningham. He understands the complications of Allied command and has demonstrated outstanding ability to meet such complications as well as an unusual understanding of Americans. He enjoys our complete confidence. His opinion would not only carry the weight that should be given to that of a supreme commander in a theater but a prejudiced view, in effect, on our part that his view must be right.

This would not at all be the case, I believe, with Douglas. He would start with handicaps of lack of experience in Allied matters, in a most difficult theater, and with certain prejudices against him to which I have referred above, justified or not.<sup>2</sup>

I realize the importance of Cunningham in the Mediterranean but I am hopeful that the situation will be so clarified navally in a short time that his services can be spared as well as some of his ships.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On June 18 Churchill had proposed Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, commander in chief of the Middle East Command, as the Supreme Allied Commander in the proposed Southeast Asia Command. Roosevelt replied on June 14 (No. 293) that he was "not prepared at the moment" to accept Douglas. Churchill responded on July 6 (No. 345) by defending Douglas's qualifications. "I have been wondering why it is you have these doubts about him, and I should be grateful if you would let me know from what they



spring. The only thing I can think of is that he sat on a very large committee under Eisenhower in the early days of BOLERO before TORCH was settled, and perhaps he could not do himself full justice there. I am sure he is animated by the most friendly feelings towards your people and that he has tact and *savoir faire*.” (*Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, 2: 263–64, 275–76, 305–6.)

2. In his memoirs, Douglas states: “While I felt that I was getting along well with the Americans, and there had been no reason whatsoever for me to believe that I was not in the closest of harmony with them, they were nevertheless inclined to be a little touchy about anything that they might consider bordered on criticism.” In addition, he noted, Americans were excessively suspicious of British motives and rigid in thinking and planning in the Mediterranean and in “their singleminded interest in the planned invasion of the Continent.” (Sholto Douglas, *Combat and Command: The Story of an Airman in Two World Wars* [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966], pp. 573, 601–2, 604.)

3. When the president sent this message on July 9, he added a concluding sentence: “I will of course abide fully by your decisions and give unquestioned support to the carrying out of the task.” (*Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, 2: 317–18.) For more on this episode, see Marshall Notes for Conversation with Sir John Dill, July 12, 1943, pp. 56–57.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

*Secret*

July 9, 1943

[Washington, D.C.]

Attached is a summary of General Giraud’s requests as they came to Somervell last night.<sup>1</sup> In brief our situation in regard to these requests is this:

We can obtain almost all of the equipment, assuming the British will turn back to us .30 caliber rifles in the hands of civilians there, I believe, which we gave them to arm the populace; the cargo vessels can be made available but instead of going in a separate convoy, for reasons of escort economy should be distributed through several convoys; the port situation is the limiting factor and one regarding which we must not allow Giraud to go over Eisenhower’s head because we are incapable of judging that on this side of the Atlantic. Therefore I regard it as highly important that we either have Giraud take this up personally with Eisenhower in Africa, which is the preferable course or we take it up by radio. Quite evidently a reply cannot be obtained at this particular moment as Eisenhower is in Malta and Smith is at Tunis and everybody is heavily engaged.<sup>2</sup>

Please read again Eisenhower’s radiogram on this subject.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Giraud had arrived in the United States on July 7. (Concerning Marshall’s role during the visit, see Marshall to Winn, July 13, 1943, pp. 57–58.) The next day the Combined Chiefs of Staff held a special meeting to hear Giraud’s views on equipping a second French corps (a second armored division, two more infantry divisions, plus support troops). Giraud wanted the materiel in North Africa by August 1. Marshall replied that the U.S.

Joint Chiefs of Staff were "in full harmony" with Giraud's wishes and that the War Department had already decided to delay the activation of certain U.S. divisions scheduled for the second half of 1943 in order to make the equipment available for the French. He warned the French leader, however, that North African port capacity, already strained by the Sicilian operation (HUSKY), would be a limiting factor. (Minutes of the Special Combined Chiefs of Staff Meeting, July 8, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS 334, CCS Minutes].) Marshall's warning was based upon a telegram from Eisenhower's headquarters stating that November 1 was the earliest date that North African ports could handle increased shipments for French rearmament. (Eisenhower to Marshall, Radio No. W-4173, July 5, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. For further developments on Giraud's request, see Marshall Memorandum for General Arnold, July 12, 1943, pp. 54-55.

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR PASCO<sup>1</sup>

July 9, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

I notice in the record of my correspondence a number of questions, some anonymous, which puzzle parents or wives and yet for which there is a very simple answer. I rather think it might be a good thing to list these with proposed answers from time to time and turn them over to the Bureau of Public Relations to be farmed out in some form of publicity.

In this morning's digest of correspondence I notice this question:

"Why are furloughs not given boys of 19 and 20 about to be sent overseas?"

That is a very easy matter to answer so that all could understand, a matter of secrecy, railroad transportation and a number of other factors which prevent such procedure.

Examine into this. . . .<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. H. Merrill Pasco was an assistant secretary of the General Staff.
2. Omitted is a request that Pasco try to find a specific World War I document.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
*Secret*

July 9, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

As a result of continuous investigation over the past eight months and the apparent strength of the Russian Army (as concerns U.S. divisions) the following reductions in personnel requirements *up to* December 31, 1943, have been ordered:



<i>Troops</i>	<i>Original allotment for 1943</i>	<i>Reduction</i>
Air	2,200,000	50,000
Divisions	1,422,918	332,610
Corps and Army troops	1,409,167	71,550
Service troops	1,153,275	52,047 (increase)
Overhead (here and abroad)	563,000	35,000
Trainees (college, privates, officer candidates)	508,000	45,000
General Donovan's forces (OSS)	5,000	—
Emergency pool	271,640 (a)	46,887
Total enlisted	7,553,000	529,000
Officers	675,000	33,000
Nurses	40,000	—
Total, officers and enlisted	8,248,000 (b)	562,000 or a total required of 7,686,000 (c)

Notes: (a) This pool includes Air and other reserves *to be* reallocated later, to the Air, for example, or for new type units or to meet unexpected attrition.

(b) This figure of 8,248,000 includes 150,000 WAC's, which were not included in original manpower estimates.

(c) Includes 150,000 in College Army Specialized Training, 7,000 in OSS and 150,000 WAC's.

There is involved a reduction of 12 divisions, or at least their delay to the January-June, 1944 program, depending upon status of Russian Army.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall sent Admiral King a summary of the army's proposed reductions. King replied that "at the present time the Navy has a shortage of personnel for manning new ships which is getting progressively worse," and it was essential that the navy adhere to its authorized strength of 2,092,960 by December 31, 1943. The navy had to build its strength gradually, as it did not have "the housing and training facilities to absorb a large mass of men at one time, which would be necessary if authorization were delayed." Marshall concurred. (Marshall Memorandum for Admiral King, July 10, 1943, King Memorandum for General Marshall, July 13, 1943, and Marshall Memorandum for Admiral King, July 20, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 320.2].)

At this time, the Roosevelt administration hoped that the army's planned strength reduction would result in reduced draft calls during the last half of 1943. But on July 21 Marshall wrote to the head of the War Manpower Commission that shortfalls in spring inductions and higher than expected personnel losses meant that army inductions would have to continue to be about 140,000 per month to meet even the reduced requirements. (Marshall Memorandum for Mr. McNutt, July 21, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)



MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF  
WAR MOBILIZATION<sup>1</sup>

*Personal and Confidential*

July 10, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Justice Byrnes: The U.S. Chiefs of Staff have been aware for a long time of a serious disadvantage under which they labor in their dealings with the British Chiefs of Staff. Superficially at least, the great advantage on the British side has been the fact that they are connected up with other branches of their Government through an elaborate but most closely knit Secretariat. On our side there is no such animal and we suffer accordingly. The British therefore present a solid front of all officials and committees. We cannot muster such strength.

General Deane<sup>2</sup> is the Secretary for the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and the senior Secretary for the Combined Chiefs of Staff; there is a British Secretary with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. General Deane stands alone in his relation to matters in Washington except for the War and Navy Departments. On the British side their man, a Brigadier,<sup>3</sup> is connected up for purposes of liaison and control with practically every branch of the British Government in an automatic manner. I am of the opinion that a great deal of our difficulty in composing military effort with production and civil life economy flows from the fact that we have no well-integrated system which is at work on the job day and night.<sup>4</sup>

The British Cabinet has a Secretary who keeps carefully recorded minutes of the meetings. He automatically circulates through the Secretariat I have been referring to, such portions as pertain to their respective affairs. For example, should the British Cabinet take up a matter relating to the military effort and reach any conclusion, that conclusion goes automatically and immediately to the Secretary of the British Chiefs of Staff as well as to other secretaries whose chiefs or committees are concerned, and it reaches the British Secretary of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington within a few hours.

On the contrary, not only are our various agencies not carefully correlated but sometimes a day or more will elapse before the specific agency, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, for example, is made aware of the important conclusions arrived at or the problem which is being considered and which deeply affects them. Important radios will sometimes be unknown to us for a considerable period of time because there is not an automatic procedure set up. Discussions with the British, officials or committees, bearing directly on Chiefs of Staff business, will take place here and there in Washington without correlation or later report of commitments.

There is also the continuing danger of misunderstandings. After Cabinet meetings Mr. Stimson invariably makes some pencil notes and dictates a memorandum which is circulated over here, with relation to any matters



that may concern the War Department. Possibly Mr. Knox does the same thing in the Navy Department. However, we have had cases where their impressions varied as to just what the President desired.

I will give you another more recent example. When I have been in town I have always endeavored to see that General Deane was present at the White House whenever there was a meeting of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff with the President. The other day the President hurriedly called a meeting at which neither King nor I was present. General McNarney represented me and Admiral Edwards represented Admiral King. A vastly important issue was discussed having to do with a proposed operation. The Joint Planners of the Army and Navy were put to work on this by General McNarney and Admiral Edwards, and a meeting was held by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to consider the proposed plan. It there developed for the first time that Admiral Leahy and General Arnold thought the President had said one thing and Admiral Edwards and General McNarney thought he had said another. Three days of intricate planning had been given to the problem, all of which we found, on inquiry by Admiral Leahy of the President, was based on a false foundation. In this instance the result was merely delay but in other instances the result has been much more serious.

In brief, what is needed is some organization of the secretaries of the various committees of the Government. We have tried to approach something like this by having General Deane invite secretaries of other groups to a meal with him to make them aware of each other's problems and to offer information but that is hardly a superficial treatment of the problem. The proposal which I sketch here is equally superficial and would require very careful thought and integration to be workable.

I am unburdening myself to you for the reason that I have just received a report on the British system prepared by General Sir Hastings Ismay who is the Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense and occupies the position of senior military officer of their Secretariat, or War Cabinet *Office* as they term it. I have known Ismay for a year or more and very intimately. In an endeavor to fit our systems into a working relation I asked him to sketch out the British system for me, because we are always in trouble when we come to match men on committees or in the matter of references to committees. He has just sent me his outline in which I think you will be interested, but I ask you to read paragraphs 9 and 10 of the principal paper and especially paragraphs 9 to 15 of Annex "C". The latter has a direct relation to the complications under which you are now laboring.<sup>5</sup>

This is a rather delicate matter for me to discuss and to circulate in the form of a British paper, because it could be charged that I was proposing not only a War Cabinet but a fundamental constitutional alteration in the matter of Cabinet responsibility to the Congress, etc., which is remote from



my purpose. I am interested solely in some form of a Secretariat for keeping all these groups in Washington in an automatic relationship one with the other. Because of the embarrassment and damage I would suffer if my purpose in acquiring this British information were misinterpreted I am asking you please not to circulate Ismay's paper or make any reference to the fact that I have brought this matter to your personal attention.

G. C. Marshall

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The Office of War Mobilization had recently been established (by Executive Order 9347 of May 27, 1943) to develop unified programs and to establish policies for the maximum use of the country's resources; it was also charged with unification of the activities of all federal government agencies and departments concerned with military or civilian supplies, materials, and products. Former Supreme Court Justice James F. Byrnes was director of the office, which was located in the White House.

2. Brigadier General John R. Deane.

3. Harold Redman.

4. For a previous expression of Marshall's concern regarding U.S. government coordination, see *Papers of GCM*, 3: 423-24.

5. During their May 27 flight from Botwood, Newfoundland, to Gibraltar, Ismay had promised to send Marshall "a note on the machinery of Government" in Britain. Five weeks later, Ismay sent a lengthy "Note on the Working of the Central Executive Government of Great Britain and of the War Cabinet Office" with a supplementary note (Annex C) giving detailed information on the principal committees. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the chief paper discussed the War Cabinet Office's characteristics ("half Civil and half Military") and the crucial importance of a unified secretariat. Paragraphs 9 to 13 of the supplemental note discussed the Lord President's Committee ("the most important focus of civil Government under the War Cabinet"), which was "responsible for keeping a continuous watch over Home Front questions and the general trend of economic development," and which handled numerous domestic policy questions. Paragraph 14 described the Allied Supplies Executive, and paragraph 15 the Committee on Reconstruction Problems. (Ismay to Marshall, July 3, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL FORTIER<sup>1</sup>

July 10, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

I think it would be interesting to General Giraud if on the way to Leesburg tomorrow you gave him from time to time, some description of the Civil War episodes that are related to the route.

For example, as he starts out the Lee Boulevard in rear of Fort Myer, you can refer to that as the perimeter of the defenses of Washington during the Civil War, and to the fact that the Confederates at one time occupied the bluff, at Lee's Mansion, in Arlington Cemetery looking down on the city.

As you reach the little settlement of Drainsville you will see a metal sign referring to the cavalry action at that place. This was Jeb Stuart's outfit,



and while it occurred early in the war, the losses were very heavy for a cavalry combat.

Probably the most interesting point on the route is the dirt road leading to the north, your right, where Stuart's Cavalry turned off to proceed to a crossing of the Potomac about three miles beyond, into Maryland, and lost themselves completely from Lee on his invasion of Pennsylvania, which ended calamitously at Gettysburg. It is possible that Stuart's decision at this point had a decisive effect on the Confederacy, because it would appear likely that had Lee had full information of the Union movements he would have employed his large force, about 70,000, with its high morale, to advantage as to the point of contact and the character of the battle. Do not imply to General Giraud that I am condemning Stuart, but rather that here was the point where a decision of the moment had a very tragic result on the operations of an army.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Brigadier General Louis J. Fortier, a graduate of the French École Supérieure de Guerre, had been temporarily detached from his post as commander of the Ninety-fourth Division's artillery to serve as an aide to General Giraud.

2. As the top graduate of the Command and General Staff School, Marshall had given the summarizing lecture on the Gettysburg campaign at the end of the class's Manassas-Gettysburg staff ride in mid-July 1908. (Untitled, undated lecture, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Speeches].)

TO MAJOR GENERAL WALTER BEDELL SMITH  
Radio No. 2192. *Secret*

July 10, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

From General Marshall for General Smith's eyes only. Reference your W 4249 regarding troop necessities,<sup>1</sup> do not refer this to Eisenhower or bother him in any way about it. But I want to hear from you further, because I still do not see that you are endeavoring to utilize French troops to the full extent possible. We have authorized you to use French troops for prison guards and yet no reference is made to that. Do they decline this service? Is there any other use you can make of French units that has not been included in the program?

Materiel for 14 AA Battalions has been sent to the French. It will be necessary for the French supporting troops to be trained for future operations and this training on the job might well be adapted to your present needs. Is there a further possibility of using native labor more extensively, organizing controlled units, etc., for this purpose? This whole matter is exceedingly serious. We have just had to authorize the transfer of a complete personnel convoy in August from ETO to your people at an expense of 90,000 troops for the former.<sup>2</sup>



NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-4184])

1. See note 1, Marshall to Eisenhower, July 5, 1943, pp. 45-46.

2. Smith replied that Allied Force Headquarters was doing its best to use French troops and further French units had been made available, but French military leaders had an intense desire to create their own strong, modern force and did not wish to divert troops to housekeeping duties. More native labor companies were being formed, "but the labor supply is rather limited. This may sound strange but actually money is of no interest to an Arab and once he has obtained a few clothes and enough food to last him for a few weeks he has no interest in work either." Smith wrote that despite the problems, "I believe we can do still more to reduce our program and I will flog the dead horse again." (Smith to Marshall, Radio No. W-4721, July 11, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 3, Item 5].)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ARNOLD<sup>1</sup>

*Secret*

July 12, 1943

[Washington, D.C.]

The attached memorandum of July 10th from General Giraud was handed to me at Leesburg yesterday with a personal statement by the General as to the importance of a special convoy arriving in Africa the latter part of July with the needed equipment. He explained that he went into the details of his discussion of the matter with the President but did not indicate the President's response.<sup>2</sup>

The following is a summary of my statements to General Giraud:

There was no complication that I knew of regarding the 100,000 sets of clothing as these were available and could be shipped on current convoys as filler cargo.

That except for certain shortages in engineer and signal equipment there was no serious complication regarding the availability of the materiel desired.

That General Somervell thought he could find some 28 cargo ships, not at one time, available for the shipment of the equipment.

That the limiting factors were the provision of the necessary escort vessels either for separate convoy or for the enlargement of scheduled convoys, and the congestion of ports in North Africa.

I stated to General Giraud that the decision, within the limits of escort availabilities, as to what should go in each convoy, must be made by General Eisenhower, that we could not on this side of the Atlantic determine priorities. I stated that General Eisenhower was under direction to carry out certain operations and that we could not from this distance deny his requests for certain shipments in favor of some other shipments and at the same time hold him responsible for the operations. Therefore I stated to General Giraud that while we would take up these matters with General



Eisenhower as rapidly as we had dependable data regarding the situation on this side, the determining course undoubtedly should be reached following a personal discussion of these matters by General Giraud with General Eisenhower.

I further stated to General Giraud that it was the urgent desire of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to have General Eisenhower use French troops wherever possible rather than to import U.S. troops. Our desires in this matter were identical with those of General Giraud. I explained to him our present dilemma in meeting General Eisenhower's requisitions for special troops and our recommendation to General Eisenhower that he endeavor to secure French troops to meet his requirements, as these special organizations would be required to round out French Army Corps organization. General Giraud made no comment on this last.

In the discussion the point was made that the shipment of the supplies would have a tremendous psychological effect on the DeGaulle influence. Also that the employment of French troops would be another positive curative. I expressed agreement in regard to this.

General Giraud made no final comments after my detailed outline of the situation. I told him that we would continue to search for ways and means and that any changes or developments would be communicated to him while he was en route in this country.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. This memorandum was also addressed to Generals Brehon Somervell, Joseph McNarney, Thomas Handy (assistant chief of staff, Operations), and Raymond Moses (assistant chief of staff, G-4).

2. Concerning General Giraud's visit and the implementation of Phase II of the United States's efforts to supply the French army, see Marcel Vigneras, *Rearming the French*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* (Washington: GPO, 1957), pp. 82–84. For the chief of staff's previous consideration of Giraud's requests, see Marshall Memorandum for Admiral Leahy, July 9, 1943, pp. 47–48. Giraud had met with Lieutenant General Somervell on July 9, and Somervell sent Marshall an analysis of the requests which described equipment availability, shipping, and North African port facilities. Giraud's memorandum was primarily concerned with shipping priorities, the highest being that for "100,000 complete clothing outfits." (Somervell Memorandum for General Marshall, July 10, 1943, and Giraud Memorandum, July 10, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. Marshall told Smith that the most promising method of shipping the supplies Giraud wanted was to add about nine ships to the convoys beginning in August. Could Smith give him "any prospect or hint as to what might be done beyond the pessimistic prospect" of no port capacity prior to November 1? (Marshall to Smith, Radio No. 2594, July 15, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-6217)].) Smith replied that revised plans would enable Casablanca to handle the proposed two hundred thousand extra tons and that the rate of nine ships per convoy could be accommodated. Marshall at once informed Giraud, who returned to Algiers on July 25. Eisenhower later reported greatly improved French troop morale as a result of the decision on supplies. (Vigneras, *Rearming the French*, pp. 84–86.)



NOTES FOR CONVERSATION WITH SIR JOHN DILL  
*Secret*

July 12, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

The solution proposed in the last paragraph of the Prime Minister's message No. 345, 6 July, is not acceptable. It does not solve the question and the first step indicated by the Prime Minister would make eventual solution more difficult, if not impossible.<sup>1</sup>

My entire thought in this matter of Southeast Asia commander is success in that area. For success it is essential that we have the leadership which will be vigorous and will bring about harmonious relations. I am convinced that we are walking into a mess if we put Sholto Douglas in as commander. I do not attempt to pass on Douglas' qualifications. Undoubtedly the Prime Minister knows more about that than I do. However, I do pass on American reaction to Douglas and the impression he makes on our people. On this point I am much better qualified to judge than is the Prime Minister.

I am perfectly aware of British reaction to Stilwell and I would be perfectly willing to replace him if I had any man who had a chance to accomplish what Stilwell is doing.

I believe that we would defy efficiency and set the stage for a failure by placing an officer in command to whom the American reaction is that he is a stuffed-shirt. The situation is in brief, no Douglas or no American participation. There will be American participation.

I realize the very difficult position in which you, personally, have been placed. The Prime Minister apparently looks to you to obtain our acceptance of Douglas. You are at liberty to use what I have said above in whole or in part if it will help any. My suggestion is as follows: That it again be pointed out that we are perfectly willing to accept a British commander but feel that the commander selected should be satisfactory to us. You will recall that in a previous message of the President he requested the submission of additional names. Although we suggested the names of Admiral Cunningham and Air Marshal Tedder, we are not trying to name the commander but to be assured that a commander will be named who will make the operation a success. It appears that the next step should be the submission of additional names.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 10, Item 63a)

1. For previous correspondence regarding the possible appointment of Sholto Douglas as commander in Southeast Asia, see Marshall Proposed Message from the President to the Prime Minister, July 7, 1943, pp. 46-47. Churchill's July 6 message (No. 345) defended Douglas, concluding: "Supposing, however, that you are still unconvinced, I could make, as a first step, a unified new British Joint South-East Asia Command under Douglas with a thoroughly good liaison with Stilwell and work up to the combined Supreme Command in two stages as confidence grew. Pray tell me with the utmost plainness what you feel." (*Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, 2: 306.) Marshall prepared the



notes printed here prior to calling Dill, who was then in San Francisco, on the scrambler telephone. This call was necessitated not only by Churchill's message but also by a July 10 message to Dill from the British Chiefs of Staff reiterating the prime minister's position and noting British problems with Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell, who commanded U.S. Army Forces in China, Burma, and India and acted as chief of Chiang Kai-shek's joint staff. The British secretary of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Brigadier Harold Redman, showed the message for Dill to Marshall, who called Dill to discuss a suitable reply. (Marshall Memorandum for Brigadier H. Redman, July 12, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Following their discussion, Dill dictated to Marshall his reply to the July 10 message. In his memorandum to Redman transmitting Dill's remarks, Marshall quotes Dill as saying: "Regarding Stilwell the point is that he is not required or expected to command other than U.S. and Chinese troops whereas Sholto Douglas is proposed to command U.S. and Chinese troops as well as British troops. . . . Marshall stated that on more than one occasion Douglas had spoken in derogatory terms of U.S. units and operations. Some of these remarks, on at least one occasion, almost led to a physical encounter. The more Marshall looks into the matter the less he likes the proposal." (Ibid.) During the conference at Quebec in mid-August, Churchill announced that Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten would be appointed supreme commander of Allied forces in Southeast Asia.

TO MRS. JAMES J. WINN<sup>1</sup>

July 13, [1943]  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Molly, Thanks for your long letter. I am relieved to learn how splendidly you are getting along and how the children have developed.

I notified your mother the other day that Giraud would take informal midday dinner with us Sunday accompanied by one other officer. She immediately came up to Washington to put on a splurge and spent Friday and Saturday morning here with me. Unfortunately I was involved for every meal each day except breakfast so really did not have an opportunity to see her until we drove down to Leesburg late Saturday afternoon.

Giraud's visit here of course involved me in a great many engagements. I met him Wednesday morning [July 7], took him to the White House for tea Wednesday afternoon, gave him a dinner for forty at the Mayflower Wednesday night, had an official meeting with Giraud Thursday morning and luncheon with him and the President and two others Thursday noon. Friday there was another luncheon for him here at the Pentagon followed by a Staff meeting in the afternoon and a dinner for him at the White House Friday night.

We had a pleasant weekend at Leesburg except that your mother was heavily involved in arrangements for Giraud's luncheon. I did my usual work up to a half hour beforehand. He arrived at 12:00 and left at 3:30. The place was full of FBI men who occupied Fleet<sup>2</sup> and kept him out of the house.



Monday [July 5] I went to Boston with Admiral King, boarded a new Naval vessel and landed at Norfolk Wednesday morning, flying up to Washington.<sup>3</sup> This week promises to be a little quieter than last but there is a great deal happening which involves my attention.

Allen arrives late Friday night by air from Louisville. I shall take him down to Leesburg Saturday and bring him back Sunday night. He will fly up to Mitchel Field Monday morning en route to Fire Island for ten days' leave before joining his unit.<sup>4</sup>

He apparently has done very well and made a high stand, but in his last letter he started on the business of reforming all other second lieutenants according to his rigid code. I shall try to prevail on him to concentrate on his own affairs and allow the rest of the Army to exist in the meantime until he arrives at a sufficient position of command to control the activities of other people.

With my love to you both, Affectionately,

GCMRL/ Research File (Family)

1. Marshall's stepdaughter.
2. The Marshalls' dalmatian.
3. Marshall had traveled on the new aircraft carrier *Lexington* (CV-16), which had been commissioned March 17, 1943.
4. Allen Brown was scheduled to report in mid-August to the First Armored Division, which at this time was resting and refitting near Rabat, Morocco. Mrs. Marshall owned a cottage on Fire Island, New York.

TO MRS. RAYMOND E. LEE

July 13, [1943]  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mrs. Lee, I received your letter of July tenth and was much concerned to learn of what had been happening to Lee. I took the matter up personally with the Surgeon General to the end that another month's sick leave is now proposed.<sup>1</sup> I hope that this additional rest will give him an opportunity to relax, after which we can determine what character of duty he can best perform.

My experience of the past four years, the last two in particular, has convinced me that the hardest job is to prevail upon certain individuals to stop worrying. With the best intentions in the world they continue to worry and of course with unfortunate results. My own fear has been that in time they would get me down and I would commence to worry about the progress we are not making, the criticisms of what we are doing, and so forth. Fortunately for me, up to the present time I have been able to go along and do my best and not give much of a damn beyond that. However, I recognize that once one starts to worry it does not help much even to



realize it is bad to worry. The complaint is very difficult to control, and I imagine that your part in this will be of great importance. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Jeanette Lee had written that her husband, who had been assistant chief of staff, G-2, between February 1 and May 4, 1942, was on sick report due to overwork following his completion of training a brigade at Fort Bragg, and she was afraid that a medical board would force him to retire. "I understand the regulations, and the summary manner in which these boards can operate. But it is inconceivable to me that such an experienced soldier should be dispensed with as readily as a draftee. . . . If he had a chronic condition such as heart trouble, I would not write but as it is, I know that he can do full duty if summary action is not heedlessly taken. I am, therefore, writing for this much consideration—could General Lee have enough time to get really fit before going before a medical board, or could he be put on some sort of duty for a month or so that would take his situation into account?" Marshall sent Mrs. Lee's letter to Surgeon General Norman T. Kirk, who observed that Lee's diagnosis was: "Anxiety neurosis, severe, with marked depression. It is believed that ultimately he will have to appear before Retiring Board. Will never be fit for general duty in command capacity; might be able to perform limited duty." (Lee to Marshall, July 10, 1943, and Kirk Memorandum for Marshall, July 13, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].) Lee did not retire until the end of February 1946.

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
*Secret*

July 13, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Eisenhower: The bearer of this letter, Col. Louis L. Williams of the Public Health Service, the leading expert in the United States on malaria, is reporting in your theater for the purpose of outlining the necessary organization for the prevention and control of malaria. His assignment has already been cleared with your headquarters. However, I wish you to know that I personally regard this as a matter of great importance and I should like you to see that his projects, within the limits of available materiel and similar necessities, are put into effect.

The Surgeon General of the Army is deeply concerned over the malaria possibilities in North Africa and Sicily in the approaching season. Most confidentially we have had grave difficulties in the Pacific and a considerable number of divisions are temporarily out of action as a result, two of them for more than six months. General Kirk feels that a similar situation is due to develop in North Africa, east of Oran, unless immediate steps are taken to meet the situation.

I understand that the malarial hazard in Sicily will probably be greater than that in North Africa.<sup>1</sup>

Apparently the trouble in the past has been that priorities for munitions overrode those for the necessary screening and other materiel to provide

protection at the bases; also there has not been sufficiently rigid sanitary discipline as to the individual soldier. Atabrine is merely a superficial protection.

Please have your construction people, who will be heavily involved in this matter, made aware of its extreme urgency. Faithfully yours,

G. C. Marshall

DDEL/D. D. Eisenhower Papers (Pre-Presidential)

1. U.S. forces in the Sicily campaign suffered 9,832 malaria cases, compared with 8,375 battle casualties. The army's success in controlling malaria during its first year in the Mediterranean was, an official history noted, "comparatively poor." (Charles M. Wiltse, *The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1965], pp. 173, 214.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

July 14, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Salvage and Battle Scrap.

You will probably be interested in the following data, as yet incomplete, on the amounts of salvage and battlefield scrap being received in the New York Port of Embarkation.

*May*

15 ships included as part of their cargo 1500 gross tons of ferrous scrap and 200,000 *pounds* of non-ferrous scrap, also 1,000,000 pounds of scrap rubber, and the following items for salvage, repair and re-issue:

4400 - 55 gallon steel drums  
135 tons of half track  
55,000 pounds of shoes  
90,500 pounds of clothing  
10,000 pounds of webbing  
10,500 pounds of canvas

In addition to the foregoing hundreds of boxes were received of repairable airplane engines and Air Force property, 100,000 pounds of oxygen and acetylene cylinders, many thousand ammunition containers and thousands of items for different technical services such as reels for the Signal Corps. There was also included captured enemy equipment for examination by our intelligence and technical people. The scrap iron was disposed of through trade channels for return to the war effort.



*June*

20 ships included as part of their cargo 2700 *tons* of ferrous scrap and 763 gross tons of non-ferrous scrap. In addition there were received many thousands of items of all classes of repairable and reuseable salvage including everything from field jackets, radio tubes, carboys, tank and band treads, miscellaneous clothing, to airplane engines, etc.

The number of items and volume of battle scrap and salvage being returned is increasing very rapidly not only from the European theater but also from the Pacific theater. In anticipation of these increases a segregation yard has already been established at the New York Port of Embarkation.

Only small amounts of copper have been returned, but the fired cartridge cases being returned include 70% copper.

Salvage and scrap activities in both Africa and the Pacific are directed by the Army. Repairable Navy property is segregated and forwarded to proper Navy depots.

To facilitate the program which was coordinated with the War Shipping Administration, the Board of Economic Warfare, the Navy Department and other interested agencies, practical business executives from the scrap metal industry have been commissioned in the Army and are actively supervising these matters both here and abroad.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

TO MRS. JOHN J. SINGER

July 14, [1943]  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Marie: A letter from you to Katherine arrived yesterday, and as she is at Leesburg I opened it. I am forwarding it to her today. I was distressed to learn that you had been sick but glad to know that you are fairly well out of the woods and in one place for the remainder of the summer. I can't imagine a more restful and agreeable place to convalesce than the Pike Run Club, and I envy you the beauty and peacefulness of the view from the lawn.<sup>1</sup>

Katherine moved down to Leesburg immediately on my last return from Africa. Allene has joined her there and presumably she will not come back to Myer until sometime in September. She has been back in town three or four times for a day or two, but shortage of gasoline makes that sort of thing rather impossible. I have tried to get down on Saturday afternoon, Friday night if at all possible, but have only succeeded in doing this last once.



Last Sunday we had Giraud for midday dinner and the place was cluttered up with FBI men to blanket the shrubbery.

Fleet is with Katherine and is a continual source of amusing trouble. His last performance was to chase a skunk out onto the lawn and after driving the family into the house he joined them in time to get sick, choosing the best rug.

Allen comes to town from his final training at Fort Knox, late Friday night and I hope to take him down to Leesburg Saturday. He gets the usual ten days' leave commencing Monday and will join Madge at Fire Island where she is spending the summer. He won his commission a month ago and has been in the field on battle training ever since—one canteen of water for each twenty-four hours, cook your own food, confined to the emergency ration, which Allen says is dehydrated hay; as his part of this was during an extremely hot spell he has great respect for a teaspoonful of water.

Clifton has had to come to Washington every other Saturday night to go to the Walter Reed Sunday morning to have his foot further treated. One foot is entirely cured, so they say, but the other is still causing trouble and as the limit in the use of radium has been reached, including a burn, and followed by an operation which removed about as much as could be spared from the sole of one's foot, he has to be very careful who attends the treatment. Therefore his trips to Washington. He goes back on Sunday evening to Richmond.<sup>2</sup>

Molly is in a lakeside tourist camp near Fort Blanding between Jacksonville and Gainesville, Florida, fortunately situated as regards cottage and neighbors and lake. The children are thriving. She seems to be well though until recently had no help whatsoever even for the laundry. Now I believe a woman comes in twice a week and does some of the laundry. Jim gets in to see her Saturday night and I believe one other night. Little Jimmy is starting to talk and is very active. Kitty is progressing very rapidly.

My movements are quite uncertain; I have been away several times and was at sea part of last week on a Naval vessel. My schedule will be quite uncertain from now on I presume until the end of the war. My departure for Africa the last time was on just a few hours notice.

Last night I had the Governor of Bermuda, Lord Knollys and Lady Knollys for tea and Harry Hopkins and his wife, out in the garden. Last week was a continual series of engagements because of Giraud. I met him Wednesday, took him to tea at the White House that afternoon and gave him a dinner for forty at the Mayflower Hotel that night; took him to lunch with the President Thursday, joined him for lunch here at the War Department Friday and dined with him at the White House Friday night. Interpolated were business meetings with the Staff with him and along with this the regular business of the War Department, the Army at large



and nine theaters of operations, so if you think you are too busy to write, measure it alongside this schedule and see if you can't do better than a page and a half!

I sincerely hope that you are feeling much better and that you have not allowed your morale to waiver.

With my love, Affectionately,

P.S. Give my love to Mary Bovard.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The Pike Run Country Club was approximately twenty miles southeast of Marshall's sister's Greensburg, Pennsylvania, home.

2. Clifton S. Brown, Marshall's elder stepson, was a captain assigned to an antiaircraft unit.

3. A family friend from Greensburg.

TO GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR  
Radio No. 5717. *Secret*

July 14, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

Is there any objection to releasing the fact that troops of the 37th and 43rd Divisions are engaged in the New Georgia operations and the names of division commanders? This would help us here in regard to the elimination and appointment of commanders of National Guard Divisions, and the delay of some National Guard Divisions in leaving the country.<sup>1</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-5515])

1. Neither the Thirty-seventh Infantry Division (Ohio National Guard)—commanded since October 1940 by Major General Robert S. Beightler, a guardsman—nor the Forty-third Infantry Division (Maine, Vermont, Connecticut, and Rhode Island National Guard)—commanded since February 1942 by Major General John H. Hester (U.S.M.A., 1908)—had had combat experience prior to their assault landings in the New Georgia island group in late June and early July. The landings (Operation TOENAILS) were part of a drive against Rabaul (Operation CARTWHEEL), which was under MacArthur's strategic command, although the two divisions were part of Admiral Halsey's South Pacific Area forces. (John Miller, Jr., *CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1959], pp. 19, 69–126.)

TO MAJOR GENERAL WALTER BEDELL SMITH  
Radio No. 2463. *Secret*

July 14, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

For General W. B. Smith. In view of accuracy of German communique 2 days ago announcing British-American battle order in Sicily is there any objection to our release of fact that 3rd, 45th, 82nd and 2nd Armored Divisions are actually in Sicily and the names of their commanders?



Editorials here have continued to emphasize the point that experienced troops from the Tunisian campaign are carrying out the operation, while the most impressive feature appears to be that these new divisions are doing so well. I have in mind strengthening our position regarding the relief of previous division commanders from the National Guard.<sup>1</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-5514])

1. National Guard units from Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and Oklahoma made up the Forty-fifth Infantry Division. Major General William S. Key, a guardsman, had been replaced by Major General Troy H. Middleton, a career soldier, in October 1942. For a previous expression of Marshall's concern over the attitudes expressed by certain members of the National Guard over the relief of Guard officers, see *Papers of GCM*, 3: 235-36.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
*Confidential*

July 14, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Our records indicate that approximately 18,978 American prisoners (white) are now held by the Japanese in the Philippines. A short time ago the Japanese government submitted the names of 1,664 American prisoners who have died from preventable causes such as beri-beri, malaria, dysentery, and colitis. Unconfirmed reports obtained from escaped prisoners and clandestine radios indicate that as many as 5,000 may have died from these causes and another report indicates a casualty percentage even as high as 40 per cent. It is difficult to obtain information regarding these prisoners because of the Japanese refusal to permit inspection of the camps by the International Red Cross or by neutral governments. It is apparent, however, that the American prisoners in the Philippines are in a distressing situation and every possible effort must immediately be made to improve their condition.

To this end a list of essential remedies and concentrated vitamin foods has been prepared with the idea that these would be transported as cargo in the U.S.S. GRIPSHOLM in connection with the exchange of Japanese civilian internees. Sufficient space has been reserved on the GRIPSHOLM for 4 months' medical supplies and for a two months' supply of concentrated food. Also, we are taking up with the Soviet government the matter of establishing a stock pile of medicine and concentrated foods at Vladivostok with a view to reshipment of these articles in Japanese bottoms to our prisoners in the Philippines.

The quickest means of providing relief appears to be through the GRIPSHOLM, but it is understood that agreement between the State Department and the Japanese involving the use of the GRIPSHOLM has not been accomplished because of the hesitancy of The Attorney General to release for



exchange certain important Japanese internees who, because of information presumably in their possession, might be of assistance to saboteurs.

In view of the reported conditions under which these American soldiers are now living and the mounting death rate, the War Department feels that the potential risk of releasing the Japanese internees should be taken. Also involved in the matter is a continuous pressure being exerted by the families of the soldiers, many of whom are members of National Guard units recruited en bloc from small communities.

Under these circumstances it is recommended that instructions be given to the Secretary of State to clear the GRIPSHOLM at the earliest possible moment.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The *Gripsholm*, a Swedish ship chartered by the United States government, had made a voyage in 1942 to exchange interned Japanese and American officials and their families. It departed on its second such voyage from New York Harbor on September 2 for the exchange point in Gôa. Some relief supplies were aboard. The ship arrived in Gôa on October 16, the exchange was made, and the *Gripsholm* returned to New York harbor on December 1. Documents concerning negotiations on exchanges, supplies, and treatment of prisoners of war are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1943, 3: 867–1046.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL PORTER, G-3<sup>1</sup>

July 14, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

The transfer of Quartermaster training activities at Fort Warren, Wyoming, has just come to my attention. I talked to General Gregory about it and his view, as you probably already know, is quite different from that of the Ground Forces as to the best method of developing these Corps and Army Quartermaster units.<sup>2</sup>

As he sees the situation we will have a division commander training at Warren deeply concerned about his division and quite naturally with not much of an interest in these parentless organizations of Quartermaster troops there. The equipment is there, the morale has been developed there towards preparation of these units, and the opportunity is presented for going much further in the organizational training of these Quartermaster troops.

I know the officer in charge of the Quartermaster training and he is an unusually able man, an ex-Infantryman.<sup>3</sup>

Please refresh your mind about all the details in this matter and come in to talk to me about it.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Major General Ray E. Porter, who had graduated from Infantry School courses in

1928 and 1932 under Marshall, had been assistant chief of staff for organization and training since May 16, 1943.

2. Fort Warren had been one of two Quartermaster Replacement Training Centers since March 1941 (the other being Camp Lee, Virginia). It was scheduled to be inactivated as a Replacement Training Center and to become a Quartermaster unit training center. Administrative control over Fort Warren was exercised by the Seventh Service Command rather than the Office of the Quartermaster General, which was headed by Major General Edmund B. Gregory. (Erna Risch and Chester L. Kieffer, *The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services*, volume 2, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1955], pp. 215, 219.)

3. Colonel Wilbur R. McReynolds had been director of training since 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL GROGAN<sup>1</sup>

July 19, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

This release lacks in certain respects.<sup>2</sup> I think it is quite important to bring out the fact that General Middleton was promoted twice on the same battlefield. First from major to lieutenant colonel for taking a particular woods, I believe the Bois des Ogons, and then from lieutenant colonel to Colonel for taking another woods, the Bois de Forêt, following in each case a number of previous unsuccessful attempts accompanied by very heavy losses. Following his last promotion he became the youngest regimental commander of a so-called Regular Army unit.<sup>3</sup>

The First Division account omits any reference to El Guettar and the repulse of 100 tanks with no outside assistance.

Regarding General Truscott I think reference should be made to the fact that he was on the staff of Mountbatten and personally participated in the Dieppe raid with the Canadians.<sup>4</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Stanley J. Grogan was a member of the Bureau of Public Relations.

2. The press release issued by Allied Force Headquarters in Algiers praised the United States Seventh Army's First, Third, Forty-fifth, Eighty-second Airborne, and Second Armored divisions and gave some background information on their commanding generals. (*New York Times*, July 18, 1943, p. 3.)

3. On October 14, 1918, two days after his twenty-ninth birthday, Troy Middleton was promoted to colonel; he commanded the Fourth Division's Forty-seventh Infantry Brigade.

4. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., had been an observer at the Dieppe raid on August 19, 1942. Promoted to major general in November 1942, he had commanded the Third Infantry Division since March 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SOMERVELL  
*Secret*

July 19, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

I called in General Osborn this morning to talk over his educational



program, in connection with my thoughts regarding plans for demobilization. I learnt that of the 100 trained educational officers set up for overseas only about 14 had left the United States.<sup>1</sup>

I am anxious to have this work gotten under way particularly with reference to isolated stations. Please have whoever controls the matter of departures endeavor to facilitate the advancement of the program.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Brigadier General Frederick H. Osborn's Special Services Division was charged with developing the army's educational programs, which were to be enlarged after the war. The Army Institute had been established on December 24, 1941, to produce educational materials and coordinate courses. It was formally opened at Madison, Wisconsin, in the spring of 1942, admitted navy personnel beginning in September 1942, and changed its name to the U.S. Armed Forces Institute in February 1943. On May 5, 1942, Marshall authorized sending approximately one hundred educational officers overseas. (Draft Memorandum to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, for Marshall's signature, filed with the document printed here.)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL HUGH A. DRUM<sup>1</sup>  
*Confidential*

July 20, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Drum: Since my note to you of May 12th<sup>2</sup> it has appeared desirable to make a change in the chairmanship of the Inter-American Defense Board which General Embick now heads and of which Admiral Alfred W. Johnson is the other U.S. delegate. General Blanton Winship is the head of the Staff.<sup>3</sup> You are to be appointed to this post.

A survey of Latin-American air facilities is to be made by the Inter-American Defense Board in September and it is desirable that you participate in this survey. Therefore you should assume your new duties here in Washington a few weeks prior to the date of departure of the group making this inspection, or about August 25th. You will therefore probably be relieved from duty with the Eastern Defense Command at about that date. Your relief from duty as Commander of the First Army will be delayed until Congress is in session and confirmation of your nomination for lieutenant generalcy can be secured, unless in the meantime the President agrees to a recessed appointment.

Major General George Grunert will probably succeed you as head of the Eastern Defense Command, and will report to you for preliminary duty, to that end, about August 15th, in order that he can familiarize himself with the existing command arrangements. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Drum, who was nearing the retirement age of sixty-four, was to be relieved from command of First Army and the Eastern Defense Command in August.



2. See *Papers of GCM*, 3: 689-90.

3. Major General Winship had been judge advocate general of the army (1931-33) and governor of Puerto Rico (1934-39); Vice Admiral Johnson (U.S.N.A., 1899) had been director of Naval Intelligence (1927-30) and had held several aeronautical commands. Both men had extensive experience in Latin American military affairs. For further information on Drum's role on the board, see Memorandum for the Secretary of War, September 3, 1943, pp. 114-16.

DRAFT FOR PORTION OF TALK BY THE  
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE<sup>1</sup>

July 22, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

For a long time there has been a great deal of discussion regarding the problem of manpower, which daily grows more acute with the necessity for an increase in the production of war materiel and the urgent requirements for farm labor.<sup>2</sup> The year and a half following Pearl Harbor has been a terrible struggle for a democracy such as ours to prepare itself in men and materiel for the greatest war in history. We have not only had to create an Army virtually out of whole cloth and then transport it over the seven seas, but it has been necessary for us to provide our Allies with tremendous quantities of equipment, planes, guns, trucks, and ammunition, as well as foodstuffs and raw materials, all these to be carried through the menace of the submarines.

This has meant the withdrawal of manpower from the civil economy of this country to build factories, to manufacture munitions, ships and planes in vast quantities, or to become soldiers or sailors. Today the task remains an immense one, but we now see the light not only in preliminary victories on land and sea and in the air but in the fact that our great war Army of more than ninety divisions and approximately a thousand squadrons of planes has so taken shape that it is now possible to level off as it were and concentrate on perfecting its quality, maintaining its strength against the casualties of sickness or battle. Already the numerous training schools for officers have been greatly reduced and the same steps have been taken regarding the multitude of installations throughout the country for the training of specialists such as mechanics, signal men, gunners, etc. No longer will it be necessary for divisions of the Army, struggling to reach a high state of efficiency with only a dozen or less officers of the Regular Army to assist in the process, no longer will it be necessary for them to furnish large cadres of their best officers and noncommissioned officers to create new units. They are now free to concentrate solely on their own perfection. Furthermore, in contrast to the agonies of expansion which had to be suffered because of our previous lack of preparation, numerous officers and men, veterans of many missions in the air or actual fighting on



the ground, are now being returned home and assigned to units in this country to provide an invaluable experience for the better efficiency and protection of our young men.

The women are daily playing a more and more important part in our war effort. The Women's Auxiliary Corps of the Army will probably replace hundreds of thousands of men, and do the special work given them maybe a little better than the men did. They are making a splendid record at this today. In the factories and on the farm already they have enlisted in large numbers, but many more will be required because the expansion of production demands large numbers of additional workmen.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Categorical, Speeches and Writings)

1. The editors have not ascertained whether Speaker Sam Rayburn used Marshall's draft.
2. Local labor shortages had begun to appear in 1942, and this trend grew in intensity during early 1943 until it had begun to affect war production as a whole by mid-1943, by which time the labor force was almost fully mobilized. In July the War Manpower Commission predicted a manpower crisis when it estimated that employment in munitions and related industries would have to increase by 1,700,000 by January 1944 to meet production programs. (Bureau of Demobilization, Civilian Production Administration, *Industrial Mobilization for War: History of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies, 1940–1945*, volume 1, *Program and Administration* [Washington: GPO, 1947], pp. 701, 711; Bureau of the Budget, *The United States at War: Development and Administration of the War Program by the Federal Government* [Washington: GPO, 1946], pp. 430–32.)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MCNAIR

July 28, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

The following suggestion was passed to me by a recent graduate of an Officer Candidate School:

The first hour of afternoon instruction is almost a complete loss. Candidates after a strenuous morning invariably eat practically everything that is placed before them, and as this is the heavy meal there results an overpowering tendency to fall asleep immediately afterwards. As a matter of fact the candidate's entire attention is usually concentrated on trying to keep his eyes open and focused on the instructor, otherwise he falls asleep. Little or anything of the subject of the lecture penetrates the befogged brain.<sup>1</sup>

This appeals to me as a common sense proposition, as I suffer weekly at meetings of the Chiefs of Staff following a heavy formal luncheon which I should treat lightly but do not.

I know that the heavy meal at noon is an Army tradition just as the overcooking and too early cooking of the meat is another practice that



seems impossible to change. However, in these training schools where all of the men are entirely new to the Army it might be better to give them a light luncheon and the heavy meal at night. I sometimes think that it has been the army cooks who have controlled this situation, because almost all laboring men eat a light luncheon. Yet when we got into the CCC we were forced to haul those boys sometimes fifteen or twenty miles in order to eat a heavy noon meal. This I believe was partly caused by the old mess sergeants that we brought in from the Army for the time being while the CCC was being launched.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. This was probably from Marshall's stepson Allen Brown.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NORMAN DAVIS<sup>1</sup>

*Secret*

July 28, 1943

[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mr. Davis: With reference to our conversation yesterday I am sending you herewith the papers explanatory of the demobilization planning which has been under way secretly in the War Department.<sup>2</sup> While my directive memorandum to the Commanding General of the Army Service Forces dated April 14th produced the principal attached paper comment, the initial step in the matter was taken last December with a single individual officer, General John McA. Palmer. Later, in January, the problem was put in the hands of the Organizational Branch of the General Staff, G-3, along with General Palmer's views at that time. After considerable study there it developed that so much of logistics was involved in every phase of Army demobilization that, aside from broad policies regarding our strategical position in the world immediately after the Armistice, and the post-war military set-up, the work could best be developed for the time being under General Somervell's direction.

The survey, copy number 41, attached, was not accepted by me as the basis for the next step for the reason that I felt it necessary for the War Department to have developed its military requirements, both demobilizational and post-Armistice, before taking up the matter with other agencies of the Government. And in order to do this it was necessary to establish certain broad assumptions as a basis for planning. These would have to have at least the off-record approval of the President, otherwise all the work done might be more or less valueless. Furthermore, it would be necessary to coordinate the War Department military problem with the Naval requirements, and this should be done through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Therefore at the present moment so far as the clearly military



problem is concerned, we are endeavoring to reach a basis for certain figures which appear as blanks in the attached memorandum of broad assumptions.<sup>3</sup>

Meanwhile the Secretary of War has taken the matter up largely from the viewpoint of industrial adjustments, and in compliance with his desires a memorandum directive was issued July 22nd, also attached, which places this planning on a more general basis.

As I explained during our conversation it is very important that this matter be kept completely secret for the time being, otherwise it would give rise (1) to such a feeling that the war is coming to an early end that the civilian effort will relax, and (2) the War Department being brought into a working basis with other agencies before it has developed its requirements. In all this there are three rather distinct factors:

a. The demobilization of personnel, which involves a serious problem for the maintenance of morale among those forces which have to be held together for a rather long period. This is my problem and my responsibility.

b. The problem of demobilization of war industry set-ups in relation to general economic requirements in the country.

c. The problem of post-war national defense.

This is a hastily dictated memorandum but I believe it gives you a rough idea of the status of affairs.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. In addition to being chairman of the American National Red Cross, Davis was chairman of the State Department's Security Committee, a member of the Civilian Defense Board, and an adviser to President Roosevelt on postwar food, rehabilitation, and relief problems.

2. The attachments Marshall mentions in this document are not printed here.

3. See Marshall Memorandum for the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff, July 30, 1943, pp. 74-76.

FOR decades, United States plans to defend the Philippines against Japanese aggression had implied a westward thrust by the U.S. main battle fleet down the five-thousand-mile-long sea lane between Pearl Harbor and Manila Bay. Formalized in 1924 as War Plan Orange and continuously modified in subsequent years, this idea was never superceded. Its implementation, however, was a moot point during 1942, as the Allies struggled desperately merely to maintain their line of communications to



Australia, but at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 Admiral King raised the issue and secured approval from the Combined Chiefs of Staff for at least the start of such a drive in 1943. The Pacific Military Conference in Washington in March 1943 had curtailed the scope of operations in the South and Southwest Pacific areas—that is, it was decided not to try to take Rabaul in 1943—thereby indirectly giving impetus to the Central Pacific alternative. At the TRIDENT Conference in May, Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved a plan that designated the Central Pacific as the location of the main effort in the Allies' westward advance, specifically authorizing Admiral Nimitz to drive through the Marshall Islands and allocating to him the resources to do it. (Editorial notes on the three conferences mentioned are in *Papers of GCM*, 3: 515–18, 604–7, 705–8.)

In June, MacArthur protested the proposed diversion of troops (especially the First and Third Marine divisions) and materiel from the South Pacific. While his objections did not dissuade the Joint Chiefs of Staff from launching the Central Pacific thrust, the fear of diverting too many forces from CARTWHEEL—the two-pronged attack aimed at the Japanese base at Rabaul on New Britain Island—was the chief reason they decided to initiate the drive against the Gilbert Islands (i.e., at Makin and Tarawa) rather than directly against the Marshalls. General Marshall supported the Central Pacific operation, observing that the great carrier forces the United States had built up could not stand idle and that the operation would help MacArthur's offensive. (Philip A. Crowl and Edmund G. Love, *Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO 1955], pp. 3, 8–12, 18, 21, 23.)

In mid-June, Admiral King proposed that the First Marine Division be withdrawn from MacArthur's command, but Marshall had opposed it. King wrote to Marshall again on July 22 to express his "strong desire that the projected operations in the Central Pacific shall be implemented by the use of Marine divisions. Not only will such use avoid the inevitable consequences of 'mixed forces' and so promote the effectiveness of the operations, but I hope you will agree that the Marines are by tradition, experience and training eminently suited for amphibious operations, particularly those where the land objectives are island in character and without a 'hinterland' as in the case of New Guinea and the larger islands of the Solomons and Bismarcks." He requested that the First and Third Marine divisions be withdrawn from the CARTWHEEL operation. (King to Marshall, July 22, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, Project Decimal File 1941–43, 381 South Pacific (7–26–43)].) ★



MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING<sup>1</sup>  
*Secret*

July 29, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Release of the 1st or 3d Marine Divisions  
for Operations in the Central Pacific.

*The 1st Marine Division* has been especially equipped and trained for its role in the CARTWHEEL operation and specifically in the ship-to-shore and shore-to-shore assault on western New Britain commencing December 1st as part of Operation 3.<sup>2</sup> The 1st Cavalry Division, which will arrive in the Southwest Pacific about August 1st, will be employed in Operation 2 (the capture of Lae, Finschhafen, Madang), starting in September. As a reserve for Operation 3, the 24th Infantry Division arrives in Australia in September, the first element having already departed Hawaii. In view of the shipping situation and the training of divisions it does not appear practicable to move another Army division to the Southwest Pacific to replace the 1st Marine Division in time for Operation 3, therefore its withdrawal would seriously disrupt the plans for the movement into New Britain.

*The 3d Marine Division* in the South Pacific is to be used together with the 25th Army Division for the operation in the Buin-Faisi area commencing 15 October. Since the 2d Marine Division will be transferred to the Central Pacific and the Army divisions now employed in current operations in New Georgia will require rehabilitation it apparently is not possible to replace the 3d Marine Division in time to initiate the Buin-Faisi operation on schedule. In other words, if the 3d Marine Division is withdrawn, the Buin-Faisi operation would have to be seriously delayed or cancelled. This in turn would adversely affect the operations against western New Britain, as well as adversely affect the air situation for us in the operation against Lae and to the westward in New Guinea.

The directive for the Central Pacific operation calls for the "2d Marine Division and one Army division to be designated later \* \* \* ." The 27th Division, now on Oahu, is the only Division, Army or Marine, which can be so designated without serious dislocation of an already critical shipping situation. This division has been in Hawaii for over a year and is a well trained division with excellent leaders. All of the advanced training facilities of Oahu, including jungle, shore-to-shore and some mockup ship-to-shore facilities, are now available for special intensive training of the 27th in preparation for an amphibious operation. The ship-to-shore training can be augmented by use of some of the APs and AKs now being assembled for the operation.<sup>3</sup> The present target date for the operation will allow a



minimum of three months of concentrated training which should result in a well coordinated unit at the peak of condition.

However desirable from the Navy point of view to employ only Marine divisions in this operation it is my opinion that both the undoubtedly bad effect on the CARTWHEEL operation and the waste of shipping far outweigh the anticipated advantages.

If the use of the 27th Division for the Gilbert operations is agreeable to you we will take necessary steps to initiate its training without delay.<sup>4</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OCS, Project Decimal File 1941-43, 381 South Pacific [7-26-43])

1. This document was drafted in the Operations Division but extensively edited by Marshall.

2. Operation CARTWHEEL was divided into six suboperations: three (A, B, and C) in Admiral Halsey's South Pacific Area, and three (1, 2, and 3) in General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area. Operations 1 (occupation of and airfield construction on Woodlark and Kiriwina islands) and A (landings in the New Georgia island group) had commenced on June 30, 1943. Operation 2 was aimed at seizing control of New Guinea's Huon Peninsula and Markham Valley in order to dominate the seas off western New Britain. Operation 3 was intended to secure the western half of New Britain. Operation B would complete the capture of New Georgia and the Japanese bases at Faisi in the Shortland Islands and Buin in southern Bougainville. Operation C aimed to seize the Japanese base at Kieta on the east coast of Bougainville and neutralize the airfields on Buka Island. All phases of CARTWHEEL were expected to take eight months. (Miller, *CARTWHEEL*, pp. 26-28.)

3. AK was the navy's designation for cargo ship, and AP stood for personnel transport ship.

4. Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Richard S. Edwards replied: "The designation of the 27th Division for the Gilbert Operations, as proposed in your memorandum of July 29 is agreeable, and Admiral Nimitz is being advised to that effect." (Edwards Memorandum for General Marshall, July 31, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, Project Decimal File 1941-43, 381 South Pacific (7-26-43)].) See Marshall's comments on training the Twenty-seventh Infantry Division in Marshall to Richardson, August 5, 1943, pp. 80-81.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT U.S.  
CHIEFS OF STAFF  
*Secret*

July 30, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Demobilization Planning.

Commencing in December, 1942 the question of Army demobilization has been given formal consideration by the War Department. In April a special group was formed for the purpose of this study, which submitted a detailed report in June. On July 22nd the Secretary of War broadened the organization for the purpose of demobilization studies in accordance with the attached directive.



As a result of the study already given this problem it is evident that certain broad assumptions must be made, otherwise the detailed work will be valueless. It is also apparent that such assumptions can only be made in coordination with the Navy Department. There is therefore attached a draft of the proposed assumptions for preliminary consideration by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

The War Department has considered this matter as one of the highest secrecy in order to avoid a public relaxation in the war effort should it become known that we were deeply involved in preparations for demobilization. However, the time is rapidly approaching when these questions must be integrated with the work of some twenty-three civil agencies now interesting themselves in the several aspects of this problem. To me it appears very important that the War and Navy Departments should arrive at a common proposal regarding the purely military aspects of the question, at as early a date as possible.

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[Enclosure]

*BASIC ASSUMPTIONS FOR DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING*

- a.* That the war in Europe will come to a successful conclusion about one year prior to victory in the Pacific.
- b.* That partial demobilization may begin with victory in Europe.
- c.* That the United States will furnish a share of the emergency interim forces required to maintain order and to guarantee adequate considerations of American peace aims. This force (Air and Ground) in the European theater a year after the conclusion of hostilities is estimated at 400,000 men. On the same date, at the assumed moment of victory in the Pacific theater 2,200,000 Army troops, \_\_\_\_\_ Marines and \_\_\_\_\_ Navy personnel will be involved.
- d.* That the United States will furnish a share of an International Police Force (probably largely Air).
- e.* That in demobilization the principle will be followed of giving earliest discharge to men of longest service. The recently inducted men will be sent overseas as replacements for this purpose.
- f.* That some form of universal training will be maintained in the United States.

Note: Factors such as the total strength of the U.S. Air Forces, Ground Army, the Navy, and the possible necessity of delaying demobilization in order to avoid economic upsets in the U.S., etc., are not to be considered in the foregoing assumptions. These questions are reserved for later determination.<sup>1</sup>



GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall's paper was discussed briefly at the August 3 meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, referred to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee for study, and a modified version of the basic assumptions (J.C.S. 431/1) approved at the September 28 meeting. The chief changes in the assumptions list were: paragraph *a*—victory in the Pacific would "require at least one additional year"; paragraph *c*—the final sentence regarding troop strengths was dropped; paragraph *d*—for purposes of demobilization planning, the "possible requirements for a future International Police Force may be disregarded"; paragraph *e*—demobilization discharges were to be based upon the military's requirements and the person's physical condition (i.e., wounds, sickness, age), length of service, combat service, and dependents. (Brigadier General W. F. Tompkins Memorandum for Chiefs of Branches, Special Planning Division, September 30, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 370.9].)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF  
OF STAFF, G-1 [WHITE]

July 30, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Recently Sir John Dill was rather disturbed by our refusal, through the Special Services Division, to accept lectures or talks by a veteran leader of the British Commandos who had had command experience in North Africa. On investigation I found that the reason was that there was no money to defray the expenses. Only mileage was available for such lectures and this could not be paid to a British officer.

As I understand Mrs. Roosevelt's proposition and the legal status, the question is whether or not the Treasury Department believes Mrs. Roosevelt's offer could be lawfully accepted.<sup>1</sup> Also it seems evident from the draft of the letter prepared for my signature that you do not feel that such lectures are particularly profitable.

One of the tragedies of our situation in 1938 and 1939 was that during the preceding twenty odd years the British had had virtually no contacts with us, were ignorant of our Leavenworth and War College courses and particularly of our Industrial Mobilization Plan. Here is an effort to provide some such contact on a continuing basis, not dependent on parsimonious appropriations in the post-war period.

Unless there is some reason for the refusal that I have missed, I am not in agreement with the proposal in your draft letter.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Kermit Roosevelt, second son of President Theodore Roosevelt, had died in Alaska on June 4 while on assignment as a major in Intelligence. On July 14 his wife, Belle Willard Roosevelt, wrote to Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson to indicate her desire to establish a fund administered by the War Department in memory of her husband, who had served in the British Army in 1917-18 and 1939-41, to pay for lectures or courses of instruction to be given by British Army officers at West Point and elsewhere in the United States and by U.S. Army officers at Sandhurst and other places in the United Kingdom. (Patterson Memorandum to General Marshall, July 16, 1943, and Patterson to Mrs. Roosevelt, August 13, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 201 Roosevelt, Kermit (July 16, 1943)].)



2. The editors have not found the Personnel Division's draft letter. On August 11 the chief of staff signed a memorandum drafted in G-1 which stated that "the proposal is an excellent one, and should be accepted," although congressional authority would be needed to accept and administer the fund. (Marshall Memorandum for the Under Secretary of War, August 11, 1943, *ibid.*)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ARNOLD  
*Confidential*

August 2, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

The Secretary of War reports that there seems to be no policy of rotation for the troops at Goose Bay, Labrador.<sup>1</sup> I thought we had such a policy and that men were continually moving towards the front.

He also stated that a 15-passenger motor bus was badly needed at that station to move passengers to and from planes. They have smaller automobiles but with the increase in traffic these are proving inadequate.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Secretary Stimson had visited Great Britain and North Africa between July 10 and 30. On July 31 his party had stopped for breakfast at the United States air base at Goose Bay. Marshall met him at the Washington airport on the morning of August 2, and they had a lengthy meeting in the Pentagon afterwards. Stimson's description of the trip and his report to the president are in Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers (Diary, 44: 22–57, 67–78.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL SERVICES  
DIVISION (THROUGH GENERAL SOMERVELL)

August 2, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

The Secretary of War found at Goose Bay, Labrador, that the Army Extension Courses had not been established. This, like the Pribilof Islands, Ascension Island, and other isolated posts, is exactly the type of station which needs the Army Extension Courses.<sup>1</sup> I do not understand why they have not already been established at Goose Bay.

Please inform me.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On this issue, see Marshall Memorandum for General Somervell, July 19, 1943, pp. 66–67.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY  
*Secret*

August 2, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

Subject: Rome an open city.

The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, just telephoned me that the Apostolic Delegate from the Vatican had informed the State Department that the new Italian government had notified the Vatican of their desire to declare Rome an open city.<sup>1</sup> Before making such a declaration they must know the essential conditions.

I gave this to General Hull over the telephone and asked him to prepare the statement of the conditions.

G. C. M.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, 300.6 OCS Papers)

1. Benito Mussolini had been removed from office and arrested on July 25; Marshal Pietro Badoglio was appointed to head a new Italian government. On July 31 the Vatican received word from the Italian government that it intended to declare Rome an open city; this information was transmitted to the State Department on August 2. This was Italy's first diplomatic approach to the Allies. (Albert N. Garland and Howard McGaw Smyth, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1965], pp. 268, 278-79.)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. 4008.<sup>1</sup> *Secret*

August 2, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall for Eisenhower's eyes only. About 30 minutes ago I advised you that the Vatican through our State Department informed US that the new Italian Government was prepared to declare Rome an open city and wished to know the essential requirements. In that message I passed on to you my view informally to the effect that pending further instructions it would appear desirable to refrain from air activities against the city of Rome proper.

A few moments ago message number 1735 your headquarters arrived "From Martelli. Stand by flash release. Rome raid approximately 1300 hours 3rd of August same targets same reasons", message to be passed to OWI.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-404])

1. This message was transmitted at 3:56 P.M. Washington time.

2. Before Eisenhower could reply, he received messages from Marshall (drafted in the Operations Division) telling him that the British Chiefs of Staff had agreed that Rome should not be bombed (Marshall to Eisenhower, Radio No. FAN-181, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-464)], sent at 5:30 P.M.) and then that the British Cabinet and Prime Minister Churchill had decided that Eisenhower should use his own judgment



regarding the desirability of bombing. President Roosevelt was out of Washington. “In the interim, while we are endeavoring to secure President’s views, if you desire to go ahead with bombing I accept responsibility for US approval.” (Marshall to Eisenhower, Radio No. 4061, *ibid.*, sent at 10:28 P.M.)

On August 3 Eisenhower replied that he did not expect the Italian government to delay acting on the Allies’ conditions, but if they temporized “we should return to the attack. . . . I do not repeat not intend to overdo operations against Rome as I fully realize all the implications and repercussions which are bound to result.” (*Papers of DDE*, 2: 1310–11.) The Italian government issued a unilateral declaration that Rome was an open city on August 14. (Garland and Smyth, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*, pp. 279–80.)

MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL MCNAIR

August 4, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

In glancing through the attached report of the Special Services Division of the “sampling” check in six army divisions, dated August 1943, I notice that the infantry stands at the bottom of the lists which reflect pride in organization, and satisfaction with job assignment. If you have not seen this report, I wish you would take a look at it and let me know, most informally, if there is anything we could do to better this situation.<sup>1</sup>

I think I understand most of the reasons, but we must work on this to improve the situation in some way.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Regarding the opinion poll entitled “What a Soldier Thinks,” McNair noted that the problem had shown itself in various forms for a year and that the corrective measures taken had been inadequate. “My frank opinion is that the underlying fault is that the infantry’s role is a dangerous one, also an uncomfortable one.” He made some recommendations regarding Infantry pay, badges, or special medals, but these were rejected for various reasons by the Personnel Division, which recommended a publicity campaign, correction of misassignments, an Infantry Badge, and an increase in the number of grades and ratings in the Infantry. (McNair Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, August 9, 1943, and Major General M. G. White Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, September 14, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 330.11 (August 4, 1943)].)

TO MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS H. BRERETON  
Radio No. 6102. *Secret*

August 4, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall to Brereton. I have read your 1901 of August 4 to Arnold and I am not only pleased with the spirit of your reply but admire greatly your fine attitude.<sup>1</sup> You have been doing a splendid fighting job in the Middle East and this adds to my admiration.

Give your Ploesti people my personal thanks for their daring and skill in striking a devastating blow at the heart of the German supply system. My



deep regret is that I cannot thank those who gave their lives in carrying out this gallant adventure.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-1128])

1. The editors have not found Brereton's message.

2. As commander of the Ninth Air Force, Brereton was responsible for planning, training, and execution of the low-altitude strike at the Romanian oil refineries on August 1 (TIDALWAVE). The Army Air Forces history observed that "the Ploesti mission fell short of expectations and entailed heavy losses" (i.e., 54 of 177 planes engaged and 532 airmen). (Craven and Cate, eds., *Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK*, pp. 478, 482-83.)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL  
ROBERT C. RICHARDSON, JR.<sup>1</sup>  
*Personal and Secret*

August 5, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Richardson: With relation to a projected operation, Admiral King was very desirous of having the First or Third Marine Divisions made available from the South or Southwest Pacific, to join up with the Second Marine Division, instead of utilizing an Army Division. This is a natural desire for the purposes of securing a more homogeneous force and complete unity. I declined to acquiesce in the matter because of the logistic embarrassments and interference with MacArthur's plans which would result from the movement of the additional Marine Division, and I nominated the 27th Division which the Navy has accepted.<sup>2</sup>

Under the circumstances I want General Smith to be made aware of the critical importance of his training preparations for the operation and of the cooperative spirit of himself and his staff.<sup>3</sup> There must be no weakness, no hesitations or reluctances in the action of units once they have landed. There must be no misunderstandings, jealousies, or critical attitudes. If there remain in the Division leaders who cannot be depended upon to carry forward in spite of casualties, lack of support and other difficulties inherent in complicated amphibious operations against a fanatical foe, those leaders must be eliminated now, immediately.

For your and his information we have had too many instances of higher leaders without drive sufficient to carry them through the vicissitudes of climate and heavy fighting with the Japanese. They become demoralized or timid and exercise command largely by asking for reinforcements. They advance too slowly and take large casualties by attrition and malaria, rather than fewer casualties—except for the moment—by aggressive action.

While the training of the 27th is of urgent and immediate importance it might be a good thing to have Smith fly down to New Georgia and get a brief experience of the problems present in these actions. J. Lawton Collins should be able to give him most valuable pointers. If Smith's Assistant



Division Commander is any good he should be able to carry forward for a couple of weeks the program already laid out. If he is not able to do this he should not be continued as Assistant Division Commander.<sup>4</sup>

Because of my reference to weaknesses displayed by certain Army commanders I should prefer that you destroy this letter and not allow it to get into the files. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Richardson was commanding general of the Hawaiian Department.
2. See Marshall Memorandum for Admiral King, July 29, 1943, pp. 73–74.
3. Major General Ralph C. Smith had been commanding general of the Twenty-seventh Infantry Division since November 1942. Richardson noted that Smith was “very much liked by Admiral Nimitz and Admiral Spruance. As the latter is to command the task force I am sure that there will be a most harmonious relationship between General Smith, his staff, and the Navy.” (Richardson to Marshall, August 12, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)
4. The Twenty-seventh Infantry Division (New York National Guard) had been in Hawaii since March 1942. It began its combat training program on August 13, after being relieved of defense duties. Major General Collins commanded the Twenty-fifth Infantry Division, which had reinforced the Thirty-seventh Infantry Division in the battle for New Georgia Island on August 2.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF  
*Secret*

August 6, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

The matter of the secrecy precautions, and their possible violations in connection with the sailing of unescorted “monsters” from the Army Base in Brooklyn has been investigated by The Inspector General of the Army and by other officials. The various factors relating to the matter have been most carefully considered and the following statement is submitted regarding what has already happened and instructions for the future.<sup>1</sup>

Bands did play during the embarkation of troops and the American Red Cross did serve refreshments to embarking troops. The bands were stationed at the end of piers out of sight and practically out of sound of civilians beyond Army installations at the pier. Red Cross personnel had been very carefully selected, photographed, finger-printed, investigated by the Army and personally vouched for by responsible heads of each Red Cross chapter. Their instructions as to secrecy are repeated each time and these particularly emphasize the requirement for secrecy after the work has been completed. Notice in advance was conveyed to but a few of the key workers. In this



connection very little if any information of military value is available to Red Cross workers that is not also available to all interested civilians who work in the port and who work or live at various locations near the shoreline of the harbor, and other places such as ferry boats, trains and activities connected with the immediate embarkation of troops.

The presence of members of the press referred to was a visit July 24-25 to a staging area, port installations and a transport during the embarkation of troops which was carried out at the request of the Acting Secretary of War and was checked by the senior member of the Joint Security Control group, a representative of which accompanied the party. This group was guided in the tour of different installations by officers on duty with the Port. The press releases were held until the vessel had arrived at its destination. The action was taken in order to reassure parents as to the care with which their men were being dispatched abroad (there had been antagonistic reactions due to the fact that for security reasons we do not give any furloughs prior to departure from this country).

The group of generals referred to consisted of a special board headed by Major General McCoy<sup>2</sup> with four generals, a colonel, and two representatives from the Office of the Under Secretary of War. They are charged with a survey of Army activities and Army plans in general with a view to checking on the correlation of all requirements in production and in personnel with the strategical plans. They are a highly responsible group which has been created at the direction of the President.

No further visit by representatives of the press to observe embarkation activities will be authorized in the near future.

The carefully supervised Red Cross services will be continued, and the use of the band, on a carefully restricted basis, will also be continued.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. At the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting on July 9, the British had presented a paper (C.C.S. 273) pointing out their anxiety over possible breaches of security in connection with troop embarkations on fast, but virtually defenseless, converted passenger liners (i.e., "monsters") like *Queen Mary* and *Queen Elizabeth*. Marshall ordered the Inspector General's Department to conduct an investigation. The document printed here was the chief of staff's report to the C.C.S. at the August 6 meeting. (Minutes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Meetings, July 9, July 30, and August 6, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS 334, CCS Minutes].)

2. Frank R. McCoy, who had retired from the army in 1938 and was president of the Foreign Policy Association, was frequently called upon for special assignments for the War Department. See *Papers of GCM*, 3: 294-96.



TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN L. DE WITT  
Radio No. 3946. *Secret*

August 7, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall for De Witt's eyes only this message booked to WDC [Western Defense Command] and ADC [Alaskan Defense Command]. In discussions regarding delay of Cottage Target date to 24th which Nimitz and King are opposed to, please have in mind the apparently changed situation on Kiska and the urgent necessity of completing this at the earliest possible date. I do not think it is the time to be ultra-conservative.<sup>1</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-2374])

1. At this time the United States and Canada had assembled thirty-four thousand troops and a naval flotilla for the invasion of Kiska Island in the Aleutians (Operation COTTAGE). De Witt and Nimitz had designated August 15 as D-day, but on July 30 the force commanders decided that the operation should be postponed until August 24 to permit further regrouping and training. The assault was launched on August 15, but the Japanese defenders, estimated at nine to ten thousand, had departed at least two weeks previously. (Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, *Guarding the United States and Its Outposts*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1964], pp. 296–98.)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio. *Secret*

August 7, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall for Eisenhower's eyes only. When Congress reconvenes a new list of nominations for promotion will be submitted. Are there any individuals who gave conspicuous evidence in combat of qualities of leadership qualifying them for the grade of brigadier or major general.

In connection with the recommendations in your letter of July 27th McNair states Ratay would not be promoted in Army Ground Forces;<sup>1</sup> that he was relieved from regimental command because of maltreatment of his soldiers. Further, in July 1942 he was reprimanded for placing official classified information in the hands of civilians to which he replied: "The redundant phrases of the administrative reprimand may be a delight to WD [War Department] clerk but they choke with disgust a field soldier", for which he was again reprimanded. Incidentally this last did not come to my attention or it would have been something other than a reprimand. Do you still feel this man should be honored with high command?<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Eisenhower had requested that seven colonels, all in service or technical posts, be placed on the promotion list. Colonel John P. Ratay was commanding the Atlantic Base



Section, a position normally filled by a brigadier general. Eisenhower praised the job Ratay had been doing, while admitting that he had “the feeling that this officer’s past, peace-time record may be spotty.” (*Papers of DDE*, 2: 1279–81.)

2. Ratay was not again proposed for promotion until mid-December 1943, when Eisenhower noted that he “has proven a thoroughly competent commander, has continued to maintain a high state of discipline and has shown exceptional capacity in handling problems in connection with relations with the French and Arabs in Morocco.” Ratay’s promotion was effective on May 24, 1944. (*Ibid.*, pp. 1602–3.)

WHILE British and United States leaders had agreed at the TRIDENT Conference (Washington, May 12–25, 1943) that after Sicily was conquered operations in the Mediterranean theater would be subordinated to the buildup for the cross-Channel invasion of France, Prime Minister Churchill was particularly anxious that the Allies not lose any opportunities to close the ring around Germany. In late June, Churchill and Roosevelt agreed that they and their military advisers should meet in Quebec City in September. In mid-July, however, due to the success of Allied arms in Sicily and the possibility of an early Italian surrender, the prime minister urged the president to move the conference’s starting date to August 14. Churchill was determined that the Allies increase their efforts in Italy and occupy the peninsula at least from Rome south; thus consideration of PRICELESS (post-HUSKY operations in the Mediterranean) was of increasing importance.

George Marshall was not opposed to seizing a favorable opportunity for securing an important port in the event of an Italian collapse, and on July 16 he suggested to Eisenhower that Allied Force Headquarters planners study the possibility of an additional landing in the Naples area. But the chief of staff did not intend that this action should signify a change in the basic orientation of Allied strategy or allocation of resources from that approved at TRIDENT—specifically that seven experienced divisions, four American and three British, be withdrawn from the Mediterranean after HUSKY for use in OVERLORD. (Garland and Smyth, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*, pp. 435–37.) “As the QUADRANT Conference drew near,” an official U.S. Army history has stated, “General Marshall and his staff were convinced of the need for a showdown with the British” over strategy. (Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1959], p. 211.)

On August 8 the president and each officer instructed to attend the Quebec Conference (designated QUADRANT) received a Marshall-approved memorandum prepared in the Operations Division describing the basic choices confronting the United States delegation regarding the European



war. The document emphasized the Allies' failure since the spring of 1942 "to concentrate their forces and to hold to decisions," citing the deleterious effects North African operations had had on the buildup for OVERLORD. "The allocation of additional forces to the Mediterranean is uneconomical and assists Germany to create a strategic stalemate in Europe." The choice facing the conferees, the paper stated, was between "attempting a decisive effort from the Mediterranean," which did not "offer an opportunity for decisive military action against Germany," and reaffirming and sticking to the decision made in London in April 1942, in Casablanca in January 1943, and in Washington in May 1943 to strike across the English Channel. (*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943*, pp. 467–72; see also Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944*, pp. 176–79.)

President Roosevelt called Marshall to the White House on August 9 to discuss the forthcoming conference and the Operations Division's memorandum. ★

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY

*Secret*

August 9, 1943

[Washington, D.C.]

The President saw me at 2:00 P.M. today. He put the following proposition to me, for which I shall have to have an answer in some form by 11:00 A.M. tomorrow:

Stating that the Planners were always conservative and saw all the difficulties, and that more could usually be done than they were willing to admit, he outlined the following as his desire:

That between OVERLORD AND PRICELESS he was insistent on OVERLORD but felt that we could do more than was now proposed for PRICELESS. His idea was that the seven battle-experienced divisions should be provided for OVERLORD but that an equal number of divisions from the U.S. should be routed to PRICELESS.

He stated that he did not wish to have anything to do with an operation into the Balkans, nor to agree to a British expedition which could cost us ships, landing craft, withdrawals, etc. But he did feel that we should secure a position in Italy to the north of Rome and that we should take over Sardinia and Corsica and thus set up a serious threat to southern France.



I told him I would not express an opinion at the moment other than to state that we had strained programmed resources well to the limit in the agreements now standing regarding OVERLORD and PRICELESS, that the movement of three divisions from PRICELESS forces to OVERLORD could be undertaken without expense in troop lift and with advantage to equipment of French divisions; that beyond this the movements to OVERLORD of veteran units would cost us troop lift and I very much feared that a corresponding movement from the U.S. to PRICELESS would impose just that much of a reduction on OVERLORD. However, I told the President I would have a critical review of the logistical involvements by tomorrow morning. Incidentally, he said he did not like my use of the word "critical" because he wanted assistance in carrying out his conception rather than difficulties placed in the way of it—all of this in humorous vein.

As I left he spoke of seeing me at noon tomorrow, and I judge from this that that hour will be proposed for the JCS to meet him. In that event I should have a critical analysis of the effect of his conception in my hands by 11:00 o'clock as I assume we would have the JCS meeting at least an hour before we went to the White House.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

**M**EETING at noon on August 10, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the Operations Division's August 8 memorandum "Conduct of the War in Europe," described in the editorial note on pp. 84-85, and Marshall's meeting with the president on August 9. Marshall and King agreed that sending seven new United States divisions to the Mediterranean would be a mistake. For King this was because of the adverse effects the shipments would have on Pacific and Burma operations. Marshall thought that it would not only be a waste of shipping but, as the minutes note, "these divisions at best could not arrive in the area before June 1944 and would constitute in reality an expeditionary force available for use in the Balkans," to which all United States planners were opposed. Eisenhower had already told Marshall that the existing resources in the Mediterranean area (forty-eight divisions by February 1, 1944) were sufficient to carry out the operations planned (i.e., occupation of Sardinia, Corsica, and southern and central Italy). (Minutes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, August 10, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS 334, JCS Minutes].)

While the Joint Chiefs were meeting, Secretary of War Stimson was at the White House reporting on his recent trip to Britain and North Africa and urging the president to "assume the responsibility of leadership" in pressing the British for the cross-Channel invasion rather than "pinprick warfare" on the periphery. Stimson also encouraged Roosevelt to select



Marshall, “our most commanding soldier,” to lead the invasion. “General Marshall already has a towering eminence of reputation as a tried soldier and as a broad-minded and skillful administrator. This was shown by the suggestion of him on the part of the British for this very post a year and a half ago. I believe that he is the man who most surely can now by his character and skill furnish the military leadership which is necessary to bring our two nations together in confident joint action in this great operation. No one knows better than I the loss in the problems of organization and worldwide strategy centered in Washington which such a solution would cause, but I see no other alternative to which we can turn in the great effort which confronts us.” (Stimson to the President, August 10, 1943, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 44: 86–87].)

The president invited Stimson to remain when the Joint Chiefs of Staff arrived at 2:15 P.M. Marshall and King reiterated for the president their discussion regarding Europe in addition to surveying British-American relations concerning operations in the Far East and elsewhere. Roosevelt was ready, Stimson noted in his diary, to go “whole hog” in supporting the cross-Channel attack. “He was more clear and definite than I have ever seen him since we have been in this war and he took the policy that the American staff have been fighting for fully.” Roosevelt favored limited operations in Italy and an American commander for OVERLORD. “I could see that the military and naval conferees were astonished and delighted with his definiteness.” The president withdrew his suggestion to send seven new U.S. divisions to the Mediterranean. (August 10, 1943, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 44: 84–85]. Minutes of the Roosevelt-Stimson-J.C.S. meeting are printed in *Foreign Relations, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943*, pp. 498–503.) ★

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
*Secret*

August 11, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Divisions for OVERLORD on May 1, 1944.

With reference to the discussion yesterday afternoon and your instructions to have a preponderance of U.S. divisions available in the United Kingdom on the target date for OVERLORD, the following is submitted:

At the TRIDENT Conference it was agreed that the British would provide a minimum of 14 divisions with a possibility of an increase to 18, if it did not prove necessary to cannibalize these 4 divisions in order to provide replacements and supporting units for the minimum number



of 14. (This British contribution of between 14 to 18 divisions would include 4 or 5 Canadian divisions.)

The U.S. agreed to provide a total of 18½ divisions on the target date. 6½ of these would not be completely equipped and ready for combat until a later period of from two to eight weeks but they would be in England. (I will see that the 18½ figure is lifted to 19 without any further discussion.)

*Note:* In discussions regarding U.S. troop strengths in the United Kingdom on the target date, the British have presented the problem of limiting our divisional strength in England on that date to the 18½ referred to because of transportation, depot, and cantonment complications. As troops cross the Channel additional divisions can be moved into Great Britain, though it is desired that the bulk of the flow of reinforcements should be transported direct from the U.S. into France.

Computations indicate that when the OVERLORD build-up in France had reached 60 divisions the composition of the forces would be about as follows:

United States	42 divisions
British	13 divisions
Canadian	5 divisions

This represents the total possible contribution of British troops unless transfers are made from the Mediterranean or elsewhere.

The TRIDENT decisions provided that on May 1, 1944, there would be 7,302 U.S. combat planes and 4,075 British.

Present tonnage figures indicate the possibility of increasing shipments to England between now and May 1st up to 100,000 men, of course providing we do not divert this shipping to send additional men to the Mediterranean. General Devers is pressing us to increase the number of technical units to support the Air Forces and the special anti-tank, artillery, and other separate units to support the Ground Forces, by a total of 100,000, which would absorb this tonnage if it materializes.

It appears to me that rather than base the American preponderance on the number of divisions alone it would be more effective to base it on the strength of the forces involved. We will have 3200 more combat planes, from 1 to 4 more combat divisions, and apparently a considerably greater number of Corps and Army supporting troops. We have not the detailed British figures on the last factor mentioned but their shortages in supporting troops along with those in manpower would indicate that our Corps and Army organization will be much stronger than theirs.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)



TO MRS. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

August 11, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mrs. Roosevelt: I received your letter of August 3d relative to the promotion and rotation of personnel in Australia.<sup>1</sup>

There will always be some cases where an individual from his personal and limited viewpoint is apparently justified in complaining of the treatment he receives. An unusual number of such complaints is indicative of a condition demanding thorough investigation.

In recognition of the conditions to which you refer, an Officer Candidate School was established in Australia to provide promotion opportunities to men who, because of military necessity or lack of transportation facilities could not be returned to the United States. This school has been operating since October, 1942, and in January of this year was expanded to a capacity of 500 students for each 4-month period.

Selection of personnel to be returned to the United States under our rotation policy is a function of the theater commander concerned. I am confident that General MacArthur's selections are designed to return the most deserving officers and men and are not influenced by the rank of the individual. For your information I inclose a copy of the War Department Circular governing the rotation and return of military personnel from outside the United States.

I will see that officers visiting the Southwest Pacific Theater look into this particular matter. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Mrs. Roosevelt had written that she was receiving letters from the families and friends of some of the younger men in the Thirty-second Division complaining that these men had no opportunity for promotion, as men who had had training in the United States were being sent out and put in charge. In addition, the soldiers believed that only officers above the rank of major were allowed furloughs or schooling in the United States. "Among the privates particularly, there is growing a feeling that this is undemocratic procedure." She suggested that for considerations of morale, Marshall "might ask some one going out there to really try to investigate it." (Eleanor Roosevelt to Marshall, August 3, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

**Q**UADRANT Conference (Quebec, August 14–24, 1943) was the third crucial Anglo-American conference in seven months. As at Casablanca in January and Washington in May (TRIDENT), the chief difficulty was the strength of Allied commitment to the cross-Channel invasion and the consequent allocation of resources between the invasion of France and



operations in the Mediterranean. Secondary bargaining concerned the Pacific theater, especially the need to strengthen Chinese resistance to and the preparation of bases for operations against Japan, which to United States military planners meant reopening the supply route through Burma.

A large support staff had already established themselves in the Château Frontenac by the time the Joint Chiefs of Staff arrived on August 13 to join the British chiefs. The next day Marshall cabled Secretary Stimson, who was still in Washington with the president: "From information following informal discussions last night and general discussion at meeting this morning it would appear that the differences are not to be insurmountable. However it is too early to hazard any definite opinion." (Marshall to Stimson, August 14, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

Marshall's caution was well founded, because the discussions soon became quite vigorous and sometimes acrimonious to the point where the C.C.S. met in closed sessions without the inhibiting presence of several score of subordinates. Marshall, the chief J.C.S. spokesman on European-Mediterranean issues, was determined to get a firm commitment from the British to launch the cross-Channel invasion. He agreed that as much of the Italian peninsula as possible (plus Sardinia and Corsica) should be occupied, that as much German power as possible should be diverted into Italy, and that north Italian air bases should be used to launch attacks on the southern portion of Nazi territory, but he was determined that the Allied commitment to Italy specifically and the Mediterranean generally should not undermine in any way the accumulation of troops and materiel in Britain for the launching of OVERLORD. Marshall reminded the British that previous operations in the Mediterranean always seemed to absorb more shipping, troops, and materiel than had been anticipated, thereby undermining or precluding operations elsewhere. Consequently he insisted that henceforth whenever there was a shortage of resources OVERLORD would have an "overriding priority." Without this, the notes of the August 15 meeting state, "in his opinion the operation was doomed and our whole strategic concept would have to be recast" and the number of U.S. forces in Britain sharply reduced. Marshall was determined that the decision made at TRIDENT to move seven experienced divisions from the Mediterranean to Britain would be carried out and that any future operations in the region would be conducted with the forces already in the theater. (*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943*, pp. 866-67.)

The British chiefs of staff began the conference aware, as a result of Field Marshal Dill's efforts and of a briefing paper prepared by their Joint Staff Mission in Washington, that: "There is apparent in all the U.S. Chiefs of Staff a feeling that the British are not standing firm enough to considered decision of 'Trident', and are tending too readily to depart from these



decisions and to set aside the operations agreed upon. They realise importance put Italy out of war, but are not prepared to see ‘Bullfrog’ [an attack on Akyab, Burma], the Pacific or ‘Overlord’ suffer unduly in consequence new commitments in the Mediterranean.” (Quoted in Michael Howard, *Grand Strategy*, volume 4, *August 1942–September 1943*, a volume in the *History of the Second World War* [London: HMSO, 1972], p. 563.)

When the Quebec meetings opened, the British military leaders asserted that they were indeed committed to OVERLORD, but that operation’s success was closely tied to the Allies’ capacity to reduce, through operations in north Italy, the number of German forces available to counter the invasion. Thus they did not wish to rule out more vigorous efforts in Italy, and these might preclude removing to Britain for OVERLORD some or all of the seven designated Mediterranean divisions.

Following the August 15 C.C.S. meeting, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke—who had already that day received a “crushing blow” when Prime Minister Churchill told him that an American would command the invasion forces—noted in his diary that the Allies had “a most painful meeting and we settled nothing. I entirely failed to get Marshall to realise the relation between cross-Channel and Italian operations and the repercussions which the one exercises on the other. It is quite impossible to argue with him as he does not begin to understand a strategic problem.” After the August 16 meeting, Brooke recorded: “Our talk was pretty frank. I opened by telling them that the root of the matter was that we were not trusting each other. They doubted our real intentions to put our full hearts into the cross-Channel operation next spring, and we had not full confidence that they would not in future insist on our carrying out previous agreements irrespective of changed strategic conditions. . . . In the end I think our arguments did have some effect on Marshall.” (Bryant, *Turn of the Tide*, pp. 577–80.)

Some compromise was clearly essential; neither group of military leaders wished the president and the prime minister to feel compelled to settle the issues themselves. On August 17 the C.C.S. adopted and sent to Roosevelt and Churchill a document describing OVERLORD as “the primary U.S.-British ground and air effort against the Axis in Europe,” with a target date of May 1, 1944. Compromise wording was adopted on the two major points of contention: (1) in the event of a shortage of resources, support for OVERLORD would be the “main object” rather than the “overriding priority”; (2) Mediterranean operations would be carried out by forces allotted at TRIDENT (e.g., not including the seven divisions to be removed) “except insofar as these may be varied by decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff” rather than without strings attached, as Marshall preferred. (*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943*, pp. 1024–25.)



August 17 also witnessed the end of the Sicily campaign. That morning Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., Seventh Army commanding general, had accepted the surrender of the port city of Messina, within artillery range of the Italian mainland. ★

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio. *Secret*

August 17, 1943  
Quebec, Canada

From General Marshall for General Eisenhower. Congratulations and my profound thanks for the brilliant success with which you have brought another tremendous job to a victorious conclusion. You have carried your vast responsibilities in a most impressive manner in the preparation, coordination, and direction of the Sicilian operation.

Pass following to Patton: "You have done a grand job of leadership and your corps and division commanders and their people have made Americans very proud of their army and confident of the future. Give them my personal thanks and congratulations".

Pass following to Spaatz: "You and your American flyers and ground crews, along with the British, have done a wonderful job in supporting our troops in Sicily and in humbling hostile Italy. My personal thanks and congratulations to you all".<sup>1</sup>

Pass following to Admiral Cunningham, General Alexander, General Montgomery and Air Marshal Tedder: "May I express my admiration for the manner in which you gentlemen have all combined to carry HUSKY through to a triumphant conclusion, along with personal thanks for the perfection of the support you have given Eisenhower".<sup>2</sup>

Pass the following to General Smith: "We are all aware of the importance of your contribution to the conduct of HUSKY and congratulate and thank you accordingly". Marshall personally sends all above messages.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz commanded the Northwest African Air Forces. This organization had been activated on February 18, 1943, to carry the main burden of air operations in the western half of the Mediterranean.

2. The Sicily operation was conducted under the control of a three-man committee: Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham was responsible for naval activities; Eisenhower's deputy, General Sir Harold Alexander, for ground operations; and Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder for air operations. General Sir Bernard Montgomery, British Eighth Army commander, had produced the strategic plan for operations in Sicily.



TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. 129. *Secret*

August 23, 1943  
Quebec, Canada

From Marshall for Eisenhower's eyes only. FAN 198 August 20th Reference. CCS suggestion concerning OSS and SOE in Sardinia was originally my proposal to give Donovan a chance to do his stuff without fear of compromising some operation in prospect. If he succeeds, fine, if not, nothing would be lost. Your reply NAF 337 August 22nd referred to landing craft, etc., with which my idea was not concerned.<sup>1</sup> Meanwhile Donovan wants to do a job in Balkans. Why not let him make a real 5th Column try in Sardinia?<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. At the August 19 C.C.S. meeting, Marshall suggested that teams from William J. Donovan's Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.) and the British Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.) operate in Sardinia in order to facilitate an unopposed Allied landing or to seize and defend certain strategic points. A modified version of the message Marshall proposed that the C.C.S. send to Eisenhower was approved on August 20 and sent as FAN-198. Eisenhower's headquarters replied (NAF-337, August 22) that the Germans' Sardinia garrison was too large (22,000 plus 6,400 flak troops) to permit fifth column activities on a scale sufficient to facilitate an unopposed landing. (*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943*, pp. 893–94, 905, 1069; *Papers of DDE*, 2: 1361.)

2. For Eisenhower's reply, see *Papers of DDE*, 2: 1360–61. Nothing came of Marshall's suggestion, as German forces evacuated Sardinia between September 11 and 18.

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
[Radio No. 5968.] *Secret*

August 25, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall for Eisenhower's eyes only. Devers and General Morgan<sup>1</sup> have been pressing us since early July to appoint an American army commander immediately to parallel activities of British army commander now building up in rather formidable fashion as to requisitions, requirements, etc.

My choice has been Bradley but I had hoped to stall them off until October or November. However OPD and Barker from London feel that the appointment should be made in the near future. Could you release Bradley for this command?<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. A British lieutenant general, Frederick E. Morgan, had been chief of staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (designate) and head of the organization of the same name (designated COSSAC) since mid-March. COSSAC was planning the cross-Channel invasion. Morgan's American deputy, Major General Ray W. Barker, had briefed the J.C.S.



on the plans and had attended the Quebec Conference. (Frederick E. Morgan, *Overture to Overlord* [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1950], pp. 1, 29, 35.)

2. Eisenhower's response of August 27 implied his reluctance to lose Bradley so soon, but the following day he wrote that Marshall should take Bradley whenever he wanted him, as "nothing is too good for that project." (*Papers of DDE*, 2: 1357-58, 1364.) For further developments on this, see Marshall to Eisenhower, September 1, 1943, pp. 108-9.

WHILE serious discussion of Pacific issues at the Quebec Conference had to await resolution of Europe-Mediterranean problems, General Marshall and Admiral King announced the U.S. position on the first day—August 14. Marshall insisted upon the strategic linkage between the European and Pacific theaters, emphasizing the important role China was to play in defeating Japan and the consequent importance of reconquering Burma in order to succor China. King put the British chiefs on notice that the Pacific theater needed greater materiel support. (*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943*, pp. 857-59.) The U.S. was planning a two-pronged thrust toward the Philippines during the next sixteen months: General MacArthur's forces were to continue driving up the north coast of New Guinea to the Vogelkop; Admiral Chester W. Nimitz (commander in chief, Pacific Fleet) was to lead an attack from Hawaii through the Gilbert and Marshall island groups to Palau in the Central Pacific. (*Foreign Relations*, pp. 427-31.)

On August 17, Field Marshal Brooke initiated the British response on Far Eastern matters by suggesting that the New Guinea thrust be curtailed, thereby releasing forces and equipment for OVERLORD. Neither Marshall nor King was willing to accept this suggestion. At the meeting on the twentieth, Marshall reiterated his contention that major ground operations had to be undertaken to liberate Burma so that China could be effectively supplied for significant air operations against Japan. The British were also dismayed at the American insistence that the Combined Chiefs of Staff commit themselves to defeating Japan within twelve months after Germany's surrender, which was assumed would occur in the autumn of 1944. Such a time limit, British planners argued, meant assaulting Japan without first securing bases in China or Formosa. (*Ibid.*, pp. 877, 977-78.)

The accumulated Pacific problems led to what Brooke called a "heated" meeting on August 19 in which the chiefs of staff closeted themselves without their staffs to resolve their differences off-the-record. Little was accomplished on the twentieth, as the British chiefs desired first to achieve an understanding regarding strategy with Prime Minister Churchill, who was opposed to operations in lower Burma and favored an invasion of northern Sumatra. (Bryant, *Turn of the Tide*, pp. 584-85.)



Finally, on August 21, the British chiefs of staff presented a compromise document, which the American chiefs studied privately; further discussion, Brooke noted, “broke the final difficulties of this Conference and practically completed our work.” (Ibid., p. 585.) The conferees adopted no long-range strategic blueprint for the Pacific war—that was left for a future conference—but the United States was given a free hand to launch its drive through the Central Pacific. The well-defended Japanese base at Rabaul was “to be neutralized rather than captured”—the first official pronouncement of what was to become the island-hopping strategy. The air route to China was to be improved and vigorous steps taken to defend it through operations in Burma. The urgency the U.S. felt to end the war quickly was ratified by adopting the goal of victory over Japan within a year of victory over Germany. (*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943*, pp. 1125–28.)

The Quebec Conference also ratified the creation of the Southeast Asia Command. The tangled command structure in the region, the endless trials of pursuing the war in that difficult climate and terrain, and the need for a fresh point of view had prompted Prime Minister Churchill to announce on June 18 that a new Allied command would be created separate from the command in India. The British wished to model the command on Eisenhower’s Allied Force Headquarters in North Africa. But General Stilwell’s situation did not fit that model, as he had to combine the functions of chief of staff to Chiang Kai-shek and commander of U.S. and Chinese forces in the area with his new duties as deputy supreme commander in Southeast Asia. When the command was discussed at the August 18 C.C.S. meeting, Marshall observed that the organization would of necessity be “abnormal.” Stilwell’s duties as deputy supreme commander would be limited; his main task was to see that Chinese forces and the U.S. Fourteenth Air Force played their parts in Burma operations. (*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943*, p. 883; Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell’s Mission to China*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1953], pp. 355–60; Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944*, pp. 237–40.) ★

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSEPH W. STILWELL  
Radio. *Secret*

August 26, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall for Stilwell’s eyes only. You will probably have seen the press announcements of last night that Mountbatten has been chosen by the British for a new Southeastern Asia Command. This has been accepted



by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. While full details will be sent to you both by radio and staff officer, the following brief of arrangements is passed on for your immediate information:

Mountbatten is to have a combined staff. Wedemeyer is to go with him and is already working on the American sections.<sup>1</sup> Mountbatten arrives here today and with Wedemeyer will work out details arrangeable at this end of the line.

He is to operate under the Combined Chiefs of Staff and while the constitution of India will not permit his being given supreme authority over logistical matters in India pertaining to his operations, it is being arranged so that he will have control of the army commander who does control communications in Assam.

This is of course an abnormal arrangement but everything connected with this theatre has of necessity been set up frankly on such a basis because of Indian government considerations and the Generalissimo's position and methods.

You are to be Mountbatten's deputy but at the same time you will command all American troops, air and ground, and will be his medium of arranging coordinated operations by Chinese troops. This will mean that once the plans of operations have been agreed upon on a basis that you think can be implemented as to American and Chinese units, your job will be to see that the American groupings are set up in proper relation to the task and that the Generalissimo permits the coordination of the Chinese effort described. You are to continue as the Generalissimo's Chief of Staff. Your status will be dual and on an ordinary organizational basis is illogical, but there appears to be no other way to meet the complexities of the situation.

Dr. Soong I believe will leave for China shortly. General Chu I know is going immediately. They were at Quebec and were told the bare outlines of the arrangement. Nothing was said to them regarding your assignment as deputy or to infer at that moment that we were attempting to place Chinese troops under Mountbatten but they were told most emphatically that we were setting up the basis for unity of command and it was imperative that wholehearted cooperation be given the enterprise.<sup>2</sup>

The President is considering sending out a special envoy to the Generalissimo but in view of Soong's departure he may not do so. Mountbatten will call on the Generalissimo as quickly as he can manage. In the meantime it is the President's view that the matter should not be taken up with the Generalissimo unless he precipitates the issue with you but even then it should be on a most guarded basis until Soong has gotten there with my emphatic views as to the mandatory requirements of cooperation.

This is a hastily prepared radio and exact details will be sent you as soon as possible. The main point is that the Prime Minister is endeavoring to



vitalize the effort as regards Burma. Mountbatten is full of energy, drive and imagination to a point that irritates staid British high officials. He is very likeable and has enthusiastically entered into cooperation with American proposals time after time. It was his leadership and first combined staff that developed most of our landing craft and air, ground and naval technique, communications, etc., for amphibious operations. You will find him a breath of fresh air.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. In his memoirs, Wedemeyer asserted that he was not pleased to be “eased out to Asia,” a “remote and relatively unimportant sphere,” by the British, who wished to get him out of planning because he “held out for the American point of view.” He was promoted to major general in September (“a promotion that was no promotion”) and departed for India in October. (Albert C. Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!* [New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958], pp. 246–49.)

2. Chinese Foreign Minister T. V. Soong and Major General Chu Shih-ming, China’s military attaché in Washington, attended the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting on August 24. Marshall left the meeting briefly with Soong, probably to inform him of Mountbatten’s selection as supreme commander of the Southeast Asia Command. Secretary of War Stimson later recorded in his diary that Marshall told him that he had “spoken with great frankness and plainness to T. V. Soong on the necessity of China being willing to take the steps necessary to put fighting ground Chinese forces into the struggle instead of confining themselves to lip service and letting someone else do that fighting.” (*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943*, pp. 960–62; September 6, 1943, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 44: 99].)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY

*Secret*

August 26, 1943

[Washington, D.C.]

Mr. McCloy brought back a rather disturbing account of morale conditions in the Aleutians and there is no doubt but that the absence of a Japanese threat, resulting from the occupation of Kiska, will result in a much more difficult morale problem, particularly as the winter approaches.<sup>1</sup>

Mr. McCloy tells me that the Navy is able to manage a rotation policy, and that the effect of this alongside our men is bound to be depressing.

I wish you would look into the possibility of swapping units, that is sending up regiments from the States to relieve units that have been a long time in the Alaskan theater. If no equipment is involved it may be that this can be handled without an undue sacrifice of shipping. Furthermore, if the 7th Division is taken out with the combat loaders already up there, we must be achieving a great saving in shipping over and above our previous calculations.<sup>2</sup>

I think this matter is rather serious and we must get action before the bad weather closes in.



GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy had recently returned from a visit to the Aleutian Islands; he had landed on Kiska with Seventh Division headquarters on August 19, four days after U.S. and Canadian troops landed to find that the Japanese garrison had secretly withdrawn from their last base in the islands. Marshall said in 1956 that as soon as he had received word that the Kiska operation was complete, he sent for Lieutenant General Somervell and instructed him to send troop transports to the Aleutians immediately to begin removing the troops assembled for the expedition. Somervell was reluctant to upset shipping plans, but Marshall asserted that he had already learned that as soon as the fighting was over in an area there would be immediate demands from the troops to return to the United States, and if the War Department appeared to hesitate, morale would suffer and there would be serious political repercussions. "I had a congressional committee on my hands the fourth day" after the operation ended. Initiating the movement of transports "took off the heat." (*Marshall Interviews*, pp. 381–82.)

2. The Seventh Division was sent to Hawaii in mid-September for jungle and amphibious training.

TO COLONEL ARTHUR S. CHAMPENY<sup>1</sup>

August 26, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Colonel Champeny: The performance of your regiment in carrying out a 62-mile foot march over difficult terrain in 42 hours during the July maneuvers in Louisiana has been brought to my attention by General McNair as a demonstration of what our soldiers can do with proper training and leadership. I congratulate you on the showing of your command which indicates a high state of discipline and training.

After one experience in battle every man in the ranks of the regiment will be grateful to you for this rigorous training, if not already aware of the stern requirements of modern war.<sup>2</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Champeny was commanding officer of the Eighty-eighth Division's 351st Infantry Regiment. This letter was sent via the division's commander, Major General John E. Sloan.

2. Marshall knew that despite the objections of many would-be soldiers, their parents, and consequently some politicians, rigorous training was essential for battlefield survival. He once encouraged his wife, who was preparing a speech to a women's group, to warn mothers not to desire for their sons an easy-going—and thus popular—commander. "Chances are nine out of ten he's going to get licked." (*Marshall Interviews*, p. 371. Marshall also sought other ways to spread this message; see *Papers of GCM*, 3: 313.)

Marshall observed in 1956: "The greatest problem of wartime training . . . was to continue long enough with the basic training, of which they were all impatient. And it is dull, and it is long, and it is very strenuous, and unless it is well done, thoroughly done, the troops are going to be lacking in discipline and performance from that time on. And yet it is very hard to have them see the reason for it." The chief of staff assigned what he called



“special professional fact-gatherers” to interview men in training and the same men after some combat experience. “They found almost everything the man objected to in this country, over there, after a brief experience, he said there was not enough of. The men can never understand how intense this [training] must be in order to register in long drawn-out engagements and over the severities of a battlefield experience.” (*Marshall Interviews*, p. 468.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT  
NEW WEAPONS COMMITTEE<sup>1</sup>

August 27, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

*Secret*

The Japanese technique in resisting our advances through jungle country is based on the sacrifice of the individual who is prepared to impose the maximum of delay. Recently defensive lines have been discovered consisting of a single Japanese soldier in each fox hole, in many cases provided with two machine guns. Where there has been time to develop head cover the process of elimination becomes all the more difficult.

In our jungle warfare we have to balance the decision for a rapid advance involving heavy casualties for the moment against the decision to proceed more carefully and possibly incur very heavy losses from malaria, dysenteries and jungle debilitation in general.

It is very important that we find some method of destroying or dispersing the Japanese infantry employed in the jungle without the long delays now suffered. It is also important that these methods include means which are readily transportable over jungle trails and that will not require a long manufacturing process before they can be shipped to the theater. Superficially I have had in mind the development of a rocket or bomb from our trench mortars which would explode well off the ground and spray a considerable area, with fragments, phosphorus or some other content. The present trench mortar shell, I understand, while the best weapon in the possession of the troops, nevertheless has the limitation of explosion on contact and therefore harmless to the enemy in fox holes unless a direct hit is secured.

I understand that General Kenney in the Southwest Pacific has introduced the use of parachute bombs over jungle positions which has caused devastating results both by blast and by fragments.<sup>2</sup> However, while a much heavier projectile can be delivered in this manner it has limited application because of the difficulty of bringing it to the exact spot desired at the moment required. The development of rockets to be fired from landing craft or DUKW's<sup>3</sup> is going forward but here again these find little application within the jungle.



It is very important that we provide the troops now engaged in such operations at the earliest possible moment with a better means of facilitating their offensives. Quite possibly it may be that a temporary expedient can be introduced while a distinctive new type of ammunition or weapon is being developed. There is great need for speed of action.<sup>4</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. This memorandum was sent to Brigadier General Raymond G. Moses, assistant chief of staff, G-4, who was the army representative on the committee. According to Vannevar Bush, who served as chairman, the Joint New Weapons Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "was set up originally because Secretary Stimson felt that there was a need for machinery to correlate the work of the services and civilians. . . . In spite of its somewhat grandiose name, J.N.W. did not accomplish much in the way of resolving differences between services. . . . Its subcommittees did a great deal to bring civilian and military thinking together on tough problems." (Vannevar Bush, *Pieces of the Action* [New York: William Morrow and Company, 1970], pp. 51-52.)

2. Lieutenant General George C. Kenney had been commander of all of the Southwest Pacific Area's air forces since September 1942. He had introduced the parachute fragmentation bomb into combat in New Guinea beginning on September 12, 1942. (George C. Kenney, *General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War* [New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949], pp. 12-13, 93-94.)

3. The "duck" was a 2.5-ton amphibious truck used for ferrying troops or cargo between ships and shore.

4. For further developments, see Marshall to MacArthur, September 14, 1943, pp. 125-26.

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio. *Secret*

August 30, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall for Eisenhower's eyes only. Reference my number 6055 of August 26th and your reply number W-8405 of August 27th regarding airfields,<sup>1</sup> the President sent for me today and said there had come to someone in the White House a disturbing message from a member of the senatorial committee stating in effect that the entire committee was very much exercised over the British and French intentions towards the airfields we have built in Africa and they felt so strongly that they were considering sending some of their members back to take up the issue in this country.<sup>2</sup>

He read to me some quotations from their letter which referred to considerable freehanded expressions of subordinate officials of ours on airfields regarding the threats of our Allies and the extreme difficulty of these officials in maintaining their position, particularly towards the French. It sounded to me very much like the usual half-baked stuff that comes from underlings but I think you had better trim their conversation a little bit.



GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall gave the president copies of these documents. In his August 26 message to Eisenhower, Marshall said that the State Department had informed him that Eisenhower had issued, or was contemplating issuing, instructions turning over to the French or British the Moroccan airfields the U.S. Army had developed at Marrakech, Port Lyautey, and Casablanca. The State Department was opposed to such action as having potentially “far-reaching effects on our post-war position. They are convinced that possession will undoubtedly be nine points of the law when the question of eventual settlements is raised.” The State Department recommended that the U.S. at least keep a skeleton force at each field under a high-ranking officer and make it clear that the U.S. maintained possession and operational control of the fields. Eisenhower replied that he had no intention of turning over any airfields to the French or British, that he and his staff realized that there would be competition for commercial air facilities, that these competing interests would have to be “solved later by proper machinery and on a higher level,” that he was determined to prevent friction from damaging “the mutual confidence and trust existing between the American and British forces in the theater,” and that he would do nothing “to jeopardize national interests.” (Attachments to Marshall Memorandum for the President, August 30, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected]. Eisenhower’s reply is printed in *Papers of DDE*, 2: 1359.)

2. Marshall, seeking to limit the number of visits to theaters by congressional leaders (see *Papers of GCM*, 3: 595), had succeeded in getting a single five-man Senate delegation (three Democrats and two Republicans) to take a sixty-five-day world tour in a plane he provided. The August–September tour was headed by Albert B. Chandler and included Ralph O. Brewster, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., James M. Mead, and Richard B. Russell. The committee’s October 1943 report, with its strong emphasis on the need for the United States to improve its capabilities in world aviation and communications after the war, is printed in *Congressional Record*, 78th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 89, pt. 8: 8912–17.

TO GENERAL MALIN CRAIG

August 31, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Malin, I found your letter of August thirtieth on the desk this morning.<sup>1</sup> I am deeply grateful for your generous expressions as well as for your thoughtfulness.

It is impossible for me to realize that four years have elapsed, as a matter of fact, four years and two months, since you and I shook hands on the day I took over the job you had carried out with such high efficiency and loyalty during the preceding four years. I had little idea of the troubles that were awaiting me; I knew there were to be great difficulties and extremely critical periods, but nothing approximating this war all over the world.

I opened a letter from you to Katherine and noticed your change of base. As it happened that evening I considered for a moment motoring by your apartment to see if you wouldn’t have dinner with me at the Army-Navy Club. I was putting in an appearance at a British gathering, but finally decided I would go home and sit down and diet for dinner.

Katherine is still at Fire Island. I am not certain whether she will return before or after Labor Day, but she will go direct to Leesburg and finish out the hot weather there.

With affectionate regards and thanks,    Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Craig, Marshall's predecessor as chief of staff, lived at the Kennedy-Warren apartments in Washington, D.C. The editors have not found his August 30 letter.



# Whatever the Decision

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September 1 – December 31, 1943

*At Cairo, Harry Hopkins came to see me one night before dinner and told me the President was in some concern of mind over my appointment as Supreme Commander. . . . The next day the President had me call at his villa . . . where in response to his question [about whether Marshall thought he should be named Supreme Allied Commander in Europe]. . . I recall saying that I would not attempt to estimate my capabilities; the President would have to do that; I merely wished to make it clear that whatever the decision, I would go along with it wholeheartedly; that the issue was too great for any personal feelings to be considered. I did not discuss the pros and cons of the matter. As I recall, the President stated in completing our conversation "I feel that I could not sleep at night with you out of the country."*

—Marshall to Robert E. Sherwood  
February 25, 1947

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Secretary of State, Categorical, Requests)

# Walter Dill

September 11, 1943

Dear Mr. Dill:

I have been thinking about you a great deal lately, and wondering how you are getting on. I hope you are well and happy. I have been very busy lately, but I have managed to find some time to write to you. I have been thinking about you a great deal lately, and wondering how you are getting on. I hope you are well and happy. I have been very busy lately, but I have managed to find some time to write to you.

Very truly yours,  
Walter Dill



BEGINNING in May 1943 and continuing as time and circumstances allowed through the summer, Marshall wrote and dictated the text of his second biennial report to the secretary of war. He knew that his official position and the importance of the subjects discussed would make this report, like its predecessor in the summer of 1941, an important political and public affairs document. The 1941 report had been a call to action in the face of a grave national emergency, and its issuance engendered many hostile letters, particularly regarding its call for a larger army and support for pending service-time extension legislation. (See *Papers of GCM*, 2: 589.)

Marshall's 1943 report was twice as long, more optimistic in tone, and written as "a record of what was done and why it was done . . . to permit a better understanding of the great offensive operations now in progress." (War Department, *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1941, to June 30, 1943, to the Secretary of War* [Washington: GPO, 1943], p. v. To the eighteen-thousand-word, thirty-six-page report were appended twenty pages of explanatory notes—probably largely contributed by staff members—plus six maps and nineteen charts.) He clarified and extended his first report's division of the war into phases. The first phase (September 1, 1939, to June 1941) "covered the period of national uncertainty as to the influence of the war upon the United States." The second phase—from the Battle of Britain to the German invasion of Russia—"was conspicuous for a growing national appreciation of the seriousness of the international situation and was marked by a limited peacetime mobilization of the citizen army, large appropriations by Congress of funds to develop the Military Establishment, and the orientation of industry to speed up the peacetime production rate of munitions of war." (Ibid., p. 1.)

Since his 1941 report, Marshall observed, the war had progressed through three additional phases. In the "grave situation" of the third phase (between the invasion of Russia in June 1941 and Pearl Harbor), the War Department had been "faced with the disintegration of the Army" until the Congress passed service-time extension legislation. (See *Papers of GCM*, 2: 565–67, 590–91.) During this period, the War Department had been "embarrassed" by its lack of modern materiel and trained units. Marshall discussed the efforts to arm and reinforce the Philippines, one example of the "trying problem" of meeting "the urgent necessities of critical fronts without jeopardy to the security of continental United States." (*Biennial Report*, pp. 2–3, 6.)

Marshall's comments on the war's fourth phase—Pearl Harbor to the battle of Midway: the high tide of Axis aggression—included a description of War Department actions immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack, a lengthy discussion of the struggle in the Philippines, and praise for the navy's actions at the battles of Coral Sea and Midway, which tipped the



balance of sea power in the Pacific to the United States. (Ibid., pp. 7–14.)

The fifth and current phase of the war, the chief of staff wrote, had begun in the Pacific in the summer and fall of 1942 with Allied offensives in the Solomon Islands and Papua; simultaneously, in the European theater American troops had begun to arrive and air units had joined in the aerial assault on the fortress of Europe, demonstrating “the soundness of the tactical doctrines of our air forces and of the basic design of their aircraft.” Marshall was careful to discuss the background of the strategic decisions and the constraints that had influenced them (particularly shipping). He wrote at length of the North African campaign, defending the necessity of dealing with Admiral Darlan, and paying special attention to the battles around Tunisia’s Kasserine Pass in February 1943, refusing to downplay these and other Allied difficulties in the ten-front war. He praised the United States’s allies and its navy and marines and explained the major army command changes. (Ibid., pp. 14–28; quote on p. 18.)

Comparing the Allies’ strategic position in mid-1943 with that of twelve months earlier, Marshall spelled out the great improvement. “In brief, the strength of the enemy is steadily declining while the combined power of the United Nations is rapidly increasing, more rapidly with each succeeding month. There can be but one result and every resource we possess is being employed to hasten the hour of victory without undue sacrifice of the lives of our men.” (Ibid., p. 32.) Further good news was that the U.S. Army—having expanded 500 percent from 1.4 million men on July 1, 1941, to nearly 7 million twenty-four months later—was about to cease its growth, leaving it free to concentrate on “polishing up the existing military machines and developing them to the highest degree of efficiency in preparation for the great battles to come.” (Ibid., pp. 34–35.) The chief of staff was enthusiastic about the Army Air Forces’ contributions: “The outstanding feature to date of America’s war effort has been the manner in which our air forces have carried the war, in its most devastating form, to the enemy” in a remarkably short time. “The end is not yet clearly in sight,” he concluded, “but victory is certain.” (Ibid., pp. 35–36.)

As the following document shows, a typescript version of Marshall’s report was ready by September 1. Released to the press at 1:00 A.M. Eastern War Time September 8, the report was widely praised by reporters and commentators for its wealth of detail, its clear and concise style, and its excellent literary qualities. Sidney Shalett observed on the front page of the *New York Times*: “General Marshall’s report was viewed by many here as one of the most comprehensive and remarkable public documents of the war. Not only did he give insights as to the possible future course of the war both in Europe and the Pacific, but he lifted the curtain of military secrecy on many fascinating historical sidelights of past operations. The Chief of Staff set forth the answers to many questions that a reporter



would have been reprimanded for asking at the Secretary of War's press conferences." (Late City Edition, September 8, 1943, p. 1.) While many newspapers and magazines ran lengthy excerpts from and analyses of the report, the *United States News* printed over three hundred thousand copies: two hundred thousand for its subscribers, seventeen hundred for the editors of every daily newspaper in the United States, thirty-six thousand for distribution in war plants, and seventy-six thousand for distribution to military reading rooms. (David Lawrence to Marshall, September 22, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].) The report was officially issued by the Government Printing Office in late 1943, but in the meantime the *Infantry Journal* released Marshall's two reports together as *Report on the Army, July 1, 1939 to June 30, 1943* in both hard cover and paperback editions. There was widespread agreement at the time with the sentiments expressed by Marshall's friend John McAuley Palmer: it was a "tremendously important" historical document. (Palmer to Marshall, September 30, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) ★

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HARRY HOPKINS  
*Secret*

September 1, 1943  
 [Washington, D.C.]

Dear Harry: Attached is my Biennial Report for the period July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1943. The part of possible interest to you is contained in the first 58 pages, my personal report. The rest are appendices.

I am planning to turn this over to the press for release by them on September 9th, the day of AVALANCHE.<sup>1</sup> I would appreciate your scanning the 58 pages referred to in order that I may have your opinion as to whether or not you personally think the President would object to such release. It is my report, of course, what I have to say, but whether or not it should be released is another matter.

I certainly could not expect the President to go through this document. I feel, and the members of my Staff all feel, that it will be helpful to the immediate future if the previous period of two years is in effect wiped from the slate as to rumors and conjectures. Here is what we did and why we did it. They may agree or not agree but guesswork would no longer be involved and the public, I believe, will be better prepared to view the great battles to come with a better understanding of all that is involved.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Planning for assault landings in the Gaeta-Naples-Salerno area as part of a multi-pronged invasion of southern Italy had been underway since mid-July. On August 16, 1943,



Eisenhower had made his final decision to launch AVALANCHE on the morning of September 9. (Martin Blumenson, *Salerno to Cassino*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1969], pp. 16-23.)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. 6595. *Secret*

September 1, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall for Eisenhower's Eyes Only. Thanks for your generous attitude regarding Bradley. Have him make preparations to leave for England.<sup>1</sup> Formal orders will be radioed.

I am assuming you will wish to keep his Corps Headquarters. If not important to do so find out from him if there is any of the personnel he would wish to have transferred to England. Tell him that he will head an Army Headquarters and will also probably have to develop an Army Group Headquarters in order to keep pace with the British planning and requisitions.<sup>2</sup>

If by chance you plan to give Bradley's Corps to Lucas and you want someone to replace Lucas in his present job, let me know and state your choice.<sup>3</sup>

The President will submit your nomination as a Major General upon the reconvening of Congress September 15th.<sup>4</sup> I think it will be confirmed by prompt acclamation. However do not be upset if a small political attack is launched against the President for taking advantage of the absence of Congress to make a recess appointment when by a short delay he could have proceeded in the normal manner. This may be connected up with some further attack along the lines of favoring the European Theater and slighting the Southwest Pacific. I do not think this will develop but do not want you to be upset if it does because it bears no relation to you personally or the regard in which you are now held. I felt that it was important to clear up this matter without delay as you had had no formal appreciation of your work since landing in Africa.

Incidentally I am now working on a further list of permanent promotions and would like to have your advice in the matter. Having in mind age as well as performance I contemplate proposing Patton and Stilwell for permanent Major Generalcies and possibly Somervell as he is the only one of the three subdivision commanders in continental U.S. who is not a permanent Major General. I then have in mind submitting a list of Brigadiers and grouping them as to rank somewhat in order of the importance of their contribution to the War Effort. McNarney would probably head the list with Kenney, Spaatz and Bradley. Also Eaker, Harmon in the South Pacific, Eichelberger, Handy and Bedell Smith.<sup>5</sup>



NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-305])

1. Eisenhower personally informed Omar N. Bradley on September 3 of his new assignment to organize the headquarters of the U.S. First Army and First Army Group in Great Britain. Bradley departed for London on September 8. (Omar N. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story* [New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951], pp. 8–10, 165.)

2. Bradley recalled: "General Marshall's invitation to raid II Corps for key members of my new Army staff was admittedly what I had been waiting to hear. . . . I could not in good conscience abandon an experienced staff and risk the Channel invasion to an inexperienced one." (Ibid., pp. 10–11.)

3. Major General John P. Lucas was given command of Second Corps on September 9, but he held this position only until taking command of the Sixth Corps on September 20.

4. While Eisenhower held the temporary rank of general, his rank in the permanent army establishment had been lieutenant colonel since 1936. He was promoted to permanent brigadier general then to permanent major general effective from August 30, 1943.

5. Eisenhower replied by letter on September 6 with praise for the men Marshall named, but he suggested that the order of promotion priority to Regular Army brigadier general be: McNarney, Bradley, Handy, Smith, Spaatz, Kenney, Eichelberger, Harmon, and Eaker. (*The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, ed. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., et al. [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970–], 2: 1388–89.) At the president's behest, promotions to Regular Army brigadier and major general had been withheld—except for the cases of former Hawaiian Department commander Delos C. Emmons, Arnold, and now Eisenhower—for more than two years "with a view to utilizing such vacancies as a special recognition of outstanding efficiency in positions of great responsibility in the present emergency." In a memorandum written for Secretary Stimson's signature, Marshall asserted that the time had come "to recognize the services of a limited group of officers who have emerged from the mass of our Officer Corps as proven leaders." (Stimson Memorandum for the President, September 9, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Marshall enclosed the list of those to be promoted. Stilwell, Patton, Somervell, and McNarney were advanced to major general effective on September 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively. Promoted to brigadier general effective September 1 were: George C. Kenney (commander, Fifth Air Force), Carl Spaatz (commander, Northwest African Air Force), Robert L. Eichelberger (commander, First Army Corps), Omar N. Bradley, Millard F. Harmon (commander, South Pacific Area Army Forces), Ira C. Eaker (commander, Eighth Air Force), Thomas T. Handy (chief, War Department Operations Division), and Walter Bedell Smith (chief of staff, Allied Force Headquarters, North Africa).

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF  
STAFF, G-2 [STRONG], ASSISTANT CHIEF OF  
STAFF, OPD [HANDY]  
*Secret*

September 1, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

In Quebec the Prime Minister had quite a talk with me regarding the selection of code designations for operations such as OVERLORD, etc.<sup>1</sup> He takes serious exception to the choices made. It is well known that he likes to settle some of these matters himself and there arises a conflict between the aptness of the choice and the security requirements.

However, the Minister makes this point which I think is sound: he referred to the importance, the gallantry displayed, and the heavy losses



suffered in the Ploesti raid, and then he remarked that he thought it was almost a crime to have such an operation as that characterized as "SOAPSUDS". He mentioned other designations which he felt were unnecessarily unfortunate and he recited a series of categories in which we could find appropriate names.<sup>2</sup>

Please have this looked into, and promptly, because he will probably bring it up to me while he is here on the present visit.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On December 3, 1941, to prevent duplication and confusion in the use of code words, Marshall and King approved the adoption of the British-prepared Inter-Services Code-Word Index for the U.S. military. Each nation was allocated blocks of words from the index for its exclusive use, and all code words had to be taken from those blocks. Control of the code-word system for the United States rested with the J.C.S. from March 16, 1942, to February 24, 1943, when this authority was transferred to Joint Security Control. (Hull Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, September 2, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 311.55 (September 1, 1943)].)

2. On June 26, Churchill had protested as "inappropriate" the designation Operation SOAPSUDS for the planned Ploesti area air raids (carried out on August 1). The operation was redesignated TIDALWAVE. (*Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, ed. Warren F. Kimball, 3 vols. [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984], 2: 280-81.) On August 8, the prime minister had written to General Ismay criticizing the "many unsuitable names" on the list for operations in which large numbers of men would become casualties. He desired that code words implying boastful, despondent, frivolous, or commonplace sentiments be replaced with such proper names as "heroes of antiquity, figures from Greek and Roman mythology, the constellations and stars, famous racehorses, names of British and American war heroes" among others. (Winston S. Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, a volume in *The Second World War* [Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951], p. 662.)

3. The Operations Division replied that part of the problem was an increasingly severe shortage of new code names on the list allocated to the United States. Marshall approved the division's recommendations that henceforth names for projected U.S. operations be approved by the J.C.S. Secretariat and that the British be requested to revise their book of code words. (Hull Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, September 2, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 311.55 (September 1, 1943)].) Following the Quebec Conference, Churchill remained in Canada for a week. He arrived in Washington on September 1, attended numerous meetings there, and gave a speech at Harvard University prior to departing for Britain on September 12. (Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, pp. 118-42.)

TO GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR,  
LIEUTENANT GENERAL MILLARD F. HARMON, JR.  
Radio Nos. 7483 and 7513. *Secret*

September 1, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

Eyes Alone MacArthur and Harmon, Harmon pass to Halsey<sup>1</sup> from Marshall. The urgent necessity for getting operations for the reconquest of Burma mounted in the most effective manner is of great importance and concern to the President and the Chiefs of Staff. At Quebec an agreement was reached that there would be American ground participation though on



a very limited scale and concentrated entirely on reinforcing a special operation by Brigadier Wingate of the British Army on an enlarged and greatly improved scale over his 3 column penetration deep into Burma last spring.<sup>2</sup> Preparations have now reached a point where we must dispatch to India at the earliest possible moment an American contingent of the highest caliber.

With Mountbatten's enthusiasm and drive we are confident that the return on the investment will operate to the advantage of your operations in the South and Southwest Pacific and the small down payment of American forces involved is therefore fully justified. Success will depend upon building this force around a nucleus of proven troops who have fought against the Japs in the jungle in your theaters.

It has accordingly been decided to concentrate 3,000 American troops in India for organization into 3 independent battalions to be intensively trained there and to operate in Burma early in 1944 with British contingents of the same sort. A column will make a deep penetration in front of the 3 general advances, 2 composed of Chinese troops from Yunnan and Ledo, and 1 of British troops south through Imphal. The aggressive action of the American columns is depended upon to insure a determined advance in their rear by the Chinese contingents which Stilwell has developed. The troops in these columns will be engaged in operations of a most strenuous nature and will be far in advance of friendly supporting troops and must live off the country except as supplied by air for which very special provisions are being made and assembled. 2,000 of the 3,000 men required are being selected as volunteers from the Caribbean and continental U.S. who have had jungle training. It is desired to obtain 700 from the South and 300 from the Southwest Pacific.

The men should be volunteers of physical ruggedness and combat experience in jungle fighting.

Replacements for these troops will be dispatched on the shipping which is being prepared to pick up the detachments herein referred to. This shipping will leave the west coast October 1st.

Details are being prepared by the General Staff as a matter of urgency and will be forwarded to you shortly.<sup>3</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-384, 385])

1. Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., was commander of the South Pacific Area and thus Harmon's theater commander.

2. Orde C. Wingate had become a British national hero as a result of his role in creating and leading a specially trained thirty-two-hundred-man long-range penetration group (popularly called Chindits after a Burmese symbol on their shoulder patch) into north Burma between February and June 1943. After this mission he strongly advocated raising an even larger force for further attacks. He had presented his case to the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting at the Quebec Conference on August 17. (S. Woodburn Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, volume 2, *India's Most Dangerous Hour*, a volume in the *History of the*



*Second World War* [London: HMSO, 1958], pp. 244, 311, 327–28; Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943* [Washington: GPO, 1970], p. 879.)

3. This urgency was occasioned by the weather. Burma's dry season occurs between November and May. Between June and October, monsoon rains virtually precluded significant troop movements and air-ground coordination.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING  
*Secret*

September 1, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Diversion of the LURLINE.<sup>1</sup>

I have asked Somervell to see Admiral Horne<sup>2</sup> regarding the diversion of the LURLINE from the carriage of Army<sup>3</sup> replacements for the South and Southwest Pacific to the transportation of 3,000 volunteers for Brigadier Wingate's deep penetration forces. In order that there may be a reasonable time for the training of the Wingate outfit it is imperative that the troops concerned be landed in India at the earliest possible moment.

The proposal is that the LURLINE be diverted to one trip to India to carry the 3,000 men above referred to. This would reduce the lift to the South and Southwest Pacific theater by a total of 7,900—almost entirely soldiers—spaces in September and October. To make up this loss it is proposed:

- a. To divert 1500 spaces from the Caribbean to the Pacific.
- b. To divert 1000 spaces from Alaska to other Pacific theaters.
- c. To divert the East Coast sailing of a vessel now scheduled with 5300 spaces for India, to the South and Southwest Pacific.

These three steps will return the spaces lost by the diversion of the LURLINE, in early October.

5300 troops who would be deferred by the diversion of the vessel from the East Coast about to leave for India will be sent to Africa on freighters and transshipped by the British for India.<sup>4</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Before the United States entered the war, the *Lurline* had been a Matson Line passenger ship.

2. Vice Admiral Frederick J. Horne was vice-chief of naval operations.

3. The word "Army" had been lined through.

4. The Burma volunteers from the Caribbean Defense Command flew to Miami, crossed the continent by rail, and assembled in San Francisco with the battalion recruited from the United States. They, and as much of their equipment as could be loaded aboard, sailed on the *Lurline* on September 21. Marshall was enthusiastic about the quality of men volunteering for the project; he told Sir John Dill that he had received reports that "the morale and appearance of the units were so splendid that many of the port personnel wished to join



the expedition." The *Lurline* picked up in New Caledonia and Brisbane, Australia, the men who were to form the third battalion; then it steamed to Bombay, India, where the three battalions disembarked by October 31. The organization (called the 5307th Composite Unit [Provisional]—later popularly known as "Merrill's Marauders," after their leader, Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill) trained in India from November 1943 through January 1944 in preparation for an invasion of north Burma. (Marshall [Sexton] Memorandum for Field Marshal Sir John Dill, September 26, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected]; War Department, Military Intelligence Division, *Merrill's Marauders (February–May 1944)*, American Forces in Action Series [Washington: GPO, 1945], pp. 8–11.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
*Confidential*

September 1, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

At the Citadel at Quebec the last day of the Conference I mentioned to you the status of Admiral Leahy as your Chief of Staff. For a time he received merely the pay of a Rear Admiral but some recent decision has permitted him to receive the allowances of the Chief of Naval Operations. However, for the reasons which I outlined to you I think it is highly desirable to get into the statutes as soon as possible a formal authorization for the precedence, rank, and pay of your Chief of Staff. While Admiral Leahy is so serving he has the necessary precedence and rank but that situation depends on the individual rather than the office.

I am attaching a draft of a law which I suggest be checked with the Bureau of the Budget, and if acceptable to you, be submitted to Congress at an early date.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Since early 1942, Marshall had encouraged President Roosevelt to create the post of chief of staff of all U.S. military services, but the president preferred that Admiral Leahy be his personal chief of staff with mainly liaison and advisory duties. (See *Papers of GCM*, 3: 285, 339.) The proposed bill, which was never introduced into Congress, stated that: "any officer . . . serving as Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army and Navy, shall have the rank of General or Admiral, as most appropriate to his previous service, and shall take precedence in rank over all other officers of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps. He shall be entitled while so serving to receive pay and allowances, including the personal money allowance, at the same rate payable to the Chief of Naval Operations." (Draft bill enclosed with the document printed here.)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MCNAIR

September 3, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

I pass on to you the following comment from an observer in Africa:



At Casablanca I visited the 2nd Replacement Center of the Ground Forces which presented a rather discouraging sight. This unit located outside of Casablanca, in which there are approximately 10,000 men, provides trained troops for the ground forces ahead.

I was unimpressed with the flabby, ill-trained look of these men. As soldiers who would soon move into the front lines, they looked soft, incompetent and completely lacking in the seriousness and confidence usually associated with hardened troops. Their average age was reported as 28 years, which, of course, is high. Most of them were fresh from basic training—13 weeks—although some had as much as 4 to 5 months' training behind them. The frightened and unsure look in their eyes and in their manner was not heartening. They looked exactly what they were—raw recruits—rather than trained fighting men, and they certainly did not compare with many of the trained divisions still in the States who had been trained together for months or more.

We have had a hard time as to the quality of our replacements in Africa. The foregoing recent report is not encouraging. Have we the right men at the head of our Replacement Training Centers? How closely is this supervised, compared to the close check on divisions? The same question applies to other replacements, particularly Medical. I am giving you the impact on me of a number of such reports which, in summation, do not present a favorable impression.<sup>1</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 9, Book 12)

1. Brigadier General John E. Hull, chief of the Operations Division's Theater Group and acting deputy of the division, discussed this issue with McNair the following day. Hull reported that he had told the head of Army Ground Forces: "General Marshall feels that the present replacement system, and particularly the training of replacements, needs the concentrated attention of the Army Ground Forces. He feels that possibly the leadership is faulty as regards officers assigned to this type duty. This is not the fault of the Army Ground Forces as they have been required to take officers returned from combat duty. He does feel, however, that this should receive General McNair's personal attention; and if the officers commanding the training centers of the replacement personnel lack aggressiveness and drive, that they should be replaced by those who have these qualifications. Is the present training schedule and system for training of replacements adequate to prepare them for battle?" (Hull Memorandum for the Record, September 4, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 9, Book 12].)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR  
*Secret*

September 3, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

*Distinguished Service Medal for General Drum*



Attached is proposed citation of DSM for General Drum.<sup>1</sup> He arrived in Washington a few days ago to head the Inter-American Defense Board.<sup>2</sup> His retirement becomes effective the end of the month but he is to be continued on active duty as head of this board. He leaves for South America shortly, with certain members of the board, regarding airfields.

I would like to arrange for a presentation of the DSM by you, to him, Tuesday morning next. It would probably require only ten or fifteen minutes, including the picture men. I am putting this request to you now so that Wright<sup>3</sup> can let me know and Drum can be notified so far in advance as possible.<sup>4</sup>

### *Reorganization of Army Service Forces*

As I told you on the phone a few days ago, I think it very important that you allow an hour Tuesday morning for General Somervell and General McNarney to present to you the plan for reorganization of the Army Service Forces. The three of us are in complete accord in the matter. It requires a series of steps, the first of which should be taken immediately as Somervell leaves for the Pacific Tuesday night. I am particularly anxious that you should hear the outline from him personally and it would be unfortunate to delay his departure because of arranged meetings with his staff officers coming from the opposite direction in the Pacific. I do not think you will find it difficult to appreciate the desirabilities of the proposed scheme. Incidentally, it has been pressed on Somervell for some time by General McNarney.<sup>5</sup>

I have seen the President and the Prime Minister several times in the last two days, in each case I was the only other person present. The issues referred to Stalin, Italian terms, and matters of that sort.<sup>6</sup> As you will have seen by the papers, the movement into the toe of Italy has started. AVALANCHE is due as scheduled and may have a rather difficult time of it, but that must be accepted as one of the inescapable hazards.<sup>7</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Lieutenant General Hugh Drum had previously received the Distinguished Service Medal for his work as chief of staff of First Army in World War I. This award would be an Oak Leaf Cluster to the D.S.M. The proposed citation praised Drum's work as commander of the First Army and Eastern Defense Command, specifically mentioning his direction of "large scale maneuvers, conspicuous for their reality and well conceived execution."

2. See Marshall to Drum, July 20, 1943, pp. 67–68.

3. Lieutenant Colonel William H. S. Wright (U.S.M.A., 1930) had been Secretary Stimson's aide since September 1942.

4. Drum resigned from the Inter-American Defense Board in mid-October, asserting that the problems of hemisphere defense and solidarity with which the board was supposed to be concerned were being handled as "routine procedures" by the Departments of War, Navy, and State. On October 18 he was appointed to head the State Guard of New York by Governor Thomas E. Dewey. (*New York Times*, October 19, 1943, p. 12.)

5. Somervell presented his Army Service Forces reorganization plan to the secretary of war on September 6. Stimson noted in his diary: "It was a radical change involving the



grouping together into three groups of first, all the work of procurement including all manufacturing and purchasing by such former units as the Ordnance, the Quartermaster, the Signal Corps and everybody else; this work was to be placed under a chief called 'Director of Procurement' and who was to be at the outset General Campbell [Major General Levin H. Campbell, Jr., (U.S.N.A., 1909)], the Chief of Ordnance; second, there was a similar grouping of all the work of distribution of materiel of every kind under a Director of Supply who in fact would be the present Quartermaster [Major General Edmund B. Gregory]; third, all work of construction of buildings, cantonments, etc. was to be placed under a Director of Construction who would be the Chief of Engineers [Major General Eugene Reybold]. This same distribution was to be carried out through the local Service Commands as geographical units, the present regional units of Ordnance or other branches being modified to conform with the Service Command boundaries, which in turn were slightly enlarged in number." Stimson directed Somervell to explain the proposed changes to Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson. (September 6, 1943, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 44: 100-101].)

Stimson's experiences as secretary of war during the 1911-12 struggle over army reorganization between then Chief of Staff Leonard Wood and The Adjutant General, Fred C. Ainsworth, gave him "considerable doubt as to the wisdom of taking on such a reorganization just now. It sweeps out a lot of time-honored traditions contained in the names and insignia of a number of famous branches of the Army. . . . It will inevitably arouse regret and opposition on the part of the men to whom those matters are dear, and I am in considerable doubt as to whether the beneficial results to be obtained are worth the fight just now." (Ibid., pp. 124 [quote], 139-42.) Despite Marshall's being "strongly for it," Patterson and Assistant Secretary John J. McCloy shared Stimson's doubts about the project's wisdom, and on October 5 Stimson rejected Somervell's plans. (Ibid., pp. 130, 172.)

6. Two of these meetings are noted in *Foreign Relations, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943*, pp. 1198-99. Telegrams resulting from these meetings to Eisenhower—approving his plans to launch an assault landing at Salerno (Operation AVALANCHE, scheduled for September 9)—and to Stalin—informing him of the coming surrender of the Italian government, German reinforcements, and British-American landings—are on pp. 1261-63.

7. The Allied invasion of southern Italy was to be a three-pronged attack. The British Eighth Army began crossing the Strait of Messina and landing in Calabria on September 3 (Operation BAYTOWN). Another British operation (SLAPSTICK) was to be launched simultaneously with AVALANCHE and was aimed at securing the heel of the Italian boot. In addition to the problems of managing a massive operation like AVALANCHE (hundreds of aircraft, 450 ships, twenty thousand vehicles, and one hundred thousand British and nearly seventy thousand American troops), there were a number of geographical difficulties in the proposed landing areas which would divide the invading forces and expose them to enemy observation, fire, and attack from higher ground. Moreover, the Germans had successfully evacuated sixty thousand men and their individual equipment from Sicily in mid-July to add to the seventy-five thousand they already had in central and southern Italy. (Blumenson, *Salerno to Cassino*, pp. 26, 28, 67.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF  
SPECIAL PLANNING DIVISION<sup>1</sup>  
*Secret*

September 3, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Outline of Post-war Permanent Military Establishment.



The outline submitted under date of August 18, in general appears a sound basis for planning purposes.<sup>2</sup> Before final decision is made on this matter I would like to have your comments with regard to the following:

*Paragraph 2b, Method of Training:* The statement is made that this will be accomplished by a "special training organization incorporating a comparatively small administrative and instructional overhead from the Regular Army reinforced by selected citizen officers, etc."<sup>3</sup> We are here involved, I think, with one of the crucial factors in connection with the post-war establishment; that is, how to train and maintain large numbers without a prohibitive financial burden.<sup>4</sup> Your statement is rather after the manner of our pre-war citizens military training camps where for a long time a few selected reserve officers were grudgingly used and Regular personnel was insisted upon. All of which, in my opinion, was entirely wrong.

As I view the matter, our only hope is to utilize a tremendous number of new lieutenants for the detailed training of the Selective Service men, this active duty of the young officers to be established practically as a routine part of the ROTC, or whatever other training basis is maintained. By such means the officer would be given a thorough practical indoctrination in handling citizen soldiers and in the maintenance of the proper standards of army discipline and control, and at the same time would provide us with the training personnel which could be maintained at a minimum cost, the pay of a Second Lieutenant. Any other scheme which presupposes a large Regular Army personnel will be wholly impracticable of maintenance.

Incidentally, this same consideration applies very markedly to the Air Corps, they have far too many commissioned pilots today and after the war it would be a tragic mistake to commission all pilots.<sup>5</sup> They should be non-commissioned officers, young and vigorous, who will return to civil life after a three or four year period of flying, except the selected few who are needed to form the permanent nucleus of the Air Forces, in various grades. Otherwise the Air Corps will be overwhelmed by older officers for whom there is no appropriate use.

*Paragraph 3a, Organization of the Regular Army:* The problem of the maintenance of war strength units, both for overseas garrisons and for whatever strategic reserve we may have, is one that I think should have clear definition.<sup>6</sup> Again the difficulty will be the cost of maintenance and I think our outlined plan should specifically take this under consideration. We started out after the passage of



the 1920 Defense Act with plans for a war strength division in each Corps Area and one at Benning, and we ended up—all of this after the passage of the act—without any because lack of appropriations ruined the entire setup. We must have this clearly in mind when proposing a system. For example, a Strategic Reserve (your Home Forces), or Regular U. S. Army units, can possibly be considered on the maintenance basis of limited strength having in mind that there will be an available trained personnel to call on, as volunteers, to fill the ranks in case of emergency. However desirable it may be to maintain war strength units, my guess is that it will be impossible of accomplishment.

In all of paragraph 3 I am somewhat confused by the intention as to general organizational setup. I am assuming not only the present breakdown between the Air, Ground, and Service Forces, but the inclusion of the Navy in one military department. Just to what extent that would affect your paper for planning purposes, I do not know. If it does not vitally affect the plan it is probably better to let the sleeping dog lie.

General McNarney has talked to you regarding certain phases of the matter, however I am considering for the moment that these are more a matter of detail than of fundamental consideration. I may be wrong about this and will discuss it with you and General McNarney personally in a few days.<sup>7</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Brigadier General William F. Tompkins (U.S.M.A., 1915) had been head of the division since its establishment on July 22, 1943. It had succeeded the Project Planning Division as the group working on demobilization and postwar planning.

2. For planning purposes, the Special Planning Division, in consultation with John McAuley Palmer, had developed (and received concurrences from the four General Staff divisions) an "Outline of a Post-War Permanent Military Establishment." The paper's basic assumptions were that after the war the United States would: (1) support relatively large armed forces; (2) adopt universal male military training for the able-bodied; (3) reorganize the Regular Army into Overseas Garrisons, Home Forces, and Training Forces; and (4) retain the Reserves but eliminate the National Guard. (Tompkins Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, August 18, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 370.9].) Marshall had read Palmer's lengthy study of June 29, 1943, on this subject. (Enclosure in Tompkins Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, August 26, 1943, *ibid.*) Concerning Palmer's role as a leading planner for the postwar army, see Marshall Memorandum for the President, June 21, 1943, pp. 23–24.

3. The rest of this sentence was: "and non-commissioned officers on temporary active duty." Marshall edited the sentence by changing the phrase "reinforced by selected citizen officers" to "the actual training being largely carried out by large quotas of newly commissioned reserve officers," and by changing the word "temporary" to "12 months."

4. Palmer estimated that the army would have to cope with an annual group of nine hundred thousand physically fit, eighteen-year-old males. He emphasized that the professional soldiers must not attempt to give this group its year of training. (Palmer Memorandum for Brigadier General W. F. Tompkins, June 29, 1943, *ibid.*)

5. At the time Marshall wrote, the number of officers per thousand enlisted men was 156



in the Army Air Forces, 97 in Army Service Forces, and 54 in Army Ground Forces. (Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *Men and Planes*, a volume in *The Army Air Forces in World War II* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955], p. xxvii.)

6. Tompkins's memorandum divided the postwar Regular Army into three parts: (1) Overseas Garrisons ("war-strength units for duty outside continental limits of the United States"); (2) Home Forces (units "maintained at [here Marshall inserted the word *limited*] war strength as garrison troops in the United States, and as a strategic reserve for minor expeditionary purposes or for the reenforcement of overseas garrisons in emergencies"); and (3) Training Forces (administrators, trainers, and trainees "organized around cadres, personnel coming from the Regular Army reenforced by the Reserves"). Beside this latter paragraph on Training Forces, Marshall wrote: "The only hope I see, from a financial point of view, is to plan that 90% of this training be carried out by the immediate product of our citizen-officer mill production, killing two birds with one stone, i.e. training officers and men." (Tompkins Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, August 18, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 370.9].)

7. Tompkins replied on September 7 with some explanations focusing on Marshall's specific concerns and noting that "in submitting this outline . . . it was intended to include only the general principles and features for approval at this time, with the idea of providing the details later." After discussing the outline with General McNarney, Tompkins asked Palmer to review Marshall's and McNarney's comments. In late October, Major General Handy of the Operations Division further analyzed the outline, and on November 2 Marshall sent it back to Tompkins for reconsideration. (Tompkins Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, September 7 and October 11, 1943, and Sexton Memorandum for the Director, Special Planning Division, [with Handy's comments dated October 28 attached] November 2, 1943, *ibid.*)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALTER KRUEGER<sup>1</sup>

September 4, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Krueger: I am enclosing two letters, one to me, and my reply relating to Major Sam Salisbury. Apparently he is in your Army.<sup>2</sup>

I am burdening you with this minor matter because I knew this man back in 1934 [1933] and found him one of the best prepared reserve officers I had come in contact with, quiet, unassuming, unobtrusive, with power of command and control. I turned over the troops on the post and the garrison to him and his officers during their training tour, while I devoted my attention with my staff to the CCC then being organized. He did it all exceedingly well with none of the usual palaver.

Salisbury, I think, was a ship captain and the son of an admiral. He must be about 45 or 50.

I wish you would find out whether or not the vicissitudes described in his letter were due to his incompetence, or more or less the hard luck of having been superseded by men who had gotten rapid promotions. I hope you will not visit on him your wrath for having written me directly; but if I know the man, this is the first time in his life he has ever spoken out of turn. Possibly if he had been more aggressive regarding his own affairs, he might



have at least gained one grade in rank. He was a major when I knew him in 1934.

Don't trouble to answer this. It is merely one of the items in my day's mail which invariably includes something of this sort. I seldom touch these unless I have reason to feel that it may be a case of genuine injustice.<sup>3</sup>

I imagine you are having a most interesting time and happy to be on the front. I was sorry not to see you in Washington before you departed, but as I recall I was either in England or Africa at the time.

With warm regards, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Krueger, commanding general of the U.S. Sixth Army and the new (in July) Alamo Force, was at his Australian headquarters near Brisbane.

2. Salisbury, who had served under Marshall in 1933 at Fort Screven, Georgia, had written to describe his activities during the seventeen months he had been in Australia and New Guinea creating and running Army Transport Service Base Sections. He noted that subordinates had been promoted ahead of him and that in April he had organized and led a rescue party aboard a blazing ammunition ship in Milne Bay, for which his two assistants were awarded the Silver Star, but he was "ignored." Marshall replied that he was "sorry that you have not had better luck, but I am glad to see that your soldierly spirit has not been dented and you still have your head up." (Salisbury to Marshall, June 11, 1943, and Marshall to Salisbury, September 4, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

3. Marshall later wrote to Salisbury: "I have just learned from General Krueger that you have been promoted, also that you have received the Silver Star for gallantry in action. He expressed himself in most favorable terms regarding your services, recognizing the hard luck of your various assignments in the past." (Marshall to Salisbury, November 10, 1943, *ibid.*)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
*Very Secret*

September 6, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

With reference to the most secret notes I sent you the other day on the DSM project (Dr. Bush's and Dr. Conant's affair)<sup>1</sup> I understand the British officials concerned with this same matter have been waiting here in Washington for an agreement between you and the Prime Minister as to "exchange" details.<sup>2</sup> I believe Dr. Bush submitted a special memorandum to you stating his and Dr. Conant's views on the subject, but I am not certain about this.

The point is, the British are extremely desirous of having the matter decided. And Dr. Bush is equally anxious to get either your approval or an expression of your views.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On June 26, 1942, the atomic bomb project was given the cover name "Laboratory for the Development of Substitute Materials," or DSM, a term that continued in use as an



official code name for the bomb project throughout the war. On August 16, 1942, the Manhattan District was officially established by the Corps of Engineers, and the term “Manhattan” gradually superseded DSM.

Vannevar Bush, as director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, reported directly to the president. James B. Conant, president of Harvard University, was chairman of the office’s S-1 Executive Committee, which recommended contracts, supervised contract operations, and cooperated with the Army’s Manhattan District. Marshall, Bush, Conant, Stimson, and Vice-President Henry A. Wallace were members of what was informally designated the Top Policy Group on atomic matters. (Vincent C. Jones, *Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1985], pp. 31, 43–45.)

2. American-British collaboration on atomic energy research and development, which had begun in the autumn of 1940, had nearly ceased by the end of 1942. (Ibid., pp. 228–32.) At the Quebec Conference on August 19, 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill signed an “Agreement Relating to Atomic Energy” which promised “complete interchange of information and ideas on all sections of the project,” and established a six-member Combined Policy Committee in Washington to ensure this collaboration. Stimson, Bush, and Conant were to be the U.S. representatives on the committee. (*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943*, pp. 1117–19.) But at the time Marshall wrote this memorandum, President Roosevelt had not revealed the details of the Quebec agreement to Manhattan officials. Stimson learned that he was to be chairman of the Combined Policy Committee only on September 8, when it held its first informal meeting. Arrangements to implement the agreement on information exchange were finally made in mid-December. (Jones, *Manhattan*, pp. 242, 245.)

3. The editors have not determined which “most secret notes” Marshall sent to Roosevelt, but later that day the secretary of the General Staff wrote to Marshall: “The President says he approves, but the Prime Minister has the papers and no final answer can be given until he expresses himself.” Marshall sent McCarthy’s memorandum to Harvey Bundy, Secretary Stimson’s assistant, with the following handwritten addition: “Mr. Bundy: Note above. Sir John Dill desires to get a date from Sec. of War for DSM committee to meet with British scientists. They will want to bring one man from Canada. Will you please arrange this. G.C.M.” (McCarthy Memorandum for General Marshall, September 6, 1943, NA/RG 107 [SW Safe, Harrison and Bundy].)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL,  
ARMY SERVICE FORCES [SOMERVELL], AND THE  
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1 [WHITE]

September 7, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Mr. Pelley of the Railroad Association<sup>1</sup> called to see me regarding the extremely serious situation in connection with the operation of railroads in eleven western states, roughly from the line Montana–Colorado–New Mexico inclusive, westward. He had discussed their difficulties with General Gross<sup>2</sup> and he appealed to me to try to protect them against the withdrawal not only of special men but of any men from the railroads in that region as men of any kind were not available for replacement.

I explained to Mr. Pelley that we were in the legal position of merely submitting our requirements and it was up to Manpower<sup>3</sup> to work it out, that we presented certain stipulations as to the percentage that we could



accept of uneducated, etc., etc. Whether we can go further than that I did not know.

I also explained to Mr. Pelley that we were through with the development of new divisions and in general Army Corps and Army troops but that we still were in the business of increasing the Air Forces and organizing special troops. I explained the pressing problem of getting additional ground troops of mechanics, etc., into England and additional combat crews for the planes in order that the planes themselves could be flown more frequently and therefore there would be a greater requirement for ground crews to keep them in repair. I explained that the same situation applies to the Mediterranean but on a different basis there, not so much of casualties to the planes and crews as of wear and tear from more frequent missions. He understands that it is a race against time, to get the best of the Germans in bombing before they develop an adequate defense. He therefore understands that we cannot limit our pressing requirements for men for these purposes.

Whether or not there is anything we can do to help him in his present dilemma I don't know, but I would like a draft of a letter prepared for my signature to Mr. Pelley on the subject.<sup>4</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. John J. Pelley was president of the Association of American Railroads.
2. Major General Charles P. Gross (U.S.M.A., 1914) had been chief of the Transportation Corps since July 31, 1942.
3. The War Manpower Commission.
4. Marshall's reply apologized for being "of such little assistance" and stated: "If you feel the railroad personnel situation in the West is sufficiently critical to justify release from the Army of a number of former railway employees, that matter should be taken up with the War Manpower Commission. If the Commission sees fit to certify to the War Department that the urgency of the situation requires release of men from active duty, the War Department will then determine the number of individuals to be released to civilian status." (Marshall to Pelley, September 18, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

TO HAROLD D. SMITH  
*Confidential*

September 10, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mr. Smith: I have just this moment read your note of September 7th regarding the return to inactive status of officers who have passed retirement age. The reactions you mentioned were anticipated.<sup>1</sup>

This action was taken by me personally after very careful thought.<sup>2</sup> It was made less drastic than originally planned, but General McNarney, my Deputy, the head of the Personnel Section of the General Staff, and the senior officers of the major elements of the Army were unanimous in the



opinion that such action not only was necessary but had been too long delayed.

The principal point which usually is not taken into account by critics of the procedure is the fact that the vast majority of the affected officers are of such rank that they of necessity head the various groups, sections or activities in which they serve. Our policy governing the age of officers assigned to duty with troops which has been in effect for two years has caused the transfer of these older officers into the Service Forces. The result is that in the supply services we have not only an accumulation of older and more sedentary officers blocking the advancement of younger and more aggressive men whose vigor, ability and wisdom have been demonstrated, but we have this very able younger leadership dominated by a much slower-moving personnel than the situation permits. These days are too critical and the efforts demanded of us are too vital for us to be hampered by any less than the most vigorous and able leadership and drive that we can provide. With my responsibility for the success of our operations, I cannot temporize in matters of this kind.

In announcing the policy we made it clear that commanders requesting the retention of the over-age officers would be required to submit conclusive and convincing evidence of the outstanding ability of the individual and of the necessity for his retention. It was to be expected that officers affected would condemn the decision, but I do not believe that our instructions are misunderstood or that responsible commanders will fail to ask for the retention of the vigorous and able older officers whose services they feel they must retain. When they do not ask for the retention of an individual, it must be assumed that it is because they cannot submit a really convincing case.

There is a further explanation of reactions in the field that must be taken into account. My greatest difficulty in building up the efficiency of the Army abroad as well as here at home has resulted from the reluctance of higher commanders regarding the removal of contemporaries and other older officers who are slowing down business or lack the vigor and drive required in active operations. These commanders were either reluctant to act or too often in relieving the officer sent him back with favorable statements to soften the blow, leaving to me the embarrassing business of refusing to give the individual the post or command in continental U.S. he thought his services merited. This reaction also finds expression in statements by local commanders in the U.S. to officers concerned that they, the commanders, are merely acting on the instructions of the War Department, when I know that they want to get rid of the men but are unwilling to tell them so.

I also anticipate strong repercussions from certain members of Congress, but I shall have to win that battle as I did the struggle over the selection of



commanders, when it meant the relief of less effective individuals.

I am writing you with complete frankness because I have appreciated your support more than I can tell you and I know you always want me to be perfectly frank with you. I do appreciate the spirit in which your note was written. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Smith, the president's budget director, had written: "Several staff members of the Bureau of the Budget who have recently returned from field trips report that the recent War Department order requiring the return to inactive status of officers past retirement age seems to be causing some confusion in the field. Although the order permits retention on active duty of especially competent officers, subject to War Department approval, some field commanders appear reluctant to request such retention, even of those officers they most dislike to lose. It occurred to me that field commanders may have read into the order some meaning not intended by the General Staff, thus causing the inadvertent loss of competent overhead personnel. For this reason I am passing along the general observation for such value as it may have to you." (Smith to Marshall, September 7, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. War Department Circular No. 167, July 22, 1943, listed the reasons for and instructions regarding the new policy of greater restrictions on the call to active duty and retention of retirement-age officers. The circular stated: "Officers will not be retained on active duty upon reaching the statutory age for retirement unless it can be definitely shown that they are physically and mentally capable of vigorous performance of full duty commensurate with their grades, and that their special qualifications for the duty to which assigned are of such character that the best interests of the service require their retention on active duty."

TO FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN DILL  
*Secret*

September 10, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Dill: I appreciate your sending me the attached message from your Military Attache in Chungking.<sup>1</sup>

My reaction to the Military Attache's message is that General Chennault has either directly or indirectly influenced him to send it to you. The statements he made in the message could only have been based on information obtained from Chennault and are almost identical with statements previously made by Chennault in other correspondence.

General Chennault is an intrepid and inspiring leader who can direct very effectively the operations of combat aircraft; but his methods of influencing his proposals present a very serious problem for me. His action results in indirectly subverting Stilwell and Stratemeyer,<sup>2</sup> who have been doing everything in their power to advance the arrangements for the support of his activities. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Dill had written on September 4, enclosing a copy of a telegram he had received the previous day. Major General Claire L. Chennault's Fourteenth Air Force was "shrouded in



gloom” because of unfulfilled promises of materiel, the attaché stated. Chennault could still complete much of his plan for 1943–44, but his minimum materiel requirements had to be met “immediately” and “without time wasting arguments.” The attaché hoped that the field marshal could have the prime minister approach the president, who, it appeared from Chungking, was not “really aware of facts.” Dill noted that he did “not intend to take any further action on this telegram. All I would ask you is not to be angry with our M.A.!” (Dill to Marshall, September 4, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Marshall sent Dill’s letter and enclosed telegram to the Operations Division, where John E. Hull drafted a response based upon Albert C. Wedemeyer’s comments; Marshall then edited this draft. These documents are in NA/RG 165 (OPD, 384, Case 8).

2. Major General George E. Stratemeyer had been commanding general of the India-Burma Sector and Stilwell’s air adviser since August 5, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR<sup>1</sup>

September 11, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

It had slipped my memory that I had tentatively accepted an invitation of General Cardenas to be present in Mexico City at the celebration of Mexican independence on the 15th and 16th.<sup>2</sup> I plan to leave here after the U.S. Chiefs of Staff meeting Tuesday afternoon, about 3:00 or 3:30, so that I can spend a quiet night at New Orleans and have an easy flight the next day, going into Mexico City the following afternoon.<sup>3</sup>

Of course if anything comes up I can return to Washington in short order and they will keep me advised through my private code by telephone. However, I see nothing that I can do here to contribute to the battle there, except probably worry them with questions.<sup>4</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall sent a similar memorandum to Secretary of State Hull.

2. Lázaro Cárdenas, former president of Mexico (1934–40), was minister of national defense.

3. For more on Marshall’s trip, see Memorandum for the President, September 18, 1943, pp. 130–31.

4. American and British Fifth Army troops had begun landing on the beaches near Salerno, Italy, shortly after 3:00 A.M. on September 9. They were met by the German Sixteenth Panzer Division (the only fully equipped armored division in southern Italy) and Seventy-sixth Panzer Corps troops were moving north from Calabria toward the beachhead. By September 11, the Allies had not occupied the high ground surrounding the beachhead, and they were expecting the Germans to launch a large-scale counterattack in a day or two. (Blumenson, *Salerno to Cassino*, pp. 74–79, 93, 96–106.)

TO GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR<sup>1</sup>  
Radio. *Secret*

September 14, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

Personal for MacArthur from Marshall. Some time ago I directed Colonel William A. Borden, Ordnance Department, to devote his entire time and



energies to the development of some means of overcoming protracted Japanese resistance in the jungles which has been costly to us in time and men.<sup>2</sup> After an exhaustive series of tests within this country Colonel Borden in conjunction with the Engineers and Chemical Warfare Service has developed certain weapons including mortars and rockets with special fuzes which it is believed improve the effectiveness of our present equipment. Limited orders have been placed for all this new equipment but it is desired to verify their effectiveness on the ground and under the conditions with which you are confronted.

If agreeable I propose to send Colonel Borden and five other officers who have been working with him on this project to the Southwest Pacific by air and with a limited amount of this equipment which will permit a trial in the field. It is contemplated that Colonel Borden and his working group will leave here by air October first and proceed to Brisbane and thence to New Guinea without delay acting as you may direct. From there they should proceed to South Pacific Area. Please Advise.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. This message was also sent to Lieutenant General Millard F. Harmon, South Pacific Area army commander.

2. See Marshall Memorandum for the Joint New Weapons Committee, August 27, 1943, pp. 99-100. Marshall wrote in mid-1945 that as a result of "the fierce fighting in North Africa and in the Papuan campaign in New Guinea, it became clear that our lack of preparedness in research in military instruments in peacetime would have to be overcome by extreme measures." Marshall selected Borden, a research and development specialist, "and directed him to work under me independently of normal War Department channels in the development and modification of weapons and improved techniques. His first efforts were devoted to increasing the effectiveness of our weapons against the Japanese in jungle fighting. As a result, the 105-mm and 155-mm mortars, flame throwers, ground rockets, improved launching devices, skid pans for towing heavy artillery in mud, improved bazooka ammunition, and colored smoke grenades were developed and the production and shipment to the theaters were expedited." (War Department, *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War* [Washington: GPO, 1945], p. 96.)

3. Borden's group arrived at Sixth Army headquarters in Brisbane on October 5. The most important of the new items they brought with them were the 4.5-inch rocket, which Ordnance had developed primarily as an aircraft-fired weapon in the hope that it would destroy Japanese coconut-log bunkers, and the Chemical Warfare Service's 4.1-inch mortar, which fired a variety of shells. (Lida Mayo, *The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefield*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1968], pp. 360-62.)

UNLESS the president specifically designated another person, the chief of staff of the U.S. Army was also commanding general of the army's field forces. (See *Papers of GCM*, 2: 3.) As such, Marshall had activated Army General Headquarters in July 1940 and later, after the reorganization



of early 1942, had designated the Operations Division as his command post. The general assumption within the army was that when the new American expeditionary force took to the field in Europe, Marshall would be its commander—the John J. Pershing of World War II—and that a subordinate officer would be appointed acting chief of staff. Marshall's designation of Eisenhower to command the headquarters for the North Africa, Sicily, and Italy invasions was not presumed to imply that Eisenhower would command U.S. forces in the great cross-Channel invasion.

As it had become clear by the spring of 1943 that the United States would contribute the majority of ground and air forces to the drive on Germany in the west, rumors began circulating that an American would become Supreme Allied Commander—although how far that command would extend was still unclear—and that Marshall would be that man. At the Quebec Conference in mid-August, Prime Minister Churchill had taken “the initiative of proposing to the President that an American commander should be appointed for the expedition to France.” (Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, p. 85.) The head of the invasion planning organization (COSSAC, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander), Lieutenant General Frederick E. Morgan, has noted that “throughout the summer months there was continual hardening of unofficial opinion that the Supreme Commander would be General George C. Marshall.” Following the Quebec Conference, Marshall invited Morgan to come to Washington for a get-acquainted visit. (Frederick E. Morgan, *Overture to Overlord* [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1950], pp. 159, 181, 188.)

Secretary of War Stimson was a strong proponent of Marshall's designation as supreme commander. On August 10, prior to the Quebec Conference, he had written to President Roosevelt:

the time has come when we must put our most commanding soldier in charge of this critical operation at this critical time. . . . General Marshall already has a towering eminence of reputation as a tried soldier and as a broad-minded and skillful administrator. . . . I believe that he is the man who most surely can now by his character and skill furnish the military leadership which is necessary. . . . No one knows better than I the loss in the problems of organization and worldwide strategy centered in Washington which such a solution would cause, but I see no other alternative to which we can turn in the great effort which confronts us.

By early September, Secretary Stimson and President Roosevelt had “agreed that Eisenhower was probably the best selection” to take Marshall's place in Washington. (*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943*, pp. 497–98; September 7, 1943, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 44: 104].)



In mid-September, leaks to the press that there was to be a Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and that Marshall was to get the job soon began to inspire domestic opposition to the appointment, primarily on the grounds either that Marshall was too important in his current job to be “demoted” to theater commander, or that some kind of conspiracy was afoot to get Marshall out of the way for President Roosevelt’s political benefit. The rumors frequently insisted that Brehon Somervell was to take over as chief of staff, and this was related to Somervell’s plans to reorganize the Army Service Forces. (On the reorganization plans, see Marshall Memorandum for the Secretary of War, September 3, 1943, pp. 114–16. For a detailed history of the Supreme Allied Commander appointment controversy, see Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943–1945* [New York: Viking Press, 1973], pp. 263–78.)

These rumors prompted the three ranking Republicans on the Senate Military Affairs Committee (Warren R. Austin of Vermont, Styles Bridges of New Hampshire, and Chan Gurney of South Dakota) to visit Stimson on September 15 to express their opposition to Marshall’s being sent to the field, particularly if his replacement was to be Somervell. Stimson recorded:

They told me how much they relied on him not only individually but how they were able to carry controversial matters through with their colleagues if they could say that the measure in question had the approval of Marshall. They had even had the fear that the proposed movement was aided and abetted by enemies who wanted to get Marshall out of his present position where his influence was so great in the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff. . . . I told them that the proposal didn’t come from Marshall’s enemies but his close friends and that, while the matter had not yet been settled whether he should go or not, he would not go unless his command was necessary to make successful the most important campaign of the war. I told them most confidentially that I happened to know that instead of the assignment being repugnant to Marshall, it would fill one of the deepest hopes of his heart.

The senators seemed greatly relieved by the secretary’s comments. (September 15, 1943, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 44: 119–20].)

But the senators’ concern was merely the beginning of the controversy over Marshall’s future role. The next day, in a move Marshall believed had been inspired by *Army and Navy Journal* publisher John C. O’Laughlin (see *George C. Marshall Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue*, rev. ed. [Lexington, Va.: George C. Marshall Research Foundation, 1991], p. 592), General Pershing sent the following letter to President Roosevelt. ★



TO FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT  
FROM GENERAL JOHN J. PERSHING

September 16, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. President: I am so deeply disturbed by the repeated newspaper reports that General Marshall is to be transferred to a tactical command in England, that I am writing to express my fervent hope that these reports are unfounded.<sup>1</sup>

We are engaged in a global war of which the end is still far distant, and for the wise strategical guidance of which we need our most accomplished officer as Chief of Staff. I voice the consensus of informed military opinion in saying that officer is General Marshall. To transfer him to a tactical command in a limited area, no matter how seemingly important, is to deprive ourselves of the benefit of his outstanding strategical ability and experience. I know of no one at all comparable to replace him as Chief of Staff.

I have written this, Mr. President, because of my deep conviction that the suggested transfer of General Marshall would be a fundamental and very grave error in our military policy.<sup>2</sup>

With sincere regard and high esteem, believe me, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On the same day that Pershing wrote, in a letter handed to the president by Harry Hopkins, Stimson again urged Roosevelt to avoid undue delay in appointing Marshall to command the European theater with the rank of General of the Armies—General Pershing's World War I rank. "I have reason to believe that Congress would readily give that title to Marshall. But, knowing Marshall as I do, I think he would not accept it unless assured that it met with Pershing's approval. I think Pershing would acquiesce in it if *you* asked him." (Stimson to Roosevelt, September 16, 1943, NA/RG 107 [White House Correspondence].)

2. Roosevelt replied: "You are absolutely right about George Marshall—and yet, I think, you are wrong too! He is, as you say, far and away the most available man as Chief of Staff. But, as you know, the operations for which we are considering him are the biggest that we will conduct in this war. And, when the time comes, it will not be a mere limited area proposition, but I think the command will include the whole European theatre—and, in addition to that, the British want to have him sit with their own Joint Staff in all matters that do not pertain to purely British island affairs. More than that, I think it is only a fair thing to give George a chance in the field—and because of the nature of the job we shall still have the benefit of his strategical ability. The best way I can express it is to tell you that I want George to be the Pershing of the second World War—and he cannot be that if we keep him here. I know you will understand." (Roosevelt to Pershing, September 20, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Roosevelt sent Marshall copies of Pershing's letter and his reply. (Roosevelt to Marshall, September 22, 1943, FDRL/F. D. Roosevelt Papers [PSF, Departmental, War].) For more on the contemplated designation of Marshall as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, see Marshall Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 5, 1943, pp. 180–81.



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

September 18, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Visit to Mexico City.<sup>1</sup>

I spent twenty-four hours as the guest of the Mexican Government, on the invitation of General Cardenas, Minister of War, for the 133rd Celebration of the notification of their independence. I arrived in Mexico City on the afternoon of the 15th, called on General Cardenas, and at 10:00 that night was received by the President prior to the formal celebration of the "Grito"<sup>2</sup> which took place at 11:00 P.M. and was followed later by supper.

The following day, the 16th, I stood with the President and General Cardenas to review a military parade of some 25,000 troops. This completed the formalities.

The President desired me to convey his greetings to you and to state that while he understood that the United States evidently had sufficient troops for the operations in view, he wished you to feel that whenever the services of the Mexican military forces were required in the common cause they would be made available. He wished me to express his pleasure in the present course of events overseas, and also to say that he hoped very much you would give him the opportunity to entertain you in a seafishing expedition off the West Coast.

General Cardenas wished me to convey to you his respects and most cordial regards.

No requests were made to me for materiel or personnel or regarding the present basis of cooperation between the two governments.

I was received with great cordiality and was accorded the distinction of a position next to the President at each ceremony and at the table.

I should like to explain, Mr. President, that I made this trip without consulting you because the fact that I had given a tentative acceptance a month or more before had entirely escaped my mind and was not brought to my attention until after your departure for Hyde Park. I likewise had failed to advise the Secretary of War. I therefore sent a note to him last Saturday regarding the proposed visit<sup>3</sup> and addressed a similar note to the Secretary of State telling him that if he thought there was any question as to the advisability of my making the journey to please send word to the War Department and I could readily find an acceptable excuse for calling off the trip. I am sorry I became involved in such an affair without due and formal reference of the matter. The truth is, I was so deeply occupied in other matters that I must plead that as my excuse.<sup>4</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)



1. Mrs. Marshall accompanied her husband. Her recollections of the trip are in Katherine Tupper Marshall, *Together: Annals of an Army Wife* (New York: Tupper and Love, 1946), pp. 159–64.

2. This was a traditional speech by the president to an assembled multitude from the balcony of the National Palace. General Manuel Avila Camacho had been president of Mexico since December 1, 1940.

3. See Marshall Memorandum for the Secretary of War, September 11, 1943, p. 125.

4. Roosevelt replied: “Dear George: I am delighted that you had such a successful trip in Mexico. I wish we could think up some method of using even a token force of Mexicans at some point outside of Mexico—just as I hope we can devise some similar token force for the Brazilians.” (Roosevelt to Marshall, September 22, 1943, FDRL/F. D. Roosevelt Papers [PSF, Departmental, War].) Marshall sent this comment to the Operations Division, which recommended that the chief of staff tell the president that on September 17, when General Cárdenas had raised the question with the Joint Mexican–United States Defense Commission, Vice Admiral Alfred W. Johnson, senior U.S. commission member, had said that the Mexican government should present a concrete proposal regarding what it was capable of doing and what assistance it would need from the United States to carry out this proposal. (Marshall Memorandum for General Handy, OPD, September 24, 1943; Handy Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, September 30, 1943; and Marshall Memorandum for the President, October 4, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 580.8].) Previously, the War Department had rejected active Mexican troop participation in overseas operations as “entirely out of the question.” (McNarney Memorandum for the Under Secretary of State, November 20, 1942, *ibid.*) On July 25, 1944, three hundred Mexican officers and men arrived in Texas to undergo unit training as the 201st Mexican Air Force Squadron. They arrived in the Philippines on May 1, 1945, and became part of the Fifth Air Force. (Message to Admiral Leahy from General Marshall, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected]; *New York Times*, May 2, 1945, p. 16, and November 18, 1945, p. 8.)

#### NOTES FOR TALK TO AMERICAN LEGION<sup>1</sup>

September 21, 1943  
Omaha, Nebraska

A few days ago I submitted a report which pretty well covered the operations of the Army during the past two years, the why and wherefore of our various moves.<sup>2</sup> There is little to add to that statement at this time except that there must be no lessening of the momentum which it has taken us three years to develop. The press and radio are keeping you well informed as to the progress of affairs in the Mediterranean and on the Russian front. You are given most of the details of the heavy bombing we are administering to the industries in Germany and the Axis satellites throughout Europe, as well as the destruction of the enemy fighter planes opposed to these devastating raids. New Guinea, somewhat like the Aleutians, is an unhealthy locality for the enemy and his planes, barges and soldiers. As a matter of fact, the entire western Pacific has become a critical problem for the Japanese. For the first time we are getting under way with



the war as we would have it conducted, and I hope that from now on we shall rarely be on the receiving end except as is inevitable when trading punches in battle contacts.

It has seemed to me from reading the papers recently, that there is some misunderstanding as to the degree of success we have attained in the prosecution of the war. One gathers the impression that our various moves of late were the final steps in the conflict.

Perhaps it might be well for me to outline the present state of our deployment. For most of the past year and a half we have been engaged in establishing bases for future operations. Comparatively speaking, large combat forces of the ground Army have not yet been engaged. As I endeavored to show diagrammatically in my recent report, our shipping has been largely employed in getting our air forces into action and building up the tremendous installations required all over the world both to maintain the combat forces already moved into the various theaters and to provide for the very much larger forces to come. These preparations have now been practically completed and it is the last-mentioned detail to which I would refer this afternoon.

We have prepared in North Africa and in Sicily, and we are about to prepare in Italy, for the supply and maintenance of heavy air and ground forces. For a long time we have been making similar preparations in the United Kingdom, and throughout the Pacific the same process has been under way since January, 1942. Meanwhile there has been built up in this country a formidable force of divisions and Army Corps with all the supporting troops, disciplined, highly trained, hardened, ready for embarkation for the great and final deployment of our Armies against the enemy. Save for assaults in the air, only a small portion of our combat strength has been engaged. Now at last we are ready to carry the war to the enemy, all overseas, thank God, with a power and force that we hope will bring this conflict to an early conclusion. But please remember that this phase is just about to begin, a point which seems not to be understood by our people here at home, possibly because they are far removed from the agonies of war except for those whose sons or husbands have been engaged in the fighting.

Concerning the public reactions of the moment I find myself in a curious state of mind. For three years or more, it has been a daily struggle of striving to meet the demands without the available means. There has been the constant problem of weighing the priorities of this theater against that one, of sending men to the front for who training ammunition had been lacking or similar deficiencies. Now I find myself in the position of being questioned, if not investigated, for having too much of something or other. I don't know yet exactly what this excess is, but I do know that I am profoundly grateful that for once in the history of the United States there is



suggested the possibility that we may have too much of something or other with which to support our armies. It will require considerable proof to assure me that such an unusual state of affairs actually exists. And I would add this view—my consideration is for the American soldier, to see that he has every available means with which to make successful war, that he is not limited in ammunition, that he is not limited in equipment, and that he has sufficient training and medical care; in other words, to see that for once in the history of this country he is given a fair break in the terrible business of making war. So I must confess that rather than being disturbed by the doubts that now seem to be arising in the public mind at the present time, I am vastly relieved that they should be of that particular character rather than the usual recriminations over tragic deficiencies of every kind and nature.

There is another phase of the present situation which I believe it will do no harm to refer to publicly and probably will be of interest, especially to you gentlemen who bore the full burden in France of our unpreparedness for war. We have been engaged for a number of months and very properly so, in plans for the further development of the war in the Pacific with the additional means as they become available from the struggle in the European theater. The first transfer made possible by our battles in the Mediterranean will result from the elimination of the Axis navy in that region. That means more naval power in the Pacific and that, in turn, means additional bases and equipment which have to be planned and provided for long in advance. We are similarly engaged in planning regarding other forces, particularly air, and it will probably interest you as much as it will discourage the Japanese to learn that our most difficult problem is to find sufficient bases from which to operate the vast forces which are to be poured into the Pacific for the rearrangement of the affairs of the Son of Heaven with his military clique.

Considering the fact that each day of war means both a colossal expenditure of money and a constant expenditure of human life, it is evident that we must not lose an hour in making our transfers from one theater to another. We are proceeding on the basis that nothing is to delay this flood of power to be added to the forces which already outnumber the enemy and are steadily growing stronger day by day. But I would add that these matters are not the affair of a moment, the result of a campaign of propaganda, or of temporary enthusiasms or special interests. We must proceed in the most businesslike manner possible to make this war so terrible to the enemy, so overwhelming in character, that never again can a small group of dictators find a sufficient following to destroy the peaceful security of a civilized world.



1. Marshall was the keynote speaker at the Legion's twenty-fifth annual national convention. His ten-minute speech was broadcast by N.B.C. radio at 1:30 P.M. and printed in the *New York Times*, September 22, 1943, p. 10. After Marshall's address, the Legion gave Marshall its Distinguished Service Medal.

2. See the editorial note concerning Marshall's 1941-43 biennial report on pp. 105-7.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL STYER<sup>1</sup>

Secret

September 22, 1943

Washington, D.C.

Mr. Harriman saw me this morning with reference to his mission to Moscow. He leaves here next Wednesday on a mission which he may or may not head; however, he will remain in Moscow as our Ambassador (this is very confidential, for your information only).<sup>2</sup>

We have had a mess in Russia between Faymonville and the Ambassador and our Attaches. I told Harriman all should be removed and a fresh start made. To this he has agreed.<sup>3</sup>

Now he wants two people in particular, one to replace Faymonville and another who can confidentially and most intimately explain at the present time and for the future the basis of our global strategy, etc.

To replace Faymonville he would like General Sidney P. Spalding who now I believe is in Africa in charge of allocation of materiel to the French.<sup>4</sup> Please let me know as quickly as possible whether or not you can detach Spalding from his job.<sup>5</sup>

G. C. M.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Major General Wilhelm D. Styer was acting commanding general, Army Service Forces.

2. Businessman W. Averell Harriman, a close friend of President Roosevelt's confidant Harry Hopkins and the lend-lease expediter in Britain since 1941, was soon to be named U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union to replace Admiral William H. Standley, a former chief of naval operations. Harriman's appointment, not publicly announced until October 1, formally began on October 7. At the time of the document printed here, Harriman was preparing to depart for a mid-October meeting of American, British, and Soviet foreign affairs department representatives in Moscow. On September 28, President Roosevelt told Stalin that he had decided to allow Secretary of State Hull to make the lengthy trip, thereby converting the meeting into the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference. (Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943*, 7 vols. [Washington: GPO, 1957-65], 1: 519, 530; *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 2 vols. [New York: Macmillan Company, 1948], 2: 1254-55.) Concerning Harriman's role, see W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, *Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946* (New York: Random House, 1975).

3. Brigadier General Philip R. Faymonville, chief of the United States Supply Mission, was the lend-lease expediter in the Soviet Union. Concerning his status, see *Papers of GCM*, 2: 635-36. Marshall approved the designation of John R. Deane, who had been the secretary of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, to head the new Moscow Military Mission and his promotion to major general. For Deane's observations regarding the establishment of the mission, see John R. Deane, *The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our*



*Efforts at Wartime Co-operation with Russia* (New York: Viking Press, 1947), pp. 10–12, 48–49. Admiral Standley, who had been United States ambassador in the Soviet Union between February 1942 and September 1943, comments at length on his strained relations with Faymonville in William H. Standley and Arthur A. Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1955), particularly pp. 235–47. The embassy's problems, both internally and with the Soviet bureaucracy, were well known. Bill Downs, Moscow correspondent for *Newsweek* magazine and C.B.S. radio, observed that prior to Harriman's arrival "the embassy staff had grown into a happy-go-lucky crowd" and that "the embassy military and naval staffs spend a lot of time chasing ballet and theater tickets." ("Harriman's Broom," *Newsweek* 22 [November 15, 1943]: 24–25.)

4. Brigadier General Spalding (U.S.M.A., 1912), who had served in various War Department supply assignments, had been sent to Allied Force Headquarters in Algiers in July to become chairman of the Joint Rearmament Committee.

5. Spalding was not under Army Service Forces jurisdiction, so Styer suggested that the chief of staff ask Eisenhower to release Spalding. Marshall did this. (Styer Memorandum for General Marshall, September 22, 1943, and Marshall to Eisenhower, Radio, September 22, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Spalding was to head the Moscow Military Mission's Lend-Lease Division.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSEPH W. STILWELL  
Radio No. 3430. *Secret*

September 22, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

Personal from Marshall for Stilwell. I gather from Bissell<sup>1</sup> and others repeat others, that you have consistently overworked and are much in need of a short rest and that you refuse to spare yourself in accordance with the congenital affliction of all higher commanders.

I want you immediately to take two weeks rest. I think it especially important that you do this before Mountbatten gets out there.

In accordance with the above I have gone ahead through Sir John Dill and you will probably receive an invitation from General Auchinleck<sup>2</sup> for the Vale of Kashmir or some other pleasant spot and my instructions are to you to accept it. Your expense account can be increased to whatever extent you feel necessary. Please acknowledge.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Major General Clayton L. Bissell had relinquished command of the Tenth Air Force in India and Burma and returned to the United States in August 1943; in September he became assistant chief of Air Staff for intelligence.

2. General Sir Claude Auchinleck had been British commander in chief in India since June 1943.

3. Stilwell replied on September 24: "I have already complied with your instructions . . . and have had more than equivalent of two weeks rest since returning to Chungking. At present, I am at critical point of a maneuver which may smooth out many difficulties. Possibilities are far reaching if I can sit on the eggs for a while longer. When this thing either develops or dies, the hills can be considered. Your interest is highly appreciated, and I hope you are practicing what you preach." (Riley Sunderland and Charles F. Romanus, eds., *Stilwell's Personal File: China-Burma-India, 1942–1944*, 5 vols. [Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1976], 3:950.) The chief of staff was not convinced by Stilwell's argument; see Marshall to Stilwell, September 30, 1943, p. 139.



TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. 8400. *Secret*

September 22, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall for General Eisenhower's EYE ONLY. I have just been talking over with Dill your problems. He and I have much the same view at long range which I repeat to you for your private information. We are fearful that in a deliberate approach to the development of a secure position including the Port of Naples you will afford the other fellow so much time that he will be in a position to make things much more difficult in the matter of an advance to Rome or in preparations for any attempts on his part to secure a prestige victory. With air power and sea power on your side, however great the burden you are now bearing to get troops into Taranto, to Sardinia and to Corsica, have you considered the possibility of pausing in your 5th and 8th Army effort when you have Naples under the guns as it were and merely a matter of a week or two, and making a dash at the Rome area? Dill and I both anticipate that the delays involved in lack of shipping and in loading will be the answer to this suggestion. However, we feel that it might possibly be managed on a reduced basis if done quickly whereas a delay would permit such German preparations as to make an elaborately prepared landing an absolute necessity. We are aware of the problems such a proposal poses for you in your position of responsibility of what might happen and you should be brutally frank with me in your reply.<sup>1</sup>

I might say that both Dill and I feel that your Avalanche should have started earlier before operations in the toe which would have meant also before the Germans could have been so well prepared to meet you and that most of the toe and the boot might have fallen into your hands by gravity rather than as has developed. Your planners at Quebec had a different view and quite evidently you and Alexander had a different view but at long range it would seem that you give the enemy too much time to prepare and eventually find yourself up against a very stiff resistance.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-10556])

1. Eisenhower replied the next day that "in spite of an earnest general conviction that speed and surprise should be sought and that landings behind the flanks would offer great results, we could not repeat not develop any possibility that offered even fair chances of success" given the strength of German forces in the area. Small landing forces "would be quickly eliminated." Large forces had to be sustained across the beaches, in the absence of large, working ports, and "this means risks to shipping and misuse of landing craft for a prolonged period." (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1452-53.)

2. "I can not repeat not agree that the Salerno operation [AVALANCHE] could have logically preceded BAYTOWN," Eisenhower stated, "although at one time I favored that sequence of events." Allied advances south of Salerno had been made "with surprising rapidity, and they have had a profound effect on the general situation." Eisenhower believed that when Allied troops took Foggia, German forces on the west coast would have to retreat. "I do not see how any individual could possibly be devoting more thought and



energy to speeding up operations or to attacking boldly and with admitted risk than I do." In closing, Eisenhower noted that Prime Minister Churchill had congratulated him for taking risks in Italy. (Ibid., pp. 1453-54.)

The Salerno beachhead had been secured by September 18. On the twenty-third, Allied forces launched a drive on Naples, entering that city on October 1. British troops occupied the Foggia area on September 27, but no general German retreat ensued. (Blumenson, *Salerno to Cassino*, pp. 136-37, 164-65, 170.)

SPEECH FOR THIRD WAR LOAN DRIVE<sup>1</sup>

September 23, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

This exhibit offers thousands of Americans an opportunity of seeing the powerful weapons and superb equipment which their purchases of War Bonds are providing.

In the wastage of every conceivable type of military equipment, this devastating war in which we are now engaged surpasses any in the history of the world. There is the hazard of loss in every shipment overseas, with a greatly increased hazard during landing operations. The development of the airplane, of modern automatic weapons, of rockets, and bombs of every description, combined with operations in all types of terrain and weather, jungles and ice caps, deserts and mountains, plus an enemy who is adept in every method of destruction, all this necessitates the production of staggering quantities of munitions. No previous war has approached such requirements as the present awful struggle. Tanks, jeeps, trucks, airplanes, and artillery are inevitably destroyed by the hundreds on the battlefield even when the going is good. So far we have been extraordinarily fortunate, but even so the losses present a serious problem. The weapons and equipment must be replaced immediately, without delay, if the advance is to continue and if we are to give the soldiers who depend on these weapons a fair break on the battlefield.

There will be no end to these requirements for weapons until the last battle is victoriously completed.

We face grim months of fighting on fronts all over the globe. Last week we secured our landings on the Italian mainland against determined resistance on the beaches. In company with the British VIII Army our V Army is now starting its offensive towards Naples and Rome. Our air war on the continent from British bases grows in intensity week by week. In the Southwest Pacific and the Solomons our advances have been greatly accelerated. And in the China-Burma theater we are getting into a position to carry heavy fighting to the Japanese. In fact we are, for the first time since the war started, ready to deploy the tremendous American Army which the purchase of War Bonds had financed. But successful as all these



operations have been of late, they impose heavy requirements in shipping and munitions to replace the losses by enemy action or by wave or wear and tear. They draw heavily on our reservoir of supplies.

The American people must give not only their full personal effort but the full use of their dollars invested in War Bonds, to back these attacks. There is no alternative. Total victory is in sight but it can only be won by concentrating every resource of America to the task.

Do not, I beg of you, be lulled into a false sense of easy victory by the initial successes which our troops have already gained. Each of these victories was secured by hard and costly fighting. The toll will mount with the increased size of the opposing forces engaged as we drive deeper into the territory of the enemy. Our men are trained and are resolved to do their full part, to the sacrifice of life itself. The Army will not fail in skill and courage. Your purchases of War Bonds must keep the weapons in the hands of our soldiers to make that skill and courage count.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)

1. Marshall spoke, beginning at 9:34 P.M., during the "Parade of Spotlight Bands" program at the Back the Attack Exposition on the grounds of the Washington Monument. The speech was broadcast on the N.B.C. Blue Network. "Back the Attack" was the theme of the Treasury Department's Third War Loan Drive (September 3-October 2) to raise \$15,000,000,000.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
*Secret*

September 28, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

The fall of Foggia has come exactly at the time when it is needed to complement our Bomber Offensive now hammering Germany from bases in the United Kingdom.<sup>1</sup> As winter weather sets in over northern Europe, our heavy bombers operating in the fair weather from the dozen or more (13) air bases in the Foggia Area will strike again and again at the heart of German production not only in Germany proper but in Austria, Hungary and Rumania. For our bombers operating from England, this aerial "Second Front" will be a great assistance.

This new avenue of approach for our allied air forces adds something like 1200 miles for which the German must provide air defenses. He cannot possibly spread his air defense to the south and east to meet this threat and yet maintain his present degree of security in the north and west. In a matter of days now we will be in a position to strike into the soft side of Germany.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The Germans had abandoned the Foggia plain on September 27 to defend the hills to



the north and west. It was October 11, however, before the British Eighth Army had driven the Germans west of the Trigno River, thereby making Foggia and the nearby airfields secure. (Blumenson, *Salerno to Cassino*, pp. 170–71.)

2. Eisenhower had written to Marshall on September 18 noting the advantages of basing bombers in the Foggia area. (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1434–35.) General Arnold had first proposed basing strategic air forces in Italy in August. On October 9 he submitted a plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to create a new Fifteenth Air Force to carry out the missions; this organization was established effective November 1. (Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK, August 1942 to December 1943*, a volume in *The Army Air Forces in World War II* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949], pp. 563–65, 723–27.)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSEPH W. STILWELL  
Radio No. 3492. *Secret*

September 30, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall for Stilwell's eyes only. Reference your 767.<sup>1</sup> Dill yesterday heard from Auchinleck that a Maharaja would be extending you an invitation for a week or two weeks pleasurable rest. Auchinleck hesitated because he had just learned that Mountbatten was coming out earlier than expected. I told Dill to tell him to go ahead with his invitation. Now for goodness sake go off for at least a week.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-14159])

1. Stilwell's Radio No. 767 was in response to a previous message on this subject; see note 3, Marshall to Stilwell, September 22, 1943, p. 135.

2. Stilwell again declined the chief of staff's suggestion; see Marshall to Mrs. Joseph W. Stilwell, December 29, 1943, p. 220.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF  
OF STAFF, G-1 [WHITE]

October 1, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

The following has come to me as a paragraph from a letter of a 2nd Lieutenant who has just joined the First Armored Division in Africa. Apropos of this quotation is the fact that this Lieutenant's brother has been promoted twice in six months here in the United States, to 1st Lieutenant and then to Captain.<sup>1</sup>

"One of the things which has struck me as most strange over here is the lack of rank among the officers in most responsible positions. I am referring for the most part to company commanders throughout the regiment. As an example take this battalion. Of the three medium tank companies two of them have 1st Lieutenant commanders. Both of these men have received Silver Stars for bravery and both of them have had over sixteen months' service,

nine of which have been spent overseas. So far as I know neither one of them has a blemish on his record. The TO [Table of Organization] calls for a Captaincy for a company commander and yet they remain 1st Lieutenants with no prospects of immediate promotion.

“The thing that makes it hard to understand is that their classmates who have remained in the States, seen no action nor undergone any real hardships, now rank them for the most part. It doesn’t bother me because I only rank two other 2nd Lieutenants in the outfit and I am convinced that I will still be a 2nd Lieutenant when the war ends; but it is a pretty tough dose for these men who have seen 80% of their fellow officers become casualties in battle and 40% of the men have had anywhere from one to three tanks shot out from under them, when they learn of fast promotions given out in the States. These men have seen tough action, have done their part, lost most of their friends and been given responsible positions without the rank to go with it. It doesn’t make too much sense.”

I have been strongly opposed to rapid promotions and have seen in my own family such an example in the advancement to First Lieutenant and then to Captain in the Antiaircraft Artillery while on staff duty here in the States, all in a very short time. The foregoing puzzles me. What is probably the cause of this slow advancement overseas?

I recall having insisted that they should not be too hasty in moving men into TO vacancies until they had demonstrated their capacity, but the foregoing quotation doesn’t seem to indicate a delay for the purpose I referred to.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The unnamed second lieutenant and his brother were undoubtedly Marshall’s stepsons Allen Brown, who was with the First Armored Division, and Clifton Brown, who was in the antiaircraft artillery.

2. The editors have not found the reply of October 2 from G-1, but the problem was not soon solved; see Marshall Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, December 24, 1943, p. 206.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
*Secret*

October 4, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Air Cargo—India to China.<sup>1</sup>

1. With reference to your comments Tuesday afternoon regarding the



unsatisfactory state of air transport over the hump into China,<sup>2</sup> the following data is submitted:

a. The following tonnages were carried by the India-China Army Air Transport Command and China National Airways [*Aviation*] Corporation as indicated below:

Month	ICATC		CNAC	
	Planes		Planes	
	On Hand	Tons	On Hand	Tons
April	100	1,829	17	701
May	136	2,166	20	835
June	146	2,369	28	801
July	189	3,451	27	1,093
August	219	4,447	23	1,282
1–21 Sept.	230	3,999	23	784
Total Cargo		18,261		5,496

While the number of ICATC planes on hand is comparatively large, the planes actually in operation averaged only about 50% of the planes on hand. This was due to a number of factors, the principal ones being unanticipated serious mechanical difficulties in the C-46 type aircraft (which difficulties are in the process of being ironed out), lack of spare parts, maintenance difficulties due to lack of experienced maintenance personnel and unfavorable working conditions, inexperienced flight personnel and weather. CNAC tonnage is proportionately larger because of long-experienced and highly paid maintenance personnel and flight crews. Also CNAC did not have the problem of breaking in a new type (C-46) plane.

b. A total of 8,505 officers and enlisted men are presently assigned to the India-China Wing of the Air Transport Command. CNAC is operating under contract to General Wheeler.<sup>3</sup>

c. Despite the difficulties of the monsoon season, 154 hard-standings have been constructed. 117 additional are required. On 3 airdromes the runways have been extended to 6,000 feet. The work now should go ahead much more rapidly before the termination of the rains, though we are in difficulties over General Auchinleck's proposed removal of some of the British engineers in supposed conformity with Quadrant priorities. This is being negotiated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.<sup>4</sup>

d. The British control every rail movement between Calcutta and Assam and they make the final decision as to what will and what will not move. This undoubtedly has affected the movement of necessary supplies to improve airports and will continue to affect movements over the hump in the future.<sup>5</sup>



1. This document was originally drafted for the chief of staff by the Army Air Forces staff, but Marshall returned it to Arnold with suggestions for extensive changes. Marshall concluded: "It is important that this memorandum be very carefully prepared in the simplest possible language and covering all the main points in such a manner that the President can follow what we are talking about." (Marshall Memorandum for General Arnold, September 30, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. On Tuesday, September 28, Marshall had lunch at the White House with Harry Hopkins, followed by a meeting with President Roosevelt.

3. Major General Raymond A. Wheeler was commanding general of Army Service Forces in the China-Burma-India theater.

4. On September 27 Stilwell had received a copy of the message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the British Chiefs of Staff regarding the need for "a clarification" of General Auchinleck's decision to move certain British engineer units and the potential impact of this on the U.S. effort to supply China by air from India. See Sunderland and Romanus, eds., *Stilwell's Personal File*, 3: 959-60.

5. Roosevelt replied by directing Marshall to contact Lieutenant General Somervell, who was then in India, "to give this whole business his special consideration and attention. Almost everything seems to have gone wrong with our program for supporting Chennault. I am sure that Somervell, when he puts his mind on it, can put a real punch behind it." Somervell replied with a list of ten problems that the India-China air route managers were working to overcome. (Roosevelt to Marshall, October 15, 1943, and Somervell to Marshall, Radio No. GW-994 TIGAR, October 23, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

Along with his directive to Marshall, Roosevelt sent a copy of an October 16 message he was sending to London expressing disappointment with the amount of supplies delivered to Chennault's air forces, noting that the British controlled the flow of supplies by rail to the air bases in Assam, and requesting that Prime Minister Churchill "take a personal part in this business because I am a bit apprehensive that with our new project in Burma our air force in China will be forgotten and I think that is a great mistake." (*Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, 2: 537.)

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER H. REDMAN, October 5, 1943  
BRITISH SECRETARY, COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF [Washington, D.C.]  
*Secret*

General Marshall requests that the following messages be transmitted through British channels:

*"For Admiral Cunningham from General Marshall*

"My congratulations to you and sympathy to Eisenhower.<sup>1</sup> What the Mediterranean loses the world theater gains. Again I would repeat our feeling here that you have rendered a service of incalculable value during the past year in the strong moral as well as tactical support you have given Eisenhower, for which I personally am profoundly grateful."

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*"For Admiral Pound from General Marshall*

"I read this morning with deep emotion the statement of your



retirement as First Sea Lord. During the past two years you have been to me a strong, steady light against a very dark horizon. Your integrity of purpose and your generous attitude through all of the difficult negotiations of the past months have given you a high place in my regard and esteem. I shall cherish our personal association and never forget the great service you have rendered our joint cause."<sup>2</sup>

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GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On October 3, Prime Minister Churchill had asked Sir Andrew Cunningham, Allied naval commander in the Mediterranean, to become First Sea Lord; this was announced publicly on October 5. (*A Sailor's Odyssey: The Autobiography of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope* [New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1951], pp. 573-74.)

2. Sir Dudley Pound had been head of the Royal Navy since May 1939. His health had deteriorated seriously following the August conference in Quebec, and he was in a London hospital. He died on October 21, Trafalgar Day. (*New York Times*, October 22, 1943, p. 17.)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER<sup>1</sup>  
[Radio No. 9354.] *Secret*

October 5, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall for Eisenhower. We have a pressing problem here to build up the morale and the reputation of the infantry soldier. Because of various classifications for mechanical and other special qualities too many men have been allocated to the infantry because they did not fit into any other slot. I do not need to tell you that an aggressive, skillful infantry is vital to our success and that the individual courage, stamina, pride and relentless purpose of the infantry soldier is essential for the infantry organization.

We receive far too little in the way of appreciations in press reports or citations for the infantry soldier. There is a board here now from the ground services considering with G-1 what might be done to better the situation.

General Surles is concentrating his forces on this question but he needs strong assistance from the field. The air forces by means of decorations have built up morale against the hazards of the service but to a certain extent this amounts to an embarrassment, notably in the case of pilots of transport planes receiving decorations when the man who took the ride in the plane and jumped from the plane and landed in the rear of the enemy has received none.

I would like your recommendations, your assistance and an energetic effort made to improve this situation.<sup>2</sup>



GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. This message was also sent to the commanding generals in the South Pacific Area (Harmon) and Southwest Pacific Area (MacArthur).

2. Eisenhower replied: "I am highly delighted that the War Department is undertaking as a studied project the task of giving the infantry soldier his due and of building up his morale. We here have made some attempts along this line in the past but I will immediately organize our efforts along comprehensive lines to support Surles in this necessary work." (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1491.) For further developments regarding Infantry morale, see Marshall to MacArthur, October 27, 1943, pp. 169-70.

TO LIEUTENANT COLONEL MATTHEW F. STEELE<sup>1</sup>

October 6, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Colonel Steele, I got a great deal of pleasure out of your unexpected letter of September thirtieth not only from the pleasant things you had to say regarding me personally, but more particularly regarding the campaign in Italy.<sup>2</sup>

Most confidentially, that is, for your private ear, there were considerations in the Italian campaign which were not common to those on the mainland of Europe or to Lee's operations in the Civil War. The airplane has introduced a factor relating to amphibious warfare that greatly complicates all of our operations until we are firmly established in Europe with large seaports in full operation entirely protected from aerial hazards. This means that General Clark's operations were limited by the speed with which troops, and more particularly equipment and supplies, could be landed over the beaches.<sup>3</sup> Modern warfare requires a tremendous outfit of equipment and supplies and the manhandling of 155 guns and howitzers, medium tanks, heavy ammunition and such like over the beaches, is a prodigious job. It was not a question of diverting troops from him to some other place, but rather of an heroic effort to expedite the build-up of his Army.<sup>4</sup>

We knew a week before the landing that his troops would be outnumbered at the start and heavily outnumbered up to the sixth day; that he would have no armored division and would be engaged with three to four Panzer divisions, plus one and a half motorized divisions. We had to depend on our air superiority and naval guns to make up the difference. This, however, was exceedingly difficult to do because the enemy could mount his guns, especially his 88's in the foothills and higher hills dominating all the beaches and could cover those gun positions comparatively easily because of the defiled approaches and his possession of a great superiority in tanks. However, we put it across as was anticipated. Fortunately for us the Germans committed themselves to an extravagant claim



by way of propaganda directed at the vassal states which quickly boom-eranged in a most destructive manner, with lasting effect.

The landings at Taranto, Brindisi, and otherwise were rushed almost entirely by improvised means, that is, the decks of cruisers and destroyers, to prevent the Germans from destroying the harbors by seizing them before the Italians had submitted to German pressure. It was then highly important that we remove the German air from the expansive airfields between Taranto and Foggia to prevent their operating against Clark's Army and over the Adriatic to hinder our somewhat indirect efforts to build up the resistance in Yugoslavia and the Ionian Islands. Air facilities and air power were the predominating factors, and as I have indicated above these troops could not have joined Clark's Army because it would have been impossible to have supported them over the beaches if we could have gotten them ashore with their equipment. Incidentally, it was not until the sixth or seventh day that important echelons of the single armored division could be gotten ashore, and throughout this period our fighter protection had to be based so far south, largely in Sicily, that the planes could only be in the air fifteen minutes over the battle area.

I am giving you a rather expansive statement regarding the campaign but you must consider me as an applicant for a Ph.D. from my old Professor of Strategy. I very much fear that the cold winter weather of North Dakota may have a depressing effect on my chances.

With affectionate regards, Faithfully yours,

P.S. I am taking the liberty of sending you a photograph.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Steele (U.S.M.A., 1883) had been one of the instructors Marshall had admired at the Fort Leavenworth schools, 1906–8. He was the author of *American Campaigns*, 2 vols. (Washington: B. S. Adams, 1909), which as late as 1959 *The West Point Atlas of American Wars* (vol. 1) said was "probably the best study yet written of major American military operations, from the Colonial Wars through the Spanish-American War." Steele had retired in 1912 and was living in Fargo, North Dakota.

2. Steele expressed apprehension about Marshall's leaving Washington to become supreme commander in Europe (see the editorial note on pp. 127–28): "I shall hate to know that you are out of telephone reach of the White House." He also suggested that it was a mistake for Eisenhower to have invaded the Italian mainland with two columns too far apart to support each other. "Neither Napoleon nor Lee would have done that, and I don't believe Eisenhower will do it again." (Steele to Marshall, September 30, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark was commanding general of the Fifth Army, which had carried out the Salerno landings.

4. Marshall later sent Steele an additional note: "Some data came to me this morning that bears on my confidential letter to you the other day, which I pass on, most confidentially, as an item of possible interest to you. During the first eighteen days of the operations of the Fifth Army in Italy the following were handled over the *beaches*: 107,000 tons of supplies; 30,000 vehicles; 175,000 troops." (Marshall to Steele, October 9, 1943, *ibid.*)



TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL DELOS C. EMMONS<sup>1</sup>  
*Confidential*

October 7, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Emmons: This letter is for your eyes only and the discussion is to be entirely personal between the two of us.

Yesterday Senator Hayden of Arizona telephoned me.<sup>2</sup> He queried regarding the interned Japanese in Arizona. His proposition was this:

The concentration of Japanese on the West Coast has always presented a very serious problem because of their low standard of living and the inevitable pressure on white competitors. He is hopeful that something can be done to break this concentration and more or less scatter these people.

Senator Hayden wished to know if the reception of Japanese into the Army had progressed to the point where we felt it permissible to proceed with the induction of those who have been screened for possible disloyal traits. He referred to the fact that bad actors had been largely eliminated from Arizona concentration camps and transferred to northern California.<sup>3</sup> He also mentioned the fact that we had Japanese troops fighting in Italy and a large number training in Alabama.<sup>4</sup>

General McNarney tells me that the present force has been built up entirely on a volunteer basis and that all who would volunteer have been taken. We have sent radios to General Eisenhower to get an exact statement of the conduct of the Japanese battalion that is now in contact with the enemy.<sup>5</sup> If these troops have proved to be battleworthy, that is, will advance, attack, submit to losses, and still go ahead, the question then is, can we somewhat change our approach to the Japanese U.S. citizenship male problem in this country. Might we induct, should we try another recruiting campaign for volunteers, etc., etc. Please give me your frank appraisal of the situation, assuming that General Eisenhower reports that the Japanese battalion in Italy has demonstrated its willingness to fight under our flag.<sup>6</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. In September, Emmons had succeeded John L. De Witt as commander of the Western Defense Command, with headquarters in San Francisco.

2. Carl Hayden, Arizona's senior senator, was the third-ranking Democrat on the Appropriations Committee.

3. The internment camp at Tule Lake, California (near the Oregon border), had become a segregation center for those judged to be disloyal to the United States, although such persons were a minority of the camp's population. (Roger Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA: Japanese Americans and World War II* [New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971], p. 114.)

4. The One Hundredth Battalion (Nisei) had been organized in June 1942 from the thirteen hundred Japanese-American members of the Hawaiian National Guard who had



been sent to Oakland, California. The battalion arrived in North Africa in early September 1943. The 442d Combat Team (which was composed of the 442d Infantry Regiment, the 522d Field Artillery Battalion, and the 232d Engineer Combat Company) was activated on February 1, 1943, at Camp Shelby, Mississippi; the team was composed mainly of Japanese Americans who had volunteered for service. At the time Marshall wrote his letter, many of the Infantry troops were on temporary duty in Alabama, guarding German prisoners.

5. The One Hundredth Battalion had been attached to the Thirty-Fourth Infantry Division and was fighting on the upper Volturno River north of Naples. Mark Clark replied for Eisenhower that the unit was very efficient and that the other troops had accepted them with confidence and friendliness because of the battalion's good behavior and friendliness. (Clark to Marshall, October 10, 1943, In Log, p. 90, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Message Log].)

6. "My personal reaction as a citizen," Emmons replied, "is that a proportion of our citizens of Japanese ancestry are loyal and are anxious to prove their right to citizenship by service in the armed forces." He recommended that the army initiate a recruitment campaign among Japanese Americans, that the draft not be used to procure personnel, but that "if the response is not satisfactory or if other circumstances make it wise, we induct a substantial number of citizens of Japanese descent in the Army for duty in organizations such as labor battalions." (Emmons to Marshall, October 11, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 014.311].) In November the War Department issued instructions to accept Japanese-American citizens who volunteered for service and were cleared by a loyalty check.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

*Secret*

October 8, 1943

[Washington, D.C.]

The following is a suggested draft for the preparation of a reply by the President to the Prime Minister's message of October 8th in reply to the President's Number 379:<sup>1</sup>

I have received your Number 441 and given most careful personal consideration to the points you make. Your views have received most earnest consideration both by me and by my advisors. What you now in effect propose is another meeting of the Chiefs of Staff, hastily prepared and necessarily involving only partial representation, and in which I cannot personally participate. Frankly I am not in sympathy with this procedure which seems to me can only result in the heaviest form of personal pressure on General Eisenhower to weaken his position against his already expressed judgment.

We have almost all the facts now at our disposal on which to judge the commitments probably involved in the Rhodes operation. As I see it, it is not merely the capture of Rhodes but it must mean of necessity and it must be apparent to the Germans, that we intend to go further. Otherwise Rhodes will be under the guns of both Cos and Crete.



I was in accord with obtaining whatever hold we could in the Dodecanese without heavy commitments, but the present picture involves not only a well-organized, determined operation, but a necessary follow-through. This in turn involves the necessity of drawing for the means, largely shipping and air, not ground troops, from some other source which inevitably must be Italy, Overlord, or possibly Mountbatten's amphibious operation. The problem then is are we now to enter into a Balkan campaign starting with the southern tip or is there more to be gained and with security, by pushing rapidly to the agreed upon position north of Rome. Is not a greater Allied threat against the Balkans implied in this than by a necessarily precarious amphibious operation against Rhodes with a lack evident to the enemy of the necessary means for the follow-through.

It seems to me these matters can be judged by us in better perspective from long range rather than by the exertion of a heavy pressure on a commander in the middle of a campaign to weaken his resources.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. In anticipation of Italy's surrender, Churchill had directed the British Middle East Command during the summer of 1943 to plan and prepare for the capture of Rhodes and other strategically important Aegean islands. On September 9, the day following the public announcement of the surrender, a small British force landed on Rhodes, but the strength of the German garrison quickly forced them to withdraw; several other Aegean islands were occupied, however. The British needed strong air support to return successfully to Rhodes, but Allied air forces were heavily engaged in Italy and under Eisenhower's command. On October 3, German forces retook the island of Cos, the only island besides Rhodes which had an airfield sufficient for fighter aircraft. (Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, pp. 204-10.)

On October 7 Churchill asked Roosevelt for a temporary diversion of some forces and materiel to the Aegean. He noted that it was not the time for the Allies to be "shortsighted" or to "easily throw away an immense but fleeting opportunity" to create a favorable situation in the Balkans—which he believed was militarily and politically part of a single theater which included Italy—that would deal the Germans a serious strategic blow. Roosevelt replied the same day (message number 379) that he was opposed to any diversions that might jeopardize the Italian campaign or the buildup to the cross-Channel invasion. (*Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, 2: 498-99, 501.)

Churchill thought that the president's assertion that borrowing a few landing craft for a few weeks might jeopardize OVERLORD rejected "all sense of proportion." (Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, p. 212.) Therefore, he again appealed for aid (message number 441), asserting that "ignoring of the whole position in the Eastern Mediterranean would constitute a cardinal error in strategy." There were already more British and American divisions in Italy than had been thought possible at the Quebec Conference. Moreover, he insisted, the Germans were withdrawing northward and Rome would be occupied in a few weeks; "it is certain that we shall not come in contact with the main German forces at the top of the leg of Italy till December, or even later, and we certainly have control of the rate of advance." There was plenty of time to withdraw a division from Italy for the Rhodes operation and then restore it to the Italian campaign before Allied forces reached the main German fortified line. He proposed that he and the British Chiefs of Staff meet at Eisenhower's



headquarters with Marshall on October 10. (*Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, 2: 502–3.)

2. Nearly all of Marshall's draft was used, albeit rearranged, in the final, longer version sent on October 8. (*Ibid.*, pp. 505–6.) Churchill later wrote that "Mr. Roosevelt's reply quenched my last hopes." On October 9, the Allies learned that Hitler had decided to reinforce his army in Italy and to make a stand south of Rome. Consequently, any significant force reductions in Italy were out of the question. In his memoirs of the war, Churchill observed that he "remained—and remain—in my heart unconvinced that the capture of Rhodes could not have been fitted in. Nevertheless, with one of the sharpest pangs I suffered in the war I submitted." (Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, pp. 215, 217, 218.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR  
*Secret*

October 8, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

Subject: Japanese prison camps.

I suggest that you read pages 9 to 12 of Magic for October 7th, Number 560.<sup>1</sup> Also the attached memorandum for the President from the U.S. Chiefs of Staff; and that you review the U.S. current procedure in this matter.<sup>2</sup>

The problem is exceedingly complex and of course requires the most careful handling both in relation to our actions at the present time and as to future developments. The storm of bitterness which will arise, once the public is aware of the brutalities and savagery displayed by the Japanese towards our prisoners, should be directed along carefully thought out lines rather than left to dissipate itself in a lurid press and unpredictable reactions.<sup>3</sup>

I don't want to burden you unnecessarily in this matter, but you have had it somewhat in hand and it pertains to the highest governmental policy.<sup>4</sup>

G. C. Marshall

NA/RG 107 (SW Safe, Japan [after December 7, 1941])

1. The Magic Diplomatic Summaries that were prepared for high officials in Washington were still heavily censored at the time this volume was prepared. Pages 9–12 discussed reports from Bangkok "concerning living conditions of British, Australian and Dutch prisoners of war in Thailand" and reported on a British protest, via the Swiss, concerning the treatment of prisoners. The Japanese rejected the protest, denied the truth of the reports, stated that any British retaliation against Japanese prisoners would be cause for Japanese retaliation against British prisoners, and expressed their dissatisfaction with British treatment of Japanese prisoners of war. (NA/RG 457 [Magic Diplomatic Summaries, SRS 1110].)

2. Stories concerning Japanese mistreatment of U.S. prisoners of war had threatened to leak to the press during the summer of 1943. Marshall and others feared that a public outcry in the United States might complicate the *Gripsholm's* current mission and make future missions impossible. (Concerning the *Gripsholm's* mission, see Marshall Memorandum for the President, July 14, 1943, pp. 64–65.) President Roosevelt had asked that the



Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend to him when he should inform the nation of the mistreatment. (Roosevelt Memorandum for the Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, September 9, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 383.6].) Marshall's staff had prepared a memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff by September 17 (J.C.S. 504) which included, as an attachment, a proposed memorandum for the president. This latter memorandum noted that officers who had escaped from Japanese prison camps "stated that conditions in these camps could scarcely be much worse and that unless such conditions are improved within a short time very few of the American prisoners will survive." The memorandum recommended that release of this information should be delayed three to six months in order to allow the supplies carried by the *Gripsholm* to reach the camps. The J.C.S. approved this memorandum at the September 21 meeting. (J.C.S. 504 and attachments are in NA/RG 107 [SW Safe, Japan (after December 7, 1941)]; Minutes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, September 21, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS 334, JCS Minutes].)

3. Stimson had a conference on the morning of October 8 with G-2 head George Strong, who was to study the prisoner treatment problem and report back. (October 8, 1943, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 44: 179].)

4. For further information on the issue of Japanese treatment of U.S. prisoners of war, see Marshall Memorandum for the President, January 27, 1944, pp. 251-53.

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL

JOHN T. LEWIS<sup>1</sup>

*Confidential*

October 11, 1943

Washington, D.C.

Yesterday in coming in from Leesburg I picked up a soldier, an anti-aircraft artilleryman, 25 years of age, on duty near Alexandria, who had been in the service for 33 months and in the District of Washington for 22 months. As I was in civilian clothes he did not know to whom he was talking. He appeared to be a reasonably conservative, nice country boy. Incidentally, he confessed to me that he had been drinking too much; that his first drink had been taken on the urging of some woman and that he had been in the service for 18 months before he took his first drink so he could not blame it on the Army.

The point in this to me is the retention in the District of Washington of young men for such long periods. I had understood that the AA set-up here was more or less a training establishment but the information I obtained in this boy's case would indicate that we are holding here for practically the duration of the war young men who ought to be overseas. I asked him about how many he thought had had as long service in the District as he had had and he guessed about 50%.

Please give me a memorandum on this because I am not at all satisfied with this heavy set-up in the District particularly if young men are being held here for such long periods.<sup>2</sup>

G. C. M.

NA/RG 165 (OCS, 220.31)

1. Lewis had commanded the Military District of Washington, D.C., since May 1942.



2. Lewis replied that only 6 men in the district's Antiaircraft Command had been there twenty-two months and that transfers to units outside the area averaged 160 men per month. He recommended that the district's battalions be sent overseas as needed, which would "assure rotation of all antiaircraft personnel." (Lewis Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, October 13, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 220.31].)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL McNARNEY  
*Confidential*

October 11, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

Apropos of the attached memorandum to General Lewis regarding the holding of young men for long periods in the District of Washington,<sup>1</sup> why might it not be a good thing to bring in here a much larger proportion of negro troops, chauffeurs, depot men, etc. Washington can absorb the negro soldier population much better than most any other city except possibly Chicago or New York, and with their presence here we would not feel that we were holding back personnel that we would wish to get overseas as quickly as possible.<sup>2</sup>

G. C. M.

NA/RG 165 (OCS, 220.31)

1. See the previous document.

2. With McNarney's and G-3's concurrence, Lewis recommended against implementing Marshall's suggestion because the antiaircraft units had to work "closely and intimately" with the many women volunteers—among them "wives of Army officers, Congressmen and important civilians"—at antiaircraft headquarters; also the units "live in and adjacent to civilian communities where cordial relations have been established" and "only a few units are located in colored communities." Further, most male chauffeurs had been replaced by W.A.C. personnel; "to use colored personnel to replace the few men required for the heavy trucks only, might bring out the question of discrimination and would present a problem of housing and messing a mixed unit." The district did not employ enlisted personnel for labor or depot work. (Lewis Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, October 13, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 220.31].) Marshall accepted Lewis's recommendation.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL McNARNEY<sup>1</sup>  
*Confidential*

October 11, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

Apropos of the recent Troop Basis I am not sufficiently clear in my mind as to the replacement requirements for the first six months of 1944.<sup>2</sup> When do we begin to cannibalize on the tail of the Army and at what rate? What are the prospective economies in troops in the Eastern and Western Defense Commands in the first six months of 1944? Have we considered furloughing to civil life, with the provision that the furlough will be canceled if the individual is not placed in a war industry, a proportion of the men evacuated from the war theaters, particularly the South and



Southwest Pacific, after lengthy service or heavy malarial disabilities out there, etc.?

General Somervell in his report of a few days ago suggested that if we could provide 3,000 replacements immediately to a division coming out of the line in the South Pacific, that unit would be ready for return to the line probably two or three months earlier than otherwise. This suggested to my mind the thought that a certain proportion of the men who have created casualties for which these replacements are intended, have probably been in that theater a long time as well as suffering physical disabilities. It is these men that I thought might be furloughed into war industries after a month's vacation or so over here.

It also occurred to me that possibly men who have been in the theater for a certain length of time could be given the option of returning to the States or, where their service has justified it, promotion for remaining in the theater.

Please talk these matters over and be ready to discuss them quite informally with me in about a week. Don't go into the preparation of a lengthy study.<sup>3</sup>

G. C. M.

NA/RG 165 (OCS, 320.2)

1. This memorandum was also addressed to the assistant chiefs of staff for personnel (Miller G. White) and organization and training (Ray E. Porter).

2. Marshall had received from G-3 a lengthy memorandum titled "Troop Basis, 1943," revising the projected operational requirements for manpower up to June 30, 1944. The memorandum noted that, in order to provide for additional service units and overhead, the personnel allotted to divisions and combat and service support had been cut by about 164,000 out of the total authorized U.S. Army strength of 7,700,000. (Porter Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, October 2, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 320.2 (October 12, 1943)].)

3. The army's "Troop Basis" document was formally revised and published semiannually and changes were quickly reflected in procurement activities. At this time General Staff departments were working on a revision of the 1943 Troop Basis and writing the 1944 document. (Handy Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, October 21, 1943, *ibid.*)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY

*Secret*

October 11, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

I have made a hasty examination of the JCS paper on Strategic Deployment of U.S. Forces.<sup>1</sup> It seems to me that possibly several considerations may have been overlooked. As far as I have been able to estimate on a hurried survey of the figures they seem reasonable up to the 31st of March, 1944. However, after that date, in consideration of what we presume has been happening, I am not quite so sure of our ground.



For example, assuming that on June 30, 1944, we are carrying out our various intentions as to OVERLORD and the complementary reaction from the Mediterranean; then it does not seem to me that we are justified in holding 67,000 troops in the Eastern Defense Command, 16,000 in Alaska [*Iceland*], and 80,000 in the Caribbean. My guess would be that at that time not to exceed 8,000 would be sufficient for Iceland and possibly less. Also that the Eastern Defense Command could be heavily cut and that further cuts could be made in the Caribbean. There may be other places where similar cuts would be appropriate to the changing situation.

When it comes to September 30, 1944, then I am convinced that our figures are too large at the places I have mentioned. I notice in the accepted assumptions in the demobilization planning that the victory over Germany is pointed to October 1, 1944. Well, certainly if we have hopes of a victory over Germany at that time it would hardly seem necessary in the quarter ending September 30 to be holding 67,000 troops along the Eastern seaboard, more than 16,000 in Iceland, etc.

I have not gone into the training and other units but I am beginning to be a little dubious about some of our figures as relate to their consistency with expectations of our strategic plans.<sup>2</sup>

G. C. M.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 9, Book 12)

1. Joint Staff Planners paper J.C.S. 521, "Strategic Deployment of U.S. Forces to 31 December 1944," was on the agenda for the October 12 Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting.

2. The minutes of the J.C.S. meeting the next day record Marshall as observing that the personnel totals contained in J.C.S. 521 "were reasonably satisfactory for planning, except for the total figure of 8,248,000, to be reached by 31 December 1944, which he thought was unduly conservative at this time. He said that he felt we should be frank and exact as to our requirements so as not to become involved in debates in defense of our estimates. He felt that possibly it might be better to understate our requirements, and if conditions arose whereby more men were needed, to ask for them rather than to provide for a cushion in overstated requirements." Marshall asserted that the planners were expecting to deploy too much manpower to defensive areas. The paper was referred to the Joint Staff Planners for reconsideration. (Supplementary Minutes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, October 12, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS 334, JCS Minutes].)

TO FREDERICK D. PATTERSON

October 12, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Dr. Patterson, I have received your note of October eighth which indicates the problem facing your School this year.<sup>1</sup> I am inclosing a contribution, and along with it go my best wishes for your success in raising the needed funds to carry on the good work of Tuskegee Institute.<sup>2</sup> Faithfully yours,



GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Patterson, the president of Alabama's Tuskegee Institute, had written: "Because of the many demands which were made upon our contributors during the past year, many of them have been forced to reduce their contributions to Tuskegee Institute more than half—some cannot contribute at all. We are trying to raise money this Fall to offset this loss. If we can get enough small contributions from old and new friends, they will take the place of large ones. Twenty-five cents or fifty cents or a dollar will help a student here." (Patterson to Marshall, October 8, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Tuskegee was the site of the Army Air Force's training school for African-American fighter pilots. On Marshall's previous relations with Tuskegee Institute and Patterson, see *Papers of GCM*, 2: 518–19, 525–26.

2. Marshall sent \$50. Patterson responded: "I am *almost* embarrassed by your generous contribution to Tuskegee Institute for I regard you as already one of our benefactors. I am constantly grateful for what you have done to make it possible for Tuskegee Institute to render a large measure of service to the war effort through its ROTC and its aviation programs which now include pre-flight training. This further contribution to our work makes me more grateful than I can tell you. We shall make every effort to justify your confidence in us." (Patterson to Marshall, October 18, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. 9994. *Secret*

October 13, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall for Eisenhower for his eyes only. I have been greatly concerned over the frequency of reports as to the unsatisfactory type of replacements being sent to your theater. I get these from Troop Commanders over there, by my personal contacts from observers from here who have traveled through your theater and have gotten the same reactions, and also have seen groups of replacements they thought were most unimpressive. We have combed the situation here with detailed inspections under General McNarney's direct supervision and I have had General McNair and his staff explain to me time after time just what they were doing to remedy the situation. However I am still not satisfied that all is as it should be.

Today I received a new slant as to one of the reasons for the unsatisfactory situation in the North African Theater. It is this: that due to the fact that the replacements are 1st worked over to organize provisional units or to provide selected men for the various base sections or rear installations, the combat divisions get what is left. Now if this is the case I think it should be terminated immediately and I should like you to have your inspector go into the matter including some of the back history.

There is always a distrust at the front of the services at the rear and if base sections or similar organizations are skimming the cream I think it should be terminated instantly.



I am discussing this at considerable length because we have taken exhaustive measures here to improve the situation, we have added 4 weeks to the training period, General Peterson has carried out exacting inspections of details going overseas, turning back those who did not appear to be well prepared in training or equipment, etc. Yet we continue to receive unfavorable reports. We must get at the root of the trouble as quickly as possible.<sup>1</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-5617])

1. Eisenhower replied that informal reports reaching him from field commanders “have not painted the situation as darkly as you do. I am initiating investigations on the most exhaustive scale possible. . . . If base sections have been skimming the cream off my replacements you may be sure that this practice will terminate forthwith.” On November 9 Eisenhower’s headquarters reported that a thorough investigation had cleared the rear echelons of suspicion of skimming. (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1138–39.)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MCNAIR  
*Confidential*

October 13, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

Apropos of several discussions we have had regarding the training of replacements and antiaircraft units, I wish you would concentrate your efforts for the next two months on these phases of the Army Ground Forces:

I am having General Eisenhower make a detailed inspection in North Africa to disclose to what extent may be the working over of replacements to create provisional organizations, and to select men for rear installations has been responsible for the reaction of division commanders.<sup>1</sup>

I continue to get unfavorable reports, and now rather positive, regarding the development of anti-aircraft units. Overseas readiness inspections give the impression of avoidable deficiencies, particularly as relate to negro units. But the reactions come to me from a number of directions which makes me question the efficiency of your present set-up. I should like you to take vigorous measures to reassure me in the matter.<sup>2</sup>

G. C. M.

NA/RG 337 (AG Section, McNair Personal File)

1. See the previous document.

2. McNair replied that he was arranging to receive better data regarding training of replacements and antiaircraft units, particularly better information concerning overseas theater commanders’ requirements. All the antiaircraft training and replacement centers had received new commanders in the previous six months “in order to secure stronger command.” He noted that Personnel Division officers had recently praised the quality of replacements being shipped from the Hampton Roads and New York Ports of Embarkation. (McNair Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, October 22, 1943, NA/RG 337 [AG Section, McNair Personal File].)



MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TOMPKINS  
*Secret*

October 13, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Single Department of War.

In general the attached paper is acceptable to me, but I wish paragraphs 5 *a* and *b* to be further amplified.<sup>1</sup>

Paragraph 5 *a* I think should read:

“The Department should be headed by a Secretary of War with four Under Secretaries, and organized into three major groups, the Ground Forces, the Air Forces and the Naval Forces, together with a general Supply Department. Provision should be made for centralized control of procurement, supply and service functions for the three combat forces, while continuing the procurement of special equipment such as naval vessels under the Naval Forces and airplanes under the Air Forces.”

Don't take me too literally on this

G. C. M.

Paragraph 5 *b* should make clear the idea that the Chief of Staff to the President would not be a member of the Department and that the over-all General Staff for matters strategical, operational, and pertaining to general policy as to strength and equipment, would consist in effect of the present U.S. Chief of Staff organization. It is important, I think, not to give the impression, particularly in initiating this move, that a great General Staff is to be created. On the contrary the Chief of Staff to the President and the Chiefs of Staff of the three Arms with the Chief of Staff for Supply should constitute the General Staff and be served by the necessary subsidiary groups.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Tompkins, director of the Special Planning Division, had written to Marshall enclosing a revised study on the unified defense department idea designed “to develop the War Department attitude” on the prospect of a unified military department. “It is believed that nearly all the ranking officers of the Army favor a single department. It is known that at least many ranking Naval officers agree. . . . The proposal is so inevitable and so many thoughtful officials favor it that the War Department might well take the initiative in advancing it.” For planning purposes, Tompkins desired to determine the J.C.S. attitude toward a single department. (Tompkins Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, October 11, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 381].)

The enclosed study delineated the justifications for a single Department of War: “the lack of real unity of command has handicapped the successful conduct of this war”; “this war is, and future wars undoubtedly will be, largely a series of combined operations in each of which ground, air and sea forces must be employed together and coordinated under one directing head”; and postwar economic and political considerations would require that numerous functions be centralized, “thus eliminating duplication and overlapping.” Paragraph 5 stated “that the Department of War should be organized broadly as follows:



“a. The Department should be headed by a Secretary of War and organized into three major groups: the Ground Forces, the Air Forces and the Naval Forces. Provision should be made for centralized control of procurement, supply and service functions for the three combat forces.

“b. There should be a U.S. (Joint) General Staff, including a Budget Section, the details and organization of which could well be prescribed by the present Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chief of the U.S. General Staff should be the Chief of Staff to the President, the Commander-in-Chief. His functions would be comparable to those now exercised by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, for the Army. He should have the same intimate contact with the President, the Commander-in-Chief, on military operations as presently pertains under the provisional arrangement now in effect.” (Ibid.)

2. For further developments on this issue, see Marshall Memorandum for Brigadier General W. F. Tompkins, October 20, 1943, pp. 160–61.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
*Personal and Most Confidential*

October 14, 1943  
[Washington D.C.]

As you are aware strong pressure and much publicity are being devoted to an attack on the War Department towards both reducing the number of officers on duty in Washington and sending those in the younger age group to duty with troops or overseas. The War Department has adopted a policy under the direction of General McNarney of relieving from duty in the District, so far as is possible without injury to our war program, officers under 35 years of age.

One of your Aides, the officer in charge of the Map Room, Lt. Col. Chester Hammond, comes within this policy as he is 33 years of age. Furthermore, he has had very little duty with troops. Under the circumstances, if we can provide a suitable replacement, I would suggest that you release him from his present duty in order that we can send him immediately to take a refresher course preparatory to troop assignment.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Hammond (U.S.M.A., 1932) had been a military aide at the White House since July 1938; he remained in that position until August 1944 when he resigned from the army and joined the executive staff of Pan American World Airways.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL IRA C. EAKER<sup>1</sup>  
[Radio No. R-4442.] *Secret*

October 15, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall for Devers pass to Eaker. Dear Eaker: I am tremendously impressed with the apparent complete destruction of the Schweinfurt ball bearing plant. This will have an effect, I believe, comparable to the Ploesti raid on the general German position. I am greatly distressed over the loss



of so many of your fine fighting men and I can only hope an appreciable number reach the ground unhurt. They sacrificed themselves in an effort of vital importance to the world.<sup>2</sup>

I was intensely interested in your message describing the German rocket technique in their attack on your formations and I feel certain that you and your people will find quickly a means of reducing this hazard.<sup>3</sup> General Arnold will move aggressively at this end of the line to meet your requests. But I want to add further that I like the tone of your message. No great battle is won without heavy fighting and inevitable losses. With your fine personnel, the pick of America, I know we can depend on their gallantry and skill to complete this victory with the destruction of the German fighter force and a demonstration of the awful power of precision bombing.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Eaker had been promoted to lieutenant general effective September 13, 1943.
2. Eaker had reported that the October 14 raid had achieved "excellent bombing results and probable destruction of target. . . . Sixty B-17s and 593 crew members are missing." (Eaker to Marshall, October 15, 1943, In Log, p. 139, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Message Log].)
3. "Yesterday the Hun sprang his trap," Eaker told the War Department (Radio No. D-1383, October 15, 1943). "He fully revealed his final countermeasure to our daylight bombing. It was not unexpected since he has revealed single acts in the play from time to time in the past as he practiced and trained." He described in detail the "perfectly timed and executed" rocket and gun attack by more than three hundred German fighters on the unescorted bomber formation. Eaker also listed the steps he planned to take to counter the new German threat and what the War Department could do to help (i.e., replace the losses, send more fighters, and ship auxiliary fuel tanks for the fighters as soon as possible). "We must show the enemy we can replace our losses; he knows he cannot replace his. We must continue the battle with unrelenting fury. This we shall do. There is no discouragement here. We are convinced that, when the totals are struck, yesterday's losses will be far outweighed by the value of the enemy materiel destroyed." (Ibid., pp. 141-42.) The importance and cost of the October 14 Schweinfurt mission are discussed in Craven and Cate, eds., *Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK*, pp. 699-705.

PROPOSED MESSAGE FOR GENERAL  
STILWELL'S EYES ONLY<sup>1</sup>

*Secret*

October 19, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

It has been decided that in view of the attitude of the Generalissimo it will be necessary to replace you in your present position in the Far East.<sup>2</sup>

I had proposed to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff giving you the option on this two months ago when there was no pressure being exerted, but dropped



the matter due to the strong opposition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, particularly Admiral King. I felt that you had been placed in an almost impossible position and that it was not fair to you to suffer any longer from the extreme difficulties under which you labored on both sides of the fence. Now the issue has been decided for us and I am particularly sorry that it has occurred just as Mountbatten enters the area because I fear the rather natural implication that he is responsible for the action. We must do our best to avert the propaganda effect of such a reaction.

Now as to your successor: the Joint Chiefs of Staff can think of no one who has any chance of putting over positive action by Chinese ground troops except possibly Somervell, who is now in your area. What is your reaction to this? Discuss it with Somervell and notify me immediately.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. This document was stamped “not used.”

2. During his August–September stay in Washington, Chinese Foreign Minister T. V. Soong had made no secret of his belief that Stilwell should be replaced. (For example, see *Foreign Relations, 1943, China*, pp. 135–37.) Soong expressed his opinion of Stilwell to Brehon Somervell and Lord Louis Mountbatten in Delhi in early October. Mountbatten was surprised and concerned, as he had just had an amicable meeting with Stilwell, and asked Albert Wedemeyer, who was also then in Delhi, to notify the War Department of Chiang Kai-shek’s apparent determination to have Stilwell relieved. (Wedemeyer to Marshall, October 21, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 17, Item 9].) Mountbatten discussed the matter with Stilwell several times. (*The Stilwell Papers*, ed. Theodore H. White [New York: William Sloane Associates, 1948], pp. 230–34.)

On October 15, President Roosevelt indicated to Secretary Stimson that Stilwell was to be relieved. On October 18, Stimson called Marshall to his office and explained the president’s attitude. He and Marshall agreed that Stilwell was the best man in the army for the job but that he and the Chinese leadership were incompatible. Stimson noted that Marshall was still troubled by Stilwell’s “very poor show of himself” during his Washington visit in late April and early May (see *Papers of GCM*, 3: 674–75). “Marshall was very troubled over it, being tired and worried himself, and I could see that it was a blow to him. He regrets that he didn’t make the decision [to relieve Stilwell] some months ago when we could have given an appearance of protection to Stilwell and not let it appear like a dismissal.” (October 18, 1943, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 44: 203].)

3. On October 19, Marshall took this draft telegram to Stimson, who recorded that while he was reading the draft a telegram from Stilwell came in indicating that Chiang Kai-shek had been persuaded to reverse his decision to have Stilwell relieved. Stimson and Marshall again conferred. Marshall believed that the draft telegram should still be sent, otherwise Stilwell would not have sufficient time to recover from the change and to make good in another assignment. Stimson disagreed and went to the White House to discuss the issue with Roosevelt. The president was “in a much more amenable frame of mind than I had expected,” and he was not pleased with the prospect of sending Somervell to China. He agreed to delay making a decision. (October 19, 1943, *ibid.*, pp. 207–8.) By the next day, the War Department had received further information that “apparently the Generalissimo has suddenly flopped over to Stilwell and apparently T. V. Soong is now in disgrace.” (*Ibid.*, p. 211.) The draft message printed here was thus not sent. For Stilwell’s view of his changing status, see *Stilwell Papers*, pp. 234–36. See also Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell’s Mission to China*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* (Washington: GPO, 1953), pp. 374–79.



MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL  
W. F. TOMPKINS  
*Secret*

October 20, 1943  
[Washington D.C.]

Subject: A Single Department of War.<sup>1</sup>

Paragraph 5 *b* still does not appeal to me as written. As now drawn it has several unfortunate implications. The Chief of Staff to the President appears as a secondary consideration, and the relationship of the Secretary of War to any form of a General Staff, is not indicated.

As to the latter implication, I think there should be a small working General Staff with each of the three major sub-divisions, Air, Ground and Naval. These would be in the same relationship to the Secretary of War and his Undersecretariat, through the respective Chiefs of Staff for Air, Ground and Navy, as in our present War Department set-up. However, the over-all General Staff should have indicated for it in most general terms, the issues with which it is empowered to deal, and I think you can find the main terms in the Presidential Executive Order on the reorganization of the War Department, defining my relationship to the President.<sup>2</sup> That should be in the relationship of the Chief of Staff to the President and his higher General Staff, composed of the four principal officials. This does not, I believe, cover the general financial problem, which has two aspects—the vital problem of proposing through the Chief of Staff to the President, to the President, the size of the military budget, and thereafter the critical problem of the sub-division of the appropriated funds into three parts, for the Ground, Air, and Naval forces.

I do not mean from the foregoing that all this should appear in the paragraph but I do consider that it is important to avoid the implications now involved, in my opinion, in your present draft.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. For previous consideration of this issue, see Marshall Memorandum for General Tompkins, October 13, 1943, pp. 156–57.

2. Paragraph 6 of Executive Order 9082 of February 28, 1942, having described the duties of the secretary of war, stated: "Such duties by the Secretary of War are to be performed subject always to the exercise by the President directly through the Chief of Staff of his functions as Commander-in-Chief in relation to strategy, tactics, and operations." (*Code of Federal Regulations of the United States of America: Cumulative Supplement, Titles 1–3* [Washington: GPO, 1943], pp. 1103–4.)

3. Paragraph 5 *b* was rewritten as follows: "There should be a Chief of Staff to the President, to serve the President in exercising his functions as constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. He would take precedence over all military and naval officers. On matters relating to strategy, tactics and operations, the preparation and presentation of the Joint Military Budget, and on such other matters as he may consider pertinent to his constitutional function as Commander-in-Chief, the President should communicate his instructions to the Department of War through the Chief of Staff to the President. In all other matters, the President's orders should be transmitted through the



Secretary of War. Each of the Armed Forces, Ground, Air and Naval, would retain a small General Staff. There should be a compact U.S. General Staff (joint) which would be headed by the Chief of Staff to the President. The U.S. General Staff would be composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the three Armed Forces and the Chief of Staff for Supply. In working out the organizational details of the U. S. General Staff, advantage should be taken of the experience of the present U.S. Chiefs of Staff in the present war.”

The version of “A Single Department of War” revised as a result of the Marshall memorandum printed here was submitted on October 22 to Marshall, who approved it. (Tompkins Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, October 22, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 381 National Defense (August 16, 1943)].) An expanded and renumbered version of the proposal was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on November 2. See the editorial note on p. 416 for further developments on this issue.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY  
*Secret*

October 20, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Colonel Truman Smith<sup>1</sup> in talking to me about the Balkans said that really the most important thing now was to make some effort to compose, at least temporarily, the differences between the various guerrilla bands; that it was probable rather than merely possible, that they would neutralize each other. On the other hand if for the moment at least they would strive together, along with the supplies that probably now can be given them by plane and by boat, great things might be achieved to embarrass the Germans on their Mediterranean front.

I commented that apparently we needed another Lawrence of Arabia and he thought that that was exactly the point; some man to go in there in the effort to influence these people for the time being. Offhand I proposed that we might send General Donovan. He has been there before and was supposedly partially responsible at least for the Yugoslavs entering the war against the Germans. You may remember that he left Yugoslavia just as the campaign began. I don't believe he can do us any harm and being a fearless and aggressive character he might do some good.<sup>2</sup>

I spoke of this to Admiral Leahy and he thought it was a fine idea and that we should go ahead and do it. I added that it would certainly have to be coordinated with the British, that we must not send somebody in there without even telling them. He called me up a little while ago to say that the President was in favor of sending Donovan in and that he saw no necessity for informing the British.

I explained again to Admiral Leahy that we could not do it that way and he agreed. It is now up to me to prepare a message either for Dill from the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to be transmitted to London for quick acquiescence, or for the President to the Prime Minister.

Have some of your bloodhounds take a flyer at this this afternoon.<sup>3</sup>



GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall had chosen Smith, an expert on the German military who was working as a special consultant for G-2, to become a staff member in the headquarters Marshall expected to establish in London when he became Supreme Allied Commander. (*Berlin Alert: The Memoirs and Reports of Truman Smith*, ed. Robert Hessen [Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1984], p. 39.)

2. William J. Donovan had visited the Mediterranean in January and February 1941, accompanied by Vivian Dykes, director of plans in the British War Office. Donovan had talked with Yugoslav leaders on January 23 and 24. (*Establishing the Anglo-American Alliance: The Second World War Diaries of Brigadier Vivian Dykes*, ed. Alex Danchev [London: Brassey's (UK), 1990], pp. 40-41.) The British had encouraged the anti-German coup in Yugoslavia that occurred on March 27, 1941, two days after the government there had signed the Tripartite Pact. (F. H. Hinsley et al., *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations*, volume 1, part 1, a volume in the *History of the Second World War* [London: HMSO, 1984], pp. 369-70.) The German army invaded Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941. Developments in Yugoslavia during 1943 are described *ibid.*, vol. 3, pt. 1, pp. 137-58.

3. Handy returned an Operations Division draft message that day that embodied Marshall's ideas and stated: "If we decide to send him [Donovan] in, all agencies of ours now working in the Balkans should be placed under his direction and the resources we put into this effort should be at his disposal." (Handy Memorandum for General Marshall, October 20, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) This message, with minor changes, was sent by the president to the prime minister on October 22. Churchill replied on the twenty-third that the British had in Yugoslavia "about eighty separate missions" working under capable men of long experience. "I have great admiration for Donovan, but I do not see any centre in the Balkans from which he could grip the situation." Roosevelt did not press the issue. (*Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, 2: 549, 553-54.)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JACOB L. DEVERS  
Radio No. R-4674. *Secret*

October 21, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

For Devers' eyes only from Marshall. I am looking for a place overseas for General Reckord, former commander of the 29th Division and now commanding the 3rd Service Command in Baltimore. He retires the end of December.<sup>1</sup>

If you do not know him Reckord is an aggressive character with considerable administrative and executive capacity who has been more or less the directing genius in all National Guard Legislation. It occurred to me that he would make a very efficient Provost Marshal particularly in relation to your negro problem and matters of that sort.<sup>2</sup> Since Key was sent to Iceland I do not know who your Provost Marshal is.<sup>3</sup> What about Reckord?<sup>4</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-9030])

1. War Department policy called for the relief from command duty of all officers reaching the statutory retirement age of sixty-four. Major General Milton A. Reckord was



to be retired effective December 28, 1943, and several important friends of his had contacted the War Department regarding a future assignment for him.

2. Concerning the problems faced by African-American troops stationed in Great Britain, see Lee, *Employment of Negro Troops*, pp. 440-41, 624-30, and David Reynolds, *Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942-1945* (New York: Random House, 1995), 216-37, 302-24.

3. Major General William S. Key, a former commander of the National Guard's Forty-fifth Division, had been head of the Iceland Base Command since June 1943.

4. Reckord became provost marshal general, European Theater of Operations, in December 1943.

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. 536. *Secret*

October 21, 1943  
Washington D.C.

For Eisenhower's eyes only from Marshall. In discussions here yesterday and this morning the thought has been expressed that extremely conservative German rear guard actions were bound to continue so long as the employment of the 7th Army and additional divisions and shipping available remained undetermined. That once it became apparent to the enemy that the 7th Army was not to be employed and the troops were moving towards England, there was the possibility if not probability that a counter thrust would be attempted if it could be managed despite the Allies overwhelming air power.

With this in mind might it not be a good thing to have Patton and members of his staff visit Corsica to consider plans for a landing in North Italy or Southern France based on assembly in Corsica. This of course would have to be adjusted with Giraud but that should not be a complicated matter. In any event it seems evident to us that Patton's movements are of great importance to German reactions and therefore should be carefully considered.

I had thought and spoke to Smith about Patton being given a trip to Cairo and Cyprus but the Corsican visit appeals to me as carrying much more of a threat.<sup>1</sup>

It seems to me highly important that in the movement of troops towards Great Britain the greatest care should be taken at Gibraltar to prevent the Algeciras Spy System from detecting the fact that combat units are being moved towards England. I am proposing for the U. S. Chiefs of Staff a communication to the British Chiefs of Staff on this subject.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-9038])

1. Eisenhower replied that the likely rapid disappearance of flying weather would increase the possibility of a German counterattack. "As it is I am quite sure that we must do everything possible to keep him confused and the point you have suggested concerning Patton's movements appeals to me as having a great deal of merit. This possibility had not previously occurred to me." On October 28, Patton and four officers on his staff went to Corsica. (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1524-25.) Concerning the Allies' anxiety and German intentions



in Italy at this time, see Hinsley et al., *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, vol. 3, pt. 1, pp. 174–76.

2. Marshall presented a paper on security precautions (C.C.S. 377) at the next C.C.S. meeting. (Minutes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Meeting, October 22, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS 334, CCS Minutes].)

TO EMANUEL CELLER

October 22, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mr. Celler, Thanks for your gracious note of October twentieth.<sup>1</sup> It is very reassuring to me. My experience has been that where the opportunity was presented for explaining matters to the Congress invariably I receive strong backing. The difficulty in the past, particularly before we entered the war, was the fact that much of what we knew, for several sound reasons could not be disclosed, all of which proved a great embarrassment in getting forward with our program.

Again my thanks for your note. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. In the Library of Congress auditorium, on the morning of October 20, Marshall had given some four hundred members of the House of Representatives a briefing on the world military situation. He was the keynote speaker in the War Department's three-hour presentation. Celler, a New York Democrat, had written: "I was indeed very much impressed with your statement this morning. . . . I am sure that I and my Colleagues will back you to the hilt." (Celler to Marshall, October 20, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].) The *New York Times* reported that there had been considerable praise for Marshall's forty-minute off-the-record presentation which, one congressman noted, "debunked a lot of optimism." (*New York Times*, October 21, 1943, pp. 1, 4.) On the afternoon of October 21, the Senate was offered the same program. See Secretary Stimson's comments on the presentations, October 20–21, 1943, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 44: 210–11, 213–14].)

TO ELLIOTT B. MACRAE  
FROM FRANK MCCARTHY

October 23, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Jimmie: Thanks for your letter of October 15.<sup>1</sup>

I had a talk with General Marshall this morning, and of course he is familiar with the standing of the Dutton Company. On the other hand, he has made up his mind quite firmly that he can give no thought at this time to writing a book, and, in fact, he has no intention of writing a book after the war. I don't like to be so categorical as this, but I know the General well enough to say that, in view of this statement, any further effort on our part would be fruitless. He keeps no diary of any kind, nor does any member of his staff keep one for him, and I am perfectly sure no amount of persuasion



DOESN'T HOLD WATER



*This Philadelphia Bulletin cartoon of October 22 captured a key element of Marshall's message delivered October 20-21 to members of the Senate and the House of Representatives. See Marshall to Celler, October 22, 1943, p. 164.*

would cause him to do any further thinking about the matter at present, and I do not believe he will ever change his mind about writing a book in later life.

While I realize this letter is somewhat blunt, I am sure you would want me to give you the straight story. This is it.

Do you ever come to Washington, and, if so, won't you look me up?  
Sincerely,



GCMRL/F. McCarthy Papers (U.S. Army 1941-45)

1. Macrae (V.M.I., 1922), secretary and treasurer of E. P. Dutton and Company, a book publisher in New York City, had written to ask McCarthy to inquire about Marshall's plans regarding memoirs and suggesting that his company would like to publish them.

DRAFT OF MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT

[October 25, 1943]

TO PRIME MINISTER<sup>1</sup>

[Washington, D.C.]

*Secret*

In reference to your 471, I am still of the opinion that the conference should be delayed as indicated in my number \_\_\_\_.<sup>2</sup> The changes you mention, the fall of Mussolini, the Italian surrender, the fact that we got the Italian fleet, our advance on Rome, all of these are in our favor. They were among our hopes but now are to our credit balance. However, since you feel so strongly I will agree to an early meeting, but November 20 is the earliest date I think we can make. This arrangement would allow you and me to proceed to Eureka by November 25 if that became necessary, while the Chiefs of Staff continued their discussions.

I do not view the situation in Italy as pessimistically as Alexander outlined in Eisenhower's NAF 486.<sup>3</sup> Our overwhelming air power is to a serious extent ignored, our naval power and threat not sufficiently evaluated. The Germans have their worries, and I am certain these days are filled for them with black prospects. Your seeming doubt as to the soundness and feasibility of OVERLORD worries me exceedingly. I feel that we have passed the point where we should be so much controlled by fear of what the Germans may do. The initiative is ours and we should use it to bend events to our will and not that of the Germans, Von Tomba [*von Thoma*] to the contrary notwithstanding.<sup>4</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall heavily edited this staff-drafted document (see NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 5, Item 12a]) and had it sent to Admiral Leahy for action. (Handy Memorandum for Admiral Leahy, October 25, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. On October 20, Churchill had asked Roosevelt to meet him at Casablanca for a meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff prior to the meeting with Stalin the two leaders were trying to arrange (which was code-named EUREKA). Roosevelt replied on October 22 (No. 394) that he preferred that they meet with Stalin first. (*Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, 2: 543-44, 550-51.)

Churchill reiterated his request for a meeting in message 471 on October 23, stating that he desired that their staffs should meet by November 15 and they themselves by the eighteenth or nineteenth. He noted the changes in the Mediterranean situation since the August conference in Quebec. "Our present plans for 1944 seem open to very grave defects," he cautioned. "The disposition of our forces between the Italian and the Channel theatres has not been settled by strategic needs but by the march of events, by shipping possibilities, and by arbitrary compromises between the British and Americans. The date of OVERLORD itself was fixed by splitting the difference between the American and British



view. It is arguable that neither the forces building up in Italy nor those available for a May OVERLORD are strong enough for the tasks set them." Mediterranean operations would be crippled, he wrote, if the movement of landing craft to Britain agreed to at Quebec was "interpreted rigidly and without review in the swiftly changing situations of war." (Ibid., pp. 555–57.)

3. General Sir Harold Alexander—commanding general of Fifteenth Army Group, the combined Anglo-American headquarters in Italy—had submitted his "Review of Battle Situation in Italy" on October 21, and Eisenhower had transmitted the report to Washington and London as NAF-486 on October 25. Churchill published the report in *Closing the Ring* (pp. 243–47). Alexander noted that the relative strength of German and Allied forces in Italy had "changed greatly" since the September invasion, and "the Allied position is less favourable." He especially did not want to lose the flexibility that Allied landing craft provided their forces. "We cannot afford to adopt a purely defensive role, for this would entail the surrender of the initiative to the Germans." He asserted that the slow-down in the growth of Allied strength in Italy might permit the Germans to consolidate and take the offensive south of Rome. Eisenhower stated that Alexander's report provided "a very accurate picture of the present tactical situation," that further assault landings would be essential, and that it was "certain that more landing craft will be required for a limited time if we are to capture Rome in the near future and avoid a slow, painful and costly series of frontal attacks." (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1529.)

4. In his No. 471 of October 23, Churchill had said: "Personally I feel that if we make serious mistakes in the campaign of 1944, we might give Hitler the chance of a startling come back. Prisoner German General Von Thoma was overheard saying 'Our only hope is that they come where we can use the army upon them'." (*Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, 2: 556–57.) Lieutenant General Ritter von Thoma, commander of the Afrika Korps' Ninetieth Light Division, had been captured by the British at El Alamein on November 4, 1942, and was a prisoner of war in England. (I. S. O. Playfair et al., *The Mediterranean and Middle East*, volume 4, *The Destruction of the Axis Forces in Africa*, a volume in the *History of the Second World War* [London: HMSO, 1966], pp. 84–85.)

Roosevelt did not use Marshall's draft message, sending instead No. 396 (October 25), a brief note suggesting that the president might be amenable to a meeting with Churchill, that Stalin be asked to send Molotov to the meeting, and that the staff meetings begin November 20. (*Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, 2: 561.)

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

Secret

October 25, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

The following is a first trial at a draft of a message regarding the subject of Russian participation in the Combined Chiefs of Staff conferences.<sup>1</sup> You will recall that the other day I was opposed to a formal joining up by the Russians with our Chiefs of Staff organization, first because I felt certain the Russians would feel that we were endeavoring to penetrate their strategical and operational plans, and further, that it would be next to impossible to reach final decisions with such a variegated group. My view is to make a small beginning, and very definitely on the basis that we are not asking for anything from the Russians in the way of information but



are offering them virtually a complete insight into all of our strategical and logistical doings.

The following is the proposed message from the President to the Prime Minister:

"The present Moscow conference appears to be a genuine beginning of British-Russian-U.S. collaboration which should lead to the early defeat of Hitler.<sup>2</sup> In order to further stimulate this cooperation and particularly to increase the confidence of Stalin in the sincerity of our intentions it is suggested that we jointly transmit some such message as the following to him.

Heretofore we have informed you of the results of our combined British-American military staff conferences. You may feel that it would be better to have a Russian military representative sit in at such meetings to listen to the discussions regarding British-American operations and take note of the decisions. He would be free to make such comments and proposals as you might desire. This arrangement would afford you and your staff an intimate and prompt report of these meetings.

If you favorably consider such an arrangement we shall advise you of the date and place of the next conference as soon as they have been determined. It would be understood that the procedure outlined carried no implication of discussion of plans for purely Russian operations except as your representative might be instructed to present."

[P.S.] King should have a shot at this before final consideration.

G. C. M.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin were negotiating the arrangements for the conferences that were ultimately held in Teheran and Cairo in November and December.

2. The conference in Moscow of U.K.-U.S.-U.S.S.R. foreign ministers had begun on October 18.

3. The proposed message, with some modifications by Admiral Leahy and the president, was sent on October 26. See Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943* [Washington: GPO, 1961], p. 42.)

TO COLONEL A. D. SMITH<sup>1</sup>

October 27, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Commendation

In accordance with your radio request, the 1st Provisional Bomb Flight



will, in the near future, be withdrawn from Greenland.

Your action in requesting that your theater strength be reduced is most gratifying. It has seldom been the case in this war that our commanders in the field propose giving up any unit. The release of the 1st Provisional Bomb Flight for reassignment is evidence of your fine understanding of the problems involved in fighting a global war.

In view of your efforts in furthering our war effort and in helping to alleviate the manpower shortage in the United States, I am extending to you my personal thanks and commendation for your action.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Smith was commanding officer of the Greenland Base Command.

TO GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR  
Radio No. 9674. *Secret*

October 27, 1943  
Washington D.C.

Personal to MacArthur from Marshall.<sup>1</sup> I have been informed by the Navy Department that it is their intention to replace Vice Admiral Carpender with Vice Admiral Kinkaid, but orders have not yet been issued. The release to press occurred at Secretary Knox's press conference where Kinkaid was called on to talk on Aleutian operations.<sup>2</sup> Reference your C-7086 October 27.<sup>3</sup> I hope this change will meet your approval. Sutherland told me you preferred a change, but he mentioned Freeman.<sup>4</sup>

Kinkaid has performed outstanding service against the Japs as Naval Commander in the North Pacific. His relations have been particularly efficient and happy with Army commanders, and he had the admiration of both services in that theater. I think you will find him energetic, loyal and filled with desires to get ahead with your operations. I think he is the best Naval bet for your purpose.<sup>5</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-12021])

1. The initial version of this document was written in the Operations Division, but Marshall extensively revised the draft to add more explanation. For example, he added the final sentence in the first paragraph and the last two sentences in the second paragraph.

2. Arthur S. Carpender commanded Allied naval forces in the Southwest Pacific Area. Thomas C. Kinkaid (U.S.N.A., 1908), who had commanded the naval forces in the North Pacific between January and October 1943, replaced Carpender in November.

3. MacArthur had written to complain that while the Australian press was carrying the news of Kinkaid's assignment, he had no official information on the change. "Since the Commander of Allied Naval Forces exercises his command not only by order of the United States Navy but also with the concurrence of the Australian Government whose Naval forces are involved, such unilateral action on the part of the United States would be certain to create serious resentment on the part of the Prime Minister and the government of Australia giving rise to a most embarrassing situation in this command." (MacArthur to Marshall, Radio No. C-7086, October 27, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 384, Case 11].)



4. Major General Richard K. Sutherland was MacArthur's chief of staff. Vice Admiral Charles S. Freeman (U.S.N.A., 1900), former commander of the Northwest Sea Frontier, had retired on December 1, 1942.

5. Admiral King sent Marshall a memorandum containing a message to MacArthur expressing regret for the premature release of information concerning the proposed change of command and asking if Kinkaid was satisfactory to MacArthur, and, if so, requesting that MacArthur inquire of the Australian government regarding Kinkaid's suitability. (King Memorandum for General Marshall, October 28, 1943, *ibid.*)

TO GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR<sup>1</sup>  
Radio. *Secret*

October 27, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

Personal for MacArthur from Marshall. Our new regulation covering the citation of units was sent to you in our Radio of October 15th.<sup>2</sup> Lest this has not come to your personal attention, I want you to know that it is designed to give commanders in the field authority to recognize a unit's exceptional performance in battle and, at the same time, permit the individuals in the unit to be promptly accorded the privilege of wearing the badge signifying their demonstrated combat quality. It appeared here that the citation of units was taking the form of a general citation of every division engaged in battle, much as occurred in [the A.E.F. in] France, with the result that the omission of a citation virtually amounted to condemnation of the unit concerned.

From all reports received here from officers who had been in combat and from War Department and other observers, it appeared that a long delayed and very general appreciation of the services of a division was of less importance than a prompt citation of small units, companies, or battalions. To provide the necessary accelerant for this type of citation authority has been decentralized to commanders in the field.

In considering other means to stimulate the morale of Infantry units, a decision has just been made to provide two qualification badges for the Infantry soldier, the first based on his demonstrated capacity during the training period, and the second on his actual performance in combat. They recognize the individual first as an expert infantryman and second as a combat infantryman. These badges are now being struck off and shortly will be sent by air to your theater together with a circular concerning the required qualifications.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. This message was also sent to the U.S. commanding generals in the Mediterranean (Eisenhower), China-Burma-India (Stilwell), European (Devers), and South Pacific (Harmon) theaters and to Alaska Defense Command head Simon Buckner.

2. War Department Circular No. 269, October 27, 1943, stated: "The present war has demonstrated the importance of highly proficient, tough, hard, and aggressive infantry,



which can be obtained only by developing a high degree of individual all-around proficiency on the part of every infantryman. As a means of attaining the high standards desired and to foster esprit de corps in infantry units, the Expert Infantryman and Combat Infantryman badges are established for infantry personnel." Regarding Marshall's concern for Infantry morale, see Marshall to Eisenhower, October 5, 1943, pp. 143–44.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SURLES

October 28, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Creel's article for Collier's.<sup>1</sup>

Page 2. The "log" is not a pile of radiograms and cables. It is a record of them.

Also on Page 2. Handy's morning visit includes not only General Strong and General Hull, but General Arnold. Further, I should like Handy referred to as Chief of Operations rather than as Assistant Chief of Staff for operations. In effect he is my Chief of Staff for the various theaters and not an Assistant Chief of Staff of the General Staff.<sup>2</sup>

Page 3. The 22,000 men incident is a miscue. The point was this: Prior to and including the period of the retreat to the El Alamein line we were under pressure to help out with both materiel and troops in the Middle East. The shortage in troop lift transports and the long voyage around South Africa combined to make it impossible to both put troops, in any quantity, into the Middle East, and at the same time build up the harbors, depots, etc., on the Persian Gulf and the railroad and truck lines leading north into Russia for which a large crew of technical men was required. Therefore the decision had to be made to accept one or the other hazard.

Also on Page 3. is the expression "At the time Rommel drove Montgomery back". Montgomery arrived after the British were established on the El Alamein line.<sup>3</sup>

Page 4. His example of my encyclopedic knowledge with relation to the establishment of an air route across the Pacific is not correct. Arnold went into the details of this and I merely approved. Everybody knew it had to be Christmas or Canton Island or both—Fiji and New Caledonia.

Also on Page 4. I prefer that the incident of the relief of the officer at Attu be omitted—and the relief was actually directed in the theater; we confirming it here. The same applies to Salerno.<sup>4</sup>

Page 5. Lieutenant General, not "Major General" McNarney. Also, General Arnold is omitted from this group.<sup>5</sup>

Also on Page 5. It is unfair to characterize the War Department in the early period of the emergency in the manner done here. It amounts to a



great reflection on General Pershing, on General MacArthur, and General Craig, not to mention others.<sup>6</sup>

Page 8. The incident in the Philippines which Hagood first referred to, relating to General Bell, took place ten years after my first tour in the Philippines, though I was still a lieutenant at the time.<sup>7</sup>

Page 9. Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, 1st Div., and not "Assistant Chief of Operations".

Last line on Page 9: I was appointed Aide to General Pershing May 1, 1919, in France. General Pershing returned to the States in September of that year.

The foregoing comments are the result of a very hasty scanning of the paper. It seems a little sticky to me, rather an overdose of building me up. In my talk with Creel I tried to make only one point and that was that having gone to France with the first convoy and not come back until the last, September, 1919, having been placed throughout this period where I could observe the development of our AEF Army from a complete state of unpreparedness to its final action—writing the order for the first American raid, for the first American offensive (Cantigny) and the order for the cessation of hostilities by the First Army, and later being personally associated with General Pershing in his meetings with Foch and Petain, and other matters—in all this, I had an unusual opportunity to observe the difficulties, the defects, and the tragic results of not only unpreparedness but complications of Allied cooperation, or lack of cooperation. That from this experience, aside from my formal military education, I have endeavored to avoid the disadvantageous circumstances under which the AEF in France was built up and operated. This applies to the organization of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, unity of command in the theaters, selection of leaders, training, logistical preparations, and the actual operation of the War Department itself in relation to the theaters.<sup>8</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Journalist George Creel, who had been chairman of the Committee on Public Information during World War I, had a forty-five-minute interview with Marshall on the afternoon of October 14. Marshall's comments concern the draft manuscript of Creel's essay that was published as "Marshall—Democratic General," *Collier's* 112 (December 18, 1943): 11–12, 81–82.

2. Creel's published version describes a typical workday for Marshall: "On reaching his desk, the Chief of Staff gives first attention to the 'log,' meaning the high lights of the radiograms and cables that have come in overnight. The progress of the war on all fronts, the demands of our own generals and the appeals of allies, each convinced that his own need is the most pressing. After digesting the log, he clears his desk of immediate personal matters, dictating in a clear, pleasant voice that never stops to fumble for a word. This done, he is ready for Major General Thomas T. Handy, Chief of Operations, General Henry H. Arnold, boss of the Army Air Forces, and Major General George Strong, head of Military Intelligence." (Ibid., p. 12.)

3. In giving an example of Marshall's decision-making ability, Creel's published version stated: "Before and during the British retreat to El Alamein, General Marshall was under



terrific pressure to help out in the Middle East. At the same time, it was urgent that we build depots, lay railroad tracks and make harbor improvements in the Persian Gulf, providing a shorter, swifter, safer way for Russian supplies than the deadly Murmansk route. Without hesitation, General Marshall stripped the home front of equipment, but refused to stop the flow of men and material to the Persian Gulf. The decision was justified by events. Our tanks and guns, bombers and fighters, enabled the British to drive Rommel back, and the Persian Gulf route contributed in no small measure to the sudden halt of the German thrust in Russia.” (Ibid.)

4. As published, this section reads: “Naturally a kindly man, he is as cold as a lizard when it comes to incompetence. Theater commanders are under orders to shift and demote as their judgment suggests, and already there are instances where high officers have been removed in the heat of battle. Here, in General Marshall’s own words, is what he expects of his leaders: ‘Military skill, physical stamina, strength of character and flexibility of mind. Not only for the day but for the duration. The success or failure of a campaign, and the welfare of innumerable lives, are dependent on decisions made by commanders. It is not enough for them to *be* good. They’ve got to *stay* good.’” (Ibid.)

5. Further describing Marshall’s daily routine, Creel noted: “Usually, however, the morning huddle [see note 2] is over in an hour or two, and then it is the turn of the ‘home-front team’ composed of Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney, Lieutenant General Brehon Somervell, Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair and the omnipresent Hap Arnold. In these four men lies the secret of General Marshall’s orderly, unhurried days.” (Ibid.)

6. In describing the state of War Department organization on September 1, 1939, and Marshall’s 1942 reorganization, Creel’s published version stated that when Marshall became chief of staff: “The Army was more thoroughly bureaucratized than any other department of government, and that’s saying a lot. . . . Ancient prejudices made for jealousies and rivalries, every branch being convinced of its superior importance, with hidebound conservatives frowning on mechanization and resisting any enlargement of the air branch.” (Ibid.)

7. Concerning Marshall’s early career, Creel’s published version said: “Serving in the Philippines, he enthused General Franklin Bell to the point of prophesying that Lieutenant Marshall might well become ‘the greatest military genius since Stonewall Jackson.’” (Ibid., p. 11.) One of Marshall’s former superiors, Johnson Hagood, had quoted Philippine Department commander J. Franklin Bell’s praise of Marshall’s handling of the 1914 Batangas maneuvers. (Hagood, “Soldier,” *Saturday Evening Post* 212[July 15, 1939]: 25, 62. On the 1914 maneuvers, see *Papers of GCM*, 1: 76–84.)

8. Perhaps in response to Marshall’s comments in this paragraph, Creel wrote at the end of his description of a typical Marshall day: “Another important part of the Marshall day involves co-ordination. In the first World War, he saw Allied armies brought to the edge of disaster time after time by lack of a unified command. Out of this bitter memory, one of his first insistences was the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assure complete co-ordination of America’s war effort.” (Creel, “Marshall,” p. 81.)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. 1198. *Secret*

October 29, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall Personal for Eisenhower. In a survey this morning of Special Service activities I discovered that your theater was the only one in which the weekly newspaper “Yank” is not an issue. In England it appears



as the Sunday supplement to the daily Stars and Stripes and the same procedure is followed elsewhere throughout the world. What is the trouble with your exclusive business?

This paper is managed by sending the mats by air to the theater. It is exceedingly well done and I wondered if you knew personally that you had an exclusive newspaper business over there.<sup>1</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-13034])

1. Eisenhower replied that supply and shipping shortages during the winter of 1942-43 had caused him to decide to concentrate the theater's efforts on producing *Stars and Stripes*. The current availability of shipping for printing supplies meant that he would now take on the publication of *Yank*. (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1548.)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SURLS  
*Confidential*

November 1, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: General Pershing story for Armistice number of TIME.

Your question as to my advice in the handling of this story is rather difficult to answer. Consulting Harbord and McCoy in New York is good, but I have my doubts about Drum who has been rather hostile to General Pershing for the past four or five years. General Craig would be a good man to include in the list and Colonel Adamson, General Pershing's secretary in France and ADC at the present time. Baruch and Charles G. Dawes in Chicago would be good men to include in the survey. Dawes in particular could give a fine characterization as he was with General Pershing through the delicate negotiations and command problems in France.<sup>1</sup>

As to General Pershing's influence on the Army today I should outline it offhand somewhat as follows:

He established the prestige of an American Army in conflict with major powers in modern warfare. He established a new General Staff system for handling both affairs in France somewhat similar to the War Department at home and for the Army in actual operations. Upon his return home he exercised a great influence on the form of the National Defense Act of June 4, 1920. Before his retirement as Chief of Staff he laid down the organization and principles for the War Department General Staff which have governed our present organization (incidentally, Fox Conner and I drafted the letter he wrote laying down these principles and also governing his statements regarding the National Defense Act). He crystallized the appreciation of higher education in the Army, particularly Leavenworth, upon whose graduates he leaned very heavily in France, to such an extent that a standing order required that every Leavenworth graduate disem-



barking in France would be detached from his unit and sent directly to Chaumont—there were very few of them in those days.

General Pershing was retired from active duty by the operation of law on becoming 64, September 13, 1924. At that time his tour as Chief of Staff was so terminated before the completion of a four-year period. His final statement or report on retirement contains matter that might well be referred to as being newsworthy at the present time.

As to principles and policy laid down by General Pershing, not included in the references above, I should say that they were his emphatic confirmation of the principle of offensive action, of the principle of open warfare or warfare of movement as compared to trench warfare technique into which the Allied armies had sunk in 1918, his insistence on thorough training in rifle firing for the infantry and the highest possible state of discipline.

His name, his record, his appearance, have acted through the years as a model for young Army officers.

I should say that probably his greatest contribution lay in his determined, aggressive, offensive spirit during the difficult if not black days of the Meuse-Argonne battle, October 1–15, 1918, when our partially trained and in some cases not half trained units were being thrown in a daily succession of offensive actions, in most difficult country, against the enemy. There were many, very many, in high positions who counseled a suspension of offensive action, who felt that the losses suffered, the hardships being endured, with the cold winter weather coming on and the confusion in partially trained units, demanded a cessation of active operations until a rest and reorganization could be managed. That he refused to listen to such counsel and insisted on driving ahead, criticized by many, including our Allies, marked him as a great commander, one who rose above the gloom and desperate conditions of the battlefield by sheer determination to win a victory.

Another great contribution by General Pershing which has generally been misunderstood was the strenuous training program he required for the AEF in the winter of 1918–1919. Conditions were most depressing, everyone wished to return home, the French villages were gloomy, streets filled with mud, accommodations for our soldiers in unheated barns and lofts of the worst. General Pershing required training to continue, rain or shine. Had he permitted the command to relax the result probably would have been a chaotic condition so far as discipline was concerned. Only by strenuous measures was the standard of efficiency of the Army maintained. His action in this situation probably resulted in more ill-will and condemnation than any other thing he did in France.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)



1. See the first volume of *Papers of GCM* for the World War I roles of and Pershing's relations with James G. Harbord, Frank R. McCoy, Hugh A. Drum, Malin Craig, George E. Adamson, Bernard M. Baruch, and Charles G. Dawes. The story about Pershing ("Old Soldier," *Time* 42 [November 15, 1943]: 55-56, 58, 60) was accompanied by a drawing of the general on the cover.

TO GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR  
Radio No. 9896. *Secret*

November 1, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

Most confidentially for MacArthur's EYES ONLY from Marshall. It probably will be the desire of the administration in connection with action in President Quezon's case at the time of his retirement November 15, to secure in some form prior to November 15 a statement of Naval and Air Bases which the Philippine Government would cede to the United States. There will possibly be Congressional action, inspired by Senator Tydings, on the general question of Philippine independence, but whatever the method of keeping Quezon in a dominant position it is desired to secure a commitment during the next 10 days regarding the bases mentioned.<sup>1</sup>

Please let me have your recommendations as to locations of Air Bases in the Philippine Archipelago.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-220])

1. Philippine President Manuel Quezon's term of office expired on November 15, 1943, but he had been pressing the Roosevelt administration to continue his term for the duration of the war and to grant the Commonwealth immediate independence. MacArthur had supported Quezon's positions. (D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur*, 3 vols. [Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970-85], 2: 513-15.)

Senator Millard E. Tydings, Democrat from Maryland and chairman of the Territories and Insular Affairs Committee, had already held hearings on Senate Joint Resolution 81, which he had introduced on September 24, that would grant immediate independence to the Philippines. Secretary of War Stimson was opposed to this "disastrous" proposal because "it would be very difficult to arrange for the getting of the necessary bases to protect the Philippines with and to get the necessary economic arrangements which would protect the Filipinos' course of life." (September 27, 1943, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 44: 148-49].) On November 3, Tydings introduced a new resolution—Senate Joint Resolution 93—that called for independence as soon as possible. President Roosevelt signed this resolution, which included an agreement on U.S. bases, on June 30, 1944. On November 5, 1943, Tydings introduced Senate Joint Resolution 95 to continue the present officers of the Philippine government in office; this was signed by the president on November 12, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING  
*Secret*

November 4, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: British proposal for exchange of  
officers on Joint Planning Committees.



Dear King: Attached is Dill's letter to you and to me of the 23rd of October with its proposal to have a British officer on our Joint Planning Committee and that we have one on theirs.<sup>1</sup> I understand from Handy informally that your people do not favor this.

It seems to me that Dill's proposal is sound unless we assume an attitude of suspicion in relation to the matter. We have to work with these people and the closer the better, with fewer misunderstandings I am certain. At the present time we are going through an illuminating experience over here with General Morgan.<sup>2</sup> He is in the Operations section. He is present at our daily operational meetings with Arnold, Handy, and me. We discuss all these matters with complete frankness and my impression is that he is so heavily on our side now as a result of such procedure that it may be embarrassing in his relation to the British Chiefs of Staff in London—though I am not unduly concerned over this phase of the matter.

In other words I believe we should go at this business with extreme frankness and openness which would be the case if on the Joint Planning Committees was a man from the other side. We are fighting battles all the time, notably in regard to the Balkans, and other places, and the more frankness there is in the business on the lower level the better off I believe we are; particularly because it seems to me in a majority of cases the younger elements on the British side favor our conceptions rather than those of the Prime Minister, for example, and therefore our chances of avoiding too many rough spots are bettered by the presence of these men on the staffs.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Dill stated that British planners did not believe that previous efforts to improve combined planning had gone "far enough in providing continuous interchange of thought and of varying points of view on a low level." The British Chiefs of Staff proposed that officers be exchanged to represent their own planning staffs and with the power to communicate directly to their respective chiefs of planning. (Dill to Marshall, October 23, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 381, Case 196].)

2. Lieutenant General Frederick E. Morgan was head of the cross-Channel invasion planning organization. See the editorial note on p. 127.

3. King sent to Marshall his staff's reply opposing the British proposal: existing cooperation arrangements should be sufficient; the navy did "not have officers to send on missions of this sort unless there is a specific planning job in view," and a single officer merely for observation would not be profitable; and "it would mean the injection of a low level group into our Joint War Plans Committees which would permit us no privacy in the consideration of problems which are purely those of the United States." The navy suggested that Marshall tell Dill that the British proposal was not "entirely suitable" and would not "produce the results which we desire." Rather, the British should establish a Joint War Planning Team in Washington to work with selected U.S. teams when combined problems were to be considered; the United States would do likewise in London; and "the present exchange of ideas on the Directors' level be continued and more freely used." (B. H. Bieri Memorandum for Admiral King, November 7, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 381, Case 196].) Marshall forwarded, over his own signature and without emendation, the navy's draft reply to Dill.



(Marshall to Dill, November 9, 1943, *ibid.*) Later, in Cairo, the heads of the U.S. and U.K. military planning groups agreed that a British team should be constituted in Washington. (Dill to Marshall, February 15, 1944, *ibid.*)

RUMORS in the press that Marshall would become supreme commander of all Allied forces in the West—that is, the Mediterranean as well as the cross-Channel invasion—prompted Prime Minister Churchill to warn Harry Hopkins on September 26 that the British considered the Mediterranean outside the OVERLORD commander's responsibilities. (Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, pp. 301–2.) On the twenty-eighth, Marshall and Hopkins met with the president, but Roosevelt continued to be unwilling to commit himself publicly on command arrangements for Europe. The following day (September 29), Operations Division chief Thomas Handy later recorded, Marshall told General Arnold and him

that no agreement had been reached as to announcement of command in the European Theater. There had been much discussion of it in both the British and U.S. press and in Congress, and the entire business was getting into more and more of a mess. He directed General Arnold and me to work out a solution. He definitely and specifically ordered that the solution be based on our own ideas of what we considered sound and that we were not to be influenced in any way whatsoever by the fact that he was involved personally in the matter. (Handy Memorandum for Record, [ca. mid-October 1943], NA/RG 165 [OPD, 384, Case 20].)

A key difficulty in delineating Marshall's role lay in the reluctance of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and many high-ranking War Department officials to lose Marshall's services in Washington. Arnold told Handy:

Leaving all personalities out of the problem, the Chief of Staff of the United States Army has been a tower of strength to the President of the United States. He, more than any other one man, has been able to give the President of the United States advice and counsel in strict accordance with military conditions as they exist, and requirements for the future. The President could always count on this advice, knowing that it would be the best obtainable. . . . It is quite apparent to most of us in the War Department that for the Chief of Staff to be appointed as Commanding General of OVERLORD makes him just another Theatre Commander. He loses the value of his long years of experience in over-all planning for global operations and the Secretary of War, the General Staff and other federal officials lose his counsel and advice. (Draft memorandum



enclosed in Arnold Memorandum for General Handy, September 29, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 384, Case 15].)

On October 1, 17, and 30, Churchill asked Roosevelt for a decision, but the president refused to act until the War Department had proposed a solution acceptable to the J.C.S. (*Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, 2:481–82, 489, 541, 571.) During October the unified command issue was debated, but as Marshall's authorized biographer has observed:

The proposals constituted wishful thinking in the extreme. To a considerable degree they amounted mainly to a blueprint of the conditions that must be met if Marshall were to be spared from Washington. Like Roosevelt and Stimson, the planners were pinning the final selection of the Supreme Commander on British acceptance of the complete command package. (Pogue, *George C. Marshall*, 3:275.)

On November 3, the British Chiefs of Staff representatives in Washington presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a memorandum (C.C.S. 387) recommending that all operational control of units in the Mediterranean area (except for certain administrative and political details in the Middle East) be vested in a single commander. (*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, pp. 150–51.) The following day, Marshall asked Eisenhower for his reaction to the British proposal (see the following document). The Joint War Plans Committee prepared recommendations for a reply (J.C.S. 558) on November 5, but that paper was withdrawn from the J.C.S. agenda as a result of Marshall's memorandum "Command of British and U.S. Forces Operating against Germany" (see below, pp. 180–81). (George A. Lincoln Memorandum for Record, November 10, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 384, Case 16].) ★

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. 1716. *Secret*

November 4, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

For Eisenhower's EYES ONLY from Marshall. British Chiefs of Staff propose unified command for entire Mediterranean Theater which would add to your present responsibilities Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Crete, Aegean Islands and Turkey. The 3 British Commanders in Cairo would remain responsible to the British Chiefs of Staff for the operation of The Middle East Base and for matters pertaining to those parts of present Middle East Command located in Africa, Asia and Levant (except Turkey) and should continue to receive political guidance from Minister of State resident in Middle East. They also transmit



Tedder's recommendation to them that the Mediterranean Air Command should be renamed Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. Our views are requested. Personally to me what is your reaction?<sup>1</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-1428])

1. Eisenhower replied on November 7 that, as regards a unified Mediterranean command, he had "discussed this previously with my three Commanders in Chief and we are all of the opinion that this is a logical centralization of operational responsibility." He also supported the new designation Mediterranean Allied Air Forces and had already named Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz to head all U.S. air forces in the region and thus to be Tedder's deputy. (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1550-51.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF<sup>1</sup>

[November 5, 1943]

*Secret*

[Washington, D.C.]

### Command of British and U. S. Forces Operating Against Germany

With reference to the memorandum by the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, Mediterranean Command Arrangements, CCS 387, 3 November 1943, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff feel that operations in the Italian and western Mediterranean area are so closely allied to operations carried out from the United Kingdom as a base, that over-all control of operations from these two areas must eventually be centered in one commander.

The U. S. Chiefs of Staff now feel, in view of the situation in the eastern Mediterranean, and in particular, the situation which may develop from recent decisions concerning Turkey,<sup>2</sup> that it may be desirable that command of all operations in the Mediterranean be vested in one officer. However, such an arrangement further complicates the question of unified direction of strategic air operations. Operations in the Mediterranean will influence the conduct of air operations from the U. K., particularly daylight bombing from the viewpoint of the reduction of losses, to such an extent that coordination of all efforts, particularly air, in the Mediterranean with those from the United Kingdom is essential.

The war in Europe has reached the stage where the necessity for command direction, in conformity with general directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, is clearly indicated. In matters pertaining to strategic bombing, it appears, in our opinion, immediately imperative. The rapidity with which decisions regarding air operations will have to be made demands command control as opposed to general directives or occasional direct action by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The U. S. Chiefs of Staff therefore propose for the consideration of the British Chiefs of Staff that:



(1) A Supreme Commander will be designated for all United Nations operations against Germany from the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, to operate under direction from the Combined Chiefs of Staff,

(2) An over-all commander for northwestern European operations will be appointed, and

(3) An over-all commander for southern European operations responsible for all operations in the Mediterranean be appointed.

The U. S. Chiefs of Staff further propose that the Supreme Commander be directed to carry out the agreed European strategy, and

(1) Be charged with the determination of the location and timing of operations;

(2) Be charged with the allocation for the forces and materiel made available to him by the Combined Chiefs of Staff; and

(3) His decisions on the above questions will be subject to reversal by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, or by his removal from command upon the proposal of one or the other of the two Joint Chiefs of Staff groups.<sup>3</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, 384, Case 15)

1. This document was initially drafted in the Operations Division, but Marshall made extensive changes. It was designated J.C.S. 567; Admiral King submitted a modification (J.C.S. 567/1) asserting that there was an even greater need for a Supreme Allied Commander for the Pacific theater. Both versions were discussed at the November 9 J.C.S. meeting.

2. At the Moscow conference of foreign ministers on November 2, the British and Soviet representatives had agreed to make immediate demands on Turkey to enter the war on the Allied side before the end of 1943 and to permit the Allies to use Turkish air bases. Roosevelt had indicated his agreement with these demands on November 4. (*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, pp. 148, 151.)

3. On November 9, prior to that week's J.C.S. meeting, Churchill—through Dill—had informed Leahy that he would “certainly never be able to accept responsibility” for the command arrangements Marshall was proposing. (Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, p. 305.) At the J.C.S. meeting that afternoon, Admiral Leahy reiterated his belief that a unified Allied command in south and west Europe was probably impossible to achieve just then. Moreover, he doubted the wisdom of placing upon one officer the responsibility for operations extending from Norway to Egypt and for functions which were being exercised by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. General Marshall, the meeting minutes recorded, believed that the reason the British were pressing for action on their proposal concerning unity of command in the Mediterranean (C.C.S. 387) “was that the Commander in Chief in the Middle East was undoubtedly receiving instructions as to operations that he should undertake in that area, and that when the British found themselves in difficulty, they found it necessary to appeal to General Eisenhower for additional resources to clear up the situation. GENERAL MARSHALL also said that if all of the Mediterranean areas were placed under one command, no doubt the British would soon press for executive control in that area, and pointed out that U.S. troops were rapidly approaching, if they had not already reached, the minority in the Mediterranean areas.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to defer action on J.C.S. 567 and 567/1 and on C.C.S. 387 until the military leaders met in Cairo in late November. (Supplementary Minutes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, November 9, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS 334, JCS Minutes].)



MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ARNOLD  
*Secret*

November 5, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Arnold: I have gone over your attached paper and also had it examined by General Handy.<sup>1</sup> The following are my views:

You propose vigorous organizational and operational steps for pressing the air war against Germany. Unifying the American strategic air forces in North Africa and the United Kingdom is certainly a step in the proper direction. However, at the moment I think it unwise to press the question of the unification of U. S. and British air commands until the more vital problem of unified command in the Mediterranean, as now proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff, and also the overall command in Europe problem, have been settled. If the decisions in these matters are made in accordance with our present views then the problems of unified air command and of overall air command will probably be settled automatically.

With reference to your general recommendations I believe that they are too detailed and technical to be included in a directive by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.<sup>2</sup> Why not pass to your air commander and possibly to COSSAC and CinC, NATO [North African Theater of Operations], these principles in tactics and technique, which would insure their maximum impact on operations in a minimum of time?

With reference to your paragraph 2, our Planners have just completed a paper for presentation to both the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff dealing with the revision of the "Plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive". If approved, this in effect accomplishes the ends recommended by you in paragraphs 2 *a* and *b*, as I understand it.<sup>3</sup> The plans of the Commanders of the Strategic and Tactical Air Forces should provide for a maximum effectiveness and flexibility also, in the employment of the POINTBLANK forces during the assault phases of OVERLORD.

Your proposal in paragraph 3 concerning the Ninth Air Force<sup>4</sup> is in conflict with the provisions of the proposed Air Annex to the Directive for the Supreme Allied Commander which is to be considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff today. The Annex proposes the passage of the Ninth Air Force to the Supreme Allied Commander on December 15th.

The points raised by you in your paragraph 4 are intimately related to the problem of overall command of all Allied Forces operating against the European Axis from the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.<sup>5</sup> The first necessity, in my opinion, is securing the decision as to the question of unified command in the European Theater.



In view of what I have said above I do not think it wise to bring up this particular paper until we have gotten a decision regarding European command.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Arnold had sent Marshall “an outline of proposed changes in employment of the R.A.F. and the A.A.F. in England. If this reads O.K., and you agree, I propose to send it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval.” (Arnold Memorandum for General Marshall, November 3, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 9, Book 13].)

2. In Paragraph 1, Arnold recommended “that the Combined Chiefs of Staff agree that Allied Air commanders in operations against Germany be directed to apply the following principles in tactics and technique: *a.* Flexibility and coordinated employment of all Allied Air Forces will be emphasized in order to: (1) Seek out and destroy the German Air Force in the air and on the ground without delay. (2) Seek out and destroy German airplane factories and repair depots on the ground. *b.* Our Air Forces will be concentrated to attain absolute and complete destruction of selected objectives in the shortest possible time. *c.* Whenever necessary we must modify our aircraft and our armament quickly to keep ahead of the German Air Force in the changing pattern of the air war, by exercising increased alertness to new conditions. *d.* Fighter protection must be provided for our bombers whenever required. Planes must be modified wherever necessary for such operations. *e.* The defensive concept of our fighter commands and air defense units must be changed to the offensive. *f.* We must take advantage of all possible means to develop new and imaginative means and methods of waging air war. *g.* When conditions do not permit daytime precision bombing operations, Army Air Forces heavy bombardment units will be used against area targets to be selected, however, with direct reference to subsidiary effects of such area attacks from [on] the sources of strength of the German Air Force.” (Ibid.)

3. Arnold’s second paragraph stated “that the Combined Chiefs of Staff direct that a Joint Army Air Force–Royal Air Force Committee revise the objectives set forth in POINTBLANK toward the ends that: *a.* An overriding first priority be given to the early defeat of the German Air Force with emphasis upon short term effect of the sources of German air strength. *b.* The destruction of sources of German strength other than air strength be placed in second priority and that objectives in this category be selected on the basis of the short term effect of their destruction.” Point *c* recommended examining steps necessary to maximize the effectiveness and flexibility of air forces during the assault phases of OVERLORD. (Ibid.)

4. Paragraph 3 recommended “the establishment of an American Commander of a Strategic Air Force to include the Eighth Air Force (United Kingdom) and the Fifteenth Air Force (Italy). The Command of United States Army Air Force units (Eighth and Ninth Air Forces) in the United Kingdom remains in status quo until after the Ninth Tactical Air Force has crossed the Channel and is established on the Continent.” (Ibid.)

5. Arnold’s final paragraph (4) asked that “the Combined Chiefs of Staff direct that a study be prepared as to procedures to be followed toward the establishment of a Supreme Allied Air Command.” This command would be responsible for a list of operational and materiel problems. (Ibid.)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio. *Secret*

November 6, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Eisenhower from Marshall. On the anniversary of the initial



landing of U. S. troops on the shores of Africa I send to you and the troops under your command the congratulations of the officers of the War Department upon the great achievements of the past year. From that first slender foothold they have moved from Africa to Sicily and on to Italy, and their air men have covered the entire Mediterranean and penetrated deep into the European continent.

My personal congratulations and thanks go to you and the officers and men of our Army under your command, together with an expression of profound admiration for your accomplishments and with confidence in the victory to come.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Eisenhower's headquarters released this message to the press on November 8. (*New York Times*, November 9, 1943, p. 8.)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY  
*Confidential*

November 8, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

Informally I have been told that our Ambassador in London, Mr. Winant, suggests turning over half of his Embassy to me if I go to London.<sup>1</sup> I don't know just how serious the proposal is, nor its implications.

Please mention this to General Morgan.<sup>2</sup>

G. C. M.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Admiral Leahy had given Marshall a note dated November 2 that read: "Winant suggests that he attend the coming conference. He also suggests letting you have half of his Embassy when you come to London." (GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Handy replied: "My first reaction, with which General Morgan is inclined to agree, is that it would be a mistake to take any action which might be construed as making the Supreme Allied Commander and his Headquarters an offshoot of the American Embassy. However, Morgan feels that there will be a question of suitable space and that the Embassy proposal should be considered." (Handy Memorandum for General Marshall, November 8, 1943, *ibid.*) General Morgan later wrote that it would have been "quite wrong to emphasise thus the American angle. In view of the atmosphere in London it would be highly desirable to stress internationality." Facilities for the supreme commander were prepared in Norfolk House, in St. James's Square, where Morgan's COSSAC offices were already located. (Morgan, *Overture to Overlord*, p. 214.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR  
*Confidential*

November 8, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Attached are clippings of some of the recent newspaper articles regarding my Presidential possibilities.<sup>1</sup>



My proposal is that at your next press conference, Thursday, you refer to this matter in some such manner as follows:

I regret very much the recent references to General Marshall of a political nature. Such discussions cannot be otherwise than harmful to our war effort on which everything must be concentrated. I know they are embarrassing to General Marshall and furthermore, I feel that they make his present task more difficult.

I can speak with authority in stating that there has been no discussion of this nature with General Marshall by anyone. Further, that he will never permit himself to be considered as a possible Presidential candidate. His training and ambitions are not political.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Following a number of Democratic party reverses in the elections on November 3, a group of anti-Roosevelt Democratic senators began seeking ways to counter moves to nominate the president for a fourth term in 1944. They discussed Marshall as a possible alternative to Roosevelt, although the general's party affiliation was not known. On November 6, Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado asserted: "The 'New Deal' is through! . . . This is a time to draft men. In this grave crisis the Democratic party owes it to the people to draft Gen. Marshall for President. He is not a candidate and he will emphatically say so, but no patriotic American from George Washington down can refuse such a call. George Marshall is not only a very great soldier and military leader, he is a fine Christian gentleman and a statesman in the highest concept of that much-abused term. He has depth and he has capacity. He is firm and he is courageous. He has tact and he has the respect and confidence of the Congress and the people regardless of party. He is the man of this tragic hour." (*New York Times*, November 7, 1943, sec. 1, p. 27.)

TO RUFUS C. HOLMAN<sup>1</sup>

November 10, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Senator Holman: Colonel Watt,<sup>2</sup> our liaison officer with the Military Affairs Committee of the Senate, presented your request for the attached statement on the distribution of Special Service materials by the Special Service Department under General Osborn.<sup>3</sup> With regard to your question as to the tangible effect of supplying this material to the soldier, our experience in France in 1917 and 1918 convinced us, particularly General Marshall, of the urgent necessity for a carefully devised system of providing some form of normal and healthful outlet for the soldiers' physical and mental energies.

The War Department has a steadily increasing problem as well as responsibility for maintaining the morale of the men serving under difficult conditions overseas, particularly those who have been long absent from home. Special measures are urgently necessary to avoid an increase in disciplinary problems, a rise in venereal rates, and to counteract apathy



and diseased mental outlooks which are liabilities of such service. All of this relates to the maintenance of morale which is a determining factor in the fighting efficiency of an Army.

The soldier overseas in many of the theaters is utterly dependent on the activity of the War Department in providing for him recreation, and reading and off-duty educational opportunities. This is particularly true in the many isolated stations such as in Greenland and the Aleutians, small islands in the Pacific and Atlantic, Equatorial Africa and in the Himalayan Mountains in Burma and China.

The men we have in the Persian Gulf, working for us at home, are carrying out a tremendous job under probably the most difficult climatic conditions, as to extreme heat, in this global war. The resources of that region provide little or nothing to refresh or stimulate them mentally. It is the obligation of the War Department to see that their special needs are met and it is General Osborn's duty to carry out this work.

The Special Service Department was organized at the specific direction of General Marshall who has given personal direction to this work from month to month. General Osborn was selected by General Marshall to perform this important task which in our opinion is being carried out with high efficiency. Sincerely yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On November 9, William T. Sexton, secretary of the General Staff, sent the following memorandum to the chief of staff: "Senator Holman is sniping at General Osborn on the materials which the Morale Branch is issuing to soldiers. General Persons [head of the Legislative and Liaison Division] thinks that the most effective way to stop this is for you to write a letter to Senator Holman on the subject, draft attached. If the sniping continues, somebody else will use your letter on the floor to refute whatever Holman might say." (GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Marshall edited the document printed here from a draft written in the Legislative and Liaison Division; it was sent over Deputy Chief of Staff Joseph T. McNarney's signature. Concerning Senator Holman's complaints earlier in 1943 regarding what he considered Roosevelt administration "propaganda," see *Papers of GCM*, 3: 539.

2. Colonel David A. Watt was a retired officer recalled to active duty with the Legislative and Liaison Division.

3. The attached statement is not in the Marshall papers.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL  
JOSEPH T. MCNARNEY<sup>1</sup>  
Radio. *Secret*

November 12(?), 1943  
[Chesapeake Bay, Maryland]

To Honey [McNarney] from Rumba [Marshall]. Statements contained in the message sent on 10 November to Eisenhower Number 2228 in Log cause me concern.<sup>2</sup> The fact that the 240 mm howitzer still requires modifications and that standard prime movers for these howitzers will not



be available until early 1944, but especially the statement that at this late date tests are just being expedited to determine what available prime movers may be employed. Why haven't these tests been made before now? The message indicates that howitzers for two 240 mm battalions will be ready for overseas shipment by 15 December. The message implies the battalions are in existence, yet that it will be two months after suitable prime movers are secured before the two battalions can be ready. I can readily understand delays due to priorities but it seems to me that we should not have things like this happening after two years of war. Please have the entire matter investigated from all points of view Ordnance, Ground Forces, War Department G-3 et cetera.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 5, Item 15)

1. Marshall may have sent this message from the USS *Iowa*, which was anchored in the Chesapeake Bay at the mouth of the Potomac River. The *Iowa* and attendant ships (Task Group 27.5) put to sea shortly after midnight on November 13, after which time the ship exercised radio silence.

2. This November 10 message from the Operations Division concerning the availability of 8-inch and 240-mm howitzers, said in part: "240 MM howitzers require modifications and it is estimated that howitzers for two battalions can be modified and ready for shipment by December 15, 1943. Standard prime mover for 240 MM howitzer, heavy tractor M-6, will not be available until early in 1944, probably February. The medium tractor M-4 is not an adequate prime mover for the 240 MM howitzer. However, expedited tests are being conducted to determine if other available prime movers will be satisfactory. You will be informed as to the results of these tests. Two trained battalions of 240 MM howitzers can be ready for shipment two months after suitable prime movers have been secured." (O.P.D. to Eisenhower, November 10, 1943, Out Log, p. 30, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Message Log].)

PRESIDENT Roosevelt had been negotiating since mid-summer to arrange diplomatic meetings with Joseph Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek. By early October, Roosevelt and Churchill had decided to meet at Cairo with Chiang; final arrangements for the meeting with Stalin somewhere in the Middle East continued into mid-November, although Stalin seemed determined to meet only in Teheran.

Serious military discussions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff with either the Chinese or the Russians, while not ruled out, seemed unlikely from the start. Anglo-American military meetings, however, were definitely required to discuss strategy and command in Europe and the Mediterranean. The Mena House Hotel, beside the pyramids near Cairo, was chosen as the location for the talks. (The Cairo phase of the meetings was code-named SEXTANT; the Teheran phase, EUREKA.)

Heavily armed with detailed planning books and memorandums, sixty-six U.S. planning officers—including numerous representatives of the air, service, and logistics forces, from the various joint committees, and from



the operating theaters—and scores of support staff were to attend the conferences. “In the view of Army planners,” a U.S. Army historian has written, “there was only one major military question to be settled by SEXTANT, and that was whether the Prime Minister and the British Chiefs of Staff would abide by the QUADRANT [Quebec Conference] commitment to OVERLORD, which was nearly irrevocable—in short, whether they were at last going ‘to fish or cut bait.’” (Ray S. Cline, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1951], pp. 227–28.) But another army historian has written that far more was at stake than the fate or date of the cross-Channel invasion. “The whole strategy of the global war; the ‘beat Germany first’ concept; the roles of the United States, Great Britain, the USSR, and China in the coalition effort—all were in the balance. A final showdown over basic European strategy was in the offing—one with profound implications for the conduct of the war against Japan as well.” (Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1959], p. 335.)

The British Chiefs of Staff had been warned by COSSAC Frederick Morgan that, as Morgan’s American deputy wrote, given the “temper of the American representation”—their “indignation at certain trends in Allied strategy in the Mediterranean Area”—the British had to “be prepared for a stiff fight, in comparison with which QUADRANT might be ‘child’s play.’” (Major General Ray W. Barker to Major General Thomas T. Handy, November 17, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 5, Item 15]. The British official history of the strategic debate is John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, volume 5, *August 1943–September 1944*, a volume in the *History of the Second World War* [London: HMSO, 1956], pp. 105–21.)

Marshall left his office on the morning of November 11. He, the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, their closest advisers, and a small support staff sailed with the president’s party on the new battleship *Iowa*, which left Chesapeake Bay shortly after midnight on the thirteenth. (A log of the president’s trip is printed in *Foreign Relations, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, pp. 270–90.)

Aboard the *Iowa*, Marshall attended six formal meetings—four of the J.C.S. and two of the J.C.S. with the president—on November 15, 17, 18, and 19. (Minutes for these meetings are in NA/RG 165 [OPD, CCS 334, JCS Minutes].) As usual in their meetings, the service chiefs discussed a broad range of issues and staff papers. The chiefs still lacked an agreed long-range strategy for the defeat of Japan. The Joint Staff Planners proposed invading Hokkaido, the northernmost of the home islands, but both Marshall and King objected, and the paper (J.C.S. 564) was returned to the staff for revision. Marshall was opposed to seeking a hard and fast



long-range plan, urging instead a policy of opportunism designed to capitalize on Japanese mistakes and weaknesses (e.g., oil supply) and Allied advantages (e.g., the imminent appearance of the B-29). He expressed doubts about the need to seize the heavily defended fortress of Truk. The chiefs agreed to proceed with the Burma campaign and to expedite air base construction in India and China to accommodate the B-29s. In their discussions with the president, however, the service chiefs concentrated on European affairs.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that unity of command over all strategic bombing forces operating against the Germans was needed immediately. Similarly, unity of command in the Mediterranean was essential, but they preferred—and the president agreed—that that region should be a sub-command of the Supreme Allied Commander (who was to be Marshall, Roosevelt reiterated on November 15); all recognized, however, that the British were certain to oppose this, preferring an independent theater command under a British leader (probably Sir Harold Alexander), given the growing ratio of British to American forces in the area. The service chiefs and the president were also unified in their determination that the United States not become involved in new operations in the Balkans or the eastern Mediterranean, the demands of which might weaken or postpone the cross-Channel thrust tentatively planned for May 1, 1944, that was at the heart of American strategy.

The shipboard meetings considered the possibility that Germany might collapse prior to or shortly after OVERLORD, necessitating the implementation of Plan RANKIN—an emergency Allied return to the Continent first discussed at the Quebec Conference in August. The Joint Staff Planners believed that Germany could be defeated by October 1944, but the Joint Strategic Survey Committee was more optimistic, suggesting the spring of 1944. Roosevelt told the service chiefs on November 19 that “he envisaged a railroad invasion of Germany with little or no fighting.” Marshall noted that destruction of the railroads meant that the land advance would be made by truck. (*Ibid.*, p. 255.)

The president believed that post-surrender Germany would be divided into three zones of occupation and that the United States would need to maintain a million troops in Europe for one or two years. Roosevelt did not like the COSSAC plan that provided for United States control in France and south Germany; he wished to avoid complications with a new Gaullist government and did not want the United States committed to “reconstituting France,” which was “a British ‘baby.’” He preferred a northwest Germany-Scandinavia zone. Marshall pointed out that once the Allies had landed in France, logistics dictated that United States forces be on the right wing, and crossing over to the left or north would be difficult. Nevertheless, the commander in chief believed that this problem could be



overcome. At the end of the final conference on November 19, he marked in pencil on a National Geographic Society map his conception of postwar occupation zones for Germany and gave the map to Marshall. (Ibid., pp. 254, 261. This map is reproduced in Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944*, facing p. 341.)

President Roosevelt discussed more than narrowly military problems with his service chiefs. "Never since the United States had entered the war," Maurice Matloff has observed, "had he given them such a glimpse of his reflections on the political problems that were bound up with the war and its outcome." At the end of the *Iowa* meetings, the president and his military advisers were firmly united on the stand they would take at the forthcoming conferences. (Ibid., pp. 344-45.)

The *Iowa* arrived in the harbor at Oran, Algeria, at daybreak on November 20. At mid-morning, Marshall and the others departed by air for Tunis, where they stayed the night. The next day, Marshall and his party flew to Cairo, Egypt, where he was assigned to Villa 4 (along with Arnold, Somervell, Handy, and four others) in the Mena House compound. ★

TO COLONEL WILLIAM T. SEXTON  
*Secret*

November 22, 1943  
[Cairo, Egypt]

My dear Sexton: I am sending this by courier, who leaves tonight.

For your eyes only, I am giving superficial consideration to the possibility of continuing on around the world instead of returning by the Atlantic. Whether or not I take Handy with me I have not discussed with him, but I rather think I will not do this. Admiral Cooke may also make the same trip. I would not visit India other than to cut straight through to Ceylon, and I would move pretty rapidly through the Pacific Theater. I imagine, if I can make my start immediately after coming south from Teheran to Basra, that it will not add more than a week or ten days to my time of absence.<sup>1</sup>

I am giving the foregoing so that you can translate any radio from me stating that I am returning via the Pacific.

I wish you would send by return courier a nomination for General Patrick Hurley to be a temporary Major General—no publicity to be given this.<sup>2</sup>

Have the returning courier bring me a summer cap and my khaki kepi, also a waist belt—none were included in my baggage.

Please send by the courier reports of correspondence handled for me, with such additional notes of more important papers that you think would be of interest and that I might find a basis of some radio instruction to you.

Tell General McNarney I have been much concerned to read in two naval bulletins of prominent athletes turned down by Army medical officers



or, as in the case of the catcher of one of the ball teams, placed on limited service because he had had a couple of broken fingers. I fear a serious scandal in this matter if this action was taken by Army doctors. It is ridiculous from my point of view to place on limited service a man who can catch with his broken fingers a fast ball. If he can't handle a machine gun, I am no soldier. What I have in mind is to check up on these particular cases, having the Inspector General go into the matter with the doctors concerned, to see if we are guilty of a serious dereliction. If the rejections were carried out by local boards, that is another matter, but if an Army officer on active duty is a participant, then we are responsible, and I don't want any damn nonsense about this thing. I have seen dozens of men with half a dozen serious complaints, in addition to their years, passed by their Army doctors—and now to find great athletes, football and baseball, exempted is not to be tolerated.

Tell Mrs. Marshall I am well and the weather has been fine and the scenery magnificent. I cannot say more for reasons of secrecy.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Concerning this trip, see the editorial note on pp. 199–200.
2. Hurley was then in Cairo, but the president intended to send him to Teheran to prepare for the conference to be held there with Stalin. (*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, pp. 377, 440.) Concerning Hurley's previous activities as Roosevelt's roving ambassador, see *Papers of GCM*, 3: 531–32.

**B**BRITISH and American military leaders arrived in Cairo bearing rather different strategic emphases. The British desired an agreement regarding plans for OVERLORD and the Mediterranean prior to the meetings with Stalin and presumed that Far Eastern issues would be discussed subsequently. Churchill had been reluctant to have Chiang Kai-shek and Chinese issues interfere with the British-American meetings. Furthermore, the British believed that the Americans greatly overestimated China's previous and potential contribution to the overall war effort. American leaders approached the November Cairo meetings with a different order of priorities: decisions on Southeast Asian problems prior to meeting the Soviets (who were not at war with Japan), leaving the crucial discussion of European operations for the Teheran meetings. The president, moreover, was determined to enhance China's and Chiang Kai-shek's ability to play a future role as a world power.

Between November 22 and 26, the two groups of military leaders met separately in the morning and then held Combined Chiefs of Staff meetings in the afternoon. There were numerous points of contention, and on at least two occasions—November 23 and 26—participants recorded that the normally vigorous debates became extremely heated. On the twenty-third



and twenty-fourth, the C.C.S. met with Roosevelt and Churchill. Marshall had a private dinner with Churchill on the twenty-third and a luncheon with Generalissimo and Madame Chiang on the twenty-fourth.

As Marshall had suspected for some weeks, the British were determined that the Mediterranean theater not be subordinate to the Supreme Allied Commander, whose primary responsibility was the cross-Channel invasion, and that it be under British command. By November 26, the J.C.S. had accepted this, pending the outcome of discussions with the Soviets in Teheran. (*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, pp. 150–51, 365.)

The key issue, however, was the relative importance of the several operations that could be undertaken during the winter and spring of 1944 and their likely impact on the overall war effort—but most immediately on the cross-Channel invasion. As it had been so often before, a shortage of shipping—this time in landing craft—was a key factor influencing British-American strategy. The chief spokesmen for the British and American points of view were Churchill and Marshall.

Churchill believed that recent German defeats had created opportunities in Italy, the Balkans, and the Aegean for further Allied blows that would serve to weaken potential German responses to OVERLORD. While reiterating British commitment to OVERLORD, Churchill insisted that the target date of May 1, 1944, established at August's Quebec Conference, be moved back to mid-June to accommodate the Mediterranean thrusts. The British were well aware of Marshall's fear of becoming bogged down in peripheral fights in the Mediterranean, thereby delaying and potentially weakening the decisive Allied thrust against the Germans on the plains of western Europe. Sir Alan Brooke, who acted as chairman of the Cairo C.C.S. meetings, viewed this attitude as demonstrating Americans' lack of strategic vision. When Churchill continued to press Marshall to support an assault on Rhodes, the chief of staff angrily told the prime minister that no U.S. forces would participate. (Arthur Bryant, *Triumph in the West: A History of the War Years Based on the Diaries of Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff* [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1959], pp. 44, 49; *Marshall Interviews*, p. 622.)

British leaders were surprised and displeased by the American determination to launch a major operation in Burma in early 1944 using mainly British, Indian, and Chinese troops. Marshall believed that Chiang Kai-shek's apparent agreement (he did not formally commit himself until November 30) to participate in Operation TARZAN—the seizure of north Burma aimed at protecting the “Hump” air supply lines and opening the Burma Road—“constituted a milestone in the prosecution of the war in the East.” (Minutes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, November 23, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OPD, CCS 334, JCS Minutes].) But Chiang was determined



to have an Allied amphibious landing in the Andaman Islands (Operation BUCCANEER) as a support operation, and President Roosevelt and the J.C.S. supported him in this. One of the major altercations in the C.C.S. meetings occurred on November 23 when Brooke suggested diverting the landing craft essential for BUCCANEER to Aegean operations. (*Stilwell Papers*, p. 245.)

By November 26, the J.C.S. had “accepted . . . as a basis for discussion with the Soviets,” and with modifications, the British proposals for Mediterranean operations, but they refused to abandon or postpone BUCCANEER without orders from President Roosevelt, who favored the Andaman landings. (*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 365.) The following morning the president, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a few assistants took off in four planes for Teheran.

While Soviet demands for a second front in the west had often been expressed, it still appeared to some American observers that Stalin was not committed to landings in France. Marshall feared that Stalin might support British thrusts in the Aegean at the expense of the six-months-distant OVERLORD. In addition, the French Committee of National Liberation was pressing Eisenhower’s headquarters to launch an invasion of southern France, and that also would absorb scarce landing craft. (*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, pp. 328, 477, 480.)

The first plenary session of the Teheran Conference was hurriedly convened on the afternoon of November 28 when, through an error in scheduling, Marshall and Arnold were on an automobile tour of the mountains north of Teheran. Stalin began the meeting by saying that the U.S.S.R. would join the war against Japan after Germany capitulated. He then surprised the British and American conferees by stating that OVERLORD should be the key operation in the West in 1944 and that all other undertakings were mere diversions. He was not impressed with the value of operations thus far in Italy, and he did not believe that Turkey could be induced to enter the war—an essential prerequisite to British Aegean plans. Moreover, using successful Soviet military tactics as his justification, he strongly supported an invasion of southern France prior to OVERLORD as a way of preventing the Germans from moving reserves to parry the northern France blow. (*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, pp. 499–501, 505–7.)

The next morning (November 29) Marshal Kliment E. Voroshilov, Stalin’s military adviser, questioned Marshall and Brooke—particularly the latter—regarding OVERLORD and their commitment to it, shipping and landing craft shortages, and air cover for the landings. When Brooke praised the Red Army’s accomplishments in crossing great rivers, Voroshilov suggested that the Anglo-American forces might use similar tactics. “The difference between a river crossing, however wide, and a



landing from the ocean,” the minutes show Marshall asserting, “is that the failure of a river crossing is a reverse while the failure of a landing operation from the sea is a catastrophe.” His own military education in World War I, Marshall continued, “had been based on roads, rivers, and railroads,” but during the previous two years, “he had been acquiring an education based on oceans and he had had to learn all over again. . . . [P]rior to the present war he had never heard of any landing craft except a rubber boat. Now he thinks about little else.” Voroshilov, in obvious professional admiration, replied: “If you think about it, you will do it.” (Ibid., pp. 515–28; quotes on pp. 527–28.)

At the second plenary session that afternoon, Stalin insisted that the British and American leaders should quickly decide: (1) who would command OVERLORD; (2) the date for that operation—he preferred May; (3) plans for a southern France support operation for the cross-Channel thrust. Churchill explained the British conception at length, but Stalin was apparently unimpressed. Charles Bohlen, a U.S. foreign service officer who took minutes at the plenary sessions, observed that the most notable feature of the “Big Three” dinner that evening was Stalin’s obvious efforts to show his displeasure at the British attitude toward OVERLORD. (Ibid., pp. 541–51, 553.)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff held their only formal session at Teheran on November 30. For the first time they seriously discussed a landing in southern France (ANVIL). There was considerable discussion of landing craft availability, with the British again raising the possibility of moving to the Mediterranean landing craft scheduled for BUCCANEER. The related topic of the timing of OVERLORD was likewise vigorously debated, and the C.C.S. ultimately agreed to launch the attack “during May”—that is, by June 1. At the plenary session that afternoon, Stalin promised that the Red Army would launch an offensive at the time of OVERLORD to prevent the Germans from transferring troops from the eastern to the western front. (Ibid., pp. 555–64, 579. Concerning the initial planning for the southern France operation, see Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944*, pp. 365–66.)

The heads of government continued their talks concerning such political subjects as the occupation of Germany and the future of Poland, and politically the conference appeared to represent “the high-water mark in international collaboration.” (Ibid., p. 367.) Meanwhile, with the military aspects of the meetings concluded, Marshall and the rest of the British-American military delegation left Teheran on December 1 for Jerusalem. There they stayed at the King David Hotel and visited various historical and religious sites around town, departing for Cairo the following morning. (Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, *Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record* [New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1952], pp. 522–23.)



Two key questions remained to be settled at the second set of meetings in Cairo, December 2–7: (1) who would command OVERLORD; (2) the relation of OVERLORD/ANVIL to Aegean/BUCCANEER operations in terms of assault shipping. As late as December 2, Marshall believed that he would be designated Supreme Allied Commander. (Copy of radio received from General Marshall, December 2, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 10, Item 63c pt. 2].) But Roosevelt was beginning to have second thoughts, perhaps in part because of opposition to his appointment from Arnold and King, who believed that Marshall was too valuable in Washington to be given a theater command, and perhaps in part because the British had declined the proposal for an overall command for Europe and the Mediterranean. (Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, 5: 200.)

A little more than three years after the event, Marshall told Robert E. Sherwood, who was working on a biography of Harry Hopkins:

At Cairo, Harry Hopkins came to see me one night [probably December 4] before dinner and told me the President was in some concern of mind over my appointment as Supreme Commander. I could not tell from the Hopkins' statement just what the President's point of view was and in my reply I merely endeavored to make it clear that I would go along wholeheartedly with whatever decision the President made. He need have no fears regarding my personal reactions. I declined to state any opinion.

The next day the President had me call at his villa . . . where in response to his question, I made virtually the same reply I made to Hopkins. I recall saying that I would not attempt to estimate my capabilities; the President would have to do that; I merely wished to make it clear that whatever the decision, I would go along with it wholeheartedly; that the issue was too great for any personal feelings to be considered. I did not discuss the pros and cons of the matter. As I recall, the President stated in completing our conversation "I feel I could not sleep at night with you out of the country." (Marshall to Sherwood, February 25, 1947, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Secretary of State, Categorical, Requests].)

Churchill, Stalin, and Eisenhower were informed of Roosevelt's decision on December 6 that Eisenhower was to command the cross-Channel invasion.

The agreement at Teheran to launch an amphibious assault on southern France further highlighted the landing craft shortage. The meetings of December 3, 4, and 5, were dominated by the debate over whether to carry out the Andaman Islands assault or to shift that assault lift to the Mediterranean. Marshall believed that the cancellation of BUCCANEER would end Chinese participation in major north Burma operations. The Japanese,



who had increased their forces in Burma in anticipation of an Allied thrust there, would then be free to threaten the air routes to China and to shift forces to the Pacific. (Minutes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, December 5, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OPD, CCS 334, JCS Minutes].) Finally, on the evening of December 5, Roosevelt gave in to British arguments, overruled the J.C.S., and agreed to abandon BUCCANEER. This was, two official U.S. Army histories agree, a turning point in Chinese-American relations. China's role in future Allied war plans began to decline, and the Soviet Union's role in the Far East began to assume greater significance. (Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944*, p. 373; Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1956], pp. 67-72.) ★

TO JOSEPH STALIN<sup>1</sup>  
Radio. *Secret*

December 6, 1941  
[Cairo, Egypt]

Secret and personal from the President and the Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin.

In the Cairo Conference, just concluded, we have arrived at the following decisions as to conduct of war in 1944 against Germany additional to the agreements reached by the three of us at Teheran:

The bomber offensive against Germany, with the objective of destroying the German air combat strength, dislocating the German military, industrial and economic system, and preparing the way for a cross-channel operation, will be given the highest strategic priority.

We have reduced the scale of operation scheduled for March in the Bay of Bengal to permit the reenforcement of amphibious craft for the operation against Southern France.

We have ordered the utmost endeavors to increase the production of landing craft in the United Kingdom and the United States for the reenforcement of OVERLORD, and further orders have been issued to divert certain landing craft from the Pacific for the same purpose.

*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 820.

1. Marshall's draft is in NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 5, Item 14, Folder 4). He read this message at the December 6 Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting. It was considered and approved and signed by Roosevelt and Churchill that evening and sent with only minor modifications. (*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, pp. 738, 749.)



DRAFT MESSAGE TO CHIANG KAI-SHEK  
*Secret*

[December 6, 1943]  
[Cairo, Egypt]

Secret and personal to Generalissimo from the President and the P.M.

In our conference with Marshal Stalin at Tehran it was agreed to launch a converging assault, land, sea and air, on the enemy's European stronghold in the late spring of 1944, calculated to drive Germany out of the war, prepared for by continuing operations throughout the winter. The final assault will be launched from the British Isles, from the Mediterranean against Southern France, from Africa and from Turkey if she enters the war against Bulgaria and Rumania, from Italy into Yugoslavia and on the Russian front from several regions. The strategic bombing will be accelerated to the maximum possible degree prior to those operations. As you are already aware operations in the Pacific increase in tempo with each succeeding month.<sup>1</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 5, Item 15, Folder 4)

1. This message was never sent. Marshall read this message at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting on December 6 and again at the C.C.S. meeting with Roosevelt and Churchill that evening. At the latter meeting: "It was agreed that on grounds of security it would be undesirable to put so much secret information into a dispatch of this nature." Moreover, the conferees wished first to see Chiang's response to Roosevelt's December 5 message stating that operations against Germany—which might end the European war "by end of summer of 1944"—made amphibious landings in the Andaman Islands "impracticable." (*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, pp. 738, 749, 803.)

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MARSHAL STALIN<sup>1</sup>  
[Radio. *Secret*]

[December 6, 1943]  
[Cairo, Egypt]

The immediate appointment of General Eisenhower to command of Overlord operation has been decided upon.

Roosevelt

Cairo, Dec. 7. 43

Dear Eisenhower, I thought you might like to have this as a memento. It was written very hurriedly by me as the final meeting broke up yesterday, the President signing it immediately.

G. C. M.

GCMRL/Museum; H

1. The message to Stalin is also printed in *Foreign Relations, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 819. This version reads "the Command of OVERLORD" rather than "command of Overlord operation." Eisenhower termed the document "one of my most cherished mementos of World War II." (Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1948), p. 208.)



From the President to Marshal Stalin

The <sup>immediate</sup> appointment of General  
Eisenhower to command of  
Overlord operation has been  
decided upon

Roosevelt

Cairo, Dec. 7. 43

Dear Eisenhower, I thought you  
might like to have this as a memento  
It was written very hurriedly by me as the  
final meeting broke up yesterday, the  
President signing it immediately.

W.C.W.

This document in Marshall's hand is transcribed in *From the President to Marshal Stalin*,  
December 6, 1943, p. 197.



TWICE previously in 1943—in January and May—Marshall had planned but had been unable to make a trip to the Pacific. On the journey from Washington to Cairo, he decided to try again. (See *Papers of GCM*, 3: 507, 643, 656, 671–72; Marshall to Sexton, November 22, 1943, pp. 190–91.) The previous two weeks had been hectic—thirteen formal meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, seventeen of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, three major sessions with the Soviets at Teheran, and numerous other important conversations, meetings, luncheons, and dinners—and a lengthy flying trip (just over 20,000 miles and nearly one hundred hours in the air) would give Marshall an opportunity to rest and read. He and his small party (four other officers and a clerk) boarded a C-54 at Cairo on the morning of December 8 and flew 320 miles south to Luxor, gateway to ancient Thebes and the Valley of the Kings. After a half-day of relaxation and touring at Luxor—including a moonlight visit to the Temple of Karnak—they took off shortly after midnight for Bahrein, where their plane refueled and then departed for Karachi, where they spent the night of December 9–10. The next morning he witnessed the training of Chinese pilots and air crews before taking off in the afternoon.

Marshall spent the night of December 10–11 at Colombo, Ceylon. The longest and most dangerous flight of the trip—necessitated by Japanese control of intervening landing sites—was between Colombo and Exmouth Gulf on the coast of central Western Australia: 3,136 miles over the Indian Ocean in fifteen and one-half hours. (Marshall always had records kept of how far and how long he flew. See GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Categorical].) On the thirteenth, Marshall flew on to Fenton Field, near Darwin; on the fourteenth he arrived in Port Moresby, New Guinea. At every opportunity, the chief of staff inspected camps, talked with troops, and visited hospitals.

Lieutenant General George C. Kenney, who commanded MacArthur's Fifth Air Force, met Marshall at Port Moresby on December 15 and flew him and his party over several important sites in New Guinea (e.g., Lae and Buna) to Goodenough Island, some two hundred miles east of Port Moresby. Lieutenant General Walter Krueger had his Alamo Force Headquarters on the island, and that morning his troops had landed at Arawe in the first phase of the attack on New Britain Island. MacArthur had already arrived from his headquarters in Brisbane. "That afternoon," Kenney recalled, "General Marshall briefed us on the situation in Europe and at home." During the visit, Marshall also "had a long and frank discussion" with MacArthur, the latter remembered. MacArthur complained about "the paucity of men and materiel I was receiving as compared with all other theaters of war. He [Marshall] said he realized the imbalance and regretted it, but could do little to alter the low priority accorded the area." Krueger remembered that Marshall "took time out to drive with me



in a heavy downpour to some of our troop units and installations.” (George C. Kenney, *General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War* [New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949], pp. 332–33; Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* [New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964], p. 183; Walter Krueger, *From Down Under to Nippon: The Story of Sixth Army in World War II* [Washington: Zenger Publishing Company, 1953], p. 29.)

Marshall, MacArthur, and the officers accompanying them, left on the morning of December 16 for Port Moresby, where they had lunch together. Marshall’s party left shortly before midnight for Guadalcanal, nearly nine hundred miles east. At Henderson Field, Marshall met Lieutenant General Millard F. Harmon, with whom he flew over various sites in the southern Solomons to Munda, on New Georgia Island. It was, Marshall later wrote, “one of the most interesting days I have ever spent.” (Marshall to Harmon, December 19, 1943, GCMRL/F. McCarthy Papers [U.S. Army 1941–45].)

“Then I flew on to the New Hebrides,” the chief of staff later told a *Yank* magazine reporter; “I inspected the Army and Navy base at Espiritu Santo and went through the hospitals there. Then I went on to the Fiji Islands where I saw troops embarking. From there I moved north, went through the camps, visited patients in hospitals and talked to men assembled in open-air meeting places.” After a night on Fiji, Marshall flew on to Canton Island, where the plane refueled, and Marshall saw a night demonstration of anti-aircraft firing. (Earl Anderson, “Gen. Marshall Reports to YANK,” *Yank: The Army Weekly* 2 [January 21, 1944]: 15.)

Marshall reached Honolulu, Hawaii, in time for breakfast on December 19. On Oahu, he witnessed jungle-fighting maneuvers. Afterward he told the assembled troops: “We have got the Japs beaten but we have to keep pushing. The Japs had jungle training long before the war and we didn’t. But the Japs are restricted and lack variation. Our great advantage is our enterprise and resourcefulness. Your training here is the best that can be given and it is up to you to push the enemy through the jungle.” He praised the resourcefulness and small-unit tactics the Germans had demonstrated in the Italian fighting. “You men have to do the same and better and you have the initiative and the leadership to do it.” (*New York Times*, December 23, 1943, p. 3.)

Another night flight brought Marshall to Los Angeles early on the morning of December 21. He stayed in Los Angeles for a “rather strenuous” day and then left early on December 22, arriving back in Washington that evening. (Concerning his California activities, see Marshall’s letter to his sister, December 30, 1943, pp. 226–27.) ★



TO GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR  
Radio. *Secret*

December 23, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

Personal from Marshall for MacArthur. Dear MacArthur: I arrived in Washington late last night and on resuming business here this morning I wish first to express my appreciation for the reception you gave me in the Southwest Pacific and of the admirable organization and fighting force you have under development there. I was greatly impressed by all that I saw. Already this morning I have talked to Arnold about some of the air matters and probably will have a little encouraging news for you in a few days.<sup>1</sup>

All good things to you and your command in the new year.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. MacArthur later stated that after this message “Washington became more generous” to the Southwest Pacific Area. (MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, p. 184.) On December 30, Marshall stated: “I am told today that we are endeavoring to arrange with the Navy for carrier on West Coast January 20th to transport 50 P-38 pursuit planes to you, these to be additional to normal pursuit plane program. Further, that pursuit plane reserve for your theater is being increased by 20 per cent. I am also told that steps are being taken to bring up your Third Bomber Group to full strength.” (Marshall to MacArthur, Radio, December 30, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
*Secret*

December 23, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

I suggest that the Prime Minister release an announcement along the following lines:

General Montgomery relinquishes command of the Eighth British Army in Italy and assumes command of a Group of Armies in England.

The agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff intentionally provides no Ground Force commander for OVERLORD.<sup>1</sup> This was done in order to permit the Supreme Commander to directly control the operation. The agreement provides for the initial force to come under the immediate command of the American First Army which will operate under the British 21st Army Group until sufficient additional Armies have crossed the channel to require additional Army Group headquarters to handle the operation. The second Army Group, the American Army Group, will be in operation on the continent not later than D plus 70. From that time on command of British and American forces will be exercised by the Supreme



Commander through two and later more British and American Army Groups. This is one of the Army Groups, or Group of Armies which happens to be the initial one, that General Montgomery should command and not be the commander of all Ground Forces throughout the operation.

I believe this latter is the Prime Minister's concept which would place all Ground Forces, American, Canadian, and British, under the command of General Montgomery, which is unacceptable.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On December 19, Churchill sent from Tunis a message listing his proposals for command relationships and commanders in the Mediterranean and for OVERLORD. "The War Cabinet desire that Montgomery should command the First Expeditionary Group of Armies. Eisenhower would have chosen Alexander, but I feel the Cabinet are right as Montgomery is a public hero and will give confidence among our people, not shared by yours." Roosevelt replied on the twentieth that he preferred "to delay announcement of changes in subordinate commands until after the first of the year, because I want to have opportunity to discuss it with Marshall." (*Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, 2: 622-24.)

Secretary Stimson was particularly worried that Churchill's phrase "First Expeditionary Group of Armies" meant that Montgomery would command all Allied ground forces, which was unacceptable. He and McNarney drafted a lengthy response and showed it to Marshall on December 23. "Marshall approved of my letter and so I told him to take it with him to the President, which he did." (December 23, 1943, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 45: 140]; Stimson's letter to Roosevelt, dated December 20, is on pp. 143-46.)

2. Marshall may have taken the document printed here to his December 23 White House meeting with the president, but it was not used because Churchill clarified his position that day in a message from London stating that "Montgomery's appointment is exclusively to the command of British and Canadian Expeditionary Forces." (*Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, 2: 629.)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. 5585. *Secret*

December 23, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

For Eisenhower's EYES ONLY from Marshall. On arrival at the office this morning from Pacific trip I found your letter of December 17th regarding OVERLORD and Mediterranean assignments. I have also read your radio number 138 of December 19th.<sup>1</sup> Arnold told me this morning of his conversations with you and with Spaatz and Tedder regarding transfers of Commanders and Staff Officers.<sup>2</sup>

I am seriously concerned over the developments in this matter. OVERLORD, largely because of Russian insistence has received in effect a guarantee; there remains however the serious problem of control of the Combined Air Forces for that operation in spite of inhibitions and the deep ruts of the Strategic Bombing Program, and the proper mounting as to time and materiel of ANVIL, particularly in relation to possible delays caused by Eastern Mediterranean Diversions. It seems to me that at this



moment the tendency is to gut the Mediterranean Headquarters and leadership leaving a most complex situation to be handled by General Wilson.<sup>3</sup> And what makes it more questionable in my opinion is this business of transferring from England to the Mediterranean those that you do not see clearly in place in the UK setup. I am referring to Eaker and to Devers. In my opinion Smith should remain in the Mediterranean at least until the middle of February purely because of American interests. The Prime Minister wished to have him made the Deputy Commander in the Mediterranean as well as Chief of Staff but I think it would be a questionable procedure, however convenient to you, to withdraw Smith from his present position until a much later date than now seems to be indicated.<sup>4</sup> Morgan in London is a very capable officer and almost seems more American than British.<sup>5</sup>

I believe I was more disturbed over the pressure of Tedder and Spaatz to move Eaker to the Mediterranean because he did not appear at all particularly suited for that theater and I am forced to the conclusion that their attitude is selfish and not purely objective.

This message as indicated above in your EYES ONLY but I wanted you to get my thoughts before we go further into the details of these assignments.<sup>6</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 17, Item 28)

1. In his letter, Eisenhower stated that he wanted Jacob L. Devers, commanding general of the European Theater of Operations since May 1943, to take command of U.S. forces in the Mediterranean. "It would appear that he will be superfluous in U.K." Eisenhower also desired to appoint a single Allied ground forces commander, who would command American troops until the United States could form its own army group (to be commanded by Bradley). Under the Allied air forces commander, he wanted a single commander for all tactical forces and a single commander for all strategic bombing forces. (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1604–5.) Message 138, written by Walter Bedell Smith, stated that in order to begin planning for ANVIL, Eisenhower desired to create a U.S. Seventh Army headquarters and that Mark Clark, current Fifth Army commander, would assume command of it after Rome had been secured. (Smith to Hull, December 19, 1943, Radio No. 138, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 17, Item 28].)

2. On his way back from Cairo, Arnold stopped in Tunis to talk with Eisenhower about air command reorganization. They agreed that Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz, deputy commander of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (M.A.A.F.), was the best choice to head the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe. Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, Eighth Air Force commander in England, would become head of the M.A.A.F., replacing Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, who would move to Britain to command all Allied air forces under Eisenhower. (H. H. Arnold, *Global Mission* [New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949], pp. 475–76. The air forces reorganization at this time is discussed in Craven and Cate, eds., *Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK*, pp. 733–56.)

3. General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, commander in chief, Middle East, officially was to become commander in chief in the Mediterranean theater on January 8, 1944. Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers became Wilson's deputy that same day.

4. When Churchill met with Eisenhower on December 12, he asked that Smith stay in the Mediterranean; when Eisenhower proved reluctant, Churchill asked that he stay at A.F.H.Q. for several weeks in order to help General Wilson get started. On December 19, Churchill proposed that Smith remain in the Mediterranean "a few weeks" before moving



to Eisenhower's new headquarters in England. (*My Three Years with Eisenhower: The Personal Diary of Captain Harry C. Butcher, USNR, Naval Aide to General Eisenhower, 1942 to 1945* [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946], p. 458; *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, 2: 623.)

5. In his memoirs, Eisenhower said of Lieutenant General Frederick E. Morgan: "He was an extraordinarily fine officer and had, long before my arrival [in England in 1944], won the high admiration and respect of General Marshall. I soon came to place an equal value upon his qualifications. He had in the months preceding my arrival accomplished a mass of detailed planning, accumulation of data, and gathering of supply that made D-day possible." (Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, p. 230.)

6. In a lengthy reply dated December 25, Eisenhower defended his decisions regarding command changes. With regard to Eaker's move, he said Eaker was "completely acceptable to me"; he was merely accommodating Arnold and Spaatz. Furthermore, he had "nothing whatsoever against Devers, and thought I was recommending him for an important post, particularly as I know that he would be acceptable to the British." Moreover, he wrote, "I have no desire to emasculate" General Wilson's staff; indeed, Wilson had said that he desired to bring in his own chief of staff and key personnel. On a subject that had but recently occupied much of Marshall's time, Eisenhower noted: "At a meeting this morning in Tunis the Prime Minister definitely announced that he had completely abandoned any thought of activity in Turkey and the Aegean Sea. He desires to concentrate activities in this theater on an amphibious operation to drive the German back of the Rome line and then to prepare full-out for ANVIL." (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1611-14.)

FOLLOWING his trips out of Washington, Marshall immediately sent messages or memorandums concerning whatever problems his staff had held for his attention. Upon completing this, he generally sent a number of shorter documents of certain types. The first type was aimed at correcting problems he had discovered that had an impact on the army, especially on troop morale; a group of these is in *Papers of GCM*, 2: 446-48. Next were thank-you notes to those who had helped him or provided services during his journey; an example is printed *ibid.*, 3: 518. A third type consisted of letters to wives of some of the officers he had visited; the following two documents are examples of these. ★

TO MRS. LEGRAND A. DILLER

December 23, [1943]  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mrs. Diller, In Port Moresby the other day I had long conversations with Colonel Diller and told him I would carry home his Christmas greetings. He looks well, as a matter of fact there is very little change from



my recollection of him at Benning. I am sorry he cannot be with you for the holidays, but he is doing an important and very fine job for General MacArthur.<sup>1</sup>

Molly is at our country place at Leesburg and I shall see her probably tomorrow and tell her that I saw Diller. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Diller was MacArthur's aide and public relations officer. He first met Marshall as a student in the 1927–28 Infantry School Company Officers Course at Fort Benning, Georgia.

TO MRS. CHARLES F. THOMPSON

December 23, [1943]  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Laura, I spent an afternoon and night with Charlie in Fiji last week and found him looking very well.<sup>1</sup> I told him I would call you up when I returned to Washington, but so far today have been unable to locate you by phone, hence this note.

I am sorry he cannot have his Christmas with you but you can know at least that he is well and most comfortably established, though in surroundings quite different from yours.

With my best wishes for the holidays, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Major General Thompson had been commanding general of Second Island Command since October 1942. Marshall had known him since the early 1920s.

TO MRS. EDWARD R. STETTINIUS

December 23, [1943]  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Virginia, At a dinner for me in Honolulu Admiral Nimitz autographed a place card to Joe and Wallace.<sup>1</sup> General Holland Smith autographed his card for Wallace, having heard of the latter's marine proclivities. Smith was the commander of the operation at Tarawa.<sup>2</sup> Affectionately,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., had become under secretary of state on October 4, 1943. His twin sons were ten years old.

2. Major General Holland M. Smith, one of the developers of the Marine Corps' new amphibious doctrine and equipment, was commander of the Fifth Amphibious Force. He had helped to plan the Second Marine Division's assault on Tarawa atoll in the Gilbert Islands, November 20–28, the first of the Central Pacific operations.



MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF  
OF STAFF, G-1 [WHITE]  
*Confidential*

December 24, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

I have taken up with you several times apparent inequalities in the promotion system, which seem invariably to reflect too rapid promotion at home and too slow abroad.<sup>1</sup> In each case your replies have indicated that the present system was sound.

I have just returned from a trip entirely around the world. Practically every place I have been I have found the same situation, lieutenants in important positions rendering conspicuous service for whom no vacancy exists, while here at home men have been advanced on a time schedule senior to these men overseas.

This matter must be corrected and immediately. I am inclined to think that the instructions in the case are so complicated that nobody can figure them all out, but my interest is in "effect" and I am not interested in background.

In some of my memorandums to your section I used examples out of my own family which have illustrated to me the unfortunate situation which now prevails as to promotions in the junior grades. I have one stepson who, after obtaining a commission in the antiaircraft, was hospitalized and then put on limited service. He advanced, I think, in six months from second lieutenant to first lieutenant on a block promotion—no selection, then about six months later he was again advanced to the grade of captain while still on limited service—again no selection.

His brother obtained a second lieutenancy in the Armored Forces. He joins a battalion of medium tanks in Africa and finds the four company commanders are first lieutenants. All have been in action, some a number of times, three have been wounded, one twice, two have received citations, and all had longer service than his brother and all were still first lieutenants. Later the captain of antiaircraft goes to Africa and he finds himself senior to men with whom he is closely associated who have had longer service as well as battle experience.

In Hawaii I have found first lieutenants doing outstanding jobs and still first lieutenants though of longer service than the captain of antiaircraft artillery I have just mentioned. I have noticed this situation pretty much over the world and the information given me here in the War Department does not impress me as an accurate representation of the facts.

Now please go into this for me immediately. It must be straightened out and that rapidly.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See Marshall Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, October 1, 1943, pp. 139–40.



MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL OSBORN<sup>1</sup>  
*Confidential*

December 24, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

I was much disturbed in the Southwest Pacific to see apparently how little had been accomplished by your activities. I was told that you had had five or six surveys made but still I found the men lacking the things that had been on issue here for a long time. General MacArthur himself seemed almost entirely unaware of what your activities were.

Before I left I spoke to you about going to the Pacific. Now I think it is urgently necessary that you do so in the immediate future. I want you to go direct to Australia and see General MacArthur personally and explain to him what your activities are and what can be done, and endeavor to find out for yourself why it has not been done.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Frederick H. Osborn, who had been promoted to major general in October, was head of the Morale Services Division, which had been created when a November reorganization of the Army Service Forces split the former Special Services Division into two independent components.

2. Osborn spent several weeks in the Southwest Pacific Area, the South Pacific Area, and the Central Pacific Area, holding conferences with numerous commanders and officials in charge of morale-related operations. In his February 14, 1944, report to Marshall, Osborn stated that he had “four to five hours of conversations” with MacArthur, who “became first convinced of the integrity of our purpose, and then enthusiastic about the value of our work.” When the theater and division commanders understood his division’s programs of information, education, and orientation, Osborn noted, they heartily endorsed it. But official instructions were needed authorizing the manpower to prepare and direct the programs; Osborn asked Marshall to direct the Operations Division to issue such instructions. Marshall sent Osborn’s report to the deputy chief of staff with the following handwritten note on the cover sheet: “Gen. McNarney: I sent Osborne to the Pacific to leave a few days after my return. He had been headed for Italy. This report indicates the state of affairs—most unnecessarily unsatisfactory—I had found. See that the necessary Officers are provided. We must put this business over immediately. G. C. M.” (Osborn Memorandum to the Chief of Staff, February 14, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 330.11].)

Later Marshall sent MacArthur a letter concerning Osborn and his visit to the Pacific: “He gave me a most favorable report of your interest in this field and the tremendous assistance you afforded him during his stay in the Southwest Pacific. This was very encouraging to me, for I feel that Osborn and his organization have filled a very definite need of our troops overseas and have done a most creditable job in view of the limits on personnel and shipping which have been imposed on him.” (Marshall to MacArthur, March 1, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO MRS. WARREN W. HARVEY

December 24, [1943]  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mrs. Harvey, I received your Christmas card with its gracious note expressing your appreciation for the “wonderful Thanksgiving dinner”



which your husband enjoyed in New Guinea. It is a great reassurance to me to feel that the efforts of the War Department to serve and support our soldiers all over the world have been reasonably successful, but more particularly that they are so generously appreciated as indicated in your note.

It might interest you to know that a recent V-mail letter<sup>1</sup> from my stepson was entirely devoted to the turkey, cranberry sauce, and mashed potatoes that he had enjoyed with the Army in Italy.

I have just seen our men in New Guinea and knowing the difficult conditions under which they labor to carry forward the desires of the American people I am gratified to learn that your husband had at least one fine, or "full" day. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. V-mail was a system whereby letters to and from service personnel overseas were written on a special form which was then microfilmed by an automatic camera; the film was sent abroad to a similar production center where a photograph of the original letter was produced and distributed. The first V-mail letters arrived in the United States on June 12, 1942, and the first shipment overseas was made five days later. (*New York Times*, July 5, 1942, sec. 4, p. 9.)

TO FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

December 24, [1943]  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mr. President: I am distressed that you cannot enter the holidays free to enjoy contemplation of the military and naval successes or victories of the past year. It seems too bad that your mind must be burdened with such serious difficulties on the home front.<sup>1</sup>

I want you to know that I deeply appreciate the support you have given me and the confidence you have reposed in me, and at the same time I wish to express my admiration for the magnificent leadership you have given the country and the Army and Navy.

I received the volume of your Inaugural Addresses which I shall treasure.

With all good wishes and my prayers for you in the New Year,  
Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. When Marshall and Stimson met with the president on December 23, Stimson recorded that Roosevelt "threw a bombshell on us of the largest size possible. He told us that the Brotherhoods of the Railroads were stubborn and insistent on their strike, which is set for next Thursday, the 30th of December." If the strike could not be avoided, the president wanted the army to take over the railroads. (December 23, 1943, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 45: 140-41].) The *New York Times* had criticized the president for mishandling railroad labor issues. (December 22, 1943, p. 22.) For more on the railroad situation, see note 1, Marshall to King, December 29, 1943, pp. 213-14. A strike in the steel industry also began on December 24.



TO SECOND LIEUTENANT ALLEN T. BROWN

December 27, 1943  
[Washington D.C.]

Dear Allen, On my return to Washington I received your letter telling me of the mix-up with General Arnold. I am sorry he advertised you to your unit. I had cautioned him about this and thought that he could manage the business without giving you away. I had been specifically (somewhat violently) charged to see you by your mother and the best I could do was to have Arnold act as my emissary. At least you got one good meal.

I had to leave immediately from Cairo after I came back from Persia or Iran, and head for India and Australia. Therefore I did not get to visit the Army in Italy much to my disappointment. The trip was pretty strenuous, long in the air and very pressing on the ground. However, I was blessed with good weather throughout until Los Angeles and there I had to delay overnight because of a front in the mountains of the Cascades. I got back here to find your mother well and Molly and the children also well. Molly, as a matter of fact, did not arrive from Arkansas until the next day. She came in with Jim.<sup>1</sup> He was to leave tomorrow by air for his unit but a few minutes ago Colonel Sexton told me that flights would probably not be possible and they are now (3:00 P.M.) trying to get him in here in time to catch the 4:30 train—if they can get a reservation on that train.

Your mother came in with me from Leesburg last night and goes back tomorrow.

We had a fine Christmas dinner and missed you and Clifton but drank your health in champagne. Allene and Molly and Jim were with us. Jimmy sat up at the table for a portion of the meal. Kitty slept.<sup>2</sup> It snowed and then sleeted—and to an extent which began to break down limbs. Today there is a bright sun and it is getting warm.

I see from my chart that you are not engaged, and I imagine from the state of the weather and the character of the terrain it will be some time before you are.<sup>3</sup>

Someone gave me several cases of oranges in California and your mother sent one to Madge. We had a note from Madge saying she and Tupper were well and were lined up for Christmas as favorably as possible without you.<sup>4</sup>

With my love, affectionate greetings, and every wish for your success and your safety in the New Year, Affectionately,

GCMRL/Research File (Family)

1. Lieutenant Colonel James J. Winn's unit—the 872d Field Artillery Battalion of the Sixty-sixth Infantry Division—was stationed at Camp Robinson, Arkansas.

2. Allene Tupper Wilkes was Mrs. Marshall's sister. Molly Winn's children were James (twenty-five months) and Katherine (ten months).

3. Brown was with the Third Battalion, Thirteenth Armored Regiment, First Armored Division. His unit had moved into Italy in November; during December it was part of



Second Corps' reserve during the drive along Highway No. 6 through the Germans' Winter Line near San Pietro.

4. Allen Tupper Brown, Jr., was twenty-seven months old.

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
[Radio No. 5810.] *Secret*

December 28, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

For General Eisenhower's eyes only from General Marshall. Reference your W-8678: It appears that we have gotten into complete confusion regarding future assignments between OVERLORD, FREEDOM, and ANVIL.<sup>1</sup> The following is to clarify the situation.

In the first place, after report to Washington of conversation between Ferenbaugh<sup>2</sup> and Smith, Hull radioed Handy with me of your desire to have Seventh Army proceed with ANVIL. No mention was made of Clark though such mention was made between Smith and Ferenbaugh. From this point onwards I followed a confused trail while traveling in the Pacific.

I was not and am not opposed to Patton with OVERLORD, or with Patton or Clark in ANVIL, etc. But my message suggesting names of McNair and Hodges<sup>3</sup> was based on assumption that you wanted Patton to command ANVIL.

I am agreeable to Devers with FREEDOM, Patton with OVERLORD, Clark with ANVIL, Lucas to replace Clark, if his later services justify such advancement.<sup>4</sup> I am also agreeable to Eaker to the Mediterranean in view of my understanding of yesterday that the principal reason of Tedder and Spaatz was to facilitate later control of Metropolitan Air Force. In other words you list your final desires and so far as I see now they will be approved.

In considering McNair, he has serious disability of deafness and great advantages of extreme firmness, expert knowledge of artillery and infantry combined action, perfect loyalty and dependability. Hodges is exactly same class of man as Bradley in practically every respect. Wonderful shot, great hunter, quiet, self-effacing. Thorough understanding of ground fighting, DSC, etc. etc. Smith must know both these men. Whether or not you wish to use either of them is your affair.

I think the foregoing should clarify things and leave you free to proceed. I suggest that you either come straight to the U.S. from Africa or if you go to England report here shortly thereafter to make the necessary contacts with the War Department, to see your family, and to get at least a brief rest.<sup>5</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Eisenhower's December 27 message No. W-8678 was in response to a message from Marshall on December 21 (No. 5363) and a follow-up on December 27 (No. 5756). On the



twenty-first, Marshall suggested certain combinations of commanders. “McNair to command the Army Group with Bradley and Devers as Army Commanders, or Devers to command Army Group with Bradley and Hodges. Possibly you had Clark in mind for a place in U. K. operation. In case Truscott is not to be proposed for Army Corps Command in the ANVIL Operation, I believe he should be given an Army Corps in England.” (Marshall to Eisenhower, Radio No. 5363, December 21, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 17, Item 28].) Eisenhower apparently did not see this message prior to responding on December 25 to Marshall’s No. 5585. (See Marshall to Eisenhower, December 23, 1943, pp. 202–4.) Consequently, Marshall sent a message on December 27 requesting a reply to No. 5363. (Marshall to Eisenhower, Radio No. 5756, December 27, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 17, Item 28].)

In his W-8678, Eisenhower said that of the combinations Marshall mentioned, he preferred the one of McNair, Devers, and Bradley. But “to be perfectly frank I feel that as long as we have Bradley in the U.K. we have the proper man to command the first U.S. army to enter the battle and that final selection of the other two need not be rushed. . . . I am not repeat not as well acquainted with McNair, Devers and Hodges as are you. . . . Since you see no place for Patton in OVERLORD I assume you intend leaving him here [in Italy] as one of the army commanders. In any event I feel very strongly that Clark must be left with a tactical command. Therefore an officer, preferably senior to Clark, should arrive here at once, unless you want Clark to take over the theater. . . . I request your decision as soon as possible on this particular point, and if you should decide Clark must take over the theater then Patton should go to the Fifth Army at once. Under this scheme Patton and Lucas would be the two army commanders here [in Italy].” (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1622–23.)

2. Colonel Claude B. Ferenbaugh (U.S.M.A., 1919) was chief of the Operations Division’s North African Section of the Theater Group. He was scheduled to become assistant commander of the Eighty-third Infantry Division in January 1944. Following the Cairo Conference, he stopped at Eisenhower’s headquarters.

3. Lieutenant General Courtney H. Hodges was commander of the Southern Defense Command and Third Army at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. Third Army was to begin moving to England in January 1944.

4. Sixth Corps commander Major General John P. Lucas was preparing his organization for an amphibious assault behind the German Gustav Line at Anzio in late January 1944.

5. Eisenhower replied with two messages on December 29. In No. W-8791, he stated that Marshall’s December 28 message had “cleared up everything and I believe we are in complete mutual understanding of what is needed.” He suggested that Marshall relieve Hodges from Third Army and send him to England to “live by Bradley’s side during the later stages of planning and preparation” for OVERLORD and to “accompany him into the operation. In no repeat no event will I ever advance Patton beyond army command, but the above arrangement will give us a bit of time to determine whether it should be Bradley or Hodges that moves back to the army group once it is necessary to insert this formation into the line.” Concerning McNair, Eisenhower believed that his hearing problem, “in an Allied organization, would be much magnified and would militate against his success.” (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1630–31.)

In his second message of December 29 (No. W-8792), Eisenhower summarized his understanding of the tentative command arrangements. See Marshall’s comments on this in Marshall to Eisenhower, December 29, 1943, pp. 215–16.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
*Secret*

December 28, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

Subject: Tonnage over the Hump into China.



I attach a message from General Stratemeyer together with a proposal that the following message be sent to General Stilwell:<sup>1</sup>

The President directs that the following message from him be delivered to the Commanding General of the India-China Wing, Air Transport Command:<sup>2</sup>

"I have been informed that on Christmas day your command transported the ten thousandth ton of vital supplies over the hump into China for the month of December. This represents an exceptionally outstanding performance and is a source of great gratification to me. The goal has been high, the air route exceedingly dangerous both as to mountains and enemy action, and the weather treacherous. Only fine teamwork and outstanding devotion to duty by the entire personnel could have made this accomplishment possible. I have directed the citation of the Wing and desire that my personal thanks be communicated to every officer and man concerned."<sup>3</sup>

G. C. Marshall<sup>4</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Stratemeyer had recommended that the India-China Wing of the Air Transport Command be given a citation "for exceptionally outstanding performance of duty in action during December 1943." (Stratemeyer to Marshall, December 27, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Brigadier General Edward H. Alexander had commanded the India-China Wing since its creation on December 1, 1942.

3. At the Washington Conference in mid-May 1943, President Roosevelt had directed that the level of air shipments from India to China reach ten thousand tons per month beginning in September. (*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943*, pp. 296-97.) Air shipments had been an important topic of discussion with the Chinese at the First Cairo Conference. An "optimistic" estimate in late November was that nine thousand tons could be transported in December 1943. (*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, pp. 313, 342-45, 354-55, 414.) A history of the Hump route is Frank H. Heck, "Airline to China," in Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *Services Around the World*, a volume in *The Army Air Forces in World War II* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 114-51.

4. The president wrote "OK FDR" to the left of Marshall's signature.

TO CAPTAIN CLIFTON S. BROWN<sup>1</sup>

December 29, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Clifton: I was sorry to leave Africa without seeing you and Allen. As a matter of fact, I was in Oran for about thirty minutes, just long enough to transfer from a battleship to a plane and go on with the President to Tunis. I had intended to return to Italy and then to Algiers and possibly to have seen you at Oran on my way to England. However it



became necessary for me to proceed immediately to the Pacific after returning from Teheran. There was no time to spare.

I wrote to both you and Allen over there but I think McCarthy probably was wrong when he had me address yours to the APO number, care of Postmaster, New York City. That did not make sense to me at Cairo.

I have had a great many letters, or notes on Christmas cards, from women who expressed appreciation for the fact that their sons or husbands had written them of the wonderful Thanksgiving dinner, of turkey, cranberries, and all the trimmings, that had been served to them.<sup>2</sup> Allen gave us three pages of it so it seemed to be a normal reaction. We have not heard yet what you had for Thanksgiving.

I found your mother well, and Molly en route from Arkansas with Jim for Christmas. They arrived the day after I did and we all had dinner together at Leesburg and drank your health and Allen's in champagne. It seemed too bad that you boys could not have been with us, but at least you were not in the jungle under the conditions some of our men are enduring in the South and Southwest Pacific.

The best of luck to you. I hope that you keep well and that your feet are not troubling you. Affectionately,

GCMRL/Research File (Family)

1. Brown had arrived in Algiers on October 26 with a group of antiaircraft artillery officer replacements. Frank McCarthy had an agreement with the secretary of Walter Bedell Smith's staff at Allied Force Headquarters that Brown would be sent to a brigade headquarters, but he was directed instead to A.F.H.Q. Marshall was not pleased and had the secretary of the General Staff call Smith's office to get Brown's orders changed; this interference from the Pentagon with a routine posting irritated Smith, who wanted to know who was issuing such instructions. Marshall replied: "Instructions were mine. I do not want my stepson saddled on a Supreme Commander's headquarters. Also I have tried through McCarthy by every hook or crook to avoid embarrassing people by disclosing his connection with me." Brown was sent to the headquarters of the Forty-fourth Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade at Philippeville, Algeria, on October 28. (McCarthy Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, October 26, 1943, Smith to McCarthy, October 27, 1943, Marshall to Smith, October 27, 1943, Smith to McCarthy, October 28, 1943, and McCarthy Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, October 28, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) For Marshall's reaction to the February 1943 discovery at Fort Knox that Allen Brown was his stepson, see *Papers of GCM*, 3: 566.

2. For his response to one such letter, see Marshall to Mrs. Warren W. Harvey, December 24, 1943, pp. 207-8.

TO MAJOR GENERAL CAMPBELL KING

December 29, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear King: I saw a note from Harriott to Katherine, on a Christmas card, on my return from abroad. Apparently you are both well and



delighted with the new grandchildren. Under the circumstances, I imagine you had a cheerful Christmas.

I had Christmas dinner with Katherine, Molly, Jim Winn and the children, and Allene—Mrs. Marshall's sister—at Leesburg where Katherine still is.

This business of travelling—35,000 miles this time—is hard enough, together with the terrific pressure once you land at a place, but becomes even worse on the return to Washington where, instead of a rest, one must meet the accumulated business that has piled up during one's absence. However, I never felt better in my life so I have no cause to complain.

The railroads capitulated yesterday but we did not accept their surrender until this morning.<sup>1</sup>

My love to you both, Affectionately,

P.S. On reading this it occurred to me that, considering how busy I am, you are a hell of a correspondent! G. C. M.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Three railroad workers' unions had decided to strike for higher wages. To prevent this, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9412 authorizing the army to assume possession and control of the railroads as of 7:00 P.M. December 27. By the next morning, it appeared to Stimson that the unions involved were willing to call off their strike scheduled for December 29, but the secretary sought to delay announcing a settlement until the "moral effect" of the president's and the army's actions could be emphasized in his radio address on the evening of December 28 and by the news media. Marshall's confidence of the unions' surrender was premature, however, as the labor organizations announced on December 30 that, unless there was an acceptable wage settlement, the strike had merely been postponed. (December 23–31, 1943, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 45: 140–41, 147–73; quote on p. 155].) For more on the strike problem, see Marshall Memorandum for Justice Byrnes, January 5, 1944, pp. 234–35.

TO MAJOR GENERAL FOLLETT BRADLEY

December 29, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Bradley: I learned on my return home that your retirement had been accomplished and you were taking an important job, on a generous basis so far as your health was concerned, with the Sperry people. I am awfully glad that you can do this and have something important to engage your attention.

I felt very badly about you because I wanted to see you while you were in the hospital and arranged several times to make the trip, but always something interfered. I felt that you had made a great contribution and a great personal sacrifice in a most gallant manner, and I was distressed over the result to your health. Now, as I said before, I am so glad that you are on your feet to the extent that you can take up an important job. Please be



very careful and you will probably live much longer than I will, though I am pretty careful.<sup>1</sup>

With every good wish for the New Year, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Bradley had spent much of his time in the Soviet Union on various air-related missions between June 1942 and October 1943. He was to become president of the Sperry Gyroscope Company. He retired from the army officially on April 30, 1944.

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. 5898. *Secret*

December 29, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall to Eisenhower for his eyes only. Have just read your W-8792 of December 29th.<sup>1</sup>

I have three comments to make.

1. With reference to your E—had you considered the possibility of having Hodges go to the 5th Army? The UK assignment seems better but this is at least a thought.<sup>2</sup>

2. With reference to your G<sup>3</sup>—one of the principal objections of Portal to US overall command of strategic bombing force was that it involved the building up of another large headquarters. Arnold and I thought and assured him that this was not the case, that the overall commander did not need a large headquarters, quite the contrary in fact.<sup>4</sup> So I am disturbed if Spaatz is going to aggrandize his job in an administrative manner, it would defeat our purpose in placing the strategic air forces under one command. Tell him to follow Foch's method which is admirably suited to his job and oppose this usual human reaction to build up a heavy overhead. I cannot see it in his case though he probably can give you some very good diagrams of requirements but is [*it*] would still be unconvincing to me.<sup>5</sup>

3. With reference to your H—I agree fully with the necessity for reorganization to promote efficiency and economy particularly in personnel.<sup>6</sup> However I believe that the method by which it is accomplished should be a matter for the theater commander to determine in each case.

Finally with reference to your last paragraph I think you made a mistake by not coming home first.<sup>7</sup> Things have been going ahead in the UK for a long time and under a wise and aggressive man and Smith has already been there. You will be under terrific strain from now on. I am interested that you are fully prepared to bear the strain and I am not interested in the usual rejoinder that you can take it. It is of vast importance that you be fresh mentally and you certainly will not be if you go straight from one great problem to another. Now come on home and see your wife and trust somebody else for 20 minutes in England.<sup>8</sup>



NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 17, Item 28)

1. This was the second of a two-part reply to Marshall to Eisenhower, December 28, 1943, pp. 210–11; it is printed in *Papers of DDE*, 3: 1631–32. Eisenhower listed—(a) through (h)—his “understanding of our tentative agreements” regarding command arrangements.

2. Eisenhower had written: “(e) You will send Hodges to me in England when I call for him with eventual assignment to be either an army or alternate to Bradley as army group commander.” See the following document.

3. “(g) Doolittle goes to command Eighth Air Force,” Eisenhower wrote, “which, incidentally will be cut down in overhead to provide Spaatz overall headquarters.”

4. This discussion occurred during the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting at Cairo on December 4. Minutes are printed in *Foreign Relations, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, pp. 682–86.

5. Eisenhower quoted this paragraph to Walter Bedell Smith and directed that Smith call Marshall’s words to Spaatz’s attention. (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1642–43.)

6. Eisenhower had stated that “(h) U.S. theater and SOS organization in both theaters will be consolidated in interests of efficiency and economy.”

7. “With regard to my visit home,” the new Supreme Allied Commander had stated, “I feel that for the moment it is an impossibility. I truly hope that February or early March will afford me such an opportunity.”

8. Eisenhower replied on December 30 that Marshall was “mistaken in thinking that I fail to realize the desirability of a good rest. Moreover I realize that there has been a very fine man [Devers] operating in England. It happens that it is that particular man who has been urging me to arrive there as quickly as possible.” Eisenhower also feared that a hurried, busy trip to the United States, with long travel times each way, would not be restful. But he said that he would start for home within the next twenty-four to thirty-six hours. (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1641–42.) For Marshall’s response to this, see Marshall to Eisenhower, December 30, 1943, pp. 220–21.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY  
*Secret*

December 29, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Apropos of Eisenhower’s radio to me of today,<sup>1</sup> tell General McNair that Hodges will go to England. Work out with him, to your satisfaction, the transfer of an Army Headquarters in place of the Seventh Army Headquarters. I mean by this all of the Army troops, etc., that are involved. Do not allow numerology to control, or undue solicitude regarding the home front. Under the circumstances it would appear it should be selected troops and people from the Third Army staff, though the staff selections should be dictated by Eisenhower and not by Hodges. As a matter of fact, Patton will command the Army in all probability and Hodges may end up commanding the First Army.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See notes 1 and 2 in the previous document.

2. Courtney H. Hodges was relieved from Third Army command, becoming deputy to Omar Bradley, commander of First Army. George S. Patton was named to command Third Army effective January 26, 1944.



TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. 5899. *Secret*

December 29, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

For Eisenhower's Eyes Only from Marshall. There were several staff arrangements I had in mind should I have taken on OVERLORD. I now pass them on to you.

Colonel Lebel of the French Mission here in Washington was with General Bethouart at Casablanca. He has been my frequent contact here and played a part in the settlement of the mess in French Guiana.<sup>1</sup> He is forcible, straight down the road and apparently quite able in a military way. I intended to wire Giraud for authority to take Lebel with me to England. There I intended to put him on the planning staff and thus provide in a reliable manner and without confusion the French representation. He is better suited for this than any other Frenchman I have seen.

There is in England Colonel [Emmanuel] Lombard, Military Attache from France in Washington for 20 years and Liaison Officer with the First Division throughout the war in France. He is a gentle character who would be completely loyal and dependable. He resigned his post here and joined the Free French as evidence of his refusal to follow the Vichy procedure when they dismissed the French Ambassador in Washington. He has been with De Gaulle in England ever since. He wrote to me some time back applying for service on my staff if I went to England. I had thought that he would probably be the best bet for me to bring in to offset the Lebel appointment because Lombard is ostensibly Free French but actually a loyal American. Tony Biddle thinks he is perfect for the purpose. I had no particular job in mind thinking I would take him on the staff and let him finally fit into a place. He would probably be more or less a liaison but he would offset criticism by De Gaullists.

Tony Biddle, at present Ambassador, I intended to have commissioned as a Lieutenant Colonel and placed on my staff without announced portfolio.<sup>2</sup> My purpose was to have him the contact with the governments of the various countries for whom he is now responsible. The President was desirous of some such arrangement. He would not be replaced in his present civil capacity as Ambassador and I had no intention of announcing that he was to be the contact with the Belgians, Dutch, etc. However, that would be his job and he could proceed on that basis to relieve me or you of the headaches involved.

Please let me have your reaction as to Biddle because the President has been pressing me for action.<sup>3</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 17, Item 28)

1. Lieutenant Colonel Albert J. P. Le Bel was a member of Major General M. Emile Béthouart's French Military Mission. On March 17, 1943, the governor of French Guiana announced that his colony had switched its allegiance from Rear Admiral Georges Robert,



the Vichy government's high commissioner in Martinique, to General Henri Giraud's government in North Africa. For a while there was a possibility that Robert would use force to suppress the defection or that General de Gaulle's supporters would stage a coup. The United States thought that the airfield at Cayenne might be useful in the antisubmarine campaign. United States troops began entering French Guiana on March 20. (Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, *Guarding the United States and Its Outposts*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1964], p. 439.)

2. Since 1942, Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., served as U.S. ambassador to various governments-in-exile in London; by late 1943 these included Belgium, Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, Norway, and Poland.

3. Eisenhower replied on December 30: "the staff arrangements you had planned including that applying to Tony Biddle are completely acceptable to me. I will be glad to use all three officers and since I am having a short conference with De Gaulle this morning I think I will tell him of my intention to use both LeBel and Lombard." (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1641.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Secret*

December 29, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: German reprisals against American airmen.

Before the Russian Kharkov "trials"<sup>1</sup> it was predicted that, as the effects of the bombing of Germany grew more serious, desperate measures would probably be employed to discourage further attacks. The recently announced intent of the Germans to try captive American and British airmen is concrete evidence of such intention.<sup>2</sup> Just what action this Government and the Government of Great Britain should take remains to be determined, but I am of the opinion that such action should be prompt, whatever it may be. Also, it appears advisable in promulgating this action to address it to both German military and civil leaders and to the entire enemy population.

From the military point of view consideration naturally has been given to what line of action should be taken and the character of the statement to be made. It is believed unwise to specify any particular form of retribution. Any mention of chemical attack, for instance, or other specific measures might well play directly into German hands.

An important consideration in this matter is the fact that the German propaganda specifically excludes Russian airmen from the list mentioned. The probability is that the Germans recognize the fact that the Russians would retaliate immediately and in a manner that would be fatal to German interests. On the contrary the Germans have reason to assume that the pressures on the home front will tend to make the British and American reaction much softer. Whether or not the American public would at this time fully back reprisal in kind is a question, but it would



appear that if we take a strong position in the matter the public will shortly be led to accept the necessity of such decision, particularly if documented cases of mistreatment and torture were published. It is considered advisable that we should go this far at the present time.

There is another very important point to be considered in this matter and that is the reaction of the Japanese. They are in great fear of the bombing of Japan. They hold large numbers of Allied prisoners, while we hold few of theirs and those few the Japanese would ignore in their considerations. I anticipate that the moment the bombing of Japan is started the Japanese will resort to every conceivable measure to deter us from the continuation of that operation, to the extent of placing all of our people in their hands at the hazard. This will present a most serious situation and it should be considered at the present time in connection with the preliminary moves of the German Government to deter our bombing of their cities.

It is recommended that the Governments of the United States and Great Britain issue a statement to the effect that notice of the recent threats has been taken at the highest level and that immediate retaliatory action will be taken if such threats are carried out. A draft of such a preliminary statement is herewith submitted:

“The Governments of Great Britain and the United States have taken notice of the threats recently made by the German Government against British and American airmen captured by the German forces. Notice is hereby served on the German political and military leaders, and the civil population generally, that if these threats are carried out the Governments of the United States and Great Britain will adopt the most drastic measures to bring home to the German people a realization that any treatment of American or British prisoners not in strict accord with the recognized laws of warfare will be fatal to the future of the German people.”<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. In mid-December a Soviet military tribunal at Kharkov in central Ukraine had indicted and begun the trials of three German soldiers on charges of atrocities against Russian civilians. The Soviet government gave the trial considerable publicity, particularly regarding the complicity of high-level officials of the German government. It seemed likely that this trial would be followed by others. (*New York Times*, December 18, 1943, p. 1, and December 19, 1943, sec. 4, p. 3.)

2. On December 22 the German Foreign Office released an official statement hinting at reprisals against British and American prisoners of war. The German news agency stated that the Kharkov trial “was being carried out in accordance with principles laid down in the Teheran conference. . . . German military courts, therefore, will soon have to deal with British and American prisoners who are guilty of a serious breach of international law although they have not yet been brought to trial.” (*New York Times*, December 23, 1943, p. 3.)

3. The president replied: “I agree with you absolutely that we should have a definite



action in mind. It seems to me that such action need not be announced beforehand but that it should be put into effect the minute the Germans start anything. I think the American public would back this up. . . . In regard to Japan we have a difficult problem but though it is horrible to contemplate, I fear that we must be definite and firm. Will you be good enough to take up this question with the General Staff and also talk with the Secretary of State about it. I like your proposed statement." (Roosevelt Memorandum for General Marshall, January 10, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO MRS. JOSEPH W. STILWELL

December 29, [1943]  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Win, Upon my return from overseas I found your Christmas card with its note to Katherine and the news of your family, and what a charming family you have, too.

Joe, in Cairo, seemed to be looking better than when he was in Washington,<sup>1</sup> also he had a little opportunity for rest and relaxation, if he could manage the mental detachment necessary for that purpose. We went into India at practically the same time. As a matter of fact he landed at Karachi about an hour after I did, but he went on directly to New Delhi and I flew south to Ceylon.

Some time back I arranged that a rajah should invite him up to the vale of Kashmir for a vacation but he declined, said he was too busy and that he had been there once before.<sup>2</sup> It is a hard job to try to get him to lay off. All of the others are similarly resistant but most of them eventually break down. He seems to be made of iron.<sup>3</sup>

With my best wishes for the New Year to all of the family, Affectionately,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Stilwell had attended conferences in Washington in late April and early May; see *Papers of GCM*, 3:674-75.

2. See Marshall to Stilwell, September 22, 1943, p. 135.

3. At this time Stilwell, in his role as commanding general of the Chinese Army in India, was leading the Chinese Twenty-second and Thirty-eighth divisions on an invasion of northern Burma aimed at opening the route of the Ledo Road to Myitkyina. (Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 124-28.)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
[Radio No. 5997.] *Secret*

December 30, 1943  
Washington, D.C.

For Eisenhower's Eyes Only from Marshall. Delighted you are coming home. Will arrange for any trip or travel you desire and will make tentative preparations on basis of complete secrecy as to your presence here.



I am having Colonel McCarthy see Mrs. Eisenhower personally to explain prospects and possibilities and necessity for secrecy. She will be able to travel by plane with you wherever you may go in this country. We shall get her suggestions as to the most restful program. I think that if arrangeable matters should be handled on the basis of as much secrecy as possible until just before you leave Washington en route to England. If your trip west is to be immediately after a night's rest in Washington we can have comfortable plane with sleeper berths ready for you and Mrs. Eisenhower.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Eisenhower replied, in part, that he would like to visit his family in Kansas. "I doubt that Mrs. Eisenhower would want to go because of her extreme aversion to air travel." (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1646.) For more on Eisenhower's visit, see Marshall Memorandum for the President, January 4, 1944, p. 232.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SURLS

*Secret*

December 30, 1943

Washington, D.C.

We have been having increasing difficulty with members of Congress regarding physical rejections of men at induction stations. Since June 1st about 40% of the men reporting have been rejected and during the same period more than 200,000 have been discharged from the Army for physical disabilities. The point of this particular note is that between 25% and 35% of both rejections and discharges were for psychological and neuropsychiatric reasons. The War Department has taken steps drastically to curtail all discharges for disability pending the promulgation of new instructions which it is believed will materially reduce the wastage of manpower.<sup>1</sup>

In all of this matter the great problem is the handling of the psychoneurotics, and I am of the opinion that we should get out one way or another some additional information on the subject. The following is a rough draft hurriedly dictated by me on which I should like your opinion and which would have to be checked by G-1 and the Surgeon General.

G. C. M.

"The War Department has just completed, under the direction of the Inspector General, whose principal assistant, Major General Howard McC. Snyder, is a medical officer, a comprehensive survey of induction and discharge processes in continental United States relating to physical rejections of inductees and discharges from the service for similar reasons. 137 stations or installations were inspected so as to assure a nation-wide cross-section of the situation. As a result of this survey



new instructions have been issued which it is believed will materially reduce the number of rejections.

"However, one problem remains extremely difficult of solution. It pertains to the fact that between 25% and 35% of all rejections and discharges for physical reasons related to psychoneurotics. While in the opinion of the several high ranking and experienced medical officers participating in this inquiry the doctors concerned, Army[, ] Navy, and civilian, on duty at induction stations are performing their duties in a manner which precludes any thought of predilection or partiality, this does not mean that the line officers on duty at induction stations always agree with the medical officers or that the doctors do not at times disagree among themselves. Nevertheless it appears that all are doing their utmost to fill required quotas with the best material available.

"The greatest differences of opinion relate to rejections for psychiatric reasons. Most physical defects can be seen and measured and therefore quite accurately diagnosed and appraised. Psychiatric disorders, however, are for the most part invisible and their detection rests with the professional ability and experience of neuropsychiatrists. These specialists at times have appeared either over-enthusiastic or over-cautious. In other instances it is evident that medical personnel have been too limited in numbers or too inexperienced in training properly to diagnose the large groups of men which must pass rapidly through induction stations. As a consequence many psychoneurotics have been inducted into the armed forces, with the consequent complications of a later discharge.

"It is this question of psychoneurotics which is least understood and is most difficult to handle. Functional nervous diseases are recognized as entities by neuropsychiatrists but these disorders cannot as a rule be definitely measured nor confirmed by laboratory tests or objective findings. For this reason there is a greater divergence of opinion regarding these cases than in any others. To the specialists the psychoneurotic is a hospital patient. To the average line officer he is a malingerer.<sup>2</sup> Actually he is a man who is either *unwilling*, *unable*, or *slow* to adjust himself to some or all phases of military life and in consequence he develops an imaginary ailment which in time becomes so fixed in his mind as to bring about mental pain and sickness. In a sense this might be considered as shirking, yet among the thousands of psychiatric cases in the Army no record exists of any psychoneurotic ever having been convicted for malingering. This is because no doctor is either willing or able to state *under oath* that the pain complained of by the psychoneurotic is non-existent. The doctor may believe there is no pain. He may even say so—off the record—but he cannot swear to



it. For this reason the layman or uninitiated line officer inclines to the belief that a medical officer's diagnosis of psychoneurosis is either wrong or else that the doctor is influenced by a hyperconsiderate professional attitude.

"This view is emphasized in the light of certain happenings with which line officers in time become familiar. For example, at one general hospital during the course of this recent inquiry there were approximately 85 psychoneurotic patients. Most of these were walking about, performing light duties, and appearing quite content with their lot and with the prospect of an early discharge for physical disability. Shortly after representatives of The Inspector General arrived rumors spread through the hospital that discharges for physical disability, insofar as psychoneurotic disorders were concerned, had been discontinued. Immediately practically all the psychoneurotics became confined to their beds, too sick, by their own testimony, even to get up and go to meals.

"A further example has been handed down from the last World War when on the publication of the Armistice some 8,000 of 10,000 shell-shocked patients were reported to have made an instantaneous recovery.<sup>3</sup>

"The fact remains that thousands of hospital beds are being occupied by soldiers under observation and treatment for psychoneurosis who require the services of cooks, nurses, doctors, ward attendants, etc., all a burden on the Army and manpower generally. Whether or not the diagnosis in their cases is correct does not appear half so important as does the fact that the men are occupying hospital beds and taking up the valuable time of limited medical personnel. Furthermore, in most cases the primary reason for these men being in hospitals is not because doctors made patients of them but because line officers were unable to make soldiers out of them.

"The desire of commanders to be rid of below-average soldiers is understandable, particularly so when those commanders are necessarily held to rigid training schedules and the accomplishment of objectives according to a time schedule. In addition there is no established method by which psychoneurotics can be adjusted more slowly to military service than are normal soldiers. They all must of necessity, in a huge Army, receive virtually the same treatment and undergo similar training. The standards set for all men are more or less alike, but are based on what is to be expected of the average man. However, the true psychoneurotic is not average; he cannot keep up nor assimilate military life as do the others, whereupon, as a defense measure he discovers some ailment to which he attributes the reason for his inadequacy and immediately begins to go on sick report. This latter action is quite



frequently condoned, if not actually encouraged by the officers and non-commissioned officers who have become weary of waging a losing struggle to keep the men up to the standard of other soldiers. We find in some instances that the line officers have importuned medical officers to help rid them of the burden of these particular cases, meaning of course by the method of disability discharge. As one doctor stated: "Conducting sick call is a game of wits; the man says he has it and the doctor says he hasn't". In some cases it appears that the men are smarter than the doctors, especially the inexperienced medical officers, while on the other hand the doctors do not care to disregard the possibility that the psychoneurotic does have some organic ailment. In any event the psy[cho]neurotic eventually gets to the hospital. Once there the man's potential value to the service is either destroyed or seriously impaired. There he exchanges information regarding his ailment with other patients and from them he learns the symptoms most likely to perplex the doctors. He is recognized and treated as a sick man. He wears the clothes of an invalid. His food is brought to him. He is catered to by "grey ladies" and above all, he escapes from those duties which he seeks to evade. He cannot be punished for malingering, therefore the worst that can happen is to be sent back to his organization where he can and will start the same process all over again. In the meantime he enjoys a life of leisure with one great goal ahead, to wit, a discharge for physical disability, a comparatively high paid job as a civilian, a discharge bonus, and eventually a pension from the Veterans Administration Bureau.

"Perhaps the most important factor contributing to the spread of psychoneurotics in our Army has been the nation's educational program and environmental background since 1920.<sup>4</sup> While our enemies were teaching their youths to endure hardships, contribute to the national welfare, and to prepare for war, our young people were led to expect luxuries, to depend upon a paternal government for assistance in making a livelihood and to look upon soldiers and war as unnecessary and hateful. The efforts to change these teachings in a few short years have left millions of our people unconvinced. The burden of changing the minds of such people who are being inducted into the Army has fallen primarily upon the hard-worked young platoon leaders and company commanders of our great war Army and the indications at present are that the problem is not yet being satisfactorily met. This is manifested by the ever-increasing number of psychoneurotic patients crowding into our hospitals. A determined effort is being made throughout the Army to better this situation. It is admittedly difficult, and also



it is important that there be a general public understanding of the problem.<sup>5</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. “The outstanding medical problem of the Tunisia Campaign was the unexpectedly high incidence of psychiatric disorders,” which “constituted a heavy burden on forward medical units.” (Charles S. Wiltse, *The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1965], p. 144.) As a result, the army sought to weed out individuals who appeared to be susceptible to “battle fatigue.” By the end of 1943, the War Department’s concern about the manpower loss due to neuropsychiatric rejection at induction centers or discharges for neuropsychiatric reasons led it to place a publicity blackout on the release of information regarding the army’s psychiatric (and also malaria) problems. Discharge rates of enlisted men on certificates of disability for neuropsychiatric conditions had reached a peak in September and October 1943 of 35.6 and 34.6 men per thousand, more than three times the rate for the same time in 1942. In mid-November the War Department reversed its policy of discharging men with neuropsychiatric disorders and sought to use them in various ways. (Robert S. Anderson et al., eds., *Neuropsychiatry in World War II*, volume 1, *Zone of Interior*, a volume in *Medical Department, United States Army* [Washington: GPO, 1966], pp. 130–31, 206, 209. The problem of defining “psychoneurosis” in the military is discussed on pp. 229–32.)

2. George S. Patton’s treatment of two soldiers diagnosed as having psychiatric problems at hospitals in Sicily on August 3 and 10, 1943—the so-called “slapping incidents”—caused considerable press comment in the United States during November and December and focused attention on the causes of emotional problems in combat. Marshall’s office received numerous letters from civilians concerning Patton’s behavior. On these incidents, see Albert N. Garland and Howard McGaw Smyth, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* (Washington: GPO, 1965), pp. 426–31.

3. Not only was Marshall’s example “not supported by any known documentation,” according to Colonel Albert J. Glass, one of the editors of the army’s neuropsychiatry history, but the number of hospital admissions of neuropsychiatric patients increased briefly after the Armistice. Moreover, after the fighting stopped, there was a tendency to discharge hospitalized patients more readily and with certificates of less disability than they would have received had the war continued. (Anderson et al., eds., *Neuropsychiatry in World War II*, 1:132.)

4. The overall rejection rate for draftees during World War II was 5.7 times higher than during World War I and 15.3 times higher in the category “mental disease.” The rate of discharges of enlisted men for neuropsychiatric causes was 2.2 times higher in World War II. The foremost factor leading to the higher rates during World War II, according to the editors of *Neuropsychiatry in World War II*, was the experience of World War I, which led to stricter standards and screening procedures. (Ibid., pp. 769, 772–73.)

5. It took three months for this document to reach and be answered by the Surgeon General’s Office; the memorandum and changes suggested by the Division of Neuropsychiatry are printed *ibid.*, pp. 131–36. The memorandum was leaked to the press during January 1944. In part as a result of this, pressure from some reporters and magazine writers, who were becoming suspicious that the War Department was hiding something, and from the American Psychiatric Association forced a liberalization of the policy against public discussion of neuropsychiatry problems beginning in late April 1944. As a result of the lifting of the blackout, Marshall’s proposed press release was deemed unnecessary. Restrictions were not eliminated on publicity concerning the topic until September 1945. (Ibid., pp. 131, 137–42, 148–49.)



TO MRS. JOHN J. SINGER

December 30, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Marie, I received your note of welcome home and saw a letter from you to Katherine. I am glad you are well but sorry you have had a little trouble in your household staff. However, my sympathies are with the girl.

I had a rather strenuous trip considering the fact that flying tends to be monotonous, particularly on long flights and that once one reaches the ground the pressure is extreme to do a great deal in a short time. On top of all this the return to Washington means a heavy overburden of accumulated work. I am pretty well by that now and looking forward to seizing a chance to get a little rest. Just when and where has to be determined.

I did not see either of the boys abroad though I went through the same town in which Clifton is located but was only there for thirty minutes between battleship and plane, and heavily involved in secrecy requirements as to the President.

I had a delightful day at Luxor doing the Tombs and the Temple of Karnak by moonlight, then flew directly from there across to Arabia, to the Persian Gulf and then on to Karachi. My stay in Ceylon was brief but delightful though I did little outside of the Governor's House. However, he was luxuriously established and I thoroughly enjoyed the rest, the fruit and the food generally.

There were no luxuries in western Australia, New Guinea and the Solomons or the New Hebrides. Not until I reached Fiji could I relax comfortably.

My day in Los Angeles was exceedingly busy, in fact, rather strenuous. I lunched with the moving picture heads and directors—no actors—to talk business with them,<sup>1</sup> and spent all afternoon going through aviation plants there and at Long Beach. That night I dined with Douglas, Kindelberger and the other great aviation manufacturers. The weather stopped me from leaving at 10:00 o'clock for Washington, so Louis Mayer<sup>2</sup> arranged a 10:00 o'clock party for me of about 100 people, including my dinner guests, the plane manufacturers, with a private performance—not movies—by some of his select people. It involved beautiful singing, some clever acting and some riotously amusing skits. My supper companions were little Margaret O'Brien on one side and Greer Garson on the other.

I left Los Angeles early in the morning and flew straight through to Washington, arriving here at 10:00 o'clock the night of the 22nd. Katherine met me and we went to Leesburg the afternoon of the 24th, returning Sunday night the 26th. Molly returned from Arkansas with Jim on the 23rd and spent Christmas with us. She brought Jim up on the 27th to catch a train and she and Katherine went back to Leesburg. I hope to join them tomorrow night, the 31st.





*(1) General Dwight D. Eisenhower and General Marshall hold an informal press conference at Allied headquarters, Algiers, on June 3, 1943.*

*(2) Allied chiefs meet during the Algiers Conference, June 3, 1943. Seated left to right: British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, General Sir Alan Brooke, Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, General Marshall, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Standing left to right: Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, General Sir Harold Alexander, and General Sir Bernard Montgomery; standing in the left background are Lieutenant Colonel Frank McCarthy and Major General Thomas T. Handy.*







George C. Marshall Foundation, Lexington, Virginia






*(3 at left & 4 above) General Marshall enjoys a fishing trip while vacationing at Sainte Anne des Monts, Gaspé Peninsula, Quebec, June 22–24, 1943.*

*(5) General George C. Marshall was present when Director Oveta Culp Hobby took the oath of office as a colonel, Army of the United States, on July 5, 1943. Left to right: Brigadier General H. W. Lewis, acting Adjutant General of the Army; General Marshall; Colonel Hobby; and Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, commanding general of the Army Service Forces.*







*(6) Admiral William D. Leahy, General Henri Giraud, and General George C. Marshall pose for a photograph with President Franklin D. Roosevelt at the White House soon after Giraud's arrival in Washington, D.C., July 7, 1943.*





(7) Principal participants gather for a photograph during the Quebec Conference, August 18, 1943. Seated left to right: Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill. Standing left to right: General Henry H. Arnold, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, General Sir Alan Brooke, Admiral Ernest J. King, Field Marshal Sir John Dill, General George C. Marshall, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, and Admiral William D. Leahy.

(8) The Combined Chiefs of Staff meet at the Château Frontenac, Quebec, August 23, 1943. Left side of table to right: Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, General Sir Alan Brooke, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Field Marshal Sir John Dill, Lieutenant General Sir Hastings Ismay, Brigadier Harold Redman, Commander Richard Coleridge, Brigadier General John R. Deane, General Henry H. Arnold, General George C. Marshall, Admiral William D. Leahy, Admiral Ernest J. King, and Captain Forrest D. Royal.







*(9) General George C. Marshall sits at his desk in the Pentagon, before a portrait of General Pershing in the background, November 1, 1943.*





*(10) General and Mrs. Marshall during a visit at Hot Springs, Virginia, November 1943.*





*(11) Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President Roosevelt, and Prime Minister Churchill sit for a group picture with their military staff during the Cairo Conference, November 25, 1943. Chinese General Shang Chen stands at the right.*



*(12) General Marshall stands at the far left as photographers take pictures of Marshal Stalin, President Roosevelt, and Prime Minister Churchill during the Teheran Conference, November 28–30, 1943.*





(13) After attending the Cairo and Teheran conferences, General Marshall returned to the United States by way of the Southwest Pacific, where he stopped to visit General Douglas MacArthur and his commanders, December 15, 1943. Left to right: Lieutenant General George C. Kenney, commanding general of Allied Air Forces in the Southwest Pacific; Major General Stephen J. Chamberlin, General MacArthur's operations officer; Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, commanding general of the U.S. Sixth Army; General Marshall; and General MacArthur.





*(14) On his tour of the Pacific, General Marshall stops at Guadalcanal. With Marshall (center) are Lieutenant General Millard F. Harmon, commander of Army Forces in the South Pacific, and Vice Admiral Aubrey W. Fitch, commander of Air in the South Pacific. They flew over the northern Solomons to view firsthand the action on Bougainville, December 18, 1943.*



*(15) General Marshall inspects the Jungle Training Center in Hawaii, December 20, 1943. Lieutenant Colonel William C. Saffarans, commandant of the Jungle Training Center, explains the method of attack used on a simulated Japanese village.*






*(16) General George C. Marshall visits Admiral Chester W. Nimitz at Pearl Harbor on December 20, 1943.*



# TIME

THE WEEKLY NEWSMAGAZINE



MAN OF THE YEAR

He armed the Republic,  
(U.S. at War)

(17) General George C. Marshall appears on the cover of Time, January 3, 1944. Cover portrait drawn by Ernest Hamlin Baker.





*(18) General Marshall greets Private Joe Donner, a wounded veteran recovering at Walter Reed General Hospital, at the American Legion dinner at the Mayflower Hotel, where General Marshall spoke on February 3, 1944.*

*(19) General Marshall confers with Captain Florence T. Newsome in his Pentagon office. Newly promoted to lieutenant colonel, Newsome was a member of the General Staff when this photograph was released in February 1944.*







*(20) General Marshall inspects troops training at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, accompanied by Major General Stanley E. Reinhart, commander of the Sixty-fifth Infantry Division, on March 5, 1944.*

*(21) General Marshall inspects a Women's Army Corps Training Center at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, April 30, 1944. To Marshall's right is Major Pauline B. Muller, commander of troops, and behind is Lieutenant Colonel Elizabeth C. Strayhorn, the commandant.*







(22) Major General Edward M. Almond, commander of the Ninety-second Infantry Division, discusses training exercises during General Marshall's inspection tour of Fort Huachuca, Arizona, on May 2, 1944. Left to right: Colonel Frank McCarthy, Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Britt, Captain Snyder, General Almond, General Marshall, Lieutenant Lewis, and Major Johnston.

(23) During an inspection tour at Camp Adair, Oregon, on May 4, 1944, General Marshall discusses a training exercise with a noncommissioned officer of the Seventieth Division. At General Marshall's left are Brigadier General Robert N. Young, assistant division commander, and Major General John E. Dahlquist, commander of the Seventieth Infantry Division.







*(24) Second Lieutenant Allen Tupper Brown, General Marshall's stepson, was killed near Campoleone, Italy, on May 29, 1944.*

*(25) Soviet Ambassador Andrei A. Gromyko presents the Order of Suvorov, First Degree, to General Marshall at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., on June 5, 1944.*





With my love, Affectionately,

P.S. Give my affectionate regards to the Bovards and to Till.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall's remarks at this affair "concerning the future trend of motion picture production" inspired Darryl F. Zanuck, of Twentieth Century-Fox Studios, to write: "Your remarks on post-war picture production are the only encouraging words I have heard from anyone in an official capacity, either in or outside the motion picture industry or the War Department. I have devoted my time exclusively, for the past six months, to the production of post-war films; but with the exception of Walter Wanger on the civilian side, and Frank Capra on the military side, there is nothing constructive being done, and I am hopeful that your words will awaken interest." He said that he and Wanger, a producer at Universal Studios and president of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, were going to meet "to discuss the picture problem dealing with soldiers when they return to civilian life, the problem you suggested." (Zanuck to Marshall, December 22, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Mayer was head of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios (MGM).

TO MAJOR GENERAL FRANK R. SCHWENGEL

December 31, 1943  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Schwengel, Mrs. Marshall and I are deeply appreciative of the warming Christmas remembrance from you. It will carry us through quite a few months of the New Year.<sup>1</sup>

Confidentially, I might confess that for the first time in my life I have felt the need of a drink occasionally. Mrs. Marshall and I work very hard on our place down at Leesburg and by work I mean the pickaxe or pitchfork, the shovel and the wheelbarrow, and at times a crowbar—no labor ordinarily being available. As our work hours as a rule start at about 7:30 A.M. and we run up to about 6:00 P.M. whenever I am able to get away from Washington, both of us now find ourselves much in need of a pick-up and here is where you come into the picture. As a matter of fact I seemingly need at times to be completely picked up, though I find that on Monday morning my brain works at top speed.

With best wishes for you in the New Year, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. When Marshall was senior instructor for the Illinois National Guard, Schwengel had been commanding general of the Guard's Fifty-eighth Field Artillery Brigade in Chicago. At this time, Schwengel lived in New York City and was head of United States operations for Seagram's Ltd. of Montreal. He sent the Marshalls a case of Seagram's whiskey.







# Aggressive and Determined Leadership

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January 1 – March 31, 1944

*Aggressive and determined leadership, from the purely military point of view, is the final determining factor in warfare. Genuine discipline, sound training, suitable munitions and adequate numbers are essentials, but they will be ineffective without the dominating influence of strong leadership.*

—Marshall Statement in H. Merrill Pasco to Enit Kaufman  
March 13, 1944



# George C. Marshall Foundation

1991-1992 - 1993-1994

The George C. Marshall Foundation is a non-profit organization that promotes the study and teaching of the life and work of George C. Marshall. The Foundation was established in 1963 and is headquartered in Lexington, Virginia. It has a long history of supporting research and scholarship on Marshall's life and work, and it continues to do so today. The Foundation's activities include publishing books and articles, sponsoring lectures and conferences, and providing grants to scholars. The Foundation's website is [www.marshallfoundation.org](http://www.marshallfoundation.org).



APPEARING on the January 3, 1944, cover of *Time* magazine, General Marshall was named “Man of the Year” as a tribute for having transformed a “worse-than-disarmed U.S. into the world’s most effective military power.” *Time* praised Marshall for seven achievements since assuming the office of chief of staff: (1) building the army from two hundred thousand in 1939; (2) planning a training program and equipment schedule unmatched anywhere; (3) holding off “hastily planned or ill-advised military operations”; (4) insisting on unity of command in Allied forces; (5) refusing to send out green and ill-equipped troops; (6) recognizing early the importance of air power and promoting the air program; and (7) breaking the “traditionally supercilious War Department enmity toward innovations of equipment. New ordnance gets Marshall’s immediate attention.” The magazine said of Marshall: “The American people do not, as a general rule, like or trust the military. But they like and trust George Marshall. This is no more paradoxical than the fact that General Marshall hates war. The secret is that American democracy is the stuff Marshall is made of.” Crediting Marshall with being the “link between the biggest military establishment in U.S. history and the U.S. people,” he was “the closest thing to ‘the indispensable man.’” According to *Time*, “never in U.S. history has a military man enjoyed such respect on Capitol Hill.” Marshall, *Time* concluded, “had armed the Republic. He had kept faith with the people. In a general’s uniform, he stood for the civilian substance of this democratic society.” (*Time* 43[January 3, 1944]: 15–18.)

*Life* magazine also published an article in its January 3 issue which praised Marshall’s achievements as chief of staff. “Marshall’s prestige seems to be in direct ratio to his tendency to self-effacement. He preserves a barrier of reserve which few persons have crossed. He has many friends, but no really intimate ones. His associates do not claim to comprehend all facets of his personality.” *Life*, too, wrote of Marshall’s popularity on Capitol Hill: “Members of both Houses and both parties trust him as they trust no other witness, being persuaded he has no axes to grind, no personal ambitions, no motives save the welfare of the Army and the safety of the U.S. At hearings he is never mysterious or pompous, egotistical or dramatic. His candor is disarming, his veracity unquestionable. He avoids politics and oratorical clichés.” The article insisted that “wherever Marshall may find himself in 1944, there is no doubt that he will remain the nation’s No. 1 soldier.” (Lincoln Barnett, “General Marshall,” *Life* 16[January 3, 1944]: 50–54, 57–58, 60, 62; quotes on pp. 51–52.)

“I believe that the New Year will be one of great decisions for us,” Marshall replied to a congratulatory letter. This was an understatement. (Marshall to Douglas S. Freeman, December 31, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) As the year 1944 commenced, General Marshall faced an enormous responsibility: preparing for the



cross-Channel invasion, fighting the Italian campaign, planning Pacific strategy, and coordinating strategy in Southeast Asia—all while confronting a manpower shortage. ★

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
*Secret*

January 4, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

General Eisenhower arrived in Washington early Sunday morning on a fast flight from Algiers. I had brought him home, over his strenuous objections, to force him to take a brief rest before he undertakes his heavy obligations in England. He was to have left Washington the evening of the day he arrived, but bad weather intervened and he was delayed until the next evening when he went up to see his son at West Point. He goes on to see his mother. He will then take a few days with Mrs. Eisenhower in a cottage at the White Sulphur Springs hospital, after which he is to come back to Washington.

As you have been confined to your room and it was desired to get General Eisenhower out of town as quickly as possible, to avoid publicity, I did not bring up the matter of his seeing you. On his return to the city I should like to have you give him an appointment.

I hope to have him return to Washington just before his departure for England. We have placed a strict censorship on everything regarding him but even so if he is seen about town the matter is bound to leak.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. General Marshall had urged General Dwight D. Eisenhower to come home for a rest before assuming his new duties as Supreme Allied Commander in England. (See Marshall to Eisenhower, December 29 and 30, 1943, pp. 215–16, 220–21.) Eisenhower arrived in Washington on Sunday, January 2, 1944, in the early morning. The next evening General Marshall hosted a dinner for Eisenhower and other visiting military officers—Lieutenant General George C. Kenney, Major General J. Lawton Collins, and Admiral Harold R. Stark—to meet with top congressional leaders. (January 3, 1944, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 46: 3–4].) General and Mrs. Eisenhower visited their son, John (U.S.M.A., 1944), at West Point. He visited family members at Manhattan, Kansas, and spent several days with Mrs. Eisenhower at a cottage at the U.S. Army's Ashford General Hospital, converted from the Greenbrier Hotel resort, in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia. Eisenhower met with the War Department staff and with President Roosevelt before he departed the United States on January 13, arriving in London on the fifteenth. (Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1948], pp. 216–20. Butcher gives his account of the trip to Washington in *My Three Years with Eisenhower: The Personal Diary of Captain Harry C. Butcher, USNR, Naval Aide to General Eisenhower, 1942 to 1945* [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946], pp. 464–69.)



TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL MILLARD F. HARMON<sup>1</sup>

January 4, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Harmon, A special effort is being made to increase production in industrial plants in the United States. The measure which appears to provide the best incentive to the workers is the showing of films in the plants of the actual conditions under which operations are conducted on the various fronts.

To produce such films a considerable increase in such footage must be available. Especially is it desired that this footage cover the war as it is actually being fought, without the usual effort to eliminate the tragic aspects of battle or campaign.

The program is now handicapped by insufficient footage of film of combat conditions and it is therefore important that an effort be made to obtain such footage and rush it to the War Department as quickly as possible. The following are particularly desired:

- a. Actual combat scenes involving men, equipment, armored vehicles and weapons in actual operation.
- b. Scenes showing casualties during and immediately after action.
- c. Results obtained by American artillery, aerial bombs, hand grenades, mortars and other destructive weapons.

The Under Secretary of War, who is charged with supervision of production, will greatly appreciate your seeing that the necessary instructions are given to procure these views.<sup>2</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Harmon was commanding general of United States Army Forces in the South Pacific Area. This letter was sent to all combat theater commanders.

2. Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson reported that between June 1943 and February 1944 the number of motion picture film showings in war industry had grown steadily from 458 showings to an attendance of 75,000 in June 1943 to 20,499 showings to an attendance of 5,317,417 individuals in February 1944. During this same time period, the films had been shown over 56,000 times to over 15,000,000 individuals on the home front to stimulate war industry and civilian morale. (Patterson Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, March 23, 1944, and Marshall [Somervell] Radio to Theater Commanders, March 28, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MORALE  
SERVICES DIVISION  
*Confidential*

January 4, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

When I was staying with the Governor of Ceylon at Colombo, Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton, he expressed great interest in our special films, the



"Prelude to War", the "Nazi Strikes", "The Battle of Britain", and the "Fall of France", and especially the more recent film, the title of which I have forgotten, which portrays the British people to the American doughboy.<sup>1</sup> I wish you would arrange to have these films sent to him with my compliments. If it is necessary to do it on a loan basis, do so.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. For Marshall's comments about the "Why We Fight" film series directed by Frank Capra, see *Papers of GCM*, 3: 411, 449-50. Marshall was referring to the film *Know Your Ally—Britain*, produced by Capra in 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR JUSTICE BYRNES  
*Secret*

January 5, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

The following information will probably be of interest to you.

An analysis of the intercepts on the Axis propaganda campaign, commencing with the coal strike issue from May 1st to 5th and the 26th of June to July 1st—the last dates in connection with the Smith-Connally Bill and the Detroit race riots<sup>1</sup>—indicate that the enemy objectives in commenting on U. S. labor troubles have taken the following lines:

To stress Axis unity and strongly contrast it with U. S. disunity, picturing the Allies as weakening, and to discourage occupied areas as to the possibility of Allied help.

To portray President Roosevelt as out of favor with the settled elements in the United States and to ridicule him as the "tool of Jews and communists."

To present the United States as a place of social unrest and insecurity, with the four freedoms meaningless.

To indicate a division between the United States and Great Britain because the U. S. was falling down on production and U. S. workers were demanding and getting more than British workers.

Today, from our most secret and absolutely authentic source (which must not be mentioned to anyone) we find instructions to Axis propagandist representatives in the U. S. and Latin America to forego any comments regarding the current hullabaloo over a "high Government official" and the rail and steel workers. Nothing is to be done that would crystalize feeling in this country in support of the "high Government official."<sup>2</sup> Three different instructions of this nature have been issued.

It is to be understood from the foregoing that these instructions have nothing to do with propaganda that is being poured into Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria, and the Balkan Peninsula generally.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)



1. In reaction to the United Mine Workers striking in May 1943 and other workers' strikes, Congress passed in June the War Labor Disputes Act, known as the Smith-Connally Act, over President Roosevelt's veto. The legislation called for unions to give thirty days' notice before striking, empowered the president to seize a war industries plant shut down because of a strike, and prohibited strikes in plants seized by the government. (Byron Fairchild and Jonathan Grossman, *The Army and Industrial Manpower*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1959], pp. 78–79.) For information on the June 1943 Detroit riot, see Marshall Memorandum for the President, June 28, 1943, p. 37.

2. Concerning the strike threats, see note 1, Marshall to King, December 29, 1943, p. 214. Stimson suspected that the strike had only been postponed. He talked with Marshall on December 31 and recorded that the chief of staff "was very explosive on the subject of the effects the railroad strike and the taking over of the railroads by the Government would have on German propaganda. He said he thought that it would protract the war by six months and it came out for the first time that he had told me, his hopes that we might have a collapse of Germany this spring, largely through the operation of our propaganda in the Balkans and in the satellite Axis countries. Now he thinks that is all gone with the wind." James F. Byrnes, director of the Office of War Mobilization, requested that Marshall call an off-the-record press conference that same afternoon, at which time "he gave them a blast on the same subject." (December 27, 29, and 31, 1943, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 45: 153–54, 164–65, 172].) The chief of staff's remarks were publicized, although initially attributed to an unnamed "high Washington official." Soon Marshall was identified as the "high official" who had stated in the press conference that the "taking over of the railroads by the Army and the walkout in the steel mills may have prolonged the war against Germany by six months, causing hundreds of thousands of needless casualties." Labor leaders—such as William Green, president of the American Federation of Labor—challenged Marshall to prove that the labor disputes had strengthened enemy propaganda. (*Washington Post*, January 4, 1944, pp. 1, 2; *New York Times*, January 4, 1944, pp. 1, 13.) For a related theme, see the last paragraph of Marshall's Remarks at American Legion Dinner, February 3, 1944, p. 265.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL,  
U.S. ARMY FORCES, NORTH AFRICAN THEATER  
OF OPERATIONS [DEVERS]

January 18, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

*Secret*

Subject: Extension of War Department Manpower Board Activities  
to the North African Theater of Operations.

1. The cut-back of the projected military manpower in the Troop Basis from 8,200,000 to 7,700,000 necessitates the utmost economy in the use of that manpower. With this in view, the War Department Manpower Board was created, operating under my direct supervision, and has physically surveyed hundreds of posts, camps and stations and other military installations in the United States. The Board has effected large economies in military manpower in the operation of the above referred to establishments through the elimination of surplus personnel as well as the substitution of



civilians where military status was not essential. In addition to the activities of this Board, the Commanding Generals of the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces and the Army Service Forces, have been revising their table of organization units in order to enforce a stricter economy in the use of personnel.

2. The manpower issue has now become so critical that I have now directed the Manpower Board to extend its activities to the U. S. Army communications zones in overseas theaters, and the North African Theater has been selected for the initial survey. The number and composition of the units now employed in the operation and security of the installations, and the greater use of local inhabitants in the support of military operations will be considered, as well as the volume of supplies now stored throughout the entire area, to determine if there are excesses that may be placed to better use elsewhere.

3. A Theater of Operation Section of the War Department Manpower Board under the Chairmanship of Major General Jack W. Heard has been directed to conduct this survey, and to work in close cooperation with your headquarters.<sup>1</sup> The Board has been given full information concerning the present and immediate future plans in that area insofar as they are known to the War Department. Please see that subordinate commanders under your jurisdiction extend to the Board full assistance and cooperation, in order that a mutual understanding of your problem and the views and plans of the War Department may be obtained and merged into an orderly solution by indicating changes in the existing set-up acceptable to you, which will result in effecting these changes as rapidly as existing conditions permit, either by you direct or your request to the War Department where such action is necessary.

4. In order that you may have a clear understanding of the function of the Board, you are advised that its action is advisory only. It operates directly under the War Department. The Board, during its surveys of the existing installations will, from time to time, prepare a series of reports showing the changes that, in its opinion, should be made in the existing organization to meet the present and immediate future military requirements in that theater, together with changes, if any, that are being effected. This will be sufficiently detailed to include a resume of the troops required to operate the installations, a list of the organizations considered surplus, as well as the general character and quantity of supplies, if any, made surplus. In the preparation of its reports, the Board will maintain close consultation with your staff. The reports of the Board will be submitted direct to the War Department after obtaining your comments and recommendations.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OCS, Project Decimal File 1944-45, 321 WDMB)



1. Heard (U.S.M.A., 1910) had been commanding general of the Fifth Armored Division before he was assigned to the War Department Manpower Board in March 1943.

2. Major General Lorenzo D. Gasser, president of the War Department Manpower Board, reported to General Marshall that Heard had completed his mission in the North African theater in early June 1944. (Gasser Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, June 3, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, Project Decimal File 1944–45, 321 WDMB].)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL CARL SPAATZ  
[Radio No. 5522.] *Secret*

January 18, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Spaatz from Marshall. I was absent from Washington at the time of your great offensive of January 11th and have only now been informed of the details.<sup>1</sup>

Please give the leaders and their pilots and crews my thanks and warmest congratulations on a splendid demonstration of skill and courage with devastating results to the enemy. The great air war they are offensively waging over Europe is approaching a decision which will have a determining effect on the collapse of German resistance.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. General and Mrs. Marshall had left Washington in the afternoon of Friday, January 7, for a trip to Miami, Florida, and they returned on Sunday, January 16. "Following my return from abroad I was deeply involved for a week or ten days in catching up with affairs," the chief of staff wrote to a friend. "Tired both from the trip and from the heavy pressures on my return home, I took Katherine and slipped off to Miami Beach where we had a cottage and a private bathing beach, and were completely cut off from outside contacts. We had a fine rest without our presence being known." (Marshall to Mrs. E. T. Comer, January 28, [1944], GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].) Marshall describes his trip to Miami in Marshall to Singer, January 19, 1944, p. 243.

On January 11, 1944, the Eighth Air Force attacked targets in the vital German aircraft industry. A force of 663 B-17s and B-24s took off to bomb aircraft parts and assembly plants at Oschersleben, Halberstadt, and in the Brunswick area. The Allies encountered stiff German fighter opposition and lost sixty bombers that day. (Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day, January 1944 to May 1945*, a volume in *The Army Air Forces in World War II* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951], pp. 21–24.) Spaatz, commander of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, reported on January 12 that "fighter-bomber coordination was excellent," particularly given the extremely bad weather conditions. Initial reports and German claims magnified bomber losses and minimized bomb damage, but as data came in from dispersed forces, Spaatz told Arnold on January 16, the mission's appearance "changed from complete failure to highly successful." (Spaatz to War Department, January 12, 1944, In Log, pp. 111–12, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Message Log]; Spaatz to Arnold, Radio No. K-3141, January 16, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)



TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JACOB L. DEVERS  
Radio No. 7598. *Secret*

January 19, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Devers Eyes only from Marshall. Your telephone conversation with Handy, your number W-448 and my 7403 in relation to General Eisenhower's communications have developed a rather confused understanding in the matter of General Officer personnel. Eisenhower's original idea was that Patton would go to England, Clark after SHINGLE to ANVIL, Lucas to Fifth Army for the time being, and that Truscott would be advanced to Corps Command. In your message number W-448 of yesterday you accept this in contrast to your previous recommendations. I therefore conclude that Clark and Lucas will provide Army Commanders to the extent necessary for your situation.<sup>1</sup>

You have asked for a Relief Corps Commander. We are prepared to give you the selection of Crittberg[er], Woodruff, Reinhardt, Walker or Haislip, now Corps Commanders in or en route to England.<sup>2</sup>

With further reference to Corps Commanders and in view of Truscott's probable fatigue at the present time, would you consider releasing him for England after SHINGLE? There is a particular desire to get him in England because of his previous experience in the Dieppe affair and in planning for cross-channel operations.<sup>3</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-7430])

1. On January 17 General Marshall had sent a message to Devers: "In your conversation with [Thomas] Handy, you recommended [Courtney] Hodges, Simpson, or some other as Army Commander for ANVIL. ANVIL should have a battle experienced Commander. The only 2 that can be considered available are Clark and Patton. I am querying Eisenhower for his reaction to the release of Patton for this purpose. Would Patton be acceptable to you? The choice rests between Patton and Clark. [John] Lucas was set to replace Clark." Marshall suggested Major General Lucian K. Truscott as a possible corps commander. (Marshall to Devers, Radio No. 7403, January 17, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-6433)].) Devers replied on January 18: "Prefer to make no changes. Clark to command ANVIL, Lucas Army. Recommend Truscott to command corps and remain in this theater." (Devers to Marshall, Radio No. W-448, January 18, 1944, In Log, p. 152-AA, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Message Log].) Lieutenant General William H. Simpson was commanding general of the Fourth Army. SHINGLE was the code name for the amphibious landing operation at Anzio, Italy.

2. Major General Willis D. Crittberger, commanding general of the Nineteenth Corps, took its headquarters to England in January 1944. In March he assumed command of the Fourth Corps in the Italian campaign. Major General Roscoe B. Woodruff (U.S.M.A., 1915) had taken the Seventh Corps to England in September 1943. In February 1944 he assumed command of the Nineteenth Corps in England. Woodruff returned to the United States in March and became commanding general of the Eighty-fourth Infantry Division at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana. Major General Emil F. Reinhardt (U.S.M.A., 1910) was commanding general of the Eighth Corps in the European Theater of Operations. Major General Walton H. Walker was commanding general of the Fourth Armored Corps, which in October 1943 had been redesignated as the Twentieth Corps. Major General Wade H. Haislip was commanding general of the Fifteenth Corps, which in July 1943 had moved to the Desert Training Center with Haislip the commanding general of the installation. The



Fifteenth Corps had sailed for the European theater in December 1943 and would receive additional training in Northern Ireland and England before landing in France in July 1944.

3. "Decisions for future command were made before my arrival, but had not yet been implemented," replied Devers. "Clark with his excellent staff is doing splendidly with the 5th Army. My recommendations were based upon my belief that a change in command, with inevitable changes in staff while seriously engaged with the enemy, would be unwise." Devers noted that "Clark desires Truscott as his corps commander for ANVIL. After SHINGLE, Truscott will have an opportunity for rest. He knows the officers and men of the 6th Corps and should, in my opinion, remain here to command it." (Devers to Marshall, January 23, 1944, In Log, p. 203-AA, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Message Log].)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. R-8316. *Secret*

January 19, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

To Eisenhower for his EYES ONLY from Marshall. Patton is now without an assignment in the Mediterranean Theater and Devers desires orders issued for him. Do you want him sent to UK now? I considered ordering him home for a short time prior to his going to England. However in view of the publicity given his case, his presence here, if not kept secret, might result in reopening the entire matter with vituperative discussions and speculations as to his future. You realize how difficult it would be to keep his presence secret. In accordance with your wishes as stated here Hodges is being held in US until you call for him. 3rd Army Headquarters is moving to UK. I have submitted names of Crittenberger, Woodruff, Reinhardt, Haislip and Walker to Devers for indication of his preference for extra Corps Commander. 3rd Division is set up for SHINGLE and decision on Truscott must be delayed.<sup>1</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-7432])

1. "I agree with you that Patton should not go to the United States," Eisenhower replied on January 20. (For information on the Patton "slapping incidents," see note 2, Marshall Memorandum for General Surles, December 30, 1943, p. 225.) "Although he would have been a good man for ANVIL, if he is not to be used in that capacity, he should be ordered here for duty since I need an additional Army commander. One disadvantage to this arrangement is that Hodges will be separated from his Third Army staff." (*The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, ed. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., et al. [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970–], 3: 1669–70.) The Third Army headquarters departed for England on January 26. In February 1944 Lieutenant General Courtney H. Hodges was assigned as deputy commanding general of First Army. See the previous document for related information.

TO BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN MCA. PALMER

January 19, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear John, Katherine showed me your letter to her regarding the



possibility of my papers being turned over to the Library of Congress.<sup>1</sup> This, I assumed, related to some future date presumably on the completion of my job as Chief of Staff.

Before turning the matter over in my mind in any detail I should like to get your comments on these factors in the matter:

In the first place the major portion of my correspondence pertains to the official files of the War Department. I don't mean "major" in the sense of numerous letters but rather of the importance of letters. I have followed a practice of almost never writing to a theater commander, to the extent that some of them have been offended because I have not given written answers to their frequent communications. The reason for this has been the wish to avoid any misunderstandings as to what was required. Their instructions are prepared by me and edited in the Operations Division, or the reverse, and are usually transmitted by radio.

The most important matters relate to formal memoranda to the U.S. or Combined Chiefs of Staff, minutes of the various meetings, and numerous hastily dictated memoranda from me to various Chiefs in the War Department—all of which pertains to War Department files.

There is a mass of correspondence with a wide variety of individuals in this country. These would have some future interest but they are on relatively unimportant matters—in the main being merely polite acknowledgments. Their principal interest would be in the reflection of the attitude of people generally to the Army effort, the war effort, or to me personally. These are already filed and indexed in my office. I have had in mind that on leaving here I would leave the file cases so that future correspondence could be largely prepared for me here in the War Department, wherever I might be.

The substance of the foregoing seems to me to be a case of having very little of more than mild human interest to turn over for file in the Congressional Library.

You spoke of the Washington papers.<sup>2</sup> The point there was that he did not work for any War Department and therefore his correspondence, other than as collected in his Barrack books, was not on file anywhere.

Now as to my papers prior to coming to the War Department; they are almost nonexistent. I have never kept any but a few selected letters on the principle that if I had many even the choice ones would be lost in the confusion of the mass. Some few letters have been collected by Katherine and pasted in a scrap book; they go back some distance into my earlier career, but they would not number more than twenty or thirty in all and are letters to me, not from me.<sup>3</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Palmer, a consultant in military history for the War Department who had an office at the Library of Congress, had written to Mrs. Marshall that he, along with the librarian,



believed that General Marshall's papers should eventually be deposited in the Manuscripts Division for future historians and biographers. "I feel that all our future is being shaped in the great activities of today and I see now, as posterity will appreciate more and more, that George is one of the most influential and potent actors in this greatest of all world dramas," wrote Palmer. "He leads his fellow actors in intellect and genius but his dominating influence, like Washington's, is in the field of character—the selflessness to which Mr. Stimson referred. The day will come when this dominating but lovable personality will be of supreme interest to historians and biographers and they will seek its manifestations in every letter or memorandum that he ever wrote." (Palmer to Katherine Marshall, January 18, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Palmer was referring to Secretary of War Stimson's reference to General Marshall which had been published in the January 3, 1944, issue of *Life* magazine. "I have watched his every act; and I can tell you he is one of the most selfless men I ever met," Stimson was quoted. (Barnett, "General Marshall," p. 51.)

2. "It is, perhaps, my four years study of the 'Washington Papers', that makes me appreciate the great importance of what I am writing to you," Palmer had written to Mrs. Marshall. "In my knowledge of 'Washington' derived from his intimate personal letters as well as his state papers I find always the 'selflessness' that Mr. Stimson attributes to George. But G.W. was almost entirely devoid of the sense of humor that G. M. always carries with him and even G.W. was not entirely free from the 'God Almighty complex' from which G. M. is so amazingly free." (Palmer to Katherine Marshall, January 18, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. "Make no decision now," Palmer replied, "except that when the proper time comes you will consider the Library of Congress as a possible custodian for such historical and biographical material as you may have. The appraisal of what you have and every other detail can wait until you doff your uniform and settle down as a country gentleman at Leesburg." (Palmer to Marshall, January 26, 1944, *ibid.*)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL  
ROBERT C. RICHARDSON, JR.  
*Confidential*

January 19, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Richardson: I received the 7th Division booklet with your card, which I was much interested in reading, and thank you for sending. I also received your letter transmitting the copy of your confidential statement to Admiral Nimitz regarding Marine Corps matters.<sup>1</sup>

Admiral King has not spoken to me in the matter so I don't know exactly what the result will be. However, you have made the issue very clear and I am quite certain it will be most helpful.

I have been away for ten days and just returned. I find that during my absence some progress has been made in the matter of supplying you with Italian prisoners.<sup>2</sup> I hope this goes through without undue delay.

I radioed Nimitz requesting that he have a survey made of the rear areas, particularly in the South Pacific, to see if we could not greatly conserve in Army strength and mentioned your needs in Hawaii and our difficulties in supplying them from the States.<sup>3</sup> I saw a message from him to Halsey's



command in the South Pacific directing that an officer familiar with the situation report at Nimitz' headquarters in Hawaii, so I presume some action will be taken.

We have under consideration now the assignment of Major General Troy Middleton who commanded the 45th Division in Sicily and at Salerno and also north of Naples. He injured his knee to such an extent that it limited his capacity for inspections in that mountainous country. Therefore he was relieved from command of the division. This was most unfortunate as his performance had been brilliant. McNair wants him as a Corps commander in this country and we are considering him as the Corps commander you asked for in Hawaii. We shall decide the question after he reaches Washington.<sup>4</sup>

Again with my thanks for your bountiful and beautifully ordered hospitality, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Richardson, commanding general of army forces in the Central Pacific Area, had sent photographs to Marshall which were taken during his visit to the Seventh Division at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. (Richardson to Marshall, December 24, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) At Admiral Nimitz's request, Richardson had written a memorandum to Nimitz regarding the Fifth Amphibious Corps. Richardson observed that "through no fault of its own, the United States Marine Corps has a very limited number of officers who have been trained for the duties of a corps staff. . . . I feel that as a tactical headquarters the Fifth Amphibious Corps is an unnecessary echelon of command and that it has no means, combat or service, to further the successful capture, defense, or development of bases in the Central Pacific Area." He therefore recommended that the Fifth Amphibious Corps exercise only administrative functions in connection with Marine Corps troops. "When the time arrives for the employment of a tactical corps as such in the Central Pacific Area, both the corps headquarters and the corps troops, combat and service, be furnished by the Army." (Richardson Memorandum to Nimitz, December 27, 1943, enclosed in Richardson to Marshall, December 29, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 323.3 Amphibious Forces].)

2. On December 30, 1943, Marshall notified Richardson that the War Department was considering moving Italian prisoners of war to Hawaii for use on labor projects. Richardson responded on January 2 that he could employ four thousand such men in handling supplies, laundries, road work, and general engineer labor. He would, however, require additional military police escort guard companies. (Marshall to Richardson, December 30, 1943, Out Log, p. 88, and Richardson to Marshall, January 2, 1944, In Log, p. 16, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Message Log].)

3. Richardson had requested an increase in personnel for his headquarters. Marshall had notified Admiral Nimitz, commander in chief of the Pacific Ocean Areas and Richardson's superior, that "physical availability of personnel has become a critical problem to the extent that most of our combat divisions are under strength. . . . A superficial examination indicates that there are troops in rear areas in the Pacific considerably in excess of requirements." Nimitz was asked to survey what reallocation of army personnel and units might meet Richardson's needs. (Marshall to Nimitz, January 11, 1944, Out Log, p. 29, *ibid.*)

4. Middleton returned to the United States from the North African theater in late January 1944. In mid-February he entered Walter Reed General Hospital for observation and treatment of his arthritic knee, and the disposition board recommended that he be



returned to duty status. Middleton was assigned to the European theater in March 1944. (GCMRL/Research File [Middleton]; Marshall to Eisenhower, March 3, 1944, Out Log, p. 13, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Message Log].) See Marshall to Eisenhower, February 25, 1944, pp. 317–18.

TO MRS. JOHN J. SINGER

January 19, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Marie, I found on my return to town a statement of the annual meeting of the shareholders of the Pennsylvania Wire Glass Company, together with a proxy for my signature. If you have any of this stock I should be interested to learn whether or not you think it is advisable to hold on or to sell, at least what is the status of the stock. I have no idea what it is worth or anything else about it but I am inclined to convert stocks into cash and in turn invest in Liberty bonds or in material things such as real estate adjacent to us at Leesburg.<sup>1</sup>

Katherine and I had a delightful rest at Miami Beach, a lovely cottage with private bathing beach and no intrusions of any kind whatsoever. I did not even see any of the commanders concerned until the last afternoon at 5:30 when I had them and their wives in for tea. I wore civilian clothes and was seldom recognized and fortunately was never picked up by the papers.<sup>2</sup>

I suppose the cold weather made things difficult for you in Greensburg. I found a fairly heavy snow on the ground on my return to Washington.

With my love, Affectionately,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall's sister replied that she knew nothing about the company, but she suggested that Marshall wait until after the meeting to see if they voted to liquidate. (Singer to Marshall, [January 22, 1944], GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) In February, Marie wrote that the company had been sold at a bankrupt sale. Marshall replied that he had "received a small check from Pittsburgh Glass on account of the closing out of business, with the implication that other checks might follow." (Singer to Marshall, February 8, 1944, and Marshall to Singer, February 12, [1944], *ibid.*)

2. For information on Marshall's trip to Miami, see note 1, Marshall to Spaatz, January 18, 1944, p. 237.

TO MAJOR GENERAL BRUCE MAGRUDER

January 20, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Magruder, I had not heard of you for a long time and was very much pleased to learn yesterday from General McNair that you were doing a splendid job at Camp Wolters. Frankly I had been checking up on all



training installation commanders to make certain that our efforts were going forward at top speed; therefore my inquiry was of a critical nature, and General McNair's commendation all the more impressive.<sup>1</sup>

With warm regards, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Magruder was the commanding general of the Infantry Replacement Training Center at Camp Wolters, Texas. "When I say I appreciate very much your kind letter," Magruder replied, "I am thinking not only of my satisfaction in knowing that you feel we are alert to the seriousness and importance of our job, but also of the fact that you took time from your manifold duties to let me know it. Your fine leadership is an inspiration to all, and deserves the very best from each and every one of us." (Magruder to Marshall, January 28, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].) For Marshall's 1939 advice to Magruder not to overwork, see *Papers of GCM*, 2: 31-32.)

TO MAJOR GENERAL THOMAS A. TERRY<sup>1</sup>

January 20, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Terry, Thank you very much for having Mrs. Marshall so carefully looked after on her recent bond-selling trip to New York.<sup>2</sup> I appreciate the care and consideration given her. I ask you to thank the Colonel who looked after her; unfortunately I don't recall his name. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Terry (U.S.M.A., 1908) was the commanding general of the Second Service Command at Governors Island, New York.

2. Mrs. Marshall had joined Mrs. Mark W. Clark in New York City for the opening of the Fourth War Loan drive. The two generals' wives held a press conference, and they dedicated a "donutmobile" which toured the city offering doughnuts to purchasers of war stamps. "Soft-spoken" Mrs. Marshall was reported to have said that there were "thousands of intangible threads stretching across the water, each one reaching some woman back home. Whether you realize it or not, you women symbolize what they are fighting for—their homes, their families and their countries." (*New York Times*, January 18, 1944, p. 40.) Mrs. Marshall relates her account of the bond-selling trip in Katherine Tupper Marshall, *Together: Annals of an Army Wife* (New York: Tupper and Love, 1946), pp. 184-86.)

TO PALMER HOYT<sup>1</sup>

January 22, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Hoyt, Thank you for your note of January seventeenth with the copy of the editorial. Please tell Parrish that I appreciate very much his generous comments regarding me.

My mind often goes back to my first meeting with Parrish. I think I took him out to see a veteran CCC camp on the Target Range near Vancouver.



But my particular recollection goes to an editorial he did on a brass cross and candelabra we had secured for the old Army chapel at Vancouver. We could obtain nothing through Army appropriations at that time in any other manner. Therefore the collection of brass was made which included a great many mementoes, old chandeliers, discarded plumbing fixtures, and our chaplain secured the gratis services of the Vancouver foundry to turn out a very handsome cross and candelabra. Parrish did a fine editorial on it.

With warm regards, Faithfully yours,

P.S. I saw Healy yesterday and had a long conversation with him—during which I did most of the talking.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. (Edwin) Palmer Hoyt, publisher of the Portland *Oregonian* newspaper, had been the director of the Domestic Branch of the Office of War Information during July to December 1943. George W. Healy, Jr., on leave from the New Orleans *Times-Picayune*, succeeded Hoyt as director of the O.W.I.'s Domestic Branch. Hoyt had sent to Marshall an editorial which Philip H. Parrish had written for the *Oregonian*. The editorial is not in the Marshall papers. (Hoyt to Marshall, January 17, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

TO GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR  
Radio. *In the Clear*<sup>1</sup>

January 24, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

For MacArthur from Marshall to be delivered January 26. Congratulations on both your birthday and the recent highly successful operations.<sup>2</sup> May the coming months bring you the great satisfaction and reward of a succession of victories on the road to Japan.

Award of the Distinguished Service Medal to you was directed today by the President with the following citation:

“General Douglas MacArthur, United States Army, for exceptionally distinguished service as Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific since March, 1942.

“Under extremely difficult conditions of terrain, climate and limited forces and material he expelled the enemy from eastern New Guinea, secured lodgments on the island of New Britain and gave strategical direction to coordinated operations resulting in the conquest of the New Georgia group and the establishment of the United States Army and Navy Forces on Bougainville Island. He has inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and established his forces in positions highly favorable for the continuation of offensive operations.”<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)



1. This message was sent at 9:20 A.M. on January 25. It was unencoded so that the recipient need not paraphrase it before it could be published. Major General Alexander D. Surles advised the Southwest Pacific Area public relations office to make immediate release of the citation upon receipt of the award. (Frank McCarthy Memorandum for Chief of Staff, January 25, [1944], GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected]; Surles to Diller, January 25, 1944, Out Log, p. 64, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Message Log].)

2. General Marshall handwrote the following note to Major General Thomas T. Handy: "What do you think of a DSM citation for MacArthur on his birthday—Jan 26 (our to-morrow)? Normally we should wait until Rabaul falls or at least Kavieng. But the latter is more Halsey's show and Rabaul is a long way off, maybe. The attached citation covers the period of his present command. Eisenhower has had 2 citations during this period. If this seems OK *to you*, send it back to McCarthy so that he can telephone it to Hyde Park and get an OK in time. G. C. M." (Marshall to Handy, [January 24, 1944], GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. Major General Richard J. Marshall (V.M.I., 1915), MacArthur's deputy chief of staff, sent the following message to Major General James A. Ulio, The Adjutant General. "The award of the Distinguished Service Medal to General MacArthur has aroused the greatest enthusiasm on the part of civil and military elements throughout the area. I have just been able to contact the General at an airfield where he had landed at dusk on his return from visiting troops of the 6th Army. As a consequence the presentation was of necessity informal. He expressed the deepest appreciation and was evidently much moved." (R. J. Marshall to Ulio, Radio No. C-949, January 26, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BUREAU OF  
PUBLIC RELATIONS

January 26, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

*(WAC RECRUITING SECTION)*

It seems to me that very poor use is made of the best publicity possibilities in the WAC organization. For example, I have heard comments in a number of places, notably in Florida, that the WAC's were not given sufficiently important work to attract the best type of women and to hold the interest of the others. Considering the great contrast, favorable to the Army, between the assignments of WAC's and those of WAVES, for example, we do not appear to have made the best of the picture.<sup>1</sup>

General Arnold has promoted recently a WAC to the grade of Lieutenant Colonel. She is the head representative of 20,000 women in the Air Forces; that is certainly a position of some importance.<sup>2</sup>

The first group of WAC officers sent to Africa were on a boat which was torpedoed and they made the shore with a loss of most of their clothing. Later these same girls were brought in as a special secretariat at Casablanca and while there were entertained at dinner by the President and the Prime Minister.<sup>3</sup> It seems to me they hit a pretty high level here but so far as I know without comment, though it may have occurred while I was out of the country.



General Eisenhower's driver has been a WAC throughout the entire African campaign and I presume she has gone with him to London. My driver in Africa was a WAC and a very efficient one.<sup>4</sup>

There came to my office shortly after the initiation of the WAC a Lieutenant F. T. Newsome. She was used to replace an officer in the outer office to meet people. Her work proved so valuable that she was gradually moved from job to job until now she is my personal secretary for all matters pertaining to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and Combined Chiefs of Staff, briefing the papers, making contact with the interested parties who include General Arnold, General Somervell, and General Handy, and apprizing me of the pros and cons of all the various issues. That is certainly an important job. Furthermore, during certain periods on off hours she performs the duty of Acting Secretary, General Staff.<sup>5</sup>

I am sure that there are a number of somewhat similar cases, none of which I have seen featured. Who is handling this business?<sup>6</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Reports of unfavorable publicity which portrayed the Women's Army Corps in a less than dignified or professional manner concerned the chief of staff. In March 1944 Director Oveta Culp Hobby recommended formation of a specialist group, under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Public Relations, to coordinate publicity with recruiting. In April General Marshall directed that such a group be formed, even though Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell and Major General Alexander D. Surles objected. The Bureau of Public Relations was supplemented by twelve officer grades—six male and six female—to form the W.A.C. Group, headed by Colonel J. Noel Macy. Stories and photographs were to present the Women's Army Corps as a success, showing the women performing jobs that were necessary to the war effort and that they were feminine and performing jobs much like those of civilian women. (Mattie E. Treadwell, *The Women's Army Corps*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1954], pp. 272–77, 699–705.)

The Women's Army Corps had fewer limitations on the types of jobs to which women might be assigned than did the U.S. Navy's W.A.V.E.S. (Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service). War Department regulations allowed women assignments to "any suitable noncombatant overhead positions" or to a combat unit organization provided the job was noncombatant and in a "fixed administrative headquarters or installation." Duties were to be within the strength of "the average woman," and the working conditions and environment were to be suitable for women. Members of the W.A.V.E.S., however, were more limited in possible job assignments by a more formalized system in which the Bureau of Naval Personnel arbitrarily limited assignments to approved positions. (Ibid., pp. 543–44, 562.)

2. Lieutenant Colonel Betty Bandel, who had been Director Hobby's first W.A.A.C. aide, was chosen in May 1943 to serve on General Henry H. Arnold's staff as Air W.A.A.C. Officer. The position was comparable to Director Hobby's in the Army Service Forces and was second only to Hobby. (Ibid., pp. 75, 132. Treadwell discusses Major Bandel's promotion to become the first W.A.C. lieutenant colonel on pp. 574–76.) Bandel was also a member of the first graduating class of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps Officer Candidate School at Fort Des Moines, Iowa, in August 1942.

3. The first five W.A.A.C. officers arrived in North Africa in December 1942. General Marshall met the women during the Casablanca Conference and obtained a list of lost equipment. "Finding that there was no legal means of free replacement," historian Treadwell



writes, "he personally paid for and forwarded new clothing, refusing to accept repayment." (Ibid., pp. 360–61.)

4. Sergeant Pearl Hargreaves was a chauffeur to General Dwight D. Eisenhower. His British civilian chauffeur and secretary, Kay Summersby, was to be commissioned a second lieutenant in the Women's Army Corps in the fall of 1944. (Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, p. 133. Kay Summersby relates her story in *Eisenhower Was My Boss* [New York: Prentice-Hall, 1948].) In the fall of 1943 General Marshall had requested several members of the Women's Army Corps to serve on his staff; among them was Sergeant Marjorie Payne, a chauffeur.

5. Lieutenant Colonel Florence T. Newsome had graduated among the first class of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps Officer Candidate School at Fort Des Moines, Iowa, in August 1942. During an interview in 1956, General Marshall mentioned that he would have taken Florence Newsome to work during the international conferences "except [Admiral] King would have gone crazy if he had a woman on these things." Marshall recalled that "she would bring us up to date on all these various things, particularly about the Combined Chiefs of Staff. She was very, very well informed and she handled all these records." (*George C. Marshall Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue*, rev. ed. [Lexington, Va.: George C. Marshall Research Foundation, 1991], pp. 337–38.)

6. For more information regarding the Women's Army Corps, see Marshall to Steinkraus, February 15, 1944, pp. 301–2, and Marshall Statement for Women's Army Corps Recruiting Campaign, March 21, 1944, pp. 360–61.

THE Allied military effort in Burma was complicated by a confusing chain of command, which was staffed with strong personalities who were forced to work with slender resources in what many regarded as a secondary theater. The Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, was Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, who exercised command over Allied land, air, and naval forces in Burma. Mountbatten wrote to General Marshall on January 16, 1944, concerning a number of organizational matters in his theater. He reported to Marshall that the integration of British and American air forces in his theater had been accomplished and was producing positive results. He was favorably impressed with the U.S. 5307th Composite Regiment (Provisional), known as Merrill's Marauders—"a grand lot, their morale is high and they are impatient for action"—and he told Marshall of his intention to assign the unit to Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell's command. "In view of the fact that Stilwell requires this Regiment as a spearhead and not for true long range penetration work I have agreed to their being sent at once to join Stilwell's Ledo Force." Wingate was "most disappointed to lose them but the urgency of Stilwell's request and the fact that the refusal of the Generalissimo to go ahead with the Yunnan advance deprives 5307 Regiment of its original allotted long range penetration role, made him feel justified in readily agreeing to their release." (Mountbatten to Marshall, January 16, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)



Mountbatten mentioned the “rather awkward situation” that had developed regarding Stilwell’s position in the present chain of command. Stilwell served as commanding general of the U.S. forces in the China-Burma-India theater and also as acting Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, which placed him directly subordinate to Admiral Mountbatten; however, Stilwell was at the same time personally directing a force of two Chinese divisions in the field. This secondary responsibility made Stilwell a corps commander, reporting to Lieutenant General William J. Slim (commanding the British Fourteenth Army) and to General Sir George Giffard (commanding the British Eleventh Army Group). Yet in his capacity as Mountbatten’s deputy commander, Stilwell gave orders to both Giffard and Slim. Stilwell refused to serve under Giffard, an officer whom he did not respect, but he did agree to serve temporarily as a corps commander under Slim, whose military abilities Stilwell regarded highly. Mountbatten informed Marshall that he had agreed to this solution for the present and that Stilwell had authorized his deputy, Major General Daniel I. Sultan, to represent him at Mountbatten’s headquarters. “Fortunately Stilwell has authorised General Sultan to represent him at my meetings with my Commanders-in-Chief because Stilwell is now in the front line and entirely inaccessible. However, we all like Sultan a lot and his presence at CBI Headquarters has already had very good results,” wrote Mountbatten. He concluded by stating that difficulties with the Chinese government and the removal of much of his amphibious resources made the fulfillment of the offensive operations planned at the SEXTANT Conference temporarily impossible. (Ibid. Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell’s Command Problems*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1956], pp. 5–6, 28–29.) General Marshall replied to Mountbatten in the following document. ★

TO ADMIRAL LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN

*Secret*

January 26, 1944

[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mountbatten, Your informative letter of January 16th has just reached me. I am gratified that your report on the 5307th Regiment should be so favorable. As to its future employment after the already scheduled operations for this dry season in the Ledo sector, whatever decision you make after consultation with Stilwell will be entirely acceptable to us.

Latest reports indicate that your Air Forces have been quite successful. The news of Allied attacks by long-range aircraft on distant strategic targets such as Bangkok, as well as by references to coordinated ground-support missions, and successful interceptions, is most encouraging.



I am glad Stilwell provided a solution to his exercise of temporary Corps command. You will find, if you get below the surface, that he wants merely to get things done without delays and will ignore considerations of his own personal prestige or position so long as drive and imagination are being given to plans, preparations and operations.

Frankly, I have found him uniformly through long years of personal command relations, irritating and intolerant of slow motion, excessive caution and cut-and-dried procedure. On the other hand he will provide tremendous energy, courage and unlimited ingenuity and imagination to any aggressive proposals or operations. His mind is far more alert than almost any of our generals and his training and understanding are on an unusually high level. Impatience with conservatism and slow motion is his weakness—but a damned good one in this emergency.

We will not give up hope of an advance by the Yunnan forces. The final decision will depend on the course of events. The President has told the Generalissimo that every favorable opportunity must be exploited to the limit with the means available, and has emphasized his views as to the importance of all possible pressure.

I am glad to have your comments regarding Sultan, Wheeler and Wedemeyer.<sup>1</sup> They confirm my views.

The best of good fortune to you and your people in the coming months. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Major General Raymond A. Wheeler served as principal administrative officer for the Southeast Asia Command. Major General Albert C. Wedemeyer served as deputy chief of staff to Mountbatten. "Wedemeyer continues to be a tower of strength to me and both he and Wheeler are respected, admired and tremendously liked by all British with whom they come into contact," wrote Mountbatten. (Mountbatten to Marshall, January 16, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) For Mountbatten's comments regarding Major General Daniel I. Sultan, see the previous editorial note, p. 249.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MCNAIR

January 26, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

I noticed on page 14 of the Minutes of the General Council of January 24th, a report on the officer personnel handled by the Antiaircraft people. This does not impress me as businesslike, certainly not efficient. Is there any good explanation for this business to have continued the way it has without evident signs of correction?<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Inspector General Virgil L. Peterson reported that the Antiaircraft Artillery Command at Richmond, Virginia, was 106 percent officer overstrength and the Antiaircraft Artillery



Training Center at Camp Davis, North Carolina, was 141 percent officer overstrength. "It appears that the Headquarters has not been as aggressive as it should have been to eliminate unqualified officers." Peterson had discussed the officer overstrength problem with battalion commanders at Camp Davis, and "all indicated that the policy was to permit them to select out of the 90 officers, the 25 or 30 that they wished to have assigned to their unit. . . . The attitude appeared to be that it was not necessary to reclassify officers as long as they could pass them on to someone else." (Minutes, Meeting of the General Council, January 24, 1944, NA/RG 407 [334.8, General Council Minutes].)

TO FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

January 27, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. President, Please accept my congratulations on your birthday.<sup>1</sup> Last year at this time we were treasuring our great hopes as a result of the recent Casablanca conference. It seems to me much more was realized than we anticipated then, and I have the feeling that the Lord will bless our efforts in the coming months, again beyond our expectations.

I anticipate some very hard knocks but I think these will not be fatal to our hopes, rather the inevitable stumbles on a most difficult course.

I wish to thank you for the strong support you have given me personally and to the entire Army in the past twelve months. Faithfully yours,

G. C. Marshall

FDRL/F. D. Roosevelt Papers (PSF, Safe, Marshall)

1. Roosevelt was born at Hyde Park, New York, on January 30, 1882.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
*Secret*

January 27, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Enemy Reprisals against American Airmen.

(Reference General Marshall's memorandum of December 29th and the President's memorandum of January 10th on this subject)

I am glad that you approve of the proposed joint statement in my memorandum of December 29th.<sup>1</sup> It should, I think, be issued only when and if we have concrete evidence of the Germans' purpose to take action, and I shall hold it for your further consideration when that moment arrives.



### *Germany*

In accordance with your note we have endeavored to reach an agreement as to just what would be as a practicable proposition the "most drastic measures" to be taken by the Governments of Great Britain and the United States. It has been suggested that we could strike at the perpetuation of the German people by delaying the return of their men after the Armistice. By such a procedure we would punish large masses of people in whom family sentiments are strong. If credible evidence should be received that the German Government has initiated trials of our airmen for war crimes allegedly constituted by the bombing of targets in Germany, the British and United States Governments might issue some such statement as the following:

"The Governments of Great Britain and the United States having learned of the intention of the German Government to bring to trial Allied airmen on charges identified with the bombing of targets in Germany, wrongfully termed war crimes, issued on \_\_\_\_\_ a solemn warning to the German people as well as to their military and civil officials that the most drastic measures would be adopted to bring home to the German people a realization that any treatment of American or British prisoners not in strict accord with the recognized laws of warfare would be fatal to the future of the German people.

"This warning has been disregarded and the Governments of Great Britain and the United States now notify the German Government and the people of Germany that for each Allied airman sentenced as the outcome of the proposed trials, 10,000 German prisoners or other German males who will later be taken into custody, will be selected and detained subsequently to the imposition of peace terms, for such substantial period as these Allied Governments deem proper. Should the German Government commit additional crimes against Allied prisoners of war, the period of detention will be increased accordingly.

"These prisoners of war will be employed anywhere in the world that the interests of the various Allied nations dictate. Moreover, upon the conclusion of hostilities every person found responsible for these trials, including the judges, will be pursued, arraigned before Allied courts and punished accordingly.

"The United States and British Governments reaffirm their intention to intensify attacks upon Germany, making every effort of which their rapidly expanding means are capable."

### *Japan*

In the case of Japan the Joint Chiefs of Staff have already recommended to you that atrocities committed by the Japanese be publicized.<sup>2</sup> I do not



believe that any official statement by our Government is desirable at this time since you have already given warning as to the punishment of all persons guilty of war crimes. However, in the event of a Japanese threat to mistreat prisoners in order to deter us from bombing Japan or as reprisals for alleged war crimes committed against them, we shall have to take a course different from that indicated for Germany because of the lack of Japanese prisoners and the fact that the Japanese Government would be ruthless in consideration of the hazard to their nationals. The following statement is suggested:

“The Governments of Great Britain and the United States have taken notice of the repeated acts of barbarism committed by the Japanese authorities against British and American prisoners of war despite the agreement of the Japanese Government to abide by the terms of the Geneva Conventions. These brutal reprisals upon helpless victims evidence the shallow advance from savagery which the Japanese people have made.

“The Governments of Great Britain and the United States reaffirm their intention to bring the present hostilities to an end by the use of every effort of which their rapidly expanding means are capable. We serve notice upon the Japanese military and political leaders as well as the Japanese people that the future of Japan as a nation, in fact that of the Japanese race itself, depends entirely and irrevocably upon their capacity to progress beyond their aboriginal barbaric instincts which are manifested by the treatment accorded to British and American personnel in Japanese hands. Every person, *irrespective of rank*, who is responsible directly or morally for the mistreatment of American and British prisoners of war will be relentlessly pursued, arraigned before Allied courts, and punished as they deem fit.”

This matter has been discussed with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War, who are in accord with it.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See Marshall Memorandum for the President, December 29, 1943, pp. 218–20. President Roosevelt’s January 10, 1944, reply is printed in note 3, pp. 219–20.

2. See Marshall Memorandum for the Secretary of War, October 8, 1943, pp. 149–50.

3. President Roosevelt approved this proposal. At the top of the copy for the White House is written “OK FDR.” General Marshall attached a handwritten note: “*To OPD* File this carefully. Notify Sec. of State and Secs. of War and Navy of the Presidents approval. Make clear for Sec. Navy that this started over Army aviators in Germany and Japan. G. C. M.” (Marshall to OPD, undated, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 383.6].) Operations Division drafted letters to the secretary of the navy and the secretary of state that were sent over the secretary of war’s signature, which enclosed Marshall’s January 27 memorandum and included a statement that the president approved. (Stimson to the Secretary of the Navy, February 1, 1944, and Stimson to the Secretary of State, February 1, 1944, *ibid.*)



TO COLONEL LAWRENCE V. CASTNER

January 27, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Castner: I find this morning that final action has been taken toward your retirement for physical disability. I have had your case carefully looked into with the hope that it would be possible for you to continue on duty of some limited nature, and that in those circumstances I might find it possible to arrange for your promotion to the temporary grade of brigadier general. However, the reports of The Adjutant General and The Surgeon General indicate that this would not be fair to you or practicable otherwise of arrangement. I am very sorry to tell you this, for in view of your outstanding record in Alaska and the Aleutians, I had great hopes for your Army future.<sup>1</sup>

I hope that soon you will be sufficiently improved to engage in some activity that will occupy your attention and not jeopardize your health.

The War Department has today approved the award of the Distinguished Service Medal to you in lieu of the Legion of Merit which was presented to you last Fall. The citation for this higher award makes specific reference to the hazardous advance landings that you organized and led in the Aleutians.<sup>2</sup>

This note carries with it my appreciation of your outstanding qualities of leadership demonstrated during the Aleutians campaign.

With my best wishes for an early and satisfactory readjustment in your life, and with my thanks for your fine services, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Castner (U.S.M.A., 1923) was assistant chief of staff, G-2, of the Alaska Defense Command between November 1940 and September 1943. A retiring board found him incapacitated for active service due to several physical disabilities, including coronary thrombosis, and the surgeon general considered him not physically qualified for limited service. (McCarthy Memorandum for Chief of Staff, January 21, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

2. General Marshall made a determined effort to see that Castner received the Distinguished Service Medal. The citation recognized that "he contributed greatly to the success of the operations to clear the enemy from the Aleutians by organizing the Alaskan Scouts, used for reconnaissance work in the Aleutians, and personally leading them in an advance landing at Adak, making a hazardous journey by submarine and landing in a rough, cold sea on a dangerous shore in small rubber boats." (Pasco Memorandums for the Chief of Staff, January 24 and 26, 1944; "Citation for Distinguished Service Medal," *ibid.*)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
*Secret*

January 28, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Operations in Italy.



I thought you would be interested in the following estimate of the situation that is developing in the operations in Italy:<sup>1</sup>

The enemy along the original front of the Eighth and Fifth Armies has continued to resist our advances with violent counterattacks. This is normal German procedure.

General Kesselring has utilized the following procedure in opposing our landing forces: instead of withdrawing divisions from the Fifth and Eighth Army fronts he has “milked” practically every division of a few organizations, usually those that were in reserve. Infantry regiments, artillery battalions, engineer battalions and companies, anti-tank units, division staffs, corps artillery, etc., are in process of movement or have arrived to face our troops south of Rome. By this procedure he has been able to carry out the movements more rapidly and at the same time has not ripped up the defensive deployment of the divisions on the Eighth and Fifth Army fronts.<sup>2</sup>

He has provided more divisional and corps headquarters than would seem normal but apparently this has been done to meet the inevitable difficulties of handling a hurriedly concentrated collection of separate units.

The enemy is apparently engaged in two purposes, an immediate resistance to further penetrations by our troops approaching the Appian Way and the highway to the north, while at the same time he is gathering a counteroffensive group to the east of Rome.

The enemy is apparently determined to hold the front of the right Corps facing the Fifth Army but there are evidences of his willingness to give ground in the center Corps and the Corps facing the British Eighth Army.

Only one enemy unit facing the Anzio beachhead has been identified as coming from the north.

At the present time the enemy has built up a force approximating about 2½ divisions. We have ashore a larger force but of a much more homogeneous nature.

We have gotten ahead of schedule in supplies for the landing forces and are increasing these from the previously planned eight-day reserve supplies to fourteen days, which places us in a more secure position while the Fifth Army is endeavoring to crash through and form a junction.

The weather the past two days has been unfavorable but we are now given a promise of favorable weather. Yesterday was a good day and today and tomorrow should also be fair with only occasional rains. Incidentally, the advance forecasts have been remarkably accurate. I attach the most recent. The pencil figures indicate the degree of overcast represented by the color.<sup>3</sup>

*Note:* The basis for the data regarding the German method for building



up resistance against the Anzio beachhead is of an ultra-secret nature and therefore has to be handled very carefully.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The Sixth Corps, commanded by Major General John P. Lucas and consisting of American and British troops, had landed at Anzio, Italy (Operation SHINGLE), on January 22, catching the Germans by surprise and consequently meeting little opposition during the assault phase. The corps' mission once ashore, however, was vague as to whether it should take the offensive by immediately striking out of the beachhead for the Alban Hills—fifteen miles south of Rome and the last good defensive position available to the Germans if they elected to defend the city—or maintain a defensive posture and content itself with drawing off German reserves from Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark's Fifth Army front sixty miles to the south on the Garigliano-Rapido river line. Lucas did not attempt to assault the hastily established German lines opposite his position until January 29–30. By this time the Germans were able to contain the Sixth Corps' advance, and on February 16 they launched their own offensive against the Anzio beachhead. (Martin Blumenson, "General Lucas at Anzio," in *Command Decisions*, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield [Washington: GPO, 1960], pp. 323–50.

Clark's offensive over the Garigliano-Rapido river line met with mixed success. The British Tenth Corps managed to get over the Garigliano River and the French Expeditionary Corps made progress against German positions around Cassino, but the U.S. Second Corps proved unable to get across the Rapido River and maintain itself on the far side. The U.S. Thirty-sixth Infantry Division suffered particularly heavy casualties attempting to cross the Rapido River on January 20 and 21, 1944. For a detailed discussion of the operations at Anzio and the main front at the Garigliano-Rapido river line, see Martin Blumenson, *Salerno to Cassino*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1969], pp. 293–396, 419–32. Clark gives his account in Mark W. Clark, *Calculated Risk* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), pp. 262–310.

2. Field Marshal Albert Kesselring had commanded Luftflotte 2 (Second Air Fleet) during the summer of 1940, and in 1941 he had been at the Russian front. In December 1941 he was appointed Axis commander in chief in the Mediterranean, and he took part in the campaigns in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. Kesselring's reaction to the Allied landing at Anzio is discussed in Blumenson, *Salerno to Cassino*, pp. 360–65, 392–93. The field marshal gives his account in Albert Kesselring, *Kesselring: A Soldier's Record*, trans. Lynton Hudson (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1954), pp. 230–36.

3. The attachment is not in the Marshall papers. For more information on the Italian operations, see Marshall to Devers, February 18, 1944, pp. 311–12.

MEMORANDUM FOR FIELD MARSHAL

SIR JOHN DILL

*Secret*

January 29, 1944

[Washington, D.C.]

I am sending you a copy of a memorandum I have just sent to the President which is self-explanatory.<sup>1</sup>

I am also attaching a message that has just come in from General Covell, an exceptionally able Engineer officer, who took Wheeler's place in North Burma. For your information Covell is a man of proven record as an



Engineer in civil projects and as a military Engineer. He served under me personally in the Meuse-Argonne where he later commanded an Engineer Regiment in our Second Division which forced a crossing of the Meuse on the night of November 11, 1918. I mention the foregoing to give you some idea of the importance I attach to his message.<sup>2</sup>

Your people will explain to you the dilemma we have reached in our operations over the Hump which were just beginning to give Chennault a chance to wreck Japanese shipping in the China Sea and the ports of Hongkong, Hanoi, Canton, etc. As the Japanese First Air Force is shown to be moving into China it is all the more important that Chennault be able to function his planes.<sup>3</sup>

I am having a message prepared for the President which I hope he will send to the Prime Minister in order that everything possible may be done to vitalize the effort to build up communications out of Calcutta. Action has already been taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to obtain from Mountbatten his reaction to the proposition to take military control of portions of the railroad.<sup>4</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall's memorandum quoted his January 17 radio message to Stilwell asking for a brief combat history of the Chinese Ledo Road operations and for Stilwell's "considered opinion of the combat value of these Chinese troops." Marshall then quoted Stilwell's January 28 reply praising the troops' actions in dense jungle against the well-entrenched Japanese Eighteenth Division. "The men are keen and fearless. Command officers lead when in and they attack with dash. Numerous instances of men who deserve DSC [Distinguished Service Cross]. They now know they can lick the Japs and have their tails up." (Marshall Memorandum for the President, January 29, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Major General William E. R. Covell (U.S.M.A., 1915) had been commanding general of Services of Supply in the China-Burma-India theater since November 1943. On January 28 Covell informed Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell of his concern at the failure of British personnel to move the necessary materiel, especially gasoline, from the port of Calcutta over the Assam line of communications to the airfields, for eventual transport of supplies over the Hump into China. "Receipt, storage and transportation of oil in India up to airfields is solely a British responsibility," wrote Covell. "Present situation due entirely to operational deficiencies amounting to almost complete breakdown of British civilian operated Assam line of communications." Covell urged the complete militarization of the Indian railway and river transport systems by Allied military authorities. (Covell to Somervell, Radio No. GW-121, January 28, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. Major General Claire L. Chennault was commanding general of the Fourteenth U.S. Air Force in China. Chennault reported that "despite increasingly bad weather we struck 78,000 tons of enemy shipping in January of 1944 and certainly sank 56,900 tons." (*Way of a Fighter: The Memoirs of Claire Lee Chennault*, ed. Robert Hotz [New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1949], p. 266.)

4. On January 28 the Combined Chiefs of Staff had discussed the serious effect of the gasoline shortage in Assam on the air lift to China. General Henry H. Arnold emphasized the need for drastic action and noted that the bottleneck was between Calcutta and Assam. (Supplementary Minutes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Meeting, January 28, 1944,



NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS 334, CCS Minutes].) On January 29 Marshall submitted to President Roosevelt a proposed message for Prime Minister Churchill—a draft proposed message written by Somervell which Marshall had edited. “Operations of the Air Transport line from India into China and operations in Burma have, from the outset, been embarrassed by a lack of vigorous management of the lines of communication. Efforts on the part of the civilian management for improvement have produced disappointing results which are now directly and adversely affecting the support of U.S. air forces in China at a critical moment. . . . I feel that only your personal intervention will secure the prompt adoption of those forceful measures which are essential to success in handling the port of Calcutta, railway and barge lines leading from that port into Assam. I urge that all of the lines of communication, from Calcutta inclusive, into Assam be placed at once under full military control. . . . The United States stands ready to assist in furnishing expert personnel should you desire this.” The president sent Marshall’s version, adding the final sentence: “I am sure Mountbatten would agree that the situation is serious.” Churchill replied on January 30 that he was giving the problem his “immediate personal attention.” (*Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, ed. Warren F. Kimball, 3 vols. [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984], 2: 690, 694. Proposed message attached to Marshall [OPD] Memorandum for the President, January 29, 1944, and Colonel Charles K. Gailey Memorandum for General Handy, January 31, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

British and American military authorities in India agreed that military control of Calcutta’s port facilities and the Indian railway system would result in more efficient delivery of supplies to Allied efforts in China and Burma. The British viceroy in India, Field Marshal Lord Archibald Wavell, supported military control of these transportation systems and forced the compliance of civilian authorities on February 6, 1944. American army personnel eventually operated the port of Calcutta, and American railway troops took over the operation of India’s railway system along the Assam line of communications on March 1, 1944. (Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell’s Command Problems*, pp. 259–73.)

TO GENERAL MALIN CRAIG

January 31, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Personnel Board.

It appears desirable, in view of the availability of General Officers recently on duty with troops, to institute gradual changes in the personnel of the Personnel Board.

Several officers of the grade of Major General who have recently retired or are about to retire are now available for this duty. It is the view of the War Department that it is desirable to have the benefit of the views of these men on the Board, who have been recently on duty with troops, as well as to give them some opportunity for continuation of active service.

It is therefore desired that you submit your recommendation for the order in which members of your Board should be returned to inactive duty, with the understanding that your name is not to be considered. It is the desire of the Secretary of War to continue you in the chairmanship of the Board.<sup>1</sup>



GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. General Craig submitted the following names in the order in which he recommended they be returned to inactive duty: Major General Charles D. Herron, Major General William E. Cole (U.S.M.A., 1898), Major General John H. Hughes (U.S.M.A., 1897), Major General Walter L. Reed, Lieutenant General Ben Lear, and Major General Walter S. Grant. (Craig to Marshall, February 1, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 210.311 (1-31-44)].) Herron was relieved from his assignment on the Personnel Board in April 1944, and Cole was relieved in the summer of 1944. Lear served with the Personnel Board until July 1944, when he became commanding general of the Army Ground Forces. Hughes served on the board until February 1945; Reed continued on active duty until June 1946; and Grant served until May 1946.

RADIO STATEMENT BY GENERAL MARSHALL  
ON THE FOURTH WAR LOAN DRIVE<sup>1</sup>

January 31, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My message tonight concerns every man and woman in America. We are approaching the most critical period of the war, a period in which the price of success demands the overwhelming support of the American people for our troops overseas in the great operations now pending.

The Fifth Army in Italy has dislocated the Nazi strategy by a daring operation against the hostile flank and rear. Our troops in the Pacific are stepping up the succession of operations which are now rapidly boring in on the Japanese lines of communication. Out of Great Britain and Italy our airmen are striking mighty blows at the heart of Germany. Our planes are sinking Japanese ships in the China Sea and wrecking their harbors and war-making facilities along the South China coast.

Enormous stores of guns, planes, vehicles, munitions, fuel, landing craft and equipment of every sort are now being assembled at bases all over the world to reenforce and to maintain these military operations. It is the job, it is the plain duty of all of us on the home front, to give without stint, with a proper sense of humility, in support of men who are dying in the terrible battles they fight for us, safe at home.

I think you should know that the troops set for us a patriotic example in the purchases of War Bonds. Army personnel have purchased \$342,000,000 worth of bonds through allotments of their slender pay. How many millions of bonds have been purchased with cash, we do not know, but it is probably a still larger amount.

To a soldier, a War Bond is something more than a means of saving his money. It is an assurance that the guns and supplies on which his life depends will keep coming. By purchasing bonds he shows his faith in the future, which he is fighting to guarantee at the hazard of his life. What is your feeling in the matter, here in the United States, safe and comfortable in your own homes?



Responsibility for America's future rests equally on every man and woman. We face crucial months when the earnest devotion of the entire nation will be required to meet the approaching ordeals and to overcome the enemy. The troops must feel certain of your unstinted and unselfish support throughout the great struggle that lies just ahead. The knowledge that the home front is solidly backing the Fourth War Loan Drive will be a tremendous encouragement to our men overseas.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)

1. General Marshall presented this statement over the C.B.S. network at 8:00 P.M.

TO NINA ANDERSON PAPE

February 1, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Miss Pape, I have just this moment read your letter of January twenty-ninth which came as a great and pleasant surprise. It has been so long since I had heard of you—I believe the last time was in Chicago about 1935—that it was a most agreeable surprise to have your note come in this morning.

As to Dr. Glasgow and his Lee's birthday talk to your students, naturally I appreciate very much the extremely generous comments he made regarding me. However, I cannot accept in silence some of the fine record and attributes he awarded me.<sup>1</sup>

I was a VMI and not a Washington and Lee boy. I did not stand first in my class scholastically, far from it—I did hold the highest rank in my class. I hope I am a Christian gentleman, and I certainly should be with Mrs. Marshall's guardianship and influence, but I must confess to occasional outbursts that are secular. You see I am trying to be honest.

I do wish I could return to those pleasant and agreeable days that Katherine and I enjoyed at Savannah. We flew over the city two weeks ago but bad weather made it impossible for us to land. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Miss Pape, a friend from Savannah, Georgia, had written that Samuel McPheeters Glasgow, a minister in Savannah since 1931, had given a talk at Pape School about General Robert E. Lee. Glasgow—having been reared in Lexington, Virginia, and a 1903 graduate of Washington and Lee University—spoke complementarily of General Marshall, a "college mate." She had written to Marshall: "I think it is nice sometimes when we are overburdened with great responsibilities to hear some nice remarks made about ourselves." (Pape to Marshall, January 29, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)



TO HERBY FUNSTON

February 2, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Herby, I like your letter, the fact that you want to do your full part in licking these Japs, and that you are training every day to prepare to serve the country as a soldier.<sup>1</sup>

It is true “that selling and buying bonds and stamps and salvaging is fighting a war”. These things must be done, so somebody must do them and that seems to be your duty at the present time. But I sympathize with you in your desire to avenge the “nice kid” from your town who became a prisoner in the Philippines.

Be patient and don’t give up the effort you are now making, but I must confess to you that it makes me sad as well as very angry to think that these Japs and Nazis have brought us to such a pass that fine, clean young boys like you must be thinking of killing men, of machine guns, bombs and other deadly tools of war. We are in the terrible business of straightening out this demoralized world so that you and your friends and millions of boys and girls like you may think more of kindness than of death and hatreds and may live useful lives in a peaceful world. But today your older brothers and your fathers and cousins need your backing at home every day of the week. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Herby Funston was a youngster from Keota, Iowa. His letter to the chief of staff is not in the Marshall papers.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
(Through the Secretaries of War and Navy)

February 3, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Medals and Decorations.

The Secretary of War has informed me of your desire that he discuss our present decorations with high ranking officers in order to arrive at a more definite policy. The subject was brought to your attention by the joint Army and Navy recommendation for the establishment of a new Bronze Star decoration.<sup>1</sup>

The latter proposal was initiated by me personally after I had obtained the comments of overseas commanders and had observed first hand the effect of the awards of the Air Medal upon combat personnel of the Air Forces. The prompt award of this Medal has been of tremendous value in sustaining morale and fighting spirit in the face of continuous operations and severe losses.



The awards of the Air Medal, however, have had an adverse reaction on the ground troops, particularly the Infantry riflemen who are now suffering the *heaviest losses*, air or ground, in the Army, and *enduring the greatest hardships*. The most satisfactory solution I can find is some such decoration as the proposed Bronze Star. Otherwise to meet the situation we would inevitably be forced to lower the standards for the award of our present decorations for exceptional heroism.

Decorations and service ribbons are of real value to the war effort only if promptly bestowed. In the first World War we were quite niggardly about it during the fighting and then after the Armistice, particularly during the early 1920's, a flock of awards was made, too frequently the result of pressure, political and personal. The Victory Medal with its bronze and silver stars was authorized too late to have any effect on the efficiency of the Army. I received a ribbon for service in Germany twenty-three years after I returned to the United States.

From my point of view there are three important factors to be considered:

a. Make the awards immediately, at the time, so as to sustain or stimulate morale. There will be a minimum of misapplication if done in the field at the time. There are too many eye witnesses present.

b. Permit these young men who are suffering the hardships and casualties to enjoy their ribbons, which mean so much to them, while in uniform. They cannot wear them once they return to civilian attire.

c. Keep a balance among the services involved in battle, the best to the man who is actually in the fighting. Something else, less impressive, to the men who labor behind the lines.

There is definite and urgent need for the Bronze Star to provide the ground people with something corresponding to the Air Medal. I want to use it now, while it will do some good, not after the war is over.

There will inevitably be unfavorable reactions or misapprehensions resulting from the wearing of numerous ribbons by men who have been transferred from theater to theater, or especially those on duty in Washington who serve for short periods overseas—participating in actual landing or bombing operations in many cases. But these are a very few people, and I am concerned about the thousands who never see Pennsylvania Avenue and are doing their best in some difficult or dangerous or isolated post overseas. The fact that the ground troops, infantry in particular, lead miserable lives of extreme discomfort and are the ones who must close in personal combat with the enemy, makes the maintenance of their morale of great importance. The frequency of air thrusts against the enemy and the steady and heavy losses made it advisable to take special measures for the Air people.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)



1. "I worry a bit about the multiplicity of medals both in and out of the Service," President Roosevelt had told the secretaries of war and navy. "The danger of this proposed bronze star medal is that if it is to be awarded for 'minor acts of heroism or meritorious achievement in combat areas, or in connection with combat operations', the whole tendency will be to give it to people who have merely gone through an operation with normal performance of duty—what they were expected to do—and with enough luck not to have been wounded." The president noted that "the coats of a lot of people are being loaded down with various kinds of service medals," and he gave an example of a man who had been in the armed forces only a few months and was already entitled to several service medals. "After five or six months in uniform, he is beginning to look like a Christmas tree." Roosevelt asked for a "more definite policy in regard to all medals, citations and decorations. There is always danger that we will cheapen the value of such things if we hand out too many of them." (Roosevelt Memorandum for the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, January 11, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. The president approved. On February 4, 1944, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9419 establishing the Bronze Star Medal for "award to any person who, while serving in any capacity in or with the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard of the United States on or after December 7, 1941, distinguishes, or has distinguished, himself by heroic or meritorious achievement or service, not involving participation in aerial flight, in connection with military or naval operations against an enemy of the United States." (*Code of Federal Regulations: Title 3—The President, 1943–1948* [Washington: GPO, 1957], p. 301.) See Marshall Memorandum for the President, February 6, 1944, p. 266. For further information regarding Marshall's views on decorations, see Marshall Memorandum for Admiral King, April 10, 1944, and Marshall to Martin, April 10, 1944, pp. 394–99.

REMARKS BY GENERAL MARSHALL AT AMERICAN  
LEGION DINNER AT THE MAYFLOWER HOTEL<sup>1</sup>

February 3, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

In the few minutes at my disposal tonight my remarks are addressed to you veterans who are familiar with the demands of battle and with the reactions of soldiers in campaign.

Last fall at Omaha I spoke to you of the gathering of our great reserves in preparation for a series of tremendous blows against the enemy all over the world.<sup>2</sup> Today this is well under way and at the present moment the initial blows are being struck against Germany from the air, on the beachhead near Rome where very hard fighting is to be expected, against the Marshall Islands and in the western Pacific and out of the air over China. These are but preliminaries to the general onslaught which will step the Allied effort into high gear.

For the time being the heaviest concentration of ground and air forces will be in the European theater, though a steady stream of reinforcements flows into the Pacific. The great battles which are impending will decide the course of civilization. The energy and spirit of the assaults will determine the duration of the war and therefore the ultimate cost in casualties and war expenditures.



In the European theater American troops will for the first time face the full power of the German Army. I have no fears whatsoever regarding the ability of the American soldier to meet the situation. Our men are well trained. They are now well disciplined. Many of the soldiers are battle-tested veterans. No Army is better equipped. The troops are an inspiration to their commanders. I do not mean that we will not have troubles and reverses. These are inevitable in large operations, unless the hostile forces are disintegrating. We must expect desperate resistance by the German Army up to the moment the German people throw off the yoke of the Gestapo.

The destruction of German industrial cities is proceeding at a constantly increasing pace despite winter weather and heavy overcasts. Between the RAF night bombardment and the American daylight precision bombing, the people of Germany are experiencing the horrors of a war, for which they are responsible, to a degree never before approximated in modern times. Berlin, by far their largest city, is now a shambles. The destruction of other smaller targets will require much less time. More than 2,000 U. S. heavy bombers are now being directed against the heart of Germany, with appropriate diversions into Austria and the Balkans, and the number will steadily increase.

In the Pacific the Japanese have had unusually heavy air and ship losses during the last six months. In the past few days they have suffered an expert demonstration of the overwhelming air and sea power which is rapidly developing in the Pacific and the perfect teamwork of our landing parties.

The operation in the Marshalls is the first assault on the strongholds which the enemy has been constructing for the past twenty-five years. The fact that the operations have been quickly successful, and were carried out without heavy losses is an indication of what is to come as our forces in the south and southwest Pacific close in with our fleet on the Jap defenses.

In the United States the combat units have reached a high state of efficiency as they move to the base ports for shipment overseas.

In brief, the Allied avalanche is at last in motion, and it will gather headway with each succeeding month. What is now required is the ardent support of our forces by the people at home. I am not referring merely to the production of equipment or to the purchase of bonds, but rather to the need of a stern resolution on the part of the whole people of the United States to make every sacrifice that will contribute to the victory. The soldiers must feel that the home folk—east, west, on the plains and in the mountains—are completely united in their determination to see this thing throughout to an overwhelming victory in the shortest possible time.

I speak with an emphasis that I believe is pardonable in one who has a terrible responsibility for the lives of many men, because I feel that here at



home we are not yet facing the realities of war, the savage, desperate conditions of the battlefronts. Vehement protests I am receiving against our use of flame fighters do not indicate an understanding of the meaning of our dead on the beaches at Tarawa. Objections to this or that restriction are inconsistent with the devoted sacrifices of our troops.

The recent release of the atrocities committed against our prisoners by the Japanese generates a storm of anger and protest. This is a natural reaction. The situation, however, demands a determination which will divorce the individual from his own selfish weaknesses and ulterior motives. Our soldiers must be keenly conscious that the full strength of the nation is behind them, they must not go into battle puzzled or embittered over disputes at home which adversely affect the war effort.<sup>3</sup> Our small sacrifices should be personal even more than financial. They should be proof positive that we never forget for a moment that the soldier has been compelled to leave his family, to give up his business, and to hazard his life in our service.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)

1. Marshall's remarks were broadcast over the radio.
2. See Marshall Notes for Talk to American Legion, September 21, 1943, pp. 131–34.
3. Concerning U.S. domestic problems, see Marshall Memorandum for Justice Byrnes, January 5, 1944, pp. 234–35.

TO CLARENCE BUDINGTON KELLAND

February 5, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mr. Kelland, Yesterday I received your letter of February first regarding Terry Allen. You pay Winchell a considerable compliment in assuming that his announcements regarding military appointments are factual. If so, I would not be Chief of Staff since he made another appointment. I have heard nothing of any proposal to relieve Terry Allen so you need not concern yourself about that.<sup>1</sup>

Of course I am sorry that his men are disturbed by the Winchell rumor but I have regrets regarding so many other similar and more serious disturbances, over which I have no control, that I am probably more philosophical than you in my reactions—even though you are far more familiar with such business.

I was glad to hear from you and recall our interesting talk just before the last Presidential election. In a note from Connie Waxman the other day she spoke of seeing you and I wondered if she had ever read your book on that attractive pie-maker in Tucson.<sup>2</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)



1. Kelland—an author and former newspaperman and war correspondent living in Phoenix, Arizona—had written to Marshall because of a statement in Walter Winchell's syndicated column to the effect that Major General Terry de la M. Allen, commanding general of the 104th Infantry Division, was to be transferred from combat to service command. He noted that Allen had the respect and confidence of his men and there was an exceptional esprit de corps and high morale among his men. Kelland had written to Marshall "to point out the harm that can be done by irresponsible rumors; harm to the morale of a division that, unquestionably, has been brought to a high degree of efficiency and pride in itself; and questionings in the mind of the public." (Kelland to Marshall, February 1, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

2. Kelland had been a Republican National Committeeman for Arizona in 1940. Connie Berry Waxman, a longtime friend of the Marshalls, and her husband Percy, a writer and associate editor of *Cosmopolitan*, were visiting with Kelland. Marshall was most likely referring to May Pershing (sister of General John J. Pershing), who resided in Tucson, Arizona.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Secret*

February 6, 1944

[Washington, D.C.]

I appreciate very much the fact that you saw fit to issue the Executive Order regarding the Bronze Star.<sup>1</sup>

I thought you might be interested in a comparison that was brought to my attention yesterday by General McNair, with whom I was discussing the means to be taken to find urgently needed infantry replacements, of which we are seriously in need now and undoubtedly will be even more so when OVERLORD gets under way. McNair tells me that he finds that while only 11% of the army—air and ground—is composed of infantry soldiers, they are bearing 60% of the present losses in Italy.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See Marshall Memorandum for the President, February 3, 1944, pp. 261–63.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SURLES

February 6, 1944

[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Appreciation of Infantry soldier.

We have been endeavoring by means of awards, authorities for citations of units (on a new basis), etc., to improve the morale of the infantry soldier.<sup>1</sup> At the same time we are confronted with a great difficulty in keeping the infantry rifleman up to strength in the units now on the various fronts. The reports from General MacArthur to me personally, and from the principal officers in the Mediterranean operations, have been unanimous



in the statement that we have to do something to maintain infantry rifle strength in order that it will not be necessary to withdraw divisions as early in action as is now the case, and also in order that the divisions can be maintained with greater power of thrust instead of becoming too quickly inert due to the extreme fatigue and hardships of the infantry riflemen and the heavy casualties they are suffering.<sup>2</sup> The interest of the country has been focussed on the losses of the airmen, notably the 8th Air Force over Germany. We have fought off too emotional a reaction of the American people and have done all in our power to buck up the air crews concerned.

Now General McNair tells me, in connection with his exceeding difficulties in providing the necessary trained replacements of riflemen for overseas, that he finds that while only 11 per cent of the Army—air and ground—are infantrymen they bear 60 per cent of the present casualties in Italy.

Men will stand almost anything if their work receives public acknowledgment. They are inclined to glory in its toughness and hazards if what they do is appreciated. There has been so little of glamour in infantry work that the public is little aware of the requirements. On the contrary, if you will recall, I was opposed vigorously in the early formation of the army for my attitude regarding the infantry soldier and his importance in our war army. It was to be all tanks and air, maybe a little artillery, with everybody motorized, etc. Now the picture is being completed in accordance with the fundamental requirements of waging a successful war. The haphazard theorizing is found to be without solid foundation and the influence of the more glamorous methods of making war is found not to be sufficient for the purposes of successful operations.

I am wondering just how we should go about dignifying the infantry rifleman (note that I am not talking about the heavy machine-gunner, though he has a hard role too but not of the same order as the rifleman). It might well be charged that we have made the mistake of having too much of air and tank and other special weapons and units and too little of the rifleman for whom all these other combat arms must concentrate to get him forward with the least punishment and losses. I don't want to discourage the rifleman and yet I want his role made clear and exalted. I don't want to unduly alarm the families of riflemen and yet it is important that some action be taken.

Think this over, talk it over with General McNair's people and see me about it without undue delay.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See the previous document.

2. Marshall notified Paul V. McNutt, chairman of the War Manpower Commission, that Infantry riflemen were suffering more casualties than any other category of troops, air or ground. He quoted from a radio message received from Lieutenant General Jacob L.



Devers in the Mediterranean theater, who had sent estimated replacement needs. "Branch breakdown should be planned for 85% infantry, 7% field artillery, and 3% each of engineers and medical. Ratio of officers to men in infantry, 1 to 17, in field artillery 1 to 10, engineers 1 to 16, and in medical 1 to 20." (Marshall [G-1] Memorandum for Honorable Paul V. McNutt, January 26, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO MAJOR GENERAL MAURICE THOMPSON<sup>1</sup>

February 7, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear General Thompson, Thanks for your gracious note of February second. It was pleasant to hear from you and Mrs. Thompson again, and recalled very peaceful days. I must look up Orting on the map to see just where you are.

My life has been so disturbed since I left the Northwest that I have almost lost comprehension of pleasurable relaxation.

White's death was a great shock to me and there have been so many other changes that it will be hard to reorient oneself after this tragic business is over. I was much interested to learn that your son-in-law is here in the Operations Section.<sup>2</sup> He must be an excellent officer because that Division requires very high standards.

With my warm regards to Mrs. Thompson and you and my hope that your health is excellent, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Thompson, retired from the Washington National Guard, was superintendent at State Soldiers' Home in Orting, Washington. He had written to congratulate General Marshall on his January 31 radio message (see pp. 259-60), and he recalled their working together when Marshall was stationed at Vancouver Barracks and Thompson was at Fort Lewis. (Thompson to Marshall, February 2, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

2. Major General George A. White had been commanding general of the National Guard's Forty-first Division. Marshall had written to him upon hearing that he was hospitalized: "I hope that you are not seriously involved because, from a rather selfish viewpoint, your continuance in command is very important to me during a period when so many Division commanders have to be relieved because of deficiencies in leadership qualifications." (Marshall to White, November 5, 1941, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) White died on November 23, 1941. General Marshall, in sending condolences to his wife, referred to White as an "outstanding soldier leader." (Marshall Radio to Mrs. George A. White, November 24, 1941, *ibid.*)

Thompson's son-in-law, Major C. B. McMath, Jr., a former officer of the 161st Infantry of the Washington National Guard, was assigned to the Pacific Division in the Operations Section. (Thompson to Marshall, February 2, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)



**P**REPARATION of strategic and tactical plans for the invasion of Normandy (OVERLORD) was complicated by the debate over the role of the southern France invasion (ANVIL) and the impact OVERLORD-ANVIL would have on the conduct of future operations in the Mediterranean theater. General Eisenhower's planners in London agreed that in order to insure success the initial assault wave into Normandy must consist of five divisions—rather than three divisions originally planned—followed by two divisions on the first day of the assault. This plan required additional landing craft and supporting naval bombardment forces; thus the expanded OVERLORD plan presented the possibility of a reduced ANVIL or perhaps its total elimination. General Marshall believed that ANVIL was linked to the success of OVERLORD. Even though most of the planners at Eisenhower's London headquarters, including Sir Bernard Montgomery and Walter Bedell Smith, agreed to a major reduction in ANVIL in early January 1944, Eisenhower would not consent to this, except as a last resort. Smith agreed with Montgomery and the British Chiefs of Staff that ANVIL should be reduced to a threat rather than viewed as an operation. Eisenhower wrote to Marshall on January 17 that “according to my understanding the British and American staffs at Teheran definitely assured the Russians that ANVIL would take place. Secondly, we have put into the French Army a very considerable investment. Since these troops, plus the Americans and the British, cannot profitably be used in decisive fashion in Italy, we must open a gateway for them into France or all of our French investment will have been wasted. Altogether there would be a great number of American and other forces locked up in the Mediterranean from whom we will be deriving no benefit.” (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1652–53, 1661–62; quote on p. 1662.)

Eisenhower was prepared, however, to accept a postponement of the actual invasion into early June in order to collect the additional forces required. But he insisted that OVERLORD and ANVIL “must be viewed as one whole.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed on January 31 to the broader assault front and a postponement of the invasion date until June. (*Ibid.*, pp. 1673–76.) The expanded assault plan required a larger naval and air support program, as well as a more complicated tactical plan for the initial assault. The new Allied operational plan for the cross-Channel invasion, code-named NEPTUNE, was issued on February 1, 1944. (The NEPTUNE Initial Joint Plan is discussed in Gordon A. Harrison, *Cross-Channel Attack*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1951], pp. 173–97.)

The Mediterranean theater was an obvious place to obtain, in part, the necessary landing craft and naval support for an expanded OVERLORD. American planners regarded further Allied offensive operations north of Rome to be strategically wasteful and unlikely to produce significant



results; consequently they insisted upon the retention of ANVIL in some form. The British came to oppose ANVIL in favor of continued offensive operations in Italy. On February 4 the British Chiefs of Staff supported Prime Minister Churchill's position that the OVERLORD-ANVIL operations were not strategically interwoven because of the distance of rugged terrain between the areas and the defensive strength of modern weapons. The difficulties currently being experienced with the Anzio operation, an amphibious assault launched on January 22 north of the main Allied lines in Italy and designed to open the main road to Rome, also influenced British thinking. The British believed that events in Italy had altered the general strategic situation and there was more to be gained by further commitment to a ground war in Italy than in allocating troops to the ANVIL operation. The British Chiefs of Staff considered the retention of a one-division lift capability in the Mediterranean to assist continued offensive operations in Italy much more useful than collecting the massive support necessary for a one- or two-division ANVIL. The British believed also that the strategic result without ANVIL would be the same, that the Germans would be forced to retain divisions in Italy that could alternately be employed against OVERLORD. (Forrest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1954], pp. 111-13; Harrison, *Cross-Channel Attack*, pp. 168-69. For Churchill's account of this debate, see Winston S. Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, a volume in *The Second World War* [Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951], pp. 511-14.)

As the views of the War Department and the British regarding ANVIL grew more divergent, Eisenhower found himself in a difficult position. He agreed that ANVIL was important, but he also was responsible for the success of OVERLORD and the possibility of a simultaneous two-division ANVIL appeared less feasible. On February 6 Eisenhower asked the chief of staff for his personal views because "I feel that as long as you and I are in complete coordination as to purpose that you in Washington and I here can do a great deal toward achieving the best overall results. . . . I honestly believe that a five division assault is the minimum that gives us a really favorable chance for success. I have earnestly hoped that this could be achieved by the 31st of May without sacrificing a strong ANVIL." However, Eisenhower believed that "late developments in Italy create the possibility that the necessary forces there cannot be disentangled in time to put on a strong ANVIL. This is a factor that must be considered. Some compensation would arise from the fact that as long as the enemy fights in Italy as earnestly and bitterly as he is now doing, the action there will in some degree compensate for the absence of an ANVIL." (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1707.)

The next day General Marshall expressed his concerns over the ANVIL debate in the following message to Eisenhower. ★



TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. 78. *Secret*

February 7, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

For Eisenhower's eyes only from Marshall. Reur W-10678 of February 6th: Judging from the discussions and differences of opinion at the present time the British and American Chiefs of Staff seem to have completely reversed themselves and we have become Mediterraneanites and they heavily pro-OVERLORD. The following are my personal views:

OVERLORD of course is paramount and it must be launched on a reasonably secure basis of which you are the best judge. Our difficulties in reaching a decision have been complicated by a battle of numbers, that is, a failure to reach a common ground as to what would be the actual facilities. As to this the British and American planners here yesterday afternoon agreed that there is sufficient lift to stage at least a 7-Division OVERLORD and at the same time a 2-Division ANVIL on the basis of May 31st. This is an apparent disagreement with the British planners in London, or Montgomery, I don't know which.<sup>1</sup>

As to ANVIL my personal feeling is this: Do you personally consider that of the combined landing craft thought to be available so much must go to OVERLORD that only a 1-Division lift will remain for ANVIL. If you consider this absolutely imperative then it should be done that way. However, the effect will be that approximately 8 or 9 less Divisions will be heavily engaged with the enemy, Divisions which will be available in the Mediterranean. Can you afford to lose this pressure, considering an additional factor, that we are almost certain to get an uprising in southern France to a far greater degree than in the north?

As to the British references to the Italian situation I would say this: If we find ourselves in Italy in early April still unable to establish our lines north of Rome then ANVIL would of necessity be practically abandoned, because we would have a good and sufficient fight on our hands for a considerable number of troops and the use for at least a 1-Divisional lift for end runs. However, if we have established ourselves north of Rome by that time, early April, there will not be a place for all the Divisions available in the Mediterranean unless it is believed that an advance into the Po valley is the profitable enterprise. With this I do not agree because it would inevitably require a heavy amphibious lift in order to get the lines through the mountains and would involve innumerable delays.

Count up all the Divisions that will be in the Mediterranean, including two newly arrived U. S. Divisions, consider the requirements in Italy in view of the mountain masses north of Rome, and then consider what influence on your problem a sizeable number of Divisions heavily engaged or advancing rapidly in southern France, will have on OVERLORD.

I will use my influence here to agree with your desires. I merely wish to



be certain that localitis is not developing and that the pressures on you have not warped your judgment.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-2771])

1. For further discussion of the differences in the figures calculated by the Washington and London planners, see the following document.

2. Eisenhower replied on February 8 that a successful ANVIL would "open up a certain channel through which all our forces could be engaged, and would have an earlier effect upon the enemy situation in France than would a continuation of the Italian campaign even on an intensive basis." He reminded Marshall that he had told Montgomery in December of the need for an expanded assault for OVERLORD, while also emphasizing his desire "to retain ANVIL on at least a two-division basis." Eisenhower insisted that he had agreed to a later target date than early May in order to permit time to gather additional material to both expand OVERLORD and retain ANVIL. The British were not supportive generally of ANVIL, he informed Marshall, and certain compromises were necessary in the conduct of coalition warfare. "But I assure you that I have never yet failed to give you my own clear personal convictions about every project and plan in prospect," wrote Eisenhower. "So far as I am aware, no one here has tried to urge me to present any particular view, nor do I believe that I am particularly affected by localitis." (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1713-15.)

MEMORANDUM FOR FIELD MARSHAL

SIR JOHN DILL

*Secret*

February 9, 1944

[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Dill: Attached is a personal message from Eisenhower to me in response to my personal message to him.<sup>1</sup>

There has been a further telephone conversation between General Smith and General Handy, largely devoted to the difference in the figures prepared by the Washington Planners and those prepared by the London planners on personnel and vehicle lift for OVERLORD. They have agreed to exchange radiograms today on the capacity factors so that the discrepancies could be adjusted. I further directed General Handy to get Smith on the phone today and bring the issue to a head.

The trouble apparently is the difference in the factor used for LSI (L)'s.<sup>2</sup> Washington planners figure 17 LSI (L)'s at a capacity of 2,000 each; total personnel lift of 34,000. London planners figure 16 ships at 1,080 men each and two at 1,440; total lift of 20,160. Difference: 13,840.

Smith further stated that it was a mistake to talk of lifting five divisions for OVERLORD because the force will actually be five divisions plus reinforcements of nearly another division plus two reinforced divisions in the follow-up; a total of 174,320 men and 20,018 vehicles.

Smith further stated that the delay in OVERLORD to May 31st might make more LST's<sup>3</sup> available.

Smith stated that Eisenhower was very strong for ANVIL and they agreed that ANVIL might help in avoiding the critical periods which Smith said



would be between D plus 3 and D plus 7, around D plus 15 and D plus 20 and the last about D plus 30.

Smith reported that one airborne division plus one regimental combat team (and another regimental combat team if absolutely necessary) can be lifted on D day.

As to Air Smith said the biggest need was for two or three very long range fighter squadrons.

With both sides checking on the one difference of opinion and a further telephone communication today between Smith and Handy, I am hopeful that a satisfactory conclusion can be reached. I shall keep you advised.<sup>4</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See the previous document.
2. Landing ship, infantry (large).
3. Landing ship, tank.
4. See the following document.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY  
AND ADMIRAL KING  
*Secret*

February 9, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: OVERLORD – ANVIL.

You have both seen my personal message to Eisenhower in response to his to me, and this morning his reply (W-10786) to my message.<sup>1</sup> His reply still leaves in the air the question as to the sufficiency of landing craft. If there is enough for a five-division lift with a two-division follow-up and also for a two-division ANVIL lift, he is in favor of ANVIL on that basis. He agrees with us as to its importance in connection with OVERLORD.

The issue then at the moment is the capacity of the landing craft to be available for a May 31st OVERLORD operation.

General Handy and General Smith conversed over the telephone yesterday afternoon. It there developed that the differences between London and Washington as to the capacity of the available craft hinged on a question of the personnel lift of LSI (L's). Combined planners in Washington figured a total personnel lift of 34,000. London planners figured 20,160. This difference, it develops, followed from the London planners assuming only two trips of these boats from the combat loader whereas the Combined planners in Washington figured a third trip.

There was a further difference in bases of calculation regarding U.S. combat loaders. London planners calculated on a total of 960 men per vessel in order to permit unloading in two trips. U.S. calculations are based



on 1400 and Navy advises that landing boats are sufficient for unloading in two trips. Smith has been so advised.

It is these differences that have complicated the entire matter and have brought about the request of the Prime Minister for the American Chiefs of Staff to go to London.<sup>2</sup>

In connection with the lifts for OVERLORD, Smith pointed out that it was not merely seven divisions of approximately 15,000 men each, but seven divisions plus supporting troops which give a divisional calculated basis of 25,000 each. However, we follow the same basis of calculation here so there is no difference of result regarding this factor.

Smith further stated that delay in OVERLORD to May 31st might make more LST's available. Handy tells me this is being discussed with the Navy.

Smith stated that Eisenhower was strong for ANVIL and they were in agreement that ANVIL might help in avoiding the critical periods which Smith said would be between D plus 3 and D plus 7, again around D plus 15 and D plus 20 and finally D plus 30.

Smith reported that one airborne division plus one regimental combat team (Air) can be lifted on D-day.

Smith further stated that in regard to their request for seven additional fighter squadrons, their biggest need was for two or three very long range fighters.

There was another conversation with Smith this morning during which he explained that the British position on LSI (L's) was based on the opinion that to hold these vessels for three trips might prove too costly from enemy action. Our people feel that considering "all out" character of the operation we should accept this hazard. Admiral Cooke states that we might find that duration of tide would have some bearing on matter.

In brief, at the present moment the differences between London and Washington regarding the OVERLORD-ANVIL operations boil down to a more or less technical Naval question involving a difference of 14,000 troops out of a total desired for OVERLORD of 176,000 (assault and immediate follow-up elements). There is also a difference regarding 1,000 vehicles out of a total of 20,000.

Considering the circumstances as outlined above, the pressure of the Prime Minister for us to go to London, the urgent necessity of an immediate decision, and the fact that in the end we should support Eisenhower's views (now that he is fully aware of our views and our feelings in the matter), I now propose (Arnold is in agreement) that we send the following message to Eisenhower and the British Chiefs of Staff:

As a result of an exchange of communications between General Marshall and General Eisenhower and several telephone conversations between General Handy and General Smith, a mutual understanding



appears to have been reached as to the facilities available for OVERLORD and ANVIL. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff now propose that the issue be finally decided in a conference between General Eisenhower as the representative of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to abide by that decision.

I further propose that General Hull of the Operations Division and a Naval officer familiar with all the facts regarding landing craft (capacity and technique) be sent to London immediately to assist Eisenhower, in a purely advisory capacity, regarding the issues which now seem to dominate the matter.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See Marshall to Eisenhower, February 7, 1944, and note 2, pp. 271–72.

2. Churchill had sent a message to President Roosevelt on February 6 that questions had arisen since the meetings at Cairo which “require direct consultation. Could you send your Chiefs of Staff over here, or at any rate General Marshall, in the next few days? . . . I am sure the time has come for a further talk on the highest staff level. The OVERLORD Commanders-in-Chief must know where they stand and every day counts.” (*Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, 2: 705.)

3. Major General John E. Hull and Rear Admiral Charles M. Cooke, Jr., arrived in London on February 12 for a week of conferences that began the next day. (For a discussion of the various landing craft issues debated at the meetings, see Harrison, *Cross-Channel Attack*, pp. 169–72.) See Marshall to Eisenhower, February 21, 1944, pp. 313–14.

TO HARRY L. HOPKINS

February 9, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Harry, I feel most apologetic about not having communicated with you before. I tried to telephone, without success, but should have gotten off a letter—several of them—because you have been daily on my mind.

McCarthy just showed me your note stating that you might get out in about a week and are going off for a month’s rest.<sup>1</sup> What I want to propose is this:

We took over the White Sulphur and established an excellent hospital there without changing the furnishings. I had two of the numerous cottages held out as a place to send high-ranking officers who are in need of rehabilitation. They are luxuriously furnished and the surroundings are delightful even in the winter season. Eisenhower and a number of general officers from overseas have been sent there to recuperate, also a number from the War Department who were getting rather sketchy physically.

We could put you and Mrs. Hopkins up there most comfortably. You could have the benefit of excellent doctors and also the advantage of having Mrs. Hopkins with you in pleasant surroundings. If the weather is



favorable you can be flown in, the trip requiring about an hour and a quarter; the railroad trip on the C & O of course consumes most of the day.

I hope very much you will let us make this arrangement for you. In the meantime I am delighted that your hospital period is about completed.<sup>2</sup>

Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Hopkins had been recovering from illness since early January at the Naval Hospital in Bethesda, Maryland. His note is not in the Marshall papers.

2. Hopkins replied on February 10 that his doctors recommended that he recuperate in a warm, sunny climate, so he was leaving for Miami Beach the next day. He did, however, stay at the U.S. Army's Ashford General Hospital at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, from early May to July 4, 1944, while convalescing from an operation. (Hopkins to Marshall, February 10, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected]; Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* [New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948], pp. 804-9.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Secret*

February 9, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

I don't believe General Arnold gave you the figures for planes delivered overseas in January. They are interesting.

883	Heavy Bombers
581	Medium and Light Bombers
1524	Fighters and Fighter Bombers
150	Reconnaissance
106	Transports
37	Utilities and others
<u>230</u>	Gliders
Total	3511

The foregoing represented 64½% of January or 71% of December, total factory deliveries to the Army Air Forces. In combat planes the shipments represent 90% of January deliveries from the factory, or 97% of December deliveries. The Ferry service involved in this transaction is considerable.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

**A**MERICAN strategic direction of the war against Japan in the Pacific had retained a general policy of flexibility through 1943, shifting the weight of forces committed as the Japanese reacted, between concurrent offensive operations in the Southwest Pacific Area—commanded by



General Douglas MacArthur, centered on the New Guinea front—and the island advances made with forces of the Central Pacific Area commanded by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. The capture of the Gilbert Islands in the Central Pacific Area and preparations for the continuation of the island campaign into the Marshall Islands for early 1944 clearly indicated the necessity for more specific decisions regarding overall strategy in the Pacific war. The leaders at the Cairo Conference in December 1943 had approved a general advance to the Formosa-China-Luzon area; however, aside from the general outline of operations, they had agreed to few specifics. Questions centered on future operations following the campaign in the Marshalls. The Mariana Islands might be next, bypassing the great Japanese naval base at Truk in the Caroline Islands, with the intention of commencing B-29 strategic bombing operations against the Japanese homeland from the Marianas. This option tended to downplay the importance of General MacArthur's operations. The alternative was a drive through the Caroline Islands after the occupation of the Marshalls, either taking Truk by assault or bypassing it and capturing the Palau Islands. The result in the latter scenario would be direct support of General MacArthur's drive toward the recapture of the Philippines. The high-level discussions over the course American strategy should follow for 1944 in the Pacific was complicated by real disagreement, strong personalities, and service rivalries. (Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1959], pp. 453–55.)

Admiral Nimitz submitted his operational plan for 1944, code-named GRANITE, to Washington on January 13, 1944. Nimitz's objective was to "obtain positions from which the ultimate surrender of JAPAN can be forced by intensive air bombardment, by sea and air blockade, and by invasion if necessary." He proposed the occupation of the Marshall Islands through assaults on Kwajalein and Eniwetok, and control of the Caroline Islands by capture of the Mortlock Islands, invading or bypassing Truk as circumstances dictated. Saipan and Tinian islands, and ultimately Guam, would be invaded in the Marianas with the general objective of basing very long range aircraft (B-29s) and submarines for offensives against the Japanese home islands. Admiral Nimitz suggested that the capture of the Palau Islands might be necessary to assist General MacArthur's operations, and he stated his acceptance of an ultimate juncture with MacArthur's forces in the Philippines. "The reoccupation of the PHILIPPINES is essential to the attainment of the ultimate strategic objective," but the plan also indicated that the Combined Chiefs of Staff in December 1943 had given priority to operations in the Central Pacific whenever conflicts in timing and allocating resources existed. (Campaign Plan GRANITE, January 13, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43)].)



General MacArthur had submitted his plan for operations in the Southwest Pacific Area to reoccupy the southern Philippines, code-named RENO III, in October 1943; but he had not presented a plan since the Cairo Conference, as Nimitz had. MacArthur intended initially to bypass the Japanese base at Rabaul on New Britain Island with the capture of Hansa Bay in New Guinea, Kavieng on New Ireland, and the Admiralty Islands. The plan called for further operations in the northern and western areas of New Guinea and operations against Halmahera Island and northeastern Celebes, with the ultimate objective the invasion of Mindanao in the Philippines by February 1945. MacArthur recognized the necessity for operations against the Japanese in the Caroline Islands. (Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944*, pp. 314-15. RENO III, October 20, 1943, is printed in Louis Morton, *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1962], pp. 686-92.)

Representatives of the Southwest Pacific Area, South Pacific Area, and the Central Pacific Area commands held a conference on January 27 and 28, 1944, at Pearl Harbor to discuss overall Pacific strategy for 1944. Major General Thomas T. Handy, assistant chief of staff of the Operations Division, reported to General Marshall that the consensus of opinion of the conferees suggested the occupation of the Marshalls; support for MacArthur's advance through New Ireland, the Admiralty Islands, and New Guinea; bypassing Truk through the capture of the Palau Islands, all with the ultimate invasion of Mindanao by the end of 1944. In addition, there was some discussion as to whether the B-29 program could be better employed in the Marianas or along the New Guinea-Mindanao axis. Handy wrote that "although the B-29's could attack Japan proper from the Marianas, the range is long, thus cutting down the bomb load; and the operation would in no way be decisive." The conferees generally agreed that Japan would be defeated from bases in China, and the most effective way the Allies could reach China was by way of the Philippines. No decisions were reached at the conference, but there was general expression of support for MacArthur's program for 1944. (Handy Memorandum for General Marshall, February 7, 1944, and Colonel William L. Ritchie Memorandum to General Handy, February 4, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 334.8, Case 125]; Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson to Marshall, February 2, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

On February 2, General MacArthur sent a message to General Marshall in which he urged the War Department to concentrate forces, following operations in the Marshalls, along the New Guinea route to the Philippines. "All available ground, air and assault forces in the Pacific should be combined in a drive along the New Guinea-Mindanao axis supported by



the main fleet based at Manus Island and other facilities already available in these waters. This axis provides the shortest and most direct route to the strategic objective and is the only one that permits of an effective combination of land, sea and air forces." MacArthur pointed out that the B-29s could be more effectively supported logistically and used more effectively with full bomb loads against the Japanese while operating from his theater. He was willing to accept a British naval presence in his theater and advocated a unified Allied naval command operating in the Southwest Pacific Area under Admiral William F. Halsey. MacArthur advocated a single unified drive aimed at the recapture of the Philippine Islands, rather than dissipating Allied strength in "two weak thrusts which can not attain the major strategic objective until several months later resulting at best in the delay of future operations that would entail conflict with the rainy season in the Philippines with a consequent overall delay in the conduct of the war of 6 additional months." MacArthur insisted that time constraints made a final decision regarding Pacific strategy imperative, and that he was sending his chief of staff, Major General Richard K. Sutherland, to Washington to express his views to General Marshall more completely. (MacArthur to Marshall, Radio No. C-1217, February 2, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-IN-1443)].)

Admiral Ernest J. King responded to General MacArthur's statements in a memorandum to General Marshall on February 8. King admitted that in the immediate future B-29s might be profitably employed in General MacArthur's theater; nonetheless he stated that his understanding was that ultimately the B-29s would be employed in a strategic bombing offensive against Japan from bases in the Marianas. Admiral King argued that unless the British Royal Navy task forces were prepared to support themselves logistically, the alternative being taking resources from the support of U.S. carrier groups, they were best deployed in the Indian Ocean diverting Japanese forces from the Pacific. At the recent conference, "adequate carrier forces in addition to surface forces were allocated to the 7th Fleet for carrying out the impending operations in the Southwest Pacific." He saw no reason to create a joint naval command in MacArthur's theater, and he insisted that "the economic employment of naval forces in the future will require that the strategic control of the Pacific remain the responsibility of a single naval commander, and that the naval support in the Areas be adjusted from time to time as required by the operations underway." King stated his understanding that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had already decided "that the advance in the Pacific shall be simultaneous along both axes and shall be mutually supporting, that when conflicts in timing and allocation of means exist, due weight should be accorded to the fact that operations in the Central Pacific promise at this time a more rapid advance toward Japan and her vital lines of communi-



cation." Admiral King also stated that "the people in the Southwest Pacific are unduly optimistic about the rate of their advance in the New Guinea theater." In addition, King commented on the staff organization in the Southwest Pacific, which he considered unsatisfactory, and gave his opinion that "we will eventually require a combined staff in this area and that we should now have a joint staff along the lines of the one we have established in the Pacific Ocean Areas." (King Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, February 8, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) On February 10 General Marshall sent the following reply to Admiral King. ★

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING  
*Secret*

February 10, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

With reference to your memorandum of February 8th regarding the Pacific situation, I gathered the impression Tuesday that many of the statements were made from the standpoint of an advocate or counsel and that the problem was not being approached with the view purely to its critical examination to determine the best course of action, leaving aside personalities, areas, command, service prestige, etc. It also was apparent, in my opinion, that we have a tremendous potential force in that region provided we conform to the basic principle of mass.<sup>1</sup>

There is a definite and almost purely Naval consideration as to what constitutes an undue hazard to our Naval power in the Pacific. However, this need only be related to the choice of successive objectives as there is no proposal by MacArthur to exercise command over the Pacific Fleet. He is concerned regarding the immediate task force that escorts and launches his amphibious enterprises.

We have struggled since the outbreak of the war over questions of command in various regions of the Pacific from the Aleutians to Australia. The time has now come, in my opinion, to divorce from our minds any thought other than a purely objective purpose to secure the maximum result in the shortest time from the means available.

The points raised by MacArthur, the record of the recent conference in Honolulu, the discussions Tuesday afternoon, recent events and developments in the Pacific, all taken together indicate to me the necessity for a re-examination of our Pacific strategy.

In your memorandum you state that MacArthur has not submitted a plan to carry out the Combined Chiefs of Staff decision, while Admiral Nimitz has done so. My understanding from the discussions to date is that both General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz have been planning to use a



considerable portion of the South Pacific forces, whose redispotion is now under consideration. Neither MacArthur's plan (Reno III) nor Nimitz' plan (Granite) carried out the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff without asking for additional forces. Therefore the scale and timing of future operations are not clear-cut and cannot be until the Joint Chiefs of Staff inform the commanders concerned of the extent to which their requirements can be met. There appears to be a general agreement that the eventual defeat of Japan requires that we establish ourselves in force on the East coast of China and there also appears to be a general acceptance that Luzon must be the stepping stone. There is no agreement, however, as to the way in which this shall be done. The present decision, which was largely for planning purposes only, of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, calls for an advance along two axes in the Pacific but does not carry through to the final establishment on the China coast. I therefore believe that a new directive is called for and my suggestion is that we issue instructions to the Strategic Survey Committee along the lines of the attached draft.

General Arnold concurs with me in the foregoing.

The point you raise about MacArthur's staff organization I will cover in a separate memorandum.<sup>2</sup>

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[Enclosure]

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO THE STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE

It is desired that you consider as a matter of urgency the broad question of Pacific strategy and advise the Chiefs of Staff as to the general line of action which should be pursued. Your report should include your views on the following:

- a. What geographical objectives should be seized, and in what order.
- b. What axis or axes of advance appear to offer the best chance for the earliest conclusion of the war in the Pacific.

In calculations as to the means available you will assume that reinforcements following a cessation of hostilities in the European theatre will not commence to be available in the Pacific in operational readiness before December 31, 1944.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On Tuesday, February 8, 1944, at the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting, Major General Richard K. Sutherland and Rear Admiral Forrest P. Sherman—respectively MacArthur's and Nimitz's chief of staff—had presented their respective headquarters' plans for operations



in the Pacific. (Supplementary Minutes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, February 8, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS 334, JCS Minutes].)

2. For further discussion of staff organization in the various theaters, see Marshall Memorandum for Admiral King, April 10, 1944, pp. 393-94.

3. Admiral King replied on February 11 that Admiral Halsey should not command a joint Allied naval force directly answering to General MacArthur's command. King insisted that General MacArthur "assumes, among other things, that because certain South Pacific forces under Admiral Halsey have been *operationally* under his command for the RABAUL campaign, he is entitled to have them allocated to him, with which I cannot agree on such grounds." He quoted directives arrived at during the December 1943 Allied conference at Cairo, which called for a two-pronged offensive in the Pacific with mutually supporting Allied offensives along the New Guinea-Netherlands Indies-Philippine Islands axis and along the Marshall-Caroline-Mariana island groups. King again pointed out that at Cairo it had been agreed that the Central Pacific would have priority if conflicts in timing and allocation of resources existed. It was his belief that strategic direction already included capture of the Carolines and Marianas with the intention of mounting very long range strategic bombing operations against Japan. King agreed that the entire discussion should be referred to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, and he also suggested that a list of C.C.S. papers pertaining to Pacific operations be added to Marshall's proposed directive. (King to Marshall, February 11, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, ABC 384 Pacific (6-28-43)].) For further information, see Marshall Memorandum for the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, March 1, 1944, pp. 324-26.

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

*Secret*

February 10, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Eisenhower: Up to the present time I have not felt that we have properly exploited air power as regards its combination with ground troops. We have lacked planes, of course, in which to transport men and supplies, but our most serious deficiency I think has been a lack in conception. Our procedure has been a piecemeal proposition with each commander grabbing at a piece to assist his particular phase of the operation, very much as they did with tanks and as they tried to do with the airplane itself. It is my opinion that we now possess the means to give a proper application to this phase of air power in a combined operation.

I might say that it was my determination in the event I went to England to do this, even to the extent that should the British be in opposition I would carry it out exclusively with American troops. I am not mentioning this as pressure on you but merely to give you some idea of my own conclusions in the matter.

With the foregoing in mind and seeing the proposed plan for OVERLORD in Airborne troops, General Arnold had Brigadier General Fred Evans, Commanding General of the Troop Carrier Command, and Colonel Bruce Bidwell, the OPD Airborne Consultant, make a study of the proposition for OVERLORD.



They first presented to us *Plan A*, which utilizes the airborne troops in three major groups with mission to block the movement of hostile reserve divisions as now located. This was not acceptable to me. On paper it was fine; but on the ground it would be too few men at the critical points with almost the certainty that the Germans would circumvent them in vicious fighting. I saw exactly this happen in the great German offensive of March, 1918. In preparation for the attack the Allies organized their forces in depth, the various points of resistance being staggered. On a map it was perfect pin-ball set-up to disrupt the enemy's effort. On the ground it was a series of quick collapses where small groups of lonely men were cut off and surrendered.

I then had them reconsider their plan more in accordance with my conception of the application of airborne troops on a large scale. This resulted in two plans.

*Plan B*—This establishes an air-head in the general Argentan area approximately thirty miles inland from Caen, with mission to seize two airfields and restrict the movement of hostile reserves that threaten the beach landing area from the east and southeast.

This plan is not satisfactory to me because the airfields are small and not capable of rapid expansion and we could not take heavy planes in to provide a quick build-up. Moreover, holding this particular locality would not pose a major strategic threat to the Germans.

*Plan C*—Establishes an air-head in keeping with my ideas on the subject, one that can be quickly established and developed to great strength in forty-eight hours. The area generally south of Evreux has been selected because of four excellent airfields.

This plan appeals to me because I feel that it is a true vertical envelopment and would create such a strategic threat to the Germans that it would call for a major revision of their defensive plans. It should be a complete surprise, an invaluable asset of any such plan. It would directly threaten the crossings of the Seine as well as the city of Paris. It should serve as a rallying point for considerable elements of the French underground.

In effect, we would be opening another front in France and your build-up would be tremendously increased in rapidity.

The trouble with this plan is that we have never done anything like this before, and frankly, that reaction makes me tired. Therefore I should like you to give these young men an opportunity to present the matter to you personally before your Staff tears it to ribbons.<sup>1</sup> Please believe that, as usual, I do not want to embarrass you with undue pressure. I merely wish to be certain that you have viewed this possibility on a definite planning basis.<sup>2</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)



1. Brigadier General Frederick W. Evans and Colonel Bruce W. Bidwell (U.S.M.A., 1924) presented their airborne plans to General Eisenhower at his headquarters on February 16. They presented their plans to Eisenhower's staff on the seventeenth and to General Sir Bernard Montgomery, Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley, and Major General Matthew B. Ridgway on February 18. Evans and Bidwell reported that on February 21 Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith announced that "decision had been made not to use the airborne effort initially as we were proposing, but to use it directly to assist the beach landing and main effort particularly to capture Cherbourg as soon as possible. Later, upon successful establishment of the beachhead, it might then be desirable to reform the airborne means and execute a vertical envelopment en masse, in connection with the inland advance." (Evans and Bidwell Memorandum for General Marshall, March 1, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 381].)

2. "My initial reaction to the specific proposal is that I agree thoroughly with the conception but disagree with the timing," Eisenhower replied on February 19. "Mass in vertical envelopments is sound—but since this kind of an enveloping force is *immobile on the ground*, the collaborating force must be strategically and tactically mobile. So the time for the mass vertical envelopment is *after* the beach-head has been gained and a striking force built up!" He maintained that "the initial crisis of the Campaign will be the struggle to break through beach defenses, exploit quickly to include a port and be solidly based for further operations." The one condition that must never be forgotten, Eisenhower noted, was "the enemy's highly efficient facilities for concentration of ground troops at any particular point. . . . Our bombers will delay movement, but I cannot conceive of enough air power to prohibit movement on the network of roads throughout northwest France." He would, however, study the plans. (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1736–39.)

On March 3 a copy of General Henry H. Arnold's February 29 reaction to Eisenhower's letter was sent to Eisenhower with no covering letter. In the files is a short cover letter of March 2 for Marshall's signature, which is stamped "not used." The unused cover letter stated: "I am sorry that you do not see your way clear initially to commit the airborne effort en masse." General Arnold remained convinced that "with the capture of the airfields we have planned, our masses of airborne forces can be made tactically mobile which should prevent them from becoming isolated and defeated in detail." He concluded: "I do not like to think of a static beachhead slowly building up before an offensive blow is struck. This was our trouble at Anzio. On the contrary, I like to think of a fluid situation wherein prongs or fingers are constantly and swiftly reaching out, joining and reaching out again. If we have this view, the beachhead and the air-head will soon join." (Arnold Memorandum for General Marshall, February 29, 1944, and "Not Used" Marshall to Eisenhower, [March 2, 1944], NA/RG 165 [OCS, 381].)

General Eisenhower responded on March 10: "Please tell General Arnold that in spite of the glowing prospects he has painted for his particular type of airborne operations, the ground situation we are facing is one that will yield only to stern fighting. The fact is that against a German defense, fingers do not stab out rapidly and join up in the heart of enemy held territory unless there is present solid tactical power and overwhelming strength. . . . I think that Arnold might restudy his analogy with the Anzio beachhead by simply realizing that that beachhead is not repeat not a separate operation but had the same purpose as would have had a very strong airborne operation." (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1766–67.)

General Marshall later recalled that he "was very strong" for the airborne unit. "I've always felt, for instance, in the final battle in Normandy, that the plan they had worked out in detail for the air, but which Eisenhower's people didn't think they could safely risk, was the quick way to end the battle—and that was to seize a field near Paris with glider planes, with parachute troops, and then fly in these small tractors and other things, and then gather in all the motor transport of the surrounding country and, of course, all the French undercover units would have joined us and built up there with the ammunition. . . . We could put in 105 [-mm] guns and build up a force there right behind the German line before they had time to get things together, and make it almost impossible for them to do anything



but to fight you with small groups. However, that was a hazard. It was a brand new thing and Eisenhower's staff and Eisenhower, I guess, himself didn't feel that it was proper to take the risk. But I always thought it was wrong to divide up the men into little groups everywhere. . . . I believe the air could have been used with great effect in splitting up the Germans very quickly at the start." (*Marshall Interviews*, pp. 465–66.)

THE Army Ground Forces began to experience personnel shortages in early 1944; shortages that would have serious implications for OVERLORD and ANVIL which projected large-scale commitments of American ground forces in France. The American strategic planning organizations had in 1943 scaled down the number of American divisions to be raised from 105 to 90, gambling that this would be sufficient to fight the war in Europe, the Pacific, and the Mediterranean, and to maintain divisions held in strategic reserve in the continental United States. Selective Service, however, was failing to maintain the deliveries of inducted soldiers that had been anticipated. (Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944*, pp. 408–9.) The personnel shortage was already being felt in the service forces, and planners predicted that after OVERLORD and ANVIL operations the need for replacements in combat units, particularly in rifle units, would become heavy.

General Marshall expressed his concern about personnel shortages at a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff held on February 1, 1944. He pointed out that Army Ground Forces were already short 87,000 to 97,000 men, that divisions undergoing training were being stripped of personnel to make up shortages in divisions departing for overseas commitment, that a need for heavy replacements in combat units could be expected in the near future as a result of offensive operations planned for 1944, and that shortages existed currently of 120,000 men in service forces designed to support these offensive operations. The army's rotation program would call for 75,000 men in the next year for replacements in the Southwest Pacific Area. The chief of staff estimated the present total deficit between 350,000 to 400,000 men. General Marshall indicated that strict economy was being practiced but that it would not be sufficient to meet the manpower crisis. He placed some of the blame on the Selective Service's operations. (Minutes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, February 1, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS 334, JCS Minutes].)

Given the current personnel shortages, General Marshall believed that the American military effort could not afford to continue large-scale support of the Army Specialized Training Program. The A.S.T.P. had been established in December 1942, assigning some 150,000 soldiers to colleges and universities to study engineering, mathematics, languages, various technical skills, dentistry, and medicine. The program was intended to



provide training for professional specialties needed in the military, while also continuing the operation of colleges which might otherwise meet financial ruin. The result was that Army Ground Forces were denied large numbers of educated men who could have served as noncommissioned or as commissioned officers in combat units. (Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1948], pp. 28–39. John D. Millett, *The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1954], p. 102.) As the following document indicates, General Marshall believed that the A.S.T.P. was a luxury that could no longer be supported. The A.S.T.P. was almost completely eliminated on April 1, 1944, retaining only the programs in dentistry and medicine. ★

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR  
*Secret*

February 10, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Serious personnel shortages.

At the present time the Army is short approximately 200,000 men due to the inability of Selective Service to deliver personnel as requested. The most serious aspect of this shortage is the fact that there is an urgent need in February for approximately 134,000 *already* basically trained men for units to be trained for shipment overseas before August 31st. These units are required for scheduled operations, the earlier ones are essential requirements of OVERLORD and ANVIL.

Further, General McNair has been unable, due to short deliveries from Selective Service, to provide the trained replacements required to keep current operations going. Therefore he has had to strip divisions of men—a most wasteful procedure. As a rule, the divisions now going to the base ports for shipment to England or into the Pacific receive two to three thousand men about two months before they sail. This necessitates a revamping of the training and in effect lowers the efficiency of the divisions before what would otherwise be the case were we able to keep them filled up. At the present time the Ground Forces are short 87,000 men.

I have been personally directing a careful canvass of the Air, Ground and Service forces to discover whether or not the present deficit in basically trained personnel can be made up from these forces. I have pressed



MacArthur, Harmon and Nimitz to close up rear installations and economize in men sufficiently to obviate the necessity of sending certain quotas or units to them. I have part of Gasser's personnel Board in Africa combing over that situation and Eisenhower has been directed to exercise rigid economies.<sup>1</sup> I am now convinced that we cannot provide the necessary men under present conditions. However, material savings in personnel to meet requirements for units to be activated *after* the 31st of August for the last half of 1944 *can* be managed. But it is the next six months, particularly February and March, that present the urgent problem.

Two weeks ago we reversed the policy carefully established to permit the rapid training of units by requiring divisions and other combat organizations to furnish a large percentage of the housekeeping details required in large cantonments. This means that company units, or even battalion units, may be removed from training for as long as two months at a time in order to perform the guard, utility, and other jobs now handled by station complements. This was done in order to release a sufficient percentage of the station complement units of trained men to enable General Somervell to organize immediately troops that must be ready to sail for England and the Mediterranean theater at an early date; even so, they will only be sketchily trained for their specific jobs.

A considerable number of Air and Ground stations or installations are being closed. Even with these economies we have been unable to meet the requirements.

I am aware of your strong feeling regarding the Army Specialized Training Program. However, I wish you to know that in my opinion we are no longer justified in holding 140,000 men in this training when it represents the only source from which we can obtain the required personnel, especially with a certain degree of intelligence and training, *except by disbanding already organized combat units*. I recognize that it would be desirable, if circumstances permitted, to withdraw personnel from the Army Specialized Training Program only as they complete scheduled terms of instruction; however, our need for these basically trained men is immediate and imperative. It is understood that appropriate compensation would have to be paid to the institutions in the cases of students withdrawn prior to the completion of a term that has been commenced.

I therefore propose that a maximum limit of 30,000 students be established, this number being required largely for the supply of doctors and dentists and such other highly trained technicians as the Army may be unable to procure from other sources. Further, in order to take maximum advantage of the superior intelligence, education and training of the men whose release I am proposing, that they be employed in accordance with the following general plan:



a. Such numbers to be assigned to the Army Service Forces as can be employed immediately in new units as non-commissioned officers and highly rated technicians.

b. The majority to be assigned to the Army Ground Forces with the stipulation that the Ground Forces transfer an appropriate number of men of lower intelligence to the Army Service Forces for use as enlisted fillers in the new units required. An appropriate number of men relieved from the Army Specialized Training Program to be assigned in the Army Ground Forces to new units where it is expected they will provide the majority of the non-commissioned officers and highly rated technicians.

The remainder of the men released from the Army Specialized Training Program to be assigned to divisions, and an equal number of men of lower intelligence to be transferred from the divisions to be used as enlisted fillers in new units.

The outstanding deficiency currently noted in our divisions is the number of non-commissioned officers who are below satisfactory standards of intelligence and qualities of leadership. The men from the Army Specialized Training Program made available by the foregoing proposal should materially raise the combat efficiency of the divisions now scheduled for shipment overseas.

If you feel that the Specialized Training Program must be continued approximately at present strength, then the following action must be taken immediately:

10 Divisions, 3 Tank Battalions and 26 Antiaircraft Battalions will be disbanded or deactivated. Even so we will still be short some 90,000 men and are now considering today whether or not we must disband combat units to meet the deficiency.

My recommendations apply only to the Army Specialized Training Program students who have been duly inducted into the military service and are included in the overall strength of the Army. It is not proposed at this time to withdraw 17-year olds from the Army Specialized Training Reserve Program or that we in any way curtail that program at present.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Major General Lorenzo D. Gasser was president of the War Department Manpower Board, whose activities had been extended to overseas theaters. See Marshall Memorandum for the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, North African Theater of Operations, January 18, 1944, pp. 235-37.

2. Following the February 18 afternoon Cabinet meeting, Secretary of War Stimson warned President Roosevelt that the manpower shortage had rendered it "imperative to shorten the ASTP." The president "expressed much chagrin at that and asked if the medical students were going to be preserved." Stimson assured Roosevelt that they were, but "I told him that the matter was already decided and that General Marshall had made it clear to me



that we faced the alternative of either making this immediate cut in ASTP or losing ten divisions from the forces which were necessary this summer.” (February 18, 1944, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 46: 61].) For Stimson’s opinion regarding the Army Specialized Training Program, see Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), pp. 458–61.

A copy of this document was sent to President Roosevelt on February 21. Marshall also directed that the memorandum be mailed on February 24 to the presidents of the colleges participating in the A.S.T.P. The copy sent to the colleges omitted only two words—“OVERLORD” and “ANVIL” in the first paragraph. (Joseph T. McNarney Memorandum for the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, February 24, 1944, and J. A. Ulloa to the Presidents of the Colleges and Universities Participating in the Army Specialized Training Program, February 24, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 320.2].)

For more information on this subject, see Marshall Memorandum for General McNarney, February 18, 1944, pp. 308–9; Army Cuts Specialized Training Program, February 18, 1944, pp. 309–11; and Marshall Memorandum for the Secretary of War, May 16, 1944, pp. 447–50.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SURLES

February 10, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: New York Times Magazine

I saw Arthur Krock as you requested. He handed me the attached communication from Arthur Sulzberger to him which is self-explanatory.<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Krock discussed the various considerations involved.

I told him that we were endeavoring to find a workable solution, that as he had already admitted, the affair was vastly complicated and that in my opinion it was reaching the point where our action might be reduced to the tragic absurdity of permitting no magazines to go to the troops because of the general insistence on the part of the various publishers which would mean “all or nothing.”

I told Mr. Krock that my concern was solely in seeing that the soldier received the reading matter he craved so far as it was practicable for us to transport and deliver it, that the maintenance of morale demanded this and that all other considerations were secondary. I told him that we were struggling with this seemingly insoluble problem in an effort to find an acceptable solution.

Krock had this proposal to make, which, as a matter of fact, had flitted through my mind before—though I didn’t mention this to him, that we proceed on a basis of alternating deliveries in the various theaters. For example, that certain magazines go one month to this theater, the next month to another theater, and the next month to another theater. Whether or not he had in mind that the newspaper magazine supplement only be treated in this way or was referring to all magazines, I do not know.



After you have looked over Sulzberger's letter and thought further in the matter, come in and talk this over with me.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. General Marshall had met with Arthur Krock, a *New York Times* Washington correspondent, to discuss Arthur H. Sulzberger's concern about discrimination against the *New York Times* in favor of *Newsweek* and *Time* in the European Theater of Operations. Sulzberger was president and publisher of the *New York Times*; his letter is not in the Marshall papers. Colonel Stanley J. Grogan, acting director at the Bureau of Public Relations, informed Marshall that the commanding general of the European Theater of Operations had sent a message that authorization for publication of any commercial American newspaper or magazine would be granted to no one except on specific instructions from the War Department. Pony editions of *Newsweek* and *Time* magazines printed in the United States were purchased by Library Service and the Army Exchange Service for shipment and distribution abroad; however, this was unrelated to the question of printing overseas editions abroad. (Grogan Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, February 4, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 095K].)

2. For another issue that Marshall discussed with Arthur Krock, see Marshall to Krock, February 17, 1944, p. 308.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JACOB L. DEVERS  
Radio No. 9431. *Secret*

February 10, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Personal for eyes of Devers only from Marshall. Re Message W-2061 of February 6 signed Wilson regarding article by Cyrus Sulzberger cabled to New York Times that date,<sup>1</sup> prefixed unpublishable without consent of War Department as to references to inferiority American weapons and morale.

After describing defects of terrain, weather, etc., this follows:

"Another pair of obstacles arises whereof American public should know more. Because of excessively strict censorship prevailing it is impossible to give many details along these lines.

First the question of weapons. Any American civilian probably assumes from political speeches and advertisements that his army is fighting with finest weapons existent. This is sheer boloney.

Weakest portion of armor on German Tiger tanks equals strongest armor plating on Sherman. Either German Mark 4 or Mark 6 outguns Sherman. New German antitank gun has at least double muzzle velocity of best American weapon. There isn't a single American gun in this theater which can equal the range of the German 170 by thousands of yards. In other words our tanks and guns must close with the enemy before they are able to deal a blow. Even if we are numerically superior that does not equalize the situation. No American Mortar equals Nebelwerfer and we have no weapon of the caliber of enemy's machine pistol.



Additionally these troops are tired. One division has been in line more than 110 days. Casualties along entire Anglo American French Front have been stiff and many fine Platoon and Company leaders lost especially in Rifle Companies. When tank is knocked out its crew is much harder to replace than the vehicle itself.

Just yesterday night writer sat up in tent with 2 tank Colonels gloomily discussing their particular mission. 'Send out the photographers' they said. 'There will be plenty of flamers. Germans have been able to make this sector regular trap and we haven't got guns to stand up against them. But we have got to get in action. As our General says "A tank doesn't make very good mantelpiece."'

As soon as time permits many of these troops need replacements but correspondents talked over this subject with many officers including principal Commanders in Italy and they complain that fault does not lie in this theater but in the draft policy in the United States which does not produce enough units.

This dispatch may sound gloomy. It is meant to. It is necessary to realize what these soldiers are up against and although they are advancing, why it is such a slow and costly process against tough obstacles and a determined skillful enemy."

For Devers: What is the purpose of the theater passing this on to the War Department? Does it partake of a form of alibi? If not why is it passed on here for us to censor, particularly at this time? Does the theater desire this to be published? Please reply to me immediately.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-4268])

1. Cyrus L. Sulzberger was a war correspondent for the *New York Times*.
2. "The theater had no purpose in passing the article of Sulzberger on to the War Department," Devers replied on February 11. "It was done through sheer stupidity. Drastic action is being taken to see that articles of this type are handled here and not passed on to Washington. The theater does not desire the article to be published." (Devers to Marshall, February 11, 1944, In Log, p. 123-A, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Message Log].)

TO BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN MCA. PALMER

February 11, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear John, Last night while looking for some papers I came across Mrs. Marshall's partial attempt at an autobiography, so I am sending it to you to read since you expressed a desire to see it.

You will find attached to the last page an outline of what the succeeding chapters were to be. In the light of the past two or three years this would be considerably augmented.



The portion referring to life in Baltimore, etc., was very sketchily and hastily done and was quite unsatisfactory to her but she never found the impulse to work it over.<sup>1</sup>

I hope Maude has fully recovered from her flu and that you have not been too overworked in your dual capacity. I was delighted to see Mary and want to find an opportunity to have a talk with her. Affectionately,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Katherine Tupper Marshall finished her autobiography in 1946. General Marshall read the draft manuscript and made editorial changes. In the foreword to her book, she noted that "General Marshall has told me that he will never write his own memoirs, his knowledge of people and events being too intimate for publication." Since this would leave historians "merely the official reports from which to paint a biographical portrait," she included trivial events along with the more serious ones. "It is through these seemingly small happenings that a clearer understanding will be gained of George Marshall's character," and "I hoped that these trivial or amusing events might illumine and make more readable this homespun account of our years together." (K. T. Marshall, *Together*, foreword [p. xiii].)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
*Personal and Confidential*

February 11, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Eisenhower, Don't take the following too seriously, especially as I don't want to trouble your mind in the midst of very important decisions.

Yesterday Arnold, Somervell, Handy and I were driving to lunch with the head of the French Mission who is about to take his departure. I queried Somervell as to the reason for a series of reports commenting so adversely on the post exchange operations in the Mediterranean that we have had to send out the head of that service to straighten things out. I wished to know why such a situation should develop there when all over the world we have had exactly the opposite reaction, high praise for the efficiency and coverage of exchange service.

Somervell felt that the trouble lay with the man in general charge of all such Special Service activities, General Hughes, and he commented on his disappointment that Hughes was not to go forward as the Governor of Rome but was to be sent to England. He stated that Hughes had been rigid and outspokenly unsympathetic in his reactions to practically all Special Service activities. I thought of the "Yank" business and wondered if he had been at the bottom of that.<sup>1</sup> Somervell spoke of the rather sarcastic reception Hughes would give each officer sent into that theater in connection with such matters.

Arnold spoke up and said that he had never made any comment but Hughes had been his particular difficulty throughout the period of the Mediterranean campaign and he could second all Somervell was saying.



Handy spoke up and said Hughes was an instructor at Leavenworth when he, Handy, was a student and that he was about the most unpopular and unsatisfactory instructor there; that when the students learnt that he had been sent to Columbia for a course in Pedagogy their humorous reaction was, “Don’t send anybody else in the Army to Columbia if Hughes was the result”.

I have never seen the man to my knowledge, therefore my viewpoint is purely abstract, but the unanimity of opinion leads me to believe that you are reacquiring one of the cast iron type in a job that requires other characteristics. You know him and worked with him so it is entirely your affair.

This letter is not going into the files of the War Department and I wish you would tear up this copy so that there will be no record because that would be most unfair to Hughes.<sup>2</sup>

I think it would be best if you make no reply. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See Marshall to Eisenhower, October 29, 1943, pp. 173–74.

2. Colonel Bruce W. Bidwell delivered this letter to Eisenhower. In July 1942 Major General Everett S. Hughes (U.S.M.A., 1908) became chief of staff, Services of Supply, for the European Theater of Operations and later became deputy chief of staff, E.T.O. In February 1943 he became deputy theater commander, North African Theater of Operations, and he commanded the American Line of Communication which supported the American combat effort from an administrative and supply position. In February 1944 General Eisenhower requested Hughes to be transferred to headquarters of the European Theater of Operations as his special assistant. Eisenhower wrote to Hughes on February 24, 1944, stating his main duties were to consult and confer with officers and enlisted men in all units to advise him of any measure to ensure the success of the operations: “whether manpower and supplies are being energetically utilized, whether responsibilities are clear and fixed and whether everything practicable is being done to support and maintain the prospective combat troops.” (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1748–49.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
*Secret*

February 12, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: “Magic”

I have learned that you seldom see the Army summaries of “Magic” material. For a long time, the last two months in particular, I have had our G-2 organization concentrating on a workable presentation on “Magic” for my use as well as for the other officials concerned, particularly yourself. A highly specialized organization is now engaged in the very necessary process of separating the wheat from the chaff and correlating the items with past information in order that I may be able quickly and intelligently to evaluate the importance of the product.



Recently I have had these summaries bound in a Black Book both for convenience of reading and for greater security in handling. Sometimes two or three of these booklets are gotten out in a single day. I think they contain all of the worthwhile information culled from the tremendous mass of intercepts now available and that are accumulated each twenty-four hours. The recent discovery of the Japanese Army machine code has added a tremendous amount of such material and will continue to give us a great deal from day to day. The problem is how to avoid being buried under the mass of information, and I think the present arrangement satisfactorily meets that difficulty.<sup>1</sup>

I am attaching two of the current booklets which I hope you will glance through in order to familiarize yourself with the manner in which the information is presented. I should like to send these booklets each day direct to the White House and have them delivered to you by Admiral Brown.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The Japanese diplomatic code had been broken prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The wartime Japanese army code had been broken in the spring and summer of 1943, and in early 1944 the code had been captured. Since early 1944 a Japanese Army Supplement had been issued in addition to the Magic Diplomatic Summaries. (Ronald Lewin, *The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan* [New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1982], pp. 191-96.) For a discussion of codebreaking successes against the Japanese army's Water Transport Code and Japanese military attaché cipher system, and finding the Japanese cipher library near Sio, New Guinea, see Edward J. Drea, *MacArthur's ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942-1945* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992), pp. 61-62, 73-78, 92-93.

2. Vice Admiral Wilson Brown was naval aide to President Roosevelt.

TO MAJOR GENERAL MAURICE A. POPE  
*Secret*

February 12, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Pope: Your proposal in your letter of February 9 to give some Canadian officers training and combat experience in the Pacific is agreeable to the War Department.<sup>1</sup> We will be glad to make the necessary arrangements.

As I told you, the training of our Pacific divisions is "topped off" in Hawaii where they have excellent set-ups for jungle warfare and amphibious training. Your officers could be passed through this training and later be attached to units scheduled for active operations.

The Commanding General in the Central Pacific has been queried as to the most satisfactory date for these officers to begin their training period in Hawaii.<sup>2</sup> With proper timing, I am sure that the four to six months' period



of attachment proposed by you will be adequate to insure their participation in active operations.

General Handy will advise you as to details of arrangements including the time the officers in question should be sent.<sup>3</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. General Marshall had met with Pope, head of the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington, on February 10, 1944. Pope had requested that ten Canadian officers, in the grade of captain or major, be attached to units of the U.S. Army assigned to the Central and Southern Pacific theaters for the purpose of “building up in Canada a small training nucleus of officers with first-hand experience.” The object was to attach the Canadian officers for a preliminary period of instruction and training, followed by their employment with units in active operations. (Pope to Marshall, February 9, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 091.713].)

2. Marshall [Handy] to Richardson, Radio No. 280, February 12, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 336.4 Canada].)

3. Major General Thomas T. Handy notified Pope on February 16 that Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, commanding general in the Central Pacific, advised that the Canadian officers should arrive in Hawaii on March 1. (Handy to Pope, February 16, 1944, *ibid.*) Most of these Canadian officers attached to the American forces were present during the fighting on Saipan during the summer. (C. P. Stacey, *Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific*, a volume in the *Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War* [Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1957], p. 509.)

TO CHARLES SEYMOUR

February 13, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Doctor Seymour: I have just received your cordial note of February 11th regarding the arrangements for the award of the Howland Prize to Sir John Dill.<sup>1</sup>

This thought occurs to me, and I must be perfectly frank with you. Mr. Bundy told me that it was your desire, or that of the officials in charge of the ceremony, that I should make a few comments. Whether or not the Secretary of War attends, I understand he is giving his Assistant Secretary, Mr. McCloy, a statement to make. Under these circumstances, wouldn't it be better if I merely attended and made no comments?

I am inclined to think that the invitation to me to comment was probably inspired more by courtesy than by a consideration of what was appropriate to the occasion. My friendship and admiration for Sir John Dill is well known, my feelings in the matter could, therefore, be easily guessed. Furthermore, most confidentially, it had seemed to me, and I so told Bundy, that the less conspicuous I was in the affair, the more effective it might be.

However, I am preparing a draft for some very brief remarks and will be ready to do my part in the ceremony as now arranged. But I want you to



have my point of view. In the event that you agree with me, I would appreciate a telegram.<sup>2</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Seymour, president of Yale University, had written that he was pleased that Marshall would give a brief address following the presentation of the award to Dill on February 16. (Seymour to Marshall, February 11, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

Apprehensive that Prime Minister Churchill would recall Sir John Dill from Washington, General Marshall had asked Harvey H. Bundy, special assistant to Secretary Stimson, to see if Yale University would confer an honorary degree on Dill. Since a special convocation could not be arranged at the moment, Seymour instead secured approval for Dill to be awarded the Howland Memorial Prize. Secretary Stimson, who also attended the ceremony, noted: "We had all felt this was a very important proceeding because there is danger that Dill be recalled home for political reasons and his departure from service here on the British Commission would mean a great blow to cooperation between the British and American Staffs. Dill himself has been of the utmost service. He is not only able but very fair-minded and tactful in his dealings with the Staff and he has been a great factor in keeping the unity of Staff operations which has been so remarkable in campaigns thus far. Therefore we are trying to give him a boom in this country to show how important he is and to make the Prime Minister a little bit cautious about removing him. Marshall has been particularly insistent upon the importance of this matter." (February 16, 1944, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 46: 54].)

The award included a check for \$500, which Dill asked Marshall to forward to the West Point Library. The chief of staff sent the check to Superintendent Francis B. Wilby, along with Dill's instructions that there be no publicity regarding the gift. (Dill to Marshall, February 17, 1944, and Marshall to Wilby, February 18, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. "We should all be deeply disappointed if you did not speak," Seymour replied on February 15. He insisted that Marshall's remarks were "essential to the effect of the ceremony." (Seymour Telegram to Marshall, February 15, 1944, *ibid.*) See Marshall Remarks at Yale University, February 16, 1944, pp. 304-5.

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT CHIEF OF  
STAFF, G-1 [WHITE]

February 14, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Colonel McCornack of the Medical Corps is about to be retired. He is suffering considerable physical disablement.

McCornack was one of the outstanding men of the Medical Corps in relationship to the army at large and to General Staff work and planning. He lost an opportunity for advancement by being made surgeon of a field army at the outset of that organization in 1939. As you will remember, the President would not promote to General grade members of the staff of Armies, excepting the Chief of Staff. Because of his General Staff ability he was then put on straight General Staff work as Deputy Chief of Staff, I believe of the 4th Army. Again in a position which denied him promotion. In brief, I wish his name put on the next list with the following statement:



“This officer is about to retire. Through the accident of assignments, due entirely to his conspicuous efficiency, as a General Staff officer (unique in an officer of the Medical Corps) and as an instructor for the Army War College, he was denied the opportunity for advancement. It is earnestly desired that he be permitted to retire as a Brigadier General (temporary).”<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Colonel Condon C. McCornack was promoted to brigadier general effective February 20, 1944. Brigadier General McCornack retired on May 31, and he died on November 5, 1944, at Letterman General Hospital in San Francisco.

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT CHIEF OF  
STAFF, G-1 [WHITE]

February 14, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Subject: Personnel Shortages, Physical Profile, Limited Service.

Yesterday morning I had a lengthy talk with General Kirk on the above subjects. In referring to the difficulties we have gotten into and the large number of discharges from the army for physical disabilities (I believe he said in the ratio of about one to every three being inducted at the time), he said that with the large numbers of civilian doctors who have to carry out our orders there is always considerable possibility of misunderstandings unless the order itself is easily understood and not easily misunderstood. He referred to one order, Serial 161 I believe, which abolished limited service which he felt had cost us a very large number of men, I believe somewhere between fifty and eighty thousand, largely through misunderstanding of the intent of the order. I am giving you the roughest generalization of the conversation, but it will serve as the basis of a discussion with me.

Regarding the physical profile, he feels that the proposal from his headquarters (that of General Somervell) is not an over-simplification and did not develop in that manner. General Nelson, speaking for General McNarney, thought it “too vague and meaningless to facilitate proper assignment” and that it would have an unfortunate morale effect, similar to that of the former characterization of limited service. Kirk, of course, does not agree with this.

In Nelson’s memorandum to me he spoke of the profile serial as being necessary to “set up a yardstick which will permit a tabulation to be made of the numerical distribution of the various categories for physical fitness.”<sup>1</sup> This implies a re-examination physically of the entire army which, I am



sure, is not intended. I will talk to Nelson about this. Meanwhile I want you to have it in mind.

Kirk makes quite a point, and it seems to me a good point, that the system we proceed on requires an unnecessarily large number of physical re-examinations preliminary to reassignment. He gave me a number of illustrations, all of which indicated a heavy and unnecessary burden on the Medical Corps.

Before I go any further in this matter I would like you to have a personal talk with General Kirk.<sup>2</sup>

G. C. Marshall

NA/RG 165 (OCS, 201.5)

1. By the end of 1943 the War Department was working on a system to make better use of soldiers according to their physical qualifications. Deputy Chief of Staff Joseph T. McNarney was chairman of a committee to work on a physical classification system. Plans were submitted by Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair of the Army Ground Forces, Surgeon General Norman T. Kirk, and the G-1 Division, but it was difficult to reach agreement on any one plan. By the end of January 1944, the chief of staff had approved in principle a Physical Profile system which provided an index of a soldier's physical fitness. (Minutes, Meeting of the General Council, January 31, 1944, NA/RG 407 [334.8, General Council Minutes].) Nelson's memorandum is not in the Marshall papers. (See Millett, *Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces*, pp. 99-100, 159-60.)

2. Major General Miller G. White replied that "General Kirk's plan, as submitted by General Somervell, and the profile plan directed by the Deputy Chief of Staff both have the same ends in view but arrive at them by slightly different routes. General Kirk agreed with me that it would be well for us to go ahead with our test and development of the profile plan and delay any final decision on the system permanently adopted until these tests have been completed, about the middle of April." (White Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, February 26, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 201.5].) In February reception centers began to use the Physical Profile Plan on an experimental basis, and on May 18 the War Department officially announced the plan. A soldier's physical profile serial was based on a grade for each of six categories: stamina, upper extremities, lower extremities, hearing, vision, and emotional stability. Reception centers, hospitals, reassignment centers, and redistribution stations were directed to administer the physical profile. (War Department Memorandum No. W 40-44, May 18, 1944, *ibid.*) The Physical Profile system is discussed in Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, pp. 64-69.

ADMIRAL Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander of the Southeast Asia Command, authorized in early 1944 the dispatch of a mission to London and Washington (code-named AXIOM) headed by his deputy chief of staff, Major General Albert C. Wedemeyer, to present his headquarters' views on future strategy. Mountbatten's staff thought it inadvisable to continue large-scale commitment of ground troops to Burma, particularly in light of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's reluctance to maintain Chinese operations supportive of the Allied campaign in North



Burma. Mountbatten's staff considered it more productive to launch a campaign into Sumatra, in the Netherlands Indies, with the ultimate objective of securing a major port on the Chinese coast. This operation would require additional resources, perhaps not available until the defeat of Germany. It would mean a suspension of active Allied operations in the Southeast Asia Command until the fall of 1944 or the spring of 1945. These operations (code-named CULVERIN) dovetailed with long-range British political objectives such as the reoccupation of Malaya, particularly Singapore, and the insurance of British military participation in final Pacific operations against Japan.

Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of the Southeast Asia Command and commanding general of U.S. forces in the China-Burma-India theater, was informed by his deputy, Major General Daniel I. Sultan, of Admiral Mountbatten's intentions regarding future Allied strategy in Southeast Asia and of his organizing a military mission to Washington to present his position. Stilwell's strategic views were completely at variance with Mountbatten's. Sultan suggested to Stilwell that he send a military mission to Washington also to present his views of future strategy. Stilwell did so, under the leadership of Brigadier General Haydon L. Boatner (U.S.M.A., 1924), commanding general of combat troops in the Ledo Sector. Stilwell had presented his views to Mountbatten at a conference held on January 31, 1944. Stilwell believed that the Allies retained a certain obligation to the Chinese government and that a continued Allied campaign in Burma was necessary. The value of possessing a major port on the Chinese coast was unquestioned, but Stilwell believed that it could be secured with an advance of Chinese ground troops. Stilwell argued that basing all operational considerations upon a future campaign into the Netherlands Indies, while terminating the existing Burma campaign, was fundamentally in error. In addition, Stilwell pointed out, the adoption of Mountbatten's plan would relieve military pressure on the Japanese in Southeast Asia for six months.

Stilwell failed to inform Mountbatten that he also had sent a military mission to Washington to present his views regarding future Allied strategy for Southeast Asia. Stilwell considered he was within his rights to send such a mission, because in his capacity as commanding general of U.S. forces in the China-Burma-India theater he reported directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington. Mountbatten believed that since Stilwell was his subordinate, in his capacity as deputy supreme commander of Southeast Asia, Stilwell was demonstrating disloyalty in communicating with Washington directly and violating proper chain of command procedures. (Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 160–63; Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944*, pp. 435–39.) Meanwhile, Stilwell's representatives had arrived in Washington. ★



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
*Secret*

February 14, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Chinese Army Corps on the Ledo Road.

General Boatner, General Stilwell's Chief of Staff for the Ledo Corps and who in effect was in command of this Corps during the period Stilwell was at Cairo, is here in the War Department. I think you would be interested in getting a direct report on the character of the Chinese troops that were trained at Ramgarh as well as regarding the situation and progress on the Ledo Road.<sup>1</sup>

General Wheeler will be in the War Department in a week or ten days and I understood from you the other day that you wished to see him. I shall notify Gen. Watson<sup>2</sup> accordingly.

General Wedemeyer, Mountbatten's Deputy Chief of Staff, will be here from a conference in London about the twenty-first. I shall notify Gen. Watson when he has arrived, in case you desire to see him, which I think would be an excellent thing.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Brigadier General Haydon L. Boatner met with President Roosevelt on February 18, 1944. Boatner reported to Stilwell, "I was impressed with complete sympathy he displayed with your efforts to advance in Burma." (Boatner to Stilwell, Radio Nos. 4549 and 6432, February 19, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 9, Book 15].) Boatner discussed with the president the improved quality of Chinese combat troops, and they agreed that the trouble was not the ability of the average Chinese soldier but rather the politicization of higher-ranking Chinese officers. "The Chinese soldier if properly trained and equipped was a first class fighting man," said Boatner, but "the Chinese Division Commanders and senior officers are very politically conscious." Boatner reported that the president "evinced no disappointment or ill feeling toward the Generalissimo in any respect and showed no reaction to my remarks that his pressure on the Generalissimo was necessary."

Boatner discussed progress on the Ledo Road, informing the president that "the worst of construction was already over" and that a pipeline needed to supply the B-29 offensive could be constructed parallel to the Ledo Road. The president asked when the Ledo Road could be expected to reach Myitkyina, and Boatner replied that the question really was when Allied ground troops could take and hold Myitkyina, which hinged on the British failure to advance from Imphal and the Chinese reluctance to advance from Yunnan. He suggested to the president that the British did not put their full energies into the Burma campaign and that they tended to exaggerate the natural difficulties of the country. "The President stated that he was more dissatisfied with the progress of the war in Burma than anywhere else," related Boatner. "It was very evident throughout the conference that the President had lost patience with the British for not pushing the conquest of Burma stronger. He seemed quite desirous of putting pressure on Mr. Churchill." ("Report by Brig. Gen. Haydon L. Boatner of Interview with the President on February 18," *ibid.*) For further information, see note 1, Marshall Memorandum for Field Marshal Sir John Dill, February 28, 1944, p. 319.

2. Major General Edwin M. Watson was President Roosevelt's military aide and secretary.

3. Major General Albert C. Wedemeyer arrived in England in February 1944 to discuss



Mountbatten's plan (CULVERIN). He met with Prime Minister Churchill, King George VI, General Eisenhower, and various senior Allied commanders. Taking his mission to Washington, Wedemeyer met with President Roosevelt; and on March 21 he wrote to Churchill that his talk with the president was "most satisfactory." Wedemeyer wrote: "I emphasized that we recommend strongly against the construction of the Ledo Road through Upper Burma to China and explained very carefully our reasons. Instead of the unfavorable reaction which I had anticipated, he did not appear to attach importance to this matter—at least not as much as he had on previous occasions." (Albert C. Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!* [New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958], pp. 258–64; quote on p. 262.)

TO HERMAN W. STEINKRAUS

February 15, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mr. Steinkraus: I am glad to have your letter of January twenty-ninth with its ideas regarding the build-up of the WAC organization.<sup>1</sup> I have sent your recommendations to the individual in charge of the campaign and I am quite certain they will be very helpful. I further intend to talk the matter over with Director of the WAC, Colonel Hobby.

Your comments on the basic military training are excellent. But they are based primarily on your experience in dealing with women who are living separate lives except for the focal point of the job. Billeting of WAC personnel is feasible in only a few stations. As a consequence, it is necessary for the Army to introduce enough of that basic disciplinary training to bring order and contentment to those who are obliged to live in groups, who may change their station at any time, and particularly to those who will serve overseas in the various theaters of war. Long experience has shown that men or women living under those conditions and under the rigorous responsibilities of those charged with fighting a war must be well-ordered, healthy and hardy. No substitute for basic disciplinary training has yet been found that will as quickly and effectively introduce those qualities in the individual.

Your other comments are valuable and will be thoughtfully considered in the effort to invest the lives of the women in our Army with the dignity, the protection, and, wherever possible, the comforts and social advantages to which they are entitled.

I am probably the strongest Army advocate of the WAC organization and I am fully convinced that a great deal of the work of the Army can be done better by women than by men. I am deeply interested in a more successful recruiting campaign because the Corps must be rapidly enlarged. But along with these desires goes my view that this must be a military organization to perform its full and proper part in the war. We will constantly improve the placing of special skills in proper jobs. And with



the help of keenly interested friends, such as yourself, we will smooth out the difficulties and bring home to the public the fine organization the women of America have introduced as their principal part in this war.<sup>2</sup>

Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Steinkraus, president and general manager of Bridgeport Brass Company in Connecticut, had sent suggestions on how to increase the number of women in the armed services. He had recently heard a news commentator who had returned from overseas battlefronts state that "half of all the jobs in the army could be done equally well by women and thereby release the men for more important uses." Steinkraus wrote that women were eager to do their share for the war effort, but that they were fundamentally interested in performing their jobs rather than "a lot of men's type of exercise" and "useless drill followed by assignment to mostly menial duties." To make the armed services more attractive to women, he recommended that men rather than women officers be in charge; drop the restrictions on dating; allow more women overseas duty; and assign women more challenging jobs commensurate to their abilities. (Steinkraus to Marshall, January 29, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

2. See Marshall Statement for Women's Army Corps Recruiting Campaign, March 21, 1944, pp. 360-61.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Secret*

February 15, 1944

Washington, D.C.

Colonel McCarthy informed me last evening that Steve Early had telephoned him your direction to have a commission issued immediately as a First Lieutenant in the Air Forces for Joseph Wright Alsop, Junior; that General Chennault had recommended it and that General Stilwell was agreeable.

General Arnold received a letter dated December 28th from Chennault submitting this recommendation.<sup>1</sup> He brought Chennault's letter to me some ten days ago along with another communication to which I am about to refer. I had held the matter, endeavoring to determine the best course of procedure.

Now, in compliance with your direction a commission will be issued to Alsop, but I wish you to be aware of certain facts and of my opinion as to the result of such action.

You will recall that Dr. Soong on his last trip out to China, during a meeting with Admiral Mountbatten and General Somervell in New Delhi, demanded the relief of Stilwell and stated that the Generalissimo did not desire him to be continued in command. Soong gave as his basis for the demand, Stilwell's incompetence, and on Mountbatten's insistence on knowing the grounds for such a statement, he, Soong, produced a letter to him from Joe Alsop giving a critical resume of conditions in the theater,



almost all referring adversely to Stilwell's exercise of command, to his staff, and to conditions generally. Soong stated that this was the basis for his demand for Stilwell's relief.

The letter, which was given to Mountbatten in great confidence, is attached hereto.<sup>2</sup> It means to me that Alsop is either more competent as a commander than Stilwell or as a General Staff expert than the officers we have out there (which would continue him in the class with some other columnists and commentators), or that he is a seriously destructive force. Commissioning him in a command under Stilwell means definitely the undermining of that commander, who has already had an extremely difficult time with the sluggish British action in India and with the idiosyncracies of the Generalissimo in China, together with Chennault's methods of circumventing his, Stilwell's authority, whenever it is not agreeable to him.

In Cairo I found that Stilwell was unaware of what brought about the sudden and determined effort to have him relieved from command. He has therefore finally acquiesced in Chennault's desire for the commissioning of Alsop. I am of the opinion that we will be placing our command and control in the Burma-China theatre on a foundation of sand if we accept subordinates who are determinedly critical and disloyal to the commander whom we charge with the responsibility for our soldiers and operations in that theatre.<sup>3</sup>

G. C. Marshall

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Joseph W. Alsop, Jr., a newspaperman and author, had joined the American Volunteer Group as an aide to Major General Claire L. Chennault. He was captured by the Japanese at Hong Kong and repatriated; he had "executed a number of important, confidential assignments with entire success," wrote Chennault. Alsop currently served as Air Force liaison officer of China Defense Supplies, and "he knows my requirements, and he has an unusual special knowledge of leading Chinese personalities, and of the situation here as it affects our effort." (Chennault to Arnold, December 28, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Alsop's letter to T. V. Soong, typed single-spaced six and one-half pages in length, reported his findings after interviewing "two or three old friends . . . who have high places in Stilwell's ground force organization, yet are personally close enough to me to talk rather freely." From their testimony and "other reliable sources," Alsop had "compiled the following admittedly fragmentary but still depressing data on the character and quality of Stilwell's personal set-up. I shall report their facts and their opinions without obtruding my own, since I dislike the old gentleman so much that I hardly trust my own judgment where he is concerned." He thereby criticized Stilwell's staff organization, the inadequacy of its intelligence section run by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph W. Stilwell, Jr. (U.S.M.A., 1933), the ineffective methods of preparing Chinese troops for the Burma campaign, and the poor condition of the airfields and short supply of airport materiel. "My conclusion, I will tell you frankly, is that we have here more evidence for my theory that military services are only reformed by disaster. It is a little unlucky, however, that if there has to be a guinea pig, the guinea pig chosen is to be China, which can so ill afford mischances." (Alsop to Soong, July 12, [1943], GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. President Roosevelt wished the commission to be issued, believing that Alsop had been in the line of duty when he wrote to Soong. Alsop was immediately appointed a first



lieutenant and assigned duty in the headquarters of the Fourteenth Air Force. (McCarthy Memo for Record, February 17, 1944, and Ulio Radio to Stilwell, February 17, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Alsop's mother, Corinne Robinson Alsop, was a niece of President Theodore Roosevelt and first cousin and childhood friend of Eleanor Roosevelt, and a distant cousin of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. (Stewart Alsop, *Stay of Execution: A Sort of Memoir* [Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1973], pp. 34-38.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

February 16, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

You asked the other day the number of divisions that would be in the continental U.S. on the date of the launching of OVERLORD. I find the following to be the present schedule:

*June 1st*

Divisions in U.S.	41
Divisions in U.K.	21
Divisions in Mediterranean	8
Divisions in Pacific	19

*September 30th\**

Divisions in U.S.	29
Divisions in OVERLORD (U.K. and N.W. France)	31
Divisions in Mediterranean	8
Divisions in Pacific	21

\*During June and July, only one division a month can be sent to U.K. as the ports will be too burdened with cross-channel business.

It is expected that on June 1st there will be a total of 1,514,700 U.S. soldiers in the United Kingdom, 2,804 four-engine bombers, 711 medium bombers and 4,346 fighter bombers or fighters.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

REMARKS AT YALE UNIVERSITY

February 16, 1944  
New Haven, Connecticut

The award this afternoon of the Howland Memorial Prize to Field Marshal Sir John Dill of the British Army appeals to me as a happy augury for the immediate future. I say this because in my opinion the



triumph over Germany in the coming months depends more on a complete accord between the British and American forces than it does on any other single factor, air power, ground power, or naval power. Therefore the recognition today of the contribution of Sir John Dill to such Allied harmony is both timely and prophetic.

Throughout the war we have known that the agents of the enemy have endeavored to stir up ill will and misunderstandings among the Allies. They had worked against our accord with Russia. These attempts were thwarted at the Moscow conference and buried at Teheran. But the Nazi propagandists will be ceaseless in their effort to create dissension between the great English-speaking peoples.

The harmful possibilities of such discord have been serious in the past and will continue to be so in the future because of the necessity in the European theater for combined operations, even involving on occasions the complete intermingling of troops, as is now the case in the Fifth Army in Italy. Under such circumstances the possibility that misunderstandings may develop into festering sores should be evident to all, not to mention the fatal effect on the power of our blows that would result from any lack of harmony in the command and staff direction of our combined efforts.

That we have been able to master these very human difficulties, that in fact we have triumphed over them to the disaster of the enemy, is in my opinion the greatest single Allied achievement of the war. So I am gratified, I am tremendously encouraged to see Yale University honor the man who, in my opinion, has made an outstanding, a unique personal contribution to the coordination of the Allied effort. Little of his great influence on the succession of momentous events in this war will be found of record by the students of history. Therefore it is the more gratifying to see his service to our common cause recognized today in the midst of the conflict.

I might add in conclusion my belief that the hope of a post-war concord which will give us peace and security for the future, will in a large measure depend on the contribution of men like Sir John Dill of whom there are very, very few—men free of prejudice, singleminded in the sincerity of their efforts to promote the unity of our two great nations.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)

1. See the following document.

TO CHARLES SEYMOUR

February 17, [1944]  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Dr. Seymour, The visit to Yale yesterday was successful from every point of view and I feel deeply indebted to you for making possible that



most impressive ceremony. I am sorry that the press and photographers created so much of confusion and delay—they usually do in their interpretation of what is required in a democracy—and I can only hope that the trouble they caused will be justified by the translation to the American people of the purpose of the day.<sup>1</sup>

I particularly wish to thank you for your gracious personal references to me. You rather drew the long bow, if I may dare make such a reference to the President of Yale University, but I am most grateful.<sup>2</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. "The whole thing went off very well," Stimson wrote. "After a three-quarters of an hour delay in order to give the photographers and movie men their full opportunity, we went back to the field and flew back to Washington." (February 16, 1944, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 46: 55].) See *New York Times*, February 17, 1944, pp. 4, 18.

2. "In the unanimous opinion of our people here it was the Chief of Staff who stole the show," Carl A. Lohmann, secretary of Yale University, wrote to Lieutenant Colonel H. Merrill Pasco. (Lohmann to Pasco, February 19, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. 124. *Secret*

February 17, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall for Eisenhower's Eyes Only. Detailed reports of the 7th Division operation against Kwajalein Island in the Marshalls indicate that General Corlett's training of the division, cooperation with the Navy (Turner incidentally) plan of battle, landing, artillery support, tank and infantry action, organization of beaches for supply, continuity of methodical effort and even details of burial of his dead, etc, approached perfection.<sup>1</sup> He has been designated to command training corps in Hawaii but if you care to use him as a corps commander he will be flown to you immediately.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-7225])

1. Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner commanded the Southern Attack Force which was given the task of capturing Kwajalein Island and the surrounding islands in the southern part of the atoll. Major General Charles H. Corlett commanded the Southern Landing Force which was composed mainly of the Seventh Infantry Division. American forces landed on Kwajalein Island on February 1, 1944, and had secured the island by February 4. The operation had achieved surprise and was ably executed. "Artillery preparation, naval gunfire, and aerial bombardment had softened up the target in a fashion unexcelled at any other time in the Pacific war. The ship-to-shore movement had been conducted expeditiously and without serious hitch. Supplies flowed ashore and to the front lines smoothly and without interruption. The infantry-engineer teams assisted by tanks moved steadily, if somewhat more slowly than had been anticipated, up the axis of the island clearing the enemy from shelters and pillboxes." According to historians Crowl and



Love, “except for the occasional failure of tank-infantry co-ordination, no important deficiency had been revealed in the execution of the plan.” (Philip A. Crowl and Edmund G. Love, *Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1955], pp. 170–71, 289–90; for a detailed discussion of the operation, see pp. 219–301.)

2. “Corlett’s early arrival here will be of great advantage to us,” Eisenhower replied on February 19. (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1736.) Corlett assumed command of the Nineteenth Army Corps in March 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR  
*Secret*

February 17, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

I am attaching references to a rather complicated matter. I should like you to consider our position on the question of rate of exchange and the proposed procedure to force the Generalissimo to a more reasonable demand.

The question as to whether or not we should threaten to discontinue the Matterhorn Project (B-29 long-range bomber operations out of China) I hope you will not trouble your mind about at this time because a great deal is involved here which affects the entire Pacific and this particular phase of the proposal will have to be considered on that basis.

What I should like to have is your view as to the stand being made as to rate of exchange and the propriety of the proposed method of bringing the Generalissimo to time. Meanwhile I am going into the question of whether or not we should hazard the B-29 project. You will see a statement from General Giles, Chief of the Air Staff, attached to these papers expressing concern regarding this aspect.<sup>1</sup> Please don’t trouble yourself about this phase of the issue at this time.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Major General Barney M. Giles had written that construction on airfields in China had slowed down because of financial difficulties with the Chinese government. “These financial matters are not within the scope of the Army Air Forces, but it is urged that whatever steps possible be taken to assure a full-scale resumption of work immediately, as continued delays will have a very serious effect on our strategical plans for the VLR aircraft.” (Giles Memorandum for General Marshall, February 15, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 9, Book 15].) Also attached was Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell’s letter which discussed the unfavorable exchange rate. Somervell suggested that the U.S. government seek a more favorable exchange rate, and if the Chinese government was not cooperative then consider reducing U.S. military operations based in China. (Somervell Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, February 15, 1944, *ibid.*)

2. “China’s exchange has fallen so low that it presents us with a very difficult problem,” Stimson recorded on February 19. “We have offered to go on with the aid to her of our American materiel provided she meets a major portion of the difference in exchange by making us donations of Chinese money. She has refused and there is trouble.” (February 19, 1944, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 46: 63].)



TO ARTHUR KROCK

February 17, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Krock, The other day you commented on the fact that your people returning from the Mediterranean were all of the opinion that the American soldier could not be brought to hate the German. I referred to a dissertation on this subject written by a Private in our Army which we had published in a pamphlet. I am inclosing the pamphlet and suggest that you read the marked portion commencing on page 15.<sup>1</sup>

Incidentally the material for this pamphlet I found in the 34th Division in Tunisia shortly after the surrender, when I made a sudden trip to Algiers with Mr. Churchill. I brought back the paper and had it published in this pamphlet for general distribution to noncommissioned officers in the Army as well as officers. The first portion is technical but well written. The latter portion, devoted to the psychological reactions, I think is very interesting.<sup>2</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Marshall had met with Krock, a Washington correspondent with the *New York Times*, on February 10. (See Marshall Memorandum for General Surles, February 10, 1944, pp. 289-90.) The twenty-page pamphlet written by Private Frank B. Sargent, entitled *The Most Common Short-Comings in the Training of Battalion and Regimental S-2 Personnel, and Some Suggestions to Overcome These*, had been published by the War Department in June 1943. (See Marshall Memorandum for General McNair, June 8, 1943, p. 5.) The last six pages deal with suggested psychological training for intelligence personnel. Sargent wrote that the training of American soldiers had overlooked "psychological preparation for combat." Newly arrived American soldiers did not "realize the nature of war; neither did they have a conception of the psychology of the enemy" because they had not seen enemy actions like the British and the French had. The American soldiers learned to hate after they had been at the front for a while. Sargent advised that newly arrived intelligence personnel visit hospitals and talk with experienced personnel. "They should be given the shock of their lives, now, in the rear areas, in order that they be prepared psychologically to such a pitch that they want nothing else but to get in and retaliate. After that, they should be taught how." (Quotes on pp. 15-16, 20.)

2. "You are a good editor as well as a great soldier," Krock responded. "You were exercising high editorial talent when you discovered the value of the material you had published, and which you kindly sent to me. I think it hits on the exact truth." (Krock to Marshall, February 18, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MCNARNEY  
*Confidential*

February 18, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

The President was disturbed over our washing out the college courses, however, he accepted the business. Towards the future he wished to know if there was any pressure he could bring to bear on the manpower people



which would produce more men for us. Apparently he referred to possible exemptions or deferments now in force over which he could command control. This was all stated to the Secretary of War.<sup>1</sup>

If you will determine what pressures he might exert or what orders he might give to improve the situation for us, let me know so that the Secretary of War can so advise the President.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Secretary of War Stimson discussed Marshall's proposal to reduce the Army Specialized Training Program with President Roosevelt on February 18. (See note 2, Marshall Memorandum for the Secretary of War, February 10, 1944, pp. 288–89.) Stimson noted in his diary: "The President then asked whether it would not be possible hereafter to get Hershey and McNutt to squeeze out young men who had been deferred in industry and on the farms and to replace them with women. I pointed out that there might be difficulty in getting the local boards to do it and said I did not know whether we had power to force them to do so. He thought it might be a matter of regulation which we could handle. . . . He agreed with everything and said that if I wanted him to he would authorize Somervell to go to Hershey and McNutt and try to get them to take these steps." The secretary of war talked the matter over with Marshall, who "is going to see Somervell and the Staff with a view to getting this matter put under way with the President." (February 18, 1944, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 46: 61].)

2. On February 22, 1944, Marshall's office sent to Roosevelt a memorandum, which had been prepared by the G-1 staff, for the president's signature to be sent to Paul V. McNutt, chairman of the War Manpower Commission, and Major General Lewis B. Hershey, director of the Selective Service System. The memorandum regarding occupational deferments emphasized that Selective Service had not delivered the quantity of men expected, and almost five million men had been deferred for occupational reasons. "Deferments for industry include over a million non-fathers, of whom 380,000 are under 26 years of age. Of almost a million non-fathers deferred in agriculture, over 550,000 are under 26." McNutt and Hershey were advised "to review all occupational deferments with a view to speedily making available the personnel required by the Armed Forces." (Memorandum for Chairman War Manpower Commission and Director Selective Service System, attached to Marshall Memorandum for the President, February 22, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

ARMY CUTS SPECIALIZED TRAINING PROGRAM<sup>1</sup>  
Immediate Release

February 18, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

The shortage of personnel from which the Army is now suffering has led the War Department to drastic decisions during the past week. Because of the inability of the Selective Service to deliver personnel according to schedule, the Army is now short 200,000 men who should have been in uniform before the end of 1943. The increased tempo of offensive operations together with the mounting casualties demanding immediate replacements in the field have created a situation which has necessitated drastic economies in the employment of personnel throughout the United States, and a decision to reduce the soldiers in colleges taking the Army Specialized



Training from 145,000 to 35,000. This last measure has been rendered necessary by the imperative requirement at this time for these men who have already had their basic training and a certain amount of specialized training for which their services are now urgently needed.

After exhausting all other sources, it was determined that the type of trained military personnel needed could be obtained only by decreasing the number of combat units or by drawing from the reservoir of men in ASTP training. It was decided that military necessity required that existing combat units be maintained.

The 35,000 remaining in the program will be primarily those trainees taking advanced courses in medicine and dentistry, or engineering and include 5,000 pre-induction students. The students withdrawn will be those already basically trained and on active duty. Seventeen-year-olds in the Army Specialized Training Program Reserve will not be affected, nor will this Reserve phase of the program be curtailed.

The student soldiers now in the Army Specialized Training Program were selected for their high intelligence, adaptability, and potential leadership. They are the type who can be expected to assume the responsibilities of non-commissioned officers and of skilled technicians. Experience to date in this war has demonstrated to the Army that the combat arms, particularly the infantry, need a substantial proportion of men with these qualities to insure continued success in operations. All experience also has shown conclusively that losses are considerably lower in units which have intelligent and aggressive leadership among non-commissioned officers.

Reassignment from ASTP to other duty before April 1st will be made, so far as military necessity permits, at the completion of a particular training course or a term in that course. Colleges will be reimbursed for the unexpired portion of contracts covering students withdrawn from ASTP.

The War Department believes, on the basis of experience, the infusion of thousands of highly intelligent student soldiers into the ground forces, which will see more action as the tempo of our offensive increases, will help to increase our striking power. Consequently, around 80,000 of the men to be transferred from ASTP will be assigned to the Army Ground Forces where the skills and capacity for leadership are now most needed. Most of the remainder will be assigned to other units destined for overseas service. The policy will be to make certain that the skills and the qualities of leadership which these thousands of student soldiers possess are used on assignments where they can function most effectively.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. General Marshall sent a draft of this release dated February 17 to the Bureau of Public Relations. The press release was distributed on the evening of February 18.

2. College administrators feared that the sudden announcement to curtail the A.S.T.P. would have a serious effect on colleges whose enrollments were already hard hit by the war,



especially those institutions which had no women students and no U.S. Navy contracts. (*New York Times*, February 19, 1944, pp. 1, 6, and February 20, 1944, p. 22.) For related information, see the previous document and Marshall Memorandum for the Secretary of War, February 10, 1944, pp. 286–89.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JACOB L. DEVERS  
Radio No. 99. *Secret*

February 18, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall for Devers' Eyes Only. Reference my 9348 and your reply W-2332:<sup>1</sup> I now learn that Alexander communicated direct to [Sir Alan] Brooke his dissatisfaction with Lucas and his corps staff. This does not bear out Wilson's expression of satisfaction in your W-2332, but it is in accord with intimations I had previously received. Our long range and therefore weakly based Washington estimates also indicated to us that the drive and leadership of your 2nd Corps and its 2 division commanders appear below stern standard required in existing situation.<sup>2</sup>

Do not mention or intimate to Wilson my reference to Alexander but let nothing stand in the way of procuring the leadership of the quality necessary. We comprehend fatigue of troops but that is normal to every hard battle and the Germans must be worse off than our men.<sup>3</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 17, Item 25)

1. "We feel some concern about the situation in Italy," Marshall notified Devers on February 9. "I want you to find out from Wilson if he is entirely satisfied with the performance of all of our Commanders. Does he desire any change? Naturally Wilson will hesitate immediately after he has taken over an Allied Command to ask for relief of American Commanders. You should make it perfectly plain to Wilson that this is from me personally to him and that no one in the theater should have any knowledge of it except Wilson and yourself." (Marshall to Devers, Radio No. 9348, February 9, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 17, Item 25].)

Devers replied on February 10: "General Wilson always frank and open with me states he was favorably impressed with Clark, did not know the other commanders, thought Lucas was slow at first but now felt that all commanders were conducting the battle in an excellent manner. . . . In my opinion there exists no cause to relieve any commander at this time except Wilbur, two regimental commanders, the Chief of Staff and G-3 of Walker's division which Clark assures me he has done." (Devers to Marshall, Radio No. W-2332, February 10, 1944, *ibid.*) Major General Fred L. Walker commanded the Thirty-sixth Division, which was a Texas National Guard unit inducted into federal service in 1940. Brigadier General William H. Wilbur (U.S.M.A., 1912) was Walker's assistant division commander. Wilbur returned to the United States as chief of staff of the Western Defense Command at the Presidio of San Francisco. For information regarding the Italian operations, see note 1, Marshall Memorandum for the President, January 28, 1944, p. 256.

2. Major General Geoffrey Keyes was commanding general of the Second Corps. The Thirty-sixth Division, commanded by Walker, attempted to cross the Rapido River, which was defended by German forces on higher ground. The Thirty-fourth Division was in reserve formation. Major General Charles W. Ryder (U.S.M.A., 1915) had been commanding general of the Thirty-fourth Infantry Division since May 1942.



3. "Lucas is tired and appears very old but he had been fighting hard," Devers replied. "He is relieved by Truscott and will become Clark's deputy for the time being. . . . Clark and Alexander both say Lucas could have done no more with what he had." Devers told Marshall that American units were fighting sternly and extremely hard and that with respect to leadership, inefficient commanders were being replaced. "Regimental Commanders are the problem. We are relieving them ruthlessly. No Regimental Commander over 45 should be sent to this Theater, and none under who have not proven themselves. Nothing is standing in my way to secure stern leadership of highest order." Devers optimistically reported that "about 500 prisoners captured today state that their units have suffered over 60% casualties." (Devers to Marshall, Radio No. 882, February 19, 1944, *ibid.*) See the following document.

Major General Lucian K. Truscott succeeded Lucas as commander of the Sixth Corps on February 22. For Clark's comments on Lucas's relief, see Clark, *Calculated Risk*, p. 306.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MCNAIR  
*Secret*

February 20, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Attached is a radio received this morning from General Devers in response to one of mine regarding the command situation in the 5th Army.<sup>1</sup> It is for your eyes only, and please return it to me under special cover.

To meet the situation he refers to as to regimental command, I wish you to do the following as quickly as possible. Let me have a list of about 8 Infantry Colonels or Lieut. Colonels, 5 of the Armored Force, the same of Artillery, 3 of Engineers and these last can go down as low as Majors, and 2 of Signal Corps. Select them from the divisions that are not scheduled to leave the United States before June 30th. I want names of the best men, the most aggressive, vigorous men that you can spot.

My purpose is to give these names to Devers and to tell him that if he so desires, they will be sent to him by air in order that he can have them serve on the staff of regiments that are in action long enough to give them the necessary experience and for him to determine whether or not it is wise to place them in command of the units they are with or those next to enter the line.

It seems to me we have a chance here not only to assist him but to gain a great deal of battle experience. Possibly he could return to us those who have lacked in vigor but displayed the qualities of leadership, and they could be used here for training units low on the schedule for service abroad.<sup>2</sup>

This brings up the question of Lucas. He has had a wealth of experience and quite evidently is tired out. I want to save his pride, I want to protect his reputation and, at the same time, get the best benefit of his service. Would you have a place for him? It might be that Eisenhower would like to



have him in England to check with them on the various plans and training they are now in process of carrying out.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See the previous document.
2. The following day, Marshall sent to Devers a list of twenty-three men “carefully selected by McNair for youth, leadership, vigor and troop experience.” (Marshall to Devers, Radio No. 380, February 21, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-9053)].)
3. Major General John P. Lucas returned to the United States in March 1944 and served as deputy commander and commander of the Fourth Army at Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. 151. *Secret*

February 21, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

For Eisenhower London from Joint Chiefs of Staff. Reference your proposal to British COS on February 19th and their COS (W-1156) to United States COS urging complete abandonment of ANVIL:<sup>1</sup> You were delegated to represent United States Chiefs of Staff in conference with British COS on question of OVERLORD-ANVIL. At present moment we have no clear cut statement of basis of your agreement or disagreement with them and the situation is therefore seriously complicated. Please seek an immediate conference and reach agreement or carefully stated disagreement, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will support your decision subject of course to the approval of the President.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-8770])

1. General Eisenhower had informed the British Chiefs of Staff on February 19 that additional naval lift capability for amphibious operations beyond OVERLORD's requirements would permit ANVIL on a two-division basis, but there would be nothing left over for Italian operations. He added that ANVIL would force the Germans to retain divisions in southern France and allow the maximum commitment of Allied strength on the continent of Europe. (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1732–34.) Eisenhower also sent a message to General Marshall on February 19 in which he described his recent meeting with the British Chiefs of Staff. Eisenhower stated his continued interest in a two-division ANVIL, but he added that if the operation must be reduced below that level ANVIL should be abandoned and the troops gathered for it committed to Italian operations. Recent operations in Italy, he told Marshall, “have been leading me personally to the conclusion that ANVIL will probably not be possible.” He had suggested to the British Chiefs of Staff that the Combined Chiefs of Staff must soon decide if “the prospects in the Mediterranean can really offer any reasonable chance of executing ANVIL.” (*Ibid.*, pp. 1735–36.)

On the same day the British Chiefs of Staff sent to the Joint Staff Mission in Washington their reaction to Eisenhower's proposal. The British Chiefs believed that retention of ANVIL was resulting in Allied resources being “skimped” for both OVERLORD and ANVIL and that an increased German commitment to the defense of Italy presented the Allies with the same opportunities to tie down German forces there as would be presented through an invasion of southern France. Given the current situation in Italy the prospect of launching ANVIL was, in the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff, “exceedingly remote,” and they strongly



recommended "the immediate cancellation of ANVIL." (British Chiefs of Staff C.O.S. [W] 1156 to Joint Staff Mission, February 19, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 10, Item 52a].)

2. This Radio No. 151, hand-drafted by Marshall, was sent out in conjunction with Radio No. 153 to Eisenhower from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Radio No. 153 included the text of a memorandum that the J.C.S. had submitted to the British Chiefs of Staff on February 21, after considering C.O.S. (W) 1156. The Joint Chiefs of Staff supported ANVIL being launched on a two-division basis. "All combat ground forces in the Mediterranean should be considered available to the Italian campaign but U.S. and French units being rehabilitated should be re-equipped and trained for ANVIL as required." The employment of French units in the invasion of southern France should be considered. (Joint Chiefs of Staff to Eisenhower, Radio No. 153, February 21, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-8837)].) Eisenhower responded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Radio No. 153 on February 22 that the ANVIL landings were contingent upon the success of operations in Italy. (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1744-45.) Also on February 22, Eisenhower and the British Chiefs of Staff agreed to maintain the status quo regarding Italy and ANVIL until March 20, when they would review the situation. For further discussion of ANVIL, see Marshall Memorandum for General Handy, March 14, 1944, and Marshall to Eisenhower, March 16, 1944, pp. 341-43 and 348-50.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MCNAIR  
*Confidential*

February 22, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Please note in the Minutes of the General Council for the 21st of February the extracts of The Inspector General's report shown on page 4 regarding the 4th Armored Signal Battalion<sup>1</sup> (there is an extract on page 5 regarding the 388th Engineer General Service Regiment, which I assume comes under the ASF. If not, please include this in the following comments):

Who is the senior officer responsible for the condition of affairs in the 4th Armored Signal Battalion? I am not referring to the commander of that unit but to the higher commanders concerned. It seems to me that drastic action is required here immediately to relieve such people without delay.

I am besieged with letters from fathers and mothers complaining regarding their sons being sent overseas with poorly trained units. The extract referred to is conclusive evidence of the correctness of their claims and it cannot be tolerated.

I wish you would concentrate again on this particular phase of the Ground Forces. I am not concerned about the divisions and the Army Corps but I continue to be very much concerned about the non-divisional units.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. An inspection of the Fourth Armored Signal Battalion at Camp Polk, Louisiana, on February 5-7, 1944, revealed that the unit's training had not been satisfactorily completed, and supervision of the battalion had been inadequate due to frequent changes in higher and unit commanders. The inspecting officer found no evidence of a "carefully prepared master



training program,” and training schedules disclosed a “haphazard system of instruction.” Morale was unsatisfactory, although discipline was satisfactory. Certain items of training equipment had never been available. “The Radio Intelligence Platoons cannot function because of a lack of trained personnel and team training. The Message Center Platoons cannot function because of a lack of clearance of many of its personnel and training in secret and confidential cryptographic systems. The Wire Platoons cannot function because of a lack of qualified specialists in the installation and maintenance and operating sections.” (Minutes, Meeting of the General Council, February 21, 1944, NA/RG 407 [334.8, General Council Minutes].)

2. McNair replied that responsibility of high commanders was divided between the Third and Fourth armies and the Nineteenth and Twenty-first corps. “These commanders interested themselves actively in the battalion and acted adequately and reasonably except that the Third Army and the Fourth Army should not have reported the unit ready when actually it was unready. This situation was brought about by differences of view in technical matters as between the signal officers of the two armies and those of The Inspector General, the latter being correct.” McNair confirmed that the unit was “unready” and would require two months to complete its training, but the equipment was not available in this country. Accordingly he recommended that, subject to the theater commander’s approval, “the battalion be moved overseas without delay as is, and that its training be completed in the theater where adequate equipment will be available. There is no battalion in this country in so advanced a state of training as this one.” In order to prevent a recurrence of this case, McNair said that “positive steps are being taken to institute an adequate system of signal tests throughout the Army Ground Forces.” (McNair Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, March 14, 1944, NA/RG 337 [AG Section, McNair Personal File].)

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MCCLOY

*Secret*

February 23, 1944

[Washington, D.C.]

I appeared, apparently informally, before most of the members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. No secretary was present, therefore no record was made.

I covered the subject offhand as nearly in conformity with your memorandum and that of General Bissell as I could.<sup>1</sup>

They asked very few questions. The principal one was voiced by Senator Vandenberg who asked whether this was an abstract proposition or concrete as to immediate possibility for reactions.<sup>2</sup> My answer was that it was a concrete proposition with a serious probability. He said that was satisfactory to him. A number of other members expressed themselves accordingly, that they had heard enough and would vote against the resolution.

They were going to decide among themselves as to the form of the statement to be made. I told them that I could see no objection to saying that on advice of the State Department and military authorities, the committee was opposed to taking any such action as advocated in the Wagner-Taft resolution, the passage of which would be fraught with very



serious possibilities regarding military operations; or something of that sort.

Senator Connally desired to talk this over because he did not want the statement to imply that they approved of the resolution even if it did not have any serious military consequences.<sup>3</sup>

Thanks for letting me have your statement so promptly.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The United States Congress passed a resolution on June 30, 1922, stating that the United States was in favor of "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people." Senators Robert F. Wagner and Robert A. Taft introduced in early February 1944 Senate Resolution 247, which suggested that the current "ruthless persecution of the Jewish people in Europe" made the establishment of a Jewish homeland all the more imperative and that the United States, therefore, should support the "free entry of Jews" into Palestine and "ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth." Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy prepared a memorandum for General Marshall on February 22, 1944, stating objections to the resolution from a military point of view. McCloy stated that the major difference between the 1922 congressional resolution and the Wagner-Taft Senate Resolution was that the latter called for the establishment of "a Jewish state as distinguished from a homeland." The support of the United States for the creation of a Jewish political entity would, suggested McCloy, necessarily upset the various Arab peoples and states upon which the United States must rely for military and logistical support of operations in the Mediterranean theater. In addition, McCloy told Marshall that support on the part of the United States government for such a statement would necessitate retaining troops for garrison duty in areas likely to react negatively to an expression of support for the establishment of a Jewish state. These troops were needed elsewhere, and he informed Marshall that Major General Clayton L. Bissell was ready to explain the exact deployment of Allied forces in the area. McCloy pointed out that perhaps the safer course would be to postpone a statement of the United States government's position on the establishment of a Jewish homeland or state until after the termination of the present war. General Marshall appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the morning of February 23 to express the War Department's concerns, from a military perspective, over the possible passage of the Wagner-Taft Resolution. (McCloy Memorandum for General Marshall, February 22, 1944, and attached Senate Resolution 247, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg was a Republican from Michigan.

3. Senator Tom Connally, a Democrat from Texas, was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

TO JOSEPH STALIN  
Radio No. 317. *Secret*

February 24, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

To Harriman for Stalin from Marshall. If you think the following an advisable procedure please go ahead with it as indicated. Otherwise cancel message and notify me accordingly. Begin message in our conversation at Teheran you discussed with me technical and tactical application of rockets by the Red Army to further our common operations against the Germans. Would appreciate if you would give Deane such technical information and



tactical data on the use of rockets with models for test as will permit US to manufacture and bring more effective rockets into action as quickly as possible.<sup>1</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-10403])

1. On February 26, 1944, Ambassador W. Averell Harriman wrote to Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav M. Molotov requesting him to forward Marshall's message to Stalin. (Brigadier General William E. Crist to Lieutenant General N. V. Slavin, April 3, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Major General John R. Deane was chief of the United States Military Mission to Moscow.

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. 175. *Secret*

February 25, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall to Eisenhower for his eyes only. Reference your 11774 regarding replacement of Reinhardt with Walker.<sup>1</sup> The fighting at Cassino did not indicate that Walker had aggressive qualities such as you will require in a Corps Commander. Furthermore I would hesitate to take away from Clark in the present difficult situation in Italy a Division Commander who appears to be acceptable to him.

The doctors state that Middleton's arthritic knee would give him trouble if he submits it to severe usage or prolonged periods of cramped position. I telephoned Middleton this morning in the Tennessee area where he is in command of a Corps in maneuvers and he tells me that since his long jeep rides and steep hill climbing in Italy his knee has given him practically no trouble, that it had not given him for years past. He feels competent for duties of the OVERLORD type. I told him that the serious matter was in sending a Corps Commander who might later have to be relieved.

McNarney had talked to General Marietta at Walter Reed regarding Middleton and the general medical feeling is, and McNarney's opinion having talked to Middleton some time ago, that Middleton could go through the training phase the landing phase and at least a portion of the fighting phase in OVERLORD; that later the strain of service might require his relief. Of course he might be put out as a casualty for other reasons during the same period. I have gone over all Corps Command possibilities and Middleton seems so much the more able of those available that I believe it better to take him with the possible later physical complications. Radio me your desires.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-10685])

1. Eisenhower had sent a message to Marshall on February 24, 1944, stating: "In further acknowledgment of your willingness to give me experienced Corps Commanders, request either Troy Middleton (if in good health) or Fred Walker in exchange for Reinhardt, now commanding VIII Corps." (Eisenhower to Marshall, Radio No. W-11774, February 24, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)



2. Eisenhower agreed with the chief of staff. "I am struggling my best to get a high degree of combat experience represented in this force and I am quite ready to take a chance on Middleton's arthritis. This means of course that I will have another surplus Corps Commander, namely Reinhardt. I dislike exceedingly to pass any problem of this type on you but since these men, who were previously selected by others as Corps Commanders, are being relieved merely because we here believe someone else is better suited to their jobs and not because of demonstrated inefficiency I feel that there is no other way out." (Eisenhower to Marshall, Radio No. W-11884, February 26, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-IN-18468)].) Major General Emil F. Reinhardt returned to the United States in March 1944 to take command of the Ninth Corps at Fort McPherson, Georgia, and in September he assumed command of the Sixty-ninth Infantry Division which joined the forces in the European theater in December 1944. Major General Shelley U. Marietta was commanding officer of Walter Reed General Hospital and Army Medical Center in Washington, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF  
STAFF, G-1 [WHITE]  
*Secret*

February 28, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

I notice in the message (W-3719, February 26) from General Devers his adverse comments on the instructions regarding rotation of personnel. He states: "Present effect of established policy is that combat troops in action receiving recommendation must wait several months until recommendations are consolidated and approved by War Department and orders issued. In the interim, many who were recommended are killed in action, missing in action, and wounded."

I am disturbed by this. I thought we had a clear understanding that orders were such that they could be executed without ever coming to Washington. I object to any procedure which is placed on such an ineffective basis. This is typical of the last war when our decorations were from three to four and six months in rear of events and the men were dead before they were recognized.

Let me have a quick reply on this and whatever the orders are make them simple and unmistakably understandable.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

MEMORANDUM FOR FIELD MARSHAL  
SIR JOHN DILL  
*Confidential*

February 28, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Dill: Reading the Prime Minister's last messages to the President I have become more disturbed over the cumulative disposition to misjudge Stilwell.<sup>1</sup> I think quite the contrary should be the case. We have leaned over



backwards in the matter and he has refrained from communicating with me. Certainly Mountbatten cannot expect more. Meanwhile, as you know, pressures have gone quite the other way.

I hope the British Chiefs of Staff and the Prime Minister can get clear in their minds that their criticism of Stilwell is a criticism of a man who wants to fight—which should be about the most easily forgiven delinquency on our side in this war. I have been debating writing to Mountbatten direct and even to the Prime Minister because I am getting fed up, where the reluctances have been on the other side from the start.<sup>2</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On February 24, President Roosevelt reiterated the United States position regarding the role of China in the Pacific war in a message—which was most likely prepared by Marshall's staff—that General Marshall had sent to Admiral Leahy at the president's request. (Marshall to Leahy, February 24, 1944, and attached Proposed Message from the President to the Prime Minister, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Roosevelt reminded Churchill of the need to increase Allied strategic air strength in China and thus to increase supplies into China, the need to take Myitkyina, and the need for an active British commitment in Burma. "I am gravely concerned over the recent trends in strategy that favor an operation toward Sumatra and Malaya in the future rather than to face the immediate obstacles that confront us in Burma," Roosevelt informed the prime minister. "Lucrative as a successful CULVERIN might be, there appears much more to be gained by employing all the resources we now have available in an all-out drive into upper Burma." Churchill responded on February 25 that "nothing will be withdrawn or withheld from the operations in North Burma for the sake of CULVERIN." Stilwell, the prime minister wrote, had been "giving a wrong impression both of the position in the South East Asia Theatre and of the views of Mountbatten." (*Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, 2: 755–56, 759.)

Admiral Mountbatten had already placed the blame on Stilwell for the War Department's position which supported northern Burma operations. When Sir John Dill sent a copy of Mountbatten's message complaining about Stilwell's representatives meeting in Washington before Wedemeyer presented his proposal, Marshall replied that Mountbatten was mistaken. "The latter part of [Mountbatten's] message indicates that the U. S. Chiefs of Staff based their position on General Stilwell's arguments and the representations of members of his staff now in Washington," replied Marshall. "This was not the case. Actually the U. S. view was formulated prior to the receipt of Stilwell's comments or the arrival of his staff officers." (Mountbatten to British Chiefs of Staff, February 21, 1944, attached to Dill to Marshall, February 22, 1944, and Marshall to Dill, February 23, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected]. For further discussion, see Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 162–63, 171–72, and Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944*, pp. 438–39.)

2. See Marshall to Stilwell, March 1, 1944, pp. 321–23.

TO SECOND LIEUTENANT ALLEN T. BROWN

March 1, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Allen, Your mother was getting off an Easter box to Clifton last night and said one had gone to you a week ago.



Spent Friday night to Sunday afternoon at Baruch's place near Hasty Point and had a delightful visit.<sup>1</sup> I had my first quail shoot in years and got eleven in two hours. Your mother thoroughly enjoyed herself. She saw Hasty Point from the plane.

Jimmie is all over the place on a velocipede. Kitty walks pretty well with guidance. Both are well. I am off on an inspection trip in a few days.

You were quite evidently in the thick of things.<sup>2</sup> We had an inch of snow yesterday, the trees heavily frosted. Today is clearing. In South Carolina the Judas and plum trees and the jonquils were blooming. The weather seems to have been uniformly wretched with you. That always appears to be the case in war, at least it was my experience in France; cold or rain and mud, high winds, or extreme heat and dust. We can but pray that this war will soon be over.

Madge seems to enjoy her job with Life but I hope she doesn't work too hard, too much night work.

Your mother is planning to go back to Leesburg about April 1. Molly of course goes with her with the children. Sahra, one of our Mexican maids, we sent back to Mexico City by air as she was to have a baby. Anna, the other girl, is still with us but may join her cousin in California next month.<sup>3</sup> We shall be very sorry to lose her. I have not been able to ride for some time because of deep mud on a good bit of the trail but I think I can get back to it again shortly. Your mother and I, however, have been taking long walks every evening. Night before last we walked two miles and a half before dinner and then walked home from Buckingham Village, another two miles.

I find your mother following news of the Italian Campaign through the papers and on the radio. She doesn't talk about it much but it is constantly on her mind.

Flap Adams is back in this country after his heart attack in Rio.<sup>4</sup> He had eight teeth pulled among other things. He is going to West Point from Tennessee on March 9th to see his nephew, then to New York to celebrate Mr. Gannett's 85th birthday and then I imagine will come here to stop over with us.<sup>5</sup> All good luck. Affectionately

GCMRL/Research File (Family)

1. General and Mrs. Marshall had visited Bernard M. Baruch at his estate near Georgetown, South Carolina.

2. Marshall's stepson had written to his wife on February 27 from an area at the foot of Monte Cassino. "This is not a particularly healthy place to go around making calls, if you get what I mean. Now don't get scared. I'm taking good care of myself, and this fighting is right up my alley. I was slowly going crazy from inactivity before I joined this New Zealand outfit. They are a good bunch and have all kinds of spirit." (Allen Brown to Margaret S. Brown, February 27, [1944], GCMRL/Research File [Family].)

3. During the Marshalls' September 1943 trip to Mexico City, Mrs. Marshall had secured visas for two women married to Mexican guards at the hotel—Sarah de Martinez



and Anna Godinez—to work as a nurse for the grandchildren and as a cook. (K. T. Marshall, *Together*, pp. 163–64.) For information regarding the trip to Mexico, see Marshall Memorandum for the President, September 18, 1943, pp. 130–31.

4. Brigadier General Claude M. (“Flap”) Adams, former military attaché in Rio de Janeiro, had returned to the United States in late January for observation and treatment. (Adams to Marshall, December 31, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected].)

5. Publisher William H. Gannett had observed his ninetieth birthday on February 10.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSEPH W. STILWELL  
Radio. *Secret*

March 1, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

For Stilwell’s eyes only from Marshall. An exceedingly critical situation has developed in connection with your relations with Mountbatten. It is not now confined to military officials but has leaked badly into the press, notably in two articles in *Time* magazine. The last mentioned, most confidentially, I found had been planted here from Naval sources for the purpose of producing pressure on British for action helpful to the Pacific. Unfortunately these articles have exercised a very direct influence on the British position.<sup>1</sup>

The issue brought up by the British Chiefs of Staff and finally by the Prime Minister is whether or not you have been loyal to Mountbatten. The doubt in the matter is based on the fact that you sent your staff officers to Washington without any reference to him and that they have represented the divergent point of view regarding operations in Burma. The agitation was promoted or inspired by the fact that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff sent a message to the British Chiefs of Staff urging immediate aggressive action in North Burma. This was prepared before your staff officers arrived here and therefore before we had seen your memorandum to Mountbatten expressing a divergent view regarding his plans. Unfortunately however the U.S. Chiefs of Staff paper was not acted upon until after receipt of the foregoing information though this did not change any portion of the paper but it did leave the implication that your memorandum and your staff officers had inspired action by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. Just at this moment an article in *Time* magazine of February 14th appeared, followed up by numerous writeups by columnists, all calculated to stir up anti-British feeling. Also the President on his own initiative sent a message to the Prime Minister pressing him for immediate aggressive action in Burma. This quite probably was attributed incorrectly to the representations of your staff officers.

As nearly as I can ascertain without asking too many embarrassing questions, you do not appear to have made an effort to establish a smooth-working relation with Mountbatten and his staff regardless of whether or



not you agree with the final decisions. I am expressing myself frankly and very much to the same point as our conversations took at Cairo. The matter of disagreement, of which we have a proper written record, is something for the Chiefs of Staff to decide rather than to create a tragic break in relationships on the ground where the situation is at best exceedingly complicated.

I should like you to seek an immediate personal interview with Admiral Mountbatten, talk over the whole matter frankly and at length repeat at length, and see if you can reach a working accord which is essential between two officials in the positions he and you occupy. This is a matter of great importance not merely to your theater but in its effect on combined operations all over the world which depend on our relationship with the British high officials. I am not considering whether he and you agree or disagree on a certain course of action. All of us disagree with each other from time to time and there are few decisions which are in complete accord with the various high officials' opinions. I am referring to a working basis that is not complicated by suspicions and a stiffness that makes Allied procedure unworkable.

The situation in the press in this country can have tragic repercussions to our serious disadvantage in other theaters. This must be avoided.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The February 14, 1944, issue of *Time* magazine contained an article entitled "Battle of Asia: A Difference of Opinion," which discussed the difficulties between Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten and Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell. *Time* stated that Stilwell considered continued construction of the Ledo Road necessary to maintain a flow of supplies to China and that current operations in Burma were vital to the maintenance of offensive pressure on the Japanese army. Mountbatten, the Southeast Asia theater commander, wanted to switch Allied resources to a series of future campaigns designed to open up a Chinese coastal city, occupy Sumatra, retake Malaya, including the prestigious target of Singapore, and perhaps even continue the Allied advance into Thailand and Indochina. According to *Time*, "The U.S. commander admitted that a southern China port must be opened before the armies of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek can be rearmed. But 'Vinegar Joe,' who probably knows China better than any brasshat in New Delhi, stoutly held that the 'Hump' air route and the Ledo Road can fill the immediate gap in China's desperate needs, thus fit into the general Asia strategy." (*Time* 43 [February 14, 1944]: 33.)

On February 28, *Time* quoted Admiral Chester W. Nimitz: "I believe the Japs can be defeated only from bases in China." That required regaining the Philippines. "Dour, realistic" Stilwell "promised to support Nimitz by 'an aggressive Allied land and air offensive projected from the interior.' But Infantryman Stilwell barbed his statement with caution that 'vital China-based air operations cannot wait for penetration of the blockade by land or sea.'" (*Time* 43 [February 28, 1944]: 25.) See Marshall Memorandum for Field Marshal Sir John Dill, February 28, 1944, pp. 318-19.

2. Stilwell met with Mountbatten on March 6, 1944; and he reported on March 7, "We are good personal friends and our relations have never been stiff." Stilwell told Marshall that he had apologized to Mountbatten for sending a military mission to Washington for the purpose of expressing his strategic views on Burma without informing the area commander. "I have eaten crow," wrote Stilwell, "for my bungle in not informing him of our mission to Washington." Stilwell suggested that he would obey Mountbatten's



directives, but he implied that until strategic decisions were reached at the highest levels he would continue to represent forcibly what he considered to be American interests in the Southeast Asia theater. “Mountbatten’s orders I am carrying out to the best of my ability,” wrote Stilwell. “Any other orders he has I will of course carry out as soon as the final decision is made.” (Stilwell to Marshall, Radio No. MS-89, March 7, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

Mountbatten reported to Field Marshal Sir John Dill that the meeting with Stilwell had been satisfactory; but he noted that Stilwell “really is a grand old warrior but only the Trinity could carry out his duties which require him to be in Delhi, Chungking and the Ledo Front simultaneously, and I still think Al. Wedemeyer or Sultan should be appointed as Commanding General for the American SEA theater and that Stilwell’s command should be confined to China though he could certainly continue with the title of deputy SAC, SEA since he had never really done anything about those duties during the whole time I have been out here.” (Quoted in Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell’s Command Problems*, p. 170.) Stilwell noted in his diary for March 6 that Mountbatten “made a dumb speech.” Then the two talked. “Usual attempt to get me to commit myself.” (*The Stilwell Papers*, ed. Theodore H. White [New York: William Sloane Associates, 1948], p. 282.) See Marshall Memorandum for Field Marshal Sir John Dill, March 2, 1944, pp. 327–28.

IN mid-February 1944 the Joint Strategic Survey Committee proposed (J.C.S. 713) that the Central Pacific route be made the primary effort with Southwest Pacific Area forces playing a supporting role. The Central Pacific concept, according to the committee, “leads most directly and most promptly to the vital Formosa, Luzon, China coast area,” while the Southwest Pacific concept “after reaching Mindanao will require further extensive operations before reaching that vital area.” After occupation of the Admiralty Islands, the committee recommended that forces occupy the Marianas and then the Palaus; from the Marianas-Palaus line an attack should be mounted against Formosa, or against Luzon first if necessary. (Philip A. Crowl, *Campaign in the Marianas*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1960], pp. 17–18; Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943–1945*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1968], pp. 406–7.)

Admiral Nimitz favored moving directly to Formosa, while General MacArthur insisted that Luzon, following the occupation of Mindanao, was the obvious stepping-stone to the China coast. (Grace Person Hayes, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan* [Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1982], pp. 603–4.) Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff deferred a clear-cut decision, the debate continued. ★



MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF,  
U.S. FLEET AND CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
*Secret*

March 1, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Your Memorandum of 24 February on Proposed Directive  
to CINCPOA and Memorandum of 27 February on JCS 713.<sup>1</sup>

With regard to my proposed message to Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur, I understand that Admiral Bieri<sup>2</sup> and General Handy have reached an agreement on the form that this should take. A copy of the revised dispatch is inclosed. If it meets with your approval, I shall see that it is cleared with Admiral Leahy and General Arnold and dispatched at once.

The part of the message I proposed, querying Nimitz about the feasibility of by-passing Truk has been omitted in the revised draft. This was done first because we were told that Admiral Nimitz was covering the specific points in question in his report which would soon be forthcoming, and also because he is to be here in person. However, I wish to make it clear that I wanted the Chiefs of Staff to have this information from Nimitz in his status as a Theater Chief whose command includes large Army ground and air forces. It was not intended in any degree to interfere with your function as the Executive of the Chiefs of Staff for the Pacific Ocean Areas.

I understand that you have no objection to directing the Joint Staff Planners, in conjunction with the Joint Logistics Committee, to prepare recommendations on the points mentioned in the last paragraph of my memorandum.<sup>3</sup> The Planners have been studying various phases of this subject, including most of the operations included in GRANITE and RENO III (Modified). They are also considering the redeployment of forces in the Pacific upon completion of the MERCANTILE-FOREARM operations.<sup>4</sup> It seems to me that what is urgently needed now is an integrated study of all these operations, setting up tentative sequence, timing and allocation of resources. This, of course, would include consideration of the directive for the next operation in the Central Pacific which you proposed in your memorandum of February 24. I suggest that the following directive be issued to the JPS and JLC:

"It is desired that you consider as a matter of urgency appropriate current studies together with latest recommendations from Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur and submit recommendations to the JCS covering the following:

- a. Most feasible approach to the vital Luzon-Formosa-China Coast Area.
- b. Tentative sequence and timing of operations necessary to



penetrate and occupy the Luzon-Formosa-China Coast Area.

c. Directives for the operations in the Central and Southwest Pacific immediately following MERCANTILE-FOREARM.

d. The availability of resources for advance in both the Southwest Pacific and Central Pacific areas toward the Luzon-Formosa-China Coast Area.

e. Redeployment of forces in the Pacific upon completion of MERCANTILE-FOREARM."

If you concur in the action indicated above, I believe we will have the data necessary to make our decisions without referring JCS 713 back to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee. However, since you propose it, I see no objection to returning JCS 713 to the Committee with the request that they consider the paper in light of the comments in my memorandum. I suggest also that our correspondence on this subject accompany the paper.

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[Enclosure]

*PROPOSED DESPATCH*

FROM: J.C.S.

TO: CinCSWPA  
CinCPOA

In clarification Paragraph 5 CCS 417/2 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have decided that our first major objective in the war against Japan will be the vital Luzon-Formosa-China Coast Area. Strategy will be directed to attain this objective by the most direct and expeditious course possible. Direction of such strategy, including allocation of means, continues to be the function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As indicated in Paragraph Seven Fox CCS 417/2 planning should be conducted on a basis which will permit flexibility in adjusting operations to the developing situation. To this end plans should be prepared for all probable operations. Timely recommendations regarding the adjustment of succeeding operations to the changing situation will be required by Chiefs of Staff.<sup>5</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On February 24 Admiral King had sent to Marshall a proposed directive to Admiral Nimitz to prepare for operations to gain control of the Carolines. On February 27 King had replied to a February 24 Marshall (staff-drafted) memorandum to Admirals Leahy and King which discussed J.C.S. 713, Strategy in the Pacific. Marshall's memorandum suggested that the Joint Staff Planners and the Joint Logistics Committee prepare more specific recommendations regarding allocation of resources and timing of operations in the Central and Southwest Pacific (see note 3). King proposed that the Joint Strategic Survey Com-



mittee should be requested to revise its paper accordingly. (King Memorandums for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, February 24 and 27, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43)].)

2. Rear Admiral Bernhard H. Bieri (U.S.N.A., 1911) was assistant chief of staff for Plans in the Navy Department.

3. The Joint Staff Planners (J.P.S.) and the Joint Logistics Committee (J.L.C.) were to prepare recommendations on the following: "1. The most feasible approach to the vital Luzon-Formosa-China Coast area. 2. The availability of resources for advances on both the Southwest Pacific and Central Pacific axes toward the Luzon-Formosa-China Coast area. 3. Tentative sequence and timing of operations in the Central and Southwest Pacific areas with assignment of resources." (Marshall [OPD] Memorandum for Admirals Leahy and King, February 24, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

4. Manus Island-Kavieng.

5. Admiral King concurred in the wording of the directive to the J.P.S. and the J.L.C. and in the message to MacArthur and Nimitz. "I am concerned lest the absence of a definite plan for the immediate future may kill the momentum of the drive now under way in the Pacific," wrote King. He therefore asked Marshall to consider approving his proposed directive to Nimitz regarding occupation of the Carolines. (King Memorandum for Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, March 1, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 323.3 POA].)

The proposed despatch was sent from the War Department the next day. (Joint Chiefs of Staff to MacArthur and Nimitz, Radio Nos. 4785 and 729, March 2, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-682)].) C.C.S. 417, Overall Plan for the Defeat of Japan, December 2, 1943, is printed in Morton, *Strategy and Command*, pp. 668-72. For further information, see the following document.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF,  
U.S. FLEET AND CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
*Secret*

March 2, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Upon receipt of your memorandum of 1 March, the necessary action was taken to clear with Admiral Leahy the message to General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz, as well as the directive to the Joint Staff Planners and the Joint Logistics Committee.<sup>1</sup>

We must take every measure necessary to maintain the momentum of our drive against the Japanese forces. The extension of our operations in the Central Pacific to include the occupation of Eniwetok, the raids against Truk and the Marianas, as well as the occupation of Los Negros Island (all at comparatively small cost), must have been highly discouraging and confusing to the enemy.

With reference to your proposed directive to Admiral Nimitz: We are now in a position, I think, to make a more specific decision as to the next operation in both the Central and Southwest Pacific areas. This is very important since any directive to be effective must make available the required means. Therefore, I would prefer that the views and recommendations of Admiral Nimitz should be obtained, while he is in Washington, before the directive for further major operations in his area is issued.



If Nimitz feels that Truk can be by-passed, it should be possible to make otherwise available immediately some of the forces now held up for the seizure of Truk.<sup>2</sup> The early seizure of a foothold on Manus Island will probably make it possible with the means already allocated, to advance the Hansa Bay operation to the same date as the Kavieng operation. Under these circumstances the release of certain amphibious equipment from the Truk allotment would make possible an advancement of almost six weeks in the dates for the Humboldt Bay or Palau or Marianas operation.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See the previous document.

2. Admiral Nimitz conferred with Admiral King in Washington on March 6, and he suggested to King that it would be “necessary to neutralize the Marianas and Truk.” Air attacks on Truk in mid-February had indicated that the Japanese base was “considerably weaker than had been supposed and might well be neutralized rather than captured.” (Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, *Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record* [New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1952], pp. 535–37.)

During the March 11 meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Nimitz presented his views in person, while Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland represented General MacArthur. Nimitz saw no need in occupying Kavieng because the enemy forces in New Ireland and New Britain were now immobilized and the Kavieng airfield was “practically inoperative.” He said that carriers were being positioned for air strikes on Truk and on the Palaus; and he emphasized the necessity of controlling the Marianas, Carolines, and Palaus in any plan. Nimitz was not in favor of any naval base in southern Mindanao, and “he would take the fleet into this area only as a last resort. The close proximity of large land masses offers too great an opportunity for enemy attacks by submarines and land based air.” (Minutes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, March 11, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS 334, JCS Minutes].)

Sutherland supported an operation against Kavieng. He advocated bypassing Truk to the south, occupying Mindanao by November 1944; he insisted that if Truk was not bypassed, the Allies would lose six to nine months in Pacific war fighting. Sutherland “questioned whether Admiral Nimitz could mount an amphibious attack against Formosa without adequate land based air support.” (Ibid.) The Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a directive to MacArthur and Nimitz on March 12, 1944, see pp. 336–38.

MEMORANDUM FOR FIELD MARSHAL

SIR JOHN DILL

*Personal and Confidential*

March 2, 1944

[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Dill: I am attaching the record of the meeting to which you evidently referred yesterday, and also a copy of my radio to Stilwell.<sup>1</sup>

On thinking over the growing complexity of this matter I have come to the conclusion that if you so desire I will not object to your transmitting to the British Chiefs of Staff a copy of my message to Stilwell but with the understanding that it is not sent to Mountbatten in any form. Also with the understanding that you explain that the reference to the Navy concern with the Time article in no way involves Admiral King. He had not heard of it.



It should also be explained that this must be treated as a matter of the utmost confidence because it concerns the "top". I am endeavoring to take measures through the Secretary of War to prevent repetitions but it is an extremely difficult thing to do.

Because of the nature of this note I am not leaving it in the records here and should have preferred to have told you this over the phone, but so that there may be no misunderstanding I am dictating it.

With reference to the conference with General Ferris, General Boatner, etc., this has been the practice with any senior officers returning from any theater and there is the further consideration that Stilwell's staff is involved also with matters in China with which Mountbatten has nothing to do.

Faithfully yours,

[P.S.] Please destroy this.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The two enclosures included a copy of the minutes of the first conference with officers from the China-Burma-India theater, February 8, and Marshall's March 1, 1944, radio message to Stilwell, see pp. 321-23. Stilwell's representatives—Brigadier General Benjamin G. Ferris (U.S.M.A., 1915), Brigadier General Haydon L. Boatner, Colonel Francis G. Brink, and Lieutenant Colonel Francis Hill (U.S.M.A., 1933)—held meetings with War Department staff officers and planners.

TO CAPTAIN CLIFTON S. BROWN

March 3, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

*Dear Clifton* – Two letters from Allen came yesterday, written in early February, the last on the 8th. He seemed to be getting along all right, but had a great deal to say about the food and wet ground for sleeping purposes, though he admitted that he slept better than he ever had on a cot. I am off tomorrow on a trip.<sup>1</sup> I think your mother is going down to Leesburg for the day to look into some spring planting. She has told you that we spent last weekend with Baruch at Hobcaw Plantation, about five miles from Hasty Point. Weather was perfect. I hunted for two hours Saturday and got eleven quail. Flowers in bloom and country very lovely. It has been cold here with recent snow but weather is moderating and snow has disappeared. Jimmie is very active, particularly on his velocipede. Kitty is just about ready to walk alone and gets along very well with a hand to guide her. Sahra, one of the Mexican maids, had to go home, by air, as she was expecting a baby. Anna is still here and very efficient.<sup>2</sup> My work seems to increase in pressure and I suppose will continue so until the end. I imagine your mother told you all about Kitty's birthday party where we had them of all ages from one year up to Sir John Dill, including Mr. and Mrs. Shedden.<sup>3</sup> No babies cried and none of the older children became



difficult or destructive. Altogether it was quite a success. I think there were fifteen children and twenty-six grownups.

Your mother represents me tomorrow morning at a White House commemorative service. She is then going down to Leesburg for the afternoon. If it is not very cold she will probably take Molly and Jimmy with her. Old James has had one bad flu attack this winter but seems to be coming through all right, back on his feet now and very partial to the cough syrup we have gotten for him. Victor has been going down on his off days to work around the place.<sup>4</sup> He seems to be crazy about Leesburg and Dodona. I think he has been painting the kitchen, having gotten in about all the timber there was to be chopped. We cut down quite a few trees that separated the two back lots bordering on the garage so that the whole can be used for a vegetable garden if we so desire. Your mother and I have been walking some 2½ to 5 miles each evening; however, the five was only on one evening. She is getting back into good shape again after her bronchitis. I imagine the weather will be changing or has already changed with you to springlike. The hot weather of the summer is not so good but believe you have more breeze there than we have here in Washington. Good luck to you. My love and affectionate regards.

GCMRL/Research File (Family)

1. General Marshall departed Washington on Saturday, March 4, for an inspection trip to the South and Southwest, and he returned Wednesday, March 8. The schedule included tours of Eglin Field, Florida, Camp Shelby, Mississippi, the Louisiana Maneuver Area, and a stop at San Antonio, Texas, for a visit to Randolph Field. The chief of staff then went to Camp Hood, Texas, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and Camp Campbell, Kentucky. (Pasco Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, March 1, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) See Marshall to Brown, March 11, 1944, pp. 335–36.

2. See Marshall to Brown, March 1, 1944, pp. 319–21.

3. Mr. and Mrs. John S. Shedden were Margaret S. (Madge) Brown's parents from New York. For Mrs. Marshall's account of the birthday party, see K. T. Marshall, *Together*, p. 216.

4. James was the caretaker for the Marshalls' Leesburg home Dodona Manor. Sergeant Victor P. Aguirre served in the Orderly Detachment of the Chief of Staff. (Marshall to Aguirre, September 5, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

TO GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR  
Radio No. 5043. *Secret*

March 9, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall for MacArthur's Eyes Only. Your letter of February 27th was delivered to me by Sutherland.<sup>1</sup> Action has not yet been taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Admiral Nimitz' recommendation that Manus Island be assigned to him for development and control. I am in agreement with the reasons you advance against such a proposal. You should retain command of all base facilities in your area unless you yourself see fit to turn over control of them.



It now appears that probably large portions of the Pacific Fleet will be operating out of Manus for considerable periods of time. The freedom of action of the fleet must not be restricted by limitations of facilities, and while the base should remain under your command, there should be a clear understanding that facilities for fleet operation and basing will be developed as desired by the fleet and that the fleet will have unrestricted use of them.

The foregoing applies also to other possible bases in the Bismarcks, which are in the Southwest Pacific Area. Other than Nimitz' proposal as to Manus Island I have heard nothing of any other proposal or intent regarding boundary changes. Furthermore, so far as I know, there has never been any idea that control of the campaign for recapture of the Philippines should be taken from you. However I do not feel that we should be unnecessarily restricted by boundaries on a map. If a real military reason exists for changes therein, these changes should be made, though I do not see them in prospect. Furthermore I cannot see that a change in boundary of your area, in itself, could be regarded as a serious reflection upon your capacity to command. This would be particularly true when the area in question was well secured in our hands and the offensive had passed beyond it.

Your professional integrity and personal honor are in no way questioned or, so far as I can see, involved. However, if you so desire I will arrange for you to see the Secretary of War and the President at any time on this or any other matter.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 17, Item 5)

1. On February 27 General MacArthur had protested a recommendation made by Admiral Nimitz in late February that Admiral Halsey develop and control the naval base on Manus Island, with Halsey under Nimitz's direction. Nimitz stated that "economy in the use of the resources available requires that back areas in the South Pacific be reduced ruthlessly as bases in the forward areas are developed. This coordinated reduction can be done most effectively if COMSOPAC is given the responsibility under the direction of CINCPAC." (Nimitz to War Department, February 24, 1944, In Log, pp. 260-61, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Message Log].) MacArthur had written that he was "in complete disagreement with the recommendation of Admiral Nimitz regarding the Bismarck Archipelago. He thus has proposed to project his own command into the Southwest Pacific by the artificiality of advancing South Pacific Forces into the area. . . . South Pacific mobile forces have actually been operating under my strategic direction and in my area for the last ten months, and in the next offensive will operate under my command." He insisted that Manus Island was within the Southwest Pacific Area and that it was soon to be recovered by Southwest Pacific forces. MacArthur warned that any attempt to reduce his control would be a serious reflection on his capacity to command, would be psychologically demoralizing, and would "cause a reaction, not only with the soldiery but in public opinion, that would be extremely serious." He insisted that his professional integrity and personal honor were involved; and if his command was to be changed he demanded that he be given "early opportunity personally to present the case to the Secretary of War and to the President before finally determining my own personal action in the matter." (MacArthur to Marshall, February 27, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

In early March Admiral Halsey met with MacArthur to discuss work on the naval base



at Manus. “MacArthur lumped me, Nimitz, King, and the whole Navy in a vicious conspiracy to pare away his authority,” commented Halsey. (William F. Halsey and J. Bryan III, *Admiral Halsey's Story* [New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1947], pp. 188–90.)

2. “I appreciate greatly your prompt and full reply,” MacArthur responded. “It has given me a feeling of reassurance.” (MacArthur to Marshall, Radio No. C-2661, March 10, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 17, Item 5].) For the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s directive to MacArthur and Nimitz, March 12, 1944, see pp. 336–38.

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
[Radio No. 254.] *Secret*

March 9, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall for Eisenhower’s eyes only. Reference your letter regarding Lee’s promotion without recommendation from you:<sup>1</sup> This was my fault. I thought you had recommended him and did not check.

The situation was, each advancement or recognition of Smith produced an immediate and emphatic proposal by MacArthur for Sutherland. In this instance it seemed best to advance Sutherland to the grade of lieutenant general but I did not wish to single him out and therefore included Wheeler on Mountbatten’s urgent recommendation and Lee, thinking this was what you wanted. I hope I have not involved you in a rank assignment which will be embarrassing. If so be quite frank in your comments and I will see what I can do to rectify matters.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. “This morning I see in the papers that General Lee is to be promoted,” Eisenhower had written to Marshall on March 3. “When in Washington I told Somervell, who was very insistent that one of his supply people be made a three-star general, that I fully intended to recommend Lee as soon as I had completely satisfied myself as to the efficiency of his machine. I had already told Lee the same thing; but this is the first time one of my chief subordinates has been advanced without consulting me.” (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1759.)

2. John C. H. Lee was promoted to lieutenant general on February 21, 1944. Walter Bedell Smith had been promoted to lieutenant general on January 13, 1944, Richard K. Sutherland on February 20, and Raymond A. Wheeler on February 21.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SURLES

March 9, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

I listened this morning to General Somervell’s birthday anniversary comments to the principal officials of the Army Service Forces. While he was making his statement it occurred to me that we might save ourselves many irritating reactions on the part of investigating committees, various interests, newspaper experts, etc., if what he said could be read by a large number of people.



As an ordinary press release I don't think this would have any value because they would take little extracts and it would be printed in such a manner as to make little impression. It occurred to me that possibly if I sent the paper immediately with a personal note to the publishers of the Reader's Digest, they might see fit to print it. If so it certainly would set a great many people straight regarding a wide variety of important matters. Take for instance his comments on the disposal of obsolescent equipment in comparison to costs of maintenance; if that were generally understood, half the radio commentators' digs would be eliminated before they could be started.

Please read this through and give me your reaction as soon as possible.<sup>1</sup>

The portion where he talks of the morale of the Army Service Forces should be stricken out.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. "The article as written demands too much background to appeal immediately to a publisher," replied Major General Alexander D. Surles. "I recommend that I arrange with the Saturday Evening Post and Reader's Digest to collaborate on an article which will contain an interview with General Somervell, embrace the highlights of his remarks and fill in the background according to the advice of the magazine experts." (Surles Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, March 10, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) See the following document.

TO DEWITT WALLACE

March 10, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mr. Wallace: Yesterday at a meeting of the principal officials of the Army Service Forces celebrating the second anniversary of its organization, General Somervell made a very informative resume of the work done and particularly of the problems ahead. It occurred to me that this information would be of great public interest and I wondered if a magazine such as the Reader's Digest would care to make use of his talk.<sup>1</sup>

General Surles, the head of our Bureau of Public Relations, advises me that the article demands too much background to appeal immediately to a publisher. He therefore recommends that he be authorized to arrange with Collier's Weekly and the Reader's Digest to collaborate on an article which will contain an interview with General Somervell, embracing the highlights of his remarks and filling in the necessary background. Quite probably he is right in his advice. Nevertheless, I am sending you direct a copy of General Somervell's statement for your consideration. Certain portions should be omitted and have been crossed out in red pencil. There are probably other portions that would not make a proper appeal to the



average reader, but I have no basis for a professional opinion on this phase of the matter.<sup>2</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. DeWitt Wallace was coeditor, along with Lila Acheson Wallace, of the *Reader's Digest*. General Marshall enclosed Somervell's forty-five-page statement. See the previous document.

2. Wallace replied that the May 1944 issue included an article by Somervell. (Wallace to Marshall, April 4, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) See Lieutenant General Brehon Somervell, "The Men Behind the Invasion," *Reader's Digest* 44 (May 1944): 86–90.

TO GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR  
Radio No. 5073. *Secret*

March 10, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Personal for MacArthur from Marshall. Admiral King has formally called my attention to the communique of March 1st from your headquarters in which reference is made to the uniting of the Southwest Pacific area and the South Pacific area, as follows: "were united under General MacArthur's command" on June 29th [26th], 1943. The communique evidently was intended to refer to the placement of the operations of both the Southwest Pacific and South Pacific forces under your direction, rather than the consolidation of the South and Southwest Pacific commands. I have so assured Admiral King.<sup>1</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-4080])

1. On March 3, 1944, Admiral Ernest J. King brought a March 1 communiqué, "which has been given wide publicity," to Marshall's attention. The communiqué announced the landing in the Admiralty Islands. "This marks a final stage in the great swing move pivoting on New Guinea, which has been the basic purpose of operations initiated June 26, 1943, when the Southwest Pacific and South Pacific were united under General MacArthur's command." King had notified the chief of staff "in view of the obvious need for correcting the statement, which bears on a matter that has been the subject of discussion in the press." (King Memorandum for General Marshall, March 3, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected]; *New York Times*, March 1, 1944, p. 2, and March 2, p. 8.) Marshall sent a copy of this message for MacArthur, "calling his attention to this error," to Admiral King. (Marshall Memorandum for Admiral King, March 10, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY AND  
ADMIRAL KING  
*Confidential*

March 11, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Since my return to the city there has been brought to my attention the desire of Mr. Vinson of the House Naval Committee to have Representative



Maas make a trip to the Pacific. I have seen Mr. Vinson's letter to the Secretary of the Navy and the latter's reply.<sup>1</sup> I am informed that you, that is, Admiral Leahy and Admiral King, and also General Arnold, approve of the trip. This puts me in a puzzling if not embarrassing position.

You are both familiar with the measures which were taken last March to avoid visits by a variety of Committees of Congress to the various active theaters. The Truman Committee proposed a trip to England and to the Mediterranean and the President referred the matter to me for an opinion. You will find attached my memorandum to him of March 19th and also his memorandum of March 23rd to the leaders in Congress.<sup>2</sup>

Following the foregoing there developed a prolonged wrangle in which Senator Barkley had to take a leading part to settle a dispute between the Senate Military Committee and the Truman Investigating Committee. The final decision was a compromise with members of both Committees and Senator Russell of the Foreign Relations Committee being authorized to make the trip.

I am told by the officers representing the War Department in such matters on the Hill that if Mr. Maas makes this trip the precedent is broken and we shall probably not only be deluged with requests but will be seriously attacked by those members who were deprived of the opportunity which they so much desired.

I was informed by the Speaker, Mr. Rayburn, that he did not intend that anyone from the House should go into the active theaters. However, this is not borne out by Mr. Vinson's proposal in regard to Mr. Maas. Furthermore, the President has acquiesced to the visit by two members of Congress to England, and possibly to Africa, as guests of the British Government. He did not intend that they should go to Africa but apparently involved himself in this without realizing he was doing so.

I certainly do not wish to set myself up as the discordant voter in this matter and I am perfectly willing to go along with you gentlemen but I wanted you to read this note so that you will be prepared for what will happen as a consequence of favorable action on Mr. Vinson's request.<sup>3</sup>

G. C. Marshall

NA/RG 218 (JCS, Leahy White House Records)

1. Carl Vinson, a Democrat from Georgia, was chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee. Congressman Melvin J. Maas, a Republican from Minnesota, was a colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve and was on active duty in the South Pacific in 1942. The two letters to which Marshall refers are not in the Marshall papers.

2. See *Papers of GCM*, 3: 595-96.

3. Senator Alben W. Barkley was a Democrat from Kentucky, and Senator Richard B. Russell was a Democrat from Georgia. Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn was a Democrat from Texas. General Marshall drafted a letter to Congressman Vinson for Admiral Leahy's signature on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which reminded him of the March 1943 memorandum. The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested that Vinson discuss the matter with the Speaker of the House.



TO SECOND LIEUTENANT ALLEN T. BROWN

March 11, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

*Dear Allen* – A report of deployments the other day created in my mind some doubt as to just where you were.<sup>1</sup> I left Saturday morning on a quick trip, first to an air base on the Gulf of Mexico to witness special types of bombing. The same evening I flew on to Mississippi and inspected an Army Corps there the following morning. That afternoon I flew on to the Louisiana Maneuver district and visited four divisions, going on that night to San Antonio. The next morning I did three Air schools or fields and one Air depot of 40 odd thousand employees, and that afternoon I flew north in Texas to a Tank Destroyer camp and went on to Sill that night. The next day I witnessed firing at Sill and flew on to Kentucky in the late afternoon; the following morning with the temperature 15 above zero and a driving snow, I went through two Armored divisions in the field and saw a great deal of firing. I flew on to Washington in the evening.<sup>2</sup>

Last night your mother and I had dinner with the Halifaxes, very informal, only six of us, and quite pleasant.<sup>3</sup> Today, Saturday, I am very busy and will be all day Sunday. We had hoped to go down to Leesburg this afternoon or Sunday afternoon to plant some fruit trees and do some other garden chores, but I doubt if we make it. The weather here is pleasant now, but it was cold and messy.

I have had a number of interruptions while dictating this letter, so it is difficult to give it any continuity. I am afraid that the small type we are using will photograph down to such a small size that you may have some difficulty in reading it. I will see if we can't use a larger type in the future. I noted your comment in a letter to your mother that you had not heard from me for three months. For a time I wrote you practically every day, and then I went travelling. Since I came home I have written about once a week or maybe for a time every ten days. Have been very, very busy, but am sorry that I don't do better. My intentions are of the best. I am going to the Alibi Club tonight for the annual business dinner. You probably don't remember what it is, a small group of about 30 men, in a rather unique and attractive setting, with famous oyster dinners. I wish you could join us and spread yourself in the warmth of a heated room and with the bountiful food that I assume will be at hand. You could do much better by it than I shall be able to, and with better results, too. You enjoy one great advantage over me. You are young. I had rather be young and in the mud than at my age and in an office chair, though it seems to me I spend a great deal of time in the air not to mention slogging over considerable muddy terrain. All good luck to you and may the good Lord watch over you.

Affectionately,

GCMRL/Research File (Family)



1. "I am still at the front, and have been here a total of eleven days," Second Lieutenant Brown wrote on March 7. "I will stay in the frontline now for quite some time. It is a little nerve-wracking at times, but I would much rather be here doing something than sitting back in a rear area just waiting." On March 11 he wrote to his wife, from an area at the foot of Monte Cassino, that he was still with the New Zealand unit at the front. (Allen Brown to Margaret S. Brown, March 7 and 11, 1944, GCMRL/Research File [Family].)

2. See note 1, Marshall to Brown, March 3, 1944, p. 329.

3. General and Mrs. Marshall had dinner with Lord and Lady Halifax at the British Embassy on the evening of March 10. Lord Halifax had been the British ambassador in Washington since 1941.

TO GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR  
and ADMIRAL CHESTER W. NIMITZ  
Radio Nos. 5171 and 989.<sup>1</sup> *Secret*

March 12, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Book message for MacArthur and Richardson pass to Nimitz for action and Nimitz repeat to Halsey from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Para. 1. With reference to our dispatch of March 2 (4785 to CINC SWPAC, 729 to COMGENCENTPAC)<sup>2</sup> the Joint Chiefs of Staff have further decided that the most feasible approach to the Formosa-Luzon-China area is by way of Marianas-Carolines-Palau-Mindanao area, and that the control of the Marianas-Carolines-Palau area is essential to the projection of our forces into the former area, and their subsequent effective employment therefrom. Examination leads us to the decision that effective lodgment in the former area will be attained by the following main courses of action:

- a. Cancellation of FOREARM. Complete the isolation of the Rabaul-Kavieng area with the minimum commitment of forces.
- b. Early completion of Manus occupation and development as an air and fleet base.
- c. Occupation of Hollandia by CINCSOWESPAC, target date April 15, 1944. The objective is the establishment of heavy bombardment aircraft for preliminary air bombardment of the Palaus and neutralization of western New Guinea-Halmahera area.
- d. Establish control of Marianas-Carolines-Palau area by POA forces—
  - (1) By neutralization of Truk.
  - (2) By occupation of the southern Marianas, target date June 15. The objective is to secure control of sea communications through the Central Pacific by isolating and neutralizing the Carolines and by the establishment of sea and air bases for operations against Japanese sea routes and long range air attacks against the Japanese home land.



- (3) Occupation of the Palaus by POA forces, target date September 15. The objective is to extend the control of the eastern approaches to the Philippines and Formosa, and to establish a fleet and air base and forward staging area for the support of operations against Mindanao, Formosa and China.
- e. Occupation of Mindanao by SOWESPAC forces, supported by the Pacific fleet, target date November 15. The objective is establishment of air forces to reduce and contain Japanese forces in the Philippines preparatory to a further advance to Formosa either directly or via Luzon, and to conduct air strikes against enemy installations in the N. E. I. [Netherlands East Indies].
- f. Occupation of Formosa, target date February 15, 1945, or occupation of Luzon should such operations prove necessary prior to the move on Formosa, target date February 15, 1945. Planning responsibilities as follows: Formosa—CINCPOA; Luzon—CINCSOWESPAC.

Para. 2. Action addressees submit to Joint Chiefs of Staff and to each other at earliest practicable date outline operation plans to support the foregoing concept.

Para. 3. We direct that CINCSWPA:

- a. Cancel FOREARM operation and complete the isolation of the Rabaul-Kavieng area with the minimum commitment of forces.
- b. Expedite occupation and development of the Admiralties as a base for—
  - (1) SWPA air forces to complete the neutralization of Rabaul and Kavieng and assist in the neutralization of Truk and Palau.
  - (2) POA air forces to assist in the neutralization of Truk and Palau.
  - (3) Units of the United States fleet as required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- c. Should additional air base facilities be required, Emirau and Mussau should be occupied and developed for this purpose.
- d. Occupy Hollandia, target date April 15. Forces available are those assigned your area plus Pacific Ocean area forces allocated for FOREARM-MERCANTILE, excluding those Marine units assigned for these operations, fast carrier groups and old battleships. All Pacific fleet APA, AKA, AGC, allocated for FOREARM-MERCANTILE-ABSTRACT will be returned to Guadalcanal or other designated SOPAC ports and released to CINCPOA not later than May 5. Pacific Fleet combatant vessels including CARDIVS [Carrier Divisions] 22 and 24 with screens will be released by you and returned to CINCPOA control not later than May 5.



- e. Following Hollandia, with available forces conduct operations along New Guinea coast and such other operations as may be feasible in preparation for support of the Palau operation and the assault on Mindanao.

Para. 4. We direct that CINCPOA:

- a. Institute and intensify to greatest practicable degree aerial bombardment of the Carolines from bases in Marshalls and Admiralties in order to hasten the neutralization of Truk and the other islands of this group. Conduct carrier strikes against Marianas, Palaus, Carolines, and other profitable targets.
- b. Provide cover for the occupation of Hollandia and other operations in the Southwest Pacific area.
- c. Occupy the southern Marianas target date June 15, and establish land based aircraft, VLR bases and secondary naval facilities.
- d. Occupy the Marianas-Palau line.

Para. 5. We direct that CINCPOA and CINCSWPA or their representatives confer and prepare plans for the coordinated and mutual support of the operations ordered in paragraphs 3 and 4.

Para. 6. With reference to the forces of the Southwest Pacific and Pacific Ocean areas, a redeployment is now under way and completion will be expedited.<sup>3</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-5137])

1. On March 11, 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed strategy in the Pacific for 1944 (see note 2, Marshall Memorandum for the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, March 2, 1944, pp. 326-27). On March 12 General Marshall, Admirals Leahy and King, and Major General Barney M. Giles, chief of the Air Staff and representing General Henry H. Arnold, met in closed session and approved the J.C.S.'s new directive to General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz. (Minutes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, March 12, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS 334, JCS Minutes].) General Marshall edited the draft of this message; his handwritten corrections are in NA/RG 165 (OPD, 381, Case 301).

2. See Marshall Memorandum for the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, March 1, 1944, pp. 324-26.

3. In order to coordinate the Pacific campaign as directed by the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Nimitz visited General MacArthur's headquarters at Brisbane, Australia, on March 25-27 for a conference. Describing his visit to Admiral King, Nimitz wrote that MacArthur "seemed pleased to have the J.C.S. directive covering the entire calendar year of 1944 because it definitely provided for his entry into the Philippines via Mindanao—a plan which is very close to his heart." (King and Whitehill, *Fleet Admiral King*, p. 538.)



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT<sup>1</sup>  
*Confidential*

March 13, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Acceptance of decoration from the  
Soviet Government by General Marshall

Last week the Russian Ambassador called on Mr. Stettinius and expressed the desire of the Russian Government to confer on General Marshall the ORDER OF SUVOROV, First Class. This is their highest military order, and has only been bestowed once on a non-Russian, the case being General Eisenhower. Admiral Giffen and General Spaatz received this order in the Second Class, and a number of other U. S. officers received it in the Third Class.<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Stettinius informed the Russian Ambassador that the matter of acceptance of decorations had been under study and that he would consult with the Secretary of War.

The following regarding the acceptance of decorations by Americans bears on this case. General Marshall secured an informal agreement with Sir John Dill that during active hostilities no decorations would be exchanged between officers on duty in the War Department or British officers here or in the British War Office, and that the conferring of decorations on field commanders would be at the discretion of the Government concerned. Several complications arose under this arrangement due to the transfer of officers, and it was decided best to reduce the informal agreement to written form. Preliminary to that, representatives of the State, War and Navy Departments drafted a policy (attached) which has not been formally passed upon by the departments.

In addition to the foregoing, General Marshall had issued certain other orders regarding decorations. All Military Attaches were instructed that if there was any mention by the local government authorities regarding the bestowal of a decoration on General Marshall, they were to state that for a number of reasons he would not be free to accept such an honor and they were to be explicit in explaining the embarrassment that would inevitably flow from the acceptance of decorations from countries soliciting Lend-Lease materiel. He also issued instructions that officers concerned with allotment of Lend-Lease materiel would not be permitted to accept decorations from the nations with whose representatives they were dealing in these matters.

It is understood that Mr. Harriman had been requested to use his best endeavors to discourage the Soviet Government from the bestowing of an award on any U. S. officer pending clarification of our policy. However he



was not successful in the case of General Marshall and the present situation has developed.

As this matter somewhat concerns the general relations with the Soviet Government, I would like to have your views or instructions.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. This document was signed by Secretary of War Stimson.
2. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., was under secretary of state. Rear Admiral Robert C. Giffen (U.S.N.A., 1907) was commander of the Pacific task force that participated in missions resulting in occupation of Guadalcanal, Kiska, Attu, and the Gilbert and Marshall islands. Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz was commanding general of the U.S. Army Strategic Air Force in Europe.
3. "I do not want to offend the Russian Government and Harriman has tried to defer the matter unsuccessfully," President Roosevelt replied. He suggested that Secretary Stimson explain to Dill the delicacy of the situation. "If Dill thinks that General Marshall should go ahead and receive it, I personally think he should do it." (Roosevelt Memorandum for the Secretary of War, March 14, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Dill informed the British Chiefs of Staff that in his opinion it would be "impossible for Marshall to refuse this Soviet decoration and his acceptance would not be taken ill by us nor would it affect our working agreement as regards not swapping decorations as between office workers." The British Chiefs of Staff agreed with Dill that to refuse would "almost certainly give offence" to Marshal Stalin. (Dill to British Chiefs of Staff, March 18, 1944, and British Chiefs of Staff to Dill, March 20, 1944, NA/RG 107 [SW Safe, Great Britain].) Secretary of State Cordell Hull informed Ambassador Andrei A. Gromyko that Marshall would be pleased to accept the Soviet decoration. The Soviet government announced on March 24 that General Marshall was awarded the Order of Suvorov "for his outstanding military ability and services in the leadership of the American armed forces in the struggle against the common enemy of the Soviet Union and the United States." (Hull to Stimson, March 22, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected]; *New York Times*, March 25, 1944, p. 6.) See Marshall Remarks on Acceptance of the Order of Suvorov, June 5, 1944, pp. 469-70.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JACOB L. DEVERS  
Radio No. 2065. *Secret*

March 13, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

For Devers' Eyes Only from Marshall. Reference my 1948 and your W-5038 regarding Army Band:<sup>1</sup> I sent the Band to Italy in order to increase its prestige and incidentally help morale. I thought by giving it an active theater background it might acquire prestige here at home approximating that of the Navy and Marine Bands. I was not very successful as little publicity has ever come out of the Mediterranean regarding the Band, at the moment I only recall one reference.

Now because the center of gravity is switching I thought again for my purpose in establishing the position of the Band before the country, that we might get somewhere by sending it to England. I don't wish to have a bad effect on your theater on morale but my purpose was directed to the Band more than to the theater. If in the light of circumstances you still feel that it



would be importantly adverse to the interests of the U.S. Troops in the Mediterranean I will not go further in the matter.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-5186])

1. "The Army Band was sent to North Africa at my personal direction," Marshall notified Devers on March 11. "It has been there for over 8 months and a move is now desirable. Unless there are strong reasons to the contrary it is contemplated moving the Band, including the Special Field Music organized since its arrival in North Africa, to the U K." (Marshall to Devers, Radio No. 1948, March 11, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Devers replied: "Last October an exceptionally fine band with field music was organized in the United Kingdom. If it is strongly desired to transfer the army band and field music to the United Kingdom, thus giving them 2, the only strong reason that can be given for retaining it here is that there will be a corresponding loss of morale." (Devers to Marshall, Radio No. W-5038, March 13, 1944, *ibid.*)

2. See Marshall to Smith, March 15, 1944, p. 348.

TO ENIT KAUFMAN

March 13, 1944

FROM LIEUTENANT COLONEL H. MERRILL PASCO

[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mrs. Kaufman: General Marshall has received your letter of March 4th and has asked me to thank you for sending him the sketch of his hands. He has approved the following statement concerning leadership to be used in the publication of the book on which you are collaborating with Dorothy Canfield Fisher:<sup>1</sup>

"Aggressive and determined leadership, from the purely military point of view, is the final determining factor in warfare. Genuine discipline, sound training, suitable munitions and adequate numbers are essentials, but they will be ineffective without the dominating influence of strong leadership. Deficiencies are made good by leadership. Difficulties are overcome by leadership. Military victories depend upon leadership. Of course, a successful army must have the strong support of the people in whose cause it fights."<sup>2</sup> Sincerely yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Portrait painter Enit Kaufman collaborated with writer Dorothy Canfield Fisher on the book *American Portraits* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1946). The work includes Kaufman's sketch of General Marshall which she made in December 1942. See *Papers of GCM*, 3: facing p. 448.

2. General Marshall handwrote this statement on leadership.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY

March 14, 1944

Secret

[Washington, D.C.]

I have read Hull's memorandum and think that it had best be handled by your sending a copy to Devers.<sup>1</sup>



However, I am inclined to the view that Hull does not make sufficiently clear (assuming he believes what follows) the great danger, if we do not do ANVIL, of finding our forces in Italy blocked by comparatively few German divisions and a large number of divisions from southern France, from Italy, and from the Balkans concentrating against OVERLORD. Dill is very fearful that this will happen and so am I, if we permit our effort to be boxed up in Italy where the geographical situation and the character of the terrain would permit the Germans to play us a scurvy trick to the great disadvantage of our principal effort in the war—OVERLORD.

I feel that the people in Italy are, through the natural reactions of people in a difficult military situation, restricted in their view to that locality, and that the OVERLORD people are apt, in view of the serious resistance they must expect in the first month of their landing, to similarly overlook the adverse possibilities that would flow from the abandonment of ANVIL or rather the confinement of our operation to Italy.

I am a little in doubt as to whether Hull's memorandum, as now written, will make a sufficiently clear picture to Devers to justify sending it, because to a certain degree, it is bound to irritate him to read a statement by a visitor with which he does not entirely concur.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Major General John E. Hull of the Operations Division, having recently returned from Algiers, informed General Marshall of the situation in Italy and the prospects for ANVIL. Hull admitted that while the stalemated situation in Italy made the preparation of ANVIL difficult, there should be no thought of abandoning ANVIL. He added that ANVIL retained for the Allies a measure of strategic flexibility, that OVERLORD might need the assistance of troops in southern France, and that divisions could be more profitably employed there than in Italy, where "there are no further important strategic objectives." Hull told Marshall that Allied efforts in Italy should concentrate on closing up the Anzio bridgehead with the main Italian front, but after that forces currently in Italy should be sufficient to maintain the Allied position. He suggested that if Rome could not be taken with the forces available, then a reevaluation of Allied objectives in Italy would have to be considered.

Hull believed that the great danger presented to the Allies by an abandonment of ANVIL was that the Germans, aided by the difficult terrain, would be able to contain the Allied advance in Italy with a few divisions. With the threat of a second invasion removed, the Germans would be able to reinforce their front in northwestern France with divisions from Italy, southern France, and the Balkans. Hull said that ANVIL would result either in a rapid advance across southern France against minimal opposition or force the Germans to commit reserves to contain ANVIL's post-landing advance that could have been employed against OVERLORD. He concluded that since ANVIL was almost entirely an American-French effort the American planning staffs should take the lead in putting ANVIL in motion, and that all resources not needed to close the gap between the Anzio bridgehead and the main Italian front should be immediately allocated to ANVIL. (Hull Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, March 14, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 9, Book 16].)

2. Major General Thomas T. Handy sent Hull's memorandum to Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers on March 15. Handy informed Devers that he believed that Marshall "is in general agreement with the thoughts expressed in Hull's memorandum. I think what



General Marshall fears more than anything else is that we may face a situation in Italy where our forces are contained by 6 to 8 German divisions, while the rest of the German forces are sent to France.” (Handy to Devers, March 15, 1944, *ibid.*) For further discussion of ANVIL, see Marshall to Eisenhower, March 16, 1944, pp. 348–50.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
*Secret*

March 15, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Air development in Burma.

There is now taking place in upper Burma a unique military operation. It is a test of the employment of air power after the manner of sea power, that is, selecting a landing point, convoying the troops to it, supplying them and protecting them in at least their initial occupation of it. Kenney did something of this sort in preparation for the occupation of the Markham Valley west of Lae.<sup>1</sup>

Following discussions in Quebec with Brigadier Wingate of the British Army, it was decided that if the British would authorize him to organize three or four long range penetration groups (LRPG's) a similar group would be organized by the U.S. Army, composed of volunteers trained for jungle warfare, a large percentage of whom would have had experience in actual jungle fighting.

Later here in Washington, Mountbatten appealed to me to see if something could not be done to provide a means of evacuating the wounded of these LRP groups since the abandonment of the wounded which had been necessary the previous year presented the most depressing morale aspect. General Arnold and I then took up with him the proposition of organizing a special Air Force to be part and parcel of Wingate's force. Arnold organized this force, its special characteristic being the employment of planes capable of landing in very restricted areas.

Under Colonel Philip Cochran the 1st Air Commando Force of some 200 planes was organized and trained. This includes fighters, bombers, transport planes, gliders and a large number of puddle jumpers of several types. This force was carefully organized and trained here in the States, a special effort being made to develop facility in landing gliders in rough and unknown terrain at night. It was sent to India and there trained with the LRP groups, awakening great enthusiasm on the part of Wingate. Our principal trouble was to prevent its being broken up to meet the special requests of various commanders who would have liked to use a piece of it.



On March 5th this Air Commando Force transported at night American engineers and British LRPG men to the vicinity of Kawdaw, approximately 160 miles in the rear of the Japanese line. The gliders had to be taken through at about 12,000 feet; several broke loose, 15 were returned to their starting point and there were other accidents. However, the main force made a successful landing at night. An air strip 300 by 5000 feet was developed in less than 24 hours by our Engineers and by March 10th 8,000 men and 1400 mules, [and] antiaircraft, radar warning equipment, etc., were established, also U.S. P-51's and P-38's.

In preparation for this move a heavy attack was made on Japanese airfields by the U.S. fighter and bomber planes of the Commando Force just referred to. It was estimated that they destroyed on the ground in one day over 20% of the Japanese aircraft in Burma.<sup>2</sup>

Immediately upon effecting the landing referred to another field was developed 60 miles to the south. Supplies had steadily been going in at night.

We therefore have a sizeable force of highly trained volunteers with air, antiaircraft, radar and supply backing established in the rear of the Japanese lines in close proximity to the principal line of communications to the units on the Salween and Chindwin Rivers and in such a position that no more than three Japanese regiments could be brought into action against this force for quite a period of time.

There is a further and most important factor in the present situation: so far as we can tell the Japanese have no knowledge of the movement, and even when the destructive interruption of communications commences—which it probably already has—they for quite a long time will probably not have any knowledge of the size of the force and of its solid establishment. Unless some untoward event occurs, and assuming that the British press on south and that Stilwell's Chinese troops keep up their good work, we may find a somewhat different situation in north Burma rapidly developing.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Lieutenant General George C. Kenney's use of paratroops and mobile air supply units dropping supplies in the Nadzab area in September 1943 is discussed in Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944*, a volume in *The Army Air Forces in World War II* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), pp. 184–86.

2. On March 12 Major General George E. Stratemeyer had sent an account of the operations of Air Commando Force Number 1 and Troop Carrier Command, noting that "Wingate is very pleased with the show." (Stratemeyer to Arnold, March 12, 1944, In Log, pp. 106–7, 115, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Message Log].) He also praised the work of the 900th Airborne Aviation Engineer Company. For information on this unit's exploits, see Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *Services Around the World*, a volume in *The Army Air Forces in World War II* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 301. For further developments regarding Wingate's LRPG, see Marshall to Stilwell, April 26, 1944, pp. 436–37.



TO THE STUDENTS OF MISS CRAIG'S CLASS<sup>1</sup>

March 15, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

I received your joint letter of February twenty-ninth and have read it very carefully. You ask me a number of questions which at best would be rather difficult to answer. Where they pertain to things you have read about me I must call your attention to the fact that many of the things credited to me I do not acknowledge or at least I should have materially to depreciate or moderate.

Mrs. Marshall tells me that my memory is seriously defective in some respects, frequently to her inconvenience. So much for that question.<sup>2</sup>

I was somewhat intrigued by your question regarding the method of selecting generals, "What are they like that makes you know they will be good ones?" This probably is the most important of my duties, the most difficult. I hardly know how to explain the method followed so that you would understand because so many different factors are involved. In the first place an experience of nearly 40 years in observing the work of officers in handling men, the efficiency of their various methods, the character and dependability they display, particularly in reference to their bearing, appearance, and speech, and many other somewhat similar factors, influences my choice. Also I am given the opinions of their immediate commanders and the senior commanders of their services. For example, General Arnold for the Air Forces, General McNair for the Ground Forces, General Somervell for the Army Service Forces, and particularly the commanders of the troops in active theaters like General MacArthur, General Eisenhower, etc. Incidentally, it is comparatively simple to select the generals after a display of their military qualities on the battlefield. The difficulty is when we must choose them prior to employment in active operations.

I would add this final comment: the most important factor of all is character, which involves integrity, unselfish and devoted purpose, a sturdiness of bearing when everything goes wrong and all are critical, and a willingness to sacrifice self in the interest of the common good.

You ask me what kind of a boy I was. I am afraid I cannot give you a proper estimate because I could not see myself as others saw me. However, I will tell you this, that I was a poor student and I was anything but a success in my particular world. Fortunately while I was still in my teens I realized some of my deficiencies and made a tremendous effort to correct them. A good bit of this reform was due to the example of others and the leadership of some of my teachers, but the point is, they caught me just in time.

You ask me what I suggest that you should do to help win the war. I hesitate to answer because I know it will be depressing to you to be told to work hard and do well all the small tasks you are called upon to perform.



However, these are the basis of discipline and discipline is vital to a soldier and to success in battle, and self-discipline probably is one of the very important factors in the life of a man or woman. What you do today is of tremendous importance in what you will do tomorrow, meaning when you are a few years older. If the world observes that all our young people have turned to every task with an intensity of purpose to make themselves better citizens, the world will be greatly impressed with the power of this country because that power is determined by its citizens, by their good sense, their integrity, their willingness to do their duty as citizens. By such conduct on your part you will discourage our enemies and encourage our friends and those who are "on the fence" trying to decide with whom they should align themselves. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Lillian Craig, a remedial reading teacher in Roanoke, Virginia, had sent a letter written to General Marshall by her students, who were nine to twelve years old. "They are healthy, normal youngsters with very high I.Q.'s but they are what we call Strepho-symbolics—or children who read backwards. . . . They are thoroughly interested in the war and are pathetically anxious to have a part in winning it." (Craig to Marshall, March 2, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

2. "We hear that you never forget anything that is important," the class had written. "We would like you to tell us all the details of how you keep from forgetting anything." (Class to Marshall, February 29, 1944, *ibid.*)

TO CAPTAIN CLIFTON S. BROWN

March 15, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

*Dear Clifton* – A V-letter came from you to your mother three days ago which indicated you were in Italy, as you referred to visiting Allen's unit but that you failed to see him. Also some officer wrote her a note from your foreign station referring to your departure from there so I suppose you are getting a taste of mud and cold, snow and rain. However, the pleasant spring weather of Italy should soon develop, in marked contrast to the wretched weather of the past two months which imposed so much of hardship on the men in the field.

Your mother and I drove down to Leesburg Sunday afternoon. Though it was raining and the ground was deep in mud I managed to plant half a dozen fruit trees and a dozen or more berry bushes. We hope to get down Sunday and do another planting job and spread some manure that we got ahold of a month ago. Allene is there at the hotel and seems to be having a pleasant time at Leesburg. James had a bad cold but is on his feet now. The place should look very lovely in three or four weeks. I hope I can see it this spring because I have never had a chance to in the past three years.



I should imagine that you are having an exceedingly interesting time in contrast to Richmond or even to your former location in N.A. [North Africa]. I have gone through the latter region so often that it began to seem like home territory but I suppose from now on I shall see less and less of it.

Events have been moving rather rapidly in the Pacific, and very badly for the Japanese. I hope we can continue without untoward event. I see that Chinese and American troops in combined action in Burma have administered a severe defeat to a Japanese force. This should greatly encourage the Chinese and improve their military morale.

Molly and the children are well and the latter very active, both increasingly so. Jimmy is in trouble almost every hour of the day and Kitty has just reached the point of walking a few steps alone. She walks all over the upstairs if someone holds her hand. A friend of mine in New York is sending Jimmy a velocipede. His feet touch the ground when he rides the little one Molly bought for him so we had the pedals removed, and he walks it about.

I have just returned from a trip into Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and Kentucky, generally visiting two large installations each day. The weather permitted me to keep up with a fast schedule and get back to Washington for important meetings here. Affectionately,

GCMRL/Research File (Family)

TO WINSTON S. CHURCHILL  
Radio. *Secret*

March 15, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

For Eisenhower personal for delivery to the Prime Minister from Marshall. Your personal message through Dill is much appreciated.<sup>1</sup> I am greatly reassured to have this indication of your personal interest and strong leadership in all that pertains to OVERLORD. Our anxiety here is to insure that whatever operations are undertaken in the Mediterranean will be calculated to hold in the theater southern France to the Balkans the largest number of German divisions during the first month of OVERLORD.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On March 12 Dill had relayed a message from Churchill to Marshall. "I have presided at a series of meetings at which either Ike or Bedell has been present and I am satisfied that everything is going on well," wrote Churchill. "I am hardening very much on this operation as the time approaches in the sense of wishing to strike if humanly possible even if the limiting conditions we laid down at Moscow are not exactly fulfilled. I hope a chance may come for us to have a talk before long. Every good wish." (Dill to Marshall, March 12, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)



TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALTER BEDELL SMITH  
[Radio No. 299.] *Secret*

March 15, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Smith from Marshall. The matter of the transfer of the Army Band from the Mediterranean to your theater has been personally handled by me.<sup>1</sup> Devers hates to lose Band but states that transportation for the Band plus field music will be available about the middle of April. I have not yet come to a decision in the matter. The trouble is this, I proposed the movement of the Band to the Mediterranean in order to give it prestige before the country so that it might be on an approximate footing with the Marine and Navy Bands. Practically nothing ever came out of the Mediterranean about the Band and I do not want to send it to the European Theater if it will be involved in the same silence. Let me have your comments.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See Marshall to Devers, March 13, 1944, pp. 340-41.

2. "Against a background of active military operations and political maneuvers in the Mediterranean it was practically impossible to produce publicity for the band," Smith replied on March 16. "Newsmen were not interested in the slightest degree and the band's broadcasts could not reach the United States. About all that could be done was to try to get away from the stilted methods that the band leader was using and endeavor to add some color so that when the band returned to the United States it would attract attention." Smith informed Marshall that "here the band will play concerts for the Prime Minister, Parliament, et cetera, and it may be possible to give it more publicity, but on this consideration alone I doubt if it is worthwhile to move it to the United Kingdom. In the United States I believe it would now attract far more attention." (Smith to Marshall, March 16, 1944, In Log, p. 145-AA, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Message Log].)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. 314. *Top Secret*

March 16, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Personal and EYES ONLY from Marshall to Eisenhower. The news from the Italian Front indicates that there is no probability of a decisive tactical change in the situation from that which existed at the time you met with the British Chiefs of Staff to represent the US Chiefs of Staff in the OVERLORD-ANVIL matter. The operation at Cassino which started yesterday may bring about within a reasonably short time the amalgamation of the beachhead with the main line but there is nothing to indicate a sufficient break in the German resistance to permit a further advance on Rome during March.<sup>1</sup>

Our concern here is over the possibility, if not the probability, that the Germans in taking desperate measures which they will certainly do to crush OVERLORD, will endeavor to hold up our troops in Italy and recall from



southern France, from Italy, and from the Balkans, and by withdrawal on the Russian Front to the Riga Line obtain from that Army, a large reserve of divisions available for the operations in western France. Both Dill and I have had this fear and it was accentuated by General Hull's conversations with General Alexander in Italy, the latter stating, in reply to Hull's query that 6 or 8 divisions could materially delay his, Alexander's, advance to the Pisa Rimini Line. Alexander now has 21 divisions in Italy and is proceeding with movements to increase this number to 28. The Germans have 24 divisions in Italy of which 19 are in the south. So it would appear that if Alexander can be materially delayed, the Germans in a series of planned withdrawals to, and maybe through, the Apennines, could free 10 to 15 divisions for France not to mention those from southern France and elsewhere that I previously mentioned. In connection with Alexander's statement, Dill's people worked up an estimate in which they conclude that 19 German divisions would be required to hold US [us] in check in Italy.

We know from MAGIC that the Germans are fearful of a landing in the northern Adriatic or on the coast of southern France. However, if they once become aware of the fact that the facilities for such a landing are not available they could re-arrange their forces to your great disadvantage.

We must of course connect up the Anzio Beachhead with the main front of the Army in Italy. Under present conditions, however, I see no great purpose to be achieved in Italy aside from maintaining pressure on the enemy to prevent the transfer of his forces to your front.

During the month since Cooke and Hull visited London your examination and detailed development of plans should have made clear whether or not you have a critical shortage in landing ships and craft.<sup>2</sup> Estimates here would indicate that all presently allocated LST's should close in to the UK under the present plans prior to the 30th of April except perhaps 7 from US production which may not arrive until about May 15.

We are about to open discussions with the British Chiefs of Staff concerning ANVIL and they have requested Wilson to let them have his estimate on the Mediterranean situation on March 18. The basis for a final decision appears no better than a month ago. The only clear-cut decision would be to cancel the ANVIL operation.

I should greatly appreciate your personal views concerning this whole situation including your present appraisal of the landing craft situation and the latest dates that you can accept craft for use in OVERLORD.

It is my intention with which Arnold agrees that we will support your desire regarding the ANVIL decision, whatever it may be. So the foregoing statement of my views is not to be accepted by you as a pressure from me to have matters arranged other than the way you would wish to see them set up.<sup>3</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-6709])



1. On March 15, 1944, an Allied air bombardment of Cassino had begun, followed by an artillery barrage. Despite the immense destruction in Cassino, the New Zealand and Indian troops made little progress and were repulsed. Heavy rain impeded the assault elements, and the too few Allied forces met stubborn enemy resistance. On March 23 the Allied divisions halted the attack. (The Allied attempt to take Cassino in March 1944 is discussed in Blumenson, *Salerno to Cassino*, pp. 433-48.)

2. Rear Admiral Charles M. Cooke, Jr., and Major General John E. Hull visited London in mid-February to discuss landing craft issues. See Marshall Memorandum for Admiral Leahy and Admiral King, February 9, 1944, pp. 273-75.

3. Eisenhower replied on March 18 that the prospect of small numbers of German divisions containing larger numbers of Allied divisions in Italy was likewise a matter of concern to him and his staff. (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1772-73.) Two days later he wrote to Marshall that "ANVIL as we originally visualized it is no longer a possibility either from the standpoint of time in which to make all the necessary preparations or in probable availability of fresh and effective troops at the appointed date." Eisenhower added that "present abandonment of formal ANVIL must not repeat not lessen our intention of operating offensively in the Mediterranean, initially in Italy and extending from there toward France as rapidly as we can." He pointed out the continued problem of assembling enough landing craft to mount simultaneous operations, and he saw the need to retain a one-division lift capability in the Mediterranean to threaten an amphibious assault and to maintain the offensive. (*Ibid.*, p. 1775.)

On March 21 Eisenhower notified General Marshall concerning the position he intended to take in a meeting the next day with the British Chiefs of Staff regarding ANVIL. He stated again that in his opinion ANVIL was no longer a possibility as originally intended, and that available landing craft were "barely sufficient" for the needs of OVERLORD. With cancellation of a simultaneous ANVIL, he "consider[ed] it essential to strengthen OVERLORD and also to increase the flexibility of the buildup during the early critical days." Eisenhower recommended, therefore, that ANVIL be abandoned as a two-division invasion of southern France with an eventual buildup of ten divisions, and that landing craft above a one-division lift capability be withdrawn from the Mediterranean and assigned to the OVERLORD operation. (*Ibid.*, pp. 1776-79.) The Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted that ANVIL be only delayed, not canceled. (See Marshall to Eisenhower, March 25, 1944, pp. 374-76.)

TO BRIGADIER GENERAL FRANK E. LOWE

March 16, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Lowe, It has just been brought to my attention that the recently created Separations Board has only one representative of the Reserve Corps on it, General Evans. Considering the fact that there are two National Guard officers on the Board I think it is important that there be another representative of the interests of the Reserve officers.<sup>1</sup> He should be a general officer if possible, otherwise he will be the only colonel on the Board.

At the moment only two names occur to me, that of General Smith and your name. It would be most unfortunate to remove General Smith from the duties he is now performing here in the War Department; therefore, not being intimately familiar with just what you are doing now, I should like to



know whether or not you would care for such a detail, provided, of course, you feel that there would be no embarrassment in replacing you with the Truman Committee.<sup>2</sup>

It is very important I think that whoever goes on this Separations Board should have an intimate knowledge of the Reserve officer movement through most of its course and that Reserve officers generally be aware of the fact that the individual possesses this knowledge.<sup>3</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. The Secretary of War's Separations Board was composed of Major General William Bryden, Regular Army and president of the board; Major General Irving A. Fish, National Guard; Brigadier General Nathaniel H. Egleston, National Guard; Brigadier General Frank S. Clark, Regular Army; and Brigadier General Edward A. Evans, Reserve. Major General Charles D. Herron, who had recently retired from the Secretary of War's Personnel Board, had written that the Bryden Board was overrepresented with Regulars and National Guard officers. (Herron to Marshall, March 15, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Brigadier General Edward W. Smith had succeeded Brigadier General Frank E. Lowe in supervising Reserve activities in the War Department, when Lowe was assigned to the Truman Committee.

3. Lowe replied that he had brought Marshall's letter to the attention of Senator Harry S. Truman, who had written the chief of staff a reply. (Lowe to Marshall, March 20, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].) See Marshall to Truman, March 23, 1944, pp. 368–69.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY  
OF WAR [PATTERSON]

March 17, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

I read the other day from some notes given me, on top of which I had added a great many pencil additions to the data. Therefore I will have to give you a new resume of that data in a form that will be understandable to you.<sup>1</sup> I might say first, something that I did not make a point of the other day and should have, only the drastic economies we have effected over the past six months have enabled the Army to meet its program. What has actually happened has been a constantly increasing deficiency on the part of Selective Service which would have left us in a tragic position had we not been making tremendous economies ourselves, all of which have been eaten up in overcoming the deficiencies in meeting new demands for operations which were not on the books or conceived six months ago.

I quoted the following on Selective Service allotments to the Army:

No Army call has been completely filled in the past six months. The following are typical:

November —	175,000 called
	117,500 received



December —	165,000 called
	111,000 received
January —	160,000 called
	118,000 received
February —	160,000 called
	110,000 (approximately) received

We anticipated receiving 35,000 in the first week of March. First reports indicate that only 18,000 were received.

The percentage of inductees over 35 years of age has steadily increased, from 8.3% in October to 9.3% in November and 10% in December. This is the least desirable group and one that has the highest discharge rate.

However quickly the Selective Service makes up the shortages they are powerless to make up our present deficiencies in trained men and we are confronted with definite operations requiring the employment of these men.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Major General Miller G. White had submitted the following manpower statistics to Marshall. (White Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, March 13, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. "The failure of Selective Service to give us the required quantity and the required quality is due chiefly to the over-liberal deferments given to young men (men from 18 to 26) in agriculture, in industry and in college. The deferments in agriculture have been extremely lax," replied Patterson. He recognized the need of war industry for men but pointed out that it could be filled by those unfit for military service, those beyond military age, and women. There were relatively few positions held by young men of special skills for whom replacements could not be trained within a reasonable time. "The war morale of the nation must also be taken into account. Public feeling is offended by the sight of numerous young men in civilian pursuits, while older and less fit men are inducted into the armed forces." (Patterson Memorandum for General Marshall, March 22, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 9, Book 16].) For more information regarding the manpower shortage, see the following document.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

March 17, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

I understood that at one of the manpower discussions the issue was brought up that we had 3 million men in the Army in this country and we should make up our deficiencies there. Of course you and I know that these people are all busy, but I have hurriedly tried to gather something of what is being done by the people in this country and I am listing it below for your information in the event that this phase of the matter is brought up in the Cabinet Meeting.



An exact tabulation is being prepared for me but it is not ready now.

*Air Forces in United States:*

- 237,000 fliers and crewmen being trained
- 283,000 officers and men training these fliers and crewmen and keeping house for them
- 194,000 in ground maintenance men, in training
- 98,000 instructors, assistants, and house-keepers training these men
- 350,000 in organized Air Force—squadrons, groups, ground crews, etc., training as complete units preparatory to being moved overseas. 60% of these will go and 40% will be held back as instructors for the succeeding increments.
- 63,000 air service command for the maintenance of the various air installations in this country
- 37,000 men in troop carrier command<, meaning air transports employed in tactical groups for transporting soldiers and their munitions and transport.><sup>1</sup>
- 188,000 in general overhead throughout the United States
- <Add in the Army Air Transport Service.>
- <—————>
- <Total>

*Ground Forces:*

- 350,000 Replacement Training Centers as individuals
- 75,000 trainers for the foregoing men
- 1 million men in 50 divisions with supporting troops which is steadily being reduced by shipment overseas

<Service of Supply (ASF)>

- 350,000 Army Service Command overhead. <Operating all base ports on east and west Coast. (\_\_\_ men), Cantonments or posts, depots for supplies, training establishments for or developing special units—Engineers, Signal, Quarters, Ordnance, Medical, etc). . . .>

The Air Transport Service is not included above and some other minor units are not involved. The point is, all of these people are working at a tremendous pace, training and shipping, running the base ports, etc.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. After General Marshall sent this memorandum to Secretary Stimson, the chief of staff added handwritten notes to the carbon file copy, which is the source copy printed here. Marshall's handwritten additions are printed within <> brackets.

2. For more information regarding manpower, see the previous document and Marshall Memorandum for Justice Byrnes, March 23, 1944, pp. 362–65.



TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSEPH W. STILWELL  
Radio Nos. 4764 and 7088. *Secret*

March 17, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Marshall to Stilwell EYES ONLY. The US Chiefs of Staff have concurred in the temporary diversion of transport aircraft for Mountbatten's use in support of British Fourth Corps. Mountbatten asked for blanket authority to make diversions of this nature in the future as emergencies arise without reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. As the primary purpose of the transport aircraft on the air ferry route is for the support of activities in China, the US Chiefs of Staff do not feel that blanket authority for diverting these aircraft should be given Mountbatten. With you on Ledo Road or at Chungking and a critical situation developing on Imphal Front, or maybe later on some other front, would it not be advisable for you to delegate authority in this matter to Sultan, permitting him to recommend without delay direct to US Joint Chiefs of Staff. It required ten days to settle the last question regarding diversion of this tonnage.<sup>1</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-7292])

1. The character of operations in the Southeast Asia theater made large air transport aircraft a high priority for moving troops by air and for supplying large formations of Allied troops that were temporarily cut off by the Japanese or where terrain made conventional supply methods difficult. Allied long-range penetration forces had been supplied by air since November 1943. Aircraft for such missions could be acquired from the Troop Carrier Command, a part of Admiral Mountbatten's forces in Southeast Asia, or they could be diverted from ferrying supplies over the Hump into China. Aircraft from the latter source belonged to the Air Transport Command and were subject to direction from the American high command in Washington. Mountbatten had borrowed large transport aircraft from the Air Transport Command in January 1944 during British operations along the Arakan coast, arguing that operational necessity forced a diversion of these aircraft from their general mission of ferrying supplies to China. The Joint Chiefs of Staff was reluctant to permit such diversion of air transport resources any longer than was required by the immediate military necessity. The Japanese offensive on the Imphal Plain in March 1944 prompted Mountbatten again to ask for the diversion of large air transport aircraft to assist his operations. Admiral Mountbatten asked for complete authority to make such diversions in the future whenever operational needs dictated, but the Americans were unwilling to grant such general authority. To meet the present emergency in Imphal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized Mountbatten temporarily to divert aircraft from the Air Transport Command. (Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944*, pp. 447-49; Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 98-100; Supplementary Minutes of the Combined Chief of Staff Meeting, March 17, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS 334, CCS Minutes].) For further discussion of Major General Daniel I. Sultan's authority, see Marshall to Stilwell, March 24, 1944, pp. 372-73.

IN January 1943 the War Department had asked Lieutenant General Millard F. Harmon, commanding general of U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area, if his theater could use a division of African-American troops. Harmon was dubious about such troops' effectiveness, and when



asked again in December 1943 his opinion was unchanged, but he reluctantly accepted the African-American Ninety-third Infantry Division. In January 1944 orders were issued sending the division to the Solomon Islands area. By early 1944 the War Department was under increasing criticism for converting combat units to service functions, and the level of criticism escalated following Secretary Stimson's February 19 reply to New York Congressman Hamilton Fish concerning conversion of African-American units. (Marshall [OPD] to Harmon, Radio No. RANE-225, December 23, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-8913)]; Ulysses Lee, *The Employment of Negro Troops*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1966], pp. 471–72, 474–81.)

On the last day of February 1944, the War Department's Advisory Committee on Negro Troop Policies recommended that the army take steps to introduce "qualified colored combat units, as promptly as possible, into battle." The War Department advised Harmon on March 7 that on-going operations on Bougainville appeared to offer an opportunity to utilize elements of the Ninety-third Infantry Division. (John J. McCloy Memorandum for the Secretary of War, February 29, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 291.2]; Marshall [OPD] to Harmon, March 7, 1944, Out Log, p. 21, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Message Log].)

Meanwhile, the First Battalion of the African-American Twenty-fourth Infantry Regiment had been assigned to the Thirty-seventh Infantry Division in a combat zone on Bougainville. On March 12 one of the battalion's patrols became involved in a skirmish with eight Japanese, and accounts of this soon reached U.S. newspapers. (*New York Times*, March 17, 1944, p. 7; Lee, *Employment of Negro Troops*, pp. 497–99.) As a result, Marshall sent the following message. ★

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL MILLARD F. HARMON  
Radio No. RANE-2031. *Secret*

March 18, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

For Harmon's Eyes Only from Marshall. In the use of the 93rd Division or its elements the first time in action, the Secretary of War and I both feel it essential that it not be committed prior to adequate preparation on the part of the unit or units involved. The first reports of its conduct in action undoubtedly will be headlined in this country. It is therefore important that news releases and reports from the theater on the conduct of these troops be strictly factual. The War Department has been under constant pressure for alleged failure to utilize Negro soldiers in a combat capacity. We are very desirous of employing them as soon as practicable and they should have a careful test to determine their battle dependability.



In order that the Secretary of War can be kept fully informed on this question it is desired that you submit a report on the conduct of the troops of this division soon after their initial entry into battle and thereafter from time to time should there be anything in their conduct under fire that warrants comment.<sup>1</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-7514])

1. Harmon responded on March 23 by stating that "all reasonable measures will be taken to insure proper preparedness." The Twenty-fifth Regimental Combat Team of the Ninety-third Division would be deployed at Empress Augusta Bay, where the First Battalion of the Twenty-fourth Infantry Regiment (Colored) had already been committed. Harmon added that no amphibious operations were contemplated with these troops. "Plan contemplates employment on limited offensive operations from base within perimeter with view of mopping up beaten Japanese and interrupting communications to the west and north. Also on combat patrols initially in conjunction with Fiji battalions." (Harmon to Marshall, March 23, 1944, In Log, p. 216, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Message Log].)

A week later Harmon described operations on Bougainville in detail; the Twenty-fifth Regimental Combat Team, possibly supplemented by the Twenty-fourth Infantry Regiment, "should be given ample opportunity for patrolling under experienced leadership before going on their own" and "should be used with increasing tempo in offensive operations of a limited scope and distance from the perimeter." (Harmon to Marshall, March 30, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) For more information about the Twenty-fifth Regimental Combat Team and the First Battalion of the Twenty-fourth Infantry Regiment on Bougainville, see Lee, *Employment of Negro Troops*, pp. 500-515.

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
*Personal and Confidential*

March 20, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Eisenhower: I have felt that we should make a special effort to give you a few more men who have had battle experience and who have demonstrated on this side that they are in an aggressive mood and have developed well in the training program. McNair is going over all of his units, particularly those not due to sail before May to see who among Regimental, Brigade, and Division commanders might be detached from their units and sent over to you to be immediately available as replacements for men regarding whom you have any doubts.

Without waiting for his more detailed report I shall mention the names of two men who I am told are excellent material, Brig. General Edmund B. Seabee, who was Chief of Staff and then a Brigadier General in the Americal Division fighting at Guadalcanal, and Brig. General Robert C. Macon, who is in the 83rd Division due to sail for your command in May, who was in the ~~Tunisian~~ Torch only fighting. I told McNair that I wasn't so much interested in the Ground Forces appreciation of their tactical skill as I was in having sturdy, aggressive fighters who would stand up during moments of adversity. I referred to the fact that we had had to relieve two



Corps commanders in the middle of a landing and we couldn't relieve any more without a most serious loss of prestige. What seemed to be lacking in each case was aggressive qualities, though due to different reasons, Lucas' being fatigue.

If you want either of the above men they will be sent to you immediately. Meanwhile McNair is digging up the names of others in the three grades I mentioned which I shall radio to you, on the basis that you may wish to have them there available for quick assignment where you have any doubts about the aggressive, sturdy fighting capacity of men now on your hands.<sup>1</sup>

I checked up on Terry Allen but McNair is not enthusiastic. He doesn't like Terry's tactics, though to what extent he still has drive, I don't know. I also looked up Alec Stark and found he had gone to the Pacific and was not favorably reported upon.<sup>2</sup>

The point I wish to make is, it is my desire to provide for you all the skill that we can muster for the first four weeks of your battle and you will not be involved in quibbles with G-1 for personnel, but radio to me direct if you have any ideas on the subject.<sup>3</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On March 21 General Marshall sent to Eisenhower a list of major generals, brigadier generals, and colonels who had been selected by Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair for their battle experience and favorable leadership prospects. (Marshall to Eisenhower, Radio No. 349, March 21, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-8872)].)

2. Major General Terry de la M. Allen had been commanding general of the 104th Infantry Division since October 1943. See note 1, Marshall to Kelland, February 5, 1944, p. 266. Brigadier General Alexander N. Stark, Jr., had been regarded by Marshall as "one of the outstanding field soldiers in the Army." Marshall had written in February 1940 that Stark "demonstrated successfully in the War in the Meuse-Argonne, and gave me a peace-time demonstration with the CCC. . . . He, Terry Allen, and one or two others, there are very few of them, are of that unusual type who enthuse all of their subordinates and carry through almost impossible tasks." (*Papers of GCM*, 2: 172.)

3. Eisenhower replied that he would take Macon. (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1795–96.) In January 1944 Macon had assumed command of the Eighty-third Infantry Division. Sebree was assistant division commander of the Thirty-fifth Infantry Division. He accompanied the division to the European Theater of Operations, and he commanded a task force composed mostly of Thirty-fifth Division troops reinforced by tanks and corps artillery in combat at Saint-Lô and Vire in Normandy.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SOMERVELL

March 20, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

I have glanced through this (Tentative Procedures—Discharge and Release from Active Duty) rather sketchily but have gotten a fair idea of what is being done.<sup>1</sup> I am appalled at the number of papers that are



involved, even after your remarkable reduction. I am tremendously interested in the simplification of this.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The pamphlet, a draft of tentative procedures, was enclosed and returned to Somervell with this document.

TO SECOND LIEUTENANT ALLEN T. BROWN

March 21, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

*Dear Allen:* Last night I saw a letter from you to your mother telling of your presence with the New Zealanders. For the past few days we have been reading of their hard fighting around Cassino and the papers have been filled with photographs of the bombardments and destruction. So you are in the thick of things, which I know is much to your taste.<sup>1</sup>

You wrote me a confidential letter some time back about your physical condition. I wish you would send me another, addressed to the Office of the Chief of Staff, giving me another frank account of how you are feeling physically. Another point, you have not mentioned whether or not your connection with me has become public property. Are you still incognito?

Flap and Ruth spent Saturday night and Sunday with us. He looks quite well, having had eight teeth pulled but is on limited service status and is returning to the hospital at Nashville.

Your mother turned her ankle in her bedroom and has it taped up. She was on crutches for part of the first day.

Have just received a report of another island captured from the Japs in the Pacific which effectually pens off some 80,000 who will be left to starve as we are sinking all their vessels and barges. An unusually interesting operation is now under way in Burma where a large force has been landed 150 miles in rear of Japanese lines, with transport, antiaircraft air warning, etc. It is giving them a bad time already with worse to follow I hope.

Our data shows that the bombing over Germany is producing tremendous results in the way of destroying German air, in the air, on the ground and in the factory. The Russians are surging steadily ahead and now are about to enter Bessarabia. The going is very hard where you are but the enemy is having a terrible time all over the world.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/Research File (Family)

1. See note 2, Marshall to Brown, March 1, 1944, p. 320, and note 1, Marshall to Brown, March 11, 1944, p. 336.

2. Marshall's secretary wrote the following at the bottom of this document: "C/S added to this in pen."



MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF  
STAFF, G-3 [PORTER]  
*Secret*

March 21, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

I wish a memorandum prepared for Justice Byrnes from me explaining what has been done and what is being done in relation to manpower economies, beginning with our reduction of 520,000 by the elimination of 12 Divisions, Corps and Army troops.

I wish to have included in this what the Gasser Board has accomplished and what it is in the process of doing abroad; what has been done in the reduction of the Washington garrison; also (1) the transfer of young and trained men out of establishments in the United States to overseas duty (when we started this and approximately how much has been already accomplished), (2) the reduction of the Coast Defense Commands of the Caribbean, Alaska, and Iceland, (3) the reduction of the ASTP, and (4) the reductions that have been accomplished by the AAF, AGF, and ASF.

I want included in the paper the list of deficiencies in Selective Service quotas from the first of July to the present time by month, the increase in age which has occurred, and any similar factors involved in the general question.

I shall need this paper very quickly. It must be drawn so that a civilian can understand what we are talking about. I wish it to make clear the extent to which we have met a demand for a great many units that could not be foreseen on July 1st (attached is a list of those units).<sup>1</sup> Draw up the paper without any regard to secrecy and we will see how to handle that later. I want this thing in triple space.<sup>2</sup>

G. C. M.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Attached was a memorandum from Major General Miller G. White regarding the manpower situation. "In July 1943 the ceiling strength of the Army was reduced to 7,700,000, including female personnel. This cut necessitated the elimination of twelve divisions, plus supporting arms and services, from the troop basis." Subsequent to revision of the troop basis, new demands totaling 715,000 had arisen and were met within the ceiling by personnel economies. The 7,700,000 strength was projected to be reached shortly after April 1, 1944. "At present both combat and service units are still under strength in trained personnel. In short, in spite of rigid, almost desperate, economies, we are three months behind in the training program." (White Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, March 21, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. See Marshall Memorandum for Justice Byrnes, March 23, 1944, pp. 362–65.

**E**FFECTIVE March 1, 1944, the Office of the Director of the Women's Army Corps moved from the Army Service Forces to the General Staff, G-1 Division. The director was authorized to deal directly with other agencies of the War Department without approval of the assistant chief of



staff, G-1. (Colonel Howard E. Kessinger G-1 Office Memorandum, February 26, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 324.5 WAC].) Previously the Army Service Forces had repeatedly disapproved proposals concerning W.A.C. issues that were army-wide, which therefore never reached the General Staff. Severe shortages of W.A.C. uniforms and criticism of the appearance of the uniform, for which the Army Service Forces was responsible, continued to draw more attention. In early 1944 General Marshall expressed his dissatisfaction, especially as it affected recruiting. "In the matter of public relations," writes W.A.C. historian Treadwell, "a rapid deterioration had been noted after the Army Service Forces took over operating duties" when the W.A.A.C. became the W.A.C. (Treadwell, *Women's Army Corps*, pp. 269–72. See Marshall Memorandum for the Bureau of Public Relations, January 26, 1944, pp. 246–48.)

Adding fuel to the fire, the director's move had not been completed when the Meek Report reached the chief of staff. Authored by Samuel W. Meek—a member of an advertising agency that was a competitor of the firm that handled advertising for the Women's Army Corps—the report criticized the operation of the W.A.C. program, "alleging that Director Hobby and her advertising advisers had overlooked many obvious means of improving recruitment, had failed to improve the WAC uniform, and had allowed the WAC to fall far below the WAVES in public esteem." The charges proved unfounded, but no one disputed the statement about the W.A.C. uniform, which Gallup polls had reported few women preferred. (Ibid., pp. 272–74.)

Director Oveta Culp Hobby studied the charges and prepared recommendations. In a preliminary report Colonel Hobby stated that "the two greatest deterrents to WAC recruiting are the attitude of soldiers toward women in the military services and apathy of unmarried non-working women. The Gallup survey developed that 60% of the unmarried non-working women interviewed felt that their present occupation was more important than joining one of the military services." She recommended that both President Roosevelt and General Marshall make a radio talk or speech to emphasize the need for women in the military services. She also recommended making short orientation films in addition to a recruiting film showing the chief of staff promoting the Women's Army Corps. (Hobby Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, March 16, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 324.5 WAC].) ★

STATEMENT FOR WOMEN'S ARMY CORPS  
RECRUITING CAMPAIGN

[March 21, 1944]  
[Washington, D.C.]

It is important that the general public understand the Army's urgent



need for women to enable the military effort to go forward according to the schedule of operations in prospect. As the Army sends more and more trained men to front line duty, we have to depend more and more upon *women* to take their places.

The Womens Army Corps is an integral part of the Army. Not only are there many jobs that women do as efficiently as men, but there are also jobs that women can do better than men.

Aside from urgent family obligations, enlistment in the military services takes precedence over any other responsibility. I am confident that American women will answer this call to duty.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See Marshall Memorandum on Women's Army Corps, April 6, 1944, pp. 390–91.

TO RAY BEALL COLL

March 22, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Ray, When I received your letter of March eighth I tried to remember when was the last time I had seen you. I don't believe I have seen you since your marriage, possibly I may have seen you about 1905. In any event I was glad to regain touch with you.<sup>1</sup>

I had the status of Lieutenant Coll looked into with a view to his being changed to an aviation engineering assignment. I find that he is a first pilot in the crew of a bomb group and to reassign him at this particular time would mean another first pilot would have to be assigned in his place which would delay the readiness of his crew. Due to the advanced state of the training of his particular unit and because of the urgent demand for men overseas, the Air people tell me that it would be to the disadvantage of the Service to accomplish his transfer at this particular time.

I am sorry that I cannot give a more favorable answer to your letter. However, I seldom ever personally intervene in such matters, otherwise there would be either complete confusion or great embarrassments.

Thank you for your gracious reference to me, and with warm regards to you and Charlie, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Ray Beall Coll, who was living in Montreal, was a friend of the family from Marshall's youth. She had written to Marshall requesting that her nephew, a first lieutenant in the Air Corps, be considered for transfer to an Air Service Command where his training in aeronautical engineering might be better utilized. He was presently assigned as a pilot on a B-17 in a bombardment squadron.



MEMORANDUM FOR JUSTICE BYRNES

March 23, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Manpower.<sup>1</sup>

In early 1943 the Army had an authorized ceiling of ..... 8,248,000 which was to be reached by 31 December 1943 and which was considered essential to meet planned operations.

In June 1943 the War Department accepted the hazard of a reduction in planned combat strength of 12 divisions plus corps, Army and service troops totaling ..... 548,000  
thus giving a new ceiling of ..... 7,700,000

This new ceiling which was to be reached by 31 December 1943 did not provide for reserves against unexpected demands or plans. These we hoped could be met by drastic economies.

The following additional requirements developed since 1 July 1943, have had to be met:

- |  |               |
|--|---------------|
| a. Increase in long range bomber program to exploit the demonstrated possibilities of the new long range bomber (B-29) .....   | 37,000        |
| b. Increase in air supporting services to step up the bomber offensive from England and to support the long range B-29 bomber program .....  | 107,000       |
| c. Increase in artillery support for Ground Force combat divisions to provide additional fire power by increasing the amount of medium and heavy field artillery .....   | 24,000        |
| d. Increase in supporting service troops to support <i>accelerated</i> Ground Force operations in China-Burma-India and in the Mediterranean area .....  | 93,000        |
| e. Increase in service troops to support <i>expanded</i> planned operations in the European Theater of Operations, in North Africa and China-Burma-India .....   | 238,000       |
| f. Increase in replacements required (and in additional training time found needed to prepare them) based on our combat experience to date and on higher estimates of anticipated losses. (Battlefield casualties due to sickness have been larger than anticipated) ..... | 79,000        |
| g. Establishment of a rotational pool to permit return of men with more than two year's overseas service .....   | 72,000        |
| h. Increase in overhead requirements of overseas theaters  | 55,000        |
| i. Increase in long term hospital cases (over 60 days) .....   | <u>10,000</u> |
| Total new demands  | 715,000       |



These increased demands were met by the following adjustments and economies:

<i>a.</i> Reduction in the Army Air Force replacement and student training program. (The Air Force attrition and loss rate has not been as high as expected, but in this item we are gambling on the length of the war.) . . . . .	108,000
<i>b.</i> Reduction in the Army Air Force training establishment in the United States . . . . .	130,000
<i>c.</i> Reduction in the Army Ground Force School and Training system . . . . .	39,000
<i>d.</i> Reduction in the Army Service Force overhead. (This includes reducing station complement and housekeeping troops whose work is to be performed as additional duties by Ground Force troops in training.) . . . . .	112,000
<i>e.</i> Reduction in the Army Specialized Training Program (College Program) . . . . .	120,000
<i>f.</i> Savings effected through downward revision of tables of organization. (Many combat and service units will be required to do the same work with fewer men.) . . . . .	102,000
<i>g.</i> Reduction in defense garrisons. (This includes the coast defense commands of the east and west coasts and the garrisons in the Caribbean, Alaska and Iceland.) . . . . .	79,000
<i>h.</i> Miscellaneous minor economies . . . . .	25,000
Total	715,000

To meet these new demands of 715,000 strained the War Department to the limit of its resources. However, on top of this the Army has had to cope with the failure of Selective Service to deliver inductees in accordance with quotas as requested. The following table compares quotas called for by the Army with actual deliveries by Selective Service:

	<u>* Call</u>	<u>** Inducted</u>	<u>Deficit</u>
July, 1943	235,000	194,000	41,000
August	175,000	131,000	44,000
September	175,000	122,000	53,000
October	160,000	113,000	47,000
November	175,000	118,000	57,000
December	165,000	111,000	54,000
January, 1944	160,000	118,000	42,000
February	160,000	# 26,000	134,000

\* Continental United States only.



\*\* Excludes about 15,000 Puerto Ricans inducted under special calls.

# This reflects transition from policy of granting a 3-week furlough after induction to the policy of preinduction examination.

By virtue of the lag in induction the strength of the Army on 31 December 1943 was 7,482,000, a deficiency of 218,000 under the planned figure. This shortage will not be made up until around 1 April 1944 and because of this the Army has lost three months of vital training time for units which are needed for operations in the immediate future. This delay is particularly serious because we have a timetable of operations which we must adhere to and, if possible, advance the dates.

Added to our problems is the fact that the Army is growing older at an alarming rate. During the first half of 1943 the average age of men supplied by Selective Service was 22.8 years but during the second half of 1943 this average age had jumped to 25.2 years. At the end of 1943 the average age of the Army was 25 years compared to the average enlisted age of 23.6 years for the Navy and 22.1 years for the Marine Corps. Of the approximately 626,000 eighteen-year-olds in the armed services the Army has 228,000; the Navy, 347,000; and the Marine Corps, 51,000. In addition, the Navy and the Marine Corps are exploiting the 17-year-old group, of which the Navy now has approximately 101,000; and the Marine Corps, 8,000. This, of course, will reduce the next 18-year-old class. All of the armed forces recognize how important it is to have hardened young men in their combat forces.

This narrative should not be interpreted as an Army complaint concerning intolerable burdens. Instead, it should be considered as a record of the adjustments that we have made. In mid-1943 the Army reduced its needs by 550,000 and in so doing felt that it had made its maximum possible contribution to the manpower problem. Since that time additional demands totaling 715,000 troops have arisen and have been met by further economies not previously thought possible and by making every possible adjustment which the favorable strategic situation has permitted. A great part of these personnel economies has been made possible by the detailed surveys of the War Department Manpower Board (created in February 1943) which is now in North Africa to determine what streamlining can be effected in the administrative establishments in that theater. Selective Service's delay has imposed a three months' time lag in the training of 200,000 men at a period when every week in sailings is of vital importance.

The Army will continue to make every possible manpower economy. As the war moves on, activities which are no longer necessary will be ruthlessly cut. The Army, I believe, has the right to expect similar action from the rest of the nation.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)



1. See Marshall Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, March 21, 1944, p. 359. The first page of Marshall's handwritten draft for the beginning of this memorandum for James F. Byrnes, director of the Office of War Mobilization, is in the Marshall papers. Marshall also edited the typewritten draft.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LEWIS, DISTRICT  
OF WASHINGTON

March 23, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

I had luncheon with Mr. Morgenthau<sup>1</sup> today at which we had a long discussion over manpower. Just as I left I brought up the question of the Palace Guard, the Engineers out at Myer, the Anti-Aircraft around Washington. Mr. Morgenthau said that he would like very much to have older men and wounded men from overseas, etc., assigned to that unit. I told him that was the policy, and he replied that he had seen no evidence of it. Please inform me regarding this.

Mr. Morgenthau would like to see you, so please call him up and arrange an appointment. He indicated a willingness to cooperate with me to reduce the number of men around Washington. I told him of criticism leveled at me for having so many soldiers in Washington. I think you may be able to effect material reductions and I wish you to do it if you possibly can, because in this present manpower fight every visible soldier is used against me and the soldiers in conspicuous positions around town are constantly referred to by manufacturers, politicians and government administrators who are opposed to requirements now being imposed by the Army.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Henry Morgenthau, Jr., was secretary of the treasury.
2. Major General John T. Lewis, commanding general of the Military District of Washington, D.C., replied on May 15 that the White House guard detachment had been cut in half and all guards had been removed from the Capitol. The Engineer Company (Colored) assigned to the White House was undergoing training for reassignment elsewhere. The antiaircraft troops had been reduced by over one-half, and the Operations Division was considering the status of the remaining group. (Lewis Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, May 15, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 320.2].)

TO ADMIRAL LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN  
*Secret*

March 23, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mountbatten: Your further expression in your letter of January thirty-first of appreciation of the work of Wheeler and Wedemeyer was gratifying to me. Wheeler's promotion, on your recommendation, was effected shortly after his arrival here.<sup>1</sup>



Wedemeyer has made a fine contribution in the higher staff levels of our joint and combined organizations. The rotation of capable top staff officers to command duties is a constant problem. Wedemeyer should receive a command assignment in due course, but I am always confronted with the necessity to disregard personal considerations because of the great importance of having outstanding men, with a full background, in the important staff positions.

Conferences here with your people have been most informative and helpful. Their statements concerning your problems have clarified the situation and have given us a much better appreciation of your proposals. Support from Asia for our Pacific operations towards their first major objective in the Luzon-Formosa-China coast area, calls for exercise of imaginative and forceful action in your theater.

We have recently received copies of the final agreements covering the establishment of a single controller over the Port of Calcutta and the establishment of better control and unification of the Calcutta-Assam Lines of Communications. Those steps should help materially in solving a most difficult problem.

Dill and I have almost daily consultations on matters pertaining to your theater. Incidentally, he showed me the fine commendation you issued regarding operations on the Ledo Road.<sup>2</sup> While I appreciate very much your doing this, what I was after was a release to the press of a statement by you on the Ledo success to offset the previous U.S. press statements regarding you and Stilwell.<sup>3</sup>

With my best wishes and hopes for you in your current operations, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Raymond A. Wheeler had delivered Admiral Mountbatten's January 31 letter to the War Department when he arrived in Washington in early February. Departing from Washington on March 25 or 26 for his return trip to Southeast Asia, Wheeler delivered General Marshall's March 23 reply. Mountbatten praised Wheeler's "splendid job" and recommended his promotion to lieutenant general, which was granted effective February 21. He also praised the work of Major General Albert C. Wedemeyer, his deputy chief of staff, and recommended that Wedemeyer eventually be assigned to an active command. "Thanks to Wedemeyer and Wheeler I can honestly say there can be no happier or more efficient Anglo-American Staff in the world to-day. I am confident that they are capable of directing the largest scale operations successfully if given the chance." (Mountbatten to Marshall, January 31, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) For Mountbatten's previous praise of Wheeler and Wedemeyer in his January 16 letter, see note 1, Marshall to Mountbatten, January 26, 1944, p. 250.

2. On March 18 Sir John Dill had sent to Marshall a message from Mountbatten which included Mountbatten's order of the day that praised the efforts of American and Chinese forces on the Ledo front, whose "successes in a series of encounters with the enemy are gaining you much honour and renown. . . . You (\*who are\*) fighting on the LEDO front, pushing forward the LEDO road, are playing a magnificent part in assuring our joint victory. During my recent visit I have seen for myself the courage and spirit you displayed



under the gallant leadership of GENERAL STILWELL and I shall remember with pride the days that I spent with you." Dill sent the handwritten note: "Dickie Mountbatten has certainly let himself go!" (Dill to Marshall, March 18, [1944], and attached Mountbatten to Dill, March 18, [1944], GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. Negative publicity concerning a lack of harmony between Stilwell and Mountbatten with regard to future strategy for the Southeast Asia Command had appeared in the press, particularly in the February 14 and 28 issues of *Time* magazine. (See Marshall to Stilwell, March 1, 1944, pp. 321–23.) "I am at a loss to understand the penultimate paragraph," Mountbatten replied on April 24. He informed Marshall that his order of the day to the Ledo forces had been released on March 20 by public relations to all correspondents in Delhi. "Enquiries have confirmed that it was despatched in full on the same day by Reuters and United Press which I believe is the second largest of the U S News Agencies. It also appeared in the C.B.I. paper 'Round up'[,] the Press of INDIA and was broadcast by the B.B.C. [British Broadcasting Corporation]. It was NOT filed by the Associated Press although their Representative, PRESTON GRAVER [*Grover*], was present in DELHI. As the statement was filed by the United Press I cannot understand why it should NOT have appeared in the U S papers, nor why the Associated Press, the largest of the U S Agencies should NOT have filed it." (Mountbatten to Marshall, Radio No. SAC 1835, April 24, [1944], NA/RG 165 [OPD, 384 CTO].)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR  
*Confidential*

March 23, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Subject: Congressional Relations.

We are approaching a very critical period on the Hill which makes the matter of our relationship with the members of Congress all the more important. At the present time the Legislative and Liaison Division handles all matters relating to legislation and a representative of Judge Patterson, with associates in his office, is in charge of War Department relations with congressional investigating committees.<sup>1</sup> Existing instructions require coordination but in actual practice, I believe, the pressure of business has created two independent agencies, which is fundamentally unsound.

Legislation and investigation are so interwoven that I believe it not advisable to handle them as separate issues, that is, by different organizations. The present system of dual liaison has been in effect over an extended period and I believe with increasing confusion in our relationship with Congress. This matter has been brought to my attention in a number of cases by members of Congress and also by General Persons, who is in charge of the Legislative and Liaison Division.<sup>2</sup>

The problem involves such a critical relationship for the coming months that I wish you would consider the rearrangement of the existing dual organization. In this connection I should like to say that there is an immense amount of business done in handling matters and in protecting us



from complications on the Hill that is of great importance to our conduct of the war.

G. C. Marshall

NA/RG 107 (SW Safe, Staff)

1. Special Assistant to the Secretary of War Julius H. Amberg, with associates in Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson's office, handled War Department relations with congressional investigating committees.

2. Brigadier General Wilton B. Persons was chief of the Legislative and Liaison Division.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL OSBORN<sup>1</sup>

March 23, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

I read through Part II of "America Goes to War" and made some rough notes on the manuscript. I then sent it to OPD to check and you will find attached to my memorandum to them, their comments. I have read these hurriedly and they appear to be sound. However, there may be some that are of a too meticulous nature. Use your own judgment in this.

It is imperative that you keep my name out of these War Department films, otherwise I am bound to be subjected to attack for publicizing myself.

My other comment is that we cannot go into post-war political aspects. Just what the differentiation is between political post-war and other post-war matters is difficult to define, I admit, but the utmost care will have to be taken with this, otherwise the whole business of War Department films will be suppressed by action of Congress.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Major General Frederick H. Osborn was director of the Morale Services Division.

2. For Marshall's reply to one charge that the War Department was producing Roosevelt administration propaganda films, see *Papers of GCM*, 3: 538-39.

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN

March 23, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Senator Truman, I received your letter regarding General Lowe and of course shall drop the matter of his assignment to the War Depart-



ment Separations Board.<sup>1</sup> It was suggested because he appeared to be the only available general officer with suitable qualifications and background for service on the Board at this time.

The other question raised in your letter, as to why General Lowe was relieved from the Office Chief of Staff and detailed as a member of the General Staff and placed in the Civil Agencies Group, was simply an administrative matter. In our efforts to meet the manpower requirements everyone has been forced to rigid economies and my office is no exception—as a matter of fact it has more or less to be the model. I found that I was charged in the surveys, for convenience of administrative bookkeeping, with men on duty as far off as India and with all those scattered about Washington, on a wide variety of duties over which I had little or absolutely no control. The decision was then made that the Office Chief of Staff and General Staff list should be held to a rigid accuracy and the hundreds of other officers accounted for in some other manner, one more accurately related to their services. As the result of these instructions, General Lowe was placed in the Civil Agencies Group along with a large number of other officers.

A possible solution to your objection would be to reassign General Lowe to the General Staff, placing him back in the Legislative and Liaison Division and designating him as the Liaison officer with your Committee. While it is my personal opinion that the present arrangement is more suitable, if you prefer the alternative I shall have the necessary orders issued.<sup>2</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Senator Truman replied to Marshall's letter to Brigadier General Frank E. Lowe asking him to represent the Reserve officers' interests on the Secretary of War's Separations Board. (See Marshall to Lowe, March 16, 1944, pp. 350–51.) "I am constrained to declare him non-available at this time," Truman responded. "You will recall that the present position of Executive to this Committee was established by reason of my conferences with you in the summer of 1942; that I made no suggestion as to personnel and that General Lowe was your selection. The Committee is wholly satisfied; General Lowe has had nineteen months experience; the volume of work is increasing, will in my opinion continue to increase, and I cannot approve transfers except they be for combat service assignment." (Truman to Marshall, March 20, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Truman replied that he was pleased and grateful that General Marshall would make no change in Lowe's assignment. Concerning Lowe's status in the War Department, Truman wrote that "your thought and position is clear to me and I have no desire to increase your present load by adding a relatively minor administrative matter. I have discussed the present set-up with General Lowe who points out that there is no change in the policy which permits him to see you when necessary and that is the important thing. He has recommended that no further action be taken and that is my decision." (Truman to Marshall, April 19, 1944, *ibid.*) On July 25 Major General Charles D. Herron informed Marshall that the Bryden Board was still overloaded with Regulars and National Guard officers. (Herron to Marshall, July 25, 1944, *ibid.*)



TO SECOND LIEUTENANT ALLEN T. BROWN

March 24, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

*Dear Allen,* Your mother, Allene, and Molly have been very busy socially the last few days despite your mother's sprained ankle. They did the symphony, a Chinese party, and a movie, and today are lunching somewhere else. I think your mother has enjoyed this because she had been leading a monastic life for quite a long time, and getting quite stale.

I am off tomorrow on a trip involving some water flight.<sup>1</sup> I enjoy thoroughly getting away from Washington. The only trouble is that by the time I return problems and troubles have so accumulated that I am under heavy pressure from the hour of my arrival here. Just at the moment I should like a few hours rest. I suppose this will continue and probably grow worse until we get to the end of this business.

I have been examining some very interesting air photographs of the Cassino region and the connecting valleys up to the beachhead. That is difficult country but it is the sort of country where the defender always digs in. I am hopeful that a little sun and blue sky will cheer things up, particularly since all the advantage in air will go to our side. Mud is a great depressant in war, almost as great as long waits for something to happen. I never saw but one battle on a pretty day and that was followed by a heavy period of rain. However, they had beautiful weather for the finale in Tunisia which enabled the air and the tanks to move with great effect.

First signs of green are showing on some of the willow trees along the river and I think two or three warm days will bring everything out. I imagine the season up around your place in Poughkeepsie is several weeks later than Washington, at least two and probably three. I can imagine your longing to get back to those surroundings, not to mention the family.

We are having a hard fight here over personnel shortages, the month by month failure of the Selective Service Act to give us the men according to the schedule. If you get press releases you will probably know something about this. It is a hard battle, with each industry and each locality opposing the stern requirements of the situation.

Molly is expecting to go back to Leesburg about the first of April with your mother. She is also counting on spending a couple of weeks in early June at Fire Island. Affectionately,

GCMRL/Research File (Family)

1. General Marshall accompanied General Henry H. Arnold on a three-day trip to Bermuda. He took Sir John Dill along, and he and Dill were guests of the governor-general and his wife, Lord and Lady Burghley. See Marshall to Lady Burghley, March 29, 1944, p. 379.



MEMORANDUM FOR FIELD MARSHAL  
SIR JOHN DILL  
*Secret*

March 24, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Dill: Under present stipulations from London Budapest and Ploesti are not to be bombed.

I wish you would examine a railroad map of the *main* lines which connect up the Lwow (Limburgh)-Bucharest front. Two things would seem to be apparent, one is the vast importance to the Germans of the railroad center at Budapest and the other is the almost equal importance to the Germans of the oil supply at Ploesti to provide for that part of the front from Odessa to Lwow, particularly if the Budapest rail center is put out of action.

I should be interested to learn why the present instructions regarding Budapest and Ploesti were given. If it is merely political it would seem that the political considerations should be weighed most carefully against the tremendous military importance of the two factors I have mentioned above.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On March 28 Dill sent to Marshall and to General Henry H. Arnold a message that he had received from British Chief of the Air Staff Sir Charles Portal. "Ban on bombing Hungary was imposed on 20th March by War Cabinet from desire that anti-German elements then in communication with Foreign Office should have every chance to stage resistance to occupation," Portal informed Dill. "It was therefore largely a political decision. In view of present situation I am seeking immediate removal of ban and thereafter Wilson's attention will be drawn to the importance attached to Budapest railway centre." Opposition to the bombing of Ploesti had been decided on military grounds. According to Portal, destruction of the refineries which were widely dispersed precision targets would require better weather than anticipated and would take away more effort than could be spared from Italy and POINTBLANK. Secondly, attack of Bucharest would most likely have more effect on the passage of oil from Rumanian fields than an effort aimed at the refineries, and it would politically damage German interests. (Portal to Dill, March 25, 1944, attached to Dill to Marshall, March 28, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MCNAIR<sup>1</sup>  
*Confidential*

March 24, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

I have talked to a number of officers who have been through the fighting in Italy and two days ago I had a lengthy conversation with General Wilbur. He summed up in rather concise, logical fashion, what they all have implied to me regarding the training of our young officers and squad and section leaders, that too much dependence has been placed on their



individual estimates of the situation as to what is to be done on the battlefield, and they have not been given enough routine procedure to carry them through the first shocks of battle.

This is almost identical with the situation we found in the First Division in France, though here it was a divisional matter instead of a small unit affair; and we only solved the difficulty by having a set piece arrangement of troops for attack which guaranteed, so far as possible, that we could feed the men in battle twice a day and could communicate with the leading units. I saw the messes in other divisions in the Meuse-Argonne where a blueprint procedure was followed rather than a realistic appreciation of the extreme difficulties of maintaining communications and feeding people and keeping up the momentum.

Wilbur told me that he talked to you about it and explained the training they had developed in the 36th Division and some other units in Italy and that you seemed rather favorably inclined, but when he talked to your staff officers they felt that the present system of training was satisfactory.<sup>2</sup> From all I have heard I am not in agreement with them and I shall want to talk to you and to the responsible staff officers about this next week.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair was commanding general of Army Ground Forces.

2. Brigadier General William H. Wilbur had been relieved as assistant division commander of the Thirty-sixth Division. (See note 1, Marshall to Devers, February 18, 1944, p. 311.) Wilbur was assigned to the Presidio of San Francisco in June 1944 as chief of staff of the Western Defense Command.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSEPH W. STILWELL  
Radio No. WARX-13850. *Secret*

March 24, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

To General Stilwell for his eyes only from General Marshall. Dear Stilwell: We have been considering the Burma problem with the U S Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the past 2 days. A few moments ago I read Mountbatten's message giving your estimate on the probabilities and possibilities of the Ledo Road force before the commencement of the monsoon.<sup>1</sup> I also reviewed my recent messages to you, particularly one regarding the delegation of authority for Sultan to deal immediately and directly with Mountbatten and then the U S Chiefs of Staff regarding air transport diversions.<sup>2</sup> I have now come to this conclusion in the effort to find some way to improve the abnormal command relationships in the south east Asia and in the China theaters: It seems to me that so long as you feel it necessary personally to exercise command and leadership of the Ledo Road force, Sultan should have delegated to him



authority to act directly with Mountbatten in practically all matters, subject to the policies that you have established. I don't know Sultan well and don't know how well you know him but from what I am told he is a very levelheaded, loyal, dependable individual, and inclined to be self-effacing, therefore the type of man who would not abuse such delegated authority.

It therefore seems to me that some such arrangement as that proposed above should be made by you on your apparent initiative. Otherwise we are in a very difficult position in supporting you as Deputy Commander of the South East Asia Theater when you are remote from the officer charged with responsibilities for that theater and are independent of him in a great many matters of vital importance.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Mountbatten's letter to which Marshall refers is not in the Marshall papers. General Marshall met with Lieutenant General Raymond A. Wheeler in his office at noon and attended a Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting at 2:30 P.M. on March 24. At the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting the chiefs discussed strategy in Southeast Asia. Sir John Dill informed the group that Admiral Mountbatten could not undertake the capture of the Myitkyina area unless "considerably more air transport were available." General Arnold said that he was forming four new groups of transport aircraft (four hundred planes) which could be sent to Southeast Asia starting in July. (Supplementary Minutes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Meeting, March 24, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS 334, CCS Minutes].) At the March 21 meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Wheeler and Major General Albert C. Wedemeyer were questioned regarding strategy in the Southeast Asia Command. (Supplementary Minutes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, March 21, 1944, *ibid.*, JCS Minutes.)

2. For information regarding delegation of authority to Major General Daniel I. Sultan and temporary diversion of transport aircraft, see Marshall to Stilwell, March 17, 1944, p. 354.

3. On March 29 Stilwell sent the following reply: "Ref. your msg. on delegation of authority. This has been in effect for some time. Sultan will be given any authority he needs to speed up action on all dealings with S.E.A.C. Hearn has similar authority on matters affecting dealings with the Chinese. Neither Hearn nor Sultan is restricted except on matters of established policy." (Riley Sunderland and Charles F. Romanus, eds., *Stilwell's Personal File: China-Burma-India, 1942-1944*, 5 vols. [Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1976], 4: 1554.) Major General Thomas G. Hearn (U.S.M.A., 1915) was chief of staff of U.S. Army Forces, C.B.I.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY<sup>1</sup>

*Top Secret*

March 25, 1944

[Washington, D.C.]

To confirm what I told you yesterday afternoon:

During my absence, and I am due back Tuesday morning—possibly Monday afternoon,<sup>2</sup> I trust to your judgment in committing me to my decisions regarding the ANVIL-OVERLORD. I think it is important that we



act promptly, and therefore I do not want my absence to delay matters and I am quite certain that your view will be a sound one.

Should anything come up, make clear to your Naval opposites that you have the authority to act in my name. The same applies to matters pertaining to India-Burma-China.

Incidentally, I sent you a draft of the radio for Stilwell yesterday afternoon with a note to dispatch it if it appeared o.k. to you. I failed to state that it should be for his eyes only, because it would be unfortunate to have Sultan read this message.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Major General Thomas T. Handy was the assistant chief of staff, Operations Division.
2. General Marshall went to Bermuda for the weekend. See note 1, Marshall to Brown, March 24, 1944, p. 370.
3. See the previous document.

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. WAR-14078. *Top Secret*

March 25, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

TopSec for General Eisenhower personal and eyes only from General Marshall. In the discussion yesterday regarding the proposed directive covering OVERLORD-ANVIL-Italy, we proposed that once the beachhead and the 5th Army front have joined, the major concern in the Mediterranean is to prepare for a later ANVIL, July 10th as the target date, and that Rome would not be considered a primary effort to the disadvantage of the proposed ANVIL. Dill indicated the British would view this with concern because of the political importance of Rome.<sup>1</sup>

Our view is that the chances of the Germans holding and fighting on a broad front are greater south of Rome than north of Rome. Also Wilson's appreciation of what he could do in joining up the bridgehead by May 15th and taking Rome by June 15th, reflects so pessimistic a view that it weighed heavily in our consideration of the importance of making Rome an immediate objective.<sup>2</sup>

What we are afraid of is the Germans instituting an economical delaying action up to the Pisa-Rimini line, reasonably secure in the knowledge that we are not set for operations elsewhere in the Mediterranean.

We have recommended to the British Chiefs of Staff that to meet your requirements for OVERLORD there be transferred from the Mediterranean to the UK 26 LST, 40 LCI (L), 1 LSH (Bulolo), 1 LSE and 1 LSD. All of these craft except 12 LST to arrive by April 30th, the remaining 12 LST to arrive by May 15th. We have also recommended the transfer of 3 U.S. Fighter Groups and 7 British Spitfire Squadrons.



In all of this, understand that our proposal for July 10th ANVIL involves diverting to the Mediterranean, landing craft due to leave for Pacific in late May and June in order to provide at least a two-division lift for ANVIL. We will not make this diversion which means a serious delay in the Pacific with the possibility of losing our momentum unless some sizable operation of the nature of ANVIL is on the books. The importance of Rome in comparison to this other factor appears to us to weigh light in the balance.

Suggest you keep in contact with British Chiefs of Staff rather than wait until they have again come to a conclusion regarding our proposal of yesterday.<sup>3</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-14078])

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff met in Washington on March 24, 1944, where they discussed ANVIL in reference to the situation in Italy. Field Marshal Sir John Dill suggested that the capture of Rome would have important psychological effects, and that if the Germans made a major effort to defend the city then increased commitments to the Italian front would have the same effect as ANVIL, that is, the diversion of enemy forces from the OVERLORD front. According to the minutes of the meeting, Dill believed that “the operation proposed against the south of France in July had certain attractions but, he felt, it was debatable whether this was right either politically or militarily.” (Supplementary Minutes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Meeting, March 24, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS 334, CCS Minutes].)

2. General Marshall stated during the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on March 24 that General Wilson’s time estimates for the capture of Rome “were unduly pessimistic.” Admiral King pointed out that General Wilson’s latest statements indicated that the forces he considered necessary to take Rome would preclude even the possibility of a delayed ANVIL. (Ibid.) Wilson had submitted to the British Chiefs of Staff his view that he continue the battle in Italy to capture Rome and its airfields, thereafter “to concentrate on intensive operations up the mainland of Italy.” He advised that ANVIL be canceled. (Wilson to British Chiefs of Staff, MEDCOS 73, March 21, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 10, Item 52b].)

3. Eisenhower responded on March 27, informing Marshall of the position adopted by the British Chiefs of Staff. They agreed that there was “no particular geographical location, including Rome,” that should have higher priority in the Mediterranean theater before operations designed to create “maximum support to OVERLORD.” In Italy current operations should be directed toward the union of the Anzio beachhead and the main Italian front. There was general agreement that in the Mediterranean about early July 1944 the Allies would launch an amphibious two-division assault with follow-up divisions in support of OVERLORD. Eisenhower suggested that final decisions depended in some measure on German actions. If the Germans elected to move north and institute delaying action up to the Pisa-Rimini line, then the strongest possible ANVIL must take place. If the Germans attempted to hold their present position south of Rome, however, then the British felt that more Allied commitment to an Italian ground campaign would be needed and the decision respecting ANVIL would have to be delayed until the situation in Italy stabilized. He had read to the British Chiefs of Staff Marshall’s proposal to divert landing craft from the Pacific to the Mediterranean, only if a strong ANVIL operation was planned. Eisenhower told the chief of staff that, from his viewpoint, the only reason the British Chiefs were reluctant to agree to Marshall’s proposal was “the fear that there might be a situation existing in the Mediterranean around early July which would indicate some other place than that generally proposed for ANVIL as the best for launching the projected operation, but they fully agree that a sizeable amphibious operation will be essential.” Eisenhower



reminded the British that ANVIL could possibly be executed solely with French divisions provided with Allied naval, air, and logistical support. (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1792-94.) The British Chiefs opposed making a commitment to a definitely planned ANVIL because the German situation might change by July. They suggested waiting until early June to review the situation. (Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944*, pp. 424-25. For discussion of this phase of the ANVIL debate, see John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, volume 5, *August 1943-September 1944*, a volume in the *History of the Second World War* [London: HMSO, 1956], pp. 245-59.)

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN

March 25, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Senator Truman: I received the joint invitation from you and Mr. Wadsworth to Mrs. Marshall and me to serve on the Committee of Invitation for the presentation of "The Forgotten Factor".<sup>1</sup> Since receipt of your letter I have given the matter very careful consideration.

Mrs. Marshall and I have some familiarity with the affair because the prime movers and some of the actors have been guests in our house at Fort Myer and have talked over the various presentations that they have made and that they plan to make, as well as their work in general. I am inclined to the opinion that for me to be sponsoring a presentation having almost solely to do with relations between capital and labor is inadvisable, however worthy or excellent the presentation.<sup>2</sup>

My mail gives me constant evidence of the resentment of people to my participation by way of endorsement, public statement, or otherwise, in matters not strictly pertaining to the military establishment, and I agree with these people. Nevertheless from time to time I have felt a compelling necessity in connection with the affairs of the Army to have something to say about outside matters, but in each instance it was a matter of great regret to me to take such action. Therefore I question the propriety of my being a sponsor for the presentation of "The Forgotten Factor".

Mr. Wadsworth has spoken to me regarding this over the telephone and I have had a note from Admiral Byrd urging me to lend my name to the invitation list.<sup>3</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Senator Truman and Congressman James W. Wadsworth, Jr., had invited the Marshalls to serve on the invitation committee for the Washington premiere of a "unique drama of industrial teamwork" presented by members of Moral Rearmament. "Written from experience in the industrial field by workers in Moral Re-Armament, it points an answer to our most serious home-front problem," wrote Truman and Wadsworth. (Truman and Wadsworth to Marshall, March 21, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. For Marshall's previous contact with the Moral Rearmament movement in April 1943, see *Papers of GCM*, 3: 646-47.



3. Marshall sent Wadsworth a copy of his answer to Senator Truman, with the following note: "I am sorry not to do as you urge but I believe I am right." Rear Admiral Richard E. Byrd (U.S.N.A., 1912) had written, "I feel sure that you could not make a mistake in giving a lift to this very splendid cause." Marshall replied by sending Byrd a copy of his answer to Truman, along with the note: "I am sorry not to go along with you but I believe I am right in not doing so." (Marshall to Wadsworth, March 25, 1944, Byrd to Marshall, March 23, 1944, and Marshall to Byrd, March 25, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JACOB L. DEVERS  
Radio. *Secret*

March 25, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

For Devers' eyes only from Marshall. Colonel William T. Sexton, late Secretary of the War Department General Staff is en route to your theatre. He has taken course at Sill and been assigned to a division during recent Louisiana maneuvers. I now want him attached to a U. S. division in the line in Italy not as a liaison officer or observer but as member of division on duty with artillery. His assignment is to be made without regard to his rank, that is, he can be made subordinate to a junior in rank. What I want is to give him the experience in fighting as a final step to offset his long service to me here in the office. Thereafter he is on his own. You can keep him or we will assign him to a division training in U.S.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Sexton was assigned as commanding officer of the artillery brigade of the Third Infantry Division.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

March 29, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Induction of IV-F men.

From what I can learn following a very brief survey of the situation, it would be inadvisable for the War Department to recommend to the Congress the suggested procedure of inducting IV-F men who did not seek employment in essential industries. The principal objections, as I understand it, follow:

In the first place, we are now approaching the saturation point on limited service men and the moment we reach our ceiling of 7,700,000 (about April 15) the intention is to cease induction of limited service men and utilize returned wounded men and other



similarly partially disqualified men in the Zone of the Interior. This has two advantages, the principal one being that the man has already had his basic training as well as more experience and further, that he has served the Government at a sacrifice and is therefore fully entitled to all the benefits that accrue to a veteran. To use the limited service man means he must have his preliminary training of at least six weeks and he then is probably much less well fitted for the work than the men by then returned from arduous service, wounds, etc., overseas.

The next and possibly most serious objection is that we would in effect stultify the approved action of the President on the recent Combined Committee to reexamine the physical standards. This, because the Committee was firmly opposed to a further reduction for sound reasons, and to turn to the acceptance of the IV-F men means a lowering of standard even below that of the present limited service men. We would probably have the result that many of these IV-F men would prefer to work laggardly at Army jobs and enjoy all the benefits of veteran legislation; we would be getting lowered efficiency compared to returned men from overseas who must be expected in large numbers very shortly; but most serious of all, we would immediately be involved in Congressional action to a general lowering of physical standards in order to avoid the induction of fathers.

There is a very serious administrative problem involving undoubtedly a heavy burden that would be required to manage the surveillance of these men who had been inducted and then furloughed to the Reserve to see whether or not they went into essential industries and remained on the job. We would probably become involved in having a heavy overhead burden of people involved in this surveillance. Whether or not it is a practical proposition would remain to be determined.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

MEMORANDUM FOR SERGEANT POWDER<sup>1</sup>

March 29, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Please take my car and purchase for me in Washington the following:

Two pieces of music from the light opera "Oklahoma". I don't recall the names of the songs but one has a chorus beginning "Oh, What a Beautiful Morning", and the other pertains to "the surrey



with fringe around the top". I want them for the wife of the Governor General of Bermuda.

See if Brentano's has a copy of James Lane Allen's "Kentucky Cardinal" and "Aftermath". These two books are generally published in one volume.<sup>2</sup>

Buy me at the drug store the serum for whooping-cough shots sufficient for three children. Find out whether it would be affected by transport by air at an altitude of possibly 10,000 feet.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Sergeant James W. Powder was General Marshall's chief orderly.
2. Allen's *A Kentucky Cardinal* and *Aftermath* (part 2 of *A Kentucky Cardinal*) were first published in the mid-1890s. They were available in one volume. (James Lane Allen, *A Kentucky Cardinal and Aftermath* [New York: Macmillan Company, 1928].)
3. See the following document.

TO LADY BURGHLEY<sup>1</sup>

March 29, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Lady Burghley: I am sending you the songs from "Oklahoma", of which your lovely mornings and the surrency "with the fringe around the top" reminded me. Also there is included a rather peculiar item, the necessary prophylactic treatments for whooping-cough for the young ladies. I understood that this was not available in Bermuda, therefore this package which is supposed to contain enough—3 cc., I believe, for three treatments for *each* of the three young ladies. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. General Marshall had returned the morning of March 28 from a three-day trip to Bermuda. He and Sir John Dill had been the guests of the governor-general and his wife, Lord and Lady Burghley. (C. A. Peterson Memorandum for Colonel McCarthy, March 28, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT CHIEF OF  
STAFF, G-1 [WHITE]

March 30, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

PENNOTE<sup>1</sup>

I do not like your message of March 29 to General Eisenhower re delegation of authority to Army commanders. Its phrasing is not appropriate to a theater commander, rather to routine AGO [Adjutant General's



Office] instructions to a company commander; also a portion of it is liable to misinterpretation.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The original draft of this typed document was presumably a handwritten note by Marshall.

2. The following message had been sent to Eisenhower on March 29: "Authority may be delegated by you to army commanders to reassign general officers within their commands to positions approved by the War Department as appropriate for general officer grade. This authority is to apply during combat operations only. Any reassignment made under this authority will be reported to the War Department with the least practicable delay." (The Adjutant General to Eisenhower, March 29, 1944, Out Log, p. 99, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Message Log].)



# A Battle to Victory

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April 1–July 31, 1944

*The final action in this terrible European war is now focused on a single battle in which every Allied force will be represented. It is to be a battle to the death for the Nazis and a battle to victory for the Allies.*

—Marshall Remarks on Acceptance of the Order of Suvorov  
June 5, 1944



George C. Marshall Foundation  
Lexington, Virginia  
The George C. Marshall Foundation  
is a non-profit organization  
dedicated to the study and  
promotion of the Marshall Plan  
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activities include the publication  
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maintenance of a library  
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also has offices in other  
parts of the world.



COLONEL Frank McCarthy, secretary of the General Staff and among the individuals closest to General Marshall, remarked in early spring 1944 that Marshall's tremendous responsibilities continued to increase. "I would not have thought it possible for General Marshall to be busier and more involved in daily decisions of the highest importance than he was six months ago, but his burden increases steadily. His ability to shoulder the ever heavier load is a wonder to us all," McCarthy wrote to Douglas S. Freeman. "He remains the great American brought forth by this war, and I think he is the only individual I have ever known who could discharge his present duties without a departure from high purpose and noble principle. It will take history a long time to find out how much he has done and is doing because of his continuing modesty." McCarthy noted that General Marshall "never worries about his own decisions with respect to the war. He makes them quickly and puts them into that very large portion of his brain which is reserved for finished business." (McCarthy to Freeman, April 1, 1944, GCMRL/F. McCarthy Papers [U.S. Army 1941–45].)

During the spring of 1944, preparation for the invasion of France was among the top business of the chief of staff in charge of a global war. Bringing the cross-Channel invasion to a realization was now General Eisenhower's responsibility, but Marshall was there to provide him support and guidance when needed. Usually a good judge of abilities and character, General Marshall had a policy of delegating authority and then not interfering unless the subordinate hesitated or faltered. "After once having assigned an officer to his job," Omar Bradley recalled, "General Marshall seldom intervened." (Omar N. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story* [New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951], p. 19.) ★

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL EISENHOWER  
*Secret. Personal*

April 1, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Herewith are six copies of a detailed report on amphibious landings and actions in the Pacific. Other copies will be sent in the routine fashion to your headquarters but I wish to be certain that these actually reach you personally because I would suggest not only that you read the report, but that you see that Montgomery, Bradley, Patton, and your planners get copies.

That you may understand a little better the importance I attach to this report, I will explain what led to it. Last April I became convinced that we must make a more direct approach in the search for methods to put the Japanese out of those islands and particularly throw them back in the jungles without either long delays or heavy losses. I first called on Dr.



Vannevar Bush and his scientists,<sup>1</sup> gave them a rough of what might be the general approach to the problem, particularly the requirement that what we wanted done must be developed in a few weeks and must not involve loads too heavy for infantry to transport. After a week or ten days the scientists had given me their best and Colonel Borden, of the Ordnance, was given the authority to proceed in this matter direct, cutting across all bureaucratic delay on the basis of developing within a period of three weeks the improvements that could be made in our technique, at least the sample materiel to be assembled on the West Coast by the end of three weeks and Colonel Borden and his group to go into the Pacific to demonstrate it. Everything assembled must be for immediate shipment; in other words, if it was not then in production so that modifications could be quickly made, I was not interested. He and his party left for the Pacific, carried their demonstrations up to the front lines for the benefit of commanders and noncommissioned officers.<sup>2</sup> Wherever materiel was desired, a radio was immediately sent to San Francisco, where materiel had accumulated and could be shipped that or the next day.

The reception of this mission was so gratifying that we continued its operation here in the War Department as a regular business, addressing its work to longer time developments.

On my return from Cairo through the Pacific I went into the details of the recent Tarawa operation, where it was evident that a better technique would have made a material saving in lives. I despatched a radio to have Colonel Borden and his people return to Hawaii and go over the technique proposed for the Kwajalein operation. This was done, again with gratifying results and a great deal was developed of major importance in the timing of bombs and fusing of naval shells. Also the related importance of emplaced artillery was made clearly apparent and the operation procedure was predicated on preliminary landings of artillery, etc.

The operation itself was not only successful in general, but a remarkable demonstration of a perfect technique.

As will be seen by this report, we had a group of Colonel, now General, Borden's men go into the Marshall Islands on the heels of the operation and make a detailed study. This report is the result, and while the defenses in France are of a different character, the principles involved are much the same. The point is, that here we were able to employ practically laboratory methods before the operation and immediately thereafter. Therefore I believe your people will find much of value in the report.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Bush was director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development in Washington, D.C., which worked closely with the U.S. Army in the development of new weapons. (Marshall to Bush, April 16, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)



2. For information regarding Borden's missions to the Pacific in 1943, see Marshall to MacArthur, September 14, 1943, pp. 125–26.

3. This report is not in the Marshall papers. Brigadier General William A. Borden had been working on special projects for General Marshall directly, which involved demonstrating and supplying new equipment. In early 1944 Colonel Claudius H. M. Roberts led an Ordnance group in the Central, South, and Southwest Pacific areas, and Colonel George G. Eddy (U.S.M.A., 1918) was in charge of a group assigned to the North African and European theaters. From early February until late June 1944, a mission headed by Colonel Roberts studied the effectiveness of beach assault equipment and weapons for overcoming mines and beach obstructions. In March 1944 Colonel Roberts submitted a report on the Marshall Islands operation. In late July 1944 Roberts and his group submitted their "Report of Mission to Pacific Theaters, 31 January to 30 June 1944." (Borden Memorandums for Colonel Frank McCarthy, January 31 and July 3, 1944, and Borden Memorandums for the Chief of Staff, February 5 and August 26, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected]. Lida Mayo, *The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefield*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1968], pp. 451–52.)

TO ADMIRAL WILLIAM F. HALSEY  
[Radio No. W-17832.] *Secret*

April 3, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

For Halsey from Marshall. I should appreciate your passing the following from me on to Army Corps commander at Empress Augusta Bay: "Congratulations to you and all the troops involved in the fighting on Bougainville. Judging from reports it is evident that the hostile offensive was met with skill and offensive blows with the utmost economy of life on our side and extremely heavy Japanese losses. The close fighting on Bougainville coupled with that on New Britain and Manus Island and the naval and air strikes on Truk, Rabaul, Wewak, Hollandia and finally Palau and Woleai, present a picture of catastrophe to the Japanese high command."<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The American beachhead at Empress Augusta Bay, Bougainville, was held by Major General Oscar W. Griswold's Fourteenth Corps (Thirty-seventh and Americal divisions). The Japanese launched a counterattack on March 8 which was halted by March 27. Effective Japanese resistance on Bougainville ended, although skirmishing continued into early April. United States ground forces landed on New Britain Island on December 15 and 26, 1943; on February 23, 1944, the Japanese began to retreat toward Rabaul. In the Admiralties, U.S. Army forces landed on Manus Island on March 15. Serious fighting ended there on March 18, although the Admiralties Island Group was not declared secure until May 18. (John Miller, Jr., *CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1959], pp. 280–95, 340–48, 351–78; Samuel Eliot Morison, *Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, 22 July 1942–1 May 1944*, a volume in the *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II* [Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1950], pp. 425–31.)

Meanwhile, Southwest Pacific Area ground-based and U.S. Navy carrier-based air forces launched major operations designed to eliminate Japanese offensive power south and east of the Philippines. A naval carrier task force launched devastating attacks on the



key Japanese base at Truk in the Caroline Islands on February 16 and 17. On February 19 they attacked Rabaul, and the next day the Japanese withdrew their remaining fighter planes, ending Rabaul's offensive capability. (Morison, *Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier*, pp. 402-3.)

In preparation for the April 22 Allied amphibious landings in the Hollandia region of New Guinea, Allied air units attacked Japanese forces at Wewak and Hollandia in March and early April. In late March, U.S. Navy Task Force planes attacked the Palaus and other targets in the western Carolines, destroying 150 Japanese planes, six combat ships, and 104,000 tons of merchant or naval auxiliary shipping. (Robert Ross Smith, *The Approach to the Philippines*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1953], pp. 20-27, 48-53.)

TO NEAL DOW BECKER

April 4, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mr. Becker, Thank you for your letter of April third.

I am afraid I confused you by my postscript regarding the character of the party this year.<sup>1</sup>

What I had in mind was the possibility that other guests than publishers might be included. I feel I know what liberties I can take in talking to newspaper men but I have grave doubts when guests outside that circle are included. Along with this comment goes my reply to your very generous offer to invite any guests that I might care to have present. There are none.

With reference to your question regarding an aide, I did not have in mind taking anyone with me but on second thought I believe it would be a good idea for General Surles, the head of our Public Relations Branch in the War Department, to go up with me.<sup>2</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. On April 1 General Marshall had accepted the invitation of Becker, president of Intertype Corporation (manufacturers of typesetting machinery), to speak off-the-record to an audience of about 250 during the American Newspaper Publishers Association convention in New York City at the Waldorf-Astoria on April 25. Marshall had added a postscript by hand: "I assume that the attendance will be the same as several years ago. If otherwise you must expect pro forma remarks by me." Becker had replied on April 3 that "the character of the party will be the same" as when Marshall spoke to the association in April 1940; the guests were carefully selected and he insisted that "the rule that everything is strictly off the record has never been violated at one of these dinners." Becker assured Marshall that no reporters would be present. (Marshall to Becker, April 1, 1944, and Becker to Marshall, April 3, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

2. An account of the event noted that General Marshall, speaking without notes, "described the international situation vividly and gave the publishers much background from which their understanding of events could be enhanced. He made a profound impression of ability, vigor and deadly earnestness." (*Who's Who in the Composing Room*, July 1944, pp. 8-10, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Secretary of State, Correspondence].)



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
*Secret*

April 4, 1944  
 [Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Mission to North China.

General Stilwell has informed me that the Generalissimo refuses to authorize any U. S. officer or Consular official to go into the Yen-an District (Communistic Area). This amounts to a withdrawal of his statement to you in his message of 23 February 1944, in which he indicated, "he would do all he could to facilitate the plan." Refusal to permit the mission to enter Communistic areas negates the purpose of the proposed mission.<sup>1</sup>

In view of the importance of persuading the Generalissimo to order some offensive action by the Yunnan force, I doubt the advisability of pressing him at this time to reverse his decision regarding the visit to the Yen-an District.

[P.S.] Since above was dictated the attached message from Chungking has arrived. I still think my proposal in par. 2 above is sound.<sup>2</sup> G. C. M.  
 GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On February 9 President Roosevelt had requested Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's support and cooperation for a plan to send an American observer mission to Communist north China, which was to gather information on the Japanese army that was concentrated in north China and Manchuria and to survey the possibilities of future ground and air operations. The Generalissimo replied on February 22: "I shall be glad to do all I can to facilitate your plan to send an American Observer Mission to gain more accurate information regarding the troop concentration of our common enemy in North China and Manchuria. I have already issued instructions to the Ministry of War to get into touch with General Stilwell's Headquarters in order to map out a prospective itinerary for the Mission in all areas where the political authority of the National Government extends, and wherever our army is stationed." (Riley Sunderland and Charles F. Romanus, eds., *Stilwell's Personal File: China-Burma-India, 1942-1944*, 5 vols. [Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1976], 5: 1913, 1938.) When General Marshall queried Stilwell on March 20 as to the status of the mission, Stilwell replied on March 30: "CKS definitely refuses to allow any US Army Officer or Consular Official to go into the Yen-an District (Communist Area). He says the President does not understand the conditions and the sinister intentions of the Communists." (Marshall to Stilwell, Radio No. 4784, March 20, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-8401)]; Stilwell to Marshall, Radio No. 15442, March 30, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected]. For further information regarding Chiang Kai-shek, see Marshall Memorandum for the President, April 11, 1944, pp. 401-2.)

2. On April 4 Marshall received a message from Stilwell, who insisted that it was essential that an observer mission proceed to the Communist areas. "Military reasons include the need of remedying the present flow of enemy intelligence from north China and Manchuria, assistance to air operations, including evasion and rescue work in guerrilla and occupied areas which will become of increasing importance, and study of possible utilization of Communist guerrillas in ground operations in North China. Political reasons include the important bearing of Chinese Communist relations with the Central Gov't and with Russia on future developments in China, particularly the North and Manchuria." Stilwell included a proposed message for President Roosevelt to send to the Generalissimo, advocating that he reconsider allowing the observer mission to proceed. (Stilwell to Marshall, Radio No. CFB-15551, April 1, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)



TO GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR  
Radio No. WAR-18390. *Top Secret*

April 4, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

For eyes of MacArthur alone from Marshall. This refers to current negotiations TOPSEC between yourself and Nimitz concerning the release of the 1st Marine Division.<sup>1</sup> These detailed arrangements are entirely up to you and Nimitz. However, you will recall our conversation about the Marine Division. I informed the Navy on my return as to your concurrence and mine in its release as soon as practicable. The Navy made a sizeable concession in agreeing to the transfer of all Major Army Combat Units, including Air, from SOPAC to you. The earliest release of the division which your tactical and shipping situation will permit will materially help in expediting the transfer of other units. Could your discussion with Nimitz be centered on possible loan of shipping by him, the lift he provides for transfer of Marines to be utilized by you to move in unit to relieve Marines. The lack of landing facilities might be overcome in part by exchange of heavy equipment. The Navy is unaware of this proposal.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-18390])

1. On March 31 Admiral Chester W. Nimitz had reminded General Douglas MacArthur that J.C.S. 713/5 provided for the First Marine Division to pass to the control of CINCPAC (Nimitz). "I desire to employ this division in the stalemate operation. Accordingly it is requested that it be disengaged as soon as practicable and withdrawn to a base in the Solomons designated by COMSOPAC [Halsey]." (Nimitz to MacArthur, Radio No. 310410, March 31, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-IN-1889)].) MacArthur replied on April 3: "The withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division from New Britain before the completion of the Rabaul Campaign can not fail to hinder the operation. . . . The division in my opinion should not be relieved before completion of its assigned mission. If however it is to be withdrawn at some arbitrary date I suggest for planning purposes the latter part of June. There are no docks at Cape Gloucester and it would be necessary largely to utilize amphibious equipment for the relief. Such equipment in view of the prospective operations of the Southwest Pacific Area is not now or apt to be available to accomplish the relief." (MacArthur to Nimitz, Radio No. 030915, April 3, 1944, *ibid.* [CM-IN-1738].)

2. For further developments, see Marshall to MacArthur, April 6, 1944, pp. 389-90.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WHITE, G-1

April 5, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

I notice that Mr. Martin of the House Military Affairs Committee had a great deal to say about promiscuous awards of decorations.<sup>1</sup> I wish you would check up on his figures and prepare a little memorandum for him on the reasons for our present policies with reference to the marked difference in the situation in 1917-1918 as well as the unfortunate results of the policy of those days. Your memorandum should also make very clear to him the



morale factor in a unit like the Eighth Air Force which takes heavy casualties day after day on a basis utterly unlike anything we had in France.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Congressman Thomas E. Martin, Republican from Iowa and member of a House military affairs subcommittee on medals and decorations, had declared on April 4 that the army was awarding service decorations at such an indiscriminate rate—175,000 thus far—that their value was being threatened. Martin stated that as the war continued, “the number of clashes with the enemy will increase, more medals and decorations for heroism will be issued and the value will decrease in proportion to the number awarded.” (*New York Times*, April 5, 1944, p. 13.)

2. Major General Miller G. White submitted a draft of a letter to Martin, which Marshall edited and sent; see Marshall to Martin, April 10, 1944, pp. 396–99. For further information regarding Marshall’s views on the award of service decorations, see Marshall Memorandum for Admiral King, April 10, 1944, pp. 394–96.

TO GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR  
Radio No. WAR-19386. *Top Secret*

April 6, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

TOPSEC Eyes Only of General MacArthur from General Marshall.

Reference your C 10408 April 6 it is my impression that Nimitz’ desire for the early relief of the First Marine Division is based on its use in the Palau operations.<sup>1</sup> To make this possible the Division would have to be released prior to 1 June. This relief is therefore directly involved in the overall picture.

Unless there is assurance that this Division will be available at the time indicated, another Division will have to be set up by them. I believe that an assurance to Nimitz that he would have the Division before June 1 would probably solve the situation.

In meeting the Navy’s queries in this matter we have told them that we were confident that a satisfactory arrangement would be worked out between you and Nimitz and that it would not be appropriate for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to intervene. Incidentally the Army policy here has been to promote mutual arrangements between you and Nimitz rather than to operate by frequent directives regarding details such as this by the JCS.

I am reassured by your message.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-19386])

1. On April 6 General MacArthur had sent to General Marshall the contents of his Radio No. 030915 to Admiral Nimitz (see note 1, Marshall to MacArthur, April 4, 1944, p. 388), and MacArthur stated that he was awaiting Nimitz’s reply. “There is no objection on my part to the transfer of the division,” MacArthur further stated. “The only question is an appropriate time. To relieve it prematurely will unquestionably be detrimental to the overall picture. If this fact is not accepted I will yield to such plans as Nimitz desires.” (MacArthur to Marshall, Radio No. C-10408, April 6, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-IN-3899)].)



2. On April 6 Admiral Nimitz sent a message to MacArthur that Pacific operations would be jeopardized if the First Marine Division was not released soon. "My plans for STALEMATE [operations against Palau] have been predicated on the use of the 1st Marine Division which General Marshall indicated in December was to have been withdrawn from New Britain early this year. . . . It is apparent that the timing and success of STALEMATE will both be somewhat jeopardized if it becomes necessary to substitute a less experienced division brought from a distant area under conditions of an acute shortage of overseas troop lift. . . . I therefore request that arrangements be made to initiate the relief of the 1st Marine [Division so] that it may be assembled in the Solomons by the 1st of June and have ample time in which to prepare for participation in a major amphibious assault." (Nimitz to MacArthur, Radio No. 060333, April 6, 1944, *ibid.* [CM-IN-4253].)

During the last week of April the first echelons of the First Marine Division departed from Gloucester, and by May 4 the entire division had left New Britain. The First Marine Division was sent to Pavuvu, the largest of the Russell Islands, a part of the Solomon Islands. There the division rested and reorganized for the assault on Peleliu in September 1944. (George McMillan, *The Old Breed: A History of the First Marine Division in World War II* [Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1949], pp. 226-30, 260-70; George W. Garand and Truman R. Strobridge, *Western Pacific Operations*, volume 4 in the *History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1971], pp. 77-97.)

For a related topic, see Marshall to MacArthur, April 12, 1944, pp. 403-4.

MEMORANDUM ON WOMEN'S ARMY CORPS<sup>1</sup>  
*Confidential*

April 6, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

The constantly increasing shortages in manpower make it imperative for the Army to intensify its efforts to build up the strength of the Women's Army Corps. A new drive is therefore to be launched which must be strongly supported by all concerned.

The Women's Army Corps is now an integral part of the Army and a highly essential part of our war effort. Its units have met their responsibilities with efficiency and are rendering an invaluable service. However, reports indicate that there are local commanders who have failed to provide the necessary leadership and have in fact in some instances made evident their disapproval of the Women's Army Corps. The attitude of the men has quickly reflected the leadership of their commanders, as always.

All commanders in the military establishment are charged with the duty of seeing that the dignity and importance of the work which women are performing are recognized and that the policy of the War Department is supported by strong affirmative action.

G. C. Marshall

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. This memorandum was distributed to all War Department General Staff and Special Staff divisions, overseas commanders, Army Ground Forces down to tactical units, as well as Army Air Forces, Army Service Forces, and Defense Commands down to posts, camps, and stations.



On March 16 Colonel Oveta Culp Hobby, director of the Women's Army Corps, reported that the "attitude of soldiers toward women in the military services" was a serious deterrent to recruiting. (Hobby Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, March 16, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 324.5 WAC]. For previous discussion of recruitment and publicity for the W.A.C., see the editorial note on pp. 359-60, and Marshall Memorandum for the Bureau of Public Relations, January 26, 1944, pp. 246-48.) A few days later she reported that anti-W.A.C. statements had been made by some high-ranking officers, most of whom were combat officers who were not familiar with W.A.C. employment. Citing a major general's remark in a national magazine that he "fortunately" had no experience working with the W.A.C. and he did not want any Wacs in his command, Colonel Hobby noted: "The attitude of the officers and enlisted men in the field will never change to the degree desired as long as key personnel, whose expressions can be assumed to reflect the War Department attitude, make statements such as these." (Mattie E. Treadwell, *The Women's Army Corps*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1954], pp. 274-75.) General Marshall therefore sent the following message.

TO ROY A. ROBERTS<sup>1</sup>  
*Confidential*

April 6, 1944  
 [Washington, D.C.]

Dear Roberts: Apropos of the publication of General Surles recent letter to you I shall quote in the *utmost* confidence a message just received from the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, General [Sir Henry Maitland] Wilson of the British Army, that you may gain some idea of how extremely ticklish and possibly costly this business of publicity really is.

"I am disturbed by a press report reproduced here today which is based on an Associated Press dispatch from Kansas City on April 3.

"Agency quotes Major General A.D. Surles, United States Army Public Relations Director, as sending following reply to letter from Roy A. Roberts, president of American Society of Newspaper Editors, and managing editor of Kansas City Star:

'News of the incident involving Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., was delayed because "that General was to be used in a cover plan following his operations in Sicily. In view of that, the Theater Commander was extremely desirous that his reputation should not be impaired by a wide discussion of the soldier-slapping incident"''.<sup>2</sup>

"This highly undesirable publicity exposes a ruse successfully employed in the cover plan for \_\_\_\_\_ and puts the enemy on his guard against similar measures we may wish to use. The exposure also comes at a time when our deception machinery is being called upon \* \* \* .<sup>3</sup>

"I would request that all possible steps be taken not only to prevent recurrence of similar exposure of most secret matter but



also to prevent General Surles' statement giving rise to further press speculation on our use of deception. This latter aspect is to my mind of momentous importance."

I assisted Surles in the preparation of the letter but I was not in Washington at the time of the agreement for its release. Since that time I have had a number of references to it as being a "good", an "excellent" letter, and a fine thing to do. You can see from the Mediterranean what their view is in the matter and there the responsibility lies for hundreds of thousands of lives and ships and planes.

I feel that we must depend on you and your most influential associates to protect us from this business of throwing pop bottles at the umpire in the hope of influencing his decisions, when the thrower of the bottle has not even played sand-lot baseball. I think we all must have clearly in mind that the American public, except through family relations in the armed services and from the very minor irritations of gas and food rationing and inability to buy certain things, is not aware of what war means as is the public in England where thousands have died and many more thousands have been injured. I am the more concerned in this matter because we are approaching the most difficult period in the war and in the midst of a presidential campaign. You men who are the leaders of our Press have a very grave problem on your hands with a multitude of difficult people and ulterior motives to combat.<sup>4</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Roberts, managing editor of the *Kansas City Star*, was president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors. General Marshall had met with Roberts and the directors of the society on October 1, 1943, at a luncheon at the Statler Hotel in Washington. Roberts assured Marshall that "the fifteen editors returned home with a much sounder view of the war picture after your illuminating discussion than they had before." (Roberts to Marshall, October 9, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. For information on the soldier-slapping incident, see note 2, Marshall Memorandum for General Surles, December 30, 1943, p. 225.

3. Operation FORTITUDE, a diversionary feint against the Pas-de-Calais area, was employed as an Allied deception plan to keep German divisions from the Normandy area. (Gordon A. Harrison, *Cross-Channel Attack*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1951], p. 76.) For more information on the deception plan, see F. H. Hinsley et al., *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations*, volume 3, part 2, a volume in the *History of the Second World War* (London: HMSO, 1988), pp. 47-49, 177-79, and F. H. Hinsley and C. A. G. Simkins, *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Security and Counter-Intelligence*, volume 4, a volume in the *History of the Second World War* (London: HMSO, 1990), pp. 237-44.

4. General Marshall spoke off-the-record to the American Society of Newspaper Editors at a luncheon on April 21 at the Statler Hotel in Washington, and he attended the society's dinner the next evening. (Roberts to Marshall, May 1, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Then on April 25 he spoke off-the-record to the American Newspaper Publishers Association in New York City. (See Marshall to Becker, April 4, 1944, p. 386.)



On April 7 Marshall notified Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers that, in reference to the release of Surles's letter to Roberts, "we will endeavor to control further references to this matter in the press and on the radio. As a matter of fact Wilson's radio gives me a strong weapon with which to control OWI and the press people. I have most confidentially transmitted portions of it to Roberts as an example of the dangerous things the press demands of us. I think it will have far reaching effects as he is the controlling head of the editorial association and a strong character. The only weakness in my procedure is that he cannot quote to other people the extracts of Wilson's message I gave him." (Marshall [OPD] to Devers, Radio No. WAR-19897, April 7, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-19897)].)

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING

*Top Secret*

April 10, 1944

[Washington, D.C.]

Your memorandum dated 1 April 1944 raises the subject of staff organization in various theaters.<sup>1</sup> I agree that our staff organization could be improved in the Mediterranean and European Theaters, and that naval interests may not be, probably are not, adequately provided for in the Southwest Pacific Theater.

I agree that improvement in the Mediterranean staff organization is hardly practicable at this late date. As to OVERLORD, I am informally advised that the U. S. Naval representation on the OVERLORD staff is not adequate. The best initial step in this matter would be for me to communicate personally with General Eisenhower. Please let me have your comments on the U. S. Naval representation on his staff for use in preparing a message.

With reference to the Pacific, in my memorandum dated 13 July 1943, it was recommended that Admiral Nimitz be replaced as commander of the Pacific Fleet and be established as theater commander in accordance with the provisions of J.C.S. 263/2/D.<sup>2</sup> I am still convinced that this is desirable since it would improve the relationship between separate Army and Navy staffs as well as joint staffs in the Pacific Ocean Area.

As for the Southwest Pacific Theater, it would be desirable for General MacArthur to have as balanced a joint staff as practicable. The problem of an integrated staff in this theater, as a practical proposition, differs materially from the problem in the Pacific Ocean Areas in that U. S., Australian, and Dutch forces are now involved and British forces may be engaged later, and coupled with the pressure of Australian interests and heavy involvement in the actual fighting goes, I am informed, a serious limitation on availability of competently trained general staff officers, with the added complication of high rank. At the present time there are twelve U. S. Naval and two Marine officers on duty with GHQ, SW Pacific Area with two more being selected to go from the next ANSCOL [Army and Navy Staff College] class. General MacArthur has stated that an increase in U. S. Naval



representation would be welcome and would be used to good advantage. In this regard, I believe an acceptable solution would be worked out if we turn over this matter to our operations people for study and report.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. After providing a history of the discussions regarding joint or combined staffs for the various theaters, Admiral King concluded: "I feel that I must again raise the question as to a complete joint or combined staff organization (as insisted upon by you for the Pacific Ocean Areas—and thoroughly agreed to by me), for the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Area, and for the OVERLORD command. The same consideration should apply, of course, to the MEDITERRANEAN command, but I am doubtful that any effort toward improving staff conditions in that Area offers much promise of success." (King Memorandum for General Marshall, April 1, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 210.31].)

2. Operations Division had prepared the July 13, 1943, Memorandum to King (NA/RG 165 [OPD, 370.5, Case 240].) Admiral King replied that he was "exploring the practical aspects of making changes in the PACIFIC." (King Memorandum for General Marshall, July 19, 1943, *ibid.*) For further discussion of this issue, see Louis Morton, *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1962], pp. 476–79.)

3. Admiral King replied that the present command setup in the Pacific was "producing excellent results and is making the best use of the command and staff talent available, Army and Navy. I prefer not to disturb this fine working arrangement." King felt that naval participation on General Eisenhower's staff should be similar to the joint staff established for the Pacific. "With the increase in U.S. Naval participation in OVERLORD, in which approximately one-half of the amphibious operations are being carried out under U.S. Naval officers, the urgency has increased," wrote King. "Specifically, U.S. Naval representation on the Supreme Commander's Staff should be such as to give effective participation in staff work concerned with planning, operations, intelligence, and logistics." (King Memorandum for General Marshall, April 14, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 322.01].)

On April 20 General Marshall sent King's recommendation to Eisenhower. The chief of staff informed Eisenhower that Nimitz's joint staff had army officers in the plans, intelligence, operations, and logistics sections, and the chiefs of plans and operations were naval officers while the chiefs of intelligence and logistics were army officers. (Marshall to Eisenhower, Radio No. WARX-25590, April 20, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-25590)].) For further discussion, see Marshall Memorandum for Admiral King, April 27, 1944, p. 438.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING

April 10, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Award of Combat Decorations.

I gave a careful reading to your memorandum of April 1 on the subject of decorations and had the statistics analyzed.<sup>1</sup> I do not believe it is practicable to make a numerical comparison on the basis of strength ratios between the two services. So many other factors enter into the picture, such as the numbers actually engaged in combat, the nature and duration of the combat (day by day operations of the strategic Bombing Force for



example), etc., that it appears impracticable to fix a ratio or to assure that awards by the two services would be approximately equal in proportion to respective strengths.<sup>2</sup>

Since our regulations are very similar, it seems to me that the difference lies in the attitude of the two departments and of the commanders in the field toward the use of decorations and their value in sustaining morale. As a result of my observation in the A.E.F. battles in France, it is my belief that decorations are one of our greatest morale boosters for the people who are doing the actual fighting, particularly under heavy and continuing pressure as in the strategical bombing or the hardships and daily casualties in prolonged infantry fighting. I have impressed upon all Army commanders the importance of seeking out and promptly recognizing acts of heroism or of meritorious achievement. I do not want to repeat the mistake we made in the last war of being niggardly with our decorations while the fighting is on and then attempting to make up for it by post-war action, which resulted in favoring the importunate and neglecting the modest, but usually more deserving men.

Almost 90 per cent of the Army decorations to date have been in the Air Medal and the Distinguished Flying Cross. I suppose that, without analysis, 135,000 of these two awards appears excessive. Yet, when it is considered that at the end of 1943 the Army Air Forces had flown 392,000 combat sorties, exposing 1,375,000 individuals to extreme dangers (enemy fire, loss of feet and hands by frostbite, operational crashes in vile weather over U.K. and Europe) and in the 8th Air Force alone have suffered up to 28 per cent losses on single missions, my concern is not that there have been too many of these awards but that there may not have been sufficient. The high morale of the Army Air Forces despite heavy losses week by week over Europe and the value that our young combat crews place upon their decorations is sufficient to convince me that our policy is right, especially when you consider that we have probably flown more sorties in the past three months than in the entire previous year and will further increase the rate with better weather.

Because I have seen what we accomplished by our liberal use of the Air Medal in the Air Forces, I initiated the action which eventually resulted in obtaining the President's approval to the Bronze Star for both services.<sup>3</sup> I wanted a decoration corresponding to the Air Medal that could be used with equal freedom among the ground forces, particularly the infantry, who, when they do get into action, not only bear the brunt of the casualties but remain under fire for long periods in conditions of great hardship.

Not only am I convinced that the policy regarding Army combat decorations to date has been a wise one, but I would be extremely reluctant to do anything that would change the present attitude of our commanders, which I have personally and so painstakingly built up.



I will conclude by stating that there was little if anything that I should desire to repeat of the practices of 1917-1918, and thereafter, with which I was intimately and officially familiar.<sup>4</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On April 1 Admiral Ernest J. King brought to General Marshall's attention the differences in practices of the army and navy in awarding the Distinguished Flying Cross and Air Medal. He presented an analysis by the Navy Department Board of Decorations and Medals during the period December 7, 1941, to February 29, 1944:

	<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy</i>
Medal of Honor	35	46
Distinguished Service Cross	1179	
Navy Cross		1360
Distinguished Service Medal	300	110
Legion of Merit	2493	549
Silver Star Medal	10385	2243
Distinguished Flying Cross	15168	1000
Soldiers Medal	2362	
Navy and Marine Corps Medal		845
Air Medal	117793	1938
	<u>149715</u>	<u>8091</u>

(Gold stars (Navy) and Oak Leaf Clusters (Army) having been included as awards of the medal concerned)

Deducting the number of Distinguished Flying Crosses and Air Medals which have been awarded (Army 132,961; Navy 2,938), gives a total remaining awards for the Army of 16,754 and Navy 5,153. Army personnel is approximately three times greater than that of the Navy; one-third of the remaining Army awards is 5,585, which compares closely with the total Navy awards for other than aerial flight.

King noted that army regulations and naval policy were similar for each award and that both required an act above and beyond that normally expected. It was King's opinion that "both uniformity of policy and practice in the Army and Navy are desirable." (King Memorandum for General Marshall, April 1, 1944, NA/RG 165 [G-1, 200.6].)

2. Major General Miller G. White's G-1 Division prepared a draft of this document, which Marshall edited. White called to Marshall's attention "the fact that whereas the Army has been quite conservative in the award of the higher ranking decorations and more liberal as the decorations decrease in value, the Navy seems to have obtained no such result." White had long noted the difference in attitude toward decorations in the army and navy. "Our policy reflects the lessons you have pounded on to us. The Navy Board's attitude is that of World War I," wrote White. (White Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, April 7, 1944, *ibid.*)

3. For information regarding the Bronze Star Medal, see Marshall Memorandum for the President, February 3, 1944, pp. 261-63.

4. For further information regarding General Marshall's views on service decorations, see the following document.

TO THOMAS E. MARTIN

April 10, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mr. Martin: My attention has been called to a statement in the



press indicating your concern over the number of Army decorations that have been awarded in this war.<sup>1</sup> I am frankly disturbed about the apparent general lack of understanding of combat decorations and their value in sustaining the morale of the men who are doing the actual fighting. Napoleon is alleged to have said "Give me enough ribbon to place on the tunics of my soldiers and I can conquer the world." I cannot vouch for the accuracy of that quotation but I certainly share the view which such a statement indicates.

We have awarded, since the outbreak of the war, probably 12,000 combat decorations other than the Distinguished Flying Cross and the Air Medal, about 3,000 decorations for distinguished or exceptionally meritorious service, and about 135,000 air decorations (Distinguished Flying Cross and Air Medal). When the size of our Army, and the extensiveness and nature of its operations are considered, the number of awards in the first two categories is surprisingly low.

The air decorations should be measured against the remarkable achievements of the Air Forces and the special nature of continuing air combat. For example, at the end of 1943 the Army Air Forces had flown 392,000 combat sorties, exposing 1,375,000 individuals to the danger of enemy fire. They have lost their hands and their feet in flying and fighting at temperatures far below zero. They suffered heavy loss of pilots or crew members, and almost as many sorties have been flown in the past three months as in all of 1943.

These are the men who pioneered the daylight bombing over Europe when the usual pessimistic predictions were that such tactics would be suicidal. They are the men who fought the Japanese air force against tremendous odds until they ultimately gained air superiority. They continued to fly missions when their chance of safe return was apparently less than one in five. They still take heavy casualties day after day, week after week. Yet their morale has continued high and their achievements have soared, and one of the reasons is that they have positive evidence that their work has been given immediate recognition.

No one who considers all of these things, and who understands the morale effect of the prompt bestowal of a bit of ribbon and bronze, would ever feel that our awards of combat and air decorations have been excessive. In fact, I wonder if we have given the men sufficient recognition. It is a tragic fact that the men who have received the most decorations are usually lost to us by their own continued daring and leadership.

It has been my opinion that one of the grave errors of the previous war was our ineffective policy in the award of decorations and our dilatory policy regarding campaign ribbons. We seemed to begrudge prompt recognition of the men who did the fighting, suffered the hardships, and took the losses. After the war the attempt was made to correct this, but as might



have been expected, more of the importunate than the modest and deserving received these belated awards, and heavy political pressures were usually involved.

From the beginning of this war I determined that we would not repeat what clearly appeared to me were serious mistakes in the past. I have impressed upon our commanders in the field not only the value of decorations and their proper use, but of the necessity for their prompt bestowal. And, incidentally, there is small chance of the wrong or undeserving man getting the decorations if it is given in the field. From personal observation of the results, I am convinced that my view is the correct one.

I was so impressed with the effect of the Air Medal and the adverse effect of the lack of a suitable award of the same level for the long-suffering infantrymen that I personally asked for and secured the President's approval to a corresponding decoration for the ground forces, to be known as the Bronze Star.<sup>2</sup> I want to obtain the same effect with this among the ground troops, particularly the infantry who suffer such a high percentage of our casualties, and I intend that it shall be awarded with the same freedom as the Air Medal.

In short, it is my sincere belief that we cannot do too much in the way of prompt and appropriate recognition of the men who carry the fight and live under the conditions that exist at the fighting front.

I intend to see that these young soldiers enjoy this small fruit of their military effort while they are amongst their war comrades and confronted with the ordeal of further fighting.

The immediate award of the campaign or theater ribbon had a somewhat different purpose. One of our most serious morale problems related to the men serving in isolated distant posts, often under extremes of temperature and usually in discomfort. They did not have the stimulation or excitement of contact with the enemy to fix their interest or satisfy their normal desire for active service, and they suffered increasingly from loneliness, from the fact that they could do little to merit public recognition. Therefore the theater ribbon. The fact that some officer in Washington may wear one or two is not a proper argument against the present policy. Furthermore, in considering matters of this kind there is little similarity today with our deployment and the short duration of the war in 1917-18.

I am writing to you personally and at considerable length because of the importance that I attach to this subject. I think it essential that our friends in the Military Affairs Committee understand the problem, and have a complete appreciation of how we are using our decorations, and why we are proceeding along this line.<sup>3</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. For Congressman Martin's statement, see note 1, Marshall Memorandum for General White, G-1, April 5, 1944, pp. 388-89.



2. For Marshall's views regarding the Bronze Star Medal, see Marshall Memorandum for the President, February 3, 1944, pp. 261–63.

3. Martin made General Marshall's letter public on June 15. (*New York Times*, June 16, 1944, p. 10.) For related information, see the previous document.

TO MAJOR GENERAL JOHN R. DEANE  
Radio No. WAR-21660-M-81. *Top Secret*

April 11, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

TOPSEC for Deane Moscow from The Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>1</sup> The rapid advance of the Russian forces into Rumania, coupled with the developing situation in the Crimea, suggests the possibility that there might be some unfortunate contacts between U. S. Strategic Air Forces and Russian Air Forces. Recognizing the primary interest of the Russians in all that pertains to the conduct of the campaign in Rumania and over the Black Sea, we would like you to inquire of the appropriate Russian officials whether or not they would care to indicate where and when they did not desire activity by U. S. Strategic Air Forces.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-21660])

1. General Marshall dictated this message.

2. Deane replied on April 17 from Moscow that he would see the Red Army deputy chief of staff, General Alexsey Antonov, sometime between April 19 and 21 concerning the coordination of air operations in the Balkans. The delay was necessary, explained Deane, as General Antonov was at the front and not immediately available. (Deane to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 17, 1944, In Log, p. 201-A, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Message Log].) General Marshall replied to Deane on April 18: "Our forces are now operating within 60 miles of each other and the hazard of American fighters shooting down Russian bombers is very real. I deplore the fact that you must wait until April 19 to 21 to attempt to adjust this matter because we may have an ugly incident on our hands and yet we must not stop our assaults on German communications in the Balkans if it can be avoided." Marshall urged Deane to find a speedy resolution to the problem, adding that weather considerations combined with communication difficulties with the Russians might impede American bombing operations. (Marshall to Deane, Radio No. WAR-24648, April 18, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Deane responded on April 19 that a permanent solution to the problem was impossible due to the absence of senior Russian generals at the front, but that consultation with Major General N. V. Slavin, Red Army General Staff, had produced a temporary bomb halt-line (Constantza-Bucharest-Polesti-Budapest). Once General Antonov returned, Deane would propose that the Red Army accept American air liaison officers to be stationed with commands of the Red Army Southern Front. (Deane to Marshall, Radio No. 446, April 19, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) John R. Deane, *The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Co-operation with Russia* [New York: Viking Press, 1946], pp. 126–30.) Repeated American proposals to send liaison officers to field headquarters were denied by the Russian General Staff, who insisted that air activities must be coordinated in Moscow.

The potential "ugly incident," of which General Marshall warned on April 18, occurred on November 7, 1944. As a result of the appearance on the map of two areas as identical and a lack of coordination between American and Russian forces, a squadron of American P-38s strafed a Russian troop column between Nis and Aleksinac in Yugoslavia, and they



attacked nine Soviet planes. Twenty Russian automobiles with equipment were destroyed and casualties included the Russian commander Lieutenant General Kotov and two officers and three men. Three Soviet planes were shot down and two pilots were killed. Two American planes were shot down. The unusual combination of circumstances created an unavoidable accident that could not be foreseen. "However," recalled Deane, "the chances of its occurrence would have been minimized had we had representatives with each of the Red Army front commanders who would have kept our Air Forces informed of Russian dispositions and troop movements." (Ibid., pp. 131-34.) American apologies and the relief of the American squadron commander seemingly satisfied the Russians. American liaison teams thereafter joined Russian units in the field on an informal basis, although eventually Red Army headquarters in Moscow found out and ordered such American-Russian relationships immediately halted. In December 1944 Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker notified the Russians where the U.S. Army Air Forces were to operate, thereby putting the burden of preventing clashes on the Russians. "Thereafter we had little difficulty as far as our Balkan co-ordination was concerned," wrote Deane, "because we adopted a firm policy of simply informing the Russians of our intentions and putting the responsibility on them of avoiding conflicts." (Ibid., pp. 135-39. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day, January 1944 to May 1945*, a volume in *The Army Air Forces in World War II* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951], pp. 748-49.)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL MARK W. CLARK  
*Secret*

April 11, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Clark, Colonel [Frank] McCarthy, Secretary of the General Staff, will hand you this letter on your arrival at Bolling Field. I have told him to explain to you just why we have had to make very special arrangements for your visit. It was considered quite important that Eisenhower's brief stay here be kept under cover, but in your particular case the situation is much more critical.<sup>1</sup> We have found it utterly impossible to secure secrecy for the visit of any high official to Washington.

Whether or not you find the White Sulphur set-up agreeable to you and Mrs. Clark is for you to determine. There are one or two other places where even greater privacy can be assured, but I doubt if you would have the surrounding comforts and the opportunity for some pleasurable diversions that are available at the White. The cottage is the most luxurious and commodious that we have under control and the surroundings are lovely.

As McCarthy will tell you we should like very much to have you here in Washington for at least a fair portion of a day in the near future and that can be arranged by an air back and forth the same day, as the flight is of a brief duration. I wish to be certain that you are given an opportunity for complete rest and relaxation so will endeavor to control matters to that end. However, it is quite possible that the President will wish to see you and that may involve a flight in a direction other than Washington.

It seems to me that the last few days of your stay we might risk here in Washington because the resulting leak would not be nearly so much to our



disadvantage as disclosure of the fact that you have just arrived in this country at this particular moment.

The visit of your opposite has been kept under complete control but that is more easily arranged there than here.<sup>2</sup>

McCarthy will make clear to you that we will make any arrangements for your mother that you desire. I am having him give you the telephone code I use so that in the event you may wish to telephone here or we to telephone you it will be possible to discuss matters without too many complications as to secrecy.

I have given instructions that every possible arrangement for your comfort is to be provided at White Sulphur, and I shall look forward to seeing you up here.<sup>3</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall had notified Clark on April 10 during his stopover at Newfoundland of the importance of secrecy during his visit in the United States. "Insure that all members of your party, plane crew and others who may obtain knowledge of your trip, do not permit leakage. You should send no further communications concerning your journey except in emergency. No individual of plane personnel is to leave plane on arrival in Washington until a representative of War Department has reported to you personally." (Marshall to Clark, Radio No. WAR-21004, April 10, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 1, Item 27].) For information regarding General Eisenhower's visit to the United States in January, see Marshall Memorandum for the President, January 4, 1944, p. 232.

2. General Sir Harold Alexander, commander in chief Allied armies in Italy, was visiting in England.

3. Clark visited with his family in a cottage at the U.S. Army's Ashford General Hospital (converted from the Greenbrier Hotel resort) in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, for several days after his arrival in Washington on April 11. He met with General Marshall in the chief of staff's office on April 17. On April 20 General Marshall arranged for Clark to talk to special guests, mostly congressmen, at the Alibi Club in Washington. (Mark W. Clark, *Calculated Risk* [New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950], pp. 335–37. April 20, 1944, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 46: 192].) For further information, see Marshall Memorandum for the President, April 15, 1944, pp. 409–10.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Top Secret*

April 11, 1944

[Washington, D.C.]

General Stilwell informs me that the Generalissimo insists that he command the VLR (B-29) Project. He maintains that his authority in relation to our VLR forces should be the same as he enjoys in connection with 14th Air Force. As stated by General Stilwell, no trouble is anticipated if we inform the Generalissimo that his authority in this matter is the same as that of Supreme Commanders in other theatres to which units of the VLR are to be sent.<sup>1</sup>



It is suggested that you dispatch a message to him along the lines of the attached draft. This requirement on the part of the Generalissimo is primarily a matter of face.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Stilwell to Marshall, Radio No. 15442, March 30, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected).

2. President Roosevelt sent a revised version of the proposed message to the Generalissimo on April 12. He stated that all the very long range bombers based in different areas were under a single commander in order to coordinate their effort; General Arnold exercised that direction for the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. "In all areas the coordination of VLR operations with those of other or local units will be under the Supreme Commander in the theatre concerned. In the China Theatre it will be under you." (Sunderland and Romanus, eds., *Stilwell's Personal File*, 5:2177.)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MCNAIR

April 12, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear McNair: I wish you would have one of your people make a complete examination of the Air Corps procedure for handling men returned from combat service overseas. I have seen their Miami installation and I know a little about that at Atlantic City and I believe they did have some arrangement at Mitchel Field.

What I have in mind is that we must have a well developed system for handling these people, both officers and men, particularly noncommissioned officers who are returned from overseas physically exhausted, wounded, etc. Otherwise we shall have many embittered people. I directed the establishment of the Air Corps system because we found that the pilots coming in after a large number of missions usually did more harm than good when we attempted to use them in training. Now I believe they work out very well. However, my major consideration at the moment is the poor devil who fell because he did not have sufficient physical stamina.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On April 25 the commanding general of the Army Ground Forces replied that his headquarters staff had studied the Air Corps procedure of handling returnees and found it to be wasteful. "The Air Corps procedure, while attractive to returnees and their families, is virtually a vacation at government expense and is unwarranted. The necessary processing and medical attention when involved can be accomplished much more simply, more expeditiously, and inexpensively." He concluded, however, that a standardized procedure should be established for all returnees of all branches. (Brigadier General J. G. Christiansen, for the Commanding General, Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, April 25, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 201.601].)

Major General Miller G. White, assistant chief of staff of personnel, disagreed with these conclusions. He reported on April 29 that several Ground Force unit commanders had indicated that "many of the men returned from overseas and assigned to their units are more harmful than helpful because of their morale or general attitude." White recommended



that all soldiers returned to the United States after combat or arduous overseas service should be provided with the same high quality of treatment accorded Air Force personnel. He reported that the present procedure for the Ground Forces was not producing desirable results. "While the approximately fourteen days that a man stays at an AAF Redistribution Center may have much of the atmosphere of, or may in fact be, a vacation at Government expense, it is worthwhile if it produces results, and from my own observation of the Center at Miami Beach I am convinced that it is producing results." White noted that the average cost of operating the center at Miami Beach was \$1.25 per man per day, "which is certainly not an extravagant expenditure on men who have earned the right to considerate treatment, and who can be of inestimable value if they are restored to the proper attitude before they are permanently reassigned in the United States." White recommended that the Army Service Forces establish and operate redistribution centers similar to the Army Air Forces model. (White Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, April 29, 1944, *ibid.*)

TO GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR  
Radio No. WAR-21958. *Top Secret*

April 12, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

For MacArthur's Eyes Only from Marshall. Concern has been officially expressed by Admiral King over possible misinterpretation of that part of your radio number C-3227 March 22nd which refers to the introduction into your theater of "Any agency other than a transient Naval force."<sup>1</sup> I assume that it was not your intention to indicate a policy which would prohibit forces of any category not assigned to your area from staging through, mounting from, or temporarily operating from installations in your area, under their own commanders, where such measures would be expedient in the execution of a particular operation. This principle will be increasingly applicable as the operations of yours and Nimitz's forces become more closely tied together. For example, it will possibly be desirable, in the Mindanao operation, for portions of your forces to stage in or operate temporarily from the Palaus. If I have interpreted your views correctly, I would appreciate early confirmation in your own words as it is desired to reassure Admiral King on this matter.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-21958])

1. On March 22 MacArthur had sent a message to Marshall regarding plans for development of a naval base at Manus Island. (For background information on this issue, see Marshall to MacArthur, March 9, 1944, pp. 329–31.) "Since this installation lies in an operational area where the coordination of all forces is required, it would be violative of basic principles to introduce any agency, other than a transient naval force, which is not part of the command," said MacArthur. "The South Pacific force has been projected into operations in the Southwest Pacific area through the artificiality of extending it forward through the Solomons to Emirau but there can be no further justification for its continued operation beyond the geographical boundaries that have been fixed by international agreement." (MacArthur to Marshall, March 22, 1944, In Log, p. 206-A, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Message Log].)

2. MacArthur replied that the expression "transient naval forces" referred "specifically to the use of the Manus Island Naval Base by forces of Central Pacific. There is of course



no objection to the staging through or mounting from this area of forces of any category of another area." He further stated that "the operation of outside forces, except the Pacific Fleet, from installations in this area however would be violative of the principle of unity of command. This would be particularly dangerous in the case of Air Forces whose employment requires such meticulous coordination with all elements. If support from one command is required by another command the support mission should be prescribed by higher authority leaving the tactical operations in the hands of the forces own commander and subject to mutual coordination between the two commanders concerned." (MacArthur to Marshall, April 13, 1944, In Log, p. 146-A, *ibid.*)

For a related topic, see Marshall to MacArthur, April 4, 1944, p. 388.

TO WINSTON S. CHURCHILL  
Radio No. WAR-22810. *Top Secret*

April 13, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

TOPSEC for General Eisenhower's eyes only from General Marshall.  
Please deliver the following message from General Marshall to the Prime Minister:

"I have been delaying answer to your OZ1895 until the receipt of the proposed directive from your COS. I now learn from Dill that in all probability no directive will be proposed until an answer from me has been made to your personal message.<sup>1</sup>

We appear to be agreed in principle but quite evidently not as to method. If we are to have any option as to what we can do when the time comes, preparations for ANVIL must be made now even though they may be at the partial expense of future operations in Italy after the beachhead has been joined to the main line. Unless this has been done, in our view there will be no option, whereas if preparations for an ANVIL are made Wilson will have an amphibious force available to carry out another and perhaps a less difficult amphibious operation than ANVIL should the circumstances at the time make the latter appear inexpedient.

Furthermore, the urgency of our need for these landing craft in the Pacific at this particular period is very great. We have established a momentum in that theater and possess a decisive superiority in naval and aircraft and also an adequate force of ground troops. It is an exceedingly serious matter to hamstring this force, as it were, through the lack of the landing craft to implement its operations. This would result in the loss of the acquired momentum which means so much toward shortening the period of the war in the Pacific. This sacrifice in the Pacific can be justified only with the assurance that we are to have an operation in the effectiveness of which we have complete faith."<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill communicated with General Marshall through Field Marshal Sir John Dill on April 12, 1944. Churchill was convinced that



OVERLORD could best be supported by a maximum effort in Italy. He stated that as it was the mission of Allied Mediterranean forces to pressure the Germans to commit the maximum number of divisions to fronts not related to OVERLORD, to accomplish this the highest priority must be given in Italy to linking the Anzio bridgehead with the main front of the American Fifth and the British Eighth armies. Churchill argued that Allied operations in Italy had already had this effect, adding that German strength commitments in Italy had even adversely affected their activities in southern Russia. He was convinced that the decision to implement ANVIL could not be taken until the Italian front had been stabilized and the initial results of OVERLORD evaluated. (Churchill to Marshall, Radio No. OZ-1895, April 12, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Dill had attached to Churchill's message a handwritten note to Marshall: "I expected a revised draft directive for Wilson from the British Chiefs of Staff today, but none has yet come." (Dill to Marshall, April 12, 1944, *ibid.*)

2. On April 16 Churchill expressed his regret that landing craft would not be diverted to the Mediterranean theater from the Pacific, since there was no definite date commitment to ANVIL. Churchill insisted that maximum effort must be maintained in Italy, and he could not bring himself "to agree before hand to starve a battle or have to break it off just at the moment when success, after long efforts and heavy losses, may be in view." He argued that perceptions of a lack of commitment by the Allied high command to a full-scale effort in Italy would have a negative effect on Allied morale on the Italian front and that without Pacific theater landing craft there would be no two-division lift for any amphibious assault to break an Italian deadlock or even for ANVIL. "Dill tells me that you had expected me to support ANVIL more rigorously in view of my enthusiasm for it when it was first proposed by you at TEHERAN." But, Churchill explained, that was before the Allied offensive in Italy bogged down south of Rome. He returned to the point that, regardless of apparent lack of Allied success in Italy, the Germans were committing to Italy the divisions that ANVIL had been designed to remove from the front of OVERLORD. The war in Italy must be continued, Churchill argued. "Therefore it seems to me we must throw our hearts into this battle for the sake of which so many American and British lives have already been sacrificed, and make it like OVERLORD an all out conquer or die." (Churchill to Marshall, Radio No. OZ-1985, April 16, 1944, *ibid.*)

On April 16 the British Chiefs of Staff informed the Joint Staff Mission in Washington that "the difference between the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and ourselves remains since we cannot possibly agree, here and now, that preparations for an ANVIL should have priority over the continuation of the battle in Italy after the bridgehead has been joined with the main battle line." The British Chiefs of Staff added that without the addition of Pacific theater landing craft to the Mediterranean, "the possibility of ANVIL, as a supporting operation to OVERLORD, is terminated." (British Chiefs of Staff to Joint Staff Mission, COS [W] 1284, April 16, 1944, *ibid.*) For further information, see Marshall to Churchill, April 18, 1944, pp. 423–24.

TO DEXTER B. WISWELL

April 13, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mr. Wiswell, I have your letter of April sixth proposing that my name be presented for honorary life membership in the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, with the note that your President, Colonel [Ross] Whistler, extends his compliments and hopes that I will accept this membership. I will be very glad to do so.<sup>1</sup>



I am interested in history, accurate history, and I have always had a very delightful recollection of my association with the First Corps of Cadets, both at Hingham and in their Armory on Arlington Street. Colonel [Thomas F.] Edmands had died before I met with the Cadets. Colonel Joy was the commander at that time and Charlie Cole the Major.<sup>2</sup>

With my regards, and thanks, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Wiswell, secretary of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, had written, "we know of your kindly recollections of the Corps, which are heartily reciprocated by its members." The director of the Bureau of Public Relations, Major General Alexander D. Surles, had recommended that General Marshall decline the invitation because the bureau had difficulty finding any information on the society's current activity and saw no reason for the chief of staff to accept. (Wiswell to Marshall, April 6, 1944, and Surles Memorandum for the Secretary, General Staff, April 10, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

2. General Marshall had been inspector-instructor with the Massachusetts Volunteer Militia during 1911-12. (For further information on Marshall's service in Massachusetts, see *Papers of GCM*, 1: 57-58, 65-72.) Lieutenant Colonel Franklin L. Joy was commander of the First Corps of Cadets when Marshall worked in Massachusetts. Charles H. Cole, promoted to brigadier general, was appointed adjutant general of Massachusetts in 1937. (For correspondence between Marshall and Cole, see *ibid.*, 1: 627-30, 2: 66-68.)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. WAR-22651. *Secret*

April 13, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

For Eisenhower's Eyes Only from Marshall. I have just finished reading extensive reports on the replacement and general personnel situation in North Africa. The situation there is so unsatisfactory and unacceptable that I am requiring Devers to take prompt and drastic corrective action.<sup>1</sup>

After surveying the African developments I am convinced that the following are essential in the operation of any replacement system and in the proper control of casual personnel in your theater:

First, a single commander whose sole responsibility will be to operate the replacement system in conformity with War Department and theater policies. He must be vigorous and aggressive with sufficient rank and a qualified staff to do the job. He must be charged with the whole replacement system, must have control of all casual personnel, must direct coordinated training programs for the recovery and proper utilization of men coming out of hospitals and for the retraining of able bodied men in the communication zone to make them available for duty in the combat zone. Above all he must take constant and aggressive action to prevent the accumulation and stagnation of men in depots such as has occurred and still exists in North Africa.



Second, there must be a rigid control of loss replacements sent to the theater to prevent their diversion for other purposes.

At the personnel conference that has just ended here, Generals Abbot and Lovett speaking for Lee have expressed Lee's vigorous opposition to the two requirements enumerated above.<sup>2</sup> It is imperative that we take action now in your theater to prevent a recurrence of the situation that has developed in North Africa and I cannot accept a stiff necked attitude in opposition to essential change based on our experiences in the latter theater. Lee was not in North Africa, he has not had the benefit of that experience nor is he familiar with the situation that developed there.

I am so thoroughly convinced of the necessity for centralized command and control of your replacements and casual personnel and action to prevent the diversion of replacements that I feel I must insist on these two things. I want your personal reaction. Please have in mind that I am judging this matter not on the basis of reports of a few and junior staff officers making a hurried survey of conditions for which they have no personal responsibility. My reactions are based on a mass of cumulative evidence and with a fair understanding of the difficulties. Also by this time I pretty thoroughly understand the irritated resistance of staff officers to any adverse report or proposed change by people who have not borne that heat of the battle.<sup>3</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-22651])

1. On April 13 General Marshall sent a message, almost identical to this one, to Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers. Marshall insisted that the replacement system must be made as efficient as possible; "centralized command seems to me to be an essential factor," he wrote. "I want your personal reaction, but I am not interested in the irritated reactions of staff officers who resent any adverse report on the conduct of affairs in their district by officers, particularly junior officers who have only had a brief opportunity to look over the situation. I am judging this matter by the great weight of cumulative evidence." (Marshall to Devers, Radio No. WAR-22650, April 13, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-22650)]. For further information, see Marshall to Devers, April 22, 1944, pp. 430–31.)

2. Marshall was probably referring to Brigadier General Oscar B. Abbott and Brigadier General Ralph B. Lovett. Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee was commander of Services of Supply for the European Theater of Operations and deputy theater commander for administration.

3. Eisenhower replied on April 17 that Marshall's suggestion to establish a single commander to handle replacements was "one that I have been contemplating. The real difficulty is to find exactly the right man because he must be tough but understanding, and broadly experienced but still full of energy. Moreover, he must be able to get along easily with people." He was not able to name anyone at present. "You can be sure that no objections on the part of subordinate commanders or staffs will deter me from setting up any system that appears to me to be the most efficient," wrote Eisenhower. (*The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, ed. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., et al. [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970– ], 3: 1827–29.) This problem with the rear areas continued; see Marshall to Eisenhower, November 2, 1944, pp. 648–49.



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
*Secret*

April 13, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

In view of our failure to secure aggressive action by the Yunnan Force at this critical period of the campaign in Burma, I sent a message to Stilwell on April seventh suggesting the allocation of all or most of the "Hump" tonnage to Chennault's 14th Air Force or the requirements of the B-29 heavy bombers in China. Yesterday a radio was received from Stilwell stating his agreement with this view and further, that he had immediately allocated the remaining tonnage in April to the 14th Air Force.<sup>1</sup>

I hope this procedure meets with your approval.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On April 7, in a staff-prepared message, General Marshall noted that a large part of the Hump tonnage for March not allocated to the Fourteenth Air Force had been for equipment and maintenance of the Yunnan force, which Chiang Kai-shek refused to use to attack a Japanese division of one-sixth the manpower. If the Yunnan force was not going to be used against the Japanese, then Stilwell should consider diverting that tonnage to the Fourteenth Air Force or to the B-29 project. (Marshall to Stilwell, Radio No. WAR-20146, April 7, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-20146)].) Stilwell replied on April 11 that he agreed. "Since Generalissimo won't fight in spite of all his promises and all and every effort on our part to make him do so we have diverted all the remaining tonnage allocated by this Headquarters to Chinese agencies for April to 14th Air Force except those that are essential to lines of communications for that force. Recommend that China National Aviation Corps contract be cancelled and planes be taken over by the Air Transport Command." (Stilwell to Marshall, Radio No. CFBX-15985, April 11, 1944, *ibid.*, [CM-IN-7989].) For a discussion of Allied efforts to persuade the Generalissimo to use the Y-Force, see Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* (Washington: GPO, 1956), pp. 304-14. For further information, see Marshall to Ho Ying-chin, April 15, 1944, pp. 413-14.

2. The president replied that he "heartily" agreed with Marshall's message regarding allocation of Hump tonnage. (Colonel Richard Park, Jr., Memorandum for Colonel McCarthy, April 14, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 580.81, Case 28].)

TO DAVID LAURANCE CHAMBERS<sup>1</sup>

April 14, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mr. Chambers: I have just received your letter of April 8.<sup>2</sup>

My letter of April 1 did not carry a specific protest directed to you by General Marshall. I merely felt that you would be interested in having me pass along his invariable and inevitable reaction. I am familiar with it as a result of three years' service in his office.

General Marshall has no idea that he can suppress such writing. His feeling is that his relations with the Army—men as well as commanders—is far more apt to be unfavorably prejudiced by such publicity rather than benefited. The Regular Army personnel in particular is suspicious of the



basis or inspiration for write-ups of this character, and he feels, or rather realizes, that their confidence is essential to the successful leadership of the Army.<sup>3</sup> Sincerely,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. This document was written by Marshall for the signature of Colonel Frank McCarthy, secretary of the General Staff.

2. Chambers, president of the Bobbs-Merrill Company, had written to Colonel McCarthy on April 8 in reply to McCarthy's April 1 letter stating that it was General Marshall's desire that his biography not be written at that time. William Frye, in charge of War Department coverage for the Associated Press, was under contract with Bobbs-Merrill Company to write Marshall's biography. The Bureau of Public Relations had already informed Frye that neither the War Department nor individual officers on duty could offer him any assistance. McCarthy insisted that Marshall was "firm in his feeling that the publication of a biography would be detrimental to his best performance of the task in which he is now engaged." He recommended that Chambers seek an agreement with Frye to abandon the project. (McCarthy to Chambers, April 1, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Chambers replied that "the time for the book is now." Rather than being detrimental to the chief of staff's performance, he believed that the book would win Marshall even wider support for his policies. The people were entitled to know that their trust was not misplaced. "Mr. Frye has found his admiration confirmed and increased at every step of his research. The more he has learned of his career, his character, his ideas, the more he has been impressed with them," wrote Chambers. (Chambers to McCarthy, April 8, 1944, *ibid.*)

3. Chambers replied, "We do not mean to contest his personal wish, however mistaken we think the ground for it may be." If a request came from General Marshall himself, they would delay publication until hostilities ended. (Chambers to McCarthy, April 25, 1944, *ibid.*) William Frye suspended his research on the project in the spring of 1944 and went to the European theater as a war correspondent. (Frye to Marshall, December 6, 1945, *ibid.*) Bobbs-Merrill Company did publish Frye's *Marshall: Citizen Soldier* in 1947.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

April 15, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

General Clark is in the United States in seclusion at White Sulphur Springs for a brief rest. To meet General Wilson's instructions he must leave for Italy on or before Friday, April 21. Immediately upon his arrival, we rushed him down to White Sulphur and we have been successful thus far in concealing the fact that he is in the United States. It would be most unfortunate if the Germans should secure this information at present as it would be rather definite indication either of his relief or that no offensive operations now threatened.

Would you care to see him? If so, I suggest that he fly down to your place on Tuesday.<sup>1</sup> We can fly him down from White Sulphur and return him there the same day. We have not seen him here in the War Department but are planning to spirit him into the Pentagon from the airfield Monday A.M. and send back that afternoon.<sup>2</sup>



GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark met with President Roosevelt, who was visiting at Bernard Baruch's estate in South Carolina, on April 18. (Colonel Richard Park, Jr., Memorandum for Colonel Frank McCarthy, April 17, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected]; Clark, *Calculated Risk*, p. 336.)

2. For further information on Clark's visit to the United States, see Marshall to Clark, April 11, 1944, pp. 400-401.

TO CHARLES A. PLUMLEY  
*Confidential*

April 15, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mr. Plumley: Since receiving your letter urging the continuation of the ROTC system of officer procurement, I have been going very carefully into all the pros and cons and have interviewed a number of officers in the matter.<sup>1</sup>

The value of the ROTC and the quality of its output cannot be questioned. I do not know what we would have done without the thousands of young Reserve officers produced by the ROTC under the peacetime regime. However, in the opinion of the War Department and in my personal opinion it cannot currently meet our wartime requirements nor can it be satisfactorily adapted to our immediate needs.

In normal times the ROTC student had four years of college, accompanied by two years of basic and two years of advanced military training. Added to this was six weeks of field training before he received his commission. By this time he was usually 23 or 24 years of age and was quite mature, along with a background of a sound college education and considerable military training. If a similar period could be devoted to the training of officers at the present time it would be highly desirable to do so but the time available does not permit us such a solution.

Today we require officers who are young and vigorous, yet they must be sufficiently mature to exercise the necessary command and control over their fellowmen. Also they must have a sufficient educational basis to permit a quick and extensive technical training for the particular job they are to do. Even if the normal college course is accelerated by a reduction to three years or even to two and a half years, the time is still much too long for our purpose. Furthermore, most of such men who would be available to enter college now would be very young, just reaching 18. When they finished a two or three year college course they would still be immature so far as leadership qualifications go. It has been demonstrated affirmatively that the very young men just out of college do not usually measure up to the necessary standards regarding leadership; for example, in the Infantry Officer Candidate School less than 50% of ROTC graduates who were under 21 years of age successfully completed the course, while high school



graduates whose experience had been rounded out by a year or more in the ranks were found to have acquired the ability to handle men in a sufficiently satisfactory manner for purposes of leadership.

There are other factors in this matter which are almost equally determining for us. There has been great confusion over the drastic and sudden reduction made in the Army Specialized Training Program.<sup>2</sup> No one regretted this action, not excepting college presidents, more than I did, and I was personally responsible for it. The fact of the matter was, if the war was to proceed in accordance with the plans to which we were committed, I was left no choice in the matter except to disband 10 Infantry divisions and 25 separate battalions of antiaircraft or tank destroyer units. It had to be one or the other, and immediately. We required the immediate presence in various organizations of several hundred thousand men who had already had their basic training and who were of a quality that promised quick advancement into positions of at least noncommissioned officer leadership. This distressing situation arose from the fact that the Army was 200,000 men short of its quota according to the schedule on which our plans of operation were based and even though the men were delivered later we were still short because they were untrained. I had exhausted the Army resources in the way of economies, drastic reductions of garrisons (this is most confidential) in the Western Hemisphere, and the transfer of most of the key noncommissioned officer personnel of the vigorous type who were manning our installations throughout continental U.S.

For your confidential information we were short, seriously short, young men in the Mediterranean, in England, and the Southwest Pacific, largely because of the fact that since last July we have been running behind the induction schedule every month until the last week of March.<sup>3</sup> This situation also bears on the question of the ROTC. To reestablish these units on the normal basis at the present time would require us not only to create further shortages for troops in active operations but would also open us to severe attack for an apparent inconsistency which would open the door to damaging infiltrations all along the line.

If our troop ceiling were raised from 7,700,000 to a larger figure and the Selective Service could give us the young men which they are having an extraordinary difficulty today in doing, the reestablishment of a normal ROTC would be easy of accomplishment, but the conditions are quite different. The Army has tried its best to be economical of manpower. In one way or another since the first of July we have brought about economies totaling approximately 1,250,000 men, but at the same time we have been forced to provide additional units of one special kind or another to the number of approximately 715,000. And along with this we have had a steady deficit in the induction of men for the Army and a constantly increasing age average.



I have to look at these matters from the viewpoint of the war round the world paralleled by the difficulties of making both ends meet here in Washington.

To keep the ROTC organization alive so that the system may be immediately restored upon the cessation of hostilities we have adopted the Specialized Training Reserve Program under which young men of 17 will be given from six to nine months of college training before they enter active military service. When the war ends we will have the organization and the schools with which to resume the regular ROTC system without the necessity of a difficult period of reorganization. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Charles A. Plumley—a Republican member of the United States House of Representatives from Vermont, who served on appropriations subcommittees for agriculture and the navy—wrote to General Marshall on February 28 expressing his concern over the War Department's negative policies regarding the continuance of R.O.T.C. and the Army Specialized Training Program. Congressman Plumley indicated that the U.S. Congress wished to see these programs retained. He pointed out the value of R.O.T.C. in producing officers, and he suggested that the absence of R.O.T.C. and the Army Specialized Training Program, when coupled with the lowering of the draft age to eighteen, would "create a hiatus in the future of well-educated American young manhood." He stated that if Selective Service inducted six hundred thousand Americans annually then sixty thousand should be shifted to colleges offering R.O.T.C., in order for them to pursue academic and military instruction for approximately two and one-half years. Plumley concluded by comparing the U.S. Army policy unfavorably with that of the U.S. Navy, which was continuing its Naval R.O.T.C. and Navy College Training Program. (Plumley to Marshall, February 28, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].) General Marshall had discussed this issue with Brigadier General Edward W. Smith, executive for Reserve and R.O.T.C. affairs, and Wilton B. Persons, chief of the Legislative and Liaison Division, in his office on March 16. (McCarthy Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, March 15, 1944, *ibid.*)

In a related matter, Major General Charles E. Kilbourne, the superintendent of the Virginia Military Institute, had informed Marshall on March 27 that a number of individuals who had completed the R.O.T.C. course were being denied commissions for physical reasons yet the same individuals were being accepted for military service as enlisted men. General Marshall responded on April 10 that such individuals would receive their commissions as second lieutenants if they were inducted into the service of the Army of the United States within five years of having completed the R.O.T.C. course. (Kilbourne to Marshall, March 27, 1944, and Marshall to Kilbourne, April 10, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. For information on the reduction of the Army Specialized Training Program, see the editorial note on pp. 285–86 and Marshall Memorandum for the Secretary of War, February 10, 1944, pp. 286–89.

3. For information on the manpower shortage, see Marshall Memorandum for the Under Secretary of War, March 17, 1944, pp. 351–52.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Secret*

April 15, 1944

[Washington, D.C.]

The attached notes on conditions in France were dictated by General



T. Bentley Mott, whom you perhaps know. If not, he was our Attache in France for many years and has spent most of his adult life in France. He married a Frenchwoman, with Foch as his best man. She has since died.

Frank McCoy tells me that Mott was allowed (apparently through oversight) more or less complete liberty in Unoccupied France for a long time and only rather recently was he taken under surveillance. He therefore had a good opportunity to sense French reactions.

The attached notes were given, I think, to General McCoy and sent by him to Mr. Stimson. I am having a group of three officers, one from Operations, one from G-2 and one from the Civil Affairs Division, call on General Mott in the hospital near New York to collect all the data that he is able to give them which bears on our immediate problems.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Brigadier General T. Bentley Mott (U.S.M.A., 1886) had lived in France most of his years since 1900, when he was first assigned as military attaché at the American Embassy in Paris. He later served as General John J. Pershing's representative to Marshal Ferdinand Foch's staff and as military attaché in Paris from 1919 to 1930. Since 1941 he had been in Paris in charge of the European Office of the American Battle Monuments Commission. Mott had been arrested by the German Gestapo in fall 1943 but was released by the Germans and returned to the United States in March 1944. Major General Frank R. McCoy, president of the Foreign Policy Association in New York City, had sent to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson the notes that Mott had dictated on April 11, while in a New York hospital, giving his impression of conditions in France. Stimson sent the notes to General Marshall. (McCoy to Stimson, April 12, 1944, NA/RG 107 [SW Safe, French].) Mott was of the opinion that the French people did not regard General de Gaulle's French Committee of National Liberation as the legitimate government of France. He stated that the French people had no more regard for Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain. "Very few people in France look to de Gaulle to save, guide or reconstruct their country," wrote Mott. "And there is nobody else." He stated that the French population seemed to have placed their faith in the U.S. Army. "The great mass of Frenchmen believe and pray that it will be the Americans who are going to drive the Germans out of France, the Americans who are going to occupy and administer the country," wrote Mott. He indicated that the French Committee was not as popular with the French people as the American newspaper reporters claimed, who received their information from sources favorable to General de Gaulle. (Mott notes on France, April 11, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) For further discussion, see Marshall Memorandum for the President, April 18, 1944, pp. 421–22.

TO GENERAL HO YING-CHIN  
Radio No. WAR-23478. *Top Secret*

April 15, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

TOPSEC to General Hearn and General Stilwell for their eyes only personal from General Marshall.

Please deliver following to Ho Ying Chin:

"I was delighted to receive your message announcing your decision for the advance of the Y force to seize Tengchung-Lungling areas.<sup>1</sup> This may



well be the decisive blow in the campaign to regain control of north Burma. I am confident of the success of the movement if you can get it under way immediately and aggressively. I am sending your message on to the President who is in the south at present, for I know he will be greatly pleased to learn of your decision.”<sup>2</sup>

I leave to your (Stilwell’s) judgment whether readjustment of HUMP tonnage is warranted to assist Yunnan forces.<sup>3</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-23478])

1. On April 14 Major General Thomas G. Hearn, chief of staff of U.S. Army Forces, C.B.I., transmitted a message from the minister of war and chief of staff of the Chinese Army, Ho Ying-chin, that China had been working on plans for offensive action against the Japanese. General Ho stated that “China has always realized her position with regard to offensives by United Nations, and it has only been because of time and lack of essential equipment that such action has not taken place before this time. . . . Decision to move part of Y Force across Salween was made on initiative of Chinese without influence of outside pressure, and was based on realization that China must contribute its share to common war effort.” Hearn added that his office was making no comment regarding General Ho’s message, except that “it is felt Chinese military leaders in all probability feel they have lost much face by failure to act. Above message appears to be attempt to convince War Department that Chinese are capable of making necessary military decisions.” He also noted that it would be necessary to restore tonnage to the Y-Force since operations were projected. (Hearn to Marshall, Radio No. 16100, April 14, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-IN-10243)].) For information on diverting tonnage, see Marshall Memorandum for the President, April 13, 1944, p. 408. For a discussion of the Chinese decision to attack across the Salween River into Burma, see Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell’s Command Problems*, pp. 312–14.

2. General Ho acknowledged General Marshall’s message on April 21 and stated that it had been submitted to the Generalissimo. “Since our chief aim is to beat our common enemy,” replied Ho, “the Chinese forces are fully prepared to do their utmost in anything that is beneficial to our joint war effort in order to accelerate the successful development of the Allied campaign in Burma as well as to meet the warm expectations of your great President.” (Sunderland and Romanus, eds., *Stilwell’s Personal File*, 4: 1645.)

3. Hearn notified General Marshall on April 15 that tonnage was being restored to the Y-Force. (Hearn to Marshall and Stilwell, Radio No. JFBX-16145, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-IN-10769)].) The Chinese crossed the Salween River in mid-May. For information on the Chinese offensive, see Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell’s Command Problems*, pp. 329–60.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
*Secret*

April 17, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

A message from Stilwell dated April sixteenth has just been received in which he reports the receipt by him of a radio from the Generalissimo asking for details on the Imphal situation and stating that since in the Mogaung Valley the terrain is “good for attacking and defending”, he, Stilwell, is to use great caution from now on in handling the operation. Stilwell states that judging from the recent actions of his Chinese division



commanders he strongly suspects that they have received orders direct from the Generalissimo either to slow down the advance or to stop it entirely right where they now are.<sup>1</sup>

The resistance in Wakawng has, in Stilwell's opinion, been broken and he anticipates little trouble in moving rapidly to Kamaing. For Myitk[y]ina they have set up a surprise attack which has a good chance for success, he feels. If for any reason this attack should be sabotaged Stilwell believes it would cheat us of the opportunity to attain some of the main objectives and would have a very damaging effect on the whole campaign.

Whether the action of the Generalissimo is the result of failure to appreciate the situation or the result of a lack of determination along with an excuse for not using the Yunnan Force, or even a desire to see the British in trouble, he (S) does not know. But he is unable otherwise to explain the increasing peculiar attitudes of his division commanders and must assume that they have received orders from the Generalissimo direct to slow down activities.

Stilwell states he will of course endeavor to handle the situation but he wants us to be prepared for eventualities. He feels that the Generalissimo acts on the basis that he is entirely free to give orders direct to his people without reference to anyone else, including Stilwell, and in effect ignores the fact that exclusive of our important Air Force there are 34,000 Americans involved in the effort and that the U.S. has a big stake in the enterprise.<sup>2</sup>

Stilwell urges that a message be sent by you to the Generalissimo to the effect that you feel you should be consulted before drastic action is taken regarding Chinese troops which would seriously affect the U.S. forces in that region.

At the moment my recommendation is that you do not, repeat not, send any message to the Generalissimo. It may be that events of the next few days will make other action appear desirable but I am inclined to think in view of the numerous messages you have already sent that further action at the time would weaken somewhat the effect of what you have already done and to a greater extent what you may wish to do later.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. "Whether it is plain stupidity or lack of determination as an excuse for not using Y Force or a desire to see British in trouble I do not know," reported Stilwell, "but the petty protests and increasing antics of the Division Commanders I cannot explain any other way than assuming that they have been ordered by the Generalissimo on a sit down strike." (Stilwell to Marshall, Radio No. CAC-663, April 16, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-IN-11727)].)

2. "The Chinese contribution would be useless without American equipment and supply, transport, medical service and engineering," stated Stilwell. "I recommend that to his attention this fact be brought and on any such vital matters that the US President insist on being consulted." (Ibid.)



ON November 2, 1943, General Marshall had submitted a proposal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to “consider whether or not they are willing to approve for planning purposes the idea of a single Department of War in the post-war period, the details of which could be settled later.” According to Marshall, “planning for the post-war period would be greatly facilitated by a decision at this time as to whether or not there will be a single department.” (Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, enclosure to “A Single Department of War in the Post-war Period,” J.C.S. 560, November 2, 1943, NA/RG 218 [JCS, CCS 040]. For background on this proposal, see Marshall Memorandum for Brigadier General W. F. Tompkins, October 20, 1943, pp. 160–61.)

The proposal was referred for study to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, which reported on March 8, 1944, that it saw no prospect of “being able to produce a comprehensive study of the problem on the scale which its scope and importance demand.” The J.S.S.C. likewise recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff appoint a special committee to make a detailed study and recommendations as to the “most efficient practicable organization of that part of the executive branch of our government which is primarily concerned with national defense.” The committee also recommended that the Joint Chiefs “approve for purposes of planning and study the idea of a single military organization.” (Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, “Reorganization of National Defense,” J.C.S. 749, March 8, 1944, NA/RG 218 [JCS, CCS 040]. For discussion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense, see note 2, Marshall Memorandum for the Chief, Army Ground Forces, April 30, 1944, pp. 444–45.)

On the same date, March 8, 1944, Congressman James W. Wadsworth introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives calling for a Select Committee on Post-war Military Policy “to investigate all matters relating to the post-war military requirements of the United States.” The House approved the resolution on March 28. (H. Res. 465, *Congressional Record*, 78th Cong., 2d sess., vol. 90, pt. 2, p. 2398, and vol. 90, pt. 3, pp. 3199–3207.) Clifton A. Woodrum, Virginia Democrat and head of the Deficiency Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, was appointed chairman of the select committee, which became known as the Woodrum Committee; its hearings began on April 24, 1944. ★

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING  
*Top Secret*

April 17, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

I have your memorandum of 13 April on the subject of reorganization of



the national defense. I also have in mind Admiral Leahy's memorandum of 5 April and my own of 2 April. From these it appears that we are in general agreement on this subject, except that Admiral Leahy in agreeing to a committee to make the study does not mention the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff.<sup>1</sup>

*I now concur in your proposal of the 13th of April.* However, the procedure to be set up does not appear sound.

In my opinion, no useful purpose will be served by further committee study of the broad question of whether we are to have one, two or three defense departments. This has been under study for years by committees and boards, both civilian and military. Another committee can add little, if anything, to the knowledge the Chiefs of Staff already have on the broad question. The latest study on this subject is the one under current consideration. In this case the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, which is the agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider such broad questions of policy, studied the question for a period of months and came out with a definite recommendation that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve *for purposes of planning and study* the principle of three services within one military organization. I favor the acceptance of this basic principle. Unless the general principle is accepted, I do not see how we can make any useful progress towards a solution of the details.

Various related but subordinate questions in our national defense set-up, such as duplication of facilities, functions, missions, roles of the Army and Navy, air organization, all have for years been the subject of study by committees and joint agencies and, in my opinion, little of importance has resulted. The solution of these related questions depends upon a sound organization at the top. In the Army we experienced the same difficulties over a period of years which we are now experiencing in the over-all military organization. We never achieved a satisfactory solution to many questions of organization, functions, etc., until we settled upon a military head to the Army in the Chief of Staff, supported by a General Staff.

Once we settle upon a sound organization at the top, committees under the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff can proceed without great difficulty to solve most of our detailed problems. However, these committees will get nowhere without the acceptance of the principle, but will almost instantly run into blind alleys and come back with split reports, generating harmful suspicions or hard feelings. The time has come, in my opinion, when the basic decision is no longer a matter for committees.

I do not intend to go into a discussion of a single military department, but I do want to mention the following considerations which appear extremely pertinent at the present time.

1. The Woodrum Committee has started its work. I am told that this committee will explore the possibility of creating a single department



of national defense, avoiding the universal military service question for the moment because of its political implications. If we cannot solve the question it is going to be solved for us, and probably in a manner which neither the War nor the Navy Departments would desire. It is therefore desirable that, if possible, we present a united view on this matter. Above all, I do not want to be forced into a position where my statements or attitude might in any way interfere with the smooth working of our present joint organization.<sup>2</sup>

2. The War Department Special Planning people, who have been working on questions of post-war organization, demobilization, etc., for over a year, agree that a decision as to whether we are to have one department or two or three is necessary as a basis for sound post-war planning. Some of the problems which are affected are: size, organization, and distribution of Air Forces; organization of Service Forces; retention and disposition of government-owned manufacturing and other facilities.

3. As to timing, I am in agreement that we must do nothing to interfere in any way with the prosecution of the war. But I am convinced that, from a practical viewpoint, no efficient major reorganization can be successfully accomplished in time of peace. But unless we have developed an approved basis for the reorganization before the close of hostilities we will be in a very unfortunate position, as concerns the National Defense.

I repeat that I concur in your proposal of 13 April though I feel that the procedure will probably be ineffective and time consuming.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. In J.C.S. 749, "Reorganization of National Defense," the Joint Strategic Survey Committee had proposed that a special committee study the matter of organization and coordination of military services in order to "eliminate unwarranted duplication and to most effectively fight the war," as well as to obtain ultimately the most efficient organization of national defense. (Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, March 8, 1944, J.C.S. 749, NA/RG 218 [JCS, CCS 040].) In J.C.S. 749/1, Admiral King recommended that the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff be ex-officio members of the special committee "in order to furnish guidance without undue calls upon the time of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." He also recommended that the special committee not be restricted in its directive to a single military department organized with three services, but that it examine the "relative advantages, disadvantages and practicability of the following basic systems of organization: (1) Two departments—War and Navy. (2) Three departments—War, Navy, Air. (3) One Department of War (or of Defense)." (Memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, March 29, 1944, J.C.S. 749/1 [March 31, 1944], *ibid.*) On April 2, General Marshall responded by proposing that the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff be given the entire responsibility to study the matter, and he recommended substituting the words "Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff" for the word "Committee" in the proposal. (Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, April 2, 1944, J.C.S. 749/2, *ibid.*) On April 5, Admiral Leahy recommended that the special committee have a free hand to study the issue on the basis of a one-, two-, or three-department organization, rather than assuming that a



single organization be approved for planning purposes. "I cannot yet agree," wrote Leahy, "that the *principle* of three services in one military organization should be *recognized* by a Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee." He omitted any reference to the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff but instead agreed to the original proposal that a special committee consisting of two officers of the U.S. Army, one of whom would be from the U.S. Army Air Forces, and two officers of the U.S. Navy be appointed to make a detailed study and recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Memorandum by the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, April 5, 1944, J.C.S. 749/3, *ibid.*)

Then on April 13 Admiral King wrote to General Marshall that the navy member of the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff was "already overwhelmed with work" and was "not in a position to carry on this special work, except in the way of guidance of the committee's activities." King therefore recommended that the special committee work under the direct supervision of the deputies, and that the committee submit recommendations to the J.D.C.S. for subsequent transmission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (King Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, April 13, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 370.01, Case 13].)

2. For more information on the Woodrum Committee hearings, see the following document and Marshall Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, April 23, 1944, pp. 431-33.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR  
*Top Secret*

April 17, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Subject: Woodrum Committee.

Senator Wadsworth told me that the Woodrum Committee would begin its hearings next Monday and instead of starting off with universal military training the first item on the agenda will be the reorganization of the War and Navy Departments. From my point of view this is unfortunate, but to be accepted as unavoidable. The point with me is this, that if I appear before the Committee I would want to state all the reasons why I consider a reorganization imperative and in doing so I would feel it necessary, in order to put across my point of view with the Committee, to analyze and, in a sense, discard most of the fallacious arguments that may be advanced by the opponents of the reorganization.

Most of the opposition it is assumed, I hope incorrectly, will come from the Navy and this would mean that a completely frank and vigorous statement by me might well, in effect, prejudice the future harmonious dealings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. First things to be treated first demand that nothing occur which will be harmful to the war effort, and harmony between the Army and Navy is of paramount importance. Therefore I am embarrassed as to how to meet the dilemma.

I think that after General John Palmer gives them an historical background regarding the National Defense and its fundamental requirements, you should appear, and Colonel Knox, Mr. Lovett, Judge Patterson and I presume some of the Secretariat of the Navy Department. This would keep the affair on a high level and would probably result in burning off most of



the long grass in the way of newspaper publicity before we get down to more of detail.

General McNarney will be back by that time and he is fully cognizant of all the pros and cons in the matter. He could appear along with General Somervell for the ASF, and General Giles for the Air, with other minor officials on details which will suggest themselves.

I should wish to keep Arnold out as long as I am out and I should prefer that I do not get involved in the first phases of the investigation for the reasons mentioned above. Senator Wadsworth thought this might be arrangeable though I doubt it.

Should Admiral King appear early in the affair and give testimony in opposition to the reorganization then I should certainly wish to move in myself in a vigorous manner though I should deplore this necessity.<sup>1</sup>

I have dictated the foregoing rather hurriedly but it gives my rough ideas at the moment.

G. C. Marshall

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. In early April the Special Planning Division issued a policy statement to guide War Department representatives testifying before the Woodrum Committee: "It is highly important that the testimony of such representatives be mutually consistent and also in consonance with the official War Department viewpoint." The official War Department line was enumerated; the first point was: "The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, has recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, for purposes of providing unity of command, of economy, and for the elimination of duplication and overlapping, there should be created a Single Department of War." (Otto L. Nelson Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, April 10, 1944, NA/RG 107 [SW Safe, Post-war Military Policy].)

The hearings commenced on April 24, and the committee of inquiry discussed the question of reorganization of the postwar military services into a single department, which would include a separate air force. John McA. Palmer took the lead for the War Department witnesses by testifying in support of a single department. On the twenty-fifth, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson presented his prepared statement. (See Marshall Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, April 23, 1944, pp. 431-33.) That same day, McNarney detailed the War Department's unification proposals, which included a single armed forces secretary, the continuation of the current service chief and Joint Chiefs of Staff organizations, an under secretary to head each of the three services, and a service of supply to control items "not peculiar to any one service." (Statement by Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Before the Select Committee on Post-war Military Policy, House of Representatives, April 25, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 370.01, Sec. 3-A].)

On April 26 Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert A. Lovett testified for a separate air force. Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson and Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, chief of the Army Service Forces, testified to the existence of inefficiency in logistical support due to the lack of interservice coordination. On April 28 Under Secretary James V. Forrestal began the testimony on behalf of the Navy Department since Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox had suffered a heart attack several days earlier. (Secretary Knox, who favored unification, died that afternoon.) Forrestal presented the navy's position that the question of military organization should be studied further, and it should not be assumed that a single department was agreed upon until completion of an objective study. No decision, even "in principle," on the unification of the departments could be taken until the war had concluded. (For the Woodrum Committee hearings, see House Select Committee on Post-war Military Policy, *Proposal to Establish a Single Department of Armed Forces*,



78th Cong., 2d sess., 1944. Major Lawrence J. Legere, Jr., presents his study in "Unification of the Armed Forces," [Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1950], pp. 271-81. For the navy's side, see Vincent Davis, *Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943-1946* [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966], pp. 39-67.)

The hearings were adjourned on April 28 and were reconvened on May 10, when the Navy Department continued with its witnesses. On May 19 the hearings ended, with none of the Joint Chiefs of Staff having testified before the Woodrum Committee. (For further developments, see Marshall Memorandum for the Secretary of War, April 22, 1944, pp. 426-27, and Marshall Memorandum for the Chief, Army Ground Forces, April 30, 1944, pp. 444-45.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Secret*

April 18, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Since my note to you of April fifteenth transmitting General T. Bentley Mott's comments regarding the situation in France, the group of officers to which I referred called on Mott and discussed in detail his written statement which you have.<sup>1</sup>

It now appears that General Mott has somewhat tempered his views which I summarize as follows:

Secretary [Cordell] Hull's announcement of our plans for a civil government in Reoccupied France was statesmanlike by proposing to use De Gaulle but not to set him up as a dictator.

The French people are in dire need of a leader but there is no one in France who can qualify. Being pro-Giraud does not prevent a Frenchman from being pro-De Gaulle; only extremists find that there is a cleavage.<sup>2</sup>

The French people fear the Committee of National Liberation more than they fear De Gaulle. The De Gaulle organization has been inept in its propaganda broadcasts to France.

At the present time in all echelons the government of France is accomplished by officials with a German at their side. Requisitions are made by French officers who are targets for part of the unpopularity which requisitions occasion. Mott feels that a practicable means of controlling civil government in the early stages would be merely to replace these Germans by Americans.

Mott states that there are plenty of active men in France. Germany received no conscripted laborers from February 1943 to February 1944. The highest proportion of available young men is probably in the former Unoccupied area.

There are 60,000 to 100,000 Communists, many of whom escaped from Spain, who are now running loose in France. These are trouble-makers and as a result there is a great deal of thuggery going on.



There is adequate food in France for all but young children and mothers. Butter is being sent from Normandy to Germany. Fuel is the greatest need.

Discussing Giraud, Mott said that Weygand's<sup>3</sup> son, who served under Giraud, told him that G was very much of an individualist and was inclined to be non-cooperative; in battle he would shove ahead without bothering to notify either his higher commander or the units on his flank.

While living in Paris General Mott stayed at the Bristol Hotel, largely occupied by German Army and Gestapo officers. His sources of information were old French Army friends, career civil servants and important business men who were producing war materials for the Germans. He had no specific knowledge of resistance movements and felt that reports have exaggerated their importance.<sup>4</sup>

G. C. Marshall

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. For background information, see Marshall Memorandum for the President, April 15, 1944, pp. 412-13.

2. For more information on the French situation and the positions of Generals Charles de Gaulle and Henri Giraud, see the editorial note on pp. 451-53.

3. General Maxime Weygand was the last commanding general of the armies of the Third Republic. He had served briefly as minister of defense in the Vichy government.

4. President Roosevelt returned this memorandum, after adding his penciled note along the entire left margin: "Where ignorance is bliss." (William D. Leahy Memorandum for General Marshall, April 21, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

Mott issued another installment of notes on April 20, in which he discussed the importance of the radio as a medium for disseminating information in France. (Major General Thomas T. Handy Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, April 24, 1944, *ibid.*)

TO SECOND LIEUTENANT ALLEN T. BROWN

April 18, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

*Dear Allen:* There have been several fairly lengthy and most interesting letters from you lately which give us a very good idea of your situation, and experiences.<sup>1</sup> We have also heard from Clifton frequently recently. Your mother seems to take the situation with considerable calm, though I imagine it is largely a matter of repressing feelings. In any event she never refers to it.

It rained Saturday but we got down to Leesburg about 11 Sunday; it started to rain but the sun came out as we arrived. I worked continuously except for thirty minutes for lunch until about six in the evening and got a great deal done but the main thing was that I cleared my brain for the trials of this week, which are pretty severe.



I can't discuss your affairs in a letter though I probably know more about them than you do. The war is moving very fast in the Pacific due to the fact that we have a large naval superiority with a tremendous force of carriers and can strike almost where we will on a 4,000-mile front which puts the enemy in a very difficult position and he is paying a heavy price. There are some 15,000 hopelessly cut off in the Marshall Islands and already on half rations with most of their antiaircraft ammunition gone. We have over 90,000 cut off in the South and Southwest Pacific, facing starvation and before long we will have still more on the shelf, and all this has been done with very few troops but it has required very stern fighting. Our hope is to utilize the mobility of the Navy so as to have things in the Pacific in such a condition that a long-drawn out struggle will not be possible for the Japanese.

The fighting in India is severe, under most difficult conditions of climate and jungle, trails and rivers. Deadly blows are being struck into Rumania by the Russian Army while our bombers are ripping up all the rail communications in the rear of the Germans on that front. The daily press probably keeps you advised of the gathering storm in England.

Altogether, however hard for us it is in any particular spot our enemies are in a dreadful dilemma.

Molly and the children are well, the latter almost too well from the viewpoint of activity. The nurse your mother found, who is excellent, went off Sunday to see her people and comes back Wednesday, bringing her sister, we hope. In the interim Molly is having a lively time because now that Kitty walks she is all over the place. With my love and prayers

Affectionately,

GCMRL/Research File (Family)

1. Marshall's stepson had recently been given command of a tank platoon, and they had moved again. "One thing I feel certain about is that we will be going into action somewhere before long," wrote Allen. "If I have half the luck I had with the New Zealanders I will consider myself a very lucky guy. I don't know who was taking care of me up there, but whoever it was, I hope they are along the next time." (Brown to Marshall, April 10, 1944, quoted in Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943-1945* [New York: Viking Press, 1973], p. 346.) For information regarding Allen's reference to the New Zealanders, see Marshall to Brown, March 21, 1944, p. 358.

TO WINSTON S. CHURCHILL  
Radio No. WAR-24751. *Top Secret*

April 18, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

TOPSEC to General Eisenhower for his eyes only from General Marshall.  
Please deliver the following message from General Marshall to the Prime Minister:



To get on with operations in the Mediterranean on a firm basis without further delay the U S Chiefs of Staff are agreeing to the directive for General Wilson proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff.<sup>1</sup> We must now throw everything we have in the Mediterranean into the battle in Italy in order to reduce the German capability to move forces to oppose OVERLORD.

Since Eisenhower's assault is not to be supported by a landing in southern France, every possible deceptive effort—air, sea and ground—in the Mediterranean will have to be utilized to hold the German Divisions in southern France during the critical days of OVERLORD. Wilson, with the means available, should be able to take prompt advantage to the utmost of the command of the sea and the tremendous air force in his theater.

Regarding LST's for later Pacific operations, our best estimates at this time indicate that there should be sufficient LST's for the various operations required to defeat Japan, but the definite allocation will have to be made on the basis of approved plans. The necessity of offsetting the delays in Naval and other ship construction created by the accelerated LST program is the reason for unwillingness here to continue at the rate of peak production.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-24751])

1. The British Chiefs of Staff proposed that the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean theater, General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, be sent a directive that Allied intentions in his theater were to: (1) launch an immediate all-out offensive in Italy to link the Anzio beachhead with the main front; (2) create the greatest possible threat "to contain German forces in Southern France," thereby diverting German divisions away from OVERLORD; and (3) to use the amphibious resources remaining in the Mediterranean theater to either support operations in Italy or to "take advantage of opportunities arising in the South of France or elsewhere." The main object was "to give the greatest possible assistance to OVERLORD by destroying or containing the maximum number of German formations in the Mediterranean." (British Chiefs of Staff to Joint Staff Mission, COS [W] 1285, April 16, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) For background information, see Marshall to Churchill, April 13, 1944, pp. 404-5.

TO ARTHUR HAYS SULZBERGER

April 19, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Sulzberger, Thanks for your note of April seventeenth.<sup>1</sup> I am glad you liked the picture.

I must apologize for troubling you to see two pictures, and it was only by a happy accident that I discovered that you had not seen "Know your Ally, Britain". The other picture I had never seen as it was a local production in England. I appreciate your taking the time to look at the second picture.

I understood from Capra that you had seen the "Prelude to War" and "The Nazi Strikes". If not I should like you to see them. There are three or



four other pictures in the educational group but from the point of view of our conversation they are not so important. I refer to “The Fall of France”, “The Battle of Britain”, the Chinese picture just completed and the Russian picture which is in two reels. There is another one done by the same Service on the negroes which was extraordinarily difficult to set up but I think they did a very good job considering the complications.<sup>2</sup>

As I told you, confidentially, the other day, Capra is at work on what to my mind is a movie of tremendous importance to the morale of the Army. It is being prepared in advance for release the moment we achieve a cessation of hostilities in the European theatre. We expect to have the reels stored in Australia, India, throughout the Pacific, in the Aleutians, etc., ready for immediate release the same day the word comes of the termination of fighting across the Atlantic. This will be unique in its purpose, in its complicated coverage and in the fact that it must be prepared long in advance, covering elaborate details of logistics, with the Disney technique, as well as other factors which naturally are hard to resolve into a definite form for facts and figures far in advance.<sup>3</sup> Faithfully yours,

P.S. If you wish to see any of these pictures at any time I will have them sent up to New York for private showing, and the use of the word “private” does not bar you from bringing in anybody you may wish to have see them with you.<sup>4</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Sulzberger, publisher of the *New York Times*, thanked Marshall for making arrangements for him to view the motion picture *Know Your Ally—Britain*, the work of director Frank Capra. “That’s a splendid picture,” wrote Sulzberger. “It is too bad that our civilian population, as well, can’t be allowed or forced to see it.” (Sulzberger to Marshall, April 17, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Marshall was referring to the documentary films *The Battle of China* and *The Battle of Russia* in the “Why We Fight” series and to *The Negro Soldier*. For a discussion of all the Frank Capra-directed films in the “Why We Fight” series and his other educational films produced for the War Department, see Victor Scherle and William Turner Levy, *The Films of Frank Capra* [Secaucus, N.J.: Citadel Press, 1977], pp. 195–221.)

3. The film *Two Down and One to Go* called for an all-out effort to defeat the last of the Axis powers—Japan—once Italy and Germany had surrendered. For further developments, see Marshall Memorandum for the Secretary of War, September 29, 1944, pp. 614–15.

4. Sulzberger replied that he had seen all of the films mentioned except *The Battle of China* and *The Negro Soldier*, which Marshall arranged for his viewing on May 4. After seeing these two films, Sulzberger noted that his first reaction was that “both pictures were extremely well done although . . . I feared that there had been too much glossing over of some of the less pleasant aspects of each problem. . . . I felt strongly, as did some of my associates, that in *THE BATTLE OF CHINA* the complete absence of any discussion of the conflict within China itself may prove to be a boomerang.” But he thought the film was “magnificent in the way it presents China’s history . . . and certainly the Japanese atrocity shots must stir anyone who sees them to a proper sense of outrage.” (Sulzberger to Marshall, April 21, 1944, and May 5, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR  
*Confidential*

April 22, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

In connection with your proposed testimony regarding consolidation of the War and Navy Departments and in particular the creation of a military group with authority to submit recommendations to the President regarding certain specified subjects only—strategy, military budget and its subdivisions—the following information may be useful as an indication of the inevitable pressure of the tax problem on all that pertains to military matters in time of peace and particularly following a war.<sup>1</sup>

*National Defense Act of  
June 4, 1920*

After hearings by the Wadsworth and Kahn Committees commencing I believe in the spring of '19 and closing with General Pershing's testimony in November of that year, a bona fide National Defense Act was placed on the statute books. It involved 18,936 officers and warrant officers and 280,000 enlisted men.

*February 7, 1921*

Less than nine months later, Congress passed a resolution directing the Secretary of War to cease enlisting men until the number should not exceed 175,000.

*June 30, 1921*

Five months later the Secretary of War was directed immediately to reduce the number of enlisted men to 150,000.

*June 30, 1922*

The Appropriation Act reduced the Officer Corps to 12,000 and the Regular Army to 125,000.

*Final Reduction*

Sufficient funds not being provided under the Appropriation Act referred to above, the Secretary of War was finally compelled to reduce the Army to 118,500 men for the fiscal year 1923.

Here in a short space of time following a long series of hearings, on the heels of war with all its lessons, an excellent measure was adopted by Congress and almost immediately thereafter emasculated in a series of destructive actions during which the Chief of Staff of the Army was practically impotent. I have a letter from General Pershing written in France and addressed to me in which he states that he has just learnt that the available funds will only maintain an Army of 110,000 and he can't imagine what they are thinking about.<sup>2</sup>

G. C. Marshall

NA/RG 107 (SW Safe, Post-war Military Policy)



1. Anticipating the Woodrum Committee's hearings on a single department of defense, Secretary Stimson wrote on April 17, "We are in favor of this last and the Navy is strongly against it and I envisage a terrific and acrimonious row over the subject on the Hill and in the press." On the eighteenth, Stimson talked with Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and "asked him his views on the consolidation of the War and the Navy Department into a single department of defense, and rather to my surprise I found that he was for it. I have had the idea that the Navy would be so strongly against it, that is the admirals, that he would hardly dare to be in favor of it." That same day Stimson "had a long talk of about an hour with General Marshall in which he elaborated his views." (April 17, 18, 1944, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 46: 184, 186].)

On April 20 General Marshall held a staff conference at which he explained that he was opposed to creating a single department of national defense unless the legislation included certain crucial provisions: the continuation of the office of the chief of staff to the commander in chief (ex-officio chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and the right of the service chiefs to "go direct to the President on important military decisions" without being disloyal to their civilian superiors. (Marshall had this right of access because Roosevelt had granted it in a mid-1939 executive order, but this did not bind future presidents.) Marshall recalled that when he was assisting General Pershing, during the crucial period prior to passage of the National Defense Act of 1920, Pershing was never in a position to present "the military angle of things" to President Woodrow Wilson. Marshall observed that in future peacetime, as in the past, the secretary of war "would be a political man and be greatly influenced by political considerations." (Notes on Conference in General Marshall's Office, April 20, 1944, NA/RG 165 [General and Special Staffs, O. L. Nelson File].)

2. "The War Department seems to be up against the real thing," General Pershing had written to Marshall on November 18, 1924. "The Budget Officer insists on reducing our estimates so that we shall not be able to have over 110,000 men. Just what this means I cannot understand. It looks as though a streak of pacifism had struck the Budget Officer, if he hasn't always had it. I do not know what is going to be done about it, but to my mind it is very discouraging." (Pershing to Marshall, November 18, 1924, LC/J. J. Pershing Papers [General Correspondence].)

For more information regarding Stimson's testimony, see Marshall Memorandum for the Secretary of War, April 17, 1944, pp. 419–21, and Marshall Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, April 23, 1944, pp. 431–33.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING

*Secret*

April 22, 1944

[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: J.C.S. 803/1 (Induction in Hawaii)

Since the receipt of your memorandum of April 20 on the above subject and my discussion with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Bard, and Admiral Crisp I have given a great deal of my time to searching out the complications in the matter and some method of meeting the issues.<sup>1</sup> The importance of the operational efficiency of Pearl Harbor and its intimate relationship to actual combat operations in the Pacific are thoroughly realized by me. I am also aware of the complication regarding shipping between Hawaii and the mainland which would be involved if large



numbers of individuals in Hawaii were drafted out of Hawaii and would have to be replaced from the civil economy of the Islands.

My embarrassment is to find a method that will not boomerang on the Army with destructive effect. General Handy<sup>2</sup> and I yesterday tried to find a means whereby we could make the rule solely apply to the Navy and the Army would take the heat but I found that insurmountable complications are involved there though I should be glad to do this if it were arrangeable.

I recognize that one of the complications in this affair, the Navy policy not to accept inductees in Hawaii, has a sound basis and that the Army can take a risk in this matter that the Navy should not. However, it greatly complicates the particular problem of the moment and the application of the same policy to Puerto Rico doesn't help matters.

I have a definite feeling of embarrassment in this matter by reason of the fact that the head of Selective Service is an Army officer and that the local Selective Service official in Hawaii is a Reserve officer of the Army. However, my relationship to these people has been wholly impersonal, in fact I have rarely ever seen General Hershey, I think I have had two conversations with him in the last two years, and I have never seen the man from Hawaii who in effect merely wears the uniform so far as Army affairs are concerned.

After a very searching consideration of the whole matter I have come to this conclusion: first, that destructive action so far as the Navy Pearl Harbor establishment is concerned will not occur during the next month. I am told that not more than probably 100 men would be involved in a separation from work with the Navy during that period. Therefore, secondly, I propose that we send our respective Inspector Generals to Hawaii immediately to make a searching investigation of the entire matter. I have already arranged for this on the Army side. Meanwhile I shall continue to study this to see if from my side some proposal can be developed which will meet your peculiar problem without a destructive reaction on the Army. I purpose talking to Mr. Bard again and going over with him some of the details that I was unaware of at the time of our conversation and I shall want to talk to you.

Finally, I suggest that in the interim the Navy accept the proposal of the Selective Service dated April 18 and addressed to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Bard, and that action be deferred on J.C.S. 803/1.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Major General Lewis B. Hershey, the director of Selective Service, informed Assistant Secretary of the Navy Ralph A. Bard on April 13 that it was his organization's intention to commence inducting men from the ages of eighteen to twenty-six in Hawaii, including those employed within the Fourteenth Naval District. On April 19 Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, in a memorandum regarding civilian employees of the War Department working overseas, informed General Marshall of the difficulties of removing men from the civilian labor force who were engaged in military-related work. "It is possible that our



problems are not the same as the Navy's," wrote Secretary Patterson, "and that our course of action should be independent." (Hershey Memorandum to The Honorable Ralph A. Bard, April 13, 1944, and Patterson Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, April 19, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 327.02].) On April 20 Admiral King had written: "We are justified in asking special treatment for Hawaii in this matter. Such action is certainly consistent with the attitude that the Army and Navy are taking as to the necessity for martial law in that Territory." (King Memorandum to General Marshall, April 20, 1944, NA/RG 80 [Central Correspondence of the Secretary of the Navy/Chief of Naval Operations, File P14-6/ND14].)

On April 22 Brigadier General Otto L. Nelson (U.S.M.A., 1924), assistant deputy chief of staff, informed Marshall that the territorial director for Selective Service for Hawaii, Lieutenant Colonel Solomon, reported that while the army was cooperating with Selective Service in Hawaii, the navy was not. Solomon gave his opinion that "the Navy in Hawaii is extravagant in their use of civilian personnel and in their requests for deferments." Nelson advised, "It appears that the Navy and Selective Service in Hawaii are embroiled in a fight in which the Army would do well not to become involved." (Nelson Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, April 22, 1944, *ibid.*) General Marshall had met with Assistant Secretary of the Navy Bard and Rear Admiral Frederick G. Crisp (U.S.N.A., 1913), director of civilian personnel for the Navy Department, on April 21.

2. Major General Thomas T. Handy was assistant chief of staff for Operations.

3. Admiral Ernest J. King replied on April 22 that the U.S. Navy was unwilling to concede to Hershey's proposal as outlined to Secretary Bard and that the navy was investigating the matter independently of the U.S. Army Inspector General's Office. Admiral King concluded that he was becoming convinced that President Roosevelt should be asked to "declare Hawaii, *as a combat area*, outside of the application of the Selective Service Act." (King Memorandum for General Marshall, April 22, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 327.02].)

TO L. FERDINAND ZERKEL

April 22, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mr. Zerkel, I am really very glad to have the map of the Valley Land and Improvement Company.<sup>1</sup> While I was about 10 years old at the time my memory regarding Luray, the Inn, the Caverns, the auctioning off of real estate, the excursion trains from the North with prospective buyers, and all the other manifestations of a boom period, is quite clear.

You mention my return visit to Luray at the time of the Officer Candidate School, about 1909, I think. I recall meeting Mr. Morrison at that time and I remember his father discussing the VMI with mother, also Colonel Charles Marshall, Lee's former Aide, who was a guest at the Inn at that time.<sup>2</sup>

In 1928 I paid an unexpected visit to Luray one evening, making a tour of the Caverns and motoring on to Upperville, Virginia.

I will have in mind your hospitable invitation should the opportunity develop where I can find time for such a pleasant visit.<sup>3</sup>

Please remember me to Mr. Morrison and with my thanks and regards to you, believe me, Faithfully yours,



GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Zerkel, commissioner for the Shenandoah National Park, had written from Luray, Virginia, to send an 1890 map of the Valley Land and Improvement Company, of which Marshall's father had been a partner. (Zerkel to Marshall, April 17, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].) Marshall recalled his father making "the great mistake of his life" by investing in the land boom and ultimately losing everything in *George C. Marshall Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue*, rev. ed. [Lexington, Va.: George C. Marshall Research Foundation, 1991], pp. 69-70.)

2. Marshall was assigned as an instructor for a week-long officers' camp for the Second Virginia Infantry held at Luray in May 1911. While there he had met Robert T. Morrison, currently the executive secretary of the Luray Chamber of Commerce, whose father, Colonel James H. Morrison, had been a member of the faculty at the Virginia Military Institute. (Zerkel to Marshall, April 17, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

3. Zerkel invited Marshall for a return visit to the Luray Caverns and surrounding attractions of the Shenandoah National Park and the scenic Skyline Drive, where "your likely wish for privacy is remembered" and "your wishes would be commands for Mr. Morrison and me." (Ibid.)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JACOB L. DEVERS  
Radio No. WAR-26520. *Secret*

April 22, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

For Devers' eyes only from Marshall. Clark left yesterday after good rest in seclusion and only one part day conference here and an afternoon with President. His presence here remained a secret.<sup>1</sup>

Have just read your letter of April 15th.<sup>2</sup> I like its tone and I have great confidence in what you are doing. I fear, in fact I feel certain that my radios regarding certain details have given you the idea of lack of confidence on my part and in effect thrown you on the defensive. Disregard such ideas because they are wholly incorrect.

I grow as exasperated with portions of the War Dept staff as I do with yours, Eisenhower's and MacArthur's yet the WD staff is in general magnificent. What I do try to do or actually do do is break through the congenital resistance that is normal to all staffs when we have a continuing trouble. In your case I still am in doubt because I am not convinced that Sawbridge is a fully capable driving executive or organizer. There has been much to indicate the contrary and by that I mean that a stronger man in his place would have broken through the organizational and staff difficulties and gotten much farther ahead. Radio me your very frank view on this.<sup>3</sup>

But be assured that I have great confidence in you and Clark and in your Corps and Division Commanders as they have been interpreted to me.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 1, Item 27)

1. For information on Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark's visit to the United States in April, see Marshall to Clark, April 11, 1944, pp. 400-401.



2. Devers had written to General Marshall on April 15 in response to Marshall's message of April 13 in which the chief of staff expressed his concerns about the general deficiencies of the replacement system. (See Marshall to Eisenhower, April 13, 1944, pp. 406–7.) "I am sure the reports which you have received with reference to the personnel and replacement situation are due to an unhealthy organization and situation which existed in this theater when I arrived in January," replied Devers. "There are many good things in this theater in spite of the many adverse reports which seem to be brought to your attention. I can assure you that we are correcting the many bad situations." Devers indicated that the various nationalities in his theater—French, Poles, Indians, Americans, British—made supply and replacement problems particularly difficult, but his staff had these matters under control. (Brigadier General Ben M. Sawbridge of Devers's staff had recently been in Washington, D.C., attempting to straighten out supply and replacement difficulties for the Mediterranean theater.) Devers reported that malaria was a problem for his command but measures were being taken to minimize the disease. He added that he was cleaning up discipline around airfields and that although problems persisted in relations with the French, their operational units were "excellent." In his opinion morale was the critical thing, there was too much talk of the superior fighting abilities of some German units—particularly the First and Fourth Paratroop divisions. Devers concluded that the troops in his theater were far better than they had been two months previously. (Devers to Marshall, April 15, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. On May 9 Devers informed the chief of staff: "Conditions in my command here are greatly improved. This includes ground, air and SOS." (Devers to Marshall, May 9, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) For further information regarding Devers's command in the Mediterranean theater and the French replacement situation, see the editorial note on pp. 451–53 and Marshall to Devers, May 16, 1944, p. 454.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY<sup>1</sup>

April 23, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

I have gone over the first draft of the Secretary's statement to be made before the Committee on Post-war Planning, copy attached. I have no suggestions to make except the following:

I believe you could clarify a little better the latter part of paragraph 7.<sup>2</sup> What I have in mind is that the Secretary might well endeavor to impress on the Committee the importance of arriving at a conclusion regarding the fundamental matter of consolidation. Once that is decided, even though not to be carried out until after the termination of hostilities—at least in the European theater—it is made far easier to settle questions of duplications. Many could readily be resolved once there is agreement on the fundamentals of the organization, and in effect we would gradually reach a point where the final consolidation would be almost painless.

Another point he might present, which I think should be greatly stressed is this: The dangers of such a hearing are that the committee becomes involved in details, trying to settle a multitude of vexing



problems all of which relate purely to details. Opposition to the consolidation will be based, I imagine in many instances, on fear regarding details. For example, the naval people fearful of their air being taken from them, or the Marine Corps fearful that it may be subjected to serious emasculation; our air people fearful that they will not get all the air they think they should have, etc., etc. If the Secretary could make clear to the committee the inadvisability of concerning themselves for a long time to come as to details and addressing their attention to the fundamentals of a proper organization, the whole matter could be handled much more simply.

In my opinion, once the fundamental basis of organization is agreed upon everything else is a detail readily solved having in mind that there will be but one Secretary, that all debates will be within the family, and at least the machinery we propose has a basis for orderly negotiations with *all* the facts on the table. I have taken some space to express these thoughts not intending that the Secretary should so elaborate, but I do think that the ideas should be put forward by him in order early in the game to give the committee a better basis of departure than they would normally have if left to their own devices.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Harvey H. Bundy was special assistant to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson.
2. Secretary Stimson insisted that "the creation of a single department of the armed forces . . . is essential if our nation is to adequately and most effectively carry on its wars under modern conditions and under the necessary limitations of our manpower and our resources." In paragraph seven of the draft, however, he wrote: "I do not believe that any such fundamental reorganization could take place at a critical period in this war without difficulties, dangers, and complications which would more than offset its advantages. We are now in the midst of great battles and, while we should continually plan for the best organization of battle forces, we should so time any actual changes in organization at the higher levels as to ensure that no slowing down of operations in the field will take place. Otherwise such changes made hastily might result in temporary disorganization and would be far too much of a strain on the men and machinery involved, particularly as they are now operating in high gear. You cannot radically change a great military organization at a critical moment of war any more than you could change the engine of an airplane while it was in flight." The latter part of paragraph seven of the draft stated: "On the other hand changes in the lower levels involving consolidations of authority and planning can be made even now and this has taken place already, as I have pointed out, in the separate theaters of operation. If it should be virtually decided upon that a similar combination at the top into a single department of armed services would be ultimately effected, knowledge of this would probably make possible many further avoidances of duplication." (First draft of Statement by the Secretary of War Before the Committee on Post-War Planning, April 25, 1944, NA/RG 107 [SW Office, Special Assistant Bundy]. For related information, see Marshall Memorandums for the Secretary of War, April 17 and 22, 1944, pp. 419-21 and 426-27.)
3. On April 25 Secretary Stimson read his prepared statement before the Woodrum Committee. "It seemed to take very well," Stimson recorded in his diary. "I argued for a decision as speedy as possible on the central question as to whether there should be one department after the war for the land, air and navy forces, and I argued strongly in favor of that, giving the reasons why it was peremptory in the present condition of modern warfare



and the size of our population. We are reaching the end of our manpower now under our present organization. That was the main point I made. I told them that the shortage did not occur from any lack of cooperation between the personnel of the military leaders. It was not the human element that produced these duplications and troubles but the organization itself and that was inevitable. Cooperation between military forces could never be as effective as combination. That was the text of my statement.” (April 25, 1944, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 46: 203].) Secretary Stimson’s statement is printed in House Select Committee on Post-war Military Policy, *Proposal to Establish a Single Department of Armed Forces*, 78th Cong., 2d sess., 1944, pp. 29–33.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Secret*

April 24, 1944

[Washington, D.C.]

With reference to your memorandum of 21 April, General Giraud’s presence in England in such a capacity might cause General Eisenhower difficulty or embarrassment at a time when he should be free to deal with major problems.<sup>1</sup> A message has been sent to Eisenhower asking him for his comments on General Giraud’s assignment to his staff in an advisory capacity. As soon as General Eisenhower’s views are received they will be transmitted to you.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On April 19 Secretary of State Cordell Hull had notified President Roosevelt that it was General Henri Giraud’s desire to be assigned as a technical adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean theater, or as a technical adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (London), or to Washington, D.C., as a technical adviser to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. General de Gaulle, president of the French Committee of National Liberation, had relieved General Giraud from any command responsibilities and from his position as commander in chief of Free French forces on April 14, 1944. Secretary Hull’s message to the president suggested that through State Department officials dealing directly with General Giraud, he should be told that the United States was appreciative of his contribution to the Allied war effort, that he could be granted political asylum in the United States if needed, but assigning him to any official capacity would have largely negative effects. Hull suggested that if Giraud decided to leave North Africa, it would be best if he went to England. On April 21 President Roosevelt asked for General Marshall’s opinions on the wisdom of assigning General Giraud to any official capacity. (Roosevelt Memorandum for General Marshall, April 21, 1944, and attached Hull Memorandum for the President, April 19, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 336 Security, Case 61]. For information on the French situation and Giraud’s removal from command, see the editorial note on pp. 451–53.

2. See the following document.

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Radio No. WAR-27196. *Secret*

April 24, 1944

Washington, D.C.

For Eisenhower’s eyes only from Marshall. The State Department has



been advised by Murphy that General Giraud has expressed hope that:

(1) He be detailed by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, to proceed to Italy where he could be available for consultation as technical adviser, or

(2) He be detailed to London in a similar capacity, or

(3) He be invited to Washington where he might be useful as a technical adviser to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The State Department has indicated to the President that if General Giraud decides to leave North Africa, it is the Department's view that it would be best for him to go to England.

The President has asked me for recommendation as to the advisability of assigning General Giraud to duty on your staff in an advisory capacity.<sup>1</sup>

I have told the President that General Giraud's presence in England in this capacity might create difficult or embarrassing situations during the coming operations. However, I informed the President that I was asking for your comments which I would forward on receipt.

I do not want to have General Giraud imposed on you if this might embarrass you in any way.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-27196])

1. See the previous document.

2. General Eisenhower replied on April 26 that assigning General Henri Giraud to his staff in an advisory capacity would be particularly embarrassing since Lieutenant General Pierre Koenig had already been assigned as commander of Free French forces and as head of the French Military Mission. Eisenhower stated that General Giraud would not place himself under General Koenig's orders and in any case, for security reasons, Giraud could not be informed of the details of military planning related to OVERLORD. The acceptance of Giraud in any official capacity, insisted General Eisenhower, would destroy any prospect of working with the French Military Mission in England. He was willing only to accept General Giraud in the capacity of a private citizen. (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1834-35.) On April 27 General Marshall sent to President Roosevelt a copy of Eisenhower's response, with the note: "I consider his comments entirely sound, and I concur in them." (Marshall Memorandum for the President, April 27, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SOMERVELL

April 26, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Retention in service in useful employment  
of officers and enlisted men who have been  
wounded, injured or exhausted in campaign.

I had a memorandum from General Peterson this morning regarding the action that has been taken in this matter, in which he stated that General Styer informed him that conferences were held with Service Commanders



in New York last week and instructions given to designate officers to contact hospitals in order that prompt action will be taken in the matter. He also understood that written instructions would shortly be issued.<sup>1</sup>

As we discussed the matter very hurriedly and I was more or less thinking out loud I wish to put into writing at this time my superficial views of the matter:

It seems to me we should have officers or maybe old sergeants like Sergeant Powder here in my office,<sup>2</sup> or maybe WAC's, or a combination of all, working on two fronts as it were, correlating one with the other.

Whoever the agent in this matter, I think he should go through the hospitals with a view to interviewing the men called to his attention by the hospital authorities, who might find satisfaction in continuing to carry on in the military service, and then establish a temporary office where any man could call on him to state his case towards future employment in or out of the Army. This agent should gradually become quite familiar with the opportunities or the needs in the various commands or headquarters in his region as well as the War Department, Ports of Embarkation and some of the large installations generally. He should in effect try to sell his people to these agencies, suggest their use, show where they might be employed to replace ablebodied men.

As the agent gradually develops his plot he would be looked to by the officers concerned in the various installations as a source of help in finding men to replace those other individuals who were to be sent overseas or to combat troops.

If the right people are selected and given a good idea and considerable liberty of action, I should think great good might come of this both in bolstering up morale on the one side and providing useful and much needed services on the other.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On April 25 Major General Virgil L. Peterson, the acting inspector general, outlined the steps he had taken to meet General Marshall's suggestion that a procedure be created for the retention in military service of officers and enlisted men recovering from service-related wounds. Major General Wilhelm D. Styer, deputy commanding general and chief of staff, Army Service Forces, had just notified Peterson that the matter had been discussed at the Service Commanders conference held in New York, that officers would be designated to contact hospitals for appropriate personnel, and that Army Service Forces headquarters would issue written instructions concerning the correct procedures to be followed. (Peterson Memorandum for the Secretary, General Staff, April 25, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Sergeant James W. Powder (born in June 1898) was General Marshall's personal orderly and junior aide. Powder had worked for Marshall since 1938.

3. Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, commanding general for Army Service Forces, replied on April 26 that written instructions concerning the retention of wounded officers and enlisted men had been issued, and he attached Army Service Forces Circular



No. 114, which referred to enlisted men. Dated April 25, 1944, Circular No. 114 indicated that while wounded personnel might still receive a discharge, it was expected that maximum effort would be made to retain such men possessing usable skills in military service. Hospitalized personnel were to be interviewed, their qualifications assessed, and the nature of the assignment explained to them at the hospital facility where they were currently held. Army Air Forces personnel were not subject to this directive. The next day Somervell sent to Marshall the War Department Circular No. 161 (dated April 25, 1944), which concerned officer personnel (except the Army Air Forces). (Somervell Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, April 26, 1944, and Somervell Memorandum for General Marshall, April 27, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) A July 4 memorandum to Somervell indicated that fourteen general hospitals had been visited and that 36 percent of the officers interviewed and 20 percent of the enlisted personnel interviewed had expressed their desire to remain on active duty. Not included in the report were the hospitals that were already making use of officer and enlisted patients on assignments such as War Bond drives, W.A.C. recruiting, and reconditioning activities. Additionally, thirty-nine officers, who still received some medical treatment, had been assigned to temporary duty at headquarters near the hospitals. (J. N. D. [Major General Joseph N. Dalton] Memorandum for General Somervell, July 4, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 201.601].)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSEPH W. STILWELL  
Radio No. WAR-28223. *Top Secret*

April 26, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall to Stilwell for his eyes only. It is not clear from your SH 73 and CRA 1969, April 25, 1944, whether you have consulted Slim or Mountbatten on coordinating plans for use of Lentaigne's long-range penetration groups with those of your Ledo forces, and whether you have indicated your views on the matter to either Slim or Mountbatten.<sup>1</sup> From here it appears that this would have been the normal procedure. Was it followed and, if so, what was the result? As I understood the existing arrangement you voluntarily subordinated yourself to Slim in assuming direct command of the Chinese Corps under Slim's over-all command.<sup>2</sup>

We have never seen Wingate's accepted plan nor except for your radio what changes have been made by Lentaigne.<sup>3</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-28223])

1. Major General W. D. A. Lentaigne had succeeded to command of the British long-range penetration groups in Burma (called Chindits) when their organizer and first commander, Major General Orde C. Wingate, had been killed in an airplane crash in Burma on March 24. (*New York Times*, April 1, 1944, pp. 1, 3. For previous information on Wingate's mission, see Marshall Memorandum for the President, March 15, 1944, pp. 343-44.) Stilwell desired that the Chindits hold at Indaw and Mawlu, severing the Japanese line of communications to north Burma and protecting the right flank of his advance toward Mogaung and Myitkyina. Lentaigne and S.E.A.C. headquarters, however, believed that the Chindits' endurance was limited to ninety days, which meant withdrawing them from the field in mid-June. Stilwell feared that if the Chindits retreated northward, their passage through Chinese lines would not only damage Chinese morale but would bring the Japanese with them. (Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 196-99, 220-21.)



On April 25 Stilwell notified Marshall: “Unless we can hold the retiring British our chances of reaching Mogaung and holding it will slacken. . . . The British consider themselves specialists who cannot be sacrificed by engaging on a real fight. It is obvious they wish to get out and go to India.” Later that same day, Stilwell reported (CRA-1969) that the British Broadcasting Corporation had stated that Lentaigne and he were in complete agreement regarding Chindit operations, which Stilwell denied. The British had merely informed him of their plans, Stilwell said, and he refused to accept responsibility for “the consequent opening of the flank southwest of Mogaung.” (Stilwell to Marshall, Radio No. SH-73, April 25, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-IN-18200)], and Stilwell to Marshall, April 25, 1944, In Log, p. 281-B, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Message Log].)

2. Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten served as the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, and Stilwell served as commanding general of the U.S. forces in the China-Burma-India theater as well as acting Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command. Stilwell, directing Chinese divisions in the field, was also a corps commander and reported to Lieutenant General William J. Slim, commander of the British Fourteenth Army. For more information on the command structure, see the editorial note on pp. 248–49.

3. “You should not have been bothered with this matter,” Stilwell replied to General Marshall. “Disregard it. I should not have allowed one of my little difficulties to drop over on you. I am seeing Slim again to get it straight. My views are known by both Slim and Mountbatten. I was simply told what the orders were and accepted them. The public announcement that I was in complete accord is what peeved me.” (Stilwell to Marshall, April 27, 1944, In Log, p. 306-C, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Message Log].)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio. *Secret*

April 26, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall for Eisenhower’s eyes only. Newspapers today carried glaring reports of General Patton’s statements reference Britain and America’s rule of the world. We were just about to get confirmation of the permanent makes. This I fear has killed them all.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Lieutenant General George S. Patton’s remarks at the opening of a British Welcome Club for American soldiers were covered in the April 26, 1944, edition of the *New York Times*, which reported that Patton indicated that it was “the destiny of the United States and Britain to rule the world.” Patton was reported to have said: “I agree with Bernard Shaw that the English and American peoples are separated by a common language. The idea of these clubs could not be better because undoubtedly it is our destiny to rule the world, and the more we see of each other the better.” The same article stated that the London *Daily Mail* quoted Patton as including the Russians in his statement. Adverse comments on Patton’s remarks from members of the United States Congress were quoted by the *New York Times* on April 26 and April 27. The April 27 edition of the newspaper stated that Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and the War Department immediately made it clear that Patton’s remarks were his personal attitude and not to be taken for the policy of the United States government. (*New York Times*, April 26, 1944, p. 10; April 27, 1944, p. 5.) For further discussion, see Marshall to Eisenhower, April 29, 1944, pp. 442–44.

The Washington *Times-Herald* reported on May 25 that Lieutenant General Patton’s promotion on the permanent list was not included with that of thirteen other general



officers and speculated that the "rule the world" remark was the cause of delaying a decision on Patton's case. (*Times-Herald*, May 25, 1944, p. 1.) For further information on Patton's promotion, see Marshall to Eisenhower, August 15, 1944, pp. 546-47.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING  
*Secret*

April 27, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

There is attached a copy of the reply from General Eisenhower to my radio of 20 April 1944 referred to in my memorandum to you of the same date.<sup>1</sup> I believe we should not press him to make major changes at this critical time. However, the United States Naval representation on the staff should be increased up to the limits of Eisenhower's requirements and the availability of suitable staff officers.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. General Marshall had sent to Admiral King a copy of his April 20 message to Eisenhower asking for his comments on King's recommendation that naval representation at S.H.A.E.F. be increased. (Marshall Memorandum for Admiral King, April 20, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 322.01].) See note 3, Marshall Memorandum for Admiral King, April 10, 1944, p. 394.

Eisenhower replied on April 25 that while he was "emphatically in sympathy" with King's request, the situation in Europe—where British as well as American service representation had to be balanced at S.H.A.E.F.—was dissimilar to the U.S. situation in the Pacific. Moreover, at S.H.A.E.F. the planning and intelligence staffs were already combined "in every sense of the word with approximately equal British and American air and naval representation." U.S. Navy representation could be added to Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay's staff at Allied naval command headquarters, Eisenhower suggested, rather than to the Supreme Allied Commander's staff, which was already "best suited to the peculiar requirements of our conditions and of our theater." (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1830-32.)

2. Rear Admiral Bernhard H. Bieri was assigned to S.H.A.E.F. as an assistant chief of staff to Admiral Ramsay. (*Ibid.*, pp. 1832, 1855-56.)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WHITE  
*Confidential*

April 27, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

In connection with the great desire of Latin American countries to play some part in the war effort, particularly as they are worried now over the reported purpose of Great Britain, the United States and Russia to manage world affairs, Mr. Rockefeller brought up a number of propositions, most of which were not workable. He mentioned one, however, that offhand might be acceptable.<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Rockefeller said he was certain that in a number of the countries, notably in Brazil, Chile and Colombia, there were a large number of young



men of the better families who would welcome the opportunity to be allowed to volunteer for enlistment in our forces. Rockefeller thought that if we would accept such volunteer enlistments of non-citizens in a statement which implied that we would greatly appreciate such assistance, it would have a tremendous effect throughout Latin-America in giving them an outlet for their zealous desire to do something. He also thought that we could have the pick of very fine young men, the examinations, physical and otherwise, being made at our consulates in those countries.

Let me have your views. Is it legal? Is it desirable?<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Nelson A. Rockefeller, coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, had met with General Marshall in the chief of staff's office on the morning of April 27.

2. On May 1 White responded negatively: it would be difficult to recruit only members of better families; there would be no prospect of recruiting only English-speaking individuals; racial distinctions were often blurred in Latin America; arguments would surface to create formations raised entirely of members of one Latin American country; as there were definite pro-Axis leanings in some Latin American countries it would be difficult to exclude potential or real enemy agents; recruitment would place the American armed forces in competition with Latin American military forces, and accepting such individuals into American military service would send the message that America was not satisfied with current Latin American support in the war. (White Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, May 1, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 327.31].)

Handy likewise responded negatively on May 2, and he added to White's list of disadvantages: that Latin Americans as a group were "apathetic toward active participation in combat"; should large numbers of Latin American volunteers be killed in combat then the United States would be accused of deliberately sacrificing them to save American manpower; transportation of such individuals from Latin America to the United States would be difficult; the general lack of education in Latin America would make such men difficult to train under American methods; legal difficulties would ultimately arise from the fact that some Latin American countries removed citizenship from individuals serving in the armed forces of another nation; this would seriously affect industrial manpower in the Latin American countries concerned; there would be some individuals who would enlist under the program simply to escape poor conditions in Latin America, get a free trip to the United States, and then have no real interest in serving in combat; and the ultimate difficulties that would arise after the war with regard to disabilities and death benefits from the United States government. Handy therefore concurred with White's recommendation of "no action." (Handy Summary Memorandum, May 2, 1944, *ibid.*)

Deputy Chief of Staff McNarney reported on May 5 that of responses from sixteen military attachés to various Latin American countries, eight were favorable, six were unfavorable, and two were noncommittal. McNarney concurred with the recommendations that no action be taken. (McNarney Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, May 5, 1944, *ibid.*) For information regarding the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, see Marshall Memorandum for the President, July 5, 1944, p. 507.

TO SECOND LIEUTENANT ALLEN T. BROWN

April 28, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

*Dear Allen,* We very much enjoyed your recent letters; you have given us



some good descriptions of what is going on. I received one that I have not shown to your mother because it referred to your physical condition. I am glad that you are not being troubled by the complaint. I am also glad that you went ahead with the proper examinations. I see that you are pleased with your new assignment to a tank platoon.

Molly leaves tomorrow night with Jimmie for Clayton.<sup>1</sup> Jim meets her in Montgomery; his new camp is 50 miles south of Clayton where his division has been transferred from Little Rock. She is leaving Kitty here until she can arrange accommodations and also see how much permanence there is to Jim's present assignment.

Your mother and I drove down yesterday evening to the country and did some gardening. I had gotten in at one o'clock from New York and then had quite an early start, 7:15 A.M. at the office; also had some work done on my eye and a tooth filled, so I went off for an afternoon of physical diversion. It was a beautiful spring day; everything is getting into bloom down there. Today it is raining hard.

I suppose the weather has greatly improved in Italy and you should have a period now of really delightful weather before it grows uncomfortably hot. Malaria is of course a great threat but Stayer is very much on the job and I imagine will see that necessary preventative measures are taken.<sup>2</sup> We find in the South and Southwest Pacific in the jungles under the worst malarial conditions that we can reduce the incidents to one percent and then we get hard to work on it and have the proper malarial disciplining of the troops. It should be much easier to manage in Italy where there is no jungle.

I enjoyed your letters and I have this suggestion to make for your economy of effort. Why not write the first part of your letters purely for Madge and the remainder of the letters descriptions for her to read and mail to your mother, or if you write to your mother follow the same procedure?

Good luck to you. Affectionately,

GCMRL/Research File (Family)

1. Molly Brown Winn's mother-in-law lived in Clayton, Alabama.
2. Major General Morrison C. Stayer was chief surgeon for the Mediterranean theater.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL PERSONS<sup>1</sup>  
*Confidential*

April 28, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Mrs. Bolton, M.C., called on me this morning. She wishes to go to England for the expressed purpose of going through the hospital installations in order to reassure the mothers in this country that everything



possible is being done for the care of the men. She reports that there is a great feeling of uncertainty during the present tension about a second front and that has come to center, from the viewpoint of the women, very largely on the arrangements for the care of the men. Because of her long association in hospital matters in the country at large as well as in Cleveland, she felt that she was well equipped for this.<sup>2</sup>

Mrs. Bolton assured me that she would not only mind her P's and Q's but would subscribe to any restrictions or instructions we wanted in this matter and as to what she might see later. I went over with her the complications of authorizing any single Member of Congress to go abroad, the flood that might result from such an exception, and the fact that when she might go would have to be very carefully determined without explanations to her. I told her that so far as I personally was concerned I thought she might render a very useful service for us, but that there were most serious complications in relation to other Members of Congress.<sup>3</sup>

Will you think this over and talk to me about it, preferably tomorrow, Saturday morning, about nine o'clock.<sup>4</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Brigadier General Wilton B. Persons was chief of the Legislative and Liaison Division.
2. Frances P. Bolton, Republican from Ohio and a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, had been active in public health nursing and nursing education. Congresswoman Bolton had met with General Marshall on the morning of April 28.
3. On the War Department's efforts to restrict congressional travel overseas, see Marshall Memorandum for Admiral Leahy and Admiral King, March 11, 1944, pp. 333–34.
4. Bolton did make a tour of overseas hospitals; see Marshall to Eisenhower, July 23, 1944, pp. 532–33.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
*Secret*

April 29, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

In the attached message General Eisenhower raises the question whether you will make an announcement about OVERLORD on or after D day.<sup>1</sup> Your desires in the matter are requested.

From the purely military viewpoint, I doubt if it could have any effect upon the success of the landing in view of the extent and rigidity of German control over the lodgment area. I can see no objection to such a broadcast from the military standpoint. There is the question of security in the preparation of its recording, if it is to be recorded, but I believe this can be handled without difficulty.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. General Eisenhower had informed General Marshall on April 28 that in the event President Roosevelt wished to make a public announcement on or immediately following Allied landings on the coast of northwestern France (OVERLORD), then it would be helpful



for Eisenhower's headquarters to have the text as soon as possible. (Eisenhower to Marshall, Radio No. S-50861, April 28, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. "It does not appear practicable at this time to make a definite decision as to the advisability of my making an announcement about OVERLORD on or immediately after 'D' day," replied President Roosevelt on May 1. The president did, however, provide the text of a short message he would make should it seem advantageous. His message thanked Allied military personnel for their efforts, and he was careful to include mention of Russian efforts on the eastern front. (Roosevelt Memorandum for General Marshall, May 1, 1944, *ibid.*)

President Roosevelt's tentative draft was sent to Eisenhower. On May 11 Eisenhower wrote to Marshall that "based on military considerations alone," it was his opinion that neither President Roosevelt nor Prime Minister Winston Churchill should make announcements to the people of Europe until the success of the Allied landings was clearly demonstrated. "Statements by both on D day for the American and British press will undoubtedly have to be made, however," wrote Eisenhower, "and these statements should be limited to good wishes and encouragement to the Allied troops, and should further the cover plan." Once General Eisenhower's forces were firmly established ashore, then there might be real military advantage to such announcements to encourage active participation in Allied efforts by the local population. (H. Merrill Pasco Memorandum for Colonel McCarthy, May 4, 1944, *ibid.* *Papers of DDE*, 3: 1860-61.)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. WAR-29722. *Top Secret*

April 29, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

For Eisenhower's Eyes Only from Marshall. Reference your S 50908 regarding Patton:<sup>1</sup> His remarks as quoted have created a stir throughout the United States. I quote excerpts from an editorial this morning in the Washington Post: "General Patton has progressed from simple assault on individuals to collective assault on entire nationalities. As Congressman Mundt observed, he has now 'succeeded in slapping the face of every one of the United Nations except Great Britain' the General insists that he excepted the Soviet Union too. But the distinction does not seem to us to be vital." The editorial then refers to his remarks on welcoming the Germans and Italians into Hell and also his reference to the "English ladies" and "American dames," with this comment "This was intended no doubt as gallantry and perhaps as a rough sort of military humor."<sup>2</sup> The truth is however that it is neither gracious nor amusing. We do not mean to be prissy about the matter but we think that Lieutenant Generals even temporary ones ought to talk with rather more dignity than this. When they do not they run the danger of losing the respect of the men they command and the confidence of the public they serve. We think that this has happened to General Patton. Whatever his merits as a strategist or tactician he has revealed glaring defects as a leader of men. It is more than fortunate that these have become apparent before the Senate takes action to pass upon his recommended promotion in permanent rank from Colonel



to Major General. All thought of such promotion should now be abandoned. That the War Department recommended it is one more evidence of the tendency on the part of members of the military to act as a clique or club. His brother officers must have had some awareness of General Patton's lack of balance, etc, etc. We confess to some perplexity as to the entire practice of permanent promotions in the midst of war. Why cannot all of these wait until the war is over and we can judge the records of our military men with some perspective? General Patton's case affords an object lesson."

Like you I have been considering the matter on a purely business basis. Its effect on you and the troops and on the confidence of the public in the War Department and in you is opposed to the unmistakable fact the [*that*] Patton is the only available Army Commander for his present assignment who has had actual experience in fighting Rommel and in extensive landing operations followed by a rapid campaign of exploitation. Whether or not we can forego the latter advantage because of the unfavorable effects referred to I leave entirely to your decision. You carry the burden of responsibility as to the success of OVERLORD. If you feel that that operation can be carried out with the same assurance of success with [Courtney] Hodges in command, for example, instead of Patton all well and good. If you doubt it then between us we can bear the burden of the present unfortunate reaction. I fear the harm has already been fatal to the confirmation of the permanent list.<sup>3</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 1, Item 28c)

1. General Eisenhower informed Marshall on April 29 that Patton reported that he had spoken to about sixty people at a private gathering and was unaware that a representative of the press was present. According to Eisenhower, Patton's actual words were: "Since it seems to be the destiny of America, Great Britain and Russia to rule the world, the better we know each other the better off we will be." Eisenhower told Marshall that this most recent evidence of Patton's inability to use discretion "in all those matters where senior commanders must appreciate the effect of their own actions upon public opinion" created for him serious "doubts as to the wisdom of retaining him in high command despite his demonstrated capacity in battle leadership." Eisenhower indicated that he would delay a final decision regarding Patton's future in the European theater until he received Marshall's views, but Eisenhower stated that if Marshall thought Patton's retention in command would "destroy or diminish public and governmental confidence in the War Department," then Eisenhower recommended "that stern disciplinary action must be taken." (*Papers of DDE*, 3:1837.) For further information regarding Patton's remarks on April 25, see Marshall to Eisenhower, April 26, 1944, pp. 437–38.

2. Marshall received the complete text of Patton's remarks from Eisenhower's headquarters on April 30; although described as "extemporaneous," the remarks were given as quoted on the Press Association wire on April 25. "The only welcoming I have done for some time has been welcoming Germans and Italians into hell. I have done quite a lot in that direction and have gotten about 17,000 there," said Patton. He then praised the British clubs as a means for the British and Americans to better know each other. "The sooner our soldiers write home and say how lovely the English ladies are the sooner American dames will get jealous and force the war to a successful conclusion and then I shall have a chance



to go and kill the Japanese." (Lawrence to Surles, Radio No. E-25641, April 30, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 1, Item 28c].)

3. Eisenhower followed his above message (note 1) with a letter, also dated April 29, in which he said: "Frankly I am exceedingly weary of his [Patton's] habit of getting everybody into hot water through the immature character of his public actions and statements. In this particular case investigation shows that his offense was not so serious as the newspapers would lead one to believe, and one that under the circumstances could have occurred to almost anybody. But the fact remains that he simply does not keep his mouth shut." Eisenhower enclosed a copy of a letter he had written to Patton, dated April 29, which warned him of any further indiscretions. (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1838-40.) For further information, see Marshall to Eisenhower, May 1, 1944, pp. 445-46.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF,  
ARMY GROUND FORCES<sup>1</sup>  
*Confidential*

April 30, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

The Chief of Staff desires that the attached excerpts from the testimony of War Department officials be immediately disseminated in the Army Ground Forces down to including commanders of divisions, training installations and all independent tactical units.

These commanders will be notified by telephone that the material is being sent to them as a military matter now under discussion before Congress. The material will be forwarded by teletype or other expeditious means.

It is necessary that the senior personnel of the Army be familiar with the attitude of the War Department in this matter, as indicated by the statements of the Secretary of War and other officials before the Congressional Committee.

Officers are to avoid public discussion of these questions, leaving that responsibility to the War Department and those officers who are brought to Washington for the purpose.

A similar memorandum would be given to the Chief, Army Service Forces with its distribution, which would include Service Commands and Technical Services, with added instructions to them to include all posts, camps, and stations.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. This document was issued over the signature of Major General Alexander D. Surles, director of the Bureau of Public Relations. Surles had submitted a draft of this document to the chief of staff, which Marshall edited extensively and to which he added information. Colonel Frank McCarthy forwarded the redraft printed here to Surles, noting that "it has been retyped to embody changes made by General Marshall in his handwriting, and therefore becomes the approved policy on the subject." (McCarthy Memorandum for General Surles, April 30, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. The Woodrum Committee hearings ended on May 19, and the committee submitted a report on June 15, 1944, in which it concluded: "The committee does not believe that the



time is opportune to consider detailed legislation which would undertake to write the pattern of any proposed consolidation, if indeed such consolidation is ultimately decided to be a wise course of action. . . . Before any final pattern for a reorganization of the services should be acted upon, the legislative committee of the Congress should have the benefit of the wise judgment and experience of many of the commanders in the field." (House Select Committee on Post-war Military Policy, *Report on Post-war Military Policy*, H. Rpt. 1645, 78th Cong., 2d sess., 1944, pp. 1-4.) The Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense was established in May 1944 to study "the most efficient practicable organization of those parts of the executive branch . . . primarily concerned with national defense." The J.C.S. directed the special committee to examine the relative advantages, disadvantages, and practicability of one-, two-, or three-department systems of organization. Admiral James O. Richardson (U.S.N.A., 1902) served as chairman of the group, which became known as the Richardson Committee. Accordingly the Richardson Committee began its hearings in June, and in the fall its members visited the various theaters of operations to interview field commanders. On April 11, 1945, the special committee recommended "a single department system of organization of the Armed Forces of the United States. This view is supported by Generals of the Army MacArthur and Eisenhower, Fleet Admiral Nimitz, Admiral Halsey, a substantial number of other commanders in the field, and many officers in Washington." (Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense, April 1945, NA/RG 218 [JCS, CCS 040].) For related information, see the editorial note on p. 416 and Marshall to Palmer, November 3, 1944, pp. 649-51.

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. WAR-30586. *Top Secret*

May 1, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Eyes Only to Eisenhower from McNarney. This message just received from General Marshall to be passed on to you: "Reference your No. S-50965 and my No. WAR 29722 regarding Patton the decision is exclusively yours.<sup>1</sup> My view, and it is merely that, is that you should not weaken your hand for OVERLORD. If you think that Patton's removal does weaken your prospect, you should continue him in command. In any event, I do not want you at this time to be burdened with the responsibility of reducing him in rank. Send him home if you see fit, and in grade, or hold him there as surplus if you so desire, or as I have indicated above, continue him in command if that promises best for OVERLORD. I fear my quotation from one editorial may have resulted in over emphasis in your mind of the necessity for drastic action to meet difficult resulting situation here at home. Incidentally, the numerous editorials, while caustic regarding his indiscretion, lack of poise or dignity, suitable to his position have not demanded his release from command.

Do not consider War Department position in the matter. Consider only OVERLORD and your own heavy burden of responsibility for its success. Everything else is of minor importance."<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 1, Item 28c)



1. Eisenhower informed General Marshall on April 30 that he had sent for Lieutenant General Patton to report and explain his actions, but based "on all of the evidence now available I will relieve him from command." Eisenhower indicated his faith in the ability of Lieutenant General Courtney H. Hodges to replace Patton as Third Army commander, but recognized that "the big difference is that Patton has proved his ability to conduct a ruthless drive whereas Hodges has not." He also expressed his regret that Major General Lucian K. Truscott was unavailable to OVERLORD as a result of his position in the Mediterranean theater. Eisenhower asked Marshall whether Patton should be returned to the United States in his permanent rank or sent home in some higher grade to serve in a training command. "His relief from an active theater will certainly be interpreted by everyone as definite and severe disciplinary action," wrote Eisenhower, "but you would have the immediate problem of absorbing him as a lieutenant general." Eisenhower added, "After a year and a half of working with him it appears hopeless to expect that he will ever completely overcome his lifelong habit of posing and of self-dramatization which causes him to break out in these extraordinary ways." (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1840-41.) For Marshall's Radio No. WAR-29722, see Marshall to Eisenhower, April 29, 1944, pp. 442-44.

2. Eisenhower replied on May 3 that because of the adverse effects Patton's relief would have on OVERLORD, he would retain Patton in command of the U.S. Third Army. "There is no question that relief of Patton would lose to us his experience as commander of an army in battle and his demonstrated ability of getting the utmost out of soldiers in offensive operations," wrote Eisenhower. (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1846.)

TO BRIGADIER GENERAL CLAUDE M. ADAMS

May 11, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Flap, I have been out of town for ten days, just returned yesterday evening,<sup>1</sup> but shortly before leaving Washington there was brought to my attention the opposition of the Surgeon General to your assignment as attache at Ottawa. G-2, following the Surgeon General's statements, also expressed reluctance, both based on the fact that frequent travel over long distances, and usually by air, is necessary for the performance of the duties of our attache in Canada.<sup>2</sup>

Before leaving town I directed that the Surgeon General make a formal statement in the matter, particularly as your retirement was qualified with the statement that you were available for limited service. On my return I find his statement which is to this effect:

"In view of the fact that General Adams has recently had a coronary accident, combined with the fact that he was hospitalized previously for heart trouble, it is thought that it would be unfair to General Adams to assign him to this duty as it would probably result in his having another attack."

I am directing that the matter be dropped. I am doing this not only because of the Surgeon General's statement but primarily because this points to a repetition of what took place in Brazil. You will recall that I was opposed to your going there because of the air travel required, just as I was



opposed to your air travel out of Washington when you were here with me. You had attacks here and you had a severe attack in Rio. Therefore I am unwilling to be a party to a third assignment which I am told will lead to another attack.

At the time I brought up the question of your detail I had hoped that in view of the limited service qualification on your retirement, there would be no complications; however I was wrong, and what is more, I am inclined to think that the limited service factor was possibly the result of your personal persuasive influence on the doctors on your Board.

I am sorry about this because I know you will be greatly disappointed. However, there is no doubt in my mind as to what my decision should be.<sup>3</sup> Hastily yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. General Marshall had departed Washington on Sunday, April 30, for an inspection trip to the South and the West Coast, returning on Wednesday, May 10. His tour included the Women's Army Corps Training Center at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia; an armored unit at Fort Ord, California; the Boeing aircraft plants at Seattle, Washington; and infantry and armored divisions at Camp Bowie, Texas; Fort Huachuca, Arizona; Camp Cooke, California; Camp Beale, California; and Camp Adair, Oregon. The chief of staff then spent a few restful days at Erskine Wood's fishing camp along the Metolius River in Oregon. (Frank McCarthy Memorandum for General Surles, May 11, 1944, and Marshall [McCarthy] to Wood, May 10, 1944, GCMRL/F. McCarthy Papers [U.S. Army 1941–45].)

2. Adams, who had a history of heart trouble, had been recuperating at Thayer General Hospital in Nashville, Tennessee. Arrangements had been made in April for Adams's assignment as military attaché at Ottawa. (Marshall Memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, April 18, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. Adams replied from Humboldt, Tennessee, that he was disappointed that the Ottawa position did not materialize, but he still hoped to have another assignment soon. (Adams to Marshall, May 25, 1944, *ibid.*) By the end of the summer, Adams had decided to settle in Tennessee. "I think Flap is very wise to get out of Washington," General Marshall advised Mrs. Adams. "There is little to be gained here but heat and heartstrain whereas in Humboldt with your new home and his business prospects he is sitting on top of the world. And I should think you would lead a far happier life—certainly a longer life." But Marshall admitted that "in all these things we seem to work by opposites. Those of us who are here want to get away and those who are away want to get to Washington. It is the perversity of man, although in my case I am quite clear and determined on what I want to do, that is, completely remove myself from active military service and settle down to a quiet life." (Marshall to Ruth Adams, September 5, 1944, *ibid.*)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR  
*Top Secret*

May 16, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Subject: Increase in the strength of the Army.

I have given much thought to your memorandum, "Our Military Reserves",<sup>1</sup> and in response to your suggestion submit my comments.



The desirability of bringing such overwhelming strength against the Germans that they will recognize the futility of fighting for a stalemate is evident. My hope is that this can be accomplished, and that Germany can be defeated this year by exploiting the following advantages which the Allied Nations now possess:

*a. Our overwhelming air superiority.* Decisive military, economic, and psychological results are within reach, and the air arm should be our most effective weapon in bringing home to the German people and the German army the futility of continued resistance.

*b. The strength and efficiency of the Soviet armies.* The ability of the U.S.S.R. to assemble great masses and to throw them ruthlessly against the enemy has been the principal cause of the Russian victories. Elimination of the Crimean front and the disaffection of Germany's satellite neighbors will accentuate the Soviet numerical superiority. Additional experience and success will make the Russian armies more and more formidable. Recent conversations between [W. Averell] Harriman and Stalin confirm the belief that the Soviets will continue their present efforts until Germany is completely defeated.

*c. The quality, rather than the quantity, of our ground force units.* Our equipment, high standard of training, and freshness should give us a superiority which the enemy cannot meet and which we could not achieve by resorting to a matching of numerical strength. The maintenance of these divisions at full strength with thoroughly trained replacements is the factor of major importance in measuring our ground fighting capacity. The increased combat effectiveness of our divisions due to our preponderance of artillery and the employment of our vast air superiority in close tactical support, are other important considerations. On the basis of these qualitative factors the Allied Nations will have in France, in my opinion, a decided advantage. On the other hand, to create new divisions and supporting troops would mean emasculating drafts on existing divisions with a consequent lowering in their efficiency.

Actually, indications are that even on a strictly numerical basis, our ground forces will compare very favorably with the German forces. Shipping and other logistical factors will permit a build-up in Europe of about four divisions a month and at this rate by April, 1945 there can be employed the fifty-nine divisions which are available to the United States. Some twenty-one British divisions can be utilized and by shifting units from the Mediterranean an additional ten to fifteen United States and French divisions can be made available for employment in France if a defensive position is taken in Italy. Thus we will have some ninety-five divisions to employ against fifty-six German divisions and we will have a



decided numerical advantage unless the Germans can strip the eastern front and remove the great bulk of their forces from Norway, Denmark and Holland. Our most troublesome factor will probably be our comparatively slow rate of build-up which is, of course, restricted by purely logistical limitations. This factor, more than any other, might bring about a slowing down of operations because the enemy can deploy his available forces much more rapidly than we can build up ours, providing he feels free to transfer divisions from other fronts.

Your concern is that a stalemate may develop in the fall of 1944 and that all possible steps are not being taken *now* to provide the additional ground combat units that would be needed *then*. Everything possible must be done to prevent such a stalemate. At this point, however, I differ from your analysis and with your conclusion that we must activate additional divisions now and increase the strength of the Army.

We are about to invade the Continent and have staked our success on our air superiority, on Soviet numerical preponderance, and on the high quality of our ground combat units. We must continue to give our all-out support to the strategical development to which we are committed. To deviate will cause diversion of effort and will require things to be done which can only be done at the expense of what we are now trying to do.

If our present plans fail and a stalemate does occur, then it is very doubtful if the few additional divisions which could be activated would be sufficient to break the impasse. Let me illustrate this point. Assume a situation where the U.S.S.R. decides to stop at expanded national boundaries along natural frontiers, where our air supremacy fails to achieve decisive results, and where our qualitative superiority in ground units is unable to prevent a stalemate. If such a situation comes to pass, then heroic measures and a complete revamping of our strategical plans would be in order. Undoubtedly a material conversion of air groups to ground combat units would be necessary. The time required to effect such a reorientation of effort would preclude decisive action prior to the summer of 1945.

In effect, my position is that, in the event of a stalemate, major decisions will be required and a material change in the timing of operations will result. We are in no position to make any far-reaching changes in our Troop Basis until we see what occurs in the initial stages of the invasion. Adjustments within the units of the Troop Basis will continue to be made as required, but additional changes beyond this are likely to handicap our present planned efforts without producing sufficient additional means to break a stalemate if the conditions you assume materialize. Considering the matter from all angles and with the realization of the hazards involved, I believe that at the present time no increase should be made in the over-all strength of the Army, except as may prove to be necessary to provide replacements.



It is appropriate, however, to make at this time all the preparations which are possible to enable an increase to be made with minimum delay. The War Department General Staff has been directed to study this question and to work out in consultation with the Selective Service a plan for the procuring of an increased strength and to prepare the most expeditious and effective program of training for an increased number of divisions. At this time I do not advocate any action beyond this prudent staff planning.<sup>2</sup>

G. C. Marshall

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On May 10 Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson expressed his concern over the evident failure to provide an appearance of overwhelming strength in the coming Allied invasion of France. "I have always felt that our contribution to the war should include so far as possible an overwhelming appearance of national strength when we actually get into the critical battle," wrote Stimson. "By this I mean not merely strength on the battle front but in reserve. It has been our fate in the two World Wars to come in as the final force after the other combatant nations had been long engaged. Our men have thus come to the field untested, even when well trained, to fight against veteran enemies. Such conditions make the appearance and possession of overwhelming strength on our part important both tactically and psychologically." The secretary of war questioned the desirability of adhering to the American decision of maintaining its ground forces at the ninety-division level, given German strength (estimated fifty-six divisions to defend France), possible replacement shortages, and the fact that German morale seemed to remain high despite the Allied bombing campaign. "Our Army calculations both in ETO and here have seemed to me to shave the line of sufficiency rather narrowly instead of aiming at massive abundance." He suggested that while aggressive pressure on the Germans by the Red Army and evident Allied air superiority perhaps lessened the danger, still the current American strategic reserve of fourteen divisions might prove insufficient in a crisis. The result was that the secretary of war suggested asking the U.S. Congress for additional manpower legislation and urged General Marshall to reconsider commitment to the ninety-division concept and begin the activation of new divisions. (Stimson Memorandum for General Marshall, May 10, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Stimson wrote in his diary for May 16 that regarding the manpower situation General Marshall "takes quite a different view—a more optimistic view on some things that I think are rather dangerous." He added, however, that he would not raise the issue with President Roosevelt, "for the last thing I want to do is to make an appearance of an issue with Marshall which really does not exist. We differ a little on the shading of things but not on essence." (May 16, 1944, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 47: 39].) The chief of staff's opinion on American troop levels would remain American policy. For previous discussion of personnel shortages, see the editorial note on pp. 285–86 and Marshall Memorandum for the Secretary of War, February 10, 1944, pp. 286–89.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL CAMPBELL

May 16, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

At Camp Adair the other day I witnessed some automatic rifle firing. Among the group of firers in my immediate vicinity there were a number of



failures to eject. Examination was made of the rifles and they had been oiled and seemed to be in good condition, but the failures continued.

I attach the cover of one of the cartridge boxes and one of the empty cartridges for such check as might be indicated.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On May 18 Major General Thomas J. Hayes (U.S.M.A., 1912) in the Ordnance Department replied for Major General Levin H. Campbell, Jr., chief of Ordnance. The Ordnance officer at Camp Adair, when questioned about the incident, reported that an M-1 rifle had developed ejection trouble due to improper lubrication. The Office of the Chief of Ordnance concluded: "From the evidence at hand there is nothing to indicate faulty ammunition. The rifle malfunction appears to have been a sporadic incident not indicative of general trouble." (Hayes for Campbell to Marshall, May 18, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 353.4 (5-16-44)].)

THE best possible utilization of French manpower resources—Free French forces, the French Resistance, and French manpower released to Allied commands through the impending invasion of metropolitan French territories—represented an ever-present problem to Allied European and Mediterranean headquarters. "The French problem will always be with us," wrote Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean theater, "for they do not seem to be on the level with themselves." (Devers to Marshall, May 9, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Free French forces were created in England immediately following the collapse of France's Third Republic government in June 1940; these units were commanded by Charles de Gaulle, a brigadier general and lately under secretary of war in the last cabinet of the Third Republic. General de Gaulle did not initially represent any organized French government, rather his activities were in direct confrontation to the armistice agreement reached between Germany and France. Allied landings in North Africa in 1942 resulted in additional Free French forces being created from former Vichy armed forces in France's African colonies. These units were commanded by General Henri Giraud, appointed commander in chief of all French ground and air units in the territory on November 14, 1942, by Admiral François Darlan, head of the provisional French government in North Africa. (Marcel Vigneras, *Rearming the French*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1957], pp. 9, 16.) The fusion of de Gaulle's and Giraud's forces on June 3, 1943, resulted from the creation of the French Committee of National Liberation (C.F.L.N., Comité Français de la Libération Nationale).

General de Gaulle persisted in his attempts to replace General Giraud as French commander in chief, with the intention that he should be the sole



political and military leader of Free French forces. President Roosevelt resisted de Gaulle's plan to remove Giraud from a position of influence. The reorganization of the C.F.L.N. in April 1944, however, gave de Gaulle his opportunity. The president of the C.F.L.N. (General de Gaulle) was appointed by decree of April 4, 1944, commander in chief of all Free French armed forces; General Giraud's position was by implication rendered superfluous. General de Gaulle offered Giraud the post of inspector general of all Free French forces on April 8, but Giraud refused to accept what he regarded as a demotion, and stated his intention to remain as commander in chief of all Free French forces. This gave de Gaulle's C.F.L.N. the opportunity to remove Giraud from any command position on disciplinary grounds, retaining him only on active reserve. (Ibid., pp. 151–53.)

The removal of General Giraud necessitated reordering other ranking Free French command positions. The commander of the French military mission to Washington, D.C., Lieutenant General Emile Béthouart, was appointed chief of staff of National Defense on April 12, 1944, basically superseding General Giraud. Béthouart held this position until August 7, 1944, when he was appointed to command the French First Corps—an element of the French First Army under General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny—operating in southern France, on September 6, 1944. Meanwhile in May, Devers referred to General Béthouart as “outstanding and thoroughly reliable.” Lieutenant General Alphonse Pierre Juin had been General Giraud's chief of staff and had been commanding a French corps in Italy (Corps Expéditionnaire Français) since June 1943. Juin's French corps had been committed to combat as a part of the American Fifth Army in Italy from January 1944. Devers called these French units “magnificent,” adding that “this is because of General Juin himself. He is a smart, aggressive leader.” While Devers praised Béthouart and Juin, he considered the other French commanders to be “erratic.” (Devers to Marshall, May 9, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Juin was relieved from his Italian command in July 1944, and in August he was appointed chief of staff of all Free French forces. (Vigneras, *Rearming the French*, pp. 72, 117, 179–83, 321.)

President Roosevelt's position was that the Allied powers should not assume that de Gaulle represented the entire French population and that Allied military leaders should be cautious so as not to appear to support de Gaulle automatically as France's postwar leader. General Eisenhower requested on May 11, 1944, that de Gaulle be invited to London for discussions relating to the impending invasion of France. Eisenhower was informed the following day by Roosevelt that while General de Gaulle might be consulted on military matters, Eisenhower was not to discuss political topics. “It must always be remembered,” wrote Roosevelt, “that the French People are quite naturally shell-shocked from sufferings at the



hands of German occupation, just as any other people would be. . . . As the liberators of France we have no right to color their views or to give any group the sole right to impose on them one side of a case.” President Roosevelt supported his position regarding de Gaulle by quoting to Eisenhower from a message he had sent to Prime Minister Churchill: “I am unable at this time to recognize any Government of France until the French have an opportunity for a free choice, and I do not desire that Eisenhower shall become involved with the Committee on a political level.” (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1857–58; Roosevelt to Eisenhower, May 12, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

General Marshall reiterated the president’s position to Eisenhower on May 13, to which Eisenhower’s headquarters responded the next day assuring Marshall that S.H.A.E.F. understood that de Gaulle’s C.F.L.N. was not to be necessarily regarded as France’s political future. Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith replied that Eisenhower was “in complete agreement with the President’s statement that questions relating to the future government of France are political and not military,” and that their dealings with the French Committee had been “to deal with it on a military basis and to use it and its representatives in planning matters of civil administration in order to assist the military operation.” Smith added, however, “that when a military commander is operating on foreign soil there is no clear cut line of demarcation between military and civil or political questions.” (Marshall [OPD] to Eisenhower, Radio No. WAR-36189, May 13, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-36189)]; Smith to Marshall, Radio No. S-51841, May 14, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

Controlling French Resistance units in metropolitan France—fitting them into S.H.A.E.F.’s command structure and utilizing them to best military advantage—was one of Eisenhower’s concerns regarding the impending invasion of France. French Resistance activities were to be coordinated by Lieutenant General Pierre Joseph Koenig, who had been the French Committee of National Liberation’s representative to S.H.A.E.F. since March 1944. Koenig was appointed to command the Resistance forces, renamed French Forces of the Interior (F.F.I., Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur), on June 6, 1944, operating directly under S.H.A.E.F. (Vigneras, *Rearming the French*, pp. 87, 300, 311.)

Maintaining Free French units as effective fighting formations was difficult as French units required retraining in up-to-date Allied military methods and complete Allied reequipment. Free French units were raised from a variety of French military formations, often with the bare minimum of necessary personnel. Replacements to these French units created a problem; for reasons of political prestige, the Free French command wished to maintain the maximum number of Free French combat units. ★



TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JACOB L. DEVERS  
Radio No. WAR-37192. *Top Secret*

May 16, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

To Devers for his eyes only from Marshall. White has shown me an extract of a personal letter he has received from Sawbridge with reference to the French replacement situation.<sup>1</sup> Apparently a satisfactory solution has not been arrived at and DeGaulle is insisting on not breaking up units for the purpose of providing replacements. I would like to have complete information on this subject in order to know how to deal with the French Mission here. In my opinion we are not justified in providing equipment either original or maintenance for French units for which there is not actually in existence an adequate replacement system and I propose to so inform the French Mission here. Incidentally I personally with complete frankness and also officially informed Giraud reference his pressure on me here in Washington for equipment for additional units that I would oppose any such issues until I was assured by U.S. Army authorities in Algiers that the French had in actual existence an adequate replacement system for existing units.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-37192])

1. Brigadier General Ben M. Sawbridge, a member of Devers's headquarters staff, had written to Major General Miller G. White (assistant chief of staff, G-1) in early May 1944 stating that when General Henri Giraud had been commander in chief of Free French forces, Giraud had agreed to disband Free French units in order to provide necessary replacements, maintaining the French units at combat strength for Allied operations in Italy and the proposed invasion of southern France, ANVIL. When General de Gaulle assumed the position of Free French commander in chief, Sawbridge reported, de Gaulle had "reneged on the agreement to break up French units to provide replacements. . . . Apparently, General DeGaulle wants to keep his cake and eat it too. In other words, he wants all the units provided by the re-armament program even though they totally exhaust his manpower. How he intends to fight those units without replacements or service units is beyond the knowledge of anyone in this headquarters." (White Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, May 15, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 9, Book 18].)

2. Devers replied on May 18 that the Free French replacement situation could be handled within the Mediterranean theater without the chief of staff's participation. In fact, they were holding a conference on May 17 and 18 to discuss the problem. "DeGaulle agrees that he must provide replacements and the matter is primarily one of training them in use of American equipment. I can handle that locally," replied Devers. "It is difficult to find out where the fault lies but it is probable that the immediate delay is due to change of policy when DeGaulle cancelled Giraud's arrangements until he could look into the situation. Prompt and energetic action has been taken on the Allied Force level." (Devers to Marshall, May 18, 1944, In Log, p. 206-A, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Message Log].)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALTER BEDELL SMITH  
[Radio No. WAR-37216.] *Secret*

May 16, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall for Smith's eyes only. The head of the French Mission,



General Saint-Didier, has just brought to me an advice from General Bethouart in Algiers that Koenig had requested the cancellation of the assignment of Colonel Le Bel and recommending his return to North Africa because of the notice that the Allied Expeditionary Forces deemed that his assignment to the staff could not be accomplished at this time.<sup>1</sup> General Bethouart appeals to me with the request to confirm the decision taken with reference to Le Bel and expressing his appreciation if I would give him the reasons motivating this decision.

What line should I take?

Saint-Didier also brought up the question of the bombing of railway installations costing the lives of French citizens. I will take this up later with General Eisenhower.<sup>2</sup> Meanwhile I pass on this seemingly practical request of Bethouart through Saint-Didier: that General Eisenhower request Koenig to provide him with a chart of the vital rail installations in France with the French recommendations as to the points most critical for the operation of the railroads. As I see it superficially at the moment this involves no disclosure of secrecy as to the character of OVERLORD as we are already engaged in a general bombing throughout northern and northwestern France.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Major General Auguste Brossin de Saint-Didier replaced Lieutenant General Emile Béthouart as head of the French Military Mission to Washington in April 1944, when Béthouart was appointed chief of staff of Free French forces. Lieutenant General Pierre Joseph Koenig had been the French Committee of National Liberation's representative to S.H.A.E.F. since March 1944. General Marshall had recommended Colonel Albert J. P. Le Bel, who had worked at the French Mission in Washington, for a position on the Allied staff in England. (Marshall to Le Bel, January 6, 1944, and Le Bel to Marshall, January 10, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected]. For Marshall's comments on Le Bel, see Marshall to Eisenhower, December 29, 1943, pp. 217–18.) On May 16 General Marshall had a meeting in his office with Saint-Didier.

2. On the afternoon of May 16, General Marshall discussed Saint-Didier's request concerning the bombing of railway installations with the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, who agreed that Marshall send to General Eisenhower the following message: "Suggest that, if you consider it practicable, you request Koenig to provide you with a chart of the vital rail installations in France and the French recommendations as to the points most critical for the operation of the railroads. Koenig should be willing to furnish this advice without asking for any commitments or information in return." Such a request "would assure the French that we are doing our very best to keep civilian casualties to a minimum." (Marshall to Eisenhower, Radio No. WAR-37353, May 16, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-37353)].)

3. Smith replied on May 17 that he had notified the French Mission that they would like Le Bel retained in England until they were able to use him, after the invasion of Normandy when the French Mission would be working more closely with S.H.A.E.F. Le Bel was currently working usefully with the French Mission, and Smith had been informed that Koenig was willing to keep him. "He is a close personal friend of Bethouart, who may be piqued that Lebel was not immediately taken into our confidence," replied Smith. "At the moment, since we are giving no information whatever on OVERLORD to the French, it



would be impossible to have French officers in or directly assigned to this Headquarters where the whole atmosphere is charged with OVERLORD."

As for the bombing of railway installations, Smith replied that he had arranged for Koenig and his senior air man to consult with Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder on bombing targets, particularly those with probable loss of life to French citizens. "To my surprise, Koenig takes a much more cold blooded view than we do," replied Smith. "His remark was 'This is war, and it must be expected that people will be killed. We would take twice the anticipated loss to be rid of the Germans.' I have had to remind him on occasion that the French civil population may not take such a complacent view. Fortunately, and to our great relief, the civilian casualties have been very much less than our most conservative estimates." (Smith to Marshall, May 17, 1944, In Log, pp. 181-C-181-D, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Message Log].) For further discussion, see the following document.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL DE SAINT-DIDIER

May 17, 1944

*Secret*

[Washington, D.C.]

Dear General: Immediately following our conversation yesterday, and without waiting for your third memorandum which I have not yet received, I communicated with General Eisenhower in England. Also I took up the matter with the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to secure their approval of my procedure.<sup>1</sup>

While the several matters are still on a basis of discussion, I am giving you the immediate reactions from England. General Eisenhower has not seen my message as he is absent on an inspection but his Chief of Staff replies to me to the following effect:

I was not aware that General Koenig had requested the return of Colonel Le Bel to North Africa and have communicated with the French Mission immediately, requesting that he be retained here until we are able to utilize his services as we desire to do. I am informed that General Koenig is quite willing to hold him.

With reference to the bombing, in my first conference with General Koenig we arranged that he and his senior air man should consult with Air Marshal Tedder on bombing targets, particularly railway targets and those involving probable loss of life among French citizens. Algiers does not know this because of the stop on communications. As you probably know the problem of reconciling of French civilian losses has occupied the Prime Minister and the British Cabinet and there have been communications with the President. As a result a number of targets which threatened the greatest loss of French life were eliminated.

Please consider the above as an interim reply in the absence of General Eisenhower.<sup>2</sup>

I am giving you this so that you can make an immediate initial reply to



General Bethouart. However, please make clear to him that this was General Smith communicating with me informally and that General Eisenhower has not yet seen my message. You may be sure that we will do everything in our power to protect the interests of the French civilians both as to life and property so far as this can be done without undue hazard to the soldiers involved in the pending operations as well as to the success of the operation.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On May 16 Major General Auguste Brossin de Saint-Didier had discussed with General Marshall the question of Colonel Le Bel's assignment to Eisenhower's staff and the problem of bombing railway installations endangering French citizens. (See the previous document.) Saint-Didier had sent to Marshall a memorandum on May 16 regarding Le Bel's assignment and one on May 17 regarding Allied bombing of railway systems and factories in France. (Saint-Didier Memorandums for General George C. Marshall, May 16 and 17, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Saint-Didier had also written a letter to Marshall dated May 16 concerning the bombing of Hanoi Station in April which resulted in ten Frenchmen killed and forty wounded and two hundred Indochinese casualties. The chief of the French Military Mission recommended that the American air forces consult with the French Intelligence Service in Chungking, which he said was more reliable than data supplied by the Chinese. (Saint-Didier to Marshall, May 16, 1944, *ibid.*)

2. General Eisenhower replied on May 21 that Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith's explanation was sufficient and that he had nothing additional on the subject. (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1877–79.) For further discussion of Smith's reply, see note 3 of the previous document.

3. Saint-Didier replied the next day that he had immediately forwarded to Lieutenant General Emile B  thouart the information obtained from Smith. "Furthermore, I conveyed to him the assurance you gave me, in the name of the American military authorities, that the French people would be spared to the utmost, both as to life and property." (Saint-Didier to Marshall, May 18, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Secret*

May 17, 1944

[Washington, D.C.]

We have had what is to me a distressing number of fatal accidents in the Air Corps due to violation of flying regulations by young pilots. I am informed that in the fourth quarter of 1943 98 aircraft costing \$5,500,000 were destroyed, and in the first quarter of 1944 140 aircraft were lost costing \$12,800,000, all as the result of violations of flying regulations. While the total financial loss of over \$18,000,000 is a sizeable sum, it is the loss of life that concerns me most, particularly from the viewpoint of controlling this matter in the future.

I had instructed General Arnold to take the most drastic measures to insure the observation of regulations in this matter, and as a result a number of pilots have been brought to trial, convicted and sentenced to



dismissal. At the present time I believe there are eleven cases which have been submitted for your consideration with the recommendation of The Judge Advocate General that the sentence of a dismissal be approved. There are other cases pending.<sup>1</sup>

I would recommend, Mr. President, that the sternest action be taken in this matter to conserve the lives of other men in the months to come, because I am convinced that only by such procedure can we control the youthful exuberance of these young men which causes them to disregard regulations with the consequent loss of life and property.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. General Henry H. Arnold, commanding general of the Army Air Forces, notified Marshall on May 12 regarding disciplinary measures dealing with overt violations of flying regulations. Arnold expressed concern over the president's delay in confirming the court-martial sentences in these cases. "The condition now in the Air Forces is becoming very critical as none of these young men have been dismissed from the Service," wrote Arnold. "No final action has been taken on these cases; and there is a general feeling throughout the Air Forces that no action will be taken and these young men will go unpunished." (Arnold Memorandum to the Chief of Staff, May 12, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 360.331].) Colonel Frank McCarthy informed General Marshall on May 12 that General Arnold's memorandum of the same date "shows only a part of the picture of what is really happening in court martial cases. The average delay in taking action at the White House is *36 days*, and in a very high proportion of cases sentences are revised downward to the great detriment of morale in the units to which sentenced officers are assigned." (McCarthy Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, May 12, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. President Roosevelt responded on May 26 that of the eleven cases mentioned by General Marshall, nine had been dismissed as recommended, one had received a suspension as a result of the recommendations of the secretary of war and of The Judge Advocate General, and that "the eleventh case arrived today and will receive prompt attention." The president expressed his agreement that "we should tighten up on these Air Corps boys, on account of their temperamental dispositions and the necessity for strict compliance with all safety regulations." Roosevelt concluded, "You may be assured that I shall do my best to carry out your request and that of the Chief of the Air Corps in considering the merits of these cases." (Roosevelt to Marshall, May 26, 1944, *ibid.*)

On July 1 Colonel McCarthy informed Marshall and Arnold that it had been reported to him that "no leniency was shown in these 11 cases and that the Secretary of War's recommendations were upheld and confirmed in each case." (McCarthy Memorandum for General Marshall and General Arnold, July 1, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 360.331].) For more information regarding this issue, see Marshall Memorandum to the Secretary of War, August 16, 1944, pp. 547-48.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MCNARNEY

May 17, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

While I was inspecting troops on my last trip I looked over some of the reservations, rather hurriedly I admit, and I came to the conclusion that in some cases we might release considerable acreages while still continuing a



cantonment in operation. This is only urgently important when the land is valuable for farming or for special crops such as fruits or nuts.

For example, at Camp Adair near Corvallis, Oregon, there is a two-division cantonment with only one division present. I imagine that cantonments on the West Coast must be held operational in preparation for return to the Pacific. However, our training requirements are such that it seems to me we could immediately lop off large sections of reservations. I found at Adair that valuable nut groves were going to seed, as it were, and that rich land was lying idle except for maneuver purposes. But there is so much acreage in the reservation that there should be ample for the character of training *now* required of troops. Therefore the earlier the date at which we release sections of these reservations the quicker they will get back into cultivation with the productive results to follow. Also I understand we would probably obtain better prices and it will assist in a gradual demobilization rather than a sudden and violent one.

In this connection I think we should have in mind that the original cantonment policy which provided such generous acreage all over the United States for the Army was based on the necessity for an exceedingly rapid development of the Army. Therefore all the facilities must be immediately at hand so that the training of the various units could proceed without any delay of one by the other and firing could be conducted with facility under the most favorable training conditions. That situation no longer exists and we should be prepared to move into a more conservative policy. You will probably find the Ground Forces opposed to any restrictions but I don't believe we are justified in such a stand. We have been given the most generous authority on which to build up the Army and I think we should be meticulous in our effort to return to ordinary civil use so much of these facilities as will not seriously affect our military procedure.

On my return I talked to Somervell, he having brought up practically the same point with me as a result of a letter I had received from the head of the Government agency which is interested in this matter—I have forgotten what individual and what agency.<sup>1</sup>

Please have the foregoing in mind in considering this business, particularly the desirability of moving progressively and rapidly, and avoiding long delays which would be involved in disposing only of complete cantonments, as I think in many instances a partial disposal is a more efficient method of procedure.<sup>2</sup>

G. C. M.

NA/RG 165 (OCS, 400.93)

1. William L. Clayton, administrator for the Surplus War Property Administration within the Office of War Mobilization, wrote to General Marshall on May 8 that he had received information that numerous military posts and properties held by the War Department were in excess of current military needs of the army. Clayton urged that such facilities be declared surplus as soon as possible to restore the lands to useful agricultural production



and to maximize the benefit to the government of disposal through resale. He recognized that some properties not currently in use might need to be retained for future employment, but any properties clearly surplus should be disposed of immediately. Since Marshall was on the West Coast on an inspection trip, Clayton's letter was referred to Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, chief of the Army Service Forces, who told Clayton that the War Department was in agreement with him and would collect information on the facilities as a means to consolidate activities. (Clayton to Marshall, May 8, 1944, and H. Merrill Pasco Brief for the Chief of Staff, May 17, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 400.93].)

2. A conference concerning this matter was held in the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff Joseph T. McNarney on May 19 at which representatives of the Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, Army Service Forces, G-3 (Organization and Training), and G-4 (Supply) were present. McNarney stated that excess or underemployed facilities should be closed in the interest of manpower conservation. He directed that an investigation be made of such facilities to determine why they were not being operated at maximum capacity, why small posts were being maintained rather than consolidating them into larger posts, and to make recommendations for maximum consolidations. The report should state the total capacity for all facilities under each command headquarters and recommend the total acreage that could be released to civilian use pursuant to General Marshall's May 17 memorandum. (Minutes of the Conference in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, May 19, 1944, *ibid.*)

TO SECOND LIEUTENANT ALLEN T. BROWN

May 17, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

*Dear Allen,* There have been several letters from you to the family, all very interesting. I think Madge is due here in a few days to do an article for LIFE. She is to stay with us and we shall be very happy to see her.

Your mother knows you have probably gone to the beachhead as a V-mail from Clifton said you had left where you were. In view of the fighting now going on she is relieved that you are not in your old locality and I have not made any comments about affairs in the beachhead.

Molly is down at Clayton and has been unable to find quarters within convenient distance of Jim's division.<sup>1</sup> She will probably go to Fire Island in June and he hopes to spend two weeks there the latter part of June. Kitty is here, and developing rapidly and very cute. She was down with us for the weekend at Leesburg from which your mother and I emerged pretty well exhausted from heavy spring labors. However, the place looks lovely and this is the first time we have been able to touch it in the spring. It is a great source of relaxation to me because it gets my mind off my troubles.

I returned a few days ago from a 7,000-mile trip pretty well around the perimeter of the United States.<sup>2</sup> Inspected about two divisions a day which kept me going from six something in the morning until late in the evening. I had good weather but rough flying most of the time. On my way East from Seattle I picked up Harry Hopkins at the Mayo Clinic at Rochester,



Minnesota, where he had undergone a very serious operation, and left him off at White Sulphur Springs Army Hospital where I understand he gained five pounds the first four days.<sup>3</sup>

Good luck to you.<sup>4</sup> With my love, Affectionately,

GCMRL/Research File (Family)

1. For information regarding Molly Brown Winn, see Marshall to Brown, April 28, 1944, pp. 439–40.

2. For Marshall's inspection trip, see note 1, Marshall to Adams, May 11, 1944, p. 447.

3. For information regarding Hopkins's health, see Marshall to Hopkins, February 9, 1944, pp. 275–76, and August 18, 1944, pp. 555–56.

4. For further information regarding Allen Brown, see Marshall to Brown, May 30, 1944, p. 468.

GENERAL MARSHALL'S REMARKS AT DINNER  
FOR THE HONORABLE BERNARD M. BARUCH<sup>1</sup>

May 24, 1944  
New York, New York

When I was in France with the AEF I heard of the outstanding contribution being made to our war effort by Mr. Baruch, but it was not until 22 years ago in the Delta of the Mississippi that I came to know him personally. While trivial matters are not appropriate to this evening, I am inclined to mention that he and I were paired in a duck-shooting competition with the Governor of Louisiana and General Pershing. Mr. Baruch was the only professional in the party, at least he was the only duck hunter in practice, but the cards were heavily stacked against him. We had no positive evidence but it appeared that the Creole guides materially assisted our competitors. The great injustice, however, was perpetrated by a New Orleans newspaper which quite naturally featured the highest possible scores for the Governor of the State and the General of the Armies. It went still further in misrepresentation by placing the bag of an inconspicuous Army major well above that of your guest of honor tonight, who, as a matter of fact, was the actual high gun of the competition.

I have come to know that Mr. Baruch prides himself on his ability to penetrate the other fellow's purpose and on his calm reticence under pressure, but at a late hour that night on the train coming north he finally confessed to me his puzzlement over this particular newspaper feature article. He understood of course why General Pershing and Governor Parker<sup>2</sup> should have been rated tops by the local paper but he couldn't understand why my record should have been falsified to his disadvantage. The point was, the publisher of the newspaper had been my roommate at college,<sup>3</sup> so even the astute Mr. Baruch occasionally gets winged.

In the fall of 1938, before the country was aroused to the seriousness of the storm center rapidly gathering in Germany, Mr. Baruch called at my



office to congratulate me on my appointment as Deputy Chief of Staff. He stayed but a moment and as he went out the door he made this comment: "We're going to lick this fellow Hitler. We're not going to let him get away with it."

Since that day, in one way or another, he has continuously labored, first to develop America's latent military power and subsequently, to harmonize the various conflicting elements into an efficient team. His efforts in the last field are well known to the public but in my view, he rendered his most vital service in assisting the War Department to convince Congress of the imperative necessity of making sizeable appropriations at a time when the necessity for such action was little understood and was strongly opposed. A hundred million appropriated in those days had the value of a billion later on. Regarding his work in that critical period I speak from an intimate knowledge, as he stood at my shoulder during discussions which had consequences of momentous importance to this country. Of that public service little is generally known, though in my opinion, he made his greatest contribution to his Government at that time.

Mr. Baruch is being specifically honored tonight for his service to humanity. He has contributed completely of his time and person whenever the need arose and he has been most generous in financial contributions for the betterment of mankind. I feel that I have expressed these views rather awkwardly and without the emphasis justified by his great service to this country and to the world, for that matter, resulting from his pure patriotism and his patience and wisdom.

The newspapers and magazines have emphasized these qualities for many years, but it seems to me they have not always recognized that his counsel and guidance are available not only to political administrations, Congressional committees, and large institutions, but also to the humble individual. During recent months I have learnt of several instances in which he has given much time and thought to the personal problems of soldiers in our Army. His method here has been characteristic, for instead of seeking privilege for the young men in whom he is interested, he has sought merely advice as to how they might proceed towards the realization of their ambitions and has passed this on after tempering it with his own wisdom.

I owe him a personal debt for his strong support in that difficult period of national lethargy and of hesitance to initiate the giant strides necessary to meet the world cataclysm which was about to engulf us. I am therefore both gratified and happy to have this opportunity to present to him the Gold Medal of the Institute of Social Sciences.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)

1. General Marshall delivered this speech at the annual dinner of the National Institute of Social Sciences held at the Waldorf-Astoria, at which time he presented Bernard Baruch



with the institute's Gold Medal in recognition of his distinguished service to humanity. The citation praised Baruch: "During many days of momentous decision, you have served your country generously and consistently with high purpose and rich results." (H. Merrill Pasco Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, May 22, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Having been chairman of the War Industries Board during World War I, Baruch was adviser to the director of the Office of War Mobilization.

2. John M. Parker was governor of Louisiana during 1920-24.

3. Leonard K. Nicholson, Marshall's roommate at the Virginia Military Institute, was publisher of the New Orleans *Times-Picayune*.

TO CAPTAIN JOSEPH M. PATTERSON<sup>1</sup>

May 26, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Captain Patterson, There is attached a clipping from the Times Herald of May 26 referring incidentally to me.<sup>2</sup> This article in my opinion introduces a serious consideration in regard to the role of a free press during a national war emergency, and I wish to make some comments, with the request for your views in the matter.

In the first place the reference to me is incorrect; neither Mrs. Marshall nor I attended the function referred to, though it had a semi-official status which required some consideration on my part. But the error or misrepresentation is unimportant in relation to the evident purpose of the reference, which could only be, so far as I can see, to weaken the Army's confidence in its Chief of Staff.

This is a very serious matter in my opinion and one fraught with grave consequences. I am not concerned in politics so the free rein permissible in assaulting political figures would not apply. I have only one job and that concerns the lives of many men.

Frankly, in such times as these I am at a loss to understand the thought behind such an article as the one attached, so far as it pertains to military leaders. If it is believed that I, for example, am not up to my job or responsibility, a free press is certainly free to say so with a view to my relief. But this article appears to be merely an endeavor to smirch, without implying a more serious purpose.

I am not asking for a retraction. That would be absurd in view of the character of the article, and it would also reflect on other military officials who felt it necessary to put in an appearance. But I am concerned over the conception of the press regarding such procedure. This incidentally is the second time this particular writer has used this method with regard to me, to which could be added references or implications reflecting adversely on my procedure or policies; but the previous article appeared in less critical days,<sup>3</sup> and yesterday's article impressed me as a much more serious case, for lack of confidence of the Army would be a matter of tragic consequences



under the pressures and hazards of the actual and impending military operations.

I should be much interested in your comments.<sup>4</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Publisher of the New York *Daily News*, Patterson had served in the First World War. His sister, Eleanor M. Patterson, was owner and editor of the Washington *Times-Herald*.

2. On May 26 the Washington *Times-Herald* had printed an article written by Walter Trohan entitled "Washington Gayest Capital In World on Eve of Invasion." Trohan wrote that "Army and Navy names up to the highest ranks are appearing on society pages with greater frequency than on the news pages, where the public is expecting momentarily to find the announcement of the invasion." The highlight of the week had been on Sunday, May 21, when Lieutenant General and Mrs. Alexander A. Vandegrift had entertained at the Marine commandant's house; Trohan included General Marshall among the military guests. (Washington *Times-Herald*, May 26, 1944, p. 2.) Marshall's appointment book shows no engagements scheduled for May 21.

3. For Walter Trohan's previous article in 1939, see *Papers of GCM*, 2: 139-40.

4. Apparently Major General Alexander D. Surles of the Bureau of Public Relations recommended that General Marshall not send this letter. Marshall's secretary wrote at the top of the carbon copy in the file: "Gen. Surles says this was killed. 5/30/44."

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JACOB L. DEVERS  
Radio No. WAR-41880. *Secret*

May 26, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall for Devers' eye only. Would it not be wise to give some recognition, at least by mention of name of commanders to French Corps and to Second and Sixth Corps and to 85th and 88th Divisions. Also as Buffalo succeeds similarly mention names of Commander of Special Force, 3rd Division and First Armored.<sup>1</sup> Up to present moment only Army Commander's name is mentioned. This hurts Clark in this country.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-41880])

1. Operation BUFFALO was the code name for the plan for the U.S. Sixth Corps breakout from the Anzio beachhead which began May 23, 1944. For a detailed discussion of this operation, see Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., *Cassino to the Alps*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* (Washington: GPO, 1977), pp. 105-7, 117-83, 191, 541-42.

THE China-Burma-India theater remained a complex military problem for the Allied armies in the spring of 1944. The Japanese began a major offensive along the Imphal front with three divisions and some Indian nationalist units on March 8, 1944. The situation worsened for the Allies in April, but by June 22 they broke the Japanese blockade of Imphal. British resistance and major Japanese supply problems, as well as exhausted and disease-stricken soldiers, forced the Japanese to discontinue the offensive in July. (Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command*



*Problems*, pp. 172–74, 192–95.) The Chinese high command adopted on April 12, 1944, a plan for an offensive across the Salween River, designed to drive from east to west on Myitkyina in Burma. (See Marshall to Ho Ying-chin, April 15, 1944, pp. 413–14.) The Salween campaign was conducted from May 11 to June 30, 1944. The Chinese crossed the Salween River, but determined resistance from the Japanese Fifty-sixth Infantry prevented productive Chinese advances into Burma. Meanwhile Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell decided in April to commence a major effort in Burma, with Myitkyina and its key airfield as the objective. Stilwell intended to assault from west to east, counting on Chinese support in the Salween River offensive. Stilwell's offensive punch was centered around Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill's 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), led by Colonel Charles N. Hunter (U.S.M.A., 1929) as a result of Merrill's recurring health problems, backed by Chinese regiments. The airfield at Myitkyina, important for the support of Hump air transport, was taken on May 17, although Japanese resistance continued and Myitkyina itself was not declared secure until August 3, 1944. (*Ibid.*, pp. 329–60, 226–28, 253–54; *The Stilwell Papers*, ed. Theodore H. White [New York: William Sloane Associates, 1948], pp. 287–88, 295–99.)

The military situation in China deteriorated rapidly in the spring of 1944. The Japanese high command intended a major offensive for China in 1944: Operation ICHIGO contemplated the Japanese Twelfth Army attacking south into Honan Province, across the Yellow River, while the Japanese Eleventh Army advanced north from Hankow to meet it, pinching off a salient in the process. Other elements of the Japanese Eleventh Army would advance south into Hunan Province to meet the advance from Hong Kong of the Japanese Twenty-third Army. The Japanese offensive began between April 17 and 19. Feeble Chinese resistance led to massive Japanese advances. (Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 316–28, 371–74.)

Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Stilwell on May 2, 1944, that his primary responsibility was to provide air support from Chinese bases for the major Allied offensive against Japan toward Formosa from the Marianas-Palau-Mindanao line. Stilwell was charged with the responsibility for air support from China against Formosa, the Ryukyus, the Philippines, and the China coast prior to and during the advance on Formosa. Without prejudice to his current operations, he was also charged with providing indirect support for the attack on Mindanao. "It is recognized," the Joint Chiefs told Stilwell, "that major curtailment of 'HUMP' support to Ground Forces in China and to such other activities as do not directly support an air effort will be required." (Joint Chiefs of Staff to Stilwell, Radio No. WARX-31202, May 2, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-31202)].)



Stilwell desired that his objectives be more precisely delineated. On May 24 he informed General Marshall of his understanding of his tasks, in an effort to see if that mirrored the chief of staff's vision of the American position in the C.B.I. theater. "My mission vis a vis the British is to cooperate in furnishing the War effort, using all available US resources in the present Campaign," wrote Stilwell. "My mission vis a vis the Chinese is to increase the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army." Stilwell considered his mission was to create a combat-efficient Chinese army, ultimately of sixty divisions. He pointed to his difficulties in this regard, particularly concerning his relations with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Stilwell also reported that the record of British Commonwealth ground forces in Burma was disappointing. "The British simply do not want to fight in Burma or reopen communications with China," wrote Stilwell. "In short, I do not believe the British help is worth what we are paying for it." As for the Chinese, "the choice seems to be to get realistic and insist on a quid pro quo," advised Stilwell, "or else restrict our effort in China to maintaining what American Aviation we can, the latter course allows Chiang Kai Shek to waltz on his agreement. It also lays the ultimate burden of fighting the Jap Army on the USA. I contend that ultimately the Jap Army must be fought on the mainland of Asia." He added that if this was not what was envisioned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then perhaps all Allied efforts in the C.B.I. theater should be eliminated except those designed to support air operations. Stilwell thought he could hold the Myitkyina area as an air base. "To insure the reopening of communications with China," wrote Stilwell, "I still need an American corps and more Engineers." (Stilwell to Marshall, Radio No. DTG-240240Z, May 24, 1944, *ibid.*, [CM-IN-18256].) General Marshall replied to Stilwell on May 26, 1944. ★

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSEPH W. STILWELL  
Radio No. WARX-42202. *Top Secret*

May 26, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

TOPSEC to Stilwell for his eyes only from Marshall. Your mission with respect to the British as stated in your dtg 240240Z May 24 is correct. Your mission with respect to the Chinese as stated by you is your primary mission and has the President's approval. Decisions taken at QUADRANT and SEXTANT conferences, especially those contained in CCS 319/5, CCS 417 and CCS 397 set up requirements for your accomplishment which for the time being interfere with your primary mission. Decision has been made for example that operations in China and southeast Asia should be conducted in support of the main operations in the central and southwest Pacific.



Japan should be defeated without undertaking a major campaign against her on the mainland of Asia if her defeat can be accomplished in this manner. Subsequent operations against the Japanese ground army in Asia should then be in the nature of a mopping up operation.

Timely support for Pacific operations requires that priority be given during the next several months to a buildup of our air effort in China.

The heavy requirements for our operations against Germany and for our main effort in the Pacific, preclude our making available to you the American corps you request to assist you in the reopening of ground communications with China. We are forced therefore to give first priority to increasing the Hump lift.

Accordingly the U. S. Chiefs of Staff are about to propose to the British Chiefs of Staff that Mountbatten's directive be changed to the following:

"To develop, maintain, broaden and protect the air link to China in order to provide maximum and timely flow of POL<sup>1</sup> and stores to China in support of Pacific operations; to press advantages against the enemy by exerting maximum effort, ground and air, during the current monsoon season; in pressing such advantages to be prepared to exploit the development of overland communications to China. These operations must be dictated by the forces at present available or firmly allocated to SEAC."<sup>2</sup>

Our view is that your paramount mission in the China theater for the immediate future is to conduct such military operations as will most effectively support the main effort directed against the enemy by forces in the Pacific. In order to facilitate timely accomplishment of this mission, for the present you should devote your principal effort to support of the Hump, its security, and the increase in its capacity with the view to development of maximum effectiveness of the 14th Air Force consistent with minimum requirements for support of all other activities in China. In pressing the advantages against the enemy you should be prepared to exploit the development of overland communications to China.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-42202])

1. POL refers to products such as petroleum fuels, lubricants, insulating oils, liquid coolants, and antifreeze compounds.

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff sent a directive to Mountbatten on June 3 that included these recommendations. (Marshall to Stilwell, Radio No. WARX-46159, June 3, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-46159)].)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
[Radio No. W-43030.] *Secret*

May 29, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall Personal for Eisenhower. Reference your letter May 24th



regarding distinctive command marking: it is OK by me and any other decision of yours to insure successful action is confirmed now in advance.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. General Eisenhower had written to Marshall on May 24 requesting permission for individuals leading combat troops to wear a distinctive mark on their uniforms to separate them from staff and support personnel. Eisenhower's headquarters proposed to allow officers to wear a narrow green band around the shoulder loop and for noncommissioned officers to wear a narrow green stripe below the rank chevron. (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1888.)

TO MRS. ALLEN T. BROWN  
Radio.

May 30, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

I have just received a message from General Clark commanding Fifth Army that Allen was killed in his tank by a German sniper at ten AM May 29th near Campoleone. General Clark has sent for Clifton. Katherine is leaving here by plane at ten o'clock for New York and will go direct to your apartment. Major Davenport of my staff will be with her in case there is anything that may arise that you wish to have done in connection with military channels. This is a distressing message to send and you have my deepest sympathy.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/Research File (Family)

1. On May 31 Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers sent the following message to General Marshall: "I am sincerely sorry to report to you that Allen was killed in action on the 29th while leading his platoon in an attack west of Velletri. He was shot by a sniper when he stood up in his turret to observe the front with his field glasses." (Devers to Marshall, Radio No. B-12811, May 31, 1944, GCMRL/Research File [Family].) Clifton Brown was present at his brother's burial on May 30 in a cemetery near Anzio. (Clifton Brown to Mrs. George C. Marshall and Madge Brown, May 31, 1944, *ibid.*) General Marshall visited his stepson's grave in June; see Marshall to Brown, June 23, 1944, pp. 487-89. For the posthumous award of decorations, see Marshall to Brown, September 28, 1944, pp. 613-14. Mrs. Marshall gives her account of Allen's death in Katherine Tupper Marshall, *Together: Annals of an Army Wife* (New York: Tupper and Love, 1946), pp. 195-96, 200-203.

TO C. PAUL NELSON

June 2, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Nelson: Replying to your letter concerning Captain Nelson in India, the War Department has necessarily established definite procedures under which officers can be returned to this country, and the authority in the matter is in the hands of the theater commanders.<sup>1</sup> They are the only ones who have the information concerning the situation in the theater—the



availability of men to replace those returning and the importance of the particular individual's assignment.

In order that Captain Nelson could be considered for return for assignment in this country he should apply for an emergency leave or for a reassignment through his commanding officer. Under ordinary conditions there would be little likelihood of his request being granted since he has not been overseas for two years. Army personnel normally are not returned to this country until after two years duty, except in the case of Air personnel who have participated in a certain number of combat missions.

I am sorry to give you such a disappointing reply because I should like to be of help, but as you will realize I must be most careful to take no action in an individual case which I cannot apply to others similarly situated. However, I am making an inquiry regarding Captain Nelson to see if there is any basis on which I might act.

I think I recall you as the Captain of D Company, the senior cadet Captain in the Corps, after Hawes' departure.<sup>2</sup> That seems a long time ago, and it is, as evidenced by the years. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. The letter from C. Paul Nelson (V.M.I., 1898), an engineer in Huntington, West Virginia, is not in the Marshall papers.

2. George P. Hawes, Jr., (V.M.I., 1898) had been First Captain of the Corps of Cadets before he resigned from the Virginia Military Institute in April 1898, shortly before graduation, to join the army during the Spanish-American War. In 1936 Hawes was awarded his diploma from the V.M.I.

REMARKS BY GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL  
ON HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE ORDER OF SUVOROV  
FROM THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS<sup>1</sup>

June 5, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

I am profoundly honored by the action of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in awarding me the decoration of the Order of Suvorov and I accept it for the American Army, as a symbol of your regard and appreciation of our war effort. That it is tendered by a country which made an historic defense against the Titanic assault of the German Army at the height of its efficiency and numbers, a country whose armies are now in the actual process of destroying the Nazi military formations on the Eastern Front, gives this decoration great significance, of which I am deeply conscious.

The final action in this terrible European war is now focused on a single battle in which every Allied force will be represented. It is to be a battle to the death for the Nazis and a battle to victory for the Allies.



I give my thanks for the honor accorded me tonight with a full appreciation of the magnitude of what has been done and what is about to be done by the Armies of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)

1. General Marshall was presented the Order of Suvorov, First Degree, by Ambassador Andrei A. Gromyko in a ceremony at the Soviet Embassy. (*New York Times*, June 6, 1944, p. 7.) For previous discussion, see Marshall Memorandum for the President, March 13, 1944, pp. 339-40.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Secret*

June 6, 1944

[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Casualties and Prisoners.

You asked me this morning what our latest returns were regarding casualties.<sup>1</sup> I give you the following, which cover the period from May 10 to June 1 (except for prisoners of war which is as of May 31) for U.S. and associated Allied troops of the Fifth Army, and from May 10 to June 2 for British, Canadian, Indian, Polish, and Italian troops of the Eighth Army:

	<i>Killed</i>	<i>Wounded</i>	<i>Missing</i>	<i>Prisoners</i>
<i>Fifth Army</i>				
U.S.	2,129	9,284	826	7,334
French	1,507	6,950	573	4,328
British	245	1,142	2,354	137
Italian	<u>2</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>365</u>	<u>0</u>
Totals	3,883	17,413	4,118	11,799
<i>Eighth Army</i>				
British, Canadian, Indian, Polish, and Italian troops	<u>2,258</u>	<u>9,177</u>	<u>1,194</u>	<u>3,956</u>
Grand totals	6,141	26,590	5,312	15,755

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall had a meeting at the White House on the morning of June 6. "I was very careful to send Mr. Roosevelt every few days a statement of our casualties, and it was done in a very effective way, graphically and rather in colors, so it would be quite clear to him when he had only a moment or two to consider," recalled Marshall in 1957. "I tried to keep



before him all the time the casualty results, because you get hardened to these things and you have to be very careful to keep them always in the forefront of your mind.” (*Marshall Interviews*, p. 416.) For another casualty report, see Marshall Memorandum for the President, August 16, 1944, pp. 548–49.

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL N. T. KIRK

June 7, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

I should like you to give me a statement regarding the various prophylaxes now administered by the Medical Department. What I am interested in is an appreciation of what might be called the factor of safety involved in relation to the inconvenience and the loss of man hours.

For example, I noticed when I was in China that the requirements for various prophylaxes which were required to be given to men returning home, though they had been given them before leaving San Francisco on their way out, resulted in an appreciable accumulation of man hours lost. Also, as I recall, at one time the typhoid prophylaxis was not given after a certain age. Now in effect you want to give it every time we turn around. I am wondering if in an endeavor to have a 100% record you are not inflicting a great deal of inconvenience as well as discomfort on the officers and men. It will be a fine thing, of course, from the Medical point of view to have a 100% record on typhoid or some other disease but the avoidance of a few cases, it seems to me, is not justified by a heavy overdose of the punishment.

We accept hazards in military operations. To what degree does the Medical Corps accept hazards in this?<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Norman T. Kirk, the surgeon general, replied that the inconvenience and loss of man hours were trivial compared to the difficulties created by the spread of infectious diseases. “In overseas theaters, especially in the Pacific area where sanitary measures cannot be applied thoroughly, malaria and dysentery, for which we do not have prophylactic inoculations, are causing more casualties than the enemy has inflicted.” The Medical Department was not “trying to make a hundred percent record for the sake of the record,” and he insisted that the immunization policies were based upon medical theory and the objective of maintaining maximum troop efficiency. “Failure to provide protection when it is known that protection can be gained by immunization would not only mean failure of the Medical Department in its specified duty but would also mean added difficulties for military operations,” Kirk told the chief of staff. Typhus was not a problem for our troops in North Africa and Italy, amid a typhus outbreak in Italy, because they had been vaccinated adequately. “Typhus immunization of our military personnel saved more man hours at Naples alone than has been expended through our entire immunization program since 1940.” (Kirk Memorandum for General Marshall, June 27, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 720.3].) For more information regarding the typhus problem, see Marshall Memorandum for the President, June 30, 1944, pp. 499–500.



MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL McNARNEY

June 7, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Mr. McCloy was speaking to me this morning about Eugene Meyer's proposed article on morale conditions in Alaska.<sup>1</sup> I am interested only in the possibility that things which might be done in the way of construction, etc., to help the morale of those remaining in Alaska are not being done for some reason or other.

I suggest that you send an Inspector up there right away to see what in his opinion we can do in Alaska to improve morale conditions.

There is the question of the length of tour up there. Of course this is hitched on to the question of the problem of the availability of shipping, etc. However, it may be that under conditions prevailing in the summer, more can be done in rotation.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy had informed Deputy Chief of Staff Joseph T. McNarney on June 6 that he was concerned over the question of morale in U.S. Army posts located in Alaska. "I was able to kill one rather lurid story which the Washington Post had on the matter," wrote McCloy. (Eugene Meyer was the editor and publisher of the *Washington Post*.) Secretary McCloy said he had heard that construction of living quarters and troop facilities had been halted in Alaska due to budgetary restrictions, and he wondered whether such policy was wise. He expressed concern that the two-year troop rotation policy was too long, suggested that increased furloughs should be encouraged, and speculated that the Medical Department might consider whether service in Alaska on a prolonged basis correlated with psychiatric difficulties. (McCloy Memorandum for General McNarney, June 6, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. A two-month investigation by the inspector general's office concluded that morale in Alaska was unsatisfactory. The problem was not in construction of living quarters or recreational facilities but in rotation policy. On September 13, 1943, the War Department had informed the commanding general of the Western Defense Command that the general rotation policy called for return to the United States after two years. Personnel serving in Alaska came to regard this as a right, not a privilege or a standard for rotation eligibility, as the War Department asserted. The investigators recommended that a definite rotation policy be established. They noted that psychiatric problems were no greater in Alaska than in other theaters, but service beyond fourteen months resulted in a lowering of troop mental efficiency. The availability of replacements, not shipping, was the limiting factor for troops departing Alaska. (Major General Thomas T. Handy Summary of Investigations of Conditions in Alaska, August 31, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 330.2 Alaska].)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSEPH W. STILWELL  
Radio No. WARX-47296. *Secret*

June 7, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall for Stilwell's and Sultan's eyes only. With reference to your 18238 of 6 June regarding VLR stocks in China:<sup>1</sup> These are not to be



released to the 14th Air Force without express approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is our view that the early bombing of Japan will have a far more beneficial effect on the situation in China than the long delay in such an operation which would be caused by the transfer of these stocks to Chennault. Furthermore, we have positive evidence in Italy of the limiting delaying effect of a purely air resistance where the odds were nearly 7,000 planes on our side to 200 on the German. Furthermore, the 20th Bomber Group represents a powerful agency which must not be localized under any circumstances any more than we would so localize the Pacific Fleet. Please keep this in mind.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-47296])

1. Stilwell had met with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on June 5, at which time they discussed the situation in north Burma and east China. The Generalissimo was satisfied with the campaign in north Burma, but he was concerned over the Japanese advances in east China and asked that the entire air effort be utilized to stop the Japanese. Stilwell said that he was diverting 1,500 tons from the June allotment of the Twentieth Bomber Command to the Fourteenth Air Force. The Generalissimo asked that the B-29 supplies at Chengtu be given to Chennault, to which Stilwell replied "not until situation is so serious as to justify its use." Stilwell continued: "However, as an ace in the hole, request that I be granted authority to make use of these very long range stocks. Be assured very long range stocks will not be touched except as a last resort." (Stilwell to Marshall, June 6, 1944, In Log, p. 96-A, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Message Log]; Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 367–69.) Stilwell commented in his diary regarding his meeting with the Generalissimo: "As expected, chiseling gasoline for the Fourteenth Air Force. All he wants is the world and nothing in return." (*Stilwell Papers*, p. 302.)

2. "Instructions understood and are exactly what I had hoped for," Stilwell replied. "As you know, I have few illusions about power of air against ground troops. Pressure from Generalissimo forced the communication." (Stilwell to Marshall, June 8, 1944, In Log, p. 126-A, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Message Log].)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JACOB L. DEVERS

June 7, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Devers, Attached is a letter from the wife of your old barber at Fort Myer, Joe Abbate, to his uncle, Giovanni Abbate, Itala Superiore, Prov. Messina, Italy. There is also inclosed \$35.00 in American currency. Possibly this should be converted into invasion currency.

Joe still has his Fort Myer shop but he also has the huge shop here in the Pentagon.

I hope you can arrange to have the delivery of the letter and the money made to Joe's uncle and also that some employment can be found for this fellow. Joe tells me he has two sons who are prisoners of war, both officers, and that he had been a well-to-do man but is now reduced to beggary. He also said that a portion of his trouble had come from his hostility to Mussolini. However, this particular can be easily picked up by your people.



I don't know how much trouble I am imposing on you but if you have any contact with Messina I should appreciate your helping out in this. Incidentally, Joe had no idea of my taking this action. He was merely telling me the story of his uncle when I offered to get a letter through, and money, if he cared to send it.<sup>1</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Devers wrote to Joe Abbate on June 21 that the letter and money had been delivered to his uncle, who was retired and receiving a small pension and salary from the city of Messina. "We have given him a position as Agricultural Adviser to the Provincial Commissioner, Messina, at 150 lire per day," wrote Devers. He also reported on the last known whereabouts of the uncle's three sons. (Devers to Abbate, June 21, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) General Marshall thanked Devers for taking care of the matter, and he added a postscript by hand: "Joe was so excited over your letter that he almost butchered my haircut." (Marshall to Devers, June 29, 1944, *ibid.*)

TO MRS. ALLEN T. BROWN

June 7, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Madge, You will probably not get this letter until your return to New York, but as I am leaving the country I shall get it off today.

The package from Abercrombie and Fitch arrived yesterday and Katherine was charmed with the contents. I can't tell you how much I appreciate your taking the time out of a busy last day in New York to do this for me. You sent me exactly what I wanted and it had a most pleasing effect. Please, without reluctance, mail an item of the cost, or the bill, to my office (attention of Miss Nason).

Clifton unexpectedly arrived Monday afternoon at 2:30 P.M. He telephoned you in New York at 6:00 o'clock and found that you had just left the apartment for the train. He is now calculating on seeing you on your return, if he is still in the country. In any event, he has written out in great detail a full account of just what happened. Also, he brought back with him all of Allen's things; the clothes we are having cleaned and when you return to New York the package will be sent to you.<sup>1</sup>

Your brief visit gave a great deal of pleasure and I think had a highly beneficial effect on Katherine. You must do it again and frequently. She and Clifton are leaving for Fire Island on Friday. He will probably be with her there for four or five days and then have to start back. They sent him over as a courier, with a pouch.

I hope your trip to Wisconsin proves interesting and holds your attention. It is the best thing you could possibly have done at this time.

With my love, and my thanks for your shopping and for your sweet card, Affectionately,



GCMRL/Research File (Family)

1. Madge worked for *Life* magazine and was traveling to Chicago and Wisconsin on a business assignment. For information regarding Allen Brown's death, see Marshall to Brown, May 30, 1944, p. 468.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSEPH W. STILWELL  
Radio No. WARX-47843. *Top Secret*

June 7, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

TOPSEC eyes only for Stilwell from McNarney.<sup>1</sup> Papers referred to in your CHC 123 of 30 May 1944 have just arrived.<sup>2</sup> General Marshall has left for UK to be absent 2 weeks. Arnold also. In view of the current situation in China and the political aspects of this case, it is not believed wise to take positive action at this time. This seems particularly advisable in view of the action already taken as requested by Sultan for you in increasing tonnage for 14th AF and also the fact that should your recommendations be effected and the situation in Central China develop as badly as might well be possible the responsibility would inevitably be charged against you.<sup>3</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 17, Item 6)

1. General Marshall extensively edited and made additions to the original two-sentence draft, including changing the addresser from Marshall to Deputy Chief of Staff Joseph T. McNarney. The draft with Marshall's handwritten alterations and additions is located in NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 17, Item 6).

2. Stilwell notified General Marshall on May 30 that he was sending papers by courier to explain a case of direct disobedience of his orders by Major General Claire L. Chennault. He reported: "Chennault had an estimate prepared which in my opinion was calculated to create suspicion in the Generalissimo's mind, discredit me, and criticize established policy. I ordered Chennault not to submit any such paper except through Theater Headquarters. He did submit it without going through our Headquarters. . . . The only reason I have not already relieved him is because of political implications." (Stilwell to Marshall, Radio No. CHC-123, May 30, 1944, *ibid.*)

On April 8 and 10 Chennault had written to Stilwell that he needed more supplies for air operations in China. Although Stilwell did not receive Chennault's April 8 letter until around April 21, he meanwhile notified Chennault on April 12 that he appreciated the conditions which Chennault described and that steps were being taken to improve the situation. Stilwell warned Chennault that if he had any intention of communicating to the Generalissimo on this subject, he was to be sure it went through theater headquarters. (Stilwell to Chennault, Radio No. SH-18, April 12, 1944, *ibid.*) At the Generalissimo's request, on April 15 Chennault as chief of staff for air, Republic of China, submitted an estimate of the air situation: "The combined air forces in China, excluding the VLR Project, may not be able to withstand the expected Japanese air offensive and will certainly be unable to afford air support to the Chinese ground forces over the areas and on the scale desired. . . . Drastic measures to provide them with adequate supplies and adequate strength must be taken." (Chennault Memorandum to the Generalissimo, April 15, 1944, *ibid.*) Chennault informed Stilwell, in explanation of his "apparent disregard" of Stilwell's instructions, that on his way to see the Generalissimo he had taken the report to Stilwell's headquarters in Chungking for clearance by Major General Thomas G. Hearn, but he was unable to see Hearn who was absent ill. (Chennault to Stilwell, May 14, 1944, *ibid.*) On



May 27 Stilwell requested that Chennault be relieved of his duties as commander of the Fourteenth Air Force and "devote his full time to the supervision of combat and training of the Chinese Air Force." (Stilwell to Marshall, May 27, 1944, *ibid.*) For further discussion of this subject, see Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 311-16, 324-26.

3. "You are right of course. Send the papers back and forget the incident. I will handle it here," replied Stilwell. Referring to the recent Allied invasion of Normandy, Stilwell concluded: "With the performance going in the main tent you can't be bothered with side shows. Good luck." (Stilwell to McNarney, Radio No. CHC-1175, June 9, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 17, Item 6].) On June 9 the papers were returned to Stilwell without action by the War Department. (Major General J. E. Hull to Stilwell, June 9, 1944, *ibid.*)

ALLIED armies invaded northwestern France early on June 6, 1944, landing five reinforced divisions between the village of Quinéville and the Caen Estuary. The Normandy landings took place over five beaches, with the initial assault supported by three airborne divisions that had landed the previous night. General Sir Bernard Montgomery (Twenty-first Army Group) was the Allied ground commander for the initial landing operation. The United States First Army (Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley) had responsibility for the two western beaches, with the objective of taking Cherbourg and clearing the Cotentin Peninsula. Bradley's right formation, the U.S. Seventh Corps (Major General J. Lawton Collins), made the initial landing on UTAH Beach with the 4th Infantry Division (Major General Raymond O. Barton [U.S.M.A., 1912]). The UTAH landing was supported by the 82d Airborne Division (Major General Matthew B. Ridgway) and the 101st Airborne Division (Major General Maxwell D. Taylor), which had landed between the villages of Sainte-Mère-Eglise and Carentan. Bradley's left formation, the U.S. Fifth Corps (Major General Leonard T. Gerow), made the initial landing on OMAHA Beach with the 1st Infantry Division (Major General Clarence R. Huebner), reinforced by elements of the 29th Infantry Division (Major General Charles H. Gerhardt). The assault on OMAHA Beach was the most difficult, producing the most American casualties, as it landed against vigorous opposition by the Germans. The British Second Army (Lieutenant General Miles Dempsey) had responsibility for the remaining three eastern beaches, with the objective of taking Caen and securing a firm Allied left flank. Dempsey's right formation, the British Thirtieth Corps (Lieutenant General G. C. Bucknall), made the initial landing on GOLD Beach with the British 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division (Major General D. A. H. Graham). Dempsey's left formation, the British First Corps (Lieutenant General J. T. Crocker), controlled the initial landing on the two remaining beaches; the 3d Canadian Infantry Division (Major General R. F. L. Keller) landed on JUNO Beach



and the British 3d Infantry Division (Major General T. G. Rennie) landed on SWORD Beach. The Commonwealth landings on JUNO and SWORD beaches were supported by the British 6th Airborne Division (Major General R. N. Gale), which had landed the previous night, taking key points around Caen on the Orne River and holding positions from there to the village of Cabourg. (Harrison, *Cross-Channel Attack*, pp. 278–335; L. F. Ellis et al., *Victory in the West*, volume 1, *The Battle of Normandy*, a volume in the *History of the Second World War* [London: HMSO, 1962], pp. 149–223; and H. F. Joslen, *Orders of Battle: United Kingdom and Colonial Formations and Units in the Second World War, 1939–1945*, 2 vols. [London: HMSO, 1960], 1: 43, 81, 106, and 2: 578–79.) The official British history of the Normandy invasion estimates that over 156,000 Allied troops were landed in France during the first day of the operation; approximately 132,715 landed from the sea and 23,400 landed from the air. (Ellis, *Victory in the West*, 1: 223.)

General Marshall, General Henry H. Arnold, and Admiral Ernest J. King left the United States on June 8 for England to meet with the Allied staffs and commanders and to observe the situation on the Normandy beaches. They arrived in England on June 9, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff met on June 10 for a general discussion of the war situation. General Marshall and Admiral King outlined the manpower situation; Marshall discussed replacements and the “new policy by which divisions at the front were being kept at full strength throughout operations with resultant increase in morale and in the length of the periods possible for units to operate without relief.” (Pogue, *Organizer of Victory*, pp. 390–96; H. H. Arnold, *Global Mission* [New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949], pp. 503–8; quote from Minutes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Meeting, June 10, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS 334, CCS Minutes]. For Admiral King’s account of the trip, see Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, *Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record* [New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1952], pp. 547–55.) General Marshall visited with Prime Minister Churchill at Chequers that evening.

On June 11 the C.C.S. discussed operations in Italy and the air situation in Europe. General Marshall supported mounting ANVIL, a landing on the southern French coastline to support the OVERLORD operations in northwestern France. Marshall urged “advancing as much as possible the target date of amphibious operations in the Mediterranean.” The Combined Chiefs agreed that, although precise objectives would be determined later, an amphibious operation with a three-division lift would be mounted from the Mediterranean theater with a target date of July 25. They also discussed the prospect of British assistance to the American effort in the war against the Japanese. (Minutes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Meeting, June 11, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS 334, CCS Minutes].)



The evening of the eleventh the American and British Chiefs of Staff and Prime Minister Churchill left by train for the southern English coast to embark on a trip to the Normandy beaches planned for June 12. The American party toured the United States sectors: first the harbor, then the beaches, a field hospital, and lunch at Bradley's headquarters. General Eisenhower, a member of the party, recalled: "Their presence, as they roamed around the areas with every indication of keen satisfaction, was heartening to the troops. The importance of such visits by the high command, including, at times, the highest officials of government, can scarcely be overestimated in terms of their value to soldiers' morale." (Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1948], p. 254; Bradley, *A Soldier's Story*, pp. 289–91.) It was extremely gratifying to General Marshall, who had worked tirelessly for the invasion of France, for him to see what was now a reality. Returning to London on the train that evening, Churchill recalled: "During the dinner I noticed General Marshall writing industriously, and presently he handed me a message he had written to Admiral Mountbatten, which he suggested we should all sign." (Winston S. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, a volume in *The Second World War* [Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953], p. 13.) ★

TO ADMIRAL LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN<sup>1</sup>  
Radio No. OZ-3095. *Top Secret*

June 12, 1944  
[London, England]

Following Private and Personal for Admiral Mountbatten. Today we visited the British and American Armies on the soil of France. We sailed through vast fleets of vessels with landing-craft of many types pouring more and more men, vehicles and stores ashore. We saw artificial harbours in the process of rapid development. We have shared our secrets in common and helped each other all we could. We wish to tell you at this moment in your arduous campaign that we realise that much of the remarkable technique and therefore the success of the venture has its origin in the developments effected by you and your Staff of Combined Operations.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. This message was signed by General Arnold, General Sir Alan Brooke, Prime Minister Churchill, Admiral King, General Marshall, and Field Marshal Jan C. Smuts. A member of the British War Cabinet, Smuts had been prime minister of South Africa since 1939 and commanding officer of the Union Defence Forces since 1940.

2. Admiral Mountbatten replied: "I am glad to think that our contribution from Combined Operations Hq. to success of landing in France has been valued so highly. I am hoping in not too distant future that we shall be allowed to carry out a similar operation in this theatre." (Mountbatten to Marshall et al., Radio No. SAC 3333, June 14, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)



ON June 13 the Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the availability of the Seventh Airborne Division for operations in northwestern France (and its nonavailability for Mediterranean operations) and possible objectives for the invasion of southern France. They approved a message for dispatch to General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, commanding Allied forces in the Mediterranean theater, and to General Eisenhower, commanding Allied forces in northwestern France, stating that “the overriding necessity is to apply to the enemy, at the earliest possible moment, all our forces in the manner best calculated to assist in the success of OVERLORD.” The chiefs agreed that “the destruction of the German armed forces in Italy south of the Pisa/Rimini line must be completed.” After that a major amphibious operation must be mounted from resources in the Mediterranean theater against either southern France, western France, or at the head of the Adriatic in order to support operations in northwestern France. Generals Wilson and Eisenhower were informed that a three-division assault, supported by one Airborne division, was envisioned for no later than July 25. (Minutes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Meeting, June 13, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS 334, CCS Minutes]; Combined Chiefs of Staff to Wilson and Eisenhower, Radio No. OZ-3116, June 14, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 17, Item 20]. For further discussion, see Marshall to Eisenhower, June 22, 1944, pp. 486–87.)

Following the meeting, Marshall and Arnold visited U.S. Army Air Forces units during the afternoon of June 13. General Arnold recalled: “As I went through from group to group, I couldn’t find anything these boys wanted that they didn’t have. They seemed to have all the planes, all the crews, and all the parts they needed.” (Arnold, *Global Mission*, p. 508.)

Sometime during his busy schedule, General Marshall handwrote the following message. ★

TO FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND  
HENRY L. STIMSON  
Radio No. S-53824. *Top Secret*

June 14, 1944  
London, England

For the President and the Secretary of War from General Marshall eyes only. TOPSEC. Conditions on the beachhead are generally favorable with but minor difficulties or delays. The Germans appear unable to muster a sizeable counter-attack for some days to come. Interruption of communications by Air Forces appears to have been effected. Operations of French resistance groups now appear to be growing in importance and effect.

Morale of all our troops and particularly higher commanders, is high. Replacements of men and materiel are being promptly executed throughout



the US beachhead. I was much impressed by the calm competence of 1st Army Commander Bradley and by the aggressive attitude of his corps commanders. Our new divisions, as well as those which have been battle tested, are doing splendidly and the Airborne Divisions have been magnificent.

The organization of the beaches was on a remarkable scale of efficiency under Generals Hoge at OMAHA and Wharton at UTAH.<sup>1</sup>

The creation of the artificial harbor off OMAHA beach proceeds with rapidity. I think exceeding expectations. It is a tremendous affair and bears a very important relationship to the success of our expansion and drive in France.

Eisenhower and his Staff are cool and confident, carrying out an affair of incredible magnitude and complication with superlative efficiency. I think we have these Huns at the top of the toboggan slide, and the full crash of the Russian offensive should put the skids under them. There will be hard fighting and the enemy will seize every opportunity for a skillful counter stroke, but I think he faces a grim prospect.

Releases and estimates from General Eisenhower's Headquarters have been and should continue to be conservative in tone. The foregoing is my personal and confidential estimate.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 107 (SW Safe, French)

1. Brigadier General William M. Hoge was commanding general of the Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group which assaulted OMAHA Beach on June 6. The unit cleared landing areas and roads and established supply dumps for ammunition, food, and gasoline for the combat units. (William M. Hoge, interviewed by George R. Robertson, *General William M. Hoge, US Army, Engineer Memoirs Series* [Washington: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1993], pp. 116–23. For further information regarding Hoge, see Marshall to Mrs. Hoge, July 20, 1944, pp. 529–30.) Brigadier General James E. Wharton led the First Engineer Special Brigade onto UTAH Beach on June 6, with the mission to organize that area of the beachhead.

2. For additional accounts by General Marshall of his visit to Normandy, see Marshall Statement for the *Stars and Stripes*, June 16, 1944, pp. 485–86, and Marshall to Stark, July 11, 1944, pp. 514–15.

COMBINED Chiefs of Staff deliberations on June 14 and 15 dealt largely, but not exclusively, with OVERLORD. They considered the Germans' potential reinforcements, likely counterattacks, and harbor destruction. General Marshall observed that the Germans were apparently unaware of Allied artificial harbors (Mulberries) off the landing beaches, and he noted that "as soon as the Germans learned of the construction of these harbors they would change completely their strategical concept of the situation." (Informal Notes and Minutes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Meeting, June 14, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS 334, CCS Minutes].)



The French determination to raise new units from among the liberated population raised questions of command and supply. General Marshall, who had held a meeting with Lieutenant General Emile Béthouart on the fifteenth, read to the C.C.S. a memorandum from Béthouart, who stated that “any action concerning the French Forces of the Interior should be taken through General Koenig,” and any new French formations from the liberated areas would be under Koenig’s command. Béthouart also requested equipment from the Allies to support the French resistance groups and the anticipated new French units.

The C.C.S. also discussed British participation in Pacific operations and the possibility of speeding up operations and achieving surprise by bypassing the Philippines and the Palaus for an early landing on Formosa. (For further discussion of Pacific alternatives, see Marshall to MacArthur, June 24, 1944, pp. 492–95.) They also enunciated Burma policy, particularly the capture of Myitkyina: “the main object of all operations being the attainment of the maximum possible flow of supplies into China.” (Informal Notes and Minutes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Meeting, June 15, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS 334, CCS Minutes].) Generals Marshall and Arnold visited with Eisenhower on June 16, and they had dinner that evening at Chequers with Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill before departing for the Italian front.

Marshall and Arnold arrived in Naples the evening of June 17. “Under no circumstances must anything be said or done which in any degree alters existing schedules of individuals,” Marshall had written to Devers. “Our stay must be brief. I desire to see Naples, Rome and at least a portion of the battle area to the north.” (Marshall to Devers, Radio No. S-53870, June 14, 1944, NA/RG 107 [SW Safe, French].) On June 18 Marshall and his party flew over the Salerno and Anzio beaches. Marshall visited his stepson’s grave and flew over areas of the recent fighting and the locations where his stepson, Allen, had fought and been killed. (For his account of the trip, see Marshall to Brown, June 23, 1944, pp. 487–89.) Marshall then visited Lieutenant General Mark Clark’s Fifth Army field headquarters near Tuscania. (Arnold, *Global Mission*, pp. 511–17; Clark, *Calculated Risk*, p. 380.)

Marshall and Arnold continued their tour by car on June 19, visiting Rome and the battle area around Viterbo. That evening they attended a conference with senior Mediterranean theater leaders. General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson stated that it would not be possible to launch ANVIL before August 15 “without prejudicing the carrying out of the directive from Combined Chiefs of Staff to complete the destruction of the enemy forces south of the PISA-RIMINI line.” The conferees discussed resource allocation to ANVIL and the Italian front, the overall feeling being that both operations could be pursued simultaneously. Marshall remarked that for



political reasons it was desirable to employ French ground forces in ANVIL. (Minutes of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference, June 19, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 334.8].)

Marshall and Arnold left Italy for the United States early on June 20, stopping at the refueling base at Stephenville, Newfoundland, on June 21 for a brief fishing expedition. A civilian member of the fishing party, Lee Wulff, wrote an article about the fishing trip for *Outdoors* magazine. Wulff wrote that Marshall and Arnold were "real and sincere," and "they are men who know and understand the outdoors and believed that a morning's fishing, even in a downpour, was the right sort of break in what must be an almost continuous time of tension and strain for them. I had a feeling . . . of intense pride that we, as a nation, had men at the head of our greatest endeavors who were . . . thoroughly human." ("Newfoundland Stopover," enclosed in Wulff to Marshall, November 20, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].) ★

INFANTRY DAY STATEMENT  
BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF<sup>1</sup>

June 15, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, issued the following statement on occasion of "Infantry Day," Thursday, June 15, 1944:

"This is the day of the doughboy, the time for his greatest service. He has already earned a reputation in this war as a skillful and determined fighter. His gallantry and victorious spirit are an increasing inspiration to the entire Army and the Nation.

"Modern warfare places an increased responsibility and burden on the Infantryman. To the dogged courage and fortitude which his fighting requires must be added a high degree of individual initiative. Many weapons must be mastered and many types of warfare, along with the complicated pattern of amphibious warfare.

"Paratroopers and airborne glider troops are Infantrymen who approach the battlefield in spectacular fashion. Once these men touch the ground, they fight as doughboys, though usually far in rear of the hostile line and encircled by the enemy.

"In the vast war in the air, on the sea and over the ground, the Infantry rifleman must take the final and decisive action. He must destroy the enemy or drive him off the battlefield. The dramatic introduction to blitz warfare and powerful air forces caused this fundamental of warfare to be forgotten. Today it is apparent to all and the Nation looks to the doughboy



to overwhelm the enemy and administer the knockout blow for the final victory.”

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)

1. General Marshall, who was in England on June 15, had prepared this message before he departed Washington.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL,  
CHIEF OF STAFF. Immediate Release<sup>1</sup>

June 15, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

The attack on Japan by the Super-Fortress B-29 from distant bases introduces a new type of offensive against our enemy. It also creates a new problem in the application of military force. Because of the enormous range and heavy bomb load of these Super-Fortresses, far exceeding that of previous strategic bombers, they can strike from many and remote bases at a single objective. The power of these new bombers is so great that the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that it would be uneconomical to confine the Super-Fortress organization to a single theater. These bombers therefore will remain under the centralized control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a single commander, General Arnold, acting as their agent in directing their bombing operations throughout the world. The planes will be treated as major task forces in the same manner as naval task forces are directed against specific objectives.

This type of flexible, centralized control recognizes that very long-range bombardment is not a weapon for the Air Forces alone. Under the Joint Chiefs of Staff theater commanders will have a voice in its employment, ensuring that maximum effectiveness will be obtained through missions which will contribute directly to the overall strategy for the defeat of the enemies.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)

1. General Marshall approved this statement on May 16, but the Bureau of Public Relations held it until it had been determined that the B-29 raid on Japan was successful. (H. Merrill Pasco Memorandum for General Surles, May 16, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

Forty-seven B-29s bombed the Imperial Iron and Steel Works at Yawata, on the northern coast of Kyushu, Japan, on June 15, 1944. This was the first strategic air bombardment of the Japanese homeland since the 1942 raid led by Lieutenant Colonel James H. Doolittle. The Yawata works were an important target, as they manufactured 24 percent of Japan's total rolled steel production. The initial B-29 operation over Japan was intended to take place simultaneously with the American invasion of Saipan, Marianas Island Group, which the American Second and Fourth Marine divisions assaulted on June 15. Reconnaissance photographs taken on June 18 indicated that direct damage to the Yawata works had been unimportant, although the real value of the strike had been psychological. It demonstrated to the Japanese civilian population, in conjunction with the Saipan invasion, the grim



realities of the current war situation. (Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *The Pacific: MATTERHORN to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945*, a volume in *The Army Air Forces in World War II* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953], pp. 3, 99–102.)

2. For a discussion of the special command system for the Twentieth Air Force, directed from General Henry H. Arnold's headquarters in Washington, see *ibid.*, pp. 33–57, 92–94.

PRESIDENT Roosevelt wished General Marshall to make it clear to General Eisenhower that the Allied military commanders must not regard Charles de Gaulle or the representatives of the Vichy government as the only two alternatives available to the French people for political leadership. "I am perfectly willing to have deGaulle made President, or Emperor, or King or anything else," wrote President Roosevelt, "so long as the action comes in an untrammelled and unforced way from the French people themselves." He recognized that "it is awfully easy to be for deGaulle and to cheer the thought of recognizing that Committee as the provisional government of France, but I have a moral duty that transcends 'an easy way'. It is to see to it that the people of France have nothing foisted on them by outside powers." (Roosevelt Memorandum for General Marshall, June 2, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected]. For previous discussion, see pp. 452–53.)

On June 13 the U.S. Chiefs of Staff reported that the British War Cabinet supported General de Gaulle's desire to visit the Normandy beaches. General Eisenhower's staff agreed only if de Gaulle's visit was confined to the British sector, that all arrangements be made by British authorities, and that General de Gaulle "must not make any broadcast or public statement while he is in France." (Marshall, King, and Arnold to Roosevelt, Radio No. S-53809, June 13, 1944, NA/RG 107 [SW Safe, French].) Churchill informed Roosevelt on June 14 that he agreed to General de Gaulle's visiting the British sector. "The responsibility for it is mine," wrote Churchill. "I hope you will not think I was wrong." (*Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, ed. Warren F. Kimball, 3 vols. [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984], 3: 185–86.)

On June 14 President Roosevelt wrote to Marshall: "It is my thought that we should make full use of any organization or influence that de Gaulle may possess and that will be of advantage to our military effort provided we do not by force of our arms impose him upon the French people as the government of France. After all, over 99 percent of the area of France is still in German hands. Therefore there does not appear to be any objection to de Gaulle's visit to France as arranged by the British government without consulting the U.S." (Roosevelt to Marshall, June 14, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) ★



TO FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT  
Radio No. S-53964. *Top Secret*

June 16, 1944  
London, England

To AGWAR for the President from US Chiefs of Staff, Marshall, King and Arnold. Reference our message to you of Wednesday regarding DeGaulle: I (Marshall) talked matters over with Ambassador Winant<sup>1</sup> Thursday evening. He had nothing new to offer in the matter. General Bethouart called on me earlier in the afternoon regarding General Koenig being the sole channel of communication to French resistance groups and reference other matters I do not think it necessary to bring into present discussion. He has been in conference with Eisenhowers Headquarters this A.M.

Reactions as to DeGaulles visit to France are undoubtedly known to you through the press. Reception cordial and fairly enthusiastic. He declined lunch invitation with Montgomery lunching on French destroyer. He did not say anything tending to incite resentment towards United Nations and he acknowledged deep indebtedness to them.

Situation regarding complications in OVERLORD affairs and active operation shows some signs of improving with regard to details such as Koenig and resistance groups, liaison officers and money.<sup>2</sup> At present we have no recommendations to submit. King will be able to present situation to you personally Monday A.M.

NA/RG 107 (SW Safe, French)

1. John G. Winant was the United States ambassador to the United Kingdom.

2. General de Gaulle was angered that S.H.A.E.F. had issued invasion currency to Allied soldiers in the assault units because he considered such a decision to be the prerogative of the French Committee of National Liberation. He also refused to allow French liaison officers trained for civil affairs work to accompany the initial assault troops, but he eventually allowed liaison officers to accompany the Allied forces. Uneasiness over the currency situation proved unwarranted when reports indicated that the French people were accepting the invasion currency. (Forrest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1954], pp. 231–35. For General Eisenhower's efforts to deal with the currency issue, see *Papers of DDE*, 3: 1921–22.)

STATEMENT FOR THE *STARS AND STRIPES*  
EXCLUSIVELY BY GENERAL MARSHALL<sup>1</sup>

[June 16, 1944]  
[London, England]

During my visit to the battle area in France there was evidence of a high standard of leadership throughout the command echelons and in the supply and logistical arrangements. The perfectly coordinated procedure in the Channel, on the beaches and throughout the narrow roads and lanes of France was tremendously impressive and on a scale never before attempted.



From every portion of the line where our men were fighting came reports of aggressive action, skill and high morale displayed by the American soldier. Those engaging in their first combat carried themselves like the veterans of the experienced divisions. This probably was the most reassuring aspect of the operation to us and most depressing to the enemy.

To those regiments, rangers, and beach parties who drove the enemy from his concrete shore defenses, and to the parachute troops, we owe a special debt of gratitude. Our planes and ships were present in overwhelming numbers and the air and naval men made a magnificent contribution to the initial success of the operation. I think all America can be proud and confident of its Armed Forces.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. This statement was published in the June 19, 1944, European edition of the *Stars and Stripes*.

2. For information regarding General Marshall's trip to the American sector of the Normandy beachhead, see the editorial note on p. 478, and Marshall to Roosevelt and Stimson, June 14, 1944, pp. 479-80.

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. WAR-54372. *Top Secret*

June 22, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

TOPSEC Eyes Only Marshall to Eisenhower. I am in accord with your views on Wilson's message and on operations in the Mediterranean in support of OVERLORD. You were called on by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to submit a similar report of your views to them. I assume that you are doing this but Wilson possesses the advantage of having gotten his report in first.<sup>1</sup>

There should be no delay in getting a firm decision on ANVIL if we are to provide the necessary additional resources in time to make it possible to launch the operation at an earlier date than August 15th. I realize you intend to make available the available resources from OVERLORD at the earliest possible date.

We appreciate your problems resulting from the bad weather in the channel. The Navy considers that amphibious resources should leave by July 1st if we are to meet an August 1st ANVIL date. The Navy further considers that the despatch of 24 LST's out of some 200 cannot seriously affect your present operations while it may make a very great deal of difference in the timing of ANVIL.

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff are now considering recommending to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that General Wilson be immediately directed to launch ANVIL at the earliest possible date, and in any case not later than August 15th.<sup>2</sup>



NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-54372])

1. During the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting in London on June 13, the C.C.S. had discussed possible operations in the Mediterranean and France as a means to assist Operation OVERLORD. On the fourteenth they sent a message to General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson and General Eisenhower asking for their comments. (See the editorial note on p. 479.) On June 20 Eisenhower had written to Marshall concerning Wilson's recommendations. Wilson claimed that ANVIL could not be launched until August 15 because Allied forces would not reach the Pisa-Rimini line before then. Wilson insisted that "the best chance of really decisive results in this theatre is to exploit the present success in Italy through the Pisa/Rimini line across the Po and then to advance towards southern Hungary through the Ljubljana Gap." Eisenhower maintained that Wilson should be directed to launch Operation ANVIL in southern France at the earliest possible date. "To speculate on possible adventures in south central Europe in the coming autumn, to my mind, has no repeat no reference to current operations in this theater," stated Eisenhower. "In spite of our brilliant successes in Italy the enemy has been moving sizeable formations out of south France into the OVERLORD area. Both the enemy and ourselves now consider OVERLORD the vital operation. It is imperative that we obtain and maintain superiority over him, and this must be done in France as quickly as we can. We need big ports," Eisenhower asserted. (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1938–40.)

2. Eisenhower informed Marshall on June 23 that he was transmitting his recommendations to the C.C.S. that day, which were: "1. That ANVIL be launched, preferably by August 15th and not later than August 30th, either on the scale desired by General Wilson or with lesser acceptable resources. 2. If this is impossible, that all French divisions plus one or two American divisions previously allocated to ANVIL be made available for OVERLORD as soon as shipping and port capacity permit their transportation and maintenance." (Ibid., pp. 1942–43; Eisenhower to Combined Chiefs of Staff, pp. 1943–46.)

TO MRS. ALLEN T. BROWN

June 23, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Madge, I returned from abroad late Wednesday evening and was too busy yesterday to manage a line to you.

Your letter from Wisconsin caught up with me the day before I left England for the Mediterranean and was much appreciated.

I flew down by Algiers and landed in Italy near Caserta late Saturday afternoon. The following morning I flew up to the Anzio beachhead and went out to the cemetery. I found they were just completing that day the last interments to be made in that plot of over 7,000, a new cemetery having been opened north of Rome. As soon as they have had an opportunity to place everything in the best of order they will take and send me some photographs which of course I will send on to you. Allen's plot is on the main pathway through the cemetery, a short distance beyond the flagpole. His Uncle Tris was with me at the time.<sup>1</sup>

After a brief reconnaissance over the beachhead site I embarked again and flew north, going by Velletri and the ground over which Allen had fought; I used the co-pilot's seat and we flew at about 300 feet so I had a



very good view of the terrain. However, I did not know exactly where he had become engaged. General [Mark] Clark met me in Rome and as it was too stormy for puddle-jumper planes which were all we could use in the forward zone he and I motored north to his Headquarters, quite a long distance north of Rome. After an interview I had with the French and American Corps commanders and all the division commanders who were not then in the line, they brought in Lieutenant Druckenmiller of Nazareth, Pennsylvania, who commanded one of the platoons in Allen's company and was immediately behind him in the fight. With him was Allen's tank driver and gunner, Technician Clifford A. Doherty of Pittsfield, Maine, and Pvt. Wallace Bobo of Spartansburg, S.C.; also Technician William J. Spence of Red Bank, New Jersey. Captain Joseph Lieberstein, the battalion surgeon, was with these men. They gave me an account of what had occurred and spoke in very high terms of Allen. Lieutenant Druckenmiller had Allen's map, a much rumpled paper with the various lines and objectives noted in crayon, which he used to explain to me the details of the action. Katherine has told me of your instructions regarding Allen's effects so I am making inquiry now as to whether or not you wish me to forward the map.

These men looked in good shape and in high morale as they were engaged in a remarkably successful pursuit. The road north for forty or fifty miles was a litter of destroyed transportation, tanks, trucks, self-propelled artillery, etc., which the Air Corps had knocked out. Allen's division was moving towards the front at the time, to deliver an attack which I see from the paper was launched, according to the schedule they gave me, yesterday morning.

From there I went on forward to one of our divisions which was in the line north of Grosseto near the coast. Fortunately the weather changed for an hour and they were able to get a puddle-jumper plane to me so instead of spending the night with General Clark I was able to fly back to Rome and thus saved almost a day in my travel. I reached Rome about 8:30 that evening and stayed at the Grand Hotel. I see by the papers here that I am being criticized because they turned on the hot water in honor of my arrival. Also they apparently moved one or two newspaper men out of their rooms to accommodate our party, which did not please.

The following morning I motored south to the Alban Hills and there took a plane and from the co-pilot's seat was able to identify the scene of Allen's last action. Following a very busy day in a number of places which I reached by air, and which included some stormy flying, I returned to my starting point late that night and had dinner with the various British commanders, Air, Ground, and Naval, as well as our own senior officers. The following morning after a 4:30 breakfast I took off for Casablanca, had lunch there, had dinner in the Azores, and had breakfast in southwest Newfoundland at 5:00 the following morning.



I shall be quite busy today but hope to get down in the country this evening for a brief rest. I wish you were to join us.

With my love, Affectionately,

G. C. Marshall

GCMRL/Research File (Family)

1. Colonel Tristram Tupper, Mrs. Marshall's brother, was public relations officer at Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers's headquarters.

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. WAR-54881. *Secret*

June 23, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

For Eisenhower's eyes only from Marshall. I find that no mention has been made in the press as to the names of any U.S. OVERLORD Commanders below Bradley except for some air men including Quesada. There was a press release some days ago that spoke of certain American Corps being in the line but that is very cold publicity. Would it not be within the bounds of security, particularly since the division numerals in most cases have already been given time after time, to begin the mention by name of some of the commanders. I should suggest for example that Collins' name might be introduced into the fighting for Cherbourg, Gerow for the original landing, together with the names of the 3 Division Commanders in the lead off on the beaches and particularly the Commanders of the 101 and 82 Airborne Divisions. I also think that the names of the commanders of the leading regiments to arrive on the beaches might be given some publicity. In all of this it would be bad business to break the whole lot at one time, but there should be 3 or 4 each day.<sup>1</sup>

In such matters I find there is a slow development of resentment over here both in and out of the Army and over the fact that where there has been heavy fighting for a considerable period of time and the units themselves have been identified, so little mention is permitted, if any, of the leaders, with the consequent increased references to a few higher officers. Bradley certainly is not of that type but he is being placed in a false position.

Since dictating the foregoing your S 54398 "Assuming that Cherbourg falls" recommending Oak Leaf Clusters for Bradley, Collins, and Gerow, has been received. Such awards are approved with great satisfaction.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-54881])

1. For the names of the commanders during the initial assault, see the editorial note on pp. 476-77. Major General J. Lawton Collins's Seventh Corps had the mission of cutting off German forces in the Cotentin Peninsula and capturing the key French Atlantic port city Cherbourg. Seventh Corps completed the isolation of the German forces in the Cotentin Peninsula by June 18, 1944; offensive operations to accomplish this had begun on June 8, with the 4th Infantry Division (Major General Barton) and the 82d Airborne



Division (Major General Ridgway) attacking Lieutenant General Erich Marcks's Eighty-fourth Corps. Major General Troy H. Middleton's Eighth Corps, which became operational on June 15 and had the mission of holding a defensive position across the Cotentin Peninsula while the Seventh Corps advanced toward Cherbourg, had the 101st Airborne Division (Major General Taylor) under its control and eventually also the 82d Airborne Division. (Harrison, *Cross-Channel Attack*, pp. 386–416.)

The final assault on the port city itself took place on June 22, preceded by what Collins called "air pulverization" of the German defenses by ground support air attacks launched by Major General Elwood R. Quesada's Ninth Tactical Air Command. (Ibid., pp. 416–17, 426–29.) The German commanders surrendered to American forces after determined resistance on June 26, although the last German defensive pockets were not eliminated in the city until June 29. The Germans had done everything possible prior to their capitulation to render Cherbourg ineffective as a port for the support of the Allied campaign in northwestern France. Colonel Alvin G. Viney (U.S.M.A., 1929), who made the initial engineer plan for rehabilitation of the port, wrote: "The demolition of the port of Cherbourg is a masterful job, beyond a doubt the most complete, intensive, and best planned demolition in history." The first Allied cargo landed at Cherbourg on July 16, but it was the end of September before the harbor was cleared of all obstructions. (Ibid., pp. 438–42.) For Marshall's congratulations to Bradley and his commanders for their superb performance and for Bradley's comments regarding the campaign, see Marshall to Bradley, July 12, 1944, pp. 517–18. For further comment regarding the Cherbourg campaign, see Marshall to Stark, July 11, 1944, pp. 514–15.

2. General Eisenhower replied on June 25 that his headquarters was immediately releasing to the press the names of the two American corps commanders in the initial OVERLORD assault, to be followed by the names of the two American Airborne division commanders and the three assault division commanders. The names of other division commanders and the names of smaller formation commanders would be subsequently released to the press as circumstances warranted. (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1950.) For further discussion, see Marshall to Eisenhower, July 14, 1944, pp. 522–23.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL McNAIR

*Secret*

June 23, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

I have just had a very adverse report from Stilwell on the quality, training, and conduct of the replacements sent him for the GALAHAD Force.<sup>1</sup> Please let me have a report on just where these men were trained and how they were gotten together.

Stilwell speaks of having to give men training in the handling of weapons actually on the battlefield in the jungle despite the fact that these men were supposed to be picked individuals. He had similarly adversely reported on the conduct of some of the Engineers that he put into the actual fighting but the case there is different as this was a special service for which they had not been specially prepared. However, he refers to officers running away and otherwise demonstrating lack of quality.<sup>2</sup>

G. C. M.

NA/RG 337 (AG Section, McNair Personal File)

1. On June 22 Stilwell reported that the Japanese were still defending Myitkyina. Sickness had reduced the GALAHAD (American long-range penetration groups) Force, and



he had brought in two combat engineer battalions as reinforcements but the units proved to be “raw and unreliable. They ran away on several occasions, incidentally abandoning wounded,” reported Stilwell. He then flew in two thousand GALAHAD replacements that had recently arrived in India. “Unfortunately GALAHAD trickled away to nothing from sickness and exhaustion and we ended up with raw units still,” wrote Stilwell. “We have had to train the replacements right on the battle field. Many of them could not use their weapons. There were some fifty psychopathic cases among them. Some of the officers ran away. It has been a very anxious and disturbing period, but we are now over the worst of it and the sheep are mostly separated from the goats. The engineers have snapped into it and the GALAHAD battalions can be depended upon defensively.” Stilwell reported that “the Chinese units have all stood up to it in excellent style.” (Stilwell to Marshall, June 22, 1944, In Log, pp. 364-A–364-B, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Message Log].) For further discussion of GALAHAD at Myitkyina, see Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell’s Command Problems*, pp. 236–53.

2. On June 26 Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, commanding general of Army Ground Forces, replied that he was at a loss to understand Stilwell’s report. The bulk of the replacements were furnished from the Ninety-seventh Division and all qualified as overseas replacements; he would furnish factual details once the information was gathered. On July 3 McNair submitted a complete breakdown of replacements, which Marshall sent to O.P.D. with the handwritten message: “Apparently we should have charged some officer with following through on these replacements considering how important their mission was to be. G.C.M.” On July 10 McNair reported the remarks of the convoy officer who accompanied the replacement shipment to India. (McNair Memorandums for the Chief of Staff, June 26, July 3, and July 10, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 370.5 CTO, Case 316].) McNair’s July 3 and July 10 messages provided the factual data for General Marshall’s reply to Stilwell on July 11; see Marshall to Stilwell, July 11, 1944, pp. 516–17. For information on typhus in the GALAHAD Force, see Marshall Memorandum for the President, June 30, 1944, pp. 499–500.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WHITE

June 23, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

I continue to receive an increasing number of objections to our rotation system as regards rank. Are you sure that you have taken the most realistic view of this matter?

I am aware of the complications of sending men overseas in lower grades and having returned from overseas men of higher grades. Also I am aware of the long time which elapses before the completion of a single transfer. However, I was informed in the field of numerous incidents where units were without senior officers for quite a long period awaiting the arrival of some inexperienced man of similar rank.<sup>1</sup>

G. C. M.

NA/RG 165 (OCS, 210.31)

1. Major General Miller G. White, assistant chief of staff, G-1, responded on June 24 that as more American combat units were deployed overseas there was an increasing surplus of field grade officers and noncommissioned officers remaining in the United States. White noted that the theaters’ complaint was not consistent. “The North African Theater has . . . requisitioned lieutenant colonels and colonels for combat commands,



stating that they did not have officers qualified for promotion to fill vacancies occasioned by the removal of unsatisfactory officers or by battle and non-battle casualties," replied White. The European theater had made a similar request. "It is not reasonable to request replacements in grade for unsatisfactory officers and for battle casualties, and at the same time object to replacement of rotated personnel in grade," asserted White. The travel delays were a matter of theater administration, but in any case, as an attempt to improve morale rotation was a failure. "We have neither the personnel nor the shipping to increase the rate of rotation, yet any soldier can calculate that rotation of 1% a month will require 8 years for completion, and that rotation of ½% a month (the North African rate) will require 16 years. The effect on the men not rotated is extremely bad, and has been reflected in soldiers' mail and in complaints from Congressional and other sources," stated White. He informed Marshall that by autumn the current rotation system would have to be abandoned. Future policies would need to include some type of rest in the United States and return of an individual to his parent unit. Considering that this change must ultimately be made, White recommended no change in current rotation policies. (White Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, June 24, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 210.31].)

TO GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR  
Radio No. WAR-55718. *Top Secret*

June 24, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

TOPSEC for General MacArthur's eyes only from General Marshall. On my return from England and Italy I found your message CX-13891 of June 18th regarding further operations in the Western and Southwestern Pacific. While your views have not been formally discussed by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff pending the receipt of Nimitz' recommendations, I think it important that you should have my comments without delay. In the first place, the query to you and Nimitz should have provided some background as to the factors leading to the further investigation of the matter by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.<sup>1</sup>

All the information we have received from MAGIC or ULTRA indicates the steady build-up of Japanese strength in the area Mindanao, Celebes, Halmahera, Vogelkop, Palau. It is also apparent from the information that the Japanese are seriously limited in their capacity to redeploy or rearrange their troops due to limited shipping. The information available appears to indicate their expectation of an early attack on Palau as well as continued advances to the northwest by your forces. In other words further advances in this particular region will encounter greatly increased Japanese strength in most localities. There will be less opportunity to move against his weakness and to his surprise, as has been the case in your recent series of moves.

It would appear that the number of troops required for a successful operation against Formosa in early 1945 would not be required against the present garrison of Formosa. But there is a further consideration in this matter that presents a pressing problem to the Chiefs of Staff and that is the collapse of resistance in China which is already threatened by the



Japanese activity of the past month. A successful culmination of the war against Japan undoubtedly will involve the use of a portion of the China coast. Therefore we cannot afford to stand by and see this region completely overrun and consolidated by the Japanese. For this reason the early capture of Formosa was studied though there was also the thought that, if the descent on Formosa could be organized with a reasonable chance of success, we would profit tremendously in the procedure provided it were done at an early date and come, therefore, more or less as a complete surprise. Incidentally, for a Formosa operation about November 1, there would be assault lift for at least six divisions, with immediate follow-up of three divisions.

Other considerations came into the matter which would have an important bearing on decisions. It may become apparent that the Japanese buildup facing the Southwest Pacific forces and the Central Pacific Forces in the vicinity of Palau offers the prospect of very heavy fighting with consequent losses and delays as well as a heavy employment of shipping. In this case the suspension of the Palau operation coupled with a target date for the substitute operation now being considered about six weeks later than the target date for Palau would permit a sustained carrier attack on the Japanese homeland of about two weeks duration prior to the launching of an operation against Formosa. This attack on the Japanese homeland could not be carried out before the Palau operation as there would not be time for the necessary fleet movements.

Involved in the immediate foregoing is also the critical factor, on which I have been insisting, that the great Pacific fleet with its thousands of planes should be maintained in practically continuous employment because of its mobility, its power to select objectives along a tremendous front and the great and rapidly increasing carrier force available.

In studying the Formosa operation it became apparent that possibly a more economical operation could be carried out against the southern tip of Japan proper, Kyushu, because the naval approach there is somewhat easier than that towards Formosa and the area available not only contains the harbor facilities and the airfields necessary, but is protected by a rough mountainous barrier over which any Japanese counter-attack can only pass under difficult conditions of transport and defense, during which all of Japan could be brought under air attack including the coverage of Tsushima Strait and practically all shipping contact with Formosa, the Philippines, and the entire Malay Peninsula.

Whether or not the Formosa or the Kyushu operation can be mounted remains a matter to be studied but neither operation in my opinion is unsound in the measure you indicate. Whether or not such operations should be carried out before a heavy blow is struck at the Japanese fleet is also of course a serious consideration. There is little doubt in my mind,



however, that after a crushing blow is delivered against the Japanese fleet then we should go as close to Japan as quickly as possible in order to shorten the war, which means the reconquest of the Philippines.

With regard to the last (the reconquest of the Philippines) we must be careful not to allow our personal feeling and Philippine political considerations to override our great objective, which is the early conclusion of the war with Japan. In my view, "by-passing" is in no way synonymous with "abandonment". On the contrary, by the defeat of Japan at the earliest practicable moment the liberation of the Philippines will be effected in the most expeditious and complete manner possible. Further, you may probably feel that the Navy is responsible for this study of the operations along the lines suggested. That is not the fact. I have been pressing for the full use of the fleet to expedite matters in the Pacific and also pressing specifically for a carrier assault on Japan.

As to you[r] expressed desire to be accorded the opportunity of personally proceeding to Washington to present fully your views, I see no difficulty about that and if the issue arises will speak to the President who I am quite certain would be agreeable to your being ordered home for the purpose.

Meanwhile we are awaiting a statement of Nimitz' views.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. In a message dated June 12, the Joint Chiefs of Staff notified Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur that they were considering ways of accelerating operations in the Pacific and asked for their recommendations. The J.C.S. was "considering the possibilities of expediting the Pacific campaign by any or all of the following courses: (a) By advancing the target dates for operations now scheduled through operations against Formosa. (b) By-passing presently selected objectives prior to operations against Formosa. (c) By-passing presently selected objectives and choosing new objectives, including Japan proper." (J.C.S. to Nimitz and MacArthur, Radio No. WARX-50007, June 12, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-50007)].)

MacArthur replied on June 18 that logistical considerations prevented him from advancing his target dates. "The proposal to bypass the Philippines and launch an attack across the Pacific directly against Formosa is unsound. . . . The occupation of Luzon is essential in order to establish Air Forces and bases prior to the move on Formosa. . . . The proposal to bypass all other objectives and launch an attack directly on the mainland of Japan is in my opinion utterly unsound." MacArthur stated that limited shipping would preclude such an endeavor, but "even with unlimited shipping I do not believe a direct assault without air support can possibly succeed." He insisted, "It is my opinion that purely military considerations demand the reoccupation of the Philippines in order to cut the enemys communications to the South and to secure a base for our further advance. Even if this were not the case and unless military factors demanded another line of action, it would in my opinion be necessary to reoccupy the Philippines. Philippines is American Territory where our unsupported forces were destroyed by the enemy. . . . We have a great national obligation to discharge. Moreover if the United States should deliberately bypass the Philippines, leaving our prisoners, nationals and loyal Filipinos in enemy hands without an effort to retrieve them at earliest moment we would incur the gravest psychological reaction." He concluded that he had provided "a mere outline of the military factors that enter into the problem. If serious consideration is being given to the line of action indicated in paragraphs B and C of your radio, I request that I be accorded the opportunity of personally proceeding to



Washington to present fully my views.” (MacArthur to Marshall, Radio No. CX-13891, June 18, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Admiral Nimitz responded that logistical and tactical problems might cause difficulty in meeting the current target dates for operations. He believed that air bases should be established in Mindanao before advancing toward Formosa, but he thought that MacArthur’s goal of reaching Mindanao by October 25 might be too optimistic. (Smith, *Approach to the Philippines*, pp. 451–52.) General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz held a conference with President Roosevelt at Pearl Harbor on July 27–28, 1944, but no strategic decisions resulted from the conference. (For further discussion, see Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1959], pp. 479–82; Robert Ross Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1963], pp. 4–8.)

TO GENERAL JOHN J. PERSHING

June 26, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear General, I had hoped to get out to the hospital to see you before this since my return from England and Italy but have not yet found the opportunity. I want to tell you that Warren is on General Bradley’s staff.<sup>1</sup>

I visited Bradley’s headquarters just as it was being established ashore in France. There had been fighting with Germans on that ground shortly before our arrival. At that time Warren was not there. They did not know just where he was en route. I therefore had no opportunity to see him.

I will try to get out to see you at my very first opportunity.<sup>2</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Major F. Warren Pershing had completed the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in January 1944. He requested assignment in the European Theater of Operations and was serving on the staff of Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley. (Warren Pershing to Marshall, January 3, 1944, and Marshall to Warren Pershing, January 6, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Marshall had lunch with General Pershing at Walter Reed General Hospital on July 3, 1944.

TO FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN DILL

June 27, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Dill, I called you up this morning to see if we could get together and found you were still at Mirador. Macready told me that you were not feeling very well. I am very sorry to hear this and hope you do not hustle back here ahead of medical schedule.<sup>1</sup>



Everyone inquired about you in England and there seemed a general regret that you couldn't be present. However, things went very smoothly, much more so than usual.

The Prime Minister had me down to Chequers the first Saturday night. He had Admiral King for lunch at Downing Street. Later we all had dinner with the King and the Prime Minister at Downing Street. Admiral King left at noon one day for Casablanca and Arnold and I did not make our departure until 10:30 that evening for Algiers. The Prime Minister therefore had Arnold and me for dinner with him at Chequers that night, we going on from there to the airfield. I am sorry I can't tell you more details but I don't think it wise to commit them to an ordinary letter.<sup>2</sup>

Macready is on his way over now to listen in at my morning resume of operations all over the world. I tried to locate Welsh but couldn't get him on the phone.<sup>3</sup> There is so much happening these days and at such widely separated points that I thought it might be helpful to your mission to see the thing put together, as it were, all in one piece.

With my affectionate regards to Nancy and you, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Dill was staying at Mirador in Greenwood, Virginia. On July 8 he went to Ashford General Hospital at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, for medical examination and rest. General Marshall arranged for Sir John and Lady Dill to stay in one of the cottages there. (Frank McCarthy Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, July 7, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected]. See Marshall to Dill, July 12, 1944, pp. 518-19.) Lieutenant General Gordon N. Macready was chief of the British Army Staff at the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington.

2. For information regarding General Marshall's trip to England and tour of the Normandy beachhead, see the editorial notes on pp. 477-78 and 481.

3. Air Marshal Sir William Welsh was head of the Royal Air Force delegation in Washington.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY

*Top Secret*

June 27, 1944

Washington, D.C.

With reference to our ANVIL procedure of this afternoon, will you please see to the following:

a. Send a copy of our reply to the British Chiefs of Staff to Eisenhower, his eyes only, together with a brief of the British proposal.<sup>1</sup>

b. Prepare for the President a very brief memorandum for Admiral Leahy to sign, stating that "The U.S. Chiefs of Staff feel that you should read the attached papers which cover the recommendations of General Wilson, General Eisenhower, the British Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff regarding operations in the Mediterranean." In



order that this does not become too voluminous a package I suggest that the original Chiefs of Staff memorandum sent following our meeting in London, to Eisenhower and Wilson be briefed down to two paragraphs and that Eisenhower's and Wilson's replies be similarly briefed, taking care to include the urgent arguments put forward by Eisenhower for the support of OVERLORD.<sup>2</sup>

G. C. M.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 17, Item 20)

1. Replying on June 26 to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff proposal that a directive be issued to launch ANVIL at the earliest possible date, the British Chiefs of Staff maintained that finishing the destruction of the enemy in the Mediterranean was of maximum importance and was at the same time assisting OVERLORD. "General Wilson states withdrawal of resources from General Alexander must begin on June 28th if a target date of August 15th is to be met. The withdrawal now of forces from Italy to achieve this target date is unacceptable to the British Chiefs of Staff. The target date of the end of August would still prejudice operations in Italy. Withdrawal of forces for ANVIL would hamstring General Alexander so that any further activity would be very modest. The adequacy of air resources for both ANVIL and Italy is gravely doubted," insisted the British Chiefs of Staff. On June 27 the U.S. Chiefs of Staff dispatched a reply that "the British proposal to abandon ANVIL and commit everything to Italy is unacceptable." They maintained that Alexander would have sufficient forces in Italy while still mounting ANVIL and that Allied airplanes outnumbered the enemy. (Marshall [Handy] to Eisenhower, Radio No. WAR-57012, June 27, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) For further discussion, see Roosevelt [Marshall] to Churchill, June 28, 1944, p. 498.

2. See Marshall to Eisenhower, June 22, 1944, pp. 486–87. Briefs of the messages are located in GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected).

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

June 27, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

You may find something of interest in the attached pamphlet. These are gotten up hurriedly, under considerable pressure, so as to permit the prompt transmission to Army units all over the world and in training at home, the reactions and views of officers and soldiers in the field. An effort is made to present the material in easily readable form.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. President Roosevelt was sent a copy of *Combat Lessons: Rank and file in combat: What they're doing, How they do it*, Number 3 in a series prepared from combat reports and published by the Operations Division. In the introduction Marshall stated that the purpose of the series was to give to officers and enlisted men the benefit of the battle experiences of others. "They do not necessarily represent the carefully considered views of the War Department; they do, however, reflect the actual experiences of combat," wrote Marshall. "The paramount combat lesson learned from every operation is the vital importance of *leadership*. . . . Aggressive and determined leadership is the priceless factor which inspires a command and upon which all success in battle depends."



TO WINSTON S. CHURCHILL  
FROM FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT<sup>1</sup>  
*Top Secret*

June 28, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

I have examined the problem of assistance for OVERLORD by operations in the Mediterranean which our Chiefs of Staff have been discussing. *On balance I find I must completely concur in the stand of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. General Wilson's proposal for continued use of practically all the Mediterranean resources to advance into northern Italy and from there to the northeast is not acceptable to me, and I really believe we should consolidate our operations and not scatter them.*

*It seems to me that nothing can be worse at this time than a dead-lock in the Combined Staffs as to future course of action. You and I must prevent this and I think we should support the views of the Supreme Allied Commander. He is definitely for ANVIL and wants action in the field by August 30th preferably earlier.*

It is vital that we decide at once to go ahead with our long agreed policy to make OVERLORD the decisive action. ANVIL, mounted at the earliest possible date, is the only operation which will give OVERLORD the material and immediate support from Wilson's forces.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. This message was drafted by General Marshall, and the president made additions which are here italicized. For previous discussion, see Marshall Memorandum for General Handy, June 27, 1944, pp. 496-97. For correspondence between Roosevelt and Churchill regarding Operation ANVIL, see *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, 3: 197-99, 207, 212-32.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSEPH W. STILWELL  
[Radio No. 57236.] *Secret*

June 28, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Stilwell from Marshall. General Donovan has submitted a report on the activities of OSS Detachment Number 101 which operates in North Burma. The report covers the assistance rendered General Merrill's forces in the Myitkyina campaign. It recites the very important services rendered.<sup>1</sup> Please indicate to me your estimate of services rendered. I ask this because there has been much criticism by certain members of JCS of Donovan's activities and this particular report would indicate very valuable services.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On June 19 Brigadier General William J. Donovan, director of the Office of Strategic Services, forwarded a report which praised the activities of O.S.S. Detachment Number 101, based in northern Burma, for providing assistance to forces serving under Stilwell and



to Merrill's Marauders in the area of Myitkyina. The unit, consisting of 76 officers, 159 enlisted men, and 3,000 natives, supplied enemy intelligence, served as guides, cleared trails, and engaged in sabotage and ambushing. (Donovan to Marshall, June 19, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 323.3 SEAC].)

2. "Services rendered by detachment 101 to Merrills force in Myitkyina campaign were of great value," replied Stilwell. "Information furnished on routes and enemy locations and strength assisted us greatly. We are further developing this organization because of its future potential value." (Stilwell to Marshall, Radio No. CHC-1236, July 1, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. WAR-57745. *Secret*

June 29, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Eisenhower from Marshall. Lord Halifax arrives in England Saturday. He feels that his position and work over here would be helped if he could say he had seen American troops in the field in France. If possible invite him to visit American sector.<sup>1</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-57745])

1. Eisenhower replied on July 12 that the British ambassador decided not to visit the American sector. "I am in a position of the most acute embarrassment in connection with visits of important personages to the Continent," wrote Eisenhower. "Recently, at my personal request, the Prime Minister issued a Cabinet order prohibiting further visits by members of the British Cabinet and heads of service ministries. Lord Halifax, who was to have accompanied [Walter Bedell] Smith on a one day visit to France, decided not repeat not to go after seeing what irritation it would cause among other British officials if he were singled out for preference." (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 1999.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
*Secret*

June 30, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

I have been looking into the menace and control of scrub typhus which has seriously affected some of our personnel in the Far East. As yet no protective prophylaxis has been developed and the ordinary measures for prevention are not very impressive—clearing of brush from bivouac sites, etc., which can seldom be done in the rapidly moving situations of jungle warfare.

As an indication of what difficulties this creates, the GALAHAD Force (approximately a regiment of carefully selected veterans of the South and Southwest Pacific and jungle-trained men from Panama, which disrupted the resistance of the 18th Japanese Division facing the Chinese troops on the Ledo Road, and later made the remarkable march and attack on the Myitkyina airfield) has suffered exceedingly heavy losses from typhus as



well as other jungle ailments. General Merrill, its commander, has been evacuated, two of its Colonels have died from typhus and a large portion of the command has been rendered ineffective—this in the midst of the fight for Myitkyina. Stilwell seems to be the only one who can continue actively on his feet through the strenuous phases of his campaign.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill, having a history of heart trouble, suffered another heart attack in mid-May 1944. The physical condition as well as morale of the GALAHAD Force deteriorated as the unit was plagued with exhaustion, malaria, dysentery, and typhus. (*Stilwell Papers*, pp. 296–97; Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 189, 230, 237–41.) For further discussion regarding GALAHAD, see Marshall Memorandum for General McNair, June 23, 1944, pp. 490–91.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSEPH W. STILWELL  
Radio No. WAR-59012. *Top Secret*

July 1, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

TOPSEC from Marshall for Stilwell for his Eyes Only. I have been waiting until the consolidation of the Myitkyina-Mogaung-Kamaing region before taking up with you a difficult problem of command arrangements related both to the SEA and to affairs in central China. However, the importance of the latter phase of the matter makes it necessary for me to trouble you in the midst of your terrific struggles with jungle, monsoons, Japanese, logistics, and scrub typhus complications which beset you to a degree I do not believe any other commander of modern times has experienced.

The British press for a readjustment of command relationships, referring specifically to your position as Deputy Supreme Commander, in view of your continued presence in charge of the fighting on the Ledo Road. This has been the contention of the British Chiefs of Staff from the start of your assumption of command of the Chinese Corps but has become very pressing in the last month.<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand, and what is to me far more important, the situation in central China appears to be deteriorating at an alarming rate.<sup>2</sup> Whether or not there is any possibility of your exerting a favorable influence on this situation I do not know. Whether or not the Generalissimo would agree to your active participation in the affairs of the Central China Forces, assuming you thought you could accomplish some good, I am without an opinion. But I think in view of the gravity of the situation that I should get your views for submission to the President.

The pressure quite naturally is on us to increase the tonnage over the hump both for Chennault's Air and for the equipment and supply of the Ground Forces. The latter presents the problem of an immense effort in



transportation with a poorly directed and possibly completely wasteful procedure.

Would there be any possibility of effecting the following arrangement and if so, would you consider it at all desirable:

The Ledo Road Force to remain under your direction but the immediate leadership to be exercised by a subordinate. You to transfer your principal efforts, once the Myitkyina-Mogaung situation is securely consolidated for the monsoon period, to the rehabilitation and in effect the direction of the leadership of the Chinese Forces in China proper. Throughout such procedure you to have a control through the Joint Chiefs of Staff of tonnage distribution over the hump. On the SEA side Sultan, for example, to be designated as Mountbatten's Deputy Commander.

The foregoing continues a rather cockeyed diagram of command relationship in that the Ledo Road Force being in Burma would be in the SEA command and you would be controlling it in effect as a subordinate under the British Ground Force Commander while operating on the other side of the hump with the Chinese to establish the Chinese Ground Forces on a more dependable basis.

Let me have your reactions and suggestions<sup>3</sup> and don't let the humidity and difficulties of the day fulminate<sup>4</sup> an explosion.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Mountbatten had wanted Stilwell transferred from the Southeast Asia Command to the China theater. (See Marshall to Stilwell, March 1, 1944, pp. 321–23.) In June 1944, during General Marshall's visit to England in conjunction with his visit to Normandy, General Sir Alan Brooke, chief of the British Imperial General Staff, informed Marshall that British opinion was that Stilwell should be removed from his current assignment as a result of his apparent inability to cooperate with Mountbatten's commanders or the British military in Burma. The British also planned to replace Mountbatten's ground, naval, and air commanders. (Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 377–78.)

To worsen matters for Stilwell, on June 20 Vice-President Henry A. Wallace arrived in China to inquire into the political-military situation. Vice-President Wallace conferred with the Generalissimo and with Major General Claire L. Chennault and his aide First Lieutenant Joseph W. Alsop. Wallace made no effort to see Stilwell, but he recommended to President Roosevelt that Stilwell be recalled. The Generalissimo had stated to Wallace that Stilwell could not appreciate Chinese "political considerations." Wallace recommended that Stilwell be replaced by an officer who enjoyed the Generalissimo's confidence; Major General Albert C. Wedemeyer was mentioned. As an alternative, Wallace suggested that President Roosevelt appoint a political representative to the Generalissimo's government with direct access to Roosevelt and who would serve as Stilwell's deputy. (Ibid., pp. 374–77.)

2. The main Japanese offensive in China for 1944, Operation ICHIGO which commenced in April 1944, had proven extremely successful, and the Chinese Army seemed incapable of halting the Japanese advance. Chennault's air offensive was disrupting Japanese supply lines but was not stopping the Japanese advance. Following the war, the Japanese commander in China, Field Marshal Shunroku Hata, stated that "supply conditions chiefly embarrassed the Japanese Forces during the Ichi-go Operation," rather than Chinese resistance. (Ibid., pp. 316–22, 325–27, 371–74, quote on p. 399.) See the map on p. 731.

3. On July 3 Stilwell indicated his lack of concern over the prospect of being relieved as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, and he recommended Major General Daniel I.



Sultan, deputy C.B.I. theater commander, as his replacement. "The British concern over my status as Deputy is in my opinion just a move to put me where I can't make any more trouble for them," replied Stilwell. "They consider me a wild man whose ill considered acts are likely to drag them into difficulties. The pretense is that I ought to take up my proper duties as Deputy and help the SAC by going around and straightening out kinks. God knows someone should, but no one can, because no one would be allowed to summarily throw out a British General, even for gross incompetence." (Stilwell to Marshall, Radio No. CHC-1241, July 3, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

Regarding China, Stilwell indicated his willingness to go, but only if he had complete authority over the Chinese Army. Stilwell then suggested that perhaps it would be better if Sultan took over his command of the Chinese forces in Burma and then appoint Lieutenant General Raymond A. Wheeler as deputy to Mountbatten. "A solution might be to make Wheeler Deputy, or in fact, anybody, since the job means nothing," wrote Stilwell, "and use Sultan with the CAI [Chinese Army in India]." He suggested that President Roosevelt send to the Generalissimo "a very stiff message" which would contain clear statements regarding American "investment and interest in China." Stilwell made some suggestions designed to improve the current military situation in China, but then added: "The case is really desperate. The harvest of neglect and mismanagement is now being reaped, and without very radical and very quickly applied remedies, we will be set back a long way." (Ibid.) For further discussion, see Memorandum for the President from the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, July 4, 1944, pp. 503-6.

4. On the version sent to the Message Center, Marshall had dictated "culminate in" instead of "fulminate."

TO NORA E. WARD<sup>1</sup>

July 3, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mrs. Ward, I have just learnt that your two sons, Ray and Roy, were killed in action on the same day over Germany. Please accept my sincere sympathy for the tragic loss you have sustained in their sacrifice for the good of their fellow citizens.

It will be some time before your pride in the service they have rendered the country can even in a small measure console you for the great loss you have suffered but I want you to know now that the Army was proud of them as American soldiers and will not forget their courage and self-sacrifice. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Mrs. Ward was residing in Fort Worth, Texas.

TO HENRY L. STIMSON  
Radio. *Secret*

July 3, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Mr. Stimson from General Marshall. Delighted to learn that you have arrived safely in Italy.<sup>1</sup> Devers will tell you that ANVIL is



approved for August 15th.<sup>2</sup> Bradley attacked south along west coast of Cotentin Peninsula early this A.M. in heavy rain. British sector is being strengthened in spite of German counterattack. MacArthur made successful and economical landing on Noemfoor Island. Saipan fighting continues bitter but we make progress. No material changes in Burma.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Stimson was touring battle areas in Italy and France. Colonel William H. Kyle, Stimson's aide, gives an account of the trip in Stimson's diary, July 1–21, 1944, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers (Diary, 47: 154–203).

2. On July 13 Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers wrote that Secretary Stimson "had an exceptionally fine visit to the theater. He saw all combat commanders and troops at the front. . . . He gave me the impression that he was exceedingly well pleased with the results." (Devers to Marshall, Radio No. B-13658, July 13, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 10, Item 52c].)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
FROM THE U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF<sup>1</sup>  
*Secret*

July 4, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

The situation in Central China is deteriorating at an alarming rate. If the Japanese continue their advances to the West, Chennault's 14th Air Force will be rendered ineffective, our very long-range bomber airfields in the Chengtu area will be lost and the collapse of China must inevitably result. Whether or not there is a possibility of our exerting a favorable influence on the chaotic condition in China is questionable. It is our view, however, that drastic measures should be taken immediately in an effort to prevent disaster to the U.S. effort in that region.

The Chinese ground forces in China, in their present state of discipline, training and equipment, and under their present leadership, are impotent. The Japanese forces can, in effect, move virtually unopposed except by geographical logistic difficulties.

From the beginning of the war, we have insisted on the necessity for building up the combat efficiency of the Chinese ground forces, as the only method of providing the necessary security for our air bases in China. The pressure on us from the Generalissimo throughout the war has been to increase the tonnage over the hump for Chennault's air in particular, with the equipment and supply for the ground forces as incidental only. This presents the problem of an immense effort in transportation, with a poorly directed and possibly completely wasteful procedure. Chennault's air alone can do little more than slightly delay the Japanese advances. We have had abundant proof of this in our operations against the German army.

Our experience against both the Germans and the Japanese in theaters where we have had immensely superior air power has demonstrated the



inability of air forces alone to prevent the movement of trained and determined ground armies. If we have been unable to stop the movement of German ground armies in Italy with our tremendous air power, there is little reason to believe that Chennault, with the comparatively small air force which can be supported in China, can exert a decisive effect on the movement of Japanese ground forces in China. The more effective his bombing of their shipping and the B-29 operations against Japan the more determined will be the Japanese thrusts in China.

Under the present leadership and organization of the Chinese armies, it is purely a question of Japanese intent as to how far they will advance into the interior of China. The serious pass to which China has come is due in some measure to mismanagement and neglect of the Army. Until her every resource, including the divisions at present confronting the communists, is devoted to the war against the Japanese, there is little hope that she can continue to operate with any effectiveness until the end of the war.

The time has come, in our opinion, when all the military power and resources remaining to China must be entrusted to one individual capable of directing that effort in a fruitful way against the Japanese. There is no one in the Chinese Government or armed forces capable of coordinating the Chinese military effort in such a way as to meet the Japanese threat. During this war, there has been only one man who has been able to get Chinese forces to fight against the Japanese in an effective way. That man is General Stilwell.

The British are pressing for a readjustment of command relationships in the Southeast Asia Command, maintaining that General Stilwell's position as Deputy Supreme Commander and that of Commander of the Chinese Corps in India are incompatible. The British would undoubtedly concur in the relief of General Stilwell from his present assignment.

After full consideration of the situation in China, we recommend:

*a.* That you dispatch to the Generalissimo the attached message, urging him to place General Stilwell in command of all Chinese armed forces.

*b.* That you promote General Stilwell to the temporary grade of General, not only in recognition of his having conducted a brilliant campaign with a force, which he himself made, in spite of continued opposition from within and without and tremendous obstacles of terrain and weather, but in order to give him the necessary prestige for the new position proposed for him in China.

We are fully aware of the Generalissimo's feelings regarding Stilwell, particularly from a political point of view, but the fact remains that he has proved his case or contentions on the field of battle in opposition to the highly negative attitudes of both the British and the Chinese



authorities. Had his advice been followed, it is now apparent that we would have cleared the Japanese from northeast Burma before the monsoon and opened the way to effective action in China proper. Had his advice been followed the Chinese ground forces east of the hump would have been far better equipped and prepared to resist or at least delay the Japanese advances.

c. That in case Stilwell goes to China, we propose the following arrangements in the Southeast Asia Command to the British Chiefs of Staff:

(1) Sultan to command the Chinese Corps in Burma under the general direction of Stilwell.

(2) Wheeler, now Senior Administrative Officer on Mountbatten's staff, to succeed Stilwell as Deputy to Mountbatten.

[Enclosure]

#### MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GENERALISSIMO

The extremely serious situation which results from Japanese advances in Central China, which threaten not only your Government but all that the U. S. Army has been building up in China, leads me to the conclusion that drastic measures must be taken immediately if the situation is to be saved. The critical situation which now exists, in my opinion calls for the delegation to one individual of the power to coordinate all the allied military resources in China, including the communist forces.

I think I am fully aware of your feelings regarding General Stilwell, nevertheless I think he has now clearly demonstrated his far-sighted judgment, his skill in organization and training and, above all, in fighting your Chinese forces. I know of no other man who has the ability, the force, and the determination to offset the disaster which now threatens China and our over-all plans for the conquest of Japan. I am promoting Stilwell to the rank of full General and I recommend for your most urgent consideration that you recall him from Burma and place him directly under you in command of all Chinese and American Forces, and that you charge him with the full responsibility and authority for the coordination and direction of the operations required to stem the tide of the enemy's advances. I feel that the case of China is so desperate that if radical and promptly applied remedies are not immediately effected, our common cause will suffer a disastrous set-back.

I sincerely trust that you will not be offended at the frankness of my statements and I assure you that there is no intent on my part to dictate to you on matters concerning China; however, the future of all Asia is at stake



along with the tremendous effort which America has expended in that region. Therefore I have reason for a profound interest in the matter.

Please have in mind that it has been clearly demonstrated in Italy, in France, and in the Pacific that air power alone cannot stop a determined enemy. As a matter of fact, the Germans have successfully conducted defensive actions and launched determined counter-attacks though overwhelmingly outnumbered in the air.

Should you agree to giving Stilwell such assignment as I now propose, I would recommend that General Sultan, a very fine officer who is now his Deputy, be placed in command of the Chinese-American force in Burma, but under Stilwell's direction.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 10, Item 60)

1. General Marshall edited more than once the drafts of this document and the enclosure which had been prepared by the Operations Division. Marshall's handwritten alterations to the drafts are located in NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 10, Item 59 and OPD 384, Case 47).

2. On July 6 President Roosevelt sent this message unchanged to the Generalissimo, and it was delivered to the Generalissimo on July 7. (Sunderland and Romanus, eds., *Stilwell's Personal File*, 5: 2406–10.) Stilwell's promotion to full general was effective August 1, 1944. For further information regarding this issue, see Marshall to Stilwell, July 7, 1944, pp. 508–10.

TO COLONEL FRANK CAPRA

July 4, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Capra, I am sending you a copy of the Atlantic Monthly with a marked reference (page 85) to your superb direction in preparing the war films for the Army. You may already have seen this but if not I wished to be certain that you did note the extent of the appreciation of your films and the reference to their possible effect for world peace.

The comment is the more impressive in view of the fact that the remainder of the article is devoted to a rather critical and analytical criticism of the American attitude.<sup>1</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. James Lansdale Hodson—English author, playwright, and war correspondent—had criticized the American press for making anti-British remarks, which were often based on ignorance. "The need for interpretation between our two nations remains very great," wrote Hodson. Films could do much good in bettering relations, but "the commercial gentlemen of Hollywood have something of a strangle hold on your screens." He recommended that the American public see Frank Capra's "Why We Fight" series and similar films produced for the army. "It would, in my view, be for the good of unity among the Allies, and ultimately for world peace, that the magnificent series of films made for the United States Army, beginning with *Prelude to War* and going on through *Divide and Conquer*, *The Nazis Strike*, *Battle of Britain*, *Battle of Russia*, *Know Your Ally Britain*, *Battle of China*,



and *Negro Soldier*, should be seen by the vast American public. . . . Nobody who saw them could pretend any longer that America is fighting Britain's war." (James Lansdale Hodson, "No Hard Feelings," *Atlantic Monthly* 174 [July 1944]: 81–86.)

TO EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

July 5, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Ed, The other day I spoke to you casually about the possibility of having a puddle jumper fly you down to Horseshoe and return and thus make it possible for you to have a little more relaxation. I don't know whether you took me seriously but I was serious. Let me know if you are interested and I will look into the question of the availability of the plane and the security of landing in the meadow in front of the house.<sup>1</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. "You are the most thoughtful person I have ever known," replied the under secretary of state on July 6. "There are certain occasions when it would be most helpful for me to have the privilege of using a plane. I do not feel, however, that the time saved in flying to Horse Shoe would justify my using a puddle jumper." (Stettinius to Marshall, July 6, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Horse Shoe Farm was the Stettinius family home near Rapidan, Virginia.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
*Top Secret*

July 5, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

It will interest you to know that the first contingent of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, a Regimental Combat Team (5,000 men), sailed from Brazil for Italy on July 3, 1944. The remainder of this, their first division, will follow later. The date for the later move depends on accumulating the necessary equipment for these troops in the Naples area and finding the troop transports in the midst of preparations for ANVIL.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The Brazilian Expeditionary Force was formally established by the Joint Brazil–United States Defense Commission in August 1943 and was supplied ground and air equipment by the United States. Eventually twenty-five thousand Brazilian ground forces and an air squadron served in the Italian theater. (Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1960], pp. 327–30.) For another related topic of Latin Americans in military service, see Marshall Memorandum for General White, April 27, 1944, pp. 438–39.



MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, July 6, 1944  
OPD [HANDY]; ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, [Washington, D.C.]  
G-2 [BISSELL]; AND THE DIRECTOR, BPR [SURLES]  
*Secret*

Mr. Elmer Davis is leaving for the Pacific in about a week. Among other things he will see General MacArthur to discuss the Australian set-up regarding propaganda, etc. According to him there are now two agencies there, one purely General MacArthur and another one combined of representatives from the British, the Australians, the Dutch and the Americans. Mr. Davis would like to be informed as to our views in regard to this matter.

Please advise me.

If there is anything else that he should know before going to the theater please give me the information.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Elmer Davis, director of the Office of War Information, was furnished a letter on July 10 which was drafted for General Marshall's signature by his staff. Davis was informed that propaganda and psychological warfare were handled in the Southwest Pacific Area by a military group directly under the command of the Australian Land Headquarters and answerable to the Department of External Affairs of the Australian government. MacArthur retained general supervision over these activities, as was proper for an Allied theater commander. "General MacArthur feels very strongly that propaganda and psychological warfare activities can best be conducted by military personnel. Under present War Department policy the theater commander is responsible for the extent to which he uses propaganda and psychological warfare and it is his decision as to what type of organization, what number of personnel and what amount of equipment is needed to accomplish his desires," wrote Marshall. But regarding the dissemination of information to the Australian public, MacArthur thought such activities were properly handled by civilian personnel of the Office of War Information. Information furnished the American public was handled in the Southwest Pacific Area, as it was in all American theater commands, under the authority of the theater commander's public relations office. (Marshall [staff-drafted] to Davis, July 10, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSEPH W. STILWELL  
Radio No. WAR-61514. *Secret*

July 7, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

For Stilwell's eyes only from Marshall. Yesterday morning the President dispatched a radio to CKS to the following general effect: Serious situation in Central China leads to conclusion that drastic measures must be taken immediately. It calls for delegation to one individual of power to coordinate all the Allied military resources in China including the Communist forces.<sup>1</sup>

"I think I am fully aware of your feelings regarding General Stilwell, nevertheless, I think he has now clearly demonstrated his far-sighted



judgment, his skill in organization and training and above all, in fighting your Chinese forces. I know of no other man who has the ability, the force, and the determination to offset the disaster which now threatens China and our over all plans for the conquest of Japan. I am promoting Stilwell to the rank of full General and recommend for your most urgent consideration that you recall him from Burma and place him directly under you in command of all Chinese and American Forces and that you charge him with the full responsibility and authority for the coordination and direction of the operations required to stem the tide of the enemy's advances."

Among other matters he says: "Please have in mind that it has been clearly demonstrated in Italy, in France, and in the Pacific, that air power alone cannot stop a determined enemy." He further states: "Should you agree to giving Stilwell such assignment as I now propose I would recommend that General Sultan, a very fine officer who is now his deputy be placed in command of the Chinese-American Forces in Burma, but under Stilwell's direction."

In all this matter the difficulty has been the offense you have given, usually in small affairs, both to the Generalissimo and to the President. Had you yourself, or at least someone on your staff, devoted a little attention to promoting harmonious relations, I think the above proposal of the President, at least insofar as his backing you and your recommendations, would have been made long ago. Now please consistently and continuously avoid unnecessary irritations in order that you can make a tremendous contribution to this war. I have felt that it has been remarkable, the manner in which you have accepted my disagreeable radios, apparently without prejudice or bitterness. However, it has been even more remarkable how quickly a new set of irritating circumstances is built up, most of which I think have been unnecessary. I ask you please this time make a continuous effort to avoid wrecking yours and our plans because of inconsequential matters or disregard of conventional courtesies.

Whether or not the Generalissimo will agree to the President's proposal remains to be seen but in any event it should make clear to him that the President is now backing you to the full. Win over to your side anyone who can help in the battle which will result from the violent hostility of those Chinese who will lose face by your appointment.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 10, Item 60)

1. For previous discussion, see Memorandum for the President from the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, July 4, 1944, pp. 503–6.

2. "Your message and instructions are unmistakably plain," replied Stilwell. "If this new assignment materializes, I will tackle it to the best of my ability. I am keenly aware of the honor of the President's confidence and of yours, and I pledge my word to him and to you that I will 'consistently and continuously avoid unnecessary irritations' and get on with the war. I fully realize that I will have to justify that confidence, and I find it even in prospect a



heavy load for a country boy.” (Stilwell to Marshall, Radio No. CHC-1260, July 9, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

Meanwhile, on July 8, Chiang Kai-shek responded to Roosevelt that he agreed “with the principle” of appointing Stilwell to the command of all Allied forces in China, but that political limitations inherent in the Chinese Army made it necessary to have a “preparatory period” before Stilwell could assume command. “I very much hope that you will be able to dispatch an influential personal representative who enjoys your complete confidence, is given with full power and has a far-sighted political vision and ability, to constantly collaborate with me and he may also adjust the relations between me and General Stilwell so as to enhance the cooperation between China and America,” replied the Generalissimo. “You will appreciate the fact that military cooperation in its absolute sense must be built on the foundation of political cooperation.” (Chiang Kai-shek to Roosevelt, July 8, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

Roosevelt replied on July 13 that he was “searching for a personal representative with farsighted political vision and ability to collaborate with you.” But Roosevelt reminded the Generalissimo that “the emergencies are primarily military” and he had in mind “the urgent necessity for delegating at once to one individual the power to take immediate military direction of forces and operations in central China.” He needed time to choose the correct person for the political representative; “in the meantime I again urge you to take all steps to pave the way for General Stilwell’s assumption of command at the earliest possible moment,” replied Roosevelt. (President to Chiang Kai-shek, July 13, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) For further discussion, see Marshall to Stilwell, August 3, 1944, pp. 544–45.

TO BERNARD M. BARUCH

July 7, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mr. Baruch, I have just received your letter of July third and find its expressions very heartening.<sup>1</sup> I am passing it along (less personal references) to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and it may be that we shall have some definite request to make of you. As a matter of fact we agreed this morning to a letter to Nelson, a copy of which I inclose, which is self-explanatory. Nelson is off sick but Wilson feels that he is duty bound to follow Nelson’s proposal which the group including Forrestal and Patterson were unanimous in condemning.<sup>2</sup> These things seem to blossom in one flower or another each week and I suppose they will continue up until the end of the war. However, I believe there are enough of us, especially including you, to slow down on this vicious business of turning to peacetime activities before we have won our victory.

Apparently all goes very well in France. The weather has been abominable, the worst in forty years, but the Germans have been rendered incapable of a serious counter-attack for a considerable time to come—and I think not even then.

I will give Katherine your message which I know she will appreciate. Also your invitation for Port Washington.<sup>3</sup> She is down at Leesburg now



with her grandchildren and between the children and the garden she keeps her mind pretty well off the tragedy of the loss of young Allen.

I sent your daughter Belle an autographed photograph this morning in response to a note she wrote to Mrs. Marshall. I felt a little embarrassed in doing this but if it's what she wants she gets it. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Baruch, adviser to the director (James F. Byrnes) of the Office of War Mobilization, had written on July 3 indicating his support for the Joint Chiefs of Staff position that war production should not shift over to peacetime industrial production at the present time. "Three times now I have effectually stopped the peace jitters," wrote Baruch. "You must have everything you need, in the fullest amount, when it is needed. . . . I know full well that there is a lot of conversion going on." Baruch added that he understood "who is the big man behind the guns and that is George Marshall. I know you will not let the politicians try to drag you into anything smacking of a political statement." (Baruch to Marshall, July 3, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Donald M. Nelson, chairman of the War Production Board, had raised the issue of relaxing civilian production restrictions, under certain conditions, as early as November 30, 1943, and discussions continued into 1944. On June 18 he publicly announced his program for reconversion, indicating that military production should be maintained at the highest level, but that "the time had come for prompt and adequate preparation for expansion of civilian production," assuming that such preparation would be necessary for the smooth ultimate conversion of a wartime economy to a peacetime economy. (*Industrial Mobilization For War: History of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies, 1940–1945*, volume 1, *Program and Administration* [Washington: GPO, 1947], pp. 791–801; quote on p. 801.) On July 4 the War Production Board met with representatives of the army and navy; Nelson, who was absent with pneumonia, was represented by the board's executive vice chairman, Charles E. Wilson. "It was well known," the board's official history noted, "that Wilson, like the Services, felt that it was not an appropriate time for issuance of the reconversion orders. But in presiding at the Board meeting as Nelson's alternate, Wilson felt bound to maintain the Chairman's views." (Ibid., pp. 802–4.) On July 7 the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed their concern to Nelson that the board was considering issuing orders that would relax controls over nonessential military production. They were disturbed over "the existing lag in war production," which if continued would "necessitate revision in strategic plans which could prolong the war." (William D. Leahy to Nelson, July 7, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, along with the army and navy, objected to issuing the proposed orders at that time. James V. Forrestal had been secretary of the navy since May 19, 1944.

3. Baruch invited the Marshalls to visit him at Port Washington, Long Island, for a weekend. (Baruch to Marshall, July 3, 1944, *ibid.*)

GENERAL Charles de Gaulle, president of the French Committee of National Liberation, visited Washington, D.C., between July 6 and 10, 1944. De Gaulle recalled in his memoirs that he "had no favors to ask" and "would undertake no negotiations." After his meetings with de Gaulle, Roosevelt wrote to Churchill on July 10, 1944, that he was willing to accept the French Committee "as temporary *de facto* authority for civil administration in France provided two things are made clear—first, complete



authority to be reserved to Eisenhower to do what he feels necessary to conduct effective military operations, and, second, that French people be given opportunity to make free choice of their own Government." Roosevelt concluded, "The visit has gone off very well." (*The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle* [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964], p. 570; *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, 3:238.)

General de Gaulle's visit also included discussions over the employment of Free French armed forces in forthcoming Allied operations. De Gaulle wished to maintain current French military units, which required American logistical support and equipment, and to raise the maximum number of new French divisions from French Resistance groups and from military-age manpower that would be shortly liberated in metropolitan France. Lieutenant General Emile Béthouart, who was chief of staff of all Free French armed forces and who accompanied General de Gaulle on his visit, met with General Marshall on July 7. He presented requests for assistance in two areas; first, that American materiel shipments to French forces be expedited. Second, that the Allies provide aircraft and aerial supply for Operation CAIMAN, whereby certain regular French units that were located mostly in the Mediterranean theater would parachute or be transported by air to join the French Forces of the Interior in seizing the Massif Central region. (Béthouart Memorandum on the Rearmament Program and the Requirements of the Sovereignty Units in North Africa, July 6, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 10, Item 52e]; Béthouart Memorandum for General George C. Marshall, July 7, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected]; Saint-Didier Memorandum for General Marshall, July 7, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 091 France].)

Marshall replied on July 9 that American authorities would try to speed munitions shipments. The CAIMAN issue required consultation with Eisenhower and Devers. General Eisenhower approved of CAIMAN's idea in principle but added that General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson should determine whether the plan should be implemented as part of ANVIL. The Allies would support Maquis forces in the south of France "to aid ANVIL and thus indirectly assist OVERLORD," replied Eisenhower, but "any plan worthy of our support must have as its principal objective the assisting of military operations and *not* merely the liberation of territory to come under French command." Devers stated that he had conferred with General Wilson and Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker and that they were opposed to CAIMAN. "Nearly all troop units required would have to be withdrawn from ANVIL," and aircraft for the initial operation and maintenance were not available. However, a scaled-down version of the operation might be of use after the initial ANVIL landings. (Marshall [staff-prepared] to Béthouart, July 9, 1944, and Marshall [OPD] to Eisenhower and Devers, Radio No. WARX-62376, July 8, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon



Office, Selected]; *Papers of DDE*, 3: 1992–93; Devers to Marshall, Radio No. BX-13550, July 11, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 10, Item 52e]. For further information regarding CAIMAN, see Marshall Memorandum for General Handy, July 19, 1944, pp. 527–28.)

Meanwhile, in light of Béthouart's communication regarding equipment assistance to Free French units, Marshall sent the following message. ★

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JACOB L. DEVERS  
Radio No. WAR-61762. *Secret*

July 7, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Personal attention General Devers from General Marshall. General Bethouart called on me this morning in regard to a number of matters of materiel. The War Department officials tell me that aside from some special items which we are short on here, deliveries on the agreed rearmament program have been made up to 5 1/3 Infantry Divisions and 3 1/4 Armored Divisions. Also for 225 out of some 260 special units. As I understand it the equipment is available here and they tell me that the shipments will not be made until you give the word over there and that you wait until the men are prepared to receive it.

In view of pending operations, what portion of the missing equipment should be put en route now without further delay?<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. "All essential equipment for French required for pending operations should arrive on time, if action already initiated is completed as scheduled," replied Devers on July 9. "Request for shipment of equipment has not been delayed in any case until men are assigned to units." But his command had refused to provide equipment for units that French authorities had proved incapable of organizing in North Africa because of lack of personnel or for units French commanders proposed to raise in metropolitan France following liberation of French territory. "The French rearmament program in my opinion was designed to equip an expeditionary force for the invasion of Continental Europe and not to furnish supplies for liberated areas in France nor to build up a post-war French Army," stated Devers. "It is suggested that no commitments based on statements made by Bethouart or DeGaulle be made by you without our comments." (Devers to Marshall, Radio No. FX-70274, July 9, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 10, Item 52e].) For further discussion of the French situation, see the following document.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JACOB L. DEVERS  
Radio No. WARX-62315. *Secret*

July 8, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall for General Devers' Eyes Only. Yesterday A. M. I made pointed comments to General Bethouart regarding relief of General Juin.<sup>1</sup>



Last night at dinner for De Gaulle Bethouart informed me most confidentially that he was to take over Juin's Corps and Juin was to take Bethouart's place as Chief of Staff to De Gaulle. Apparently the decision followed my comments. Bethouart is a fine man I think and gave fine account of himself commanding French division at Narvik, Norway and in assisting American landing in western French Morocco.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-62315])

1. On July 2 Devers had sent his views as to possible issues which might be discussed between President Roosevelt and General de Gaulle during de Gaulle's visit to Washington. "DeGaulle may raise the question of what future employment is to be given to Juin, for whom we have a very high regard," reported Devers. "Our view is that the selection and employment of French commanders is entirely the concern of the French, unless there is some Allied objection on purely military grounds to a proposed individual. DeGaulle visited Italy and Elba recently, decorated and complimented Juin. To direct question reference Juin, he said that he had 2 commanders of army rank. He proposed to use the 2nd now and rest Juin; later he hoped to form a 2nd army which he intimated would be commanded by Juin." (Devers to Marshall, Radio No. B-13244, July 2, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 10, Item 52d].)

2. "A perfect solution," replied Devers. "We are all fond of General Bethouart here." (Devers to Marshall, Radio No. T-12434, July 9, 1944, *ibid.*, Item 52e.) Lieutenant General Alphonse Pierre Juin replaced B  thouart as chief of staff of National Defense in early August 1944, when B  thouart was appointed commanding general of the French First Corps of the First French Army. (Vigneras, *Rearming the French*, pp. 183, 321.)

TO ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK

July 11, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Betty, Thanks for your letter regarding the generous comments of the British officer concerning the American troops in the Cherbourg peninsula.<sup>1</sup> I hope his impression is the general one. As a matter of fact I have taken satisfaction and received considerable assurance from the conduct of our new divisions in their first time engaged with the enemy. What I am even more impressed with is the handling of Corps and Army echelons. These are the hardest to train and the most complicated to manage, and the beachhead conditions accentuated the difficulties. It all goes to indicate that our large maneuvers in this country, which covered as much as an entire state, have been productive of a fine result.

I noticed in France, despite the state of the action, the shallowness of the beachhead, and the narrowness of the country roads, that there was almost no confusion, no traffic blockades, dumps were well arranged and adequately served, in fact all the machinery behind the fighting divisions was moving along in a most businesslike and veteranish manner. Along with





(26) *Generals Henry H. Arnold, George C. Marshall (with field glasses), and Dwight D. Eisenhower inspect invasion progress on a Normandy beachhead from offshore, June 12, 1944.*

(27) *Generals Marshall and Eisenhower and Admiral Ernest J. King stand in an amphibious DUKW as they tour Allied beachheads in northern France, June 12, 1944.*







(28) *During his tour of inspection of American troops on a beachhead in northern France, General Marshall stops to talk with a soldier, June 12, 1944.*

(29) *Generals Eisenhower, Marshall, and Arnold leave an amphibious vehicle to visit American installations on the invasion coast of France, June 12, 1944.*







(30) Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley greets Generals Marshall and Arnold during their visit to inspect the progress of battle on the Normandy beachhead, June 12, 1944.

(31) Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark (left rear), commander of the Fifth Army, accompanies General Marshall on his tour in the Grosseto area of Italy, June 18, 1944.








*(32) During his tour of the Fifth Army front, General Marshall talks with soldiers of the 142d Infantry Regiment, Thirty-sixth Division, in the Grosseto area of Italy, June 18, 1944. Left to right: Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers, Major General David G. Barr, General Marshall, and Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark.*





*(33) General Marshall greets General Charles de Gaulle at Washington National Airport, July 6, 1944. Left to right: General Henry H. Arnold, General de Gaulle, Admiral Ernest J. King, and General Marshall.*

*(34) General Marshall relaxes with his family at Dodona Manor in Leesburg, Virginia, September 1944. Left to right: Molly Winn, Mrs. Marshall, Jimmy Winn, General Marshall, and Kitty Winn.*







*(35) General Marshall arrives at the Quebec airport for the Second Quebec Conference, September 12-16, 1944.*





*(36) The heads of government and their military advisers at the Second Quebec Conference gather for a photograph on the sun deck of the Citadel at Quebec, September 16, 1944. Seated left to right: General George C. Marshall, Admiral William D. Leahy, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, and Field Marshal Sir John Dill. Standing left to right: Major General Leslie Hollis, General Sir Hastings Ismay, Admiral Ernest J. King, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, General Henry H. Arnold, and Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham.*





*(37) The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff hold a meeting at the Second Quebec Conference, September 1944. Left to right: Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, General Henry H. Arnold, General George C. Marshall, Admiral William D. Leahy, and Admiral Ernest J. King.*

*(38) During a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Second Quebec Conference in September 1944, General Marshall explains an issue by using a map as Brigadier General Andrew J. McFarland, secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, listens.*







*(39) Arriving in France on October 6, 1944, General Marshall and James F. Byrnes, director of the Office of War Mobilization, are greeted by General Dwight D. Eisenhower (left) and Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley (right).*



*(40) Soon after his arrival in Paris on October 6, 1944, General Marshall confers with General Eisenhower.*





*(41) French children greet General Marshall with a bouquet of flowers during his visit to France in October 1944.*



(42) During his inspection trip in France on October 10, 1944, General Marshall talks with Major General Walton H. Walker, commander of the Twentieth Corps. Standing in the background are Lieutenant General Thomas T. Handy and Lieutenant General George S. Patton.



(43) General Marshall listens intently as Major General Stafford Le Roy Irwin (left), commander of the Fifth Infantry Division, describes the surrounding French terrain, October 10, 1944. Major General Walton H. Walker is in the right foreground.







*(44) General Marshall talks with soldiers in Belgium on October 11, 1944. Standing in the background are Major General Troy H. Middleton (left), commander of Eighth Corps, and Major General Donald A. Stroh (far right), commander of the Eighth Infantry Division.*

*(45) Major General Norman D. Cota, commander of the Twenty-eighth Infantry Division, greets General Marshall in Belgium on October 11, 1944.*







*(46) An informal portrait of General George C. Marshall taken somewhere in the European Theater of Operations, October 1944.*





(47) General Marshall talks to soldiers in the vicinity of the Siegfried Line, Germany, October 11, 1944. Left to right: General Marshall, Major General Raymond O. Barton, commander of the Fourth Infantry Division, and Major General Leonard T. Gerow, commander of Fifth Corps.

(48) General Marshall, Major General J. Lawton Collins (left rear), commander of the Seventh Corps, and Lieutenant General Thomas T. Handy inspect the Siegfried Line sector in Collins's armored car.







(49) General Marshall talks with his brother-in-law Brigadier General Tristram Tupper, public relations officer for Sixth Army Group, during his visit to France in October 1944.

(50) Brigadier General John McAuley Palmer meets with General Marshall in the chief of staff's office, November 1944.







*(51) General Marshall watches a combat demonstration staged at the Fort McClellan, Alabama, Infantry Replacement Training Center on December 13, 1944.*



this comment goes the handling of the heavy artillery with the Corps and Army, which has I believe been most expertly done.<sup>2</sup>

Corps and Army echelons are very hard to train and we could not have had a more difficult situation for a first experience than that confronting Bradley's outfits in Normandy.

I was very sorry not to see more of you, or as a matter of fact, anything of you while I was in England. I had counted on having a meal with you towards the end of our stay, but as matters worked out, I was continually on the move and frequently involved with the Prime Minister; also the Ambassador and General Bethouart cut into my schedule. However even the brief glimpse I had of you was a great pleasure and I was glad to see you looking so well.<sup>3</sup>

I gave your message to Katherine and she appreciated greatly your remembering her.

With my affectionate regards, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Stark, commander of United States Naval Forces in Europe, had relayed to General Marshall the comments of a British Army officer who had been with the U.S. Army in the fighting up the peninsula to Cherbourg. The British officer enthusiastically stated that "he believed the American Army with whom he had been associated to be the best troops in the world. He said they not only fought like tigers and that no troops could have fought harder or longer or taken it better; one thing that was particularly outstanding to him was our troops' extreme adaptability, the quickness with which they grasped a situation and turned it to good advantage, and the beating of the enemy at his own game," wrote Stark. (Stark to Marshall, July 4, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) For information regarding the Cherbourg campaign, see note 1, Marshall to Eisenhower, June 23, 1944, pp. 489–90.

2. For Marshall's comments regarding his visit to the Normandy beachhead, see Marshall to Roosevelt and Stimson, June 14, 1944, pp. 479–80, and Marshall Statement for the *Stars and Stripes*, June 16, 1944, pp. 485–86.

3. For information on Marshall's trip to England, see the editorial notes on pp. 476–82.

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL GROGAN  
FROM COLONEL FRANK McCARTHY

July 11, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

The Chief of Staff approves the following statement to be used as a preface to "Army Life:"<sup>1</sup>

MEMBERS OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES:

As a newly inducted soldier you will find it necessary to make a complete readjustment of your previous habits of life. You have become a part of a huge organization in which you will live in intimate daily association with other soldiers conforming to the exacting requirements



of the military team. The necessary disciplinary control and the military surroundings will present an entirely new order of life for you, all essential to our great purpose in this war.

To help you make the necessary readjustments this book, ARMY LIFE, has been prepared. It is based on experiences of millions of men who have entered the Army before you and it should provide the answers for most of the questions every new soldier asks himself or his associates. Study carefully its contents, for it should assist you greatly in making the necessary readjustments in establishing yourself as an efficient soldier.

Good luck to you. May you find friends and experience that will be of great help to you in the years to come.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. *Army Life* was among the War Department pamphlet series issued to soldiers. See Marshall Memorandum for the President, June 27, 1944, p. 497.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSEPH W. STILWELL  
Radio No. WAR-63270. *Secret*

July 11, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Eyes alone Stilwell from Marshall. Your report on the quality of the replacements furnished for GALAHAD as contained in CHC 1216 Jun 22nd has been the subject of serious investigation on our part.<sup>1</sup> The results of our inquiries are as follows:

1. Composition of contingent: Officers 93 Infantry, 15 Medical, 4 Quartermaster, total 112. Enlisted men 2219 from the 97th Division, 223 from the 71st Division, 532 mostly volunteers from miscellaneous sources.
2. Of personnel furnished by 97th Division exclusive of Medical all but 5 had qualified with their individual weapon.
3. 23 enlisted men of entire shipment required additional training at Replacement Depot.
4. 97th Division activated February 15, 1943 thereby afforded men from this division an unusually extended period of unit training.
5. 85% of the Infantry Officers and 223 enlisted men from the 71st Division were jungle trained at Hunter Liggett.
6. Enlisted men met closely the proportion of military occupational specialties required for a tabular Infantry Regiment.

The Convoy Officer who accompanied the shipment from AGF Replacement Depot number 1 Fort Meade to India reported upon his return in part as follows: "The First Battalion (The replacements were organized tentatively as a regiment at Fort Meade) arrived at Ramgarh at 1100 on May 29, 1944 and was being moved by air at 0700 May 30 to reinforce



Merrill's Marauders in Burma. Replacements rates are not used at Ramgarh. The shipment went into combat as set up by this depot with but few alterations." General McNair states that it is "Out of the question to expect a Battalion such as this one to fight effectively".

The foregoing is in no sense intended as a criticism of your handling of these units in your Myitkyina fighting. Rather it is a response to my searching investigation of why men seemingly so poorly trained, should have been sent to your theatre.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-63270])

1. For Stilwell's adverse report on the GALAHAD replacements, see Marshall Memorandum for General McNair, June 23, 1944, pp. 490–91.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL OMAR N. BRADLEY  
*Personal*

July 12, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Bradley, I have been on the verge several times recently of sending you and some of your people a special commendation, but for several reasons decided that the time was not quite ripe—though the Cherbourg campaign was a great feat and displayed a very high capacity of leadership, organization, and general battle management. Please have in mind my complete confidence in your ability, and when occasion permits pass informally to your Corps commanders the tremendous reassurance I get from their fine performances. Compliment Collins for me on Cherbourg and give Taylor and Ridgway a pat on the back for the superb performance of their divisions and their long endurance under heavy losses.<sup>1</sup>

The weather has treated you badly, particularly considering the character of the terrain you have been trying to break through. However, i[t se]ems to me that things have gone extraordinarily well and that the German dilemma must be a nightmare for them.

With my very best wishes and complete confidence in the developments of the coming weeks,<sup>2</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. For information regarding the Cherbourg campaign, see note 1, Marshall to Eisenhower, June 23, 1944, pp. 489–90.

2. Bradley replied that it had been difficult fighting through the marshes to get to a place where they could make a concentrated attack. "It was necessary to get out of the marshes before making such an attack so that we could get a proper road net. Except for the unfortunate bombing of our own troops with part of the effort, the fight has gone about according to our plan and we feel we have been highly successful," wrote Bradley. "The cooperation between the advancing columns and the fighters and fighter-bombers of the Ninth Tactical Air Command has been of a very superior nature. They were in constant communication and in many cases the Air was able to tell the advancing columns where they could expect resistance and just how much, and in addition they attacked many targets



ahead of the moving column. Major General Quesada has done a fine job in all phases of our fighting to assure close cooperation between the air and ground forces." Bradley concluded, "I am leaving First Army headquarters tomorrow to take over the Army Group." (Bradley to Marshall, July 31, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN DILL

July 12, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Dill, Thank you very much for your two notes of appreciation for the arrangements at White Sulphur; one written before your departure and the other which came to me today.<sup>1</sup> I am glad that you found Powder helpful and not an irritant. I can always be certain that he will start work with a determination to do his job to the full, but sometimes, particularly in your case, it might not be so good.

We tried to get Nancy yesterday for canoeing but got no answer on the telephone. Katherine is leaving for Leesburg today. It is very hot here, and dry—a real drought.

I hope that the doctors don't bother you too much with further examinations. I asked them to lay off as much as possible on this sort of business and hope that the records from the Walter Reed as well as those from your personal physicians will suffice. However, if you will treat the X-Ray artist merely as you do the press photographer it won't be so bad. I don't know of a more peaceful spot for reestablishing yourself than the White during the summer months, and I am sure that when Nancy joins you you will find it a much more pleasant place. Incidentally, she should be able to get in some good riding and golf, and certainly walking, down there.

With my affectionate regards,<sup>2</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On July 8, immediately before departing Washington for White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, Dill had written to tell Marshall "how immensely I appreciate your kindness in letting me go there." Lady Dill would join him there at one of the cottages in a few days. On the tenth Dill wrote to express his appreciation that Marshall had sent Sergeant James W. Powder, Marshall's orderly, to assist him when he arrived at the cottage. "It really was kindness itself to send Sergeant Powder here to look after my comfort," stated Dill. "I need not tell you how well he has done his job—what a charming person he is!" Dill was being moved to the hospital that evening for a blood transfusion and X rays. "I shall count the hours until I can get back to this lovely cottage," Dill wrote. (Dill to Marshall, July 8 and 10, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. On July 15 Colonel Clyde McK. Beck, commanding officer at Ashford General Hospital, informed Colonel Frank McCarthy that Dill had sustained a mild heart attack a few nights before. The medical officers were disturbed that Dill's severe anemia, diagnosed the first of June, was persisting in spite of blood transfusions and other measures. Beck, however, wrote that Dill was "definitely improved in strength and general sense of well-being." (Beck to McCarthy, July 15, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon



Office, Selected].) Dill's cousin and physician, Dr. Foster Kennedy (a leading neurologist) and his colleagues had diagnosed the field marshal as having aplastic anemia and suspected that he would not recover; however, they did not reveal the full implications of this diagnosis until after Dill's collapse on October 30. (Alex Danchev, *Very Special Relationship: Field-Marshal Sir John Dill and the Anglo-American Alliance, 1941–44* [London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986], pp. 142–43.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY  
OF STATE [STETTINIUS]  
*Confidential*

July 13, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Ed: General DeWitt, who is the head of the Joint Army and Navy Staff College here in Washington, has submitted the attached recommendation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by whom it is now being considered.<sup>1</sup> In due time you will probably receive their recommendations.

In the event that this may be talked over by you with some of your people, I would like you to have the following in mind:

After the last World War an effort was made to bring representatives of the Diplomatic Corps and the Consular Service into the course at the Army War College—which Naval officers also attended. The diplomatic representatives very quickly fell out, the members of the Consular Service continuing a little longer, but in a very short time there was no more trace of the State Department. This, to my mind, was a very unfortunate business because political strategy must always have in the background military fundamentals or capabilities—or else written history is a great misrepresentation of what has occurred in the past. When I came into the War Department I found practically no relationship between the War and State Departments except in minor irritating little matters, generally some Ambassador or Minister's difficulties with the Military Attache or the desire of some Ambassador or Minister to have some portion of our poverty-stricken military equipment made available to some Latin-American country, to build up good will. From this has grown up the present much more intimate relationship, but it is not yet based on a proper understanding of the military involvements or aspects of the various problems. For example, General Eisenhower has an exceptionally fine man, Mr. Phillips, as his political advisor.<sup>2</sup> But the latter has no sound basis for comprehension of Army and Navy problems and procedures, which definitely lessens his value to General Eisenhower. (This is not reflecting any expressed or implied view of General Eisenhower. He has never discussed the matter, so far as I know). We put the leading staff officers and commanders of the Army through a strenuous educational course at



Leavenworth, later at the War College, and now in the Joint Army and Navy Staff College. We do this so that they will have a general understanding of Army and Navy requirements, which includes Air. Furthermore, particularly at the Army War College, they were given a great deal that had to do with political matters concerning Latin-American, European, and Far Eastern countries, because unless there was an understanding of such involvements the individual would not be competent to advise as a General Staff Officer when such complications arose.

Now General DeWitt, the present head of the Joint Army and Navy Staff College, the one-time head of the Army War College, and the former Assistant Commandant and Instructor at the Army War College during the period of the effort to bring the State Department into the picture, urgently recommends that the Joint Chiefs of Staff propose to the State Department the detail of a few men to take this four-and-a-half months course—not a piece of it, but all of it. When the matter is brought to you, please give it careful attention. The usual answer is, no one is available.<sup>3</sup> Faithfully yours,

P.S. Possibly it would be best to keep this letter out of the record or files. G. C. M.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Lieutenant General John L. De Witt recommended that "in view of the close relationship that the functions of the State, War and Navy Departments bear to each other in the prosecution of war" it made sense to include foreign service officers of the State Department in subsequent courses of the Joint Army and Navy Staff College. Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy agreed with De Witt: "I think it is a step in the right direction because it will inevitably add some realism to our diplomatic thinking." (De Witt to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 11, 1944, and McCloy Memorandum for General Marshall, July 15, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. William Phillips—a career diplomat, a former under secretary of state, and former director of the Office of Strategic Services in London—was General Eisenhower's political adviser.

3. "I am delighted," Edward Stettinius replied, "to assure you that the State Department will cooperate in every way possible and will make available just as many of our foreign service officers as is possible." He added, however, that there was a manpower shortage in the diplomatic service. (Stettinius to Marshall, July 14, 1944, *ibid.*) General Marshall later recalled: "I sent a note to Stettinius that they always told me the same thing—they didn't have men to spare, but I said they certainly didn't have any knowledge to spare either. He revoked their reaction and they sent the first people down to the War College for that course." (*Marshall Interviews*, p. 562.)

TO JOHN S. SHEDDEN

July 13, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mr. Shedden: Thank you for your note of the 12th [11th], it was



very understanding and appreciative of you to have written as you did.<sup>1</sup> I was sorry to learn that Madge had been laid up with flu. Lord knows she had enough to bear without that added to her troubles. However, she is young and courageous and fortunately is occupied with an interesting job, and more fortunately, she is close to you and Mrs. Shedden.<sup>2</sup>

Katherine gets along pretty well and has the necessary courage but lacks the physical and nervous strength. She has been working industriously down at Leesburg and is getting into better shape generally.

With my affectionate regards to you both, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Madge Shedden Brown's father had written that he and Mrs. Shedden "greatly appreciate the help you have given Madge. She is devoted to you and Mrs. Marshall and all you have done for her has given her the courage to bear her loss bravely." He concluded, "I understand fully what Allen's death means"; his son had been killed when returning from a mission the plane struck the side of a hill in England in January 1943. (Shedden to Marshall, July 11, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General]. Regarding Shedden's son, see *Papers of GCM*, 3: 521–22.)

2. Madge Brown and son Tupper (Allen T., Jr.) lived with her parents in New York, and she worked for *Life* magazine.

TO COLONEL ROBERT R. MCCORMICK

July 13, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear McCormick: In reply to your telegram concerning the proposal that General Summerall visit the First Division, I agree that his presence in this unit for a brief period when it is not actually in the line, would be of material benefit.<sup>1</sup> However, for the present General Eisenhower is receiving great pressure from both British and American sides for visits from numerous high officials—as well as many other prominent personages—to the battle area of Normandy. In order to protect his commanders and to prevent actual interference with operations, he is holding these visitors to an absolute minimum. Incidentally, he has secured an order from Mr. Churchill prohibiting visits of high British officials (this is most confidential) and I am endeavoring to give him the same protection on the American side.<sup>2</sup> In view of this I would be reluctant to propose a visit by General Summerall at this particular time.

At a later date when the liberated areas of France are more secure and fully organized, consideration will be given to your suggestion. Thanks for forwarding it to me. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. McCormick, editor and publisher of the *Chicago Tribune*, had served with the First Division during World War I. "Wouldn't it be a great gesture to have Gen Summerall visit the First Division," he had suggested to Marshall. (McCormick to Marshall, July 9, 1944,



GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].) General Charles P. Summerall commanded the First Division during July-October 1918 and September 1919-June 1921.

2. For further information, see note 1, Marshall to Eisenhower, June 29, 1944, p. 499.

TO MRS. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, JR.

July 14, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mrs. Roosevelt, I learned late last night of Ted's death in France.<sup>1</sup> You have all of my sympathy.

Ever since I met him on my arrival with the headquarters of the First Division at Gondrecourt in July, 1917, I have felt that we had a close bond of understanding between us. The first raid in the Ansauville sector which he directed and Archie<sup>2</sup> led, the early days in the Toul sector and the heavy fighting around Cantigny and later at Soissons, built up in me a great admiration for his courageous leadership and his willingness to give his all to the Army and for the country.

His final service in the fighting in France of 1918 in the grand rush on Sedan and the March to the Rhine marked him as one of the great battalion and regimental commanders of that vast Army. And in this war, in Tunisia and on the beachhead at Gela, he displayed the same fighting, courageous spirit. I am happy in the thought that he had the satisfaction of going into France in the first wave and that if he was to be stricken down it should come in the midst of the fighting.

I know you are a woman of great courage, but this blow will nevertheless be a very hard one for you to bear. However, you have so very much of which to be proud in husband and sons and Ted has left for you and for the country such a wonderful example of good citizenship and in courage and self-sacrifice that you may find a solace for your grief.<sup>3</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., died on July 12, 1944, of a heart attack at the Fourth Division command post in the Normandy area. (*New York Times*, July 14, 1944, p. 1.)

2. Archibald B. Roosevelt was Theodore, Jr.'s, brother.

3. Roosevelt was awarded the Medal of Honor; see Marshall Memorandum for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, July 24, 1944, pp. 533-34.

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. WAR-65051. *Secret*

July 14, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Eisenhower from Marshall. The release of the names of corps and division commanders has had a happy effect in the home press



though you still have one corps commander secreted away, for what reason I don't know.<sup>1</sup>

I think that you might to great advantage in the progress of your battle follow some such method as this:

Have Bradley turn in the name of a regimental or battalion commander or other leader every 2 or 3 days, and not once a year, who has displayed very aggressive leadership with his unit and send us his name and the designation of the unit and what they did. I think nine times out of ten no secrecy would be involved as the divisions have been largely identified, and I am certain the effect would be tremendous in having everyone in your forces realize that the publicity was not confined only to generals and that if you did a fine stunt you and your unit were mentioned. I assume that some of the opposers of this proposition would state that it will be hard to determine which unit without a board and that somebody else's jealousy might be aroused. This carries no weight with me whatever.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-65051])

1. For the chief of staff's interest in publicity for commanders, see Marshall to Eisenhower, June 23, 1944, pp. 489–90.

2. "I long ago gave instructions that such a similar procedure was to be followed but it was my fault that I did not follow up to see that it was done," replied Eisenhower on July 15. He suggested that rather than send stories to Washington for publication that they would have more effect if filed by correspondents in the field. Eisenhower replied he would discuss the matter again with Omar Bradley and the public relations officers. (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 2008–9.) General Marshall replied that Eisenhower's proposal for release of stories there was correct. "My apparent proposal for release here was merely an error of careless or hurried dictation," Marshall responded. "Bureau of Public Relations suggests, however, that total effect will be improved if after release in theater your Public Relations Officer sends expanded details to War Department by air courier for feature and magazine release, since limitations on wire space may keep correspondents from giving full play to action on which your release is based." (Marshall to Eisenhower, Radio No. WAR-66121, July 16, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-66121)].)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JACOB L. DEVERS  
Radio No. WARX-66124. *Top Secret*

July 16, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

TOPSEC from Marshall to Devers for his eyes only, information copy to Eisenhower for his eyes only. After considering all factors, I agree that we should set up an Army group for ANVIL and am glad that General Wilson wants you to command it. Eisenhower agrees with this.<sup>1</sup> While the details of the formation of an Army group are up to Wilson and you, its task indicates it should probably be primarily an American headquarters, with a carefully chosen French representation. Logistical support will remain primarily an American responsibility. Eisenhower favors the Army group idea so as to keep control over all Civil Affairs matters as well as troop and



supply priorities and major tactical decisions. All of these matters will require increasing coordination with Eisenhower as the ANVIL operation progresses.<sup>2</sup>

You should do your best to keep the headquarters small. Probably most of the personnel required can be found in your theater. We will do our best to give you such top personnel as required. Time is short and you will need to press the formation of your new headquarters.

I believe that your theater is now functioning so that you will not be burdened with a great amount of administrative routine. You should, however, take any necessary additional steps to insure that you can give your time and energy to commanding the troops fighting under you, while still carrying your responsibility as the American Theater Commander.

The decision as to additional American divisions for ANVIL, beyond the 3 in the assault, must await developments. We must push into OVERLORD everything which can be accepted and used. If we can move additional divisions and Eisenhower agrees to their use in the Mediterranean, I hope that they can go directly into ANVIL through ports you have opened. Developments in Italy must determine the timing and way in which we move U. S. Forces from there to ANVIL. If the forces in Italy bog down on the Pisa-Rimini Line, we should not long delay putting 5th Army divisions into the fight in southern France. I hope that Alexander will quickly get into the Po Valley. Then the 5th Army, or portions thereof, could be moved into France, possibly some of it moving overland. This, however, must be a CCS decision.

The important thing is that we push ANVIL to the utmost as the main effort in the Mediterranean. The large forces we will still have in Italy should enable us to maintain strong and unrelenting pressure on the enemy. While satisfying OVERLORD, we will do our utmost to support Wilson in the two battles he has to fight in southern France and in Italy.

There should be no waiting for a perfection of arrangements or for the optimum in supplies and equipment. I believe we are approaching the point in Europe where carefully planned bold and rapid action in the application of our forces may reap successes which will shorten the war.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Devers had informed General Marshall on July 13 that General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson wished to establish an army group headquarters for ANVIL and that Wilson wanted Devers for the command. He stated that Allied intentions in Italy concerned forcing the Po River and Apennines lines by August 15; eventually the American Fifth Army might alter its advance to the west, clearing the Alps, and perhaps linking up with ANVIL forces, depending upon actions of the Germans. (Devers to Marshall, Radio No. B-13658, July 13, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 10, Item 52c].) On July 12 General Eisenhower had written to Marshall that he had no objection to Devers taking personal command of the ANVIL operation. "I understand that Devers has been on the battle front a lot and that he has demonstrated a happy faculty of inspiring troops," stated Eisenhower. "That is enough for me, and if you want to arrange the American affairs in the Mediterranean so that he can be



free to command ANVIL while someone else takes over the administrative burden, I would accept the decision cheerfully and willingly.” (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 2000.)

2. Concerning the Allied command arrangements for ANVIL, General Eisenhower told the chief of staff on July 15: “If the expedition is to be French-American and the French are to have an army of their own I would definitely favor the army group idea so as to keep overall civil affairs control as well as troop and supply priorities and major tactical decisions in American hands.” He continued, “The big thing is that within the Mediterranean ANVIL must be recognized as the main effort. . . . This means that the commander of ANVIL must be a strong and positive character.” The Sixth Army Group (with Devers commanding), controlling the First French Army and the Seventh U.S. Army, was organized the first of August and became operational on September 15. (*Ibid.*, pp. 2009–10.)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. WAR-66163. *Secret*

July 17, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Eisenhower from Marshall. In rotating War Department General Staff personnel I am willing to release Major General Ray E. Porter, G-3 of the War Department for Divisional Command only. He had highly successful operational experience in Tunisia.<sup>1</sup>

Also I am willing to release Major General Miller G White, at present G-1 of the War Department, for a high personnel assignment. Possibly you might desire his services as G-1 of the American Army Group as I noticed your first G-1 was Beach Commander on Utah.

In both of the foregoing cases I am merely trying to give the men an opportunity for service in an active theater. There is no implied obligation on your part whatsoever to request their services.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-66163])

1. Marshall also sent this information regarding Porter to the commanding generals of the United States forces in North Africa and the Central Pacific Area and to the Army Air Forces Headquarters Advance Command Post in Italy. (NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-66164)].) Porter had served as deputy commander of the Eastern Assault Force during the landing in Algiers in November 1942, and he served in the Tunisian campaign as deputy commander of the Second Corps and deputy chief of staff Allied Forces in charge of Eisenhower’s advanced command post.

2. Porter remained in the War Department until December 1944, when he moved to the European Theater of Operations. In mid-January 1945 he briefly commanded the newly arrived Fifteenth Army and then became commanding general of the Seventy-fifth Infantry Division in the Rhineland. White—who had been assistant chief of staff, G-1, since September 1942—arrived in Caserta, Italy, in August 1944 to become G-1 of the North African Theater of Operations.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JACOB L. DEVERS  
Radio No. WARX-66179. *Secret*

July 17, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Devers from Marshall. At my suggestion General Eisen-



hower released in series the names of Corps Commanders and then Division Commanders whose units had been identified.<sup>1</sup> It has created a very favorable publicity here at home with considerable writeups on each individual. He has now agreed to my suggestion to have General Bradley propose every few days the name of some Unit Commander, Company, Battalion or Regiment, whose organization has done especially well in some current operation. This will be released in the theater as an item of news, referring specifically to Commander, Organization, and incident. Further, Theater Public Relations will send War Department Public Relations a detailed account of the specific operation in order that more extensive writeups can be managed on this side than are acceptable over communication channels from the theater. Please institute such procedures in your theater but due to smaller size of your US Forces releases as frequent as indicated above would not be appropriate.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-66179])

1. For further information, see Marshall to Eisenhower, July 14, 1944, pp. 522-23.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY  
*Secret*

July 19, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

I should like you to talk to the retired officers today at the conclusion of Colonel Proctor's presentation.<sup>1</sup> Please give them a brief survey of your, or our, view of how the war is going in the various theaters, particularly in Italy and in OVERLORD. Tell them as much as you can in regard to OVERLORD, that is, build-up in strength, problem of breaking into the open country, storm interference, etc., having in mind weighing the hazards of disclosing too much information against the advantage of having a number of older officers in Washington sufficiently well informed regarding the general situation to help us by their influence on the civilians with whom they talk, club and hotel gossip, etc.

I have felt in talking to these officers, though of course I have never given any such idea to them, that it was very important to have them fairly well informed as to the situation so that we in the War Department would not suffer from the influence on prominent civilians in Washington of the ill-based views of retired general officers, some of great distinction in the public mind. Up to the present time I think we have profited greatly by these conferences in that these men felt they were taken into the picture, and I have heard reports from various sources that they have unconsciously exerted a considerable influence in their strong support of the wisdom of the War Department in its conduct of the war. I have followed the same procedure in dealing with a selected group of men from the press and



radio, and I believe have saved us many a headache of strong ill-advised public opinion.<sup>2</sup>

G. C. M.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, 201 Handy, Thomas T. [Section 1])

1. Lieutenant Colonel William G. Proctor (U.S.M.A., 1935) was a member of the Operations Division's Current Group, which collected and disseminated the latest information regarding operations. Beginning shortly after the North African landings (TORCH), Marshall had initiated the practice of holding occasional War Department briefings and film showings for retired army general officers in the Washington, D.C., area.

2. Marshall had held occasional off-the-record press conferences with ten to twenty selected reporters and news commentators since before the United States entered the war. (For example, see his November 15, 1941, meeting in *Papers of GCM*, 2: 676–81.) The reporters who regularly covered the War Department were displeased with the infrequency of Marshall's on-the-record press conferences, however, and in late October 1944 they began drafting a memorandum of complaint. (Frank McCarthy Memorandum for General Surles, October 24, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 000.71].)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY

*Top Secret*

July 19, 1944

[Washington, D.C.]

I explained to General de St. Didier the priorities of (1) OVERLORD, (2) ANVIL, and (3) Alexander's Army, which have to be considered in this matter; also the critical factor of transport planes.<sup>1</sup> I explained that the airborne division going in with ANVIL would have to be on a supply basis with shipping before transport planes could be released from its support, and that this was indeterminate. Further, that General Eisenhower's requirements were heavy and determining and that time again was involved here.

I stated that I favored some such operation; that I considered it would have great value both to the north and to the south, but the problem was merely how and when to finance it; that it might be that a smaller operation of this general nature could be worked in; that it might develop that Eisenhower could extend the D plus 10 period for General Wilson for return of transports, but that all of these factors could not be determined now and that the priorities went to OVERLORD and ANVIL and also Alexander's Army as being the larger questions involved.

I stated that I was doing my best to promote the operation by communicating direct with General Eisenhower and with General Wilson through General Devers; that I could not deal with Wilson except through the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

What de St. Didier would like is some written statement that he can use in his reply to de Gaulle who is pressing him.<sup>2</sup> What I didn't ask him but it is pertinent to the issue, is whether or not, and if not, why not, Bethouart had seen Wilson in Italy.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)



1. Major General Auguste Brossin de Saint-Didier, chief of the French Military Mission in the United States, had met with Marshall on the morning of July 19 to discuss Operation CAIMAN. (See the editorial note on p. 512.)

2. The Operations Division drafted and Marshall edited a memorandum for de Saint-Didier that restated the views Marshall expressed in the document printed here. (Marshall Memorandum for General A. Brossin de Saint-Didier, July 20, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 10, Item 52e].) On July 31 General Marshall notified General Eisenhower that de Saint-Didier had again asked him to support the CAIMAN plan. "While your message and Devers' indicate that the French plan is considered too ambitious and does not fit in with ANVIL and OVERLORD," said Marshall, "a modification of it might well make a very important contribution to the possible explosive effect of a successful ANVIL landing and an immediate rapid advance. I am thinking of possibility of securing a Biscay Port by default." (Marshall to Eisenhower, Radio No. WAR-73220, July 31, 1944, *ibid.*) Eisenhower replied that proposals for CAIMAN or modifications of the operation were "contingent on our furnishing air lift for a longer period than already allocated and possibly airborne troops from this theater. In the light of our planned requirements for the employment of airborne troops in northwest France and the expected maximum dividend from their use it is improbable that we will be able to furnish any assistance to DRAGOON [ANVIL renamed] in addition to that now committed." (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2054.) Operation CAIMAN was never executed.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL  
ROBERT C. RICHARDSON, JR.  
*Top Secret*

July 20, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Richardson: I am not informed as to whether or not you have been advised of the approaching visit of the President to Hawaii.<sup>1</sup> Until you are so informed by Admiral Nimitz please do not disclose my mention of the visit to him or to any other individual.

To meet the President and Admiral Leahy, General MacArthur has been directed to arrive at Honolulu on July 26th. He has been told that you would be notified in advance of his arrival—this is the notification—therefore that there would be no occasion for him to communicate in advance with you. As soon as Admiral Nimitz informs you, if he has not already done so, of the President's proposed visit, please advise him that I had notified you of the fact that General MacArthur was to arrive in Honolulu on July 26th. Incidentally, General MacArthur has not been told that he is to meet the President, though it is quite probable that he has guessed as much. General MacArthur has been advised that in communicating with you of the time of arrival of his plane he, MacArthur, should be referred to as "Mr. Catch"; therefore when some such message arrives you will know whom it refers to and make arrangements accordingly.<sup>2</sup>

I should like you to arrange for his appropriate reception and for him to stay with you.



I assume that you will know at the time of his arrival when will be the convenient hour for him to pay his respects to the President. You can arrange this through Admiral Leahy.

I assume that there will be no publicity regarding the President's visit until after his return to the mainland and therefore there should be no reference to General MacArthur's presence in Hawaii.<sup>3</sup> The restrictions regarding the President are not my affair, but I wish you to see that no reference is permitted regarding General MacArthur's presence in Hawaii except in strict accordance with the President's instructions.<sup>4</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. At this time, the president was at the San Diego, California, naval base. On the night of July 20 he made a radio address to the Democratic party's national convention in Chicago, accepting the nomination for a fourth term. He was planning to depart soon for Hawaii aboard the cruiser *Baltimore*, scheduled to reach Pearl Harbor on July 26. Discussions of Roosevelt's Hawaiian visit and his talks with MacArthur and Nimitz are in William D. Leahy, *I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1950), pp. 291–300, and D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur*, 3 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970–85), 2: 526–36.

2. On July 6 Marshall notified MacArthur: "Arrange your plans so as to arrive in Honolulu July 26th. It is of utmost importance that the fewest possible number of individuals know of your expected departure or of your destination." On July 18 Marshall informed MacArthur to "proceed as directed" and that no further orders were necessary. "Purpose general strategical discussion," cabled Marshall. "I will be in Washington but you will see Leahy, etc. In communicating notice to Army theatre commander of arrival time your plane refer to yourself as Mister Catch." (Marshall to MacArthur, Radios, July 6 and 18, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. Roosevelt's visit was a "wide open secret" for several days in Pearl Harbor prior to his arrival, but mainland newspapers did not release word of the Hawaiian trip until August 11. (*New York Times*, August 11, 1944, p. 1.)

4. In his report to Marshall on the president's visit, Richardson noted that he had been "told by General MacArthur that Admiral Leahy seemed inclined toward his (MacArthur's) thesis—that it was essential to capture Luzon for the success of the operations against Japan. Parenthetically, I might add that that is my opinion and that of my entire staff, as we fail to see how we can support logistically the great amount of troops to be employed in Formosa unless we have bases in Luzon." (Richardson to Marshall, August 1, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) For more on this debate, see Marshall to MacArthur, June 24, 1944, pp. 492–95, and Marshall Memorandum for General Embick, September 1, 1944, pp. 567–69.

TO MRS. WILLIAM M. HOGEL

July 20, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mrs. Hoge: Direct appeals to General Marshall have become so numerous that it is no longer possible for him to deal with them personally



except in very special circumstances. Therefore I am replying to your letter to him of July eighteenth.<sup>2</sup>

I rather imagine you are only partially informed as to General Hoge's movements and duties, judging from the comments in your letter. General Marshall saw General Hoge in France on June twelfth. I saw him at the same time. He was in command of a brigade of special troops, largely engineers, and was responsible for the organization of the southern beach over which our U.S. landing in France was made, and for the movement of men and supplies across this beach. There is no record here of just when he returned to England or of the fact that he had returned to England and the reason for such return. Normally this would not be known in the War Department as the dispositions of officers overseas are responsibilities of theater commanders.

As to your reference regarding General Somervell's possible influence on General Hoge's present situation, I am quite certain that he is wholly unaware of where General Hoge is and of what he is or is not doing. These are matters that are handled by the authorities in the theaters, and as I have already explained to you, General Hoge was in command of a brigade in France at the time I saw him.<sup>3</sup>

I am returning the letter from Captain Hoge which I am certain you will wish me to do.<sup>4</sup> Sincerely yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. This letter to the wife of Brigadier General Hoge, who had been an instructor under Marshall at the Infantry School between 1928 and 1931, was dictated by General Marshall but sent over Colonel Frank McCarthy's signature. Marshall's private secretary, Mona K. Nason, wrote on the bottom of the file copy: "c/s said use this as a 'sample of similar letters.'"

2. Hoge had arrived in England in November 1943 to command the Fifth Engineer Special Brigade until March 1944, when he took command of the Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group, which was utilized in the OMAHA Beach assault. (See Marshall to Roosevelt and Stimson, June 14, 1944, pp. 479-80.) The special brigade group was deactivated on OMAHA Beach on June 26, with its material used to create the OMAHA Beach Command headquarters. Mrs. Hoge had written to say that her husband had been in London since June 27 "without a job" and that his letters indicated that he was "pretty discouraged." She attributed part of her husband's problem to his being "extremely unpopular with Bill Somervell." She wished to bring her husband's "present forced inactivity" to Marshall's attention. (Mrs. Hoge to Marshall, July 18, [1944], GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

3. In mid-October, Hoge was given a combat command in the Ninth Armored Division.

4. Captain William M. Hoge, Jr. (U.S.M.A., 1941), was a battery commander in the Seventh Field Artillery Battalion of the First Infantry Division. Apparently Mrs. Hoge had enclosed a letter from her son, but there is no mention of such in her letter or in the Marshall papers.



TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. WAR-68072. *Secret*

July 20, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Eisenhower from Marshall. The case of Private 1st Class Lewis Beaton, ASN 32658756, Company G, 175th Infantry, 29 Division, has come to my personal attention. His sister wrote him a letter which was returned marked "deceased". War Department Casualty Branch had no information upon which to base reply to the sister's inquiry. Request from here to SHAEF brought reply that Beaton was killed in action on June 13th and that casualty report was forwarded on July 18th, more than a month later.

In this connection I was shown WAR 65398 from Ulio to Eisenhower and your E 38343 from Lee for Ulio. I am informed that in one week there were more than 100 cases in which casualty reports reached next of kin unofficially from ETO before the War Department was notified.<sup>1</sup>

There is not today a more vitally important feature of our public relations than the prompt and efficient handling of casualty reports. Confusion creates bitter enemies for the army and it is essential that every effort be made to eliminate such occurrences so far as is practicable. The delay in the foregoing case does not appear to be normally excusable unless it occurred in the rendering of the initial report by the man's company.

Please have your inspector look into the whole matter of handling casualty reports and let me know that measures are being taken to improve the system.

I understand of course that there will be errors in operations of the magnitude of OVERLORD but I am positive that they can be reduced in number and not give the public the impression of carelessness.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-68072])

1. In a July 20 memorandum for the secretary of the General Staff, Captain Frank E. Werneken, Jr., reported: "Since June 14 the Casualty Branch of the Adjutant General's Office has been flooded with inquiries from Congressmen and private persons regarding reports in letters and on letters that kin or acquaintances had been wounded or killed before the official casualty reports arrived from the theaters. Colonel [George F.] Herbert's alarm finally made sufficient impression last week to result in the despatch of a radiogram to General Eisenhower from the Adjutant General [WAR-65398 of July 15, 1944] simply stating the facts and calling attention to regulations prohibiting the dissemination of casualty information through any channel until the official notification to the next of kin has been made by the War Department. General Eisenhower's reply, received yesterday, reported that corrective action was in progress and that steps to expedite the official casualty reports were being taken. In Colonel Herbert's opinion the results of these measures will not be felt for about three weeks." (Werneken Memorandum for Colonel McCarthy, July 20, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)



TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JACOB L. DEVERS  
Radio No. WAR-68323. *Secret*

July 20, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Devers from Marshall. United Press release from 5th Army dated July 20 speaks of the 100th Hawaiian-American Battalion "composed partly of Americans of Japanese descent".<sup>1</sup> The word "partly" destroys the effect which we are trying to create with this publicity.<sup>2</sup> The War Department has no knowledge of this being anything except a Japanese-American Battalion with possibly a few non-Japanese officers. Please continue the buildup of this unit but make certain that your correspondents and censors do not weaken the material by such references as this one.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-68323])

1. An Associated Press dispatch from Rome of the same date noted that the One Hundredth Infantry Battalion—which was made up largely of Japanese Americans from the Hawaiian National Guard—was "composed of Hawaiian-Americans." (*New York Times*, July 21, 1944, p. 5.) Concerning the origins of the Japanese-American units, see Marshall to Emmons, October 7, 1943, pp. 146-47.

2. In late June, the Operations Division had sent Devers a message regarding the 442d Combat Team and the One Hundredth Infantry Battalion: "If military reasons do not preclude, it would be beneficial to give publicity to aggressive action of these Japanese troops. It has tremendous value, not only from the propaganda side, but helps materially in our handling of the American-of-Japanese-descent problem in this country, particularly on the west coast." (Marshall [OPD] to Devers, Radio No. WAR-57243, June 28, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-57243)].)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. WAR-69604. *Secret*

July 23, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Personal for General Eisenhower from Marshall. Congresswoman Frances P. Bolton, Republican of Ohio, is arriving in England by British air transportation on or about July 23. She travels in an unofficial and personal capacity in view of firm War Department policy concerning the travel of members of Congress to active theaters.<sup>1</sup> The purpose of Mrs. Bolton's trip is to inspect hospital facilities and make some report which will probably reach the women of America to reassure them as to the treatment of their wounded. Personally, I feel that this is a worthwhile project considered from that standpoint. Please provide her with every feasible opportunity to see as much as possible concerning the care and handling of the wounded that may be consistent with your military situation. The question of whether or not she is permitted to go to France is of course left entirely to your discretion. The State Department advises informally that, in the absence of information here, it is radioing Ambassador [John G.] Winant to ascertain expected time of arrival in England.<sup>2</sup>



NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-69604])

1. For previous discussion of the congresswoman's trip, see Marshall Memorandum for General Persons, April 28, 1944, pp. 440–41. On July 24 Marshall proposed that the War Department release the following announcement: "Mrs. Bolton traveled to England as a guest of the British Government, by British air transportation, in an informal and personal capacity. In keeping with her long interest and activity concerning hospital facilities, she intends to devote her time to the inspection of such facilities in the United Kingdom. In keeping with War Department policy covering travel of members of Congress to active theaters, she was not furnished Army transportation." (Marshall Memorandum for General Reber, July 24, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

Members of Congress increasingly evaded Roosevelt administration and War Department efforts to restrict their overseas travel by securing passports from the State Department and buying their transportation from the British. The War Department could not ask the British to cease furnishing transportation, General Staff secretary Frank McCarthy noted, "for this would put us in the position of asking the British to discriminate against our own Congressmen." (McCarthy Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, September 23, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, SGS, Memos to Chief of Staff].)

2. Bolton, who had two sons in the military, visited hospitals in Great Britain until late August, when she went to France. She returned to Washington on September 28. (*New York Times*, August 28 [p. 24], September 7 [p. 6], and September 29 [p. 24], 1944.)

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT  
CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1 [WHITE]

July 24, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

The Secretary of War tells me that General Barton of the 4th Division recommended Theodore Roosevelt for a Medal of Honor.<sup>1</sup>

If such recommendation has reached the War Department, expedite its passage through our channels. Twenty-four hours should be sufficient.

If the proposal has not reached the War Department from ETO, prepare a radio requesting information as to when it will be forwarded if at all. State that if favorable action is considered in ETO, that expediting action is considered important by the War Department.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Secretary of War Stimson had returned to Washington, D.C., from his European trip on the morning of July 24. (For information on Stimson's trip, see Marshall to Stimson, July 3, 1944, pp. 502–3.) He brought with him the Medal of Honor recommendation by Major General Raymond O. Barton; Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., had been assistant commander of the Fourth Infantry Division. (H. Merrill Pasco Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, August 20, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 201 Roosevelt, Theodore].) On Roosevelt's death, see Marshall to Mrs. Roosevelt, July 14, 1944, p. 522.

2. G-1 sent messages to Eisenhower's headquarters on July 24 and 31. Eisenhower replied that he had heard nothing concerning the recommendation. Another message was sent on August 14, and the next day Eisenhower's headquarters replied that Eisenhower and Bradley agreed that the Distinguished Service Cross (D.S.C.) was the appropriate award for Roosevelt's actions but that a Medal of Honor recommendation was being forwarded to the War Department for consideration. The department's Decorations Board considered the situation and agreed with Eisenhower that the D.S.C. was the appropriate award. (Pasco Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, August 20, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS,



201 Roosevelt, Theodore].) Marshall discussed the situation with Stimson on August 21. "Both Marshall and I thought he [Roosevelt] deserved the Medal of Honor and so ruled. This action pleased me very much." (August 21, 1944, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 48: 12].) For further discussion, see Marshall to Mrs. Roosevelt, September 28, 1944, pp. 611-12.

TO MRS. LESLEY J. MCNAIR

July 26, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mrs. McNair, General McNair's death has taken from me one of the strongest supports I have had in this war.<sup>1</sup> I am at a loss for words sufficient to describe the great contribution which he has made to the Army and to the war effort through the force of his character and wisdom in leadership. My official feelings, however, are more than equalled by the strong personal loss I feel. Our long association has given me a regard for him which amounted to a deep affection.

There is nothing I can say at this time which will be of much comfort to you but I want you to feel that in his death the Army has lost a great leader who will not be forgotten. I pray that you find the faith and courage to bear your sorrow. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. McNair, head of the Army Ground Forces and *pro tempore* commander of the fictitious First U.S. Army Group, a notional force whose role was to convince the Germans that the Allies planned to invade France in the Pas-de-Calais area, was killed on July 25 when U.S. bombers in Operation COBRA dropped their loads short of the German lines. Operation COBRA—the First Army plan to penetrate German defenses in the Cotentin by coordinated ground attack and air bombardment—is discussed in Martin Blumenson, *Breakout and Pursuit*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* (Washington: GPO, 1961), pp. 213-46. Eisenhower requested that word of McNair's death be delayed until Lieutenant General John L. De Witt could replace McNair. (Walter Bedell Smith to Marshall, Radio No. FWD-12450, July 25, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Thus Marshall's letter to Mrs. McNair was sent on July 27.

TO COLONEL OVETA CULP HOBBY

July 27, [1944]  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mrs. Hobby, Your Executive, Colonel Rice, told me this morning that she had talked to you on the phone last evening. I am glad to learn that you are getting along so well. However, I am disturbed that you follow the conventional reaction of all the higher officials in the War Department to the effect that you think a minimum of absence is sufficient for the purpose of a complete rehabilitation.<sup>1</sup>



Please do not make that mistake, which invariably has serious consequences. Ten days of the present Washington heat will break down a good constitution, let alone someone who has felt the urgent necessity for a rest. It seems to me you should get away to some cool place for a final rest and diversion. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Colonel Hobby had been hospitalized several times during 1944 at Walter Reed General Hospital in Washington for “anemia, exhaustion, and a throat ailment which prevented speaking. Eventually Army doctors ordered her for six weeks to Brooke General Hospital in San Antonio and thence to an address known only to her family, with orders that not even policy matters could be communicated to her.” (Treadwell, *Women’s Army Corps*, p. 719.) On July 27 Lieutenant Colonel Jessie P. Rice, former head of W.A.C. recruiting and deputy director of the Women’s Army Corps since March 1, 1944, notified Marshall’s office that Colonel Hobby had indicated her appreciation for his interest in her health and that her sick leave would terminate about August 14. (Cora E. Thomas to Marshall, July 27, [1944], GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. WAR-73221. *Top Secret*

July 31, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

To General Eisenhower for his eyes only from General Marshall. The Washington representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff have expressed a lack of knowledge concerning your plans and your estimate of the situation. They have suggested that periodic appreciations similar to those which have been furnished by Wilson would be helpful.<sup>1</sup>

It is true that until your 12493 arrived Saturday we had not received recently any information on your thoughts concerning the situation and your probable course of action. For instance, we received no information of Bradley’s present offensive except an unexplained reference in a radio from Mr Stimson referring to COBRA, whatever that was.<sup>2</sup>

Will you give thought to sending periodic messages concerning your intentions, plans, and your ideas on the progress of the campaign. Any information you do not wish to send to the CCS can be sent to me personally. If you feel able to send such messages it would place us in a better position to deal with inquiries and size up the situation.

Let me have your frank reaction on this matter so that, if indicated, I can make some statement to the local Combined Chiefs of Staff organization.<sup>3</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-73221])

1. Marshall had met with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on July 28. General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson was Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean theater.

2. Eisenhower’s F-12493 of July 30 stated that Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley’s Twelfth Army Group—which included the existing U.S. First Army and Lieutenant General



George S. Patton's new Third Army—would begin functioning on August 1, but there would be no public announcement in order to maintain the deception plan covering the Pas-de-Calais area. Eisenhower also mentioned that the fighting southwest of Saint-Lô was "very confused," but he had "found everyone in good heart and extremely confident." The British Second Army was undertaking an attack that he believed would "secure great results." (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2043. The exploitation of the breach in the German lines resulting from Operation COBRA is described in Blumenson, *Breakout and Pursuit*, chap. 15. For more information regarding COBRA, see note 1, Marshall to McNair, July 26, 1944, p. 534.)

3. "I am sorry that I have not kept you more fully abreast of future plans as I did in North Africa," Eisenhower replied on August 2. "My excuse is that in my anxiety to push events the matter had merely slipped my mind. Hereafter I will have the staff draw up a suitable weekly appreciation for the Combined Chiefs of Staff." Eisenhower did not believe that the Germans would succeed in blocking the Allied advances currently under way, and he hoped to achieve the rapid conquest of Brittany and the destruction of the German Army in the region. (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2048–51.)



# A Crucial Stage

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August 1 – December 31, 1944

*It is very important to keep in mind that we have reached a crucial stage of the war. The size and fury of the attacks must constantly increase. The pressure on the enemy must not be eased for a single moment until his last squad is battered into a state of helplessness.*

—Speech to the American Legion  
September 18, 1944



George C. Marshall was born in 1880 in Lexington, Virginia. He was a member of the George Washington College and the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in the United States Army during World War I and World War II. He was a member of the United States Senate and the United States Supreme Court.

## A General's Story

### George C. Marshall's Life

George C. Marshall was a general in the United States Army. He was a member of the United States Senate and the United States Supreme Court. He was a member of the United States Army during World War I and World War II. He was a member of the United States Senate and the United States Supreme Court.

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CHINA seemed to be the only dark spot in an otherwise bright summer of Allied victories. There Japanese ground forces were successfully advancing in the south in an effort to force the evacuation of the laboriously constructed and supplied U.S. air bases. Despite this, on August 3 Chinese and American arms were finally victorious in central Burma when Myitkyina fell, thereby creating the possibility of reestablishing a road from India to China. This simultaneous victory and defeat helped to keep relations between Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his chief of staff, General Joseph W. Stilwell, subject to swings between extreme tension and putative good will. Marshall's efforts to defend Stilwell's role and leadership in China, against not only Chiang but also against President Roosevelt and others in the United States, continued to require considerable effort from him.

After seven bitter weeks of fighting in Normandy, in late July Operation COBRA at last punched a hole in the German front, allowing British and American forces to break out into country better suited to their armored and motorized formations. On August 15, French and American Seventh Army troops landed in southern France, initiating the long-debated ANVIL/DRAGOON operation; they soon captured France's greatest port, Marseille, and began driving northward to effect a junction with Patton's Third Army. Allied ground operations in France, heretofore lagging behind predicted achievements, suddenly leapt ahead of preinvasion projections; Paris was liberated on August 25, thirty-one days after COBRA began. On the eastern and southern fronts, Hitler's forces were likewise in retreat. Germany's allies began to defect: Romania on August 23, Bulgaria on August 26, Finland on September 2, and Hungary on October 1.

The war appeared to be going so well that plans were under way in Britain for ending the blackout and suspending Home Guard training. Plans for the occupation of Germany were announced on August 18. Military leaders began to predict a total German collapse before winter. Marshall now found himself having to warn Americans against overconfidence and to worry about production shortfalls. With the war in Europe apparently soon to conclude, leaders in Washington and London increasingly turned their attention to likely postwar problems and to the Pacific. ★

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL PARK<sup>1</sup>  
FROM COLONEL FRANK McCARTHY  
*Secret*

August 1, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

General Marshall requests that the following message be transmitted from him to Admiral Leahy as quickly as possible:<sup>2</sup>



"MacArthur advises me that President discussed with him 'The reestablishment in effect of ABDA area under British control'.<sup>3</sup>

"Is President aware that British Chiefs of Staff stated several times on their own initiative that their proposed operations into the Netherlands East Indies from Australian bases were to be under command of General MacArthur.

"Whether or not this presents any confusion in revival of ABDA status I do not know, but it seems to me that it does.

"We did not question the British in the matter. They made the statement several times that their Navy, Air and Ground troops operating in Australia would be under MacArthur's command."<sup>4</sup>

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Colonel Richard Park, Jr. (U.S.M.A., 1933), a member of the War Department General Staff, had been a military aide to the president since 1943.

2. Admiral Leahy had accompanied President Roosevelt to Hawaii. (See Marshall to Richardson, July 20, 1944, pp. 528-29.) At the time Marshall's message was dispatched, the president's party was aboard the cruiser *Baltimore* heading for Alaska. (William D. Leahy, *I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time* [London: Victor Gollancz, 1950], p. 297.)

3. Concerning his July 26-28 conferences with President Roosevelt in Hawaii, MacArthur wrote: "The basic subjects discussed . . . were the question of the possibility of bypassing Luzon and, second, that of the reestablishment in effect of the ABDA [American-British-Dutch-Australian] area under British control. . . . My own views in opposition to both of these propositions were expressed at length." (MacArthur to Marshall, Radio No. C-15589, August 1, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-IN-496)].) Concerning MacArthur's views, see note 1, Marshall to MacArthur, June 24, 1944, pp. 494-95.

Since early 1944, Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff had been anxious for British and Commonwealth forces to undertake an offensive in the southwestern Pacific. Debate regarding the proper axis of the proposed advance began in the spring and continued into the summer, but all plans were predicated upon using Australia as a base and thrusting into parts of the Netherlands Indies and North Borneo with the ultimate intention of recapturing Malaya and joining with the United States in the drive on Japan. The problem of command in the Pacific was raised by the British during the June visit of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to London. The short-lived A.B.D.A. Command under General Sir Archibald Wavell had been responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff until its demise in late February 1942. Thereafter the Pacific had become an area of United States responsibility, and the Southwest Pacific Area and the various Pacific Ocean area commands had reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The British Chiefs of Staff desired that British and Commonwealth forces in the region be placed under British commanders subordinate to MacArthur, who would be supreme commander and thus would report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The British internal debate regarding strategic operations in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea area was still going on at the end of July, although increasingly it seemed that the main British ground effort would be in Burma while the Royal Navy would assist MacArthur. (John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, volume 5, *August 1943-September 1944*, a volume in the *History of the Second World War* [London: HMSO, 1956], pp. 481-85, 498-99.)

4. Leahy replied: "I believe the President is fully informed as to the present British attitude toward the Command in the Southwest Pacific Area." (Park Memorandum for the



Secretary of the General Staff, August 4, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio. *Secret*

August 1, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall for Eisenhower's and Smith's eyes only. Reference death of McNair: His pilot and his aide, who were present at his death, returned to Washington and not having received any instructions as to secrecy, informed at least four or five individuals of the facts. We are endeavoring to suppress the story here in line with your desire to avoid an air-ground antagonism, but this will be futile unless more care is taken on your side. It would be advisable to give correct facts at home if leak is to be anticipated.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Concerning McNair's death during Operation COBRA, see Marshall to Mrs. Lesley J. McNair, July 26, 1944, p. 534. On July 27 the War Department released the news of McNair's death and said that it was due to enemy fire. Eisenhower had told Marshall privately on July 26 that McNair "may have been hit by one of our own bombs that fell short." That this was the case, however, was not definitely established until several days later. (*New York Times*, July 27, 1944, p. 1; *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, ed. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., et al. [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970– ], 3: 2030.)

In his reply to Marshall's message, Eisenhower stated: "I consider it absolutely futile and harmful to try to conceal this bitter truth. . . . I am certain that so far as air and ground troops in this theater are concerned, the general reaction has been that while the affair is deeply regretted, it must spur us on to perfection of technique and must not operate to create a rift between the air and ground forces." The announcement regarding the circumstances surrounding the accident was made on August 2. To maintain the cover story, the War Department stated that McNair had been assigned to a troop command. (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2051; *New York Times*, August 3, 1944, pp. 1, 3.)

TO MAJOR GENERAL AUGUSTE BROSSIN  
DE SAINT-DIDIER  
*Secret*

August 2, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear General de Saint-Didier: Following our conversation of July 26th, I sent a message to General Stilwell's headquarters in order to clarify the apparent misunderstanding between that headquarters and the French representatives in Chungking.<sup>1</sup> I am enclosing for your information a paraphrase of the reply which has just been received which indicates that there is now no misunderstanding in Chungking. I must ask that the



information contained in subparagraphs 4 and 5 of the paraphrase be withheld from the Chinese.<sup>2</sup>

Concerning proposed arrangements whereby Colonel [Victor] Morizon, Chief of the Research Branch of the French Military Mission in Washington, may have active liaison with G-2 for the development of reciprocal information in the Far East, I feel that the exchange of information affecting operations there will be more direct and effective when made by representatives in the theater. General Bissell has already arranged for exchange of additional information through the Foreign Liaison Office in Washington. I approve of this arrangement and hope that it will prove adequate.

In reference to General Blaizot's proposed trip to Admiral Mountbatten's headquarters in Kandy, I appreciate your informing me of the plan. As the question of approval appears to be a British matter and as you have stated that the British have agreed in principle, it does not seem appropriate for me to intervene in the matter, though I do think it advisable that General Blaizot discuss matters with Admiral Mountbatten.<sup>3</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The head of the French Military Mission in Chungking had asked General Stilwell's chief of Intelligence (Lieutenant Colonel Joseph K. Dickey [U.S.M.A., 1931]) to discuss an exchange of information, but Dickey said that since France was not a combatant nation, it could not be done. Saint-Didier pointed out to Marshall that the French Committee of National Liberation in Algiers had declared war on Japan, that the French had a mission in Chungking, and that the French had given U.S. and Chinese authorities in Chungking information, including data on Japanese troop movements. (Statements made by General de Saint-Didier to General Marshall, through an interpreter, July 26, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Major General Clayton L. Bissell, assistant chief of staff for Intelligence, sent Stilwell's headquarters a message over Marshall's name asking for clarification of the incident, noting that the incident was "most unfortunate especially considering the truly magnificent fighting of the French Divisions in Italy," and instructing them to give the French information and to "be liberal in interpretation of these instructions" in areas where the justification for French interest seemed weak. (Marshall [Bissell] to Stilwell, Radio No. WAR-72279, July 28, 1944, *ibid.*)

2. The attached paraphrased message stated that Dickey had told the French that he was not at liberty to disclose to them information on the Japanese Order of Battle since French forces were not actively participating in the fight against Japan, but he did not realize that he had given the impression that he was criticizing French efforts in Europe. In the numbered subparagraphs that Marshall mentions, Stilwell's headquarters stated that "some of the things we do for the French to foster good will and cooperation are: 1. Furnish transportation to them to all points in China. 2. Transmit radio messages for them into Indo-China. 3. Give them radio sets. 4. Many times we have furnished them with an officer escort to the Indo-China border so that their papers would not be intercepted by the Chinese. 5. We safely transport any of their papers passed to us whenever the Chinese restrict French travel."

3. In late 1943, the French Committee of National Liberation expressed its determination to get French troops into the Pacific war (particularly into Indochina), and they were sensitive to any indication that their participation might be questioned. The committee was planning a Far East Expeditionary Corps of two brigades—to be commanded by Lieutenant General Roger Blaizot—and had already received some materiel from the British, but the United States, which would have to provide most of the materiel, had not responded to



French proposals. The French renewed their pressure on the United States concerning the Expeditionary Corps in the autumn of 1944, but they were unable to get a commitment of support prior to the Japanese surrender in 1945. See Marcel Vigneras, *Rearming the French*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* (Washington: GPO, 1957), pp. 391–99.

TO GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR  
Radio No. WAR-75226. *Secret*

August 3, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Marshall personal for MacArthur your UX 29442. We have several names to propose but suitability in a sense might well be affected by character of service in prospect for the division.<sup>1</sup> If aggressive combat leadership is the immediate requirement the name of Major General Robert L Spragins, now commanding the 71st Division, is proposed. He served in the Solomons in the 14th Corps and was recommended for advancement by General Patch. He was promoted to Major General September 1943 when in command of the 71st Light Division.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand if immediate aggressive combat service is not in prospect it might be more advisable to place a man in command who we know from his past experience has displayed an ability to handle negro troops, that is, Major General Harry H Johnson now Governor of Rome Italy. He went to the Mediterranean in command of the 2nd Cavalry Division which was in effect inactivated in order to provide the necessary service troops for a pending operation. Johnson we believe is an aggressive character with the courage of his convictions; we know he can handle negro troops. He probably would be reasonably competent in combat. Krueger knows Johnson as he served under Krueger's command as a lieutenant colonel of Cavalry, later as colonel, then a brigade commander and finally as a division commander. Which do you prefer?<sup>3</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-75226])

1. The Ninety-third Infantry Division, an African-American unit, had moved by echelon to Guadalcanal, January 11 to March 5, 1944; there its units were sent to various islands. (On the discussions concerning this deployment, see the editorial note and Marshall to Harmon, March 18, 1944, pp. 354–56.) In early June 1944, its headquarters moved to Stirling Island in the Treasury Group—about twenty miles south of Bougainville, where some of its units had fought. Rumors were spreading in the area alleging that the division had broken and run on Bougainville. (Ulysses Lee, *The Employment of Negro Troops*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1966], pp. 500, 512, 514.) The move to the Treasury Islands had brought the division under Southwest Pacific Area control, and MacArthur had requested the names of possible new commanding generals.

2. Spragins (U.S.M.A., 1913) had been chief of staff of the Fourteenth Corps on Guadalcanal from November 1942 until July 1943. Thereafter he had been sent to Camp Carson, Colorado, to command the Seventy-first Infantry Division. In August 1944, he had



been given command of the Forty-fourth Infantry Division, which was soon to sail for France. Major General Alexander M. Patch had commanded the Fourteenth Corps from January to March 1943.

3. Lieutenant General Walter Krueger was commanding general of Eighth Army, which included the Fourteenth Corps, of which the Ninety-third Division was a component. Krueger had been at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, as commanding general of the Second Division (February 1939–October 1940), then Eighth Corps Area commander (October 1940–May 1941), and finally Third Army commander (May 1941–January 1943). Johnson was a lieutenant colonel in the Texas National Guard after December 1934. He was inducted into federal service on September 16, 1940, as a lieutenant colonel and the executive officer of the 124th Cavalry Regiment. Subsequently Johnson commanded the 112th Cavalry (September–November 1941), the Second Brigade, First Cavalry Division (November 1941–January 1942), the Fifty-sixth Cavalry Brigade (January–December 1942), and the Second Cavalry Division (Horse) (Colored), December 1942–May 1944. The Second Cavalry Division—which included the famous Ninth and Tenth Regiments—was activated in February 1943. The division began arriving in North Africa in March 1944; inactivation of its component units began in February and continued until June. (On the inactivation and the reaction in the United States to the conversion of African-American units to service duties, see Lee, *Employment of Negro Troops*, chap. 17.) Johnson assumed command of the Ninety-third Division in August 1944.

TO GENERAL JOSEPH W. STILWELL  
Radio No. WAR-75342. *Top Secret*

August 3, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Sultan to General Stilwell for his eyes only from General Marshall.<sup>1</sup> A decision regarding your new assignment has not yet been taken. As matters now stand, the President in reply to the Generalissimo's message replying to the President's initial proposal regarding you, stated he considered it highly important that action be taken immediately on your assignment. As to the Generalissimo's expressed desire that the President designate some individual to act as the President's personal representative between you and the Generalissimo, presumably in a superior status to you, the President stated that he would consider the matter. The Generalissimo has not replied, therefore no action is being taken and I assume that the Generalissimo is waiting for a nomination from the President. The President is on tour.<sup>2</sup>

It would be extremely difficult for you to function if a Presidential representative were present who ostensibly would be senior to you in his advice to the Generalissimo. Nevertheless there is the possibility that in order to meet the Generalissimo's proposal on this point, which was also stated at length to Mr. Wallace,<sup>3</sup> the President may not only delay in taking further action, but probably will end by designating some such individual in some such capacity. In order to precipitate a decision and also to lay the ground for a workable arrangement for you, the thought has occurred to us here that in view of the President's past use of General Hurley in the



Middle East, and of Hurley's admiration for you and his previous contact with you and the Generalissimo in China, we might propose to the President that he designate General Hurley as his personal representative, without defining his authority and with the understanding here to Hurley that his job was to facilitate your relations with the Generalissimo. Hurley is persistently as well as suavely highly efficient. I am inclined to think that he could pour more oil on the troubled waters out there to your advantage than any other individual that might be selected. He is a hard worker. What would you think of some such arrangement as this? No move will be made here without getting your reaction. But the more I think of Hurley the more I am impressed with the idea that he is what you, at least in the past, have very much needed.<sup>4</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Major General Daniel I. Sultan was deputy commander of the China-Burma-India theater and was at theater headquarters in New Delhi, India.

2. Concerning Stilwell's status and the possibility of appointing a personal representative, see Memorandum for the President from the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, July 4, 1944, pp. 503–6, and note 2, Marshall to Stilwell, July 7, 1944, pp. 509–10.

3. Concerning Vice-President Henry A. Wallace's trip to China, see note 1, Marshall to Stilwell, July 1, 1944, p. 501.

4. Stimson had talked with Marshall on August 3 and praised his handling of the question in July of Stilwell's role in China. "I also told him that I had talked with McCloy about getting an adequate job for Pat Hurley. Apparently this put a thought into his [Marshall's] mind and late in the afternoon he read me a telegram that he was drafting to Stilwell asking whether the appointment of Pat Hurley as the President's representative in Chungking would be agreeable to him. On thinking it over, my own impression was that it was a very fortunate suggestion on Marshall's part. Hurley is loyal, intelligent and extremely energetic and all of those qualities are tremendously needed at the present moment in Chungking. He is the only man that either Marshall or I could think of to revolutionize the situation of backbiting and recrimination and stalemate that has been surrounding poor Stilwell. At the same time Hurley is extremely pleasant and diplomatic in his manner and will offset Stilwell's acidness. The only danger that I see a possibility of is that he may try to 'hustle the East' a little too hard, for he is a fast traveler and will find it hard to reconcile himself to China's ways." (August 3, 1944, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 48: 7].)

Stilwell replied with a pun on his well-known nickname of "Vinegar Joe": "I would welcome the help of your candidate. It takes oil as well as vinegar to make good French Dressing." (Stilwell to Marshall, Radio No. TST-513, August 5, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-IN-3986)].)

TO ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEAHY  
Radio. *Secret*

August 5, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Since no reply to the President's last message has been received from the Generalissimo it appears that he is waiting for the President to propose the third party discussed in the previous messages. In the meantime the situation in China continues to deteriorate. I do not think we can afford to allow



such a critical matter to drift and there follows a proposal from me for a message from the President to the Generalissimo. Incidentally, Mr. Stimson is aware of this suggestion and highly approves.

“With further reference to our discussions regarding General Stilwell and your desire for the designation of a personal representative from me:

“I feel that the critical situation in your theater requires immediate action so far as Stilwell is concerned, otherwise it will be too late.

“I have this proposal now to make: that General Patrick J. Hurley, former Secretary of War, former Minister to New Zealand, and recent Special Representative of mine in the Middle East, be designated by me as my personal representative with you. General Hurley has had broad diplomatic, political and business experience. He is a well known and respected figure in public life in this country. He served actively in the First World War and knows our Army. He should be of great service in adjusting relations between you and General Stilwell. He met you in Chungking and appears highly qualified for this most important duty.”<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. President Roosevelt accepted Marshall's draft but added a concluding paragraph: “I would like to associate with him Honorable Donald M. Nelson who for two years has been the chairman of our War Production Board and was before the war the head of Sears-Roebuck and Company. He has done a splendid piece of work and I can spare him only because the production problem is going so well. He would, I think, supplement the work of General Hurley in the non-military field and should be able to be of real assistance to you.” Chiang accepted this proposal on August 12. (Roosevelt to Chiang, August 9, 1944, and Chiang to Roosevelt, August 12, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) See Marshall's August 18 draft instructions to Hurley for the president's signature on p. 554. See also Marshall to Stilwell, August 31, 1944, pp. 563-66.

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. WAR-80880. *Confidential*

August 15, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Eisenhower from Marshall. Notify Patton that Senate Military Affairs Committee today unanimously approved nomination of General Patton for permanent rank of Major General and sent it to the Senate. Further, there are already press reports of typical statements by “some General” guessed to be Patton. Tell him from me direct not to smirch a magnificent job by any comments of any kind whatsoever. Also keep out of camera lens as much as possible.<sup>1</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-80880])



1. Eisenhower replied: "I am glad that committee has approved Patton and I cannot believe he has made any statement whatsoever in view of my orders to him. However, I will repeat these orders including your message and will use censorship also." (Eisenhower to Marshall, August 16, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Concerning Patton's previous troubles over statements to the press and the consequent delay in his promotion, see Marshall to Eisenhower, April 26, 1944, pp. 437–38.

MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR  
*Secret*

August 16, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

The attached is not of immediate, or rather pressing importance, but it may be that you care to think it over a bit while you are at St. Hubert's.<sup>1</sup>

Judge Patterson's memorandum to me is self-explanatory. However, in the last paragraph he states, "From our telephone talk [of August 7], I take it that these considerations are in accord with your views". The conversation took place over the desk phone and therefore was not a very satisfactory procedure. I am not in agreement with the manner of reduction of these sentences. I do not think the fine and reprimand will have the desired effect. I endeavored to explain to the Judge that in my opinion that if a modification were indicated, it must take some other form in order to uphold discipline, specifically in compliance with flying regulations on the part of these returning aviators. My suggestions were those of the moment during the conversation, and took the form of a suspension from duty for possibly a six months' period, maybe a year, with only a small amount of pay remaining to the officer's credit. If you will remember, something of this sort was done in the case of Billy Mitchell. He was not dismissed but was suspended from duty for two years, I think.

I had in mind that some such sentence as this suspending the hero from the consequences of dishonorable discharge, yet effectively separating him from Army service (probably to the end of the war) would have the desired effect on other officers.

As Arnold points out, the number of these offenses will probably increase steadily unless very positive action is taken to cope with the usual tendency of the returning flying veteran, particularly the much decorated type. As Arnold also points out, within the past month we have had three tragic affairs due to low flying. If we confine ourselves to severity only in the cases where the low flying hits the innocent individual, we have done little to deter other officers from similar reckless flying.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The attachments included Acting Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson's Memorandum for the Chief of Staff of August 8, 1944, regarding Army Air Forces officers recently returned from combat who had been court-martialed for various offenses in the United States—frequently for flagrant violation of flying regulations—and who had been



found guilty and sentenced to dismissal from the service. Patterson believed that dismissal was sometimes too strong a punishment, given the individuals' previous records, and he had recommended to President Roosevelt that the punishment be reduced to a reprimand and a heavy fine. (Patterson Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, August 8, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 360.331].) For previous correspondence regarding this problem, see Marshall to Roosevelt, May 17, 1944, pp. 457–58. Between August 4 and 20, Stimson was at his cottage at the Ausable Club in the Adirondack Mountains near St. Huberts, New York; he returned to the War Department on August 21.

2. Stimson replied that he agreed with Marshall that “the reckless disregard of regulations by some of our air men, causing damage and loss of life, must be stopped by sharp punishment” and that reprimands and fines were not a sufficient deterrent, but “the men should not be made felons except in very serious cases.” (Stimson Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, August 22, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 360.331 (August 9, 1944)].) Patterson responded on September 12 that he was concerned that there be uniformity of treatment in similar court-martial cases and that of the 227 similar cases in 1944 for breach of flying regulations—none involving flyers with distinguished combat records—80 percent were settled without dismissal. Ultimately the three cases that Patterson was most interested in resulted in fines. (Patterson Memorandum for the Secretary of War, September 12, 1944, and Pasco Memorandum for General Marshall, October 13, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. WAR-81638. *Secret*

August 16, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

For Eisenhower's eyes only from Marshall. Reference your S-56678 regarding Major Generalcy for Bradley in Permanent Army.<sup>1</sup> I agree with you and more too as to Bradley's ability, recent performance and future potential, but in view of many factors complicating such nominations I am not yet ready to propose his. I plan to do so but a different timing is indicated. You are free to tell Bradley of what you recommended and what I eventually intend to do.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-81638])

1. Eisenhower had asked Marshall to consider promoting Omar Bradley to major general in the Regular Army; he was a temporary lieutenant general in the wartime Army of the United States. (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2053.)

2. Bradley was promoted effective September 8, 1944. His base salary thus went from \$6,000 plus \$500 service pay to \$8,000 plus \$666.67 (i.e., the same as Marshall's and Eisenhower's).

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
*Secret*

August 16, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

You will probably be interested in the attached graph on casualties from the landing in Normandy up to August 7. The Second Division in which you have expressed a particular interest, has had about 5,000 casualties.<sup>1</sup>



We have no returns yet on the casualties of the Armored Divisions in the great drive now on, but an urgent request for ten new regimental commanders and twenty new battalion commanders to be sent immediately by air would indicate that there have been pretty heavy casualties among the senior officers.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The attachment is not in the Marshall papers. It was presumably based upon an August 7 casualty report from the European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, showing that the Second Infantry Division, which had landed in France on June 7, had suffered 4,785 battle and nonbattle casualties. This report (which lists 83,901 confirmed casualties for the theater's ground forces between January 1, 1942, and August 7, 1944) is in NA/RG 165 (OPD, 704 ETO, Case 14).

2. The COBRA breakthrough at Saint-Lô had, by the first week of August, developed beyond the breakout from the wooded and difficult offensive terrain of Normandy into a mobile battle in the relatively open spaces of Brittany and Maine. By mid-August, most of Brittany had been liberated. The German counterattack at Mortain (August 7–12) had been contained, creating the Argentan-Falaise Pocket, from which the Germans began a hurried withdrawal beginning on August 16. Meanwhile, the most advanced elements of Patton's Third Army were in Orléans and east of Chartres, approximately forty miles from Paris. Total Allied battle casualties since D-Day were approximately 180,000 by August 14. (Martin Blumenson, *Breakout and Pursuit*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1961], p. 516.) For another casualty report, see Marshall Memorandum for the President, June 6, 1944, pp. 470–71.

TO MRS. JOHN J. SINGER

August 17, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Marie, I returned yesterday from six days in the Adirondacks and found your note from Pike Run. They are sending you several of the autographed cards so that you can deal them out as necessary.<sup>1</sup>

You know, you amuse me, usually with each letter—and amusements are rare these days. I shall quote from your last letter: "It is so hard to write up here for we are always *doing something*; always golf, then driving all over the country and eternally eating." Since I write to you and at considerably greater length than you write to me, I take it that Pike Run compares very favorably with the job of global warfare.

Katherine is at Leesburg. We went down yesterday. She is much benefitted from her stay in the Adirondacks. We were there with the Joe Davies!<sup>2</sup> They gave us a detached cottage and left us pretty generally undisturbed; we devoted ourselves to sleeping late, swimming several times a day on the beach by our cottage, canoeing, etc. I had a pouch sent up from the War Department every other day with the current papers and reports and kept in touch otherwise by telephone.

With my love, Affectionately,



GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall's sister had requested "one of those cards with your autograph" for a twelve-year-old boy who "greatly admires General Marshall." (Singer to Marshall, [August 14, 1944], GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Joseph E. Davies, a lawyer who had held numerous positions in the national Democratic party and had carried out some diplomatic assignments (e.g., ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1936-38), was chairman of the President's War Relief Control Board. Between August 9 and 15, the Marshalls had stayed with Davies and his wife, Marjorie Merriweather Post, at "Camp Topridge" on Upper Saint Regis Lake in New York.

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. WAR-82265. *Top Secret*

August 17, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

For Eisenhower's eyes only from Marshall. Reference your personal and confidential report to me, CPA 90228, August 17:<sup>1</sup>

The plans outlined appeal to me as sound. I was very glad to be advised of your plans against the Pas de Calais with the airborne forces. I had felt that the vicinity of Rouen was the first point indicated but that in view of the movement of German divisions from the Pas de Calais towards the Seine and the gradual evacuation of the Falaise-Mortain pocket, the better operation would be in the Pas de Calais area and for a double purpose, to suppress the robot activity and to establish our people well in rear of the German right.

In surveying the matter here particularly the present disposition of German troops so far as known and having in mind the tremendous psychological impact it appeared that a landing in rear of Dunkirk was the ideal point and that the Dunkirk beach defenses could probably be stupefied by continuous air bombardment to permit the airborne troops to take the port from the rear without heavy losses or delays. This would give you a harbor for the buildup of a sizeable force in rear of the German right and would greatly facilitate the deployment of the divisions arriving in England. However you have your more accurate knowledge of the German dispositions and your own deployments on which to base a decision. Our G-2 people do not feel that the Paris-Orleans German assembly has the capability for a counterattack.

Another matter: Tremendous publicity was given throughout the U.S., press and radio, and particularly editorial, to the creation of an American Army Group under Bradley, your movement to France and your assumption of direct command of the American Group. The recent statement from your Headquarters that Montgomery continues in command of all



ground forces has produced a severe reaction in the New York Times and many other papers and I feel is to be deplored.<sup>2</sup> Just what lay behind this confusion of announcements I do not know but the Secretary and I and apparently all America are strongly of the opinion that the time has come for you to assume direct exercise of command of the American contingent. I think you will have to consider this matter very carefully because the reaction here is serious and will be, I am afraid, injected into the debates in Congress within the next 24 hours.<sup>3</sup>

The astonishing success of the campaign up to the present moment has evoked emphatic expressions of confidence in you and in Bradley. The late announcement I have just referred to has cast a damper on the public enthusiasm.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-82265])

1. Eisenhower had reported on the Falaise-Mortain Pocket, the likelihood that the Germans were assembling for a counterattack on the Paris-Orléans front, and the operations in Brittany. He also discussed the next airborne operation, first to help the Allies get across the Seine River, or more likely one in the Pas-de-Calais area. "Seizure of that area would of course practically eliminate the present fly bomb [V-1 rocket] activity and I am convinced it would have the most tremendous moral effect, favorable for ourselves and adverse for the enemy." (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2071–72.)

2. At the opening of Operation COBRA on July 25, Eisenhower had announced that U.S. forces in France were to be regrouped under Omar Bradley in the Twelfth Army Group. This group became active on August 1, and thereafter Field Marshal Montgomery, commander of all Allied ground forces in France, channeled his orders to the U.S. armies through its headquarters. This news was not released to the press, however, until a mid-August error by a censor permitted reporters to announce the activation of Twelfth Army Group and that Bradley and Montgomery were equal in authority. On August 16, officials at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force in London denied this latter statement, but they did not note that it would become true on September 1, when Eisenhower would assume direct command in the field. Some British newspapers deplored this as a demotion for Montgomery; some newspapers in the United States responded with criticism of the command arrangements, asserting that the British controlled the Allied forces in France and that Eisenhower was a figurehead. (Forrest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1954], pp. 261, 263–64.) Since August 1, the Bureau of Public Relations had been telling correspondents, off-the-record, that Bradley and Montgomery were on the same level, each reporting independently to Eisenhower. The bureau requested a clarification of the command situation. (Surles to Walter Bedell Smith, Radio No. WAR-82113, August 17, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-82113)].)

3. He and Bradley were "somewhat taken aback that our plans for initial, transitional and the ultimate command systems are apparently not understood by the War Department," Eisenhower replied on August 19. "It seems that so far as the press and the public are concerned a resounding victory is not sufficient; the question of 'how' is equally important." Eisenhower insisted that command arrangements had been carefully planned for many months, that he was "directly responsible for approving major operational policies and principal features of all plans of every kind," that Montgomery had been "placed in temporary charge of the coordination of ground operations" because of his "experience and seniority," and that communications, congestion, and shipping problems were the chief reasons necessitating the present command transition period. (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2074–77.)



TO MAJOR GENERAL ELLARD A. WALSH  
*Confidential*

August 17, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear General Walsh: I have your letter of August eighth protesting the distribution of a pamphlet to Army personnel in China which contains a severe reflection on the National Guard.<sup>1</sup>

The existence of the pamphlet was unknown to the War Department prior to the receipt of your letter. I quote below a paraphrase of a radio which I dispatched to General Stilwell, after your letter was received. You will hear from me after I have received his reply.<sup>2</sup>

“President of Adjutant General Association and National Guard Association has written me a strong letter of protest concerning the printing and circulation of a booklet entitled ‘Notes to bear in mind when dealing with the Chinese’. In view of the second paragraph, which in discussing politics in the Chinese Army, states: ‘This unfortunate circumstance compares with the situation in our National Guard’, the protest is fully justified and this statement is to be regretted.

“Please forward by airmail a copy of the pamphlet together with a full report concerning its production and distribution.”

Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Walsh was adjutant general of Minnesota and president of the Adjutants General Association of the United States and of the National Guard Association of the United States. He had written to say that he had received a copy of the small, thirty-four-page orientation pamphlet and that he considered its second paragraph “to be so libelous and uncalled for where the National Guard is concerned that I am constrained to bring it to your personal attention.” The pamphlet also libeled “the several States and the Governors thereof” as well as the Chinese. The offending paragraph stated: “Chinese Officers, particularly higher commanders (regimental and up) are not too good as a rule. However, there are notable exceptions. Many of the higher commanders hold their positions through political maneuvers, rather than military ability. This unfortunate circumstance compares with the situation in our National Guard.” Walsh concluded: “This matter is so outrageous, transcending as it does all canons and ethics, that I am impelled to bring it not only to your attention but to the attention of the Governors and the Adjutants General of the several States and the Members of the Congress as well. I feel strongly that not only should this pamphlet be suppressed but the perpetrators should be cashiered and dismissed from the service, for manifestly they are unfit to serve in the armed forces.” (Walsh to Marshall, August 8, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected]. A copy of this pamphlet is in NA/RG 407 [Communications Branch, 461].)

2. For further developments in this affair, see Marshall to Walsh, September 26, 1944, pp. 606–7.



DRAFT MESSAGE<sup>1</sup>

Secret

August 18, 1944

[Washington, D.C.]

The view concerning General DeWitt expressed in my earlier cable is concurred in by General Marshall and Mr. McCloy, both of whom, with high regard for his qualifications as a commander, feel that he is too rigid or unbending in his personal views to permit of a reasonable basis for negotiation. McCloy derived this opinion from his intimate relations with DeWitt in connection with the Japanese complications on the West Coast and in Hawaii; General Marshall has had his own experiences along the same line. These views do not relate to his abilities as a commander, which is quite another thing.<sup>2</sup>

It might well be possible to secure the services of General Richardson for this position in the event that he would be the head of the mission.\* Richardson speaks French fluently, is familiar with affairs in Europe, and has plenty of backbone. It may save time if meanwhile you can let us know General Eisenhower's attitude regarding the selection of Richardson.<sup>3</sup>

\* European country mission, AMG [Allied Military Government]

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. At the bottom of the file carbon copy, Mona K. Nason, Marshall's secretary, had typed: "Original to Gen. J. Hilldring, Civil Affairs, to insert in mes. he is sending. dictated by CS 8/18/44." Major General John H. Hilldring was chief of the Civil Affairs Division.

2. Eisenhower was seeking a chief for the new S.H.A.E.F. Mission to France which his headquarters was in the process of establishing. The mission was intended to provide liaison between General de Gaulle's provisional government and S.H.A.E.F., particularly concerning such matters as French rearmament, the status of the Allies in France, and assistance in dealing with civil affairs in liberated areas. (Pogue, *Supreme Command*, pp. 320–21; Vigneras, *Rearming the French*, p. 324.)

Lieutenant General John L. De Witt, commandant of the Army and Navy Staff College since September 1943, had arrived in England on August 6 and assumed the late Lieutenant General McNair's role as commanding general of the phantom First U.S. Army Group. After Pearl Harbor, as commanding general of the Western Defense Command, De Witt had presided over the internment of the Japanese Americans on the West Coast.

3. At this time Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, Jr., army commander in the Pacific Ocean Area, was embroiled in a conflict with Admiral Nimitz over the extent of navy authority. "The tendency is growing at CinCPOA's headquarters," Richardson wrote to Marshall, "to pass from unified command to single command authority, beyond the scope of current Joint Chiefs of Staff directives." Marshall thought that Richardson was "quibbling over details." (Richardson to Marshall, August 16, 1944, and Marshall note for Handy, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

Marshall's draft was not used, although on August 22 Hilldring noted in a message to Eisenhower that "there is strong feeling back here in important places that General De Witt is not ideally suited temperamentally as a negotiator for General Eisenhower with General De Gaulle and other members of the Comite." Hilldring suggested that S.H.A.E.F. take either Major General Ray E. Porter, then head of War Department G-3, or Major General John T. Lewis, commanding general of the Military District of Washington. (Hilldring to Eisenhower, Radio No. WAR-84909, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-84909)].) Eisenhower ultimately chose Lewis.



DRAFT INSTRUCTIONS<sup>1</sup>  
*Secret*

[August 18, 1944]  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear General Hurley: You are hereby designated as my personal representative with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, reporting directly to me. Your principal mission is to promote efficient and harmonious relations between the Generalissimo and General Stilwell to facilitate General Stilwell's exercise of command over the Chinese Armies placed under his direction. You will be charged with additional and specific missions.

In carrying out your missions it is desired that you maintain intimate touch with the U. S. Ambassador to China,<sup>2</sup> keeping him advised of your actions.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall wrote this for President Roosevelt. On the origins of the Hurley-Nelson mission, see Marshall to Leahy, August 5, 1944, pp. 545-46. In the covering memorandum, Marshall stated: "Lack of knowledge of the President's desires in the matter make it impracticable to present a draft directive for Mr. Nelson." The president's instructions to Nelson are printed in Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944*, 7 vols. [Washington: GPO, 1965-67], 6: 248-49.

2. Clarence E. Gauss had been in China since May 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY  
*Secret*

August 18, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Recommendations regarding records  
for Combined operations.<sup>1</sup>

I am not prepared to express an opinion in this matter and I should like you to consider it further.

It seems to me important that a number of the records of both the Combined and U.S. Chiefs of Staff should be maintained on a continued basis of secrecy. For example, the publication or the reference in historical writings to the bitter discussions which have arisen from time to time over various plans of campaign, allocations of materiel, etc., etc., and particularly the views of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and of their advisers regarding matters pertaining to the British or other Allied nations, would be highly inadvisable in the future. Otherwise we should sow definite seeds of bitterness that would be exaggerated and continued for years to come, to the great disadvantage of all possible British-American accord.

We find an example of the action I am proposing in that followed by the members of the Constitutional Convention, where, under the guidance of Washington and Franklin, complete secrecy was maintained as to what



actually took place in the discussions, the members realizing that the publication of the debates or altercations would in all probability have made impossible the adoption of the Constitution.

Another example: General Pershing has held in his office, I think, some of the most important and confidential files of the AEF which have never been released to historians.

I don't think we should become involved in any loose decisions in this matter until all the consequences are considered.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On June 20, 1944, the director of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Fred W. Shipman, had written to the president concerning the disposition of enemy records after the end of the war. He concluded: "We should also have a policy regarding the disposition of records of joint operations to which we are a party." Roosevelt sent Shipman's memorandum to Secretary of War Stimson, who sent it to G-2, which noted that the War Department had no policy regarding the disposition of enemy records and no assurance that the department would receive all records of combined operations. The Joint Logistics Committee prepared a report with proposals regarding these issues—J.C.S. 950—recommending that the important records of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and Joint Chiefs of Staff be duplicated for preservation purposes with an eye to future publication. It became immediately apparent that numerous British and American agencies as well as various theater headquarters would be affected if a comprehensive records collection was to be produced. The records concerning this issue are in NA/RG 165 (OPD, 318, Case 249).

2. For further consideration of this issue, see Marshall Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of War, September 7, 1944, pp. 576–77.

TO HARRY L. HOPKINS

August 18, [1944]  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Harry, I just learned by accident that yesterday was your birthday, so I send you my congratulations.

The conventional expression of the wish that you may have "many more" does not meet the situation. Your good health is a matter of great and professional interest to me. I missed you much and sadly during the recent period of your indisposition and I am worried now, particularly with the Washington sultry heat, that you may again be overdoing.<sup>1</sup>

You have rendered a great service to the country in the past three years, one which will never be understood and therefore unappreciated, and given reasonable health—you always have the courage—you will be of great importance to what comes next in our international and war problems.

I don't wish, I ask you to be careful, to conserve your energies and not to overdo and I am also prepared to damn you for your cigarettes, your drinks, and your late hours. Confine your excesses to gin rummy. Faithfully yours,



GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Hopkins, who was fifty-four on August 17, had been recovering from an illness and several surgical operations. See Marshall to Hopkins, February 9, 1944, pp. 275-76. He had been back in his Georgetown home since July 4.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JACOB L. DEVERS  
Radio No. WAR-82805. *Secret*

August 18, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Personal to Devers from Marshall. Please give Patch my congratulations on great success of the initial phase of his landing. It evidences planning of a high order and aggressive leadership. I look to him to press ahead with a continuation of the same vigor. You can tell him that the President today nominated him for the grade of temporary lieutenant general.<sup>1</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-82805])

1. Devers had added command of the new Sixth Army Group (which was activated on August 1 and to which Seventh Army was subordinated) to his three overlapping Mediterranean commands. Major General Alexander M. Patch had commanded the Seventh Army since March 2. His army began their French Riviera assault (centered on Saint-Tropez) on August 15 and was at this time beginning its breakout from the beachhead. (Jeffrey J. Clarke and Robert Ross Smith, *Riviera to the Rhine*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1993], pp. 30, 32, 108-33.) Patch's promotion was confirmed by the Senate on August 23; his new rank was to be effective from August 7.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
*Secret*

August 22, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Subject: Strength of the Army.<sup>1</sup>

The Army is now 5% overstrength—that is, it totals 8.05 million. There will be a further increase, though slight, this month and next. Thereafter the strength should decline and gradually approach the authorized figure of 7.7 million.

The following factors are involved:

*OVERLORD-ANVIL* – A deliberate overstrength of 150,000 was arranged for in April to meet the expected casualties in the *OVERLORD* and *ANVIL* landings. As very heavy casualties were anticipated it was necessary, in order to be certain that the momentum of battle could be maintained, that we have fully trained replacements actually in the European-North African Theaters. This could not be managed under the ordinary, routine loss expectancy percentages.



*Rotation Policy* – The establishment of a rotation policy permitting men who have been overseas for prolonged periods or who were worn down beyond the point of usefulness involved us in personnel requirements beyond those calculated on at the time the ceiling for the Army was determined. For example, because of the time consumed on departure leave at home, in staging camps, in ports of embarkation, and in transit to and from theaters, and the fact that the replacements for men being returned had to be in the theater before the latter started home, it was found that 40,000 men had to be allocated to provide a monthly rotation of 6,000 from the Southwest Pacific. This figure varied for each theater according to its distance from continental United States but once the pipelines had been filled, additional allocations were not required. It is estimated that the rotation policy (which incidentally has been on such a limited basis that it has possibly caused more disappointment and hard feeling than it has accomplished good), has required 85,000 additional men.

*Wounded, Missing, Pipeline* – In maintaining divisions at a constant full strength it was found that we must permit division commanders to drop all wounded men from their effective strength total and requisition replacements accordingly. This meant that provision had to be made within the Army's ceiling to carry an estimated 60,000 men (the figure will increase as more divisions are committed) who would normally have been charged against the Divisions. Further, the War Department, in estimating its total manpower requirements, did not take sufficiently into account the number of men who would be in hospitals, carried as missing, absorbed in transition camps and in transportation to and from the theaters. Possibly the most serious oversight in the original calculations of several years ago was the failure to realize the tremendous loss of immediately effective manpower involved in keeping the pipelines to all the theaters constantly filled. For example, the United States strength in India, Burma and China totals only 150,000, but virtually 28,000 men in the pipelines have been required to maintain this strength, or 12% over and above the authorized theater strength. Much larger totals are involved in the principal theaters.

*Lines of Communication* – There was also a failure in War Department calculations to allow sufficiently for the absorption of men in establishing unexpected travel routes and for the prolonged period that is required to clean up or evacuate communication routes and installations. Africa, for example, finally involved us in three East-West routes. The second route established which went through Nigeria was abandoned almost immediately because of the successes in North Africa. Nevertheless, it not only absorbed a great many men but has required considerable time to close out the installations. The Hudson



Bay, Greenland and Iceland ground set-ups were somewhat unexpected and likewise required their share of personnel.

*Detached Forces* – The requirements for maintaining forces to stand off isolated Japanese garrisons such as those in New Britain, Wewak, Bougainville, etc., have been heavier than anticipated—not so much divisional troops but rather the service units to maintain the divisional elements in their numerous isolated localities.

*Accuracy of Strength Reports* – The extremely complicated conditions under which the Army operates, scattered around the world and frequently dispersed in small units, have presented a perplexing problem as to the monthly accounting for personnel. General McNarney has had a group working for five months to develop the basis for a really accurate monthly check. We believe we now have it, and for the first time are reasonably sure of what the actual strength of the Army is. The new method has shown that the errors were practically all in the overseas theaters; not that the commanders were derelict at all, but that the conditions readily lent themselves to such errors and the necessity of maintaining fighting forces at full strength inevitably meant that there would always be a “report” loss of men who were not actively employed—hospital cases, rotational groups, etc. One of the complications involved was the establishment of a procedure which would accurately determine who should be charged with the man en route from the United States to an overseas theater or on the reverse journey. The tendency overseas was not to accept credit for a man until he stood in the organization to which he was assigned. The tendency on this side was to transfer credit the moment the man left his base camp. The previous rules appeared sufficient for an accurate check but were wholly inadequate. This has now been corrected.

*Economies of Personnel* – Tremendous economies in the utilization of men have been accomplished in the United States and in the Caribbean and are under way in Alaska and the Aleutians. The same is true in North Africa. It is not the case in Italy, France, England, India, China and the Pacific generally. We have an elaborate investigating system which operates directly under me and which has cleaned up pretty well conditions in the United States, though there is still more of economy that can be brought to bear in the Air service and this is now under way. I did not send a group of these investigating specialists into the Mediterranean theater until we were firmly established in Italy because it is exceedingly irritating to a commander in the field to be fighting a battle in his forward area while being investigated in the rear. We will proceed with these investigations in other theaters as rapidly as the situations permit. However, it is imperative that every fighting unit in an active theater be maintained at full strength and that depots close



in rear be filled with the necessary fully trained men to provide automatic and immediate replacement for battle casualties. It is also necessary that we have immediately available in the theater the special troops ready to take over ports, railroads, utilities, etc., the instant the fighting troops conquer them. We cannot well tell a theater commander that our calculations do not permit us to give him sufficient men to do this or that even though such a course imposes a terrific strain on our personnel requirements. Yet we do cut their personnel estimates heavily. MacArthur's service troop estimate was reduced 50% and Eisenhower's OVERLORD replacement estimate was cut 90,000 men.

*Strength Controls* - Measures have recently been introduced to reduce the intake into the Army below anticipated losses. Although there is a monthly overseas requirement for 85,000 replacements, we have reduced our Selective Service calls to 60,000 a month, starting in September. This is the minimum figure which will furnish the young, able-bodied men who will be needed to maintain the combat arms if the war in Europe continues. The overseas theaters have been informed that they must produce from their own resources the additional replacements required to keep their service elements at effective strength. Instructions have been issued to relax the present pressure recruiting for the Women's Army Corps and to seek only sufficient recruits for maintenance purposes. This will effect an eventual reduction in excess of 3,000 in our monthly intake of women. A further action which will tend to reduce our over-all strength is a stimulated discharge of men in low physical brackets. Last Spring when we were critically short of personnel, the policy was adopted of not permitting a man to be discharged who could conceivably render any useful service in the Army. The continued over-rigid adherence to this policy has resulted in a large accumulation of men who now can be released without detriment to the service.

*Raising the 7,700,000 Ceiling* - The proposition to ask for an increase of the authorized ceiling to eight million has been advocated by the War Department staff from time to time during the past six months. I have opposed this because I think, given more time, we can reduce the Army strength to the agreed ceiling of 7,700,000. There is always within any established ceiling a conflict as to the proportion which will be allotted to units and that which will be set up to cover personnel in transit, in hospitals and otherwise non-effective. We are presently well on the way to striking a proper balance between these conflicting pressures. The announcement of a new, higher ceiling at this time would be liable to undo many of the economies we have effected and would destroy the most effective means we have to prevent continued increases in strength. I consequently recommend



that we adhere to the present ceiling and take no further action at this time.<sup>2</sup>

Members of my staff keep the War Manpower Commission, the Bureau of the Budget, and Selective Service fully informed of all developments concerning Army strength. Today my Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel will see the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and go over the subject in detail. Faithfully yours,

G. C. Marshall

FDRL/F. D. Roosevelt Papers (PSF, Departmental, War)

1. The president had sent Marshall a Memorandum for the President from Harold Smith, director of the Bureau of the Budget, and had asked Marshall for "a memorandum on this matter of over strength in the Army." (Roosevelt Memorandum for General George Marshall, August 15, 1944, FDRL/F. D. Roosevelt Papers [PSF, Departmental, War].) Smith reported that as of June 30, 1944 (his memo said "1943"), the army was 280,000 in excess of the president's manpower authorization of 7,700,000 for calendar year 1944 and that strength would probably exceed 8,000,000 by the end of September. He noted that an "informal inquiry" of General Staff officers indicated that they thought that the president was aware of the over-strength. "It seems to me that we should impress upon the Army the need for your prior authorization for any change in military strength in order that there may be over-all coordination of manpower," and he suggested that Roosevelt "will wish to discuss the matter with the Chief of Staff." (Smith Memorandum for the President, August 2, 1944, *ibid.*)

Marshall rejected the Personnel Division's draft reply. He noted that discussions for the president "need to be carefully developed as to sequence, provided with side headings, and special attention given to the content of the first sentence in each paragraph and particularly of the first paragraph of the memorandum." The chief of staff then dictated a lengthy memorandum containing "some ideas of mine" which, with a few changes, became the final version as printed here. (Memorandum for General Henry, August 21, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. At this time the army was beginning to feel the effects of a manpower shortage that would continue through the winter of 1944-45; see Roland G. Ruppenthal, *Logistical Support of the Armies*, volume 2, *September 1944-May 1945*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* (Washington: GPO, 1959), chap. 11. For a discussion of army troop strength limitations, see Byron Fairchild and Jonathan Grossman, *The Army and Industrial Manpower*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* (Washington: GPO, 1959), chap. 3. While the troop basis was not formally raised, the army continued to grow in size, reaching 8,291,000 in May 1945, when the authorized ceiling was raised to reflect that number. (*Ibid.*, p. 55.)

MESSAGE TO THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION  
OF BROADCASTERS<sup>1</sup>

[August 22, 1944]  
[Washington, D.C.]

Conspicuous among the developments unknown to the first World War is the increasing dependence of the American public on radio broadcasts. The industry exerts a tremendous influence on public opinion and it must therefore bear the burden of a heavy responsibility. You gentlemen quite evidently are fully aware of this responsibility and I believe have endeavored



to give the public reasonable protection against the abuse of this powerful agency.

The radio renders an important service towards maintaining the morale of our troops overseas, both in the way of entertainment and also by presenting accurate accounts of the march of events in the various theatres of action. The soldier, particularly in isolated stations in the vast Pacific, in Africa, and in the Far East, is seriously dependent on the radio and grows more so with each passing month.

Speaking for the Army, I thank you for your cooperation and for the important services you have rendered us. At the same time I desire to emphasize the importance of keeping the radio service, at least so far as pertains to the soldiers in our overseas forces, on a very high plane. Confusion in the public mind here at home is a mere incident in the democracy of free speech. Overseas where the morale of the group, or the organization, or the Army is a matter of great national importance, the consequences can be most unfortunate.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)

1. Marshall recorded this for playback at the August 29 broadcasters' meeting in Chicago.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSEPH T. MCNARNEY<sup>1</sup>  
Radio. *Secret*

August 26, 1944  
Bishop Army Air  
Forces Base, California

For General McNarney from General Marshall. Tell Handy personally to instruct Merrill to make no observations whatever regarding Mountbatten or British. He may under approved arrangement discuss GALAHAD complications.<sup>2</sup>

Also Handy personally request Civil [*sic*] Hull (Gen)<sup>3</sup> or his principal subordinates to see that Stilwell representative Davies makes no comment that could possibly reach news agencies, regarding Mountbatten or British.<sup>4</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. McNarney was acting chief of staff. Marshall and Arnold had left on the evening of August 22 for a fishing expedition in the Sierra Nevadas in Inyo National Forest east of Yosemite National Park. They returned to Washington, D.C., on the afternoon of August 30.

2. Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill, leader of "Merrill's Marauders" (i.e., the 5307th Composite Brigade [Provisional], code-named GALAHAD), had recently returned to the United States from operations in north Burma. On August 25 he talked to the press about problems he had—particularly a temporary breakdown in unit morale—in the successful battle to take Myitkyina. (*New York Times*, August 26, 1944, p. 7.)

3. Major General John E. Hull was chief of the Operations Division's Theater Group.



4. Stilwell had been at Lord Louis Mountbatten's Southeast Asia Command headquarters in Ceylon since the end of July. John Paton Davies, Jr., a Foreign Service officer, had been attached to Stilwell's staff as political adviser since July 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL PASCO  
*Confidential*

August 31, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

There was a Captain Earl W. Pit[t]man, O-920189 who organized the Sales Commissary at Fort Myer in a very efficient manner. He was transferred to the Aleutians and I learn informally that he is on duty of a nature for which he is not very well prepared, and that therefore his special ability in connection with food supplies is not being utilized.

I dislike mixing up in such things, but make a quiet inquiry regarding the fellow and see if there would be any point to taking him out of Alaska and, for example, turning him over to the Post Exchange Service, or putting him in a position in the QMC [Quartermaster Corps] where his talents would be better utilized.

Try not to inject me into this. I am merely trying to see if we have got a square peg in a round hole.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Pittman was soon transferred to the European theater where he was assigned to procuring food for the army.

TO JESS KRUEGER<sup>1</sup>

August 31, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Krueger: Your letter of August tenth arrived during my absence from Washington. I can understand your desire to get into the field as soon as possible. However, I think that what you heard about new war correspondents being put through a probationary period is not really well founded.

It is impossible for a theater to take care of all the correspondents who wish to observe action. Therefore opportunities to visit the front are provided on the best basis of impartial treatment that the accommodations and other considerations permit. Whether or not you will be assigned immediately to an active area will somewhat depend on the representation that the Hearst newspapers already have in that area.

The public relations officers at General Eisenhower's headquarters are all experienced newspaper men and I think are naturally sympathetic in providing proper orientation and briefing for the correspondents. Their



assistance, together with your previous experience, should effectively overcome any unfamiliarity you may feel at first.

I am frank to tell you that I do not feel free to write a special note in your case, because of the large number of exactly similar requests that I have already been compelled to decline. This note is the best I can do under the circumstances. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Krueger was a reporter, columnist, and promotion editor for the Hearst newspaper chain; he worked for the *Chicago American* and knew Marshall in Chicago in the mid-1930s. He had served with the Thirty-third Division (Illinois National Guard) in World War I and again entered federal military service as an artillery officer when the division was federalized in March 1941. After being released because of his age, he returned to the Hearst organization. He had written to Marshall to say that the Hearst organization was soon going to send him to the European theater as a war correspondent. "I have been told that a new correspondent often has a hard time with staff officers before his 'reputation' is established, such as being greatly restricted from going into the field of operations." He wanted Marshall to indicate to "the responsible officer in London or France" that he, Krueger, "already had considerable experience as a war correspondent" and was trustworthy. (Krueger to Marshall, August 10, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

TO GENERAL JOSEPH W. STILWELL  
Radio No. WAR-89892. *Secret*

August 31, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

To General Stilwell for his eye only from General Marshall.<sup>1</sup> When CKS [Chiang Kai-shek] puts into effect his agreement to place you in command of all forces in China a number of changes in the India-Burma-China setup appear to be desirable. In the first place I think it highly important that you enter on this new command with as few involvements as possible. Your relations with CKS at best will be difficult in the delicate process of reconstituting the China forces. Therefore so far as practicable of arrangement, all irritating matters such as Lend-Lease, hump tonnage, et cetera, should ostensibly be divorced from your immediate direction, but managed to your satisfaction through the agency of the JCS or otherwise within the control of the War Department. From our point of view here the following setup appears to be indicated:

The IBC U.S. theater to be divided into an India-Burma theater and a China theater, you to command the latter through a deputy in a manner similar to Eisenhower's command of the British theater through General Lee as his deputy.<sup>2</sup> Wheeler to command the India-Burma theater. He also to be our designee as deputy Supreme Commander with Mountbatten, but to have a deputy in immediate representation for theater affairs. Wheeler would have included in his theater responsibilities all administrative and



training matters pertaining to the Chinese at Ramgarh and elsewhere in the theater. He would be required to manage this to meet your desires, to be implemented if that proved necessary by orders from the JCS.

The Chinese combat troops and related formations as well as U.S. and British attached units in the Ledo Road-Mogaung-Myitkyina area to be commanded by Sultan operating directly under Mountbatten rather than under the British ground commander. The co-ordination between this force and the Salween forces to be accomplished by agreement between you as commander of the China theater and Mountbatten as commander of the India-Burma theater. Orders from the CCS would probably be necessary from time to time to meet differences of view between you and Mountbatten. There is the possibility, maybe the probability, that an early junction might be effected between the Salween forces and the Ledo Road forces;<sup>3</sup> in that event a new command adjustment would be required, possibly Sultan commanding. In this last case we would have a complicated problem presented by this sizeable Chinese force including American and British detachments, operating under Mountbatten, or the reverse situation which would involve British units operating directly under your command and yet in British territory. Just how this complication might best be met I don't see at the moment.

All military forces operating in China would be under your command, ground and air, regardless of nationality, except the VLR [B-29] bombers. Reinforcement of air from the 10th Air Force or vice versa would have to be directed by the JCS.

The C.G. [Commanding General] of the New India-Burma theater would have the mission of the logistical support of Allied Forces in China as well as the support of the Chinese-American forces in Burma. In addition he would of course have the complicated problem of coordinating U.S. and British affairs in India and SEAC.

If Wheeler should go to theater command as well as deputy supreme command a PAO [Primary Action Officer] vacancy is created in SEAC which the British may attempt to fill with one of their people. Do you think a British officer in this position is now acceptable? If not who would be your suggestion to replace Wheeler? How about Covell?<sup>4</sup>

The British may press for a deputy Supreme Commander who has no other job but that. If we acceded to that demand who should be our India-Burma theater commander and who should be our deputy Supreme Commander for SEAC?

As to Lend-Lease, it is the President's desire that you be removed from this embarrassing relationship with the Generalissimo. At the same time your desires can be enforced by the Chiefs of Staff. What do you think about transferring your present Lend-Lease representative to the Staff of the Commander of the India-Burma theater?



Regarding hump tonnage: That would be under the direction of the Commander of the U.S.-India-Burma theater. The policy as to allocations would be determined as at present by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. The detailed breakdown would be determined by the expression of your desires to the Commander of the India-Burma theater. Where this proved insufficient the JCS can intervene.

As in the past most of the foregoing is an irregular arrangement, but between the Government of India, the SEAC, the hump problem, the Chinese Ledo Road force, the Generalissimo's position and personality and your dominating mission to save the military situation in China, nothing less than a most complicated setup will meet the various requirements of the situation. Please let me have as quickly as possible both your comments and your concrete recommendations.<sup>5</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Authorship of this document has been ascribed to Major General Thomas T. Handy (see Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1956], p. 419) because on the version transmitted by and stored in the records of the Pentagon's Classified Message Center file his name is given as originator. Marshall's dictation to his private secretary, Mona K. Nason, is recorded in her shorthand notebook, however. (Notebook 108/7, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Shorthand Notebooks].) It seems likely that Marshall sent his draft to the Operations Division for comment—as he normally did in such cases—changes were made in O.P.D., and the final version was sent to the Classified Message Center where they ascribed authorship to the head of O.P.D.; this was a common occurrence.

2. In January 1944, Eisenhower had simplified the administration of the United States forces under his command by consolidating the headquarters in Britain of the European Theater of Operations, United States Army (E.T.O.U.S.A.), and the headquarters of Services of Supply; the enlarged headquarters kept the E.T.O.U.S.A. name. Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee, formerly commanding general of the Services of Supply, was made deputy theater commander for supply and administration and became the de facto head of E.T.O.U.S.A.; Eisenhower was its nominal commander. (Pogue, *Supreme Command*, p. 74.)

3. It had been clear to Allied planners since Burma was lost in early 1942 that “were Myitkyina in Allied hands, the Ledo Road and its companion pipelines could link with the prewar communications net of North Burma, Myitkyina would become a great supply center, and the end of China's blockade would be at hand.” Stilwell's efforts to capture Myitkyina by driving southeast from Ledo in Assam had begun in October 1943 and ended in victory on August 3, 1944. Under prodding from President Roosevelt, Chiang Kai-shek agreed in mid-April 1944 to attack with his seventy-two-thousand-man Y-Force across the Salween River into Burma east of Myitkyina. The idea was that a junction of the Y-Force and Stilwell's forces south of the Myitkyina-Bhamo line would free the proposed route of the Ledo Road, which U.S. engineers had been building south from Ledo since late 1942 and which aimed to connect with the old Burma Road at Wanting, on the Burma-China border. Y-Force had launched its attack on May 11 but soon bogged down. (Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 121 [quote], 328–33.)

4. Brigadier General William E. R. Covell had been head of Services of Supply in the theater since November 1943. In October 1944, his responsibilities were changed to include only the India-Burma Theater; the following month, he was promoted to major general.



5. Stilwell replied that he did not like the proposed command arrangements; they would be more complicated than what existed. Moreover, he believed that if he lost control of lend-lease, he would be reporting to Chiang "with an empty satchel. . . . It does not make any difference who administers lend-lease because the Chinese will expect me to be able to influence it. The basic question is whether or not we will make good, and this will be very important in Chinese eyes. In brief, Sultan can handle everything except lend-lease and I will be blamed for that anyway. . . . I should welcome a more definite and less complicated mission. Your proposal accomplishes this as far as I am concerned, but I believe it weakens our position here generally. If you leave the present set-up in India, I can go to China with very little on my mind. If I can get definite guidance on how far we are prepared to go with lend-lease I can do better than if I shrug my shoulders and tell them someone else is responsible." (Stilwell to Marshall, Radio No. CRA-12616, September 2, 1944, quoted *ibid.*, p. 419.) For more on the command issue, see Marshall to Stilwell, September 4, 1944, pp. 570-72.

TO GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR  
Radio No. WAR-23629. *Secret*

September 1, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Personal to General MacArthur from General Marshall. I have discussed with Generals Giles, Hull and Bissell your service troop problem.<sup>1</sup> If we can secure Chinese labor at a possible rate of twenty or thirty thousand a month, to be shipped direct from Calcutta to the Southwest Pacific other than Australia, there to be organized in improvised units, would you care to have such a force? If your opinion is favorable I will take it up immediately with the Generalissimo.

We have a large capacity for carrying people from China to Calcutta. There would be the problem of securing shipping space from Calcutta but under the urgency of the situation I think we could find a solution to that. Please let me have your view as soon as possible.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The effects on future operations of the approximately 148,000 service troops the United States was short in the Pacific had been discussed at the J.C.S. meeting that afternoon. Lieutenant General Barney M. Giles had been deputy commander of the Army Air Forces since May 1944. Major General John E. Hull was acting deputy of the Operations Division. Major General Clayton L. Bissell was head of the Personnel Division.

2. On September 2, a message was sent to Stilwell saying that "an acute service troop shortage in Southwest Pacific is jeopardizing General MacArthur's future operations" and that MacArthur strongly favored the idea of obtaining fifty thousand Chinese laborers. (Marshall [OPD] to Stilwell, Radio No. WAR-24174, September 2, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-24174)].) Stilwell replied on September 8 that "such numbers could not be spared permanently from the basic industry of the country," although this was primarily because of "wastage from stupid administration" not a shortage of manpower. He recommended against making such a request of the Chinese government. (Riley Sunderland and Charles F. Romanus, eds., *Stilwell's Personal File: China-Burma-India, 1942-1944*, 5 vols. [Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1976], 5: 2448.) Marshall



told Stilwell that he had discussed the issue with the president, who was “very much interested,” and that the Operations Division had drafted a message from Roosevelt to Chiang on the subject. (Marshall [OPD] to Stilwell, September 9, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Nothing ever came of the idea, however.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL EMBICK  
*Top Secret*

September 1, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

I have been studying your Joint Strategic Survey Committee report (JCS 924/2) regarding the policy to be followed towards the final defeat of Japan.<sup>1</sup> There are certain phases of the matter pertaining to the views of your Committee regarding which I am not at all clear and I wish you would give me your views.

What consideration are you giving to the entry of Russia into the war?<sup>2</sup>

To what extent do you weigh the comparative losses resulting from a number of minor operations to gain air bases within the perimeter defined on your map, against those to be anticipated from an unexpectedly early, in other words, a surprise attack on the Japanese mainland before a larger garrison has concentrated there?<sup>3</sup>

At the present time, for example, there is a comparatively small force in Japan proper but it is to be expected that this will gradually increase as we close in for the kill. It seems to me that the attrition of men and resources resulting from a prolonged campaign involving a series of secondary operations prior to the final assault on Japan, may equal or exceed the cost of an early invasion of the Japanese homeland. Do you gentlemen think there will be less losses resulting from the gradual approach and a final assault after a heavy air beating, or by striking at a much earlier date by way of surprise before the enemy has prepared himself for the final struggle in the homeland? In this connection, have you considered the effect of a maximum carrier air strike or strikes against the Japanese homeland? By this, I mean an operation extending over ten days or two weeks.

Except on the mainland of Asia, there are few land masses affording reasonable air facilities within effective range of Japan. Formosa is the closest to Japan of these large land masses and Luzon comes next. The map in your paper shows that, for the purpose of attacking Japan, neither of these is a suitable base for other than very long range aircraft. Furthermore, the information I have is that it will be a considerable time after we have seized these areas before we will be able to bring against Japan the bombing effort they are capable of supporting.



The Japanese are concentrating strength in Formosa. Extending your illustration taken from the Saipan operation to Formosa, we may, based on estimated Japanese strength on February 15, 1945, expect to suffer approximately 90,000 casualties in taking that island. This approximates our total U.S. ground force casualties in France during the first two and a half months of the present campaign.<sup>4</sup> Consider this loss in Formosa in comparison to the prospects for an operation against the southern half of Kyushu, where at the present time only the equivalent of one Japanese division is stationed, if made following one or two fleet air strikes against the Japanese mainland.

I am not going into the question of the security of our lines of communication or the logistical complications but merely discussing this matter from the viewpoint of casualties to be anticipated and Japanese air power to facilitate the fighting of their ground troops.

Please either see me personally to talk this over or let me have an informal statement.<sup>5</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. J.C.S. 924/2 was titled "Operations Against Japan Subsequent to Formosa." At their September 1 meeting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had reviewed the Pacific strategic situation and had agreed that it was necessary to issue a directive concerning future Pacific operations. But they agreed to postpone a definite decision, as a cessation of hostilities in Europe, which seemed likely to occur in the late autumn, would permit a reevaluation of the available resources. (Minutes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, September 1, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS 334, JCS Minutes].) The service chiefs had already agreed that MacArthur's forces would assault Leyte in the geographical heart of the Philippines in December 1944, but subsequent operations were still being debated. General MacArthur was determined to liberate Luzon; Admiral King supported a Formosa-first strategy. At this time, Marshall (and most army members of J.C.S. subordinate committees) leaned toward the Formosa-first strategy, and, like King, he had expressed the opinion that Japan itself, rather than Luzon, should be considered the substitute should Formosa prove impossible. (The Luzon versus Formosa debate is summarized in Robert Ross Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1963], pp. 1-9.)

2. The army's representative on the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Lieutenant General Stanley D. Embick, replied that he regarded this as of "cardinal importance." Soviet national interests would ultimately cause its entry into the war against Japan, but not immediately after Germany's defeat. The Japanese had about 1,200,000 men in Manchuria, Korea, and North China. If the United States invaded Japan prior to a Soviet declaration of war, "a considerable part" of the 800,000-man ground component of the Kwantung army would be transferred to the home islands and concentrated against the beachhead. (Embick Memorandum for General Marshall, September 2, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. Should the United States invade prior to Soviet entry and before Japanese strength had been reduced through blockade and air attacks, Embick stated, "we will incur far more casualties than if we take a relatively few intermediate objectives" such as southern Formosa and Okinawa, "which should be taken at relatively small cost." The Joint Strategic Survey Committee had submitted their paper because they had "gained the impression that there is a growing inclination to regard the invasion of Japan as an



objective of greater immediateness than is implied in the approved over-all concept expressed in J.C.S. 924.” (Ibid.)

4. Using the ratio of United States to Japanese casualties in the Saipan operation (16,471 versus 27,000 and 3,051 killed versus 25,111) and the estimated Japanese garrison on Formosa and Amoy as of February 15, 1945 (145,000), the Operations Division concluded that the United States could expect to suffer 88,600 casualties, including about 16,000 killed, in the conquest of Formosa. Total United States ground forces casualties in the European Theater of Operations between January 1942 and August 21, 1944, were 98,138, of whom 17,133 were killed. (George A. Lincoln Memorandum for General Handy, August 31, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

5. See Marshall Memorandum for General Embick, October 3, 1944, pp. 616–17.

TO MAJOR GENERAL MORRISON C. STAYER<sup>1</sup>

September 4, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Stayer, I have had several notes from Clifton lately about his foot. In the last one he makes this statement:

“Both Gen. Stayer and his surgeon, Col. Churchill,<sup>2</sup> have looked at my one remaining bad foot. They tell me another operation and grafting job will be necessary, and I will be laid up for two and a half to three months. It looks as if this headquarters will fold up within the next few weeks. \* \* If possible when we do fold up here I would like to get back to the States and get the operation over with instead of waiting around over here for months doing nothing and then go home and have to lay around in a hospital for three more months. All I want is your OK to go ahead on this. I can handle all the details myself and you need not be involved.”<sup>3</sup>

I am much embarrassed over this business; specifically, in regard to the last sentence: “I can handle all the details myself and you need not be involved”, because it would appear to me that he would either be in the process of being sent home now if you surgeons thought it necessary or he is depending on the fact that a request from him carries something of my influence.

Clifton got out to the Mediterranean through my having an exception made in relation to limited service in his case. He was very anxious to go and has been there less than a year. Also he has been back here once, coming in as a courier at the time of Allen’s death. General Eaker did this.

I do not want anything to be done that would not be done for Tom, Dick, or Harry and as he has consulted you in this matter I am taking the liberty of writing you direct to make my position clear. There are thousands of officers who have been overseas longer than two years, some of them who have had several bouts with malaria, all anxious to get home and in some instances developing very heavy pressure in this country to get them



home. I must not be put in the position of backing favoritism in my own family.

Will you please radio me your view in this matter.<sup>4</sup> Faithfully yours,

P. S. I was sorry not to see you while I was in Italy the other day.<sup>5</sup> They told me you were in Dakar, I believe.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Stayer, a friend of Marshall since the Infantry School period, was theater surgeon, North African Theater of Operations, and deputy director of medical services, Allied Force Headquarters.

2. Colonel Edward D. Churchill was the theater's surgical consultant.

3. The omitted portion read: "Our work here in the Antiaircraft Section is already finished, and we do nothing now other than sit around." Marshall's stepson said that he hoped to get to the Pacific war after his operation. (Clifton Brown to Marshall, August 29, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

4. Marshall wrote to Clifton quoting Stayer's reply: "Provided minor and longstanding limiting disability does not increase, no reason exists for evacuation through medical channels or other preferential manner." Marshall noted that Clifton had gone to the Mediterranean at his own request and that "countless thousands" of men who had been abroad far longer were endeavoring to return home. "I would prefer that you make no mention of this to General Stayer as it is embarrassing to him as well as to me. If your foot develops badly then take it to the doctor and let him decide." (Marshall to Brown, September 11, 1944, *ibid.*)

5. Marshall had visited Italy June 17-20; see the editorial note on pp. 481-82.

TO GENERAL JOSEPH W. STILWELL  
Radio No. WAR-25105. *Secret*

September 4, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

For Stilwell's EYES ONLY from Marshall. In the new position you are expected to assume we feel that it is very important that you be relieved of the many complicated relationships connected with the India-Burma area in order that you will not only be free to devote your energy to the employment of the American and Chinese forces in China, but that you will be freed from the unfortunate effect of the inevitable squabbles that arise in the solution of the vexing problems concerned.<sup>1</sup>

As regards command on the India-Burma side here are my views. As I see it you will want Sultan in command of the U.S. forces in the India-Burma area. What is your reaction to Wedemeyer as DSAC?<sup>2</sup> I feel sure he would be acceptable to the British. MacArthur may be unwilling to release Griswold who has an important independent command. However, if available, Griswold could then be used as field commander NCAC<sup>3</sup> under Sultan who would be responsible to Mountbatten for NCAC operations. Have you any other candidate if Griswold cannot be made available?<sup>4</sup>

As regards Lend Lease there are 2 major questions to be settled. First, how is it to be administered. Second, what commitments are we to make.



The administration as regards assignment of equipment could be handled much as it is handled for the French in North Africa. China could have representation on a committee in Chungking with a U.S. chairman who could be responsible direct to the MAB [Munitions Assignments Board] in Washington. Delivery of military Lend Lease materials to China to be through U.S. supply channels regulated by MAB in accordance with priorities established by the JCS. Such a procedure would meet the request of CKS [Chiang Kai-shek] that China be placed on the same basis as other countries without loss of control on our part. In the matter of commitments the U.S. position was explained in our 11706, 31st December.<sup>5</sup> If Germany goes under and it can be delivered, all the equipment the Chinese can use effectively against the Jap will undoubtedly be provided. However the timing is at present unpredictable. What is your reaction to possible use of captured German equipment for this purpose?<sup>6</sup>

U.S. military role in China is primarily air. The ground operations must of course be carried out by the Chinese with first priority for security of the L of C [line of communications] and air bases.

Your further comment is desired. Our only purpose is to make it possible for you to function effectively as commander in China without the irritating effects for you there and for us here which are now involved in your numerous and delicate relationships. What you want in every instance so far as I can see we can get for you but the disagreeable work will be here or in Burma-India and not laid at your door.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-25105])

1. For previous communications on this subject, see Marshall to Stilwell, August 31, 1944, pp. 563–66. Regarding lend-lease, Stilwell replied: “I appreciate your motives in making the suggested changes. They will of course free me of many worries. The lend lease setup you have in mind should help materially.” (Stilwell to Marshall, Radio No. CFB-22236, September 8, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Concerning Marshall’s suggestion that Major General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Lord Louis Mountbatten’s deputy chief of staff, replace Stilwell as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, Stilwell replied: “My reaction . . . is no. I think Wedemeyer is very properly placed where he is. I believe his talents run to staff work and not command.” Stilwell listed five other candidates for the post; for the chief of staff’s reaction to these, see Marshall to Stilwell, September 9, 1944, pp. 578–79.

3. The Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC) was established on February 1, 1944, to control the Allied combat, supply, and communications personnel involved in the Ledo Road campaign. (Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell’s Command Problems*, pp. 138–39.)

4. Major General Oscar W. Griswold continued to command the Fourteenth Army Corps through the end of the war. In lieu of Griswold, Stilwell suggested the names of six major generals. In the end Marshall selected none of them, preferring to leave the choice to Daniel I. Sultan. Sultan was promoted to lieutenant general (effective September 2), and in late October he was named commander of U.S. Forces, India-Burma Theater, and commander of Chinese armies in India.

5. On December 31, 1943, the War Department’s new military supplies representative in Chungking took up his duties. His job was to relieve Stilwell’s headquarters of the duty of commenting on Chinese lend-lease requisitions and to deal directly with the War Depart-



ment. Approval of lend-lease requests, in accord with the directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, was the duty of the Munitions Assignments Board, whose chairman was Harry L. Hopkins. Stilwell's headquarters continued to control the time and place of delivery of Chinese lend-lease supplies. (Ibid., pp. 281-84.)

6. "The use of captured German equipment would complicate types of weapons and ammunition and create a new problem of spare parts, but as a stopgap it would be acceptable. Rifles are the principal critical item." (Stilwell to Marshall, Radio No. CFB-22236, September 8, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. WAR-25528. *Secret*

September 5, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

For Eisenhower's Eyes only from Marshall. In your FWD 13792 you state that your greatest difficulty is maintenance and that the closer you get to the Siegfried line the greater you will be stretched administratively and eventually a period of relative inaction will be imposed upon you.

In your FWD 13784 you state that you are disposed to release 100 transport aircraft for an operation in Greece although this will reduce your supply to ground troops by a definite amount.<sup>1</sup>

I suppose you are under heavy pressure from the PM in the matter and are embarrassed by the fact that all British transport planes have been placed under your control. About two weeks ago we scraped everything available in the U.S. to give you 100 more transport planes. There are no more that we can give you and yet the push on the west wall is of major importance in the conduct of global war at the moment. Can you not handle this matter through Cannon?<sup>2</sup> I should be much more disposed to bring pressure from here on the Mediterranean than to see you weaken your supply capabilities at such a vital moment in the great European battle.<sup>3</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-25528])

1. These two messages from Eisenhower are printed in *Papers of DDE*, 4:2113-14, 2118-19. On September 3, Marshall had asked Eisenhower for his views on a proposal from the British Chiefs of Staff to dispatch one hundred British transports to the Mediterranean for a week to support an operation in Greece. In his FWD-13784 of September 4, Eisenhower said: "Our immediate need for transport aircraft is not so intense as formerly because of cancellation of airborne operation in Pas de Calais area." (Ibid., p. 2114.)

2. Major General John K. Cannon, commanding general of the Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force and the U.S. Twelfth Air Force, was at Eisenhower's headquarters and had stated that in an emergency he could help the British in Greece without assistance from Eisenhower. (Ibid.)

3. Walter Bedell Smith, replying for Eisenhower, said that Prime Minister Churchill had not pressed the matter and that S.H.A.E.F. could afford to lend the planes since loading



and landing fields were the bottlenecks, not aircraft. (Ibid., p. 2115.) Ultimately, the British operation was not executed until mid-October, at which time the Mediterranean-based U.S. Fifty-first Troop Carrier Wing assisted. (Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day, January 1944 to May 1945*, a volume in *The Army Air Forces in World War II* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951], pp. 474–75.)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER AND  
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JACOB L. DEVERS  
Radio No. WARX-25757. *Secret*

September 5, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Eisenhower and Devers from Marshall. Chief of French Military Mission has submitted a request that 30,000 sets of clothing and individual equipment be immediately furnished for the purpose of equipping 2 French divisions, one in the northern zone and one in the southern zone. The division to be equipped in the northern zone is the 19th Infantry Division. The one in the southern zone is unknown.<sup>1</sup>

The United States Chiefs of Staff have approved as a general principle the equipping of French units which can be used at an early date against the enemy. This contemplated the entire equipment for infantry battalions, artillery battalions and engineer battalions but not that required for complete divisions. If this clothing and individual equipment is considered desirable by you at this time it may be provided from your theater stocks to be replenished from United States as a charge against the total figures currently appearing in the French rearmament program.

As this request has apparently not been brought to your attention your immediate views are requested.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-25757])

1. Discussions and negotiations regarding the rearming of liberated French manpower had been going on since 1943. French leaders were determined to rebuild their metropolitan army, and most of the material necessary would have to come from the United States. In mid-June 1944, Eisenhower had asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff for a policy decision on rearming the western European Allies. By mid-August, Eisenhower and Devers were primarily desirous of creating French security and labor units. At the end of August, “the French were still without a clear statement as to what material assistance they could expect from the Allies in equipping their liberated manpower.” As France was liberated, French authorities sought to deal with the problem of the French Forces of the Interior—two hundred thousand armed and an equal number of unarmed men at large in liberated areas—by launching a mobilization program. (Vigneras, *Rearming the French*, pp. 311, 318–20, quote on p. 318.)



TO MAJOR GENERAL AUGUSTE BROSSIN  
DE SAINT-DIDIER  
*Secret*

September 6, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear General Brossin de Saint-Didier: I have just received your letter advising of the plans of the French High Command to organize immediately two French divisions, one in the northern zone, and one in the southern zone of France, with your request that 30,000 sets of clothing and individual equipment, per T/E [Table of Equipment] 21, be furnished therefor.

I am radioing for immediate comment upon this plan by Generals Eisenhower and Devers as to their ability to furnish the necessary equipment from their present stocks. It is essential that we receive their comments, but I am prepared to act immediately upon receipt of their favorable replies.

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff have approved the general policies applicable to the entire French rearmament program. While this plan does not contemplate the equipment of complete additional divisions, it does permit a charge for the requisite number of sets of clothing and individual equipment to be made against the plan in case it should prove to be desirable.

I am indeed glad to hear that you have been able to reconstitute the 19th Division, and sincerely hope that its infantry and artillery components will be in condition to participate at an early date in operations against the Germans.<sup>1</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The French desired to absorb the various resistance groups, reconstitute their armed forces, and participate in the final battles and occupation of Germany. The British wanted to equip French manpower for posthostilities occupation duties. Eisenhower and Devers, however, replied to Marshall's September 5 message that they desired French service and internal security troops not more combat troops. Negotiations and proposals regarding these issues continued for weeks. At the end of October, influenced by stiffening German resistance, Eisenhower changed his position and proposed that two additional French infantry divisions be activated and equipped for use as replacements. At the end of November, the French submitted a new enlarged armament plan to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Saint-Didier met with Marshall on December 18 to try to expedite C.C.S. consideration of the new plan. By the end of December 1944, the German Ardennes offensive plus a shortage of infantry replacements for the U.S. Army had led to an agreement to enlarge the French Army in 1945. (These issues are examined in Vigneras, *Rearming the French*, pp. 321-36.)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. WAR-26119. *Top Secret*

September 6, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

TOPSEC to Eisenhower for his eyes only from Marshall. This morning's reports indicate that the progress of the forces from the southern Mediter-



anean has been more rapid than envisaged in Wilson's MEDCOS 181 and even faster than appears to have been anticipated in your FWD 13853. Your proposal for assuming command of ground forces advancing from the Mediterranean appears satisfactory. I think you should get Devers into group control as quickly as possible for several reasons related to French ambitions and Mediterranean complications.<sup>1</sup> I doubt if you are proposing sufficient tactical air support for Devers' command. The DRAGOON forces have already merged into the main effort of OVERLORD and are now the right wing of the great attack on Germany.<sup>2</sup> There should be no improvisation in their support so long as needed resources are available. You may consider that you have adequate air support in the Ninth Air Force to supplement the one fighter-bomber group you propose be furnished from the Mediterranean. If not, there should be no hesitation in drawing more U S fighter-bombers from the Mediterranean where there are approximately 20 U S groups and some 1200 RAF planes of this type with the tactical air forces. Arnold agrees.

Somervell is examining, as a matter of urgency, your problem concerning the diversion of divisions through Marseilles to strengthen the right wing of your effort. I think this very important if only for the purpose of giving Patch a U S Army to match the French.

As to the matter of U S forces in Italy, I agree that we cannot make a decision now. If the campaign in Italy should move with the speed of Patch's campaign or the one in northern France, we can better determine then on the future employment of the Fifth Army.

In view of the provisions of your directive, I suggest that you send the CCS at once a brief recommendation on your assumption of command of forces which have entered through southern France. Details should, of course, be left to arrangements between you, Devers and Wilson.<sup>3</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-26119])

1. The German Nineteenth Army had withdrawn north much more rapidly than the planners of the southern France invasion had expected. By September 6, the Seventh Army troops were well north of Lyons, the point at which planners had agreed that Eisenhower's headquarters should take control of those forces. The commander of the French forces, Jean de Lattre de Tassigny—dismayed at certain tactical proposals made by U.S. Sixth Corps commander Lucian Truscott and approved by army commander Alexander Patch, and determined that his forces would be united as an independent army, as agreed upon—unilaterally announced the formation of two French corps-level commands on September 3 and forced the Americans to modify their plans. (Clarke and Smith, *Riviera to the Rhine*, pp. 182–83.)

2. Elements of the Seventh Army's French First Infantry Division and the Third Army's U.S. Sixth Armored Division met on September 11, formally marking the physical union of the DRAGOON and OVERLORD forces. (Ibid., p. 223.)

3. Just after midnight on September 15, S.H.A.E.F. assumed operational control of all units coming from southern France. Simultaneously the Sixth Army Group became operational under the command of Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers. The U.S. units



continued to be designated Seventh Army, while the French corps were combined under a new headquarters and called the First French Army.

Even before the landings, Devers had been concerned that the preponderance of French forces in the southern France operations might soon lead to political problems with the French government. To offset this imbalance of forces, he had proposed that the entire U.S. Twelfth Air Force and Fifth Army be transferred from the Italian campaign to southern France. This was politically and operationally impossible, however, so Devers sought to acquire the U.S. Fourth Corps from Italy. Mediterranean commander in chief Sir Henry Maitland Wilson blocked this move in early September, however, by convincing the C.C.S. and the J.C.S. that this would ruin any chance for success of the operations then under way in Italy. (*Ibid.*, pp. 224–25.) Marshall agreed at the second Quebec Conference not to send troops from Italy to reinforce the Seventh Army; see the editorial note on p. 580.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT  
SECRETARY OF WAR  
*Confidential*

September 7, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear McCloy: With reference to the attached memorandum from you of September 7th, I am not quite clear as to your views because I sense that you did not understand what I meant in regard to secrecy concerning at least the Joint Chiefs of Staff records.<sup>1</sup>

In a sense I am not concerned about keeping from the Government the knowledge contained in certain records but I am concerned, and deeply, to see that publicity is not given to certain of these records. If by the Government you mean, as I must assume you do, the Congress, of course there could be no secrecy there.

Another phase of the matter: In the main, the formal proposals of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to the British Chiefs of Staff and vice versa, are not offensive documents, though some of them may contain references to other nations that would not be helpful to the peace and serenity of the post-war period. But among these records are the minutes of the meetings and the statements of the Planners to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and it is to these in particular that I refer in my belief that publicity would be tragically unfortunate in its results.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. For Marshall's previous concern regarding the secrecy of certain records, see Marshall Memorandum for General Handy, August 18, 1944, pp. 554–55. McCloy had written: "I am inclined to think that the directive as amended by General Handy is sound. I have some difficulties, however, with certain of the implications in his memorandum. I do not believe that either the Combined Chiefs of Staff or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the last analysis, have the right to keep a secret from their respective governments in papers which deal with combined operations." (McCloy Memorandum for General Marshall, September 7, 1944, NA/RG 107 [Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, Classified Reference—Subject File, War Department].)



2. Discussion of this issue, in the War Department and with the British, continued for months. In May 1945, versions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff paper on the subject of combined operations records—C.C.S. 701—were sent to various commanders. In September 1945, a Joint Records Depository was established under the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the collaboration of the National Archives to determine policy.

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio. *Confidential*

September 8, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Eisenhower from Marshall. At your convenience repeat your convenience, please have someone make a tour of the U.S. cemeteries and memorials and prepare a report on the condition in which they have been found. If by chance you already have this knowledge and it is favorable you might radio it in your name to General Pershing, to arrive on his birthday September 12th.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Eisenhower sent Pershing birthday greetings that included the following: "I am happy to report to you that our first hasty surveys of American battle monuments and cemeteries, constructed under your personal supervision, indicate that they are intact and undamaged. Specific reports will be sent you as they can be completed." (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2131.) In the late 1920s, Eisenhower had served under Pershing in the offices of the American Battle Monuments Commission.

TO GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR  
*Confidential*

September 8, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear MacArthur: Attached is a short article from *TIME* of August twenty-first regarding the fighting along the north coast of New Guinea. I requested *TIME* to do such an article for two reasons. I felt that the struggle then going on between our forces and the Japanese east of Aitape was a dramatic affair of bitter fighting which ended, at least temporarily, with a great American success, yet it passed almost unnoticed in the American press, the attention being focused on Saipan and Guam and on affairs in France. I also wished to have the article include a resume of the characteristics of the campaign along the entire New Guinea coast to the Vogelkop, featuring the distances covered, the complete domination of the Japanese accomplished, and the small number of casualties suffered.<sup>1</sup>

I am writing you this note because I could not get an article of the character desired due to the fact, according to the *TIME* people, that I gave them no name or units on which to hang [hang] the Aitape affair. There were two radios sent from me asking for a release on General Wing who we



understand was in command of the immediate fighting, though we later learned that a Corps commander had come up to Aitape.<sup>2</sup> However, in each case, for reasons presumably of security, no permission for the release of the name was granted. The result was a very ineffective article whereas I think one rebounding greatly to the credit of you and your command and which would have brought the American public to a far better understanding of what was being done, might have resulted.

All of which leads me to this suggestion, that your public relations people give us more names, otherwise you can expect much less of desirable credits for your command than would otherwise be the case.

I have had to take this same line with France and Italy and the results have been quite remarkable but the releases were not given over there until I pressed them in the interests of general morale of the troops themselves who follow the accounts so carefully. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. In the essay "Seven Forward Passes," *Time* noted that "the strategic conquest of New Guinea, world's second largest island, was completed last week by General Douglas MacArthur" and that "its final phase was all but bloodless," at least for the Allies. (*Time*, 44[August 21, 1944]: 29-30.)

2. Major General Leonard F. Wing, a lawyer who had served between the wars in the Vermont National Guard, took command of the Forty-third Infantry Division in August 1943. His division arrived in New Guinea in early August 1944, during the final stages of the Aitape operation. The Forty-third Division was a part of the Eleventh Corps, commanded by Major General Charles P. Hall (U.S.M.A., 1911).

TO GENERAL JOSEPH W. STILWELL  
Radio No. WAR-27944. *Top Secret*

September 9, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Eyes Only of General Stilwell from Marshall. Your comments in radio 22236 of September 8 have been helpful.<sup>1</sup> As regards Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Bonesteel is the only one on your list in my opinion who might possibly be used. Frankly I was somewhat shocked by the names you proposed. Benedict was relieved from corps command, Magruder was released from division command and Fredendall from corps command in Tunisia. Bonesteel was the only man who had not been relieved of command.<sup>2</sup> Wedemeyer incidentally displayed considerable command ability in temporary command of a regiment in Sicilian operation.<sup>3</sup>

The northern combat area command field commander under Sultan cannot be named immediately but we should be able to make a suitable officer available. Meanwhile I suppose Sultan could do as you have done and command in person.

More particulars on Lend-Lease will be worked out here.



Suitable personnel will be made available to meet requirements when China-Burma-India is split into two theaters.<sup>4</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. For previous discussion of various China-Burma-India theater issues and Stilwell's September 8 response, see Marshall to Stilwell, September 4, 1944, pp. 570–72.

2. As candidates for the post of Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, Stilwell had recommended Jay L. Benedict (former commanding general of the Ninth Corps Area and, since April 1942, president of the War Department Dependency Board), Donald C. Cubbison ([U.S.M.A., 1904], former commanding general of the First Infantry Division and, since May 1942, commander of the Field Artillery Replacement and Training Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina), Bruce Magruder (former executive officer at the Infantry School and, since March 1942, commander of the Infantry Replacement Training Center, Camp Wolters, Texas), Lloyd R. Fredendall (former commanding general of the Second Corps in Tunisia and, since June 1943, commanding general of Second Army, Memphis, Tennessee), and Charles H. Bonesteel (commanding general of the Western Defense Command at the Presidio of San Francisco, California, since July 1944). Prior to sending Stilwell's September 8 message to Handy, Marshall wrote on the document: "The only possibility is Bonesteel who is a fine type." Bonesteel was sent to S.H.A.E.F. headquarters in France in November 1944. Raymond A. Wheeler became Deputy Supreme Allied Commander effective November 12.

3. In June 1943, Marshall had sent Wedemeyer to visit the Mediterranean theater and to observe the Sicily invasion as an officer temporarily attached to Patton's Seventh Army staff. He landed with the assault troops and engaged in combat. In a letter to Marshall, Patton praised Wedemeyer. (Albert C. Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!* [New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958], pp. 222–25; Patton to Marshall, July 18, 1943, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 381 ETO, Case 74].)

4. On October 24, 1944, the U.S. Army Forces in the Chinese Theater of Operations, Burma and India, was succeeded by U.S. Forces, China Theater, and U.S. Forces, India-Burma Theater.

WHILE the Combined Chiefs of Staff had held five formal meetings in mid-June 1944 (see the editorial notes on pp. 477, 479, 480–81), there had been no full-blown conference of Anglo-American heads of government plus military chiefs since Cairo in December 1943. Churchill had been trying to arrange such a meeting with Roosevelt for months, but the president continually put him off. Finally, in mid-July, a conference was scheduled for mid-September (code name OCTAGON) at the Château Frontenac in Quebec, the site of the August 1943 QUADRANT meetings. (Documents concerning the arrangements for this conference are published in Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conference at Quebec, 1944* [Washington: GPO, 1972], pp. 3–40.)

The official histories of the U.S. Army and of British participation in the war agree that the second Quebec Conference (September 12–16) marked a turning point in the war. At this time, there were no crucial strategic decisions that needed to be made and no important materiel shortages to disrupt planning. (Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition War-*



fare, 1943–1944, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1959], pp. 508–9; Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, 5: 505–6.) Allied arms were victorious in every theater but China. Indeed, a report by the Combined Intelligence Committee on September 9 stated that organized German resistance in Europe “is unlikely to continue beyond 1 December 1944, and that it may end even sooner.” Joint Chiefs of Staff planners calculated that Japanese resistance would outlast German by only one year. As the minutes have Churchill observing at the first plenary session on September 13, “everything we had touched had turned to gold, and during the last seven weeks there had been an unbroken run of military successes.” (*Foreign Relations, Conference at Quebec, 1944*, pp. 238, 313.)

Between mid-1942 and mid-1944, General Marshall had served as “counsel for the American case. By OCTAGON his midwar role as advocate was over. At that conference he appeared rather as a principal architect of victory, advising and checking on the almost-complete structure against the blueprints he had done so much to fashion.” (Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944*, p. 518.)

The two most important military issues the British desired to discuss with the Americans at Quebec were the future of the Italian campaign and the British role in the Pacific. In regard to Italy, at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting on September 12, Marshall assured the British chiefs that he would not weaken Fifth Army in Italy by withdrawing important units to reinforce Seventh Army in southern France. Moreover, the American chiefs agreed to hold in readiness until October 15 landing craft for a possible British landing in Istria. The Americans did not comment when Field Marshal Alan Brooke mentioned that there might be “great advantages” to a drive from Trieste through the Ljubljana Gap to Vienna, a strategy the Joint Chiefs of Staff had long opposed. (*Foreign Relations, Conference at Quebec, 1944*, pp. 302–5, quote on p. 303.)

Also at the September 12 C.C.S. meeting, the conferees approved Eisenhower’s proposal to consider the Holland-Ruhr (or northern flank) as the key route of advance into Germany and encouraged him to secure the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam. They discussed the British proposal to remove the strategic bombers in northern Europe from control by Eisenhower’s headquarters. The service chiefs agreed that no decision on occupation zones in Germany could be effected until the heads of government had further considered the issue. (*Ibid.*, pp. 302, 308–11.)

Not considered at this first C.C.S. session was British determination to send major naval and strategic bomber forces to the Central Pacific. The next morning (September 13), however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered this issue and approved for submission to the British chiefs a memorandum (C.C.S. 452/27) stating that the J.C.S. “would welcome a British naval task force in the Pacific to participate in the main operations against



Japan. They consider that the initial use of such a force should be on the western flank of the advance in the Southwest Pacific. They assume that such a force would be balanced and self-supporting." The J.C.S. also accepted "the British proposal to form a British Empire task force in the Southwest Pacific" to operate under MacArthur's command. (Ibid., p. 447.) ★

TO HENRY L. STIMSON  
Radio. *Top Secret*

September 13, 1944  
Quebec, Canada

To Col. Frank McCarthy for Mr. Stimson's eyes only from General Marshall. You probably have seen the papers of the meetings as they have progressed so far. Actually there has only been one full meeting, that of yesterday, where the principal discussion related to the Fifth Army in Italy, Wilson's future campaigns, the change of control of the strategic bombing force and the acceptance of Eisenhower's general plan of campaign.<sup>1</sup>

This morning the President and Prime Minister have called a plenary meeting very suddenly, to which I go in a few minutes. Presumably the discussion will relate to the British fleet in the Pacific. Last night the Earl of Athlone had a dinner arranged at the last moment for the President and the Prime Minister and their wives for the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff. I rather think the purpose of the dinner was to permit the Prime Minister to urge his Pacific desires on us. I sat next to him and got it in detail but he talked later to both King and Arnold on the same subject.<sup>2</sup> I do not think there is any great complication in the matter and I believe that at the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting this morning we reached a satisfactory statement for the British, one that we might have taken a long time ago.<sup>3</sup>

Presumably the meetings here will break up about Saturday but there was an effort to end on Friday. Whether or not this program works out will depend on the possibility of strong differences of opinion en route, though I do not foresee such complications at the present time.

The weather has been beautiful and we are comfortably established; I am in the same rooms I had at the last meeting in Quebec.

I hope that you are not being harassed by Dumbarton complications<sup>4</sup> and will get in a good final rest-up before the strenuous fall season commences.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. For the C.C.S. telegram of September 12 to Eisenhower regarding future campaign plans and memorandums concerning future operations in the Mediterranean and the control of strategic bomber forces in Europe, see *Foreign Relations, Conference at Quebec, 1944*, pp. 428-34.



2. The Earl of Athlone (Alexander Cambridge) had been governor-general of Canada since 1940. Arnold records in his memoirs that at the dinner, in addition to the Pacific issue, the subject arose of aiding the Polish resistance uprising in Warsaw that the Germans were threatening to crush. "General Marshall and I talked this over at length." (Henry H. Arnold, *Global Mission* [New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949], pp. 524-25.)

At the pre-luncheon plenary session, Prime Minister Churchill had reiterated his determination that British naval and strategic bombing units participate in the Pacific war. President Roosevelt, the British minutes record, said "that the British fleet was no sooner offered than accepted." The Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting following lunch merely "took note" of British proposals. (Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, 5:518; *Foreign Relations, Conference at Quebec, 1944*, p. 321.)

3. On this statement (C.C.S. 452/27), see the preceding editorial note, pp. 580-81. The nature of the British role in the Pacific war was not finally decided until the C.C.S. meeting on the morning of September 14, and then not without strenuous objections from Admiral King, who did not wish to commit himself to specific future employment of the British fleet. Moreover, the American minutes record that he stated that he was not "prepared to accept a British Fleet which he could not employ or support," and "it would be entirely unacceptable for the British main fleet to be employed for political reasons in the Pacific and thus necessitate withdrawal of some of the United States Fleet." British Army chief Sir Alan Brooke recorded in his diary that King had "lost his temper entirely and was opposed by the whole of his own Committee." In the end, the British received assurances that their "balanced and self-supporting" fleet would "participate in the main operations against Japan in the Pacific." (*Foreign Relations, Conference at Quebec, 1944*, pp. 333, 335; Arthur Bryant, *Triumph in the West: A History of the War Years Based on the Diaries of Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff* [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1959], p. 205. The British minutes of this discussion are quoted in Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, 5:520-23.)

4. At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which had been held in Washington, D.C., since August 21, diplomats from the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union were drafting "Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization."

#### MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

September 13, 1944  
[Quebec, Canada]

Mr. John Franklin Carter<sup>1</sup> has forwarded to my office a secret report on what the Army is doing with respect to the adoption of a single point parachute harness release. In sending the document he has stated that he does so pursuant to instructions from the President's office.

Mr. Carter states that the Army Air Forces, being prejudiced against the single point parachute release, have not aggressively pressed the program of conversion from the old to the new type release.<sup>2</sup> General Arnold tells me that the conversion of the entire manufacture of parachute releases to the single point type is going forward as rapidly as production will permit. Deliveries have been behind estimated schedules but this results from over-optimism on the part of the Air Forces when making out the production schedules.

I am asking General Arnold to return Mr. Carter's report with his comments.



GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Carter was a Washington-based writer and newspaper columnist for the Bell Syndicate.
2. The 1945 *Airman's Almanac* noted: "In 1944 a minor controversy developed with newspaper allegations that standard U. S. parachutes were unsafe for water landings and that the U. S. military services had been negligent in not adopting the British quick-release chute. Impartial investigators reported the allegations without foundation; that the U. S. had three adaptations of the British harness; and that most airmen who had jumped with both types preferred the U. S. chute." (Francis Walton, ed., *The Airman's Almanac* [New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1945], p. 192.)

TO BERNARD M. BARUCH

September 14, 1944  
[Quebec, Canada]

Dear Baruch, Thanks for the fine and generous compliments in your letter of September sixth. They have exceptional value, coming from you.<sup>1</sup>

I am glad on two counts that you feel it unnecessary for you to continue on in Washington—for you personally and because you evidently take so favorable a view of the production situation. However, I know you will continue ready to come to our assistance should that again prove necessary.

We have about finished up the military end of the conferences here—Quebec—to my satisfaction and convenience. However, I find that as rapidly as one phase or matter is concluded in this war we must immediately move on to the solution of other difficult problems. So it goes.

Again my thanks and war[m] regards. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Baruch, a financier and philanthropist who had been chief of the Office of War Mobilization's Advisory Unit on War and Post-war Adjustment Policies, had written: "As the matter of production is now headed in the right direction, I feel that my presence will not be required in Washington for that purpose. However, I cannot wait longer to express to you the deep sense of obligation I feel to you, and also the great pride I have in your accomplishments—the raising of this vast army, its training, and the procurement of all of the congeries that will defeat our enemies. It was your mind, your courage, and your patience above all, that accomplished this. I cannot find words to express my gratification, admiration and thanks." (Baruch to Marshall, September 6, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
[Radio No. OCTAGON-31]. *Top Secret*

September 14, 1944  
[Quebec, Canada]

Top Secret for Eisenhower's eyes only from Marshall. You will receive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff the new directive for control of the strategic bombers in Europe, placing them under Arnold and Portal with Spaatz and Harris as executives.<sup>1</sup> In discussing this matter in the conference meetings Arnold and I had clearly in mind your needs and the points in



your messages FWD 13605 to me and FWD 13657 to Arnold. The British urged on us the difficulties of control by you due to your headquarters being in France and the operating headquarters in England which must of necessity exercise control over the actual strategic bombing operations. Also they made the point that the land operations of OVERLORD have now progressed so that the bombers can probably return to strategic missions for a great part of their effort. The British stated further that you should not be made responsible for the strategic efforts distant from the army fronts. Finally it was apparent that one of the critical matters was the problem of control and use of the RAF Bomber Command in view of the restricted uses for which it is suitable and for other reasons.

Arnold and I concluded that the best solution was to accept the British proposal and include adequate guarantees that you would receive on simple demand all the help you wanted and when you wanted that help. I believe that this object is accomplished by the unqualified provisions that (a) the strategic bombers give you promptly the assistance for which you ask, and (b) the strategic bomber commanders have responsibility for coordinating their operations with your tactical air forces. The directive leaves the priority of targets as you have established them. Spaatz will be told to consult you in connection with shifts of priorities. Arnold will expect you to make immediate recommendations when you consider changes in priorities should be made.<sup>2</sup>

Arnold has read this message and agrees.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur T. Harris had been commander in chief, Bomber Command, since February 1942; his U.S. Army Air Forces opposite number was Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz. On strategic bomber control, see Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, 5: 513-15.

2. In his memoirs, Eisenhower commented: "They set up an arrangement whereby the strategic bombers were to be directly subordinate to the Combined Chiefs of Staff through the medium of a combined agency set up in London. From my own viewpoint, this was a clumsy and inefficient arrangement, but so far as our operation was concerned it made no difference whatsoever. This was because a paragraph was inserted in the directive which gave the demands of the supreme commander in Europe priority over anything else that the strategic bombers might be required to do. With this safeguard and unequivocal authority, I had no objection to the new arrangement regardless of my opinion of its awkwardness. Spaatz protested bitterly at the new command system for the strategic bombers until I showed him that it made no difference to me." (Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1948], pp. 307-8.)

PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT  
TO THE GENERALISSIMO<sup>1</sup>  
*Top Secret*

September 16, 1944  
[Quebec, Canada]

After reading the last reports on the situation in China my Chiefs of



Staff and I are convinced that you are faced in the near future with the disaster I have feared.<sup>2</sup> The men of your Y forces crossing the Salween have fought with great courage and rendered invaluable assistance to the campaign in North Burma. But we feel that unless they are reinforced and supported with your every capacity you cannot expect to reap any fruits from their sacrifices, which will be valueless unless they go on to assist in opening the Burma Road. Furthermore any pause in your attack across the Salween or suggestion of withdrawal is exactly what the Jap has been striving to cause you to do by his operations in Eastern China. He knows that if you continue to attack, cooperating with Mountbatten's coming offensive,<sup>3</sup> the land line to China will be opened in early 1945 and the continued resistance of China and maintenance of your control will be assured. On the other hand, if you do not provide manpower for your divisions in North Burma and, if you fail to send reinforcements to the Salween forces and withdraw these armies, we will lose all chance of opening land communications with China and immediately jeopardize the air route over the hump. For this you must yourself be prepared to accept the consequences and assume the personal responsibility.

I have urged time and again in recent months that you take drastic action to resist the disaster which has been moving closer to China and to you. Now, when you have not yet placed General Stilwell in command of all forces in China, we are faced with the loss of a critical area in East China with possible catastrophic consequences. The Japanese capture of Kweilin will place the Kunming air terminal under the menace of constant air attack, reducing the hump tonnage and possibly severing the air route.

Even though we are rolling the enemy back in defeat all over the world this will not help the situation in China for a considerable time. The advance of our forces across the Pacific is swift. But this advance will be too late for China unless you act now and vigorously. Only drastic and immediate action on your part alone can be in time to preserve the fruits of your long years of struggle and the efforts we have been able to make to support you. Otherwise political and military considerations alike are going to be swallowed in military disaster.

The Prime Minister and I have just decided at Quebec to press vigorously the operations to open the land line to China on the assumption that you would continue an unrelenting attack from the Salween side. I am certain that the only things you can now do in an attempt to prevent the Jap from achieving his objectives in China is to reinforce your Salween armies immediately and press their offensive, while at once placing General Stilwell in unrestricted command of all your forces. The action I am asking you to take will fortify us in our decision and in the continued efforts the United States proposes to take to maintain and increase our aid to you. This we are doing when we are fighting two other great campaigns in Europe and



across the Pacific. I trust that your far-sighted vision, which has guided and inspired your people in this war, will realize the necessity for immediate action. In this message I have expressed my thoughts with complete frankness because it appears plainly evident to all of us here that all your and our efforts to save China are to be lost by further delays.<sup>4</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. This message was drafted by Marshall, with Handy's assistance, read by Marshall at both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff meetings the morning of September 16, approved without change by President Roosevelt, and sent the same day. (*Foreign Relations, Conference at Quebec, 1944*, pp. 374, 380–81, 464–66.)

2. This document was in response to Stilwell's message CFB-22638 of September 15 regarding the imminent loss of the air bases at Kweilin and Liuchow, approximately 450 miles east of the Hump terminal at Kunming. This meant that all of Chennault's air bases in south China were now lost. "The jig is up in South China. . . . The disaster south of the Yangtze is largely due to lack of proper command and the usual back-seat driving from Chungking. The trouble continues to be at the top. The Gmo [Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek] called me in today and proposed a withdrawal from Lungling to the east side of the Salween. I was appalled and protested strongly, pointing out that we are fighting for a road to China, and that with Lungling in our possession we control the entire trace of that road. It made no impression on him. He is afraid the Japs will advance to Kunming if we are beaten at Lungling, but he has failed utterly in keeping the Y-Force supplied with fillers. . . . The Gmo says that if I do not attack from Myitkyina towards Bhamo within a week, he will withdraw the Y-Force, thus throwing away the results of all our labors." (Quoted in Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, p. 435.)

3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed on September 14 at Quebec that Mountbatten was to launch operations CAPITAL (a continuation of the North Burma battle) and DRACULA (the capture of Rangoon by an airborne and amphibious assault—target date March 15, 1945). (Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, 5:517; *Foreign Relations, Conference at Quebec, 1944*, pp. 335–39.)

4. This message was received in Chungking on September 19, in the midst of Patrick Hurley's discussions with Chiang Kai-shek. Stilwell noted his reaction to the document in his diary: "Mark this day in red on the calendar of life. At long, at very long last, F.D.R. has finally spoken plain words, and plenty of them, with a firecracker in every sentence. 'Get busy or else.' A hot firecracker. I handed this bundle of paprika to the Peanut and then sank back with a sigh. The harpoon hit the little bugger right in the solar plexus, and went right through him. It was a clean hit, but beyond turning green and losing the power of speech, he did not bat an eye. He just said to me, 'I understand.' And sat in silence, jiggling one foot." (*The Stilwell Papers*, ed. Theodore H. White [New York: William Sloane Associates, 1948], p. 333.) The effect on Chiang of this note and its manner of delivery and Chiang's reply are described in Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 443–53. For further developments, see Marshall Memorandum for Admiral Leahy, October 4, 1944, pp. 618–19.

TO COLONEL RALPH D. MERSHON

September 16, 1944  
[Quebec, Canada]

Dear Mershon: I have your letter of September ninth and I appreciate



your generous comments. I am inclosing several copies of the directive you requested pertaining to planning for the post-war Army.<sup>1</sup>

As to your further generous offer of \$10,000 to the Civilian Military Education Fund, I am not prepared at the moment to advise you, but I will look into the matter very carefully, correspond with Gignilliat and write you later.<sup>2</sup>

While I was in Miami Beach incognito last January I tried to get in touch with you on Tiger Tail road, but the operators would not let me through on your phone. I left a message for you but got no response to that, so I missed seeing you, much to my regret.<sup>3</sup>

I hope you are feeling well and in good spirits, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Mershon, a longtime supporter of efforts to improve civil-military relations and reserve officer training (see *Papers of GCM*, 1:386–87), had written to praise Marshall's August 25 statement of principles which sought to make a case for a postwar military establishment composed of a small professional force supplemented by the military training of "every able-bodied young American." (Mershon to Marshall, September 9, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected]; War Department Circular No. 347, August 25, 1944.) This statement was praised by members of Congress and various newspapers. (*New York Times*, September 2 [p. 1], 3 [p. 16], and 6 [p. 18], 1944.) Actually the statement was largely the work of Marshall's friend, John McAuley Palmer. (See Marshall Memorandum for the President, June 21, 1943, pp. 23–24.) Writing to Marshall concerning the August 25 statement, Palmer said that he was pleased that the country was calling it the "Marshall Plan" and that he hoped to write some magazine articles supporting it. (Palmer to Marshall, September 14, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Mershon had asked Marshall if he thought his proposed donation was necessary or desirable. Marshall had been a member of the fund's board during the mid-1930s. Brigadier General Leigh R. Gignilliat was a longtime member of the fund's board. Marshall later said that he thought Mershon's contribution would be desirable to help the fund maintain a reserve against the later necessary "earnest efforts" to achieve universal military training. (Marshall to Mershon, September 23, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. On Marshall's Florida trip, see Marshall to Spaatz, January 18, 1944, p. 237.

TO BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN MCA. PALMER

September 18, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear John, I have just this moment glanced at your letter of September sixteenth to Cal O'Laughlin.<sup>1</sup> As I have just returned to the office and am leaving in ten minutes for Chicago, I can only make a hasty comment.<sup>2</sup>

I worked with General Pershing in the Adirondacks and throughout his preliminary hearings with War Department officers including General March, in preparation for his appearance before the Joint Committee of Congress on his return from France, early in November as I recall. My



recollection is that at the time the War Department proposal was 500,000 and General Pershing, as I dimly recall, mentioned 285,000, but his testimony will show this.<sup>3</sup> My recollection is based on General Fox Conner's disturbed comments as to the General's proposal for so small a force. He had not given us that figure at the time he went upon the Hill.

With further reference to the general matter, I called up Tompkins just as I was leaving for Quebec and told him that if in the hearing he was preparing for on that day anything was brought up in relation to post-war Army he should state that the plan was drafted by you. The release came entirely unexpectedly to me and I understand was obtained by the Associated Press from the Adjutant General's Department though we are still endeavoring to trace this down. However, the prodigal use of my name in connection with the draft prepared by you and I believe unchanged by a single word, is an embarrassment to me and in due time I will see that you get the credit.<sup>4</sup> Hastily,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Palmer had sent Marshall a copy of a letter he had written to John Callan O'Laughlin, publisher of the *Army and Navy Journal*, to correct statements made in the journal's September 9 issue ("General Marshall Opposes Large Standing Army," p. 31), which commented on War Department Circular No. 347 (see the previous document) and asserted that Pershing had "urged a Regular Army of 500,000." The proposal to maintain a standing army of this size "was not made by General Pershing and it did not meet with his approval," Palmer stated. (Palmer to O'Laughlin, September 16, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Marshall was going to the American Legion's annual convention.

3. Marshall wrote to correct portions of this paragraph, which was typed after he left the office. The revised first sentence read: "I worked with General Pershing in the Adirondacks preparing for his hearings before the Joint Committee of Congress, and was with him during the preliminary informal hearings he held with War Department officials, including General March, after his return to town and before his appearance on the Hill." (Marshall to Palmer, September 19, 1944, *ibid.*) Concerning Marshall's and Fox Conner's assistance to Pershing with the testimony on what became the National Defense Act of 1920, see the editorial note in *Papers of GCM*, 1: 193-94.

4. Palmer had written on September 14 that he was "greatly touched" when Major General (as of August 7) William F. Tompkins, director of the Special Planning Division, "told me that you asked him to have credit given me for my part" in preparing the statement on postwar military planning in Circular No. 347. "I told him that this is not the time for such credit. The country has hailed the pronouncement as the 'Marshall Plan'. With your great prestige back of it, I hope to live to see the accomplishment of what I have worked for all my life. That is all I ask." (Palmer to Marshall, September 14, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL GEORGE S. PATTON, JR.      September 18, 1944  
Radio.    *Confidential*      Washington, D.C.

Personal for Patton from Marshall.    When you have nothing else to do



except invade Germany have one of your people stop by Gondrecourt between Neufchateau and Barleduc and look up Madame Jouatte, formerly Rue Sourcy, my landlady in France during depressing days. Her husband was Justice of the Peace. Have them find out what her necessities are if any without committing me. But give her a very personal message from me and a contact with your headquarters.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Patton replied that the day after receiving Marshall's message he visited Gondrecourt "reinforced by three pounds of coffee and five pounds of sugar." He discovered that Mme Jouatte had moved to Montauban in the south of France. He obtained her new address, sent her a letter, and promised Marshall that he would send a staff officer to visit her "when the situation in southern France clears up." (Patton to Marshall, September 27, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) See Marshall to Patton, October 23, 1944, pp. 635–36.

#### SPEECH TO THE AMERICAN LEGION<sup>1</sup>

September 18, 1944  
Chicago, Illinois

Last September in my talk to the representatives of the American Legion I explained that we had finally reached the point where we could shift our principal efforts from the organization of air and ground Armies to the problem of deploying these vast forces overseas and launching a series of great offensive operations.<sup>2</sup> Since then you have followed the prolonged air assault on the continent of Europe, the campaign north through Italy, the landings in France and the forward surge of the Allied Armies to the German frontier, coordinated with the massive attacks of the Soviet forces, followed by the collapse of Finland, Rumania and Bulgaria.

You must also have followed our increasingly rapid advances through the Japanese fortified bases in the Central and South and Southwest Pacific areas, until today the enemy admits to his people the precarious nature of the situation. In the Far East we have only had a small, but an extremely potent force of U.S. ground troops. However, our campaign in the air in that area has been on a constantly increasing scale, especially notable for the tremendous logistical task involved in the movement of supplies over the Himalayas into China. General Stilwell's development and leadership of a highly effective Chinese striking force were most important factors in the North Burma campaign of the past spring and summer.

During recent months our great advantage over the Germans lay in the quality and training of our men, the abundance and excellence of their equipment and the skill displayed by higher commanders and staffs in the handling of divisions, corps and armies. The fact that the now historic



breakthrough to the south and east and finally to the northeast of Patton's Third Army was carried out by three Army corps which had never before been engaged in battle is evidence of the quality of our leaders and the soundness of the training given the troops. The large scale maneuvers in Louisiana and in the desert region of southeastern California, as well as in other parts of the country, declared an amazing dividend in the dramatic liberation of France.

Few people, I am sure, comprehend what is involved in the deployment of our 8-million-man Army. The missions of the Air Forces called for approximately 1,000,000 men and 1,000 squadrons overseas. The deployment of this vast force was completed in May. In addition there are newly formed squadrons for the operation of the already famous B-29 bombers which are carrying the war to the Japanese homeland.

Of the ground Army more than 60 divisions have reached the front, thoroughly trained, equipped, and most of them already battle-tested. But an even greater strength in Corps and Army combat troops as well as service units totaling more than 2,155,000 officers and men, accompanied these divisions abroad. The movement of additional troops overseas goes forward in a constantly increased flood of both men and materiel. Eight divisions sail this month.

The deployment of our air and ground forces literally around the globe involves a monumental undertaking in transportation and supply. The Air Transport Command alone has more than 110,000 men engaged in the operation of 135,000 miles of air supply systems. The Army Transportation Corps employs 1600 ships in moving men and supplies overseas. Then there is a continuing and constantly increasing burden for the maintenance of food, clothing, and medical services and for the replacement of battle casualties and the huge materiel wastage inevitable in campaign. It is no simple matter to supply millions of American soldiers on the fighting fronts and keep them fully equipped and provided with every necessity; nevertheless we are endeavoring to expedite the movement overseas of the remaining combat troops in continental United States.

In planning campaigns we must provide for a myriad of requirements of almost every conceivable description. These greatly influence the timing, the extent, and the character and direction of operations. In a global war of the present stupendous proportions the logistical requirements have ramifications so diverse and so numerous that one has the feeling of picking his way through a veritable maze of obstacles and uncertainties. So far we have been reasonably successful and I believe that we have imposed far greater difficulties upon our enemies. Witness approximately 150,000 Japanese troops cut off from their supplies and withering on the vine, with the same fate now in store for even larger garrisons.

It is very important to keep in mind that we have reached a crucial stage



of the war. The size and fury of the attacks must constantly increase. The pressure on the enemy must not be eased for a single moment until his last squad is battered into a state of helplessness.

Today and every day thousands of airplanes flash on missions in advance of our armies. Before dawn tomorrow and every morning until the victory has been won, hundreds of thousands of American soldiers will move forward from comfortless foxholes and bivouacs, sweating in the tropics, chilled or freezing in the damp European fall, to press an unrelenting assault against the enemy. They will go about this duty with a courageous determination to get on with the job, without hesitation over the question of personal safety. It is our duty to make sure that the flow of reinforcements and of munitions keeps pace with their advances.

A conspicuous factor in the sustained successes of the past six weeks has been the steady flow of well-trained men to replace combat losses. Our divisions are kept at full strength from day to day. The losses suffered by battle casualties are usually made good within twenty-four hours and the missing materiel in trucks, tanks and guns is being replaced at the same rate. On the German side of the line, divisions dwindling in strength and gradually losing the bulk of their heavy equipment, always find themselves beset by full American teams whose strength never seems to vary and whose numbers are constantly increasing. These German deficiencies will bring about their downfall if we on this side of the Atlantic see to it that our forces are maintained day in and day out at full strength, and supplied with every possible need. We have a stern duty here at home if our attacks are to surge forward in constantly increasing strength and power during what we all hope are the last hours of this great European conflict. We must let nothing divert our efforts from the great purpose of all these sacrifices of life and expenditures of money. We must remember that the individual soldier will place just as much importance on his life in the final week of the victorious advance as he does today. If the protective covering fire of bombs and artillery is curtailed in any degree because of shortages in supply, there will be a bitter resentment. Recently we were forced to inform the commanders in the field that we could not give them the quantities of bombs and shells they demand, but I am now able to report that production rates have finally risen somewhat and we hope that the rationing of such necessities will soon be unnecessary.<sup>3</sup>

Recently it has appeared that as our forces have gained positions from which to strike at the heart of Germany and just as they are breaking into the last Japanese outposts, the feeling that an early victory is assured causes certain of our people to relax in the war effort and turn to other considerations. I have complete confidence in the success of our military efforts provided we can have steady backing on this side of the oceans until the cessation of hostilities is actually announced.



I am talking very frankly to you veterans of the Legion because your understanding influence has been of great assistance to me in the past and the War Department is depending on your help to weather the gales of the final fighting in Germany and the rapid transfer of our military power to the Pacific. There is also a very special reason why the young Armies of this war have a right to your strong support in what is yet to come. They have just delivered from the enemy the cemeteries of your heroic brothers in arms who fell in your war; they have given you back your great war memorials and they have redeemed your battlefields—all of them from Belgium and Le Cateau, through Cantigny, Chateau Thierry, Soisson[s] and the Marne Salient, across the plains north of Reims to the awful fields of the Meuse-Argonne and St. Mihiel. And mark this, they did it for you in the best American manner, at top speed and within a few days' time. Not satisfied with that, they are about to introduce the American art of war into Germany so that any doubts the enemy may have had regarding our military competence or willingness to fight will be dispelled in an unmistakable and final manner.

War is the most terrible tragedy of the human race and it should not be prolonged an hour longer than is absolutely necessary. Yet it may have been a good thing for the future that our military forces found the opportunity to develop and display their power on the battlefield, so that the would-be tyrants of the future may realize the power of our great democracy and the willingness of its people to defend the great principles of freedom against the wanton destruction at the hands of European dictators or treacherous barbarians of the Pacific.

Finally, I would ask that you keep carefully in mind what I have told you several times in the past and now repeat again, that our power to defeat the enemy with certainty and without the bitter cost of long delays has been largely due to the carefully organized cooperation of the British-American forces under unity of command. This has made possible our great successes, the coordinating of our efforts with the vast campaigns of the Russian armies and the Chinese forces, and has permitted the effective employment of the other Allied forces who bear their portion of the heat of the battle.

For the past year the sole hope of our enemies has been to create dissension in the Allied ranks; and they are still hard at it. Bickering over post-war rights should not be permitted to delay the Armistice or sully the victory. Let's finish this terrible business as a great team, the greatest the world has ever known, and then resolve the conflicting peacetime interests of our countries with something of the orderly procedure which has enabled us to compose our military differences in the much more difficult business of conducting a global war.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)



1. Marshall flew to Chicago on the morning of September 18, delivered his speech at 1:30 P.M., and returned to Washington that evening. His speech was broadcast over the Mutual Network and printed in the *New York Times*, September 19, 1944, p. 14.

2. See Marshall Notes for Talk to American Legion, September 21, 1943, pp. 131–33.

3. There had been numerous and continuing shortages of certain types of equipment and ammunition, particularly artillery shells, since the Normandy landings. These resulted from a general slackening of the production effort in the United States, a shortage of port facilities in France, the difficulty of transporting supplies to the front, and administrative errors. In early September, however, there was a brief period of optimism regarding ammunition supply prospects. (Ruppenthal, *Logistical Support of the Armies*, 2: 246–47.) For more on the ammunition shortage, see Marshall Memorandum for Justice Byrnes, September 25, 1944, pp. 603–4.

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. WAR-32886. *Top Secret*

September 19, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

For Eisenhower's eyes only from Marshall. There has been a back and forth exchange of radios regarding our failure here to receive word that you desired three divisions rerouted into Marseilles. A careful check would seem to prove that the message from your headquarters which you had been notified must be received here by September 10 was not received until September 17.

I have commented adversely on the fact that the OPD people here did not telephone on the 10th to follow up this matter. I know you were involved in a change of headquarters with consequent communication difficulties. However it seems to me that somebody on your side failed to follow up and this business of follow up is vital in war. Ordinary routine will never suffice.

Possibly you were already familiar with this affair but if not I suggest that you bore into the individual who did not follow up despite the mess up of communications.<sup>1</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-32886])

1. On September 21, Eisenhower replied: "In two years I cannot remember coming so close to losing the last atom of my patience as I did over the fiasco involving our exchange of telegrams on the diversion of three Divisions to Marseilles. I arrived at the decision to divert the Divisions only through personal study, sweat and blood. I was so concerned that on September 10th I twice made personal inquiries as to whether this message had gone and assured myself that it had. I cannot forgive myself for not demanding an acknowledgement of receipt. It happened that on that day I flew up to Brussels for a conference with Montgomery, but I was still at fault for not following through in personally checking on the matter. Among other reasons for being very anxious to divert those Divisions to Devers was so that I could bring Patch's army up to respectable strength quickly without creating additional drain on our communications in northwest France. However, I will make the best of the situation." (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2167.) On September 20, Eisenhower was notified that three subsequent divisions—the 14th Armored and the 100th and 103d Infantry—would be diverted from Cherbourg to Marseille. (*Ibid.*, p. 2169.)



An example of the careful editing Marshall normally did on his correspondence is the following. Here he complains to Assistant Secretary of the General Staff Merrill Pasco about the style used in a September 18, 1944, draft letter to Frank Turgeon, Jr., a Palm Beach, Florida, photographer. The offending sentence read: "I noted with interest the recognition that has been given to the portrait you made of me." Marshall returned the draft with the note shown here attached. "In future please avoid such routine expressions as 'I note with interest,' they are about the equivalent of 'yours to hand and contents noted.' GCM"

*Pasco*  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF  
WASHINGTON  
*note by Col. Pasco*  
*In future please*  
*avoid such routine*  
*expressions as "I note*  
*with interest," they are*  
*about the equivalent*  
*of "yours to hand and*  
*contents noted." GCM*  
*9/19/44*

TO DEWITT WALLACE<sup>1</sup>

September 20, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mr. Wallace: The attached letter from General Palmer has been written more or less at my suggestion, therefore I feel it desirable to give you some background on General Palmer.

In the first place, he refers to the fact that Congressman Andrews furnished Mr. Palmer, of your staff, with his statement to The Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy, last April, on our past military policy. To make certain this reference is clear I enclose a copy of that statement.<sup>2</sup>

General Palmer has been the deepest student of the underlying facts and the fundamentals regarding our military policy in the past that we have had in the Army, or out of it so far as I know. Furthermore, he is a trained writer both in a minor fictional way—for McClure's many years ago—and of historical studies. The last being the Life of Von Steuben.<sup>3</sup>

I think that whatever he prepares will be in thoroughly readable style, and I am quite certain that it will be worthy of public interest.



I had in mind, when I was talking to General Palmer, that he would prepare the article, submitting it for your consideration. However, he has chosen instead to merely discuss his preparation with you. I hope you will be favorably disposed.<sup>4</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Wallace was editor of *Reader's Digest*.

2. Walter G. Andrews was the ranking Republican on the twenty-three-man committee. Palmer testified on April 24, 1944, but he sat regularly with the committee as an adviser. Palmer's role in postwar military planning in 1943 and 1944 is discussed in I. B. Holley, Jr., *General John M. Palmer, Citizen Soldiers, and the Army of a Democracy* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), pp. 636–65.

3. *General von Steuben* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1937).

4. *Reader's Digest* already had a writer working on the issue, and despite Marshall's efforts, the magazine was unwilling to publish Palmer's piece in addition to Thomas M. Johnson's (which was published in December as "Military Essentials for Our Postwar Safety"). In October, Marshall wrote to Ben Hibbs, editor of the *Saturday Evening Post*, who accepted the article. Hibbs changed the title of the article from Palmer's "An Army of the People" to "General Marshall Wants a Citizen Army," asserting that "General Marshall's name is, of course, magic so far as readership is concerned" and would "boost readership by from 25 to 50 per cent." The essay was published in the December 23, 1944, issue. (Kenneth W. Payne to Marshall, September 22, 1944; Marshall to Wallace, October 4, 1944; Minnich Memorandum for General Marshall, October 21, 1944; Marshall to Hibbs, October 22, 1944; and Hibbs to Palmer, November 6, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. WAR-34206. *Top Secret*

September 21, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Eisenhower from Marshall. Reference our W-82702 and your CPA 90232 of August 19th regarding General Gerow; at the time of your message he was being considered by you as a probable Army Commander.<sup>1</sup> Since then Truscott's performance has been so outstanding particularly in the light of his previous performances at Salerno and in the advance north through Rome that is [it] seems to me he has clearly established his right to the Army appointment. In addition to which he is already a Lieutenant General. Unless you see serious objection to this which is not indicated by you in your FWD 12428 July 22nd discussing Truscott as a desirable Army Commander,<sup>2</sup> we have a changed situation regarding Gerow's return to the U.S. by October 3rd, in view of the fact that his Corps is now heavily engaged in the Siegfried Line. I feel that his withdrawal at this time would be most unfortunate. Would it help you if we permitted his return to be delayed until say October 20th, that is to arrive here by that date. Let me have your answer immediately.<sup>3</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-34206])



1. Marshall had forwarded to Eisenhower the Army Pearl Harbor Board's request that Major General Leonard T. Gerow, commanding general of Fifth Corps, return to the United States to testify on the events surrounding Pearl Harbor. (Marshall to Eisenhower, Radio No. WAR-82702, August 18, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-82702)].) Eisenhower replied that Bradley was likely soon to appoint Gerow to command an army, but he could combine the board appearance with a visit to his prospective army staff. Gerow was directed to report to the board on October 3. (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2079-80.) A congressional resolution had directed the army and the navy to begin investigations of the Pearl Harbor disaster; see the editorial note on pp. 597-99.

2. Eisenhower had cabled on July 22: "As of this date my first preference for an army commander would be Truscott." (*Papers of DDE*, 3: 2023.)

3. Eisenhower replied: "Gerow is already on his way home. I agree with you that Truscott has become the next logical Army commander. As you know he was always my first choice for such assignment and as he is now under my orders, when the time comes I will take care of the matter on that basis." (Eisenhower to Marshall, Radio No. FWD-15486, September 23, 1944, DDEL/D. D. Eisenhower Papers [Pre-Presidential, Cables Off].) Gerow had been acting assistant chief of staff, War Plans Division, at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. He left Fifth Corps headquarters on September 18 and testified on September 27 and 28.

TO FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN DILL  
*Secret*<sup>1</sup>

September 21, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Dill, We have the problem of proposing a new Deputy Supreme Commander for the Mediterranean theater to replace Devers who now is becoming wholly engaged in the control of the Army Group in Central France. I wonder if you could obtain for me without the knowledge of any other parties but yourself and Wilson, his view in the matter so far as pertains to individuals now in the Mediterranean theater.

For your very personal information and not for Wilson I shall give you my slant on the matter: Clark will be the senior U.S. officer in that region. Eaker is junior to him. There is the possibility that Wilson would not prefer Clark because of past British feeling, I understand, inimical to him. At the same time I feel rather certain that Wilson would feel that Eaker would be very easy and pleasant to get along with. From my own point of view that is the principal trouble with Eaker. He is not a strong enough character and I was very much shocked at his attitude regarding the unavailability of air in the Mediterranean theater to do anything for Alexander if we undertook ANVIL. To me such a stand was preposterous. At the time Eaker made this statement in the presence of Wilson and Slessor (who I think had influenced Eaker) there had not been a German plane in the air for thirteen days and there were over 5500 U.S. and British planes in Italy and adjacent islands.

Later on, and again for your information only, I was told most indirectly that Eaker felt compelled to take the stand he did because of General



Wilson's and Alexander's views or pressure. Therefore my statement that Eaker gets along too well and does not represent U.S. interests sufficiently. I must have people who stand on their own feet, therefore I am embarrassed in the matter of a Deputy Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean because I anticipate that Wilson will propose Eaker.

I think probably Wilson and Devers have talked over the matter for Devers proposes Eaker but, again frankly, Devers has been rather jealous of Clark and Clark has not helped matters by his somewhat Montgomery-esque habit of permitting his people to give over-prominence to his name rather than to subordinates.

I think the foregoing gives you at least my point of view.

Now before committing myself, I should like to find out something of Wilson's views and desires on a frank and personal basis rather than official.<sup>2</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall's secretary had typed "For Field Marshal Dill's Eyes Only" in the upper left corner of the letter.

2. This document was delivered to Dill's office by special courier. Dill visited Marshall's office at 10:45 A.M. this same day. Marshall soon decided to name Deputy Chief of Staff Joseph T. McNarney to the post effective October 22. On that day also, Operations Division chief Thomas T. Handy became deputy chief of staff and John E. Hull became head of O.P.D. On October 23, Eisenhower wrote to Wilson concerning McNarney. "I can tell you that he is a thorough-going, intelligent and selfless soldier. Any views he may ever present to you will be his honest convictions and without any thought of their effect upon himself. I regard him as one of our finest and I know that you will have a very pleasant association with him. He is tough but most sensible." (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2243.) Shortly after arriving at his new post, McNarney sent Marshall a summary of his initial actions and impressions. "Clark's mental attitude is a curious mixture," he noted. "He has the highest admiration for himself, his staff, his commanders and troops. He is consumed with bitterness against the British and Devers." (McNarney to Marshall, October 27, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

THE Roberts Commission's 1942 report on the Pearl Harbor attack, which placed the primary blame for the errors committed by United States forces on the local commanders—Lieutenant General Walter C. Short and Admiral Husband E. Kimmel—had not stilled interest in the question of responsibility. Both officers, determined to have courts-martial in order to clear their names, were collecting evidence, and they had numerous allies in their services, among the public, and, more importantly, in Congress. The Navy Department initiated an investigation by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, former Asiatic Fleet commander, that ran from February 22 to June 15, 1944. Hart interviewed forty witnesses and collected numerous documents, but Congress was not satisfied. By Senate Joint Resolution 133 of June 13, 1944, Congress required the War and Navy



departments “to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe.” (The testimony, documents, and reports of all the wartime investigations were included in Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, *Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings . . . Pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27*, 40 parts, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1946. One of the best scholarly analyses of the events and the investigations is Gordon W. Prange et al., *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* [New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1981].) Secretary of War Stimson was convinced that “the instigating forces in Congress which produced the inquiry are largely political and trying to embarrass the President.” (September 21, 1944, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 48: 102].)

The Army Pearl Harbor Board began work on July 20 and the Navy Court of Inquiry on July 24, 1944. The three-member board, sometimes called the Grunert Board after its president, Lieutenant General George Grunert (the other members were Major General Henry D. Russell and Major General Walter H. Frank), began hearing witnesses on August 7 when it held a session in Marshall’s office in the Pentagon Building. Marshall admitted that he was not particularly well prepared, but he thought that “in view of the fact that the Secretary did not feel he could appear for quite some time, it was essential that I at least make a preliminary appearance before the Board, to give you as much data as I could, so that you could get ahead on that basis without undue delay.” Marshall quickly asked for a closed session—i.e., with only himself and the three members—which lasted for fifty-seven minutes. At this time he discussed the signals intelligence derived in December 1941 from the broken Japanese high-level diplomatic code: MAGIC. In the open session, Marshall answered questions concerning Pacific defenses, correspondence with General Short, relations with the navy, and administrative procedures. (Marshall testimony, August 7, 1944, *Pearl Harbor Attack*, pt. 27, pp. 11–34; quote on pp. 11–12.)

By August 28, Admiral Kimmel had succeeded in obtaining and entering into evidence before the Navy Court of Inquiry certain of the highly secret MAGIC intercepts, particularly those relating to the fourteen-part message sent from Tokyo to the Japanese embassy in Washington, D.C., December 6–7, concerning the cessation of the ongoing negotiations and likely severing of diplomatic relations. (Concerning this message, see the editorial note and Marshall’s Roberts Commission statement in *Papers of GCM*, 3: 3–6.) This new evidence provoked new questions: (1) Was enough known at the highest government levels that one could reasonably argue that Japanese intentions regarding the Hawaiian fleet base should have been deduced? (2) If so, had Washington leaders deliberately withheld information from Kimmel and Short that was crucial to carrying out their duties? As George H. E. Smith, secretary of the Senate Minority (i.e., Republican) Steering Committee, and a firm believer in the thesis that the Roosevelt administra-



tion had been responsible for the nation's entry into the war, wrote to Kimmel's attorney, Charles Rugg, "The diplomacy leading up to Pearl Harbor is the bulwark of Admiral Kimmel's defense—not the technical situation at Pearl Harbor." (Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, pp. 628, 630.)

On September 2, Marshall testified before the Navy Court of Inquiry regarding aircraft and air defenses in Hawaii and army-navy relations. There was also a lengthy discussion of U.S.-Japan diplomacy immediately prior to the December 7 attack. The court desired to know whether Marshall considered "the contemplated severance of the diplomatic relations practically a declaration of war." Marshall "was not certain of that. They have so many devious ways of doing things nowadays that whether or not their first move would be an out-and-out act of war was not any certainty in my mind." (*Pearl Harbor Attack*, pt. 33, p. 831.)

Since the number of people with knowledge of MAGIC was expanding as a result of the navy court's actions, when Marshall prepared to testify before the army board again on September 29—this time on the record—he was particularly concerned with the MAGIC intercepts, their handling, and their meaning. ★

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BISSELL  
*Top Secret*<sup>1</sup>

September 22, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

I have read carefully your memorandum of the 20th of September regarding an investigation of the manner in which certain Top Secret communications were handled; also the memorandum to you of the investigation of this same matter, signed Carter W. Clarke.<sup>2</sup>

To the best of my recollection, so far as I had personal familiarity with the matters represented, the statements appear to be correct, except as follows:

On page 6 in the 8th line is a reference to my having arrived in the War Department a short time before 11:25 E.S.T., the time at which Colonel Bratton reported to my office.<sup>3</sup> My recollection is that I arrived about 10:45 A.M. and that the secret communication referred to was on my desk and I began reading it at that time. However, I must say I may be wrong about this.

Further, the statements do not make clear that the Top Secret Army No. 25850 instructing the Japanese Ambassador to present the Japanese reply (Top Secret Army No. 25843) to the Department of State at 1:00 P.M. Washington time that afternoon, was not seen by me until I had read through the lengthy Top Secret Army No. 25843, some parts of it several times.<sup>4</sup>



Further, my recollection of the incident is rather clear that there was no debate regarding the importance of the 1:00 o'clock Washington hour. Everyone agreed immediately to the probable importance of this item.<sup>5</sup>

Further, there was also the immediate agreement of all concerned that all commanders on the Japanese front should be advised in the matter. The investigation implies that there was some debate about this.<sup>6</sup>

Finally, the statement is in error when it states or implies that I called Admiral Stark a second time.<sup>7</sup> Following my first telephone message and his statement that he thought it inadvisable to send another warning to the field commanders, I drafted the message as actually sent, lacking the final sentence. My memory is very clear on this portion of the affair. I was in the act of delivering the pencil copy of the message when Admiral Stark called *me* and asked if I had sent a message. I told him I had prepared one and it was just being taken to the message center. He then requested that the sentence be added instructing each Army commander to inform his Naval opposite. I added this sentence in pencil and immediately started the message on its way to the message center.<sup>8</sup>

There is still another error in that the statement omits the fact that after Colonel Bratton's second return from the message center, I being not satisfied with the information he described, had him return a third time and this time he was accompanied by Colonel Bundy. It may be that Colonel Bundy also accompanied him on the second trip. I know that he did on the third.<sup>9</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. This document was marked "For General Bissell's Eye Only." Major General Clayton Bissell was the assistant chief of staff for Intelligence (G-2).

2. Bissell had sent Marshall a summary and a copy of an eight-page report by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, deputy chief of the Military Intelligence Service, concerning the results of an investigation conducted September 14-16, 1944, by Clarke's service on the handling of certain key MAGIC intercepts shortly before the Pearl Harbor attack. (Bissell Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, September 20, 1944, and Clarke Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, September 20, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Pearl Harbor Investigation Records, Col. Root's Papers].) Marshall's comments concern Clarke's memorandum.

3. In December 1941, Colonel Rufus S. Bratton had been chief of G-2's Far East Section and chief of the Intelligence Group; he was responsible for the delivery of MAGIC intercepts to the select list of officials authorized to see them. Marshall had recalled Bratton from France, where he had been commanding officer of the Special Troops at Third Army headquarters since March 1944, in order to testify before the board.

4. Document 25843 is the fourteen-part Japanese message of December 6-7, 1941. Document 25850 was received on the morning of December 7 and reads: "Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th, your time." Both documents are printed in *Pearl Harbor Attack*, pt. 33 (Proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry), pp. 1380-85.



5. The sentence Marshall cites included the statement that on the morning of December 7, 1941, “the Chief of Staff asked all officers present for an expression of opinion as to the meaning or significance” of the 1:00 P.M. timing mentioned in document 25850.

6. Clarke’s report states that Brigadier General Sherman Miles, then head of G-2, had urged that the commanders in the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, and the West Coast be informed about the timing of the Japanese reply to the most recent United States negotiating position and that the commanders be on alert.

7. After writing his message to the four affected commanders, the report states, “Gen. Marshall again got Adm. Stark on the telephone” and read the message to him.

8. This message is printed in *Papers of GCM*, 3: 7.

9. Colonel Charles W. Bundy was then chief of the War Plans Division’s Plans Group. Marshall’s message was filed in the War Department’s Message Center at 6:30 A.M. Honolulu time (eighty minutes prior to the arrival of the first wave of Japanese planes); it was delivered to the message center at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, at least seventy minutes after the attack began. The War Department asserted that the message was received at 11:45 A.M. (Winterbottom to Sarnoff, December 23, 1941, *The SHAFR Newsletter* 26 [June 1995]: 19–21.)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL CLARK  
*Top Secret*

September 22, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Clark: I am inclosing pages 10 to 14 of the Surgeon’s statement regarding the prevention of loss of manpower from psychiatric disorders. I am taking this direct method to reach you because I know how deeply immersed you are in the conduct of actual operations and their logistics as well as related administrative matters. Please read these pages.

I have formed no conclusions myself except that I am much impressed with whatever can be done to break the strain of too long employment of the individual in active operations.

I am sending these same pages to Eisenhower in France and to MacArthur.<sup>1</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Mark Clark replied that “psychiatric casualties have been of great concern to me since last winter” and later in the Cassino area fighting when the “casualties from psychiatric causes were fairly high.” Since operations against the Gothic Line had begun, good troop morale had meant few psychiatric casualties. “It appears clear from the report which you sent me, which was based largely on Fifth Army experience, that susceptibility to psychiatric breakdown is directly related to length of time in combat.” Shortage of Infantry replacements was a continuing and serious problem. (Clark to Marshall, October 6, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

On October 11, Secretary of War Stimson read the surgeon general’s August 31, 1944, health report. Stimson observed that it “gave a rather appalling analysis of what our infantrymen are confronting in the present war in the way of psychosis.” The strain on the army’s replacement system, wherein a division could be kept in the line for a long period by continual replacement of casualties, “has fallen on the diminishing number of old men in each unit who never get any relief.” (October 11, 1944, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 48: 134–35].)



MEMORANDUM FOR FIELD MARSHAL  
SIR JOHN DILL  
*Top Secret*

September 22, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Dill: At the plenary meeting, 16 September, at Quebec, I undertook to examine the Prime Minister's proposal that one or two U.S. divisions be furnished to assist operations in Burma, specifically to permit additional British units to be released for DRACULA. As I stated at the time, all the remaining U.S. divisions are now committed, 23 to the European theater and 3 to the Pacific for scheduled operations.<sup>1</sup>

At the present moment a change in allocations does not appear advisable. My people are studying the proposition from the viewpoint of a rapid movement once the Allied Expeditionary Force and the Russian forces appear to have the enemy in a state closely approaching complete collapse. It is being planned that the proportionate service forces would accompany these troops.

Will you please communicate the foregoing to the Prime Minister as the answer for the present to his proposal?<sup>2</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See the minutes of the September 16, 1944, meeting in *Foreign Relations, Conference at Quebec, 1944*, p. 380.

2. Marshall's memorandum was prompted by a letter from Lieutenant General Gordon N. Macready, commander of the army staff of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, which stated that the War Office had sent him a most urgent telegram saying that planning for the British operation to capture Rangoon (DRACULA) "has now reached the stage when it is all-important to know at the earliest possible moment whether two U.S. Divisions, with administrative tail, can be made available for the operation." (Macready to Marshall, September 22, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) On British planning for the capture of Rangoon (called VANGUARD until August 23, when the code name became DRACULA), see Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, 5: 492-98, 501-4. On October 5, Prime Minister Churchill notified the British Joint Staff Mission and Admiral Mountbatten that stubborn German resistance had forced DRACULA's postponement from March 1945 until November 1945. (Ibid., p. 533. The attack was ultimately carried out in May and was unopposed.)

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING

September 23, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Please have the following passed on to Admiral Halsey:

"The operations of you and your command since August 30th have been magnificent. Your aggressive leadership and the dashing performance of your fliers set the pace for an early and overwhelming victory in the Pacific. Signed Marshall."<sup>1</sup>



GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. In 1945 Marshall wrote: "Toward the end of August Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet began a probing operation in the western Carolines and the Philippines. His carrier planes struck at Yap and the Palau Islands on 7 and 8 September, and the next two days bombed Mindanao. On the morning of the 12th, Admiral Halsey struck the central Philippines and arrived at a conclusion which stepped up the schedule by months. . . . He recommended that three projected intermediate operations against Yap, Mindanao, and Talaud and Sangihe Islands to the southward be canceled and that our forces attack Leyte in the central Philippines as soon as possible. . . . General MacArthur's views were requested and 2 days later [September 15] he advised us that he was already prepared to shift his plans to land on Leyte 20 October, instead of 20 December as previously intended." On the evening of September 15, at the Quebec Conference, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued instructions to execute the Leyte operation on October 20. (*Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War* [Washington: GPO, 1945], p. 71.)

MEMORANDUM FOR JUSTICE BYRNES

*Secret*

September 25, 1944

[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Justice Byrnes: I send you the attached radio so that you may get a concrete idea of what our tribulations are regarding heavy artillery ammunition.<sup>1</sup>

In reading that portion which refers to the increase in "rationing" that General Bradley desires, please have in mind that he would prefer to shoot a much larger amount of ammunition but realizes that is out of the question.

We are going to be able to ship immediately all of the ammunition requested except for the 8-inch gun. However, this exhausts our resources and stops all training of the additional heavy artillery units whose development we are rushing in this country to batter the German heavy defenses.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. A September 23 message from S.H.A.E.F. Communications Zone headquarters in Paris said: "There is a serious shortage of heavy artillery ammunition for current operations. . . . It is realised that production of these items is limited but our lines now (D plus 108) are far in advance of phase lines originally planned for this date. Troops are facing heavily fortified positions (Siegfried Line) and in the opinion of field force commanders concerned only concentrations of heavy artillery fire will reduce these positions without disproportionate loss of life. Only immediate shipment of ammunition set up for future loadings will alleviate the present conditions." If commanders were allowed to fire at the desired rates, the supply of various sizes of ammunition would be exhausted in fifteen to twenty-five days. Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee requested the immediate shipment of ninety thousand rounds of heavy artillery shells on two fast freighters. (Lee to War Department, Radio No. EX-49415, September 23, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)



2. The artillery ammunition situation continued to worsen for several weeks, precipitating a hurried reform of the ammunition issues and expenditures control system. According to a U.S. Army history, in October "the shortage of ammunition, more than any other factor, determined the character of tactical operations." Patton's Third Army was the hardest hit. The ammunition shortage is discussed in Ruppenthal, *Logistical Support of the Armies*, 2: 246-75; quote on p. 255.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING  
*Top Secret*

September 25, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Attached is the draft of a letter which I feel it advisable to send to Governor Dewey.<sup>1</sup> It may be that you do not care to be involved in the matter and, if so, I can strike out the reference to you. In any event, I would like your opinion.

A recent speech in Congress had deadly implications and I now understand much more is to be said, possibly by Governor Dewey himself.<sup>2</sup> This letter of course puts him on the spot, and I hate to do it but see no other way of avoiding what might well be a catastrophe to us.

Just what he can do in the matter without giving reasons I do not know, but at least he will understand what a deadly affair it really is. I had in the back of my mind the possibility, without telling him, that if he responds favorably I would secretly, here in my office, tell Republican Floor Leader Martin the dangers of the business so that he, on the Washington side of the fence, would understand something of Governor Dewey's attitude, without being informed that Governor Dewey had the same facts in his possession that I was giving Martin.<sup>3</sup>

The whole thing is loaded with dynamite but I very much feel that something has to be done or the fat will be in the fire to our great loss in the Pacific, and possibly also in Europe.<sup>4</sup>

G. C. Marshall

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The draft of the letter to Thomas E. Dewey concerning the breaking of Japanese codes was dated September 21. Dewey, who had first gained national attention in the mid-1930s for his successful prosecution of criminals in New York, had been elected governor of that state in 1942. In the summer of 1944, he became the nominee of the Republican party for the office of president.

2. Marshall later wrote that it had been reported to him "that it was the purpose of the Republican party, in the campaign that was then in progress, to launch a detailed attack on the Administration in connection with the Pearl Harbor incident." Such a debate, he believed, would inevitably have disclosed that the U.S. military had succeeded in breaking certain high-level Japanese and German codes. (Marshall Memorandum for the President, September 22, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. Joseph W. Martin, Jr., of Massachusetts.

4. Admiral King indicated five minor changes and returned the memorandum with his concurrence. See the following document.



TO THOMAS E. DEWEY  
*Top Secret*<sup>1</sup>

September 25, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Governor, I am writing you without the knowledge of any other person except Admiral King (who concurs) because we are approaching a grave dilemma in the political reactions of Congress regarding Pearl Harbor.

What I have to tell you below is of such a highly secret nature that I feel compelled to ask you either to accept it on the basis of *your not communicating* its contents *to any other person* and returning this letter or not reading any further and returning the letter to the bearer. . . .<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. At the upper left corner of the letter was "For Mr. Dewey's Eyes Only" in capitals and doubly underlined.

2. The italicized words were underscored on the typewriter in the original version. A description of the events surrounding the delivery of this document and the revised version dated September 27 is given in "Statement for record of participation of Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke, GSC in the transmittal of letters from Gen. George C. Marshall to Gov. Thomas E. Dewey the latter part of September 1944," NA/RG 457 (Studies on Cryptology, SRH-043). Clarke had been directed to wear civilian clothing, to deliver the letter to Dewey in Tulsa, Oklahoma, on September 26, and to give the letter to the governor only if he and Clarke were the only persons present. Clarke managed to arrange this.

After reading the two paragraphs printed here, Dewey stopped and put the letter down. He told Clarke that he did not want Marshall's top secret letter to seal his lips regarding what he already knew or might soon learn about the Pearl Harbor attack. Furthermore, he did not believe that Marshall and King were acting alone or that Marshall would approach an opposition candidate and make the proposition that Dewey suspected was contained in the letter. According to Clarke, Dewey said: "Marshall does not do things like that. I am confident that Franklin Roosevelt is behind this whole thing."

Upon beginning to reread the first two paragraphs, Dewey saw the word "cryptograph" in the fifth paragraph. He told Clarke: "Now if this letter merely tells me that we were reading certain Japanese codes before Pearl Harbor and that at least two of them are still in current use, there is no point in my reading the letter because I already know that." Besides, "Franklin Roosevelt knows all about it. He knew what was happening before Pearl Harbor and instead of being reelected he ought to be impeached." Dewey returned the letter to Clarke and said that he would be back in Albany, New York, in two days and would be "glad to receive you or Gen. Marshall or anyone Gen. Marshall cares to send to discuss at length this cryptographic business or the whole Pearl Harbor mess."

Clarke returned to Washington that evening and reported to Marshall the following morning, September 27. Marshall revised his letter, and Clarke flew to Albany on the morning of September 28. The revised letter, including the portion omitted here, is printed on pp. 607–11.

TO ADMIRAL SIR PERCY NOBLE

September 25, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Admiral Noble: I was very much surprised when your note reached



me with the information that you were leaving Washington on October fourth.<sup>1</sup> Dill made some comments the other day about changes in personnel but it did not register in my mind or I did not pin it down to you personally.

I am very sorry you are going because I have always felt that we had the basis of a very satisfactory and agreeable relationship for our official business, not to mention a friendly intercourse. And I hope that whatever your new assignment is, it will be to your complete satisfaction, certainly with a better climate and less of argumentation than you have been involved in over here.

Mrs. Marshall and I appreciate the invitation to join you for cocktails next Friday and we are planning to be there.

With warm regards, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Noble, who had been head of the naval staff of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington for the past two years, had written: "I go with great regret, and have many things to thank you for." (Noble to Marshall, September 22, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO MAJOR GENERAL ELLARD A. WALSH  
*Confidential*

September 26, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear General Walsh: Since my letter to you of August 17th, I have seen a copy of the pamphlet subject "Notes to Bear in Mind When Dealing or Working with the Chinese".<sup>1</sup>

General Stilwell informs me that he has directed the deletion of the sentence which reflects on the National Guard from existing and future copies of the subject pamphlet.

The statements contained in the pamphlet concerning the high ranking Chinese officers and those which reflect severely on the National Guard are regretted and your protest is fully justified. My views in the matter are further indicated in the following paraphrase of a radio which I am dispatching to General Stilwell.

"I received your letter with two inclosures subject Orientation Pamphlet dated 9 September. Although the booklet is without official identification the mere fact that it was written, printed and distributed by Army personnel (whether with or without your personal knowledge) makes the War Department and your headquarters responsible for its contents. The statements made in the subject pamphlet reflecting upon the National Guard and those derogatory to the high ranking Chinese officers have serious implications and are to be deplored.



"To date, you have directed only the deletion of that sentence which was objectionable to the National Guard. The pamphlet should be further amended to delete all portions which reflect adversely on the Chinese."

Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See Marshall to Walsh, August 17, 1944, p. 552.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MCNARNEY

September 26, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

The Congressman from the Anniston District of Alabama, together with another Alabama Congressman, both of the Military Committee called on me yesterday to protest against the alleged proposed abandonment of the Fort McClellan reservation.<sup>1</sup> Their grounds of course were that there was a permanent installation there with a number of buildings and a fine reservation. I gathered from the conversation that the stumbling block probably is the fact that it is a hutment or tent camp.

Will you let me know what the situation is in regard to McClellan.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. John J. Sparkman, a Democrat from the Alabama Eighth District, was a member of the House Military Affairs Committee. Sam Hobbs, a Democrat from the Alabama Fourth District, was a member of the House Judiciary Committee, but Fort McClellan lay in his district.

2. Fort McClellan was a Ground Forces replacement training center. Its housing capacity was 42,127, of which only 5 percent were of the permanent-construction type. War Department plans called for the post's inactivation after the war, not its abandonment. (Pasco Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, September 28, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) For further developments, see Marshall to Hobbs, November 2, 1944, p. 648.

TO THOMAS E. DEWEY<sup>1</sup>  
*Top Secret*

September 27, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Governor, Colonel Clarke, my messenger to you of yesterday, September 26th, has reported the result of his delivery of my letter dated September 25th. As I understand him you (a) were unwilling to commit yourself to any agreement regarding "not communicating its contents to any other person" in view of the fact that you felt you already knew certain of the things probably referred to in the letter, as suggested to you by seeing the word "cryptograph," and (b) you could not feel that such a letter



as this to a presidential candidate could have been addressed to you by an officer in my position without the knowledge of the President.

As to (a) above I am quite willing to have you read what comes hereafter with the understanding that you are bound not to communicate to any other person any portions on which you do not now have or later receive factual knowledge from some other source than myself.<sup>2</sup> As to (b) above you have my word that neither the Secretary of War nor the President has any intimation *whatsoever* that such a letter has been addressed to you or that the preparation or sending of such a communication was being considered. I assure you that the only persons who saw or know of the existence of either this letter or my letter to you dated September 25th are Admiral King, seven key officers responsible for security of military communications, and my secretary who typed these letters. I am trying my best to make plain to you that this letter is being addressed to you solely on my initiative, Admiral King having been consulted only after the letter was drafted, and I am persisting in the matter because the military hazards involved are so serious that I feel some action is necessary to protect the interests of our armed forces.

I should have much preferred<sup>3</sup> to talk to you in person but I could not devise a method that would not be subject to press and radio reactions as to why the Chief of Staff of the Army would be seeking an interview with you at this particular moment. Therefore I have turned to the method of this letter, with which Admiral King concurs,<sup>4</sup> to be delivered by hand to you by Colonel Clarke, who, incidentally, has charge of the most secret documents of the War and Navy Departments.

In brief, the military dilemma is this:<sup>5</sup>

The most vital evidence in the Pearl Harbor matter consists of our intercepts of the Japanese *diplomatic* communications. Over a period of years our cryptograph people analyzed the character of the machine the Japanese were using for encoding their *diplomatic* messages. Based on this a corresponding machine was built by us which deciphers their messages. Therefore, we possessed a wealth of information regarding their moves in the Pacific, which in turn was furnished the State Department—rather than as is popularly supposed, the State Department providing us with the information—but which unfortunately made no reference whatever to intentions towards Hawaii until the last message before December 7th, which did not reach our hands until the following day, December 8th.<sup>6</sup>

Now the point to the present dilemma is that we have gone ahead with this business of deciphering their codes until we possess other codes, German as well as Japanese, but our main basis of information regarding Hitler's intentions in Europe is obtained



from Baron Oshima's messages from Berlin reporting his interviews with Hitler and other officials to the Japanese Government. These are still in the codes involved in the Pearl Harbor events.

To explain further the critical nature of this set-up which would be wiped out almost in an instant if the least suspicion were aroused regarding it, the battle of the Coral Sea was based on deciphered messages and therefore our few ships were in the right place at the right time. Further, we were able to concentrate our limited forces to meet their naval advance on Midway when otherwise we almost certainly would have been some 3,000 miles out of place. We had full information of the strength of their forces in that advance and also of the smaller force directed against the Aleutians which finally landed troops on Attu and Kiska.

Operations in the Pacific are largely guided by the information we obtain of Japanese deployments. We know their strength in various garrisons, the rations and other stores continuing available to them, and what is of vast importance, we check their fleet movements and the movements of their convoys. The heavy losses reported from time to time which they sustain by reason of our submarine action, largely result from the fact that we know the sailing dates and routes of their convoys and can notify our submarines to lie in wait at the proper points.

The current raids by Admiral Halsey's carrier forces on Japanese shipping in Manila Bay and elsewhere were largely based in timing on the known movements of Japanese convoys, two of which were caught, as anticipated, in his destructive attacks.

You will understand from the foregoing the utterly tragic consequences if the present political debates regarding Pearl Harbor disclose to the enemy, German or Jap, any suspicion of the vital sources of information we possess.

The Roberts' Report on Pearl Harbor had to have withdrawn from it all reference to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily appeared incomplete. The same reason which dictated that course is even more important today because our sources have been greatly elaborated.

As another example of the delicacy of the situation, some of Donovan's people (the OSS) without telling us, instituted a secret search of the Japanese Embassy offices in Portugal. As a result the entire military attache Japanese code all over the world was changed, and though this occurred over a year ago, we have not yet been able to break the new code and have thus lost this invaluable source of information, particularly regarding the European situation.



A further most serious embarrassment is the fact that the British government is involved concerning its most secret sources of information, regarding which only the Prime Minister, the Chiefs of Staff and a very limited number of other officials have knowledge.<sup>7</sup>

A recent speech in Congress by Representative Harness would clearly suggest to the Japanese that we have been reading their codes, though Mr. Harness and the American public would probably not draw any such conclusion.<sup>8</sup>

The conduct of General Eisenhower's campaign and of all operations in the Pacific are closely related in conception and timing to the information we secretly obtain through these intercepted codes. They contribute greatly to the victory and tremendously to the saving in American lives, both in the conduct of current operations and in looking towards the early termination of the war.

I am presenting this matter to you in the hope that you will see your way clear to avoid the tragic results with which we are now threatened in the present political campaign.<sup>9</sup>

Please return this letter by bearer. I will hold it in my most secret file subject to your reference should you so desire.<sup>10</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. At the upper left corner of the letter was "For Mr. Dewey's Eyes Only" in capitals and underlined. The portion of the first version of this letter that Governor Dewey read on September 26 is printed on p. 605. The first two paragraphs of the letter printed here replaced the first two paragraphs of the September 25 letter. The balance of the letters is nearly the same.

2. When Clarke arrived at the governor's mansion in Albany, New York, he discovered that Dewey was still suspicious of Marshall's motives in sending a top secret message that would likely preclude the Republican party's use of the Pearl Harbor attack in the campaign. Dewey was unwilling to read the letter unless he could keep a copy and unless Elliot V. Bell—New York state banks superintendent and a trusted speechwriter—was present and also permitted to read it. After some discussion with Clarke, Dewey telephoned Marshall, talked with him for several minutes, and arranged for these changes in Clarke's orders. Nevertheless, the governor was still unconvinced of the need for such secrecy in the Pearl Harbor codes matter, asserting that it was "the worst kept secret in Washington." (There was clearly some truth to this; see Marshall to Patch, June 29, 1943, pp. 39–40.) Despite Clarke's assurances, Dewey found it hard to believe that the United States was still reading two of the prewar Japanese codes: "why in hell haven't they changed them, especially after what happened at Midway and the Coral Sea?" ("Statement for the Record of Participation of Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke, GSC in the Transmittal of Letters from Gen. George C. Marshall to Gov. Thomas E. Dewey the Latter Part of September 1944," NA/RG 457 [Studies on Cryptology, SRH-043]. All subsequent quotes from Clarke are from this source.)

3. The September 25 version read: "I should have preferred."

4. Marshall added to the September 25 version the phrase "with which Admiral King concurs."

5. The September 25 letter read: "In brief, the military dilemma resulting from Congressional political battles of the presidential campaign is this."



6. As he made clear in his testimony of December 7, 1945, Marshall was referring to the December 3, 1941, message from a Japanese agent in Honolulu to Tokyo establishing signals for reporting ships and their movements in Pearl Harbor. It was not deciphered and translated by U.S. cryptanalysts until December 11. (*Pearl Harbor Attack*, pt. 3, p. 1138. The December 3 document is printed in Department of Defense, *The “Magic” Background of Pearl Harbor*, 8 pts. [Washington: GPO, 1977], vol. 4 Appendix, A-151–A-153.)

7. This paragraph was added by Marshall for this version. Prior to Dewey’s reading the letter, Clarke told him: “Churchill considered this [ULTRA intelligence] his secret weapon and that it had really saved England. I described how Churchill felt about security, how the Navy prized it so highly and how difficult it had been to break down British resistance because of American lack of security consciousness. I quoted to him Churchill’s reported statement about protecting this source, how that in order to protect the source the British had time and again permitted convoys to be attacked rather than divert them from their course and thus blow security.”

8. Forest A. Harness was a Republican from Indiana. In his September 11, 1944, speech, he told the House of Representatives that “the Government had learned very confidentially that instructions were sent out from the Japanese Government to all Japanese emissaries in this hemisphere to destroy the codes.” (*Congressional Record*, 78th Cong., 2d sess., vol. 90, p. 7649.)

9. The September 25 version of this paragraph read: “I am presenting this matter to you, for your secret information, in the hope that you will see your way clear to avoid the tragic results with which we are now threatened in the present political campaign. I might add that the recent action of Congress in requiring Army and Navy investigations for action before certain dates has compelled me to bring back the Corps commander, General Gerow, whose troops are fighting at Trier, to testify here while the Germans are counter-attacking his forces there. This, however, is a very minor matter compared to the loss of our code information.”

10. After Dewey and Bell had finished reading the letter, according to Clarke, the governor said: “Well, except for the matter of the two codes and the OSS, there is little in this letter that I did not already know.” After some further discussion with Clarke, Dewey and Bell left the room for about twenty-two minutes. Upon their return, Dewey reread several paragraphs and finally said: “Well, Colonel, I do not believe that there are any questions I want to ask you nor do I care to have any discussion about the contents of the letter.” He said that he had no message he wished to give to Marshall. Clarke returned to Washington that evening.

In his December 7, 1945, testimony, Marshall noted that “there was no further mention of Pearl Harbor, as I recall, during the campaign.” After the election in November 1944 and again after Roosevelt’s death in April 1945, Marshall endeavored to demonstrate to Dewey the value of the codebreaking activities to the Pacific campaign. (*Pearl Harbor Attack*, pt. 3, p. 1136.) News of the Dewey-Marshall agreement was not leaked to the press until a year later. See Marshall Memorandum for the President, September 22, 1945, in *Papers of GCM*, volume 5.

TO MRS. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, JR.

September 28, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mrs. Roosevelt: I appreciate very much your note concerning the ceremony in honor of Ted last week, and I will gladly see that the other officers who were present are made aware of your gracious comment.<sup>1</sup>



The recommendation for the Medal of Honor was originated with the Fourth Division, but the citation that reached the War Department was apparently written in the First Army Headquarters, and therefore General Bradley was responsible for it. It was approved here substantially as submitted with very minor changes.

I was much moved the other morning by thoughts going back more than twenty seven years to my first meeting with Ted in Gondrecourt on the arrival of the headquarters of the First Division in that dreary little town, and they carried me through my personal arrangements with him for the first American raid actually led by his brother, Archie, and during which I was present with him—actually under the instructions of General Sibert to see that he, Ted personally, did not participate, in addition to his brother.<sup>2</sup> Incidentally, the scene of that raid is the scene today of heavy fighting in Patton's Army.

There was also recalled to my mind his appearance in my dugout on his relief from the front line at Cantigny, to get permission to search for you in Paris—he having just learnt of the German crash-through from the Chemin des Dames, and that further and final war contact of ours when he appealed to me to get him out of his job at Langres and back to the front, and I arranged to have him rejoin his old regiment in time for the Sedan rush, incidentally, under circumstances which caused him to be carried as absent without leave.

All this coupled with his final great display of warrior spirit naturally made a deep impression on me, accentuated by this magnificent climax to his earthly career. You should be very proud. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Brigadier General Roosevelt had died in Normandy on July 12, 1944, of a heart attack. The Medal of Honor was awarded for his leadership during the assault landings on June 6, 1944. Concerning the initial actions on the Medal of Honor award, see Marshall Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, July 24, 1944, pp. 533–34. The medal presentation ceremony was on September 21. Mrs. Roosevelt wrote: "Ted's citation was one of the most beautiful pieces of writing I have ever seen, especially the part referring to 'his seasoned, precise, calm and unfaltering leadership.' I wonder if I might know someday just who wrote that." (Roosevelt to Marshall, September 23, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Marshall comments on this November 1917 affair in *Memoirs of My Service in the World War, 1917–1918* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976), pp. 50–52.

MEMORANDUM FOR FIELD MARSHAL  
SIR JOHN DILL  
*Top Secret*

September 28, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Dill: With reference to our oral conversation regarding the with-



drawal of an Indian Division from the Eighth Army front for transfer to the Burma Theater, I discussed the matter with the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and it was our understanding that at Quebec we were in accord with the suggested transfer of an Indian Division from the Eighth Army to Burma and that such a movement was not inconsistent with our statement that there was no intention to withdraw major American units from our Fifth Army until the completion of General Alexander's present operation.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. At Quebec on September 16, Prime Minister Churchill submitted a memorandum regarding the proposed Rangoon operation (DRACULA). Of the five or six divisions needed, he noted: "a British-Indian division from Italy will start at the earliest moment irrespective of the state of the European war." At the plenary session that day, Marshall had examined Churchill's proposals from the American standpoint; his chief objection was the prime minister's request to include two U.S. divisions in the operation. (*Foreign Relations, Conference at Quebec, 1944*, pp. 380, 463.)

TO MRS. ALLEN T. BROWN

September 28, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Madge, I have been intending to write you a note ever since I returned to Myer and found you missing, to tell you how much I really did miss you. Yesterday I received your note of generous appreciation, along with the references to what Katherine had told you regarding a press release and the presentation of a medal.<sup>1</sup>

I did not know that she was going to mention the matter to you. I had merely mentioned it to her and she had not seen the papers. What has happened is this and the fat is now all in the fire and has been for several days: General Terry will approach you regarding a convenient hour for the presentation.<sup>2</sup> That being the case, the press release would be automatic. Therefore to avoid the danger of some well-meaning person overdoing the matter or carelessly phrasing a statement, it was crafted in the Bureau of Public Relations here in the War Department.

I do not think it wise for me to send other instructions to General Terry at this late moment; furthermore, what you say in regard to Allen I don't think applies to the circumstances. Were he receiving the decoration I could understand his decent reticence about having the matter publicized, particularly in view of his relationship to me, but under the present circumstances my own assumption is that he would be gratified to know that what he did and what he suffered was not ignored, in a world which only too quickly forgets the sacrifices people make to bring us comfort and enjoyment. Besides, he has many friends who would be greatly pleased to learn in this manner what a fine job he did, at Cassino, for example, and



was doing in the advance on Rome when he met his end. The press release was restrained in tone and merely covered the essential facts.

I will certainly watch for an opportunity to meet you for lunch in New York and to see Tupper. It looks as though I should be there towards the end of October for an evening, Navy Day, to be exact, and while I may not make the luncheon hour I will probably be able at least to have tea with you. Affectionately,

GCMRL/Research File (Family)

1. Allen's widow had written to thank Marshall for allowing her to stay with them at Fort Myer for two months. She was dubious about the planned press release about Allen's decorations. "As you know, he never wanted any special notice paid him while he was in the Army. Do you think he would have liked a special announcement made of his decorations?" (Brown to Marshall, September 24, 1944, GCMRL/Research File [Family].)

2. Major General Thomas A. Terry, head of the Second Service Command, presented Allen's Bronze Star (for gallantry in action near Campoleone, Italy, on May 29, 1944) to Madge on October 23. (*New York Times*, October 24, 1944, p. 8.) The Italian government awarded him the Bronze Medal of Military Valor.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR  
*Confidential*

September 29, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Colonel Frank Capra has just completed a film explaining the demobilization process. The purpose of the film was to translate into a movie the decisions that have been made as to the method of partial demobilization at the conclusion of hostilities in Europe with relation to the transfer of military forces to the Pacific. Capra and Walt Disney struggled with this difficult proposition and have prepared a film which those who have seen it feel will make the picture as clear as it is practicable to do so to the enlisted men.

The purpose is to have copies of the film placed in confidential reserve in France, in Italy, in England, in Africa, and also in Alaska, and in the principal depots in the Pacific, including Australia. Then the moment hostilities terminate in Europe, a telegram will be sent releasing these films so that the displays will begin immediately to the men before a series of unfortunate rumors builds up regarding the inequities or the complete misunderstandings of the demobilization process. We consider it most important to have the men in the isolated garrisons see this film within a very few days of the termination of European hostilities. Otherwise we shall have an extremely serious morale reaction.

I hope you can arrange to see the film as soon as possible in order that they can go ahead immediately with the production of duplicates which will require about two months' time and an additional time to accomplish the distribution to the various theaters.<sup>1</sup>



GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Stimson saw the motion picture *Two Down and One to Go* on October 2. "It was a very able and strong film. The expository mechanical features of it had been done by Walter Disney and, in spite of the intricate mechanics of the plans, the film made it quick and interesting to see and it was interwoven by enough general features to prevent the ordinary watcher from being tired." (October 2, 1944, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 48: 112].)

Determined to insure that it was shown as widely and as soon as possible after release to all army personnel, Marshall closely monitored the film's distribution. He demanded safeguards against premature or delayed showings. On an October 17 memorandum concerning the film's distribution, he wrote: "I think it most important that copies of the film in sealed containers 'to be *opened* and display only after official announcement of cessation of hostilities in Europe', be placed in isolated garrisons—Canton, Fiji, Ascension Island, Accra, Natal, Cairo, Teheran, Karachi, Iceland, Goose, etc." (Note on Pasco Memorandum for General Marshall, October 17, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 062.2].) War Department Circular No. 428, November 2, 1944, governed the handling of the film in the field. For further developments, see Marshall to Davis, November 24, 1944, p. 675.

TO MRS. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

October 2, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mrs. Roosevelt: I have read your letter and enclosure concerning the unfortunate situation in Italy concerning the award of the Infantry Combat Badge to Medical Corps personnel and subsequent withdrawal of the badges and additional pay.<sup>1</sup> The statute authorizing these badges and extra pay specifically provides that they will be given to infantrymen only, hence the withdrawal.

I have had the War Department finance authorities make a careful investigation to see if some means could be devised to enable these soldiers of the Medical Corps who had received the Combat Badges to at least retain the extra pay. I am advised that no way can be found to do this under present provisions of the act. The Infantryman's Combat Badge was legally established some time ago as one of the several measures taken to improve the morale and quality of our infantry. The men were suffering about eighty-five per cent of combat losses and enduring the greatest hardships of the campaign. However, they had fewer ratings and, what produced the most unfortunate reaction, their work was little appreciated by the general public. Under these circumstances General McNair and I, following a careful investigation with the board working specifically on the matter, arrived at a decision to secure Congressional authority for an increased number of ratings, for the Infantry Combat Badge with the additional pay, increased pay for the Air Carrier Borne Infantry, and also instituted a campaign of publicity featuring the vital importance of the infantryman to the modern battlefield, the heavy losses he sustained and the high quality of personnel required. The results have been gratifying and



have, I think, enabled us to meet the heavy infantry losses some of the divisions have suffered in France without loss of continuing striking power.

Under these circumstances, to give the same award to the members of another branch of the service—the artillery, for example, who work close to the infantry, the medical personnel who serve the wounded, the engineers who at times even precede the infantry—would immediately lessen the effect of the award to the infantry soldier himself.

Awards and additional pay for the medical personnel are dependent on new legislation, and the advisability of submitting such legislation to Congress is now under study in the War Department.<sup>2</sup> This, of course, includes consideration of the claims of the Engineers, the Signal troops who have suffered heavily, the Artillery, and the Armored Forces—who, incidentally have had comparatively small losses. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Mrs. Roosevelt had written: "I am sending you a complaint which seems to me entirely justified. Is there nothing one could do to let these men have some kind of a badge which would not conflict with the Geneva Convention and to allow them to keep the extra pay which they were given?" She enclosed part of a letter from a medical corpsman in Italy stating that on July 23 all the front-line medics had been awarded the Combat Infantryman's Badge and the accompanying extra ten dollars per month in pay. These were later taken away. The anonymous writer stated: "We are not asking that the same badges be necessarily returned to us, but we do desire at least another for our self satisfaction that others realize our participation in this war." (Roosevelt to Marshall, September 14, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. On March 1, 1945, the War Department authorized a Medical Badge that was the equivalent for Medical Department personnel of the Combat Infantryman Badge. Eligibility for the award was made retroactive to December 7, 1941. (War Department Circular No. 66, March 1, 1945.)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL EMBICK<sup>1</sup>

*Top Secret*

October 3, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: U.S. Policy in re Russian Participation  
in the War Against Japan.

With reference to your memorandum to me of September 30 I agree that the manner and timing of Russian participation in the war against Japan is of great importance to us.<sup>2</sup> At first thought it seems to me that our bargaining position in this matter would be weakened rather than strengthened by slowing down the tempo of operations against Japan. On the Russian side they have to consider that their Armies in Manchuria will be confronted by the largest concentrations of Japanese ground troops and therefore the fighting will be bitter in the extreme. Also the further fact that



the position of their lines is such as to give the Japanese a decided initial advantage. Should we adopt such a scheme as you suggest the Russians might reasonably think that we are maneuvering to get them into the fight in such a manner that they will suffer the major losses.

In my memorandum of September 1, I indicated some of the aspects of our final operations against Japan which require further study. I agree with you that we should exploit our sea and air power to the utmost during a rapid advance to the heart of Japan. In connection with your thought that there are sound reasons to justify a delay in closing in for the final kill, have you considered the political and economic acceptability of deliberately extending the length of the war with Japan?

As to the question of cost in lives, which is of first interest to me, have you considered the cost in casualties to seize and hold adequate air bases to generate anything like a bombing effort proportionate to that we have launched against Germany during the past year? Such a deployment of air power requires a tremendous number of bases. Even with air power with which we blasted Germany, the German ground forces on the Siegfried line appear capable of strong resistance. Do you think the ground opposition to our divisions landing in Japan will be less under a plan by which we delay the landings, permitting the enemy to build up his forces, or under a plan calling for a rapid movement against the heart of the Japanese homeland, taking full advantage of his increasing transportation difficulties in redeploying his troops due to the heavy sinkings of shipping we are carrying out day by day?

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall edited this from an Operations Division draft. It does not appear to have been sent to Embick.

2. Embick's memorandum was an elaboration of his previous memorandums on the subject; see Marshall Memorandum for General Embick, September 1, 1944, pp. 567–69. In his September 30 memorandum, Embick said that the Soviet Union had a vital interest in ejecting Japan from the Asiatic mainland, but if the United States appeared to regard a speedy end to the war as “of overriding importance, regardless of the cost to America,” and if the United States was prepared to invade Japan without awaiting Soviet participation, “then we may confidently expect that Russia, motivated by her own national interests, will delay her entry into the war until she can occupy Manchuria with a minimum of cost.”

Embick recommended that after the United States had firmly established its forces in the Bonin and Ryukyu islands and on the China coast, but prior to invading Japan: “(a) We will still retain a bargaining position with Russia, pointing out to her that inasmuch as our own security is ensured our further advances will await her cooperation. (b) We can meanwhile exploit to great advantage and at small cost to ourselves, those means (naval and air) which, because of our vastly superior machine production—more than six to one, we possess in so great a preponderance. The employment of such means—to which Japan is singularly vulnerable—will reduce progressively the Japanese war potential, and thus greatly lessen the task involved in the invasion of their home citadel.” (Embick Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, September 30, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)



MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY  
*Top Secret*

October 4, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Attached is a draft, hurriedly revised by me this morning, of a memorandum to the President in the event that he is unwilling to forward the message we proposed insisting on Stilwell's retention.<sup>1</sup>

I question the advisability of showing the President this draft prior to our discussion of the entire situation. Incidentally the Secretary of War is very much concerned that the President should have in writing the views of the Chiefs of Staff, not merely what is to be done if General Stilwell is relieved but more particularly the evil result, catastrophic as he phrased it, that will come from Stilwell's relief. This phase of the matter was to be discussed with the President, as I understood our discussion yesterday, and in the event that he was unwilling to make any further effort to have the Generalissimo retain Stilwell, then we were to present the memorandum of our recommendations to meet the new situation. This memorandum is attached.<sup>2</sup>

I am now about to undertake the draft of a proposed memorandum for the Chiefs of Staff to be presented first this afternoon regarding the importance of forwarding the message already submitted to the President, remonstrating with the Generalissimo and outlining the serious consequences that are bound to follow the relief of Stilwell.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On September 25, in response to a Marshall-drafted message (see Proposed Message from the President to the Generalissimo, September 16, 1944, pp. 584-86), Chiang Kai-shek asked for Stilwell's relief because of Stilwell's lack of cooperation, his apparent belief that "he was in fact being appointed to command me," and his lack of fitness for "the vast, complex and delicate duties which the new command will entail." (Romanus and Sutherland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, p. 453.) Marshall and Stimson discussed the China situation at length on October 3. The secretary of war noted that Marshall "said that if we had to remove Stilwell he would not allow another American general to be placed in the position of Chief of Staff and Commander of the Chinese armies for it was so evident that no American would be loyally supported." On September 28, "Marshall and the Staff had prepared a sharp rejoinder for the President" declining to relieve Stilwell, but Roosevelt had not only declined to send it but was inclined to side against Stilwell. (October 3, 1944, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 48: 113-15]. A copy of the "sharp rejoinder" is in GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

The attached draft that Marshall mentions had the president say: "I must state my surprise and regret at the reversal of your agreement of some weeks ago to accept Stilwell for command. Further, the ground situation in China has so deteriorated during the past two months that I do not feel that the United States Government should now assume the responsibility involved in placing an American officer in command of the Chinese ground forces." Stilwell would be relieved and returned to the United States, Chennault would replace him as Chiang's chief of staff, and China would be separated from the India-Burma theater in the United States command organization. (Draft of Message from the President to the Generalissimo, October 4, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)



2. This memorandum—"Action to be taken in the event that General Stilwell is to be relieved from duty in China"—is very similar in content to the following document.
3. See the following document.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT<sup>1</sup>  
*Top Secret*

October 4, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Situation in China.

The situation in China has deteriorated to such an extent that it is extremely doubtful if any except the most drastic measures can *even partially* save the situation. The lack of adequate leadership, organization and direction of supply for the Chinese ground forces, has resulted in a failure to prevent the Japanese from over-running eastern China, and rapidly eliminating the airfields of the 14th Air Force.

It is our considered and unanimous view that only one individual at this time, General Stilwell, could possibly retrieve this situation, and that only to a limited degree. Any other American officer designated would require a period of months in which to make the necessary contacts and build up the power to act; meanwhile the situation would be deteriorating with increasing rapidity, and quite possibly to a complete collapse.

We have made great and positive sacrifices to increase the flow of supplies to China and to assist the Chinese forces, air and ground, in their war against the Japanese. This has been done at a heavy cost to our effort in other theaters, particularly in air transport planes. We have never been able to meet General MacArthur's urgent requirements for air transport. General Wilson in Italy has not had the transport planes he needed. The situation in Holland has hung in the balance, the outcome dependent largely upon adequate support by air for the forces flown in to secure the Rhine crossings. In spite of these vital requirements in our most critical battle areas and which involve the lives of American soldiers, we have built up a line of communications to China by air from Burma which handles a larger tonnage than the old Burma Road.

The United States effort exerted in the China-Burma-India theater in support of China, if placed in other areas, would undoubtedly have expedited and shortened operations in those areas. General Stilwell has been literally the sole proponent in high command in the Far East, of aggressive ground action both in China and Burma. Should he be relieved, he must be returned to the United States. The loss of prestige, if we accede to the Generalissimo's views, would destroy General Stilwell's usefulness in Asia, not only in China, but in India where our dealings with the British are



always extremely difficult, and his determination to force aggressive action in that theater has been bitterly resented.

As the sorties for the B-29 bombers are stepped up this month and next month, as is now planned, the injury to the Japanese will in all probability determine them to continue their drive to neutralize the Chengtu fields. The loss of airfields during the past month in eastern China has already been so serious, that the transport planes at the Kunming terminal of the Hump flight will undoubtedly soon be under frequent attack, to which they will be highly vulnerable. It was General Chennault's original contention that with 7,000 tons over the Hump, he could successfully operate against the Japanese ground forces and protect his airfields. He has been receiving in excess of 13,000 tons per month during the past 3 months, but he has not been able to check the advance of the Japanese ground forces.

We therefore strongly recommend that you send the attached message to the Generalissimo in a final effort to save the situation.<sup>2</sup>

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. This document was to be signed by Admiral Leahy as chief of staff to the commander in chief. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were to meet with Roosevelt at 3:30 P.M., October 4.

2. The draft message was similar to the one attached to the previous document (see note 1, p. 618), but rather than relieving Stilwell, it suggested that he be relieved as Chiang's chief of staff and from "connection with Lend-Lease matters," but that he "be placed in direct command under you of the Chinese forces in Burma and of all Chinese ground forces in Yunnan Province, it being understood that adequate support in replacements and supplies be furnished these armies by you." Removing Stilwell from the Burma campaign would bring results "far more serious than you apparently realize." Chennault's role would remain unchanged, but "at an early date" the president would designate some other officer "to assume supply responsibilities for the U.S. forces in China and who can serve as an advisor to you in similar matters for Chinese forces." The president approved this draft on October 5. It is published in *Foreign Relations, 1944*, 6: 165-66. For further developments, see Draft of Message from the President to the Generalissimo, October 16, 1944, pp. 627-28.

TO MRS. WALTER BEDELL SMITH

October 4, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mrs. Smith, When I went home last night I found the shotgun, much to my surprise. Smith had spoken to me about this when I was at his headquarters in England in June and I told him then that I deeply appreciated his proposal but felt that he had already endowed me far too heavily with fishing rods, flies, and other items. However, I am delighted to have the gun which is a beauty and will afford me no excuses for not making a kill.

My departure has been delayed twenty-four hours, therefore I shall be that much late on his birthday, but considering the distances involved that



is a fairly close connection. I will bring you messages from him on my return.<sup>1</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Eisenhower's chief of staff was born October 5, 1895. Concerning Marshall's trip to France, see the following editorial note.

BY early October 1944, Eisenhower had completed his reorganization of the European Theater of Operations and had moved his main headquarters from London to Versailles. Marshall intended to conduct an extensive inspection of the front that had expanded so greatly from the constricted Normandy sector he had seen during his brief visit in June. He persuaded James F. Byrnes, director of the Office of War Mobilization, to accompany him and to investigate the ship-unloading problems at the port of Cherbourg, which were slowing ammunition shipments to the front. Army Operations chief Thomas T. Handy and the chief of air operations, Major General Howard A. Craig, accompanied Marshall. (On the S.H.A.E.F. reorganization, see Pogue, *Supreme Command*, chap. 15, especially pp. 275–78; James F. Byrnes, *All in One Lifetime* [New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958], p. 244.)

Marshall's party departed from Washington on the morning of October 5 in the new C-54 prepared for President Roosevelt—unofficially dubbed *The Sacred Cow* by its crew. The flight inaugurated, with considerable publicity, the Air Transport Command's new scheduled New York–Paris air route. They first flew twelve hundred miles to Stephenville, Newfoundland. Following a ninety-minute refueling stop, they flew directly to Orly Airport near Paris, a distance of twenty-eight hundred miles. Marshall's picture appeared in numerous newspapers in the United States because of the flight, which reporters and commentators said (incorrectly) was the first such nonstop aerial crossing from North America to the Continent since Charles A. Lindbergh's famous 1927 journey. Marshall's arrival, and his well-publicized reception by Eisenhower and Bradley, fueled press speculation about a great Allied winter offensive that was alleged to be in the planning stage. ("Photographic, Newspaper, and Radio Coverage of the Visit to the European Theater of Operations by General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army, October, 1944," GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Scrapbooks]. Forrest C. Pogue discusses Marshall's trip in *George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943–1945* [New York: Viking Press, 1973], pp. 474–78.)

After a day in Paris to recover from the nineteen-hour trip and to hold discussions with Eisenhower, Marshall began an exhausting round of inspections by flying to Bradley's Twelfth Army Group headquarters at



Verdun. On the way he had the pilot fly low over the World War I Meuse-Argonne battlefields. Later that day (October 7), he drove by car through the area of the Saint-Mihiel salient battle and visited the billet he had at Souilly in the late summer of 1918. (See the map of Marshall's trip on p. 623.) Returning to Verdun, he picked up Bradley and they went to Patton's Third Army headquarters at Etain for lunch before returning to Verdun for the evening. The following document was dispatched from Bradley's headquarters. ★

TO LIEUTENANT COLONEL H. MERRILL PASCO  
FROM COLONEL FRANK MCCARTHY  
Radio No. QX-30278. *Confidential*

October 7, 1944  
Verdun, France

Tell please next of kin of following that Chief has seen them and found them well and doing good jobs:

Patton;

Major Generals Leven Allen and Gaffey;

Brigadier Generals Sibert, Moses, Kibley [*Kibler*], Gay, O. P. Wyl [*Weyland*] and H E Earnest.<sup>1</sup>


Following is from Marshall for McNarney:

"Patton and Bradley say that the most unsatisfactory feature of the replacement system relates to use of inexperienced junior officers with veteran units. Please have the staff look quickly into the proposition of allowing each company of infantry, and each appropriate unit of other combat arms, in all active theaters an overstrength of one 2nd or 1st Lieutenant for purposes of combat and troop leadership experience. This would provide opportunity for utilization of our domestic officer surpluses in certain arms and also for more battlefield commissions. To avoid the heavy requirements of the foregoing procedure if applied to all combat units, it probably will prove best to make authorizations on a company basis for infantry units but to reduce considerably the authorization for artillery, engineer and similar units. At this moment Bradley states that losses in arms other than infantry are exceedingly small. The important thing in this matter is not to have it under study for three months".

This message is sent you from General Bradley's headquarters. Tomorrow we plan to visit Montgomery and Devers, spending night with latter. Please continue to address me in care of Trimble and keep families informed that all is well.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)







1. These men were Leven C. Allen, Twelfth Army Group chief of staff; Hugh J. Gaffey, Third Army chief of staff; Edwin L. Sibert, Twelfth Army Group assistant chief of staff, G-2; Raymond G. Moses, Twelfth Army Group assistant chief of staff, G-4; A. Franklin Kibler, Twelfth Army Group assistant chief of staff, G-3; Otto P. Weyland, commanding general Nineteenth Tactical Air Command; Hobart R. Gay, Third Army assistant chief of staff, G-4; and Herbert L. Earnest, formerly commander of Task Force A in Brittany but at S.H.A.E.F. headquarters since the end of the siege of Brest on September 19.

2. Colonel Ford Trimble (U.S.M.A., 1920) was secretary of the S.H.A.E.F. General Staff.

SUNDAY, October 8, was perhaps the most trying day of Marshall's French trip. From Bradley's headquarters at Verdun, Marshall flew to Eindhoven, Holland, to visit Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery at Twenty-first British Army Group headquarters. Montgomery was of the opinion that Eisenhower's failures as Supreme Allied Commander had deprived the Allies of the possibility of quickly defeating the Germans. When Marshall arrived, Montgomery recalled:

I had a long talk with him, alone in my office caravan. I told him that since Eisenhower had himself taken personal command of the land battle, being also Supreme Commander of all the forces (land, sea, and air), the armies had become separated nationally and not geographically. There was a lack of grip, and operational direction and control was lacking. Our operations had, in fact, become ragged and disjointed, and we had now got ourselves into a real mess. Marshall listened, but said little. It was clear that he entirely disagreed. (*The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein*, K.G. [Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1958], p. 254.)

A dozen years later, Marshall told his official biographer that he

came pretty near to blowing off out of turn. . . . [Montgomery] was criticizing the fact that he had been relieved from command, from active command as he called it, . . . and I was under terrific urge to whittle him down. And then I thought, now this is Eisenhower's business and not mine, and I had better not meddle, though it was very hard for me to restrain myself because I didn't think there was any logic in what he said, but overwhelming egotism. (*George C. Marshall Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue*, rev. ed. [Lexington, Va.: George C. Marshall Research Foundation, 1991], p. 345.)

Marshall's day did not improve. Leaving Montgomery's headquarters, he flew to Luxeuil, where the French First Army, commanded by General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, had just launched a major offensive into the



High Vosges Mountains north of the Belfort Gap. At French Second Corps Headquarters, de Lattre recalls having taken advantage of Marshall's visit "to acquaint him with the inadequacy of our supplies. General Marshall at once showed surprise at a complaint which he visibly had not expected, but he recognized it as being well founded and promised me that he would put the matter right." (Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, *The History of the French First Army* [London: George Allen and Unwin, 1952], pp. 194–95.)

Marshall recalled the scene quite differently from the Frenchman. He was "outraged" that de Lattre was

criticizing Truscott very much, that he wasn't getting the proper amount of supplies and all, coming up the trail towards the Vosges. The truth was there were no supplies to get. A division was supposed to have nine hundred tons a day, I think, and they were cut down. Patton was getting only three hundred tons and all action had ceased on the front because we couldn't get supplies to them, particularly gasoline. And on top of that de Lattre was making this a triumphant march and they were delaying in villages after villages and cities, and they were not up to the place, you know, and he was very critical of Truscott in front of the French reporters. . . . I just stopped the thing right where it was and walked out. (*Marshall Interviews*, p. 333.)

The next day (October 9), Marshall visited Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott's Sixth Corps headquarters. Truscott recalled that Marshall said that de Lattre "had launched into a bitter denunciation of me, saying the VI Corps had shown to advantage because I had stolen the gasoline allocated to French troops." (Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., *Command Missions: A Personal Story* [New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1954], p. 439.)

After spending the night at Jacob Devers's Sixth Army Group headquarters at Vittel, Marshall spent October 9 through 12 visiting corps and division headquarters all along the front from the Vosges to Holland. As his assistant Colonel Frank McCarthy recalled, Marshall's party visited "all the US corps headquarters, and all but about six of the US division headquarters. In short, we saw just about every field general on the front, tasted a little action, and even got down as low as battery headquarters in some of the divisions." (McCarthy to William McCarthy, November 19, 1944, GCMRL/F. McCarthy Papers [U.S. Army 1941–45].) Patton recorded in his diary on October 10: "I believe that General Marshall and General Handy were very well pleased with what they had seen. I have never seen General Marshall in such a good humor." (Copy in GCMRL/F. McCarthy Papers [Patton Movie, Series 6].)

Marshall's party returned to S.H.A.E.F. headquarters at Versailles on October 12, spent October 13 at Versailles, and departed for Newfoundland



that evening. After a brief stop at Stephenville on October 14, Marshall left for Washington, reaching the city at 7:30 that evening. ★

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
*Secret*

October 16, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Eisenhower: After a comfortable flight but with headwinds up to sixty miles an hour and the lowest barometer that the pilot had ever seen, during the flight between Newfoundland and Maine, we reached Washington at 7:30 Saturday night.

The trip was immensely profitable to me and to those with me because I do believe that in a very short time we learned a great deal about conditions with you and therefore are much better prepared to meet your requirements from this end.

I am immensely indebted for your fine and generous hospitality and for all the arrangements made for me, and especially for the dinner the night of our arrival and the fine attention given Justice Byrnes. I always feel apologetic for burdening you in this way by taking up so much of your personal time.

Of course after I left I thought of many things I should have liked to have mentioned but I think all in all we covered the main points.

A full Naval engagement is now brewing off Formosa while at the same time our two Corps are approaching Leyte. Naturally we hope that things will go through smoothly but there are unescapable hazards in any such far-flung blows. However, I think everyone welcomes the showdown on a Naval action and I have tremendous confidence in Halsey.<sup>1</sup>

With very warm regards, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. In June 1944, Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., had been designated commander of the Third Fleet, which comprised most of the Pacific Fleet's strategic forces. His principal strike force was Task Force 38, commanded by Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher (U.S.N.A., 1910). This force, which included four fast carrier groups, had sortied from Ulithi atoll on October 6 to attack Japanese airfields in the Ryukyu Islands, Formosa, and the Philippines. Despite a series of air battles between Halsey's forces and Formosa-based Japanese aircraft, October 12 to 16, the two nations' fleets did not engage. For a description of the Formosa air battle, see Samuel Eliot Morison, *Leyte, June 1944-January 1945*, a volume in the *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1958), pp. 86-109.



DRAFT OF MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT  
TO THE GENERALISSIMO<sup>1</sup>  
*Top Secret*

[October 16, 1944]  
[Washington, D.C.]

Your message of 9 October 1944 was transmitted to me through General Hurley.<sup>2</sup> I must say at once that I disagree completely with your statement that General Stilwell lacks the essential qualifications for the command which I hoped you would give him. Otherwise I would not have urged it. I am most emphatically not in accord with your views on General Stilwell as expressed in your aide memoire to General Hurley dated 9 October 1944, and certainly do not accept the charge that he had any responsibility for the loss of east China. Quite the contrary. Furthermore, General Stilwell was not responsible for the decisions with respect to attacking in north instead of south Burma. Decisions of the Prime Minister and myself led to this choice. And I will add that our conclusions, which were inescapable and which I would repeat today, were reached only after the most serious consideration of all the pertinent facts.

In view of your message, however, I am issuing instructions to recall General Stilwell from the theater. It is with the utmost regret that I take this step but your attitude toward General Stilwell leaves me no alternative. Nothing could be accomplished if he remained.

A full and open explanation of the reasons for General Stilwell's recall will of course have to be made. The American people will be shocked and confused by this action and I regret the harm that it will inevitably do to the sympathetic attitude of the American public toward China.

The recall of Stilwell will necessitate other changes of which I will outline the most important.

No replacement will be sent for him. What has heretofore been the U.S. China-Burma-India Theater will be separated into two theaters of which China will be one and the remainder of the present theater under General Sultan will constitute the other. The 14th Air Force will remain in the China Theater under General Chennault who will be in command of U. S. military activities there. General Sultan will have a limited Liaison Group in China. I am sure you will agree that the Ramgarh training and the supply and command of the X Force should be continued. It is hoped that you will give full assurance that necessary replacements will be furnished to enable this force to complete its mission. I trust you will agree that Sultan should be in command of all Chinese forces in India, and that you will authorize him to appoint a U. S. field commander over these Chinese forces. Hump activities and operations to establish a land line of communications will continue.

In this connection the offensive operations of the Y forces will be most important and I should like your assurance that they will advance in



conjunction with the offensive operations in Burma of Admiral Mountbatten.

New Lend-Lease arrangements under which bids will be submitted by the Chinese Mission to the War Department in Washington will go into effect. Since the flow of Lend-Lease supplies must be through U. S. channels they will remain under the control of Sultan in India and of Chennault in China until they are released to your representatives.

I am hopeful that all of these disrupting steps will not reduce our planned flow of supplies to China. Regardless of our disagreement on the subject of General Stilwell, I want you to know that it is my keenest desire, as it always has been, that all practicable assistance continue to be given to China in her long struggle against our common enemy.<sup>3</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 10, Item 60)

1. Marshall created this draft by editing a preliminary version produced in the Operations Division. Marshall met with President Roosevelt on October 16. In his diary, Secretary Stimson noted that he saw Marshall "and he told me of his interview with the President where he evidently had put the President somewhat on the defensive in regard to Stilwell and China. Marshall is evidently preparing for a battle on the latter subject." (October 16, 1944, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 48: 152].)

2. This message (a telegram and attached aide-mémoire) is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1944*, 6: 166-69. (See also Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 460-62.) Chiang asserted in his telegram that the American officer chosen to command all Chinese forces had to be "one in whom I can repose confidence, and must be capable of frank and sincere cooperation. . . . General Stilwell has shown himself conspicuously lacking in these all-essential qualifications." In his aide-mémoire, the Chinese leader blamed Stilwell specifically and Allied strategy generally for the current military crisis in eastern China. The Burma campaign, on which he had always differed with Stilwell, had absorbed too many of his country's resources and was the cause of the defeat in east China, according to Chiang.

3. Roosevelt's October 18 reply eliminated most of Marshall's defense of Stilwell—although he accepted responsibility with Prime Minister Churchill for the North Burma campaign—and said that Stilwell would be recalled immediately. (See Marshall to Stilwell, October 18, 1944, p. 631.) Chiang had already indicated that his suggestions for Stilwell's replacement included Alexander M. Patch, Walter Krueger, and Albert C. Wedemeyer. Roosevelt nominated Wedemeyer. (Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 468-69.)

TO MAJOR GENERAL FRANK R. MCCOY

October 17, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Frank: On my return from France I found your letter inviting me to the dinner for the President on October 21st, to be given by the Foreign Policy Association. I am sorry that I do not feel that I can accept, for several reasons.

In the first place I have to be in New York on the 27th for the Navy Day dinner as they have attached great importance to my being present, though



I should much prefer to have merely appeared at the local dinner here in Washington. Two trips of this kind for me at this time are too much of a tax on my time and physical stamina as I have been engaged in a most strenuous program over the last month and a half and particularly the last three weeks.

I am loath to decline an invitation such as this from you in particular, but I do not think my mere attendance in the light of the President's appearance would be of any moment one way or another.

I had an intensely interesting inspection trip in France, covering an immense amount of ground in a very short time. I was astonished at the repetition of situations and localities from the days when you and I were in that part of France. The right of Patton's Third Army was in the village and No Man's Land in the exact spot that I found in October, 1917, when I arranged for the induction of separate battalions of the First Division into a French front.<sup>1</sup> The coincidences of this sort were apparent all along the front and I even found in one place that our Fifth Division was deployed in its old World War sector with its same companion, the 90th Division, on its left, and the commander of the Corps a former officer of the Fifth Division.<sup>2</sup>

During my hurried trip I started out after a night at Verdun, flew to Holland to see Montgomery and then immediately South the same morning to the Belfort front. During the next four days, three of them in a downpour of rain, I went through five Armies, eight Army Corps, sixteen Divisions, and also saw the commanders and staffs of eight other Divisions. Fortunately the weather picked up the last morning just as I left the border of Holland again and I was able to fly into Paris without the tedium of a long motor trip.

Since my return here I have been buried in accumulated work and difficult and critical decisions. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See *Papers of GCM*, 1: 122–23.

2. Twentieth Corps commander Major General Walton H. Walker had arrived in France in April 1918 as a captain with the Fifth Division's Thirteenth Machine Gun Battalion.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HENRY  
*Secret*<sup>1</sup>

October 18, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

There are two or three things I wish to talk to you about. I shall list them below so that you can have them in mind.

The clarification of the replacement situation in Italy. I am not interested now in the complicated explanations of what brought about what now exists. My interest focuses on what are we going to do about it and what



speed can we make in the process. I noted the sailing dates for three lots of replacements and a message to General Eisenhower which I believe told him it was unnecessary to transfer replacements from his pool to Italy.<sup>2</sup>

I am interested in the procedure to be followed regarding transfers of officers from the European to the Pacific theater and the partial demobilization resulting from the cessation of hostilities in the former theater. There are several aspects of this that I am concerned about: one is the handling of the professional Regular officers; the other is the handling of high-ranking officers, together with what scheme is to be followed for the demotions involved. Offhand I should assume that we should send in to the Pacific, so far as possible, all Regular officers and thus permit the maximum release (I don't like the word discharge) of temporary officers. Of course there will have to be many exceptions but the nature of these should be pretty well defined in advance. I am wondering about the best scheme to be followed in demoting officers of high rank. This will have to be done but it must be accomplished in the manner best calculated to avoid hard feelings and possible reflection on a man's career. Offhand the thought has occurred to me that we should have a list made now (this would have to be on a very secret basis) of the officers in this country who least merit retention, so that their demotion would take place to create vacancies for the highly deserving veterans of the European theater. Also I assume we should have a somewhat similar list of the senior officers in the European theater who should first be demoted.

I think we must also have a very precise idea of the manner of demotion of men returning from overseas. In the last war an acute and wholly unnecessary humiliation was caused by actually demoting Generals aboard ship in the harbor on their arrival. They thus returned to their homes for a first visit with lowered rank. Nothing like this must occur again and we must take special measures to protect the dignity and reputation of each individual.

As I mentioned above, all of this will have to be regarded as on a very secret basis for I don't want the usual War Department whispering gallery to get to work.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. In the upper left corner was typed, in capitals and underlined: "For General Henry's Eyes Only." Major General Stephen G. Henry had been head of the War Department's personnel division since August 19, 1944.

2. Fifth Army's manpower shortage was growing increasingly critical as its drive toward Bologna continued. The War Department finally approved the diversion to Italy of three thousand men originally scheduled as replacements in northwestern Europe, but they were unable to arrive before a stalemate developed that lasted through the winter. (Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., *Cassino to the Alps*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1977], pp. 361-62, 372-73.)

3. For further consideration of the demotions issue, see Marshall Memorandum for General Handy, December 30, 1944, pp. 719-20.



TO GENERAL JOSEPH W. STILWELL  
Radio. *Top Secret*

October 18, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

For Stilwell's eyes only from Marshall. In all probability a message will go forward from President to Generalissimo shortly acquiescing in your relief from duty with Chinese. You will be ordered home. I will get special message to you in advance of President's message so that you will not receive such news from Chinese sources.<sup>1</sup> This flash is to prepare you for what now appears to be inevitable. Make no comment to anyone of this matter until President's decision is finally determined.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The special message, drafted in the Operations Division, gave a precis of the October 18 message from Roosevelt to Chiang discussed in note 3, Draft of Message from the President to the Generalissimo, October 16, 1944, p. 628. It also directed Stilwell "to proceed to India at once; thence to return to Washington D.C. and report to the Chief of Staff without delay." (Marshall [OPD] to Stilwell, Radio, October 18, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Concerning Stilwell's arrival in Washington, see the Draft Press Release, November 3, 1944, p. 652.

MEMORANDUM FOR FIELD MARSHAL  
SIR JOHN DILL  
*Top Secret*

October 20, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

On 12 August 1944 the Generalissimo agreed in principle to designate General Stilwell as the commander of all Chinese Army Forces in China, to meet the desperate situation then developing. There followed a usual delay over details until finally the Generalissimo reversed himself for several reasons, among which was his irritation over receiving at the hands of General Stilwell the message from the President read to the British Chiefs of Staff at Quebec.<sup>1</sup> Another apparent reason was the Japanese broadcast to the effect that Stilwell was plotting to make himself Czar of China,<sup>2</sup> and finally that Stilwell's responsibility for the failure to carry out the amphibious campaign in lower Burma demonstrated his incapacity for the great responsibility involved in the new command. General Stilwell has been ordered home.

The above has necessitated a number of rearrangements. As far as United States forces are concerned, the China-Burma-India area will be divided into two theaters, one China and the other India-Burma. General Sultan will be placed in command of the India-Burma theater. We have requested the Generalissimo to delegate control of the Chinese Ledo (X) force to General Sultan. At the present time it is very important that Sultan himself be completely free to handle the Ledo situation, particularly as



concerns the Chinese troops, and his other responsibilities should be reduced to a minimum.

Heretofore one of the objections advanced by the British to General Stilwell as Deputy Commander, Southeast Asia Command, was that he was actively conducting a fight in North Burma and not present with the Supreme Commander. Accordingly Sultan should not be designated as Deputy Supreme Commander to Admiral Mountbatten. Considering all circumstances and personnel involved, the best solution, in our opinion, is to make Wheeler Deputy Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Command, while retaining his present staff assignment.

The Generalissimo has requested the detail of General Wedemeyer to command the Chinese forces. The President has expressed his unwillingness at this late date to charge an American officer with such responsibility but has expressed to the Generalissimo his willingness to have General Wedemeyer occupy the post of Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo. It is a matter of regret that this will take Wedemeyer away from his duties on the staff of Admiral Mountbatten. However, under the circumstances no other arrangement appears possible at this time.<sup>3</sup> If there are any suggestions you wish to advance as to General Wedemeyer's successor, they will receive most sympathetic consideration and we will do our best to provide a satisfactory substitute.

As to the matter of coordination of operations of the Chinese Ledo (X) force and the Salween (Y) forces with each other and with Mountbatten's forces, we cannot say exactly how it will be accomplished. However, it has been proposed to the Generalissimo that it could be effected by Wedemeyer as the Generalissimo's Chief of Staff in communication with Sultan and Mountbatten.<sup>4</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See Proposed Message from the President to the Generalissimo, September 16, 1944, pp. 584-86.

2. On September 26, Stilwell had sent a message to Marshall concerning a Japanese broadcast. "The broadcast referred to claimed that I was plotting to seize power from CKS and make myself Czar of China. In view of the character of CKS, such stuff, silly as it is, is dangerous. It may possibly be at the bottom of present impasse. Also, it may possibly have been manufactured here" [in Chungking]. (Sunderland and Romanus, eds., *Stilwell's Personal File*, 5:2492.)

3. A telegram dated October 24 from the War Department informed Major General Albert C. Wedemeyer that he had been selected to succeed Stilwell. He arrived in Chungking on October 31 and immediately assumed his duties as commanding general U.S. Forces, China Theater, and chief of staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. He was promoted to lieutenant general effective January 1, 1945.

4. Mountbatten had been pressing the Combined Chiefs of Staff to create a new agency—Headquarters, Allied Land Forces, Southeast Asia (ALFSEA)—under Lieutenant General Sir Oliver Leese, who had commanded the British Eighth Army in Italy since January 1944. The British Joint Staff Mission replied on October 26 to Marshall's memorandum by urging that Sultan's forces and the Chinese Y-Force (when it crossed into



Burma) come under Leese's command. Marshall gave informal approval to the new arrangement on October 30. Leese's new headquarters was activated on November 12. Concerning these command arrangements, see Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Time Runs Out in CBI*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* (Washington: GPO, 1959), pp. 87–88.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT<sup>1</sup>

*Secret*

October 20, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Two U.S. divisions participated in the airborne operation between Eindhoven and Arnhem, the 82nd and the 101st. They are still in the line.<sup>2</sup>

Brigadier General James M. Gavin has been in command of the 82nd Division for about three months. His name was to have headed the next promotion list for advancement to the grade of Major General.

Today a message was received from General Eisenhower stating that the Commander of the Airborne Forces, Lieutenant General Brereton, recommends the immediate promotion of General Gavin while on the battlefield as an acknowledgment of his gallant and brilliant leadership from September 17th to date. This action was first recommended by the Commanding General of the British Airborne Corps and also by the Commanding General of the XIII Corps, under both of whom the 82nd had served. General Eisenhower thinks this action would distinguish the airborne operation and would be a stimulant to the continued gallantry of the operations of this and its companion division (which is commanded by a Major General) for the remaining weeks they must remain in line in the hard battle to maintain and broaden the salient.

It is therefore recommended that a recess appointment of General Gavin to the grade of Major General be authorized.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall wrote this for Secretary of War Stimson's signature.

2. Operation MARKET was an effort to drop three and a half airborne divisions in the vicinity of Grave, Nijmegen, and Arnhem to seize bridges over several canals and the Maas, Waal (Rhine), and Neder Rijn rivers. They were to open a corridor more than fifty miles long leading from Eindhoven northward. A companion piece was Operation GARDEN, wherein ground troops of the Second British Army were to push nearly a hundred miles northeast from the Belgian-Dutch border to link up with the airborne units. The major objective was to get Allied troops across the Rhine River and to capture the Ruhr industrial area of Germany. If accomplished, MARKET-GARDEN would have isolated the German troops remaining in western Holland, outflanked the West Wall defenses, and positioned British ground forces for a drive into the North German Plain.

Operation MARKET was carried out on September 17 with excellent initial success. The 101st Airborne Division, commanded since May 1944 by Major General Maxwell D. Taylor, landed north of Eindhoven. Brigadier General James M. Gavin (U.S.M.A., 1929) became commander of the 82d Airborne Division in August; his troops landed south of Nijmegen. British and Polish units landed west and south of Arnhem, the most distant



point from Allied lines. MARKET-GARDEN was essentially over by September 25 when the British were forced to withdraw from Arnhem, but the defense of the salient against serious German attacks continued through October. After suffering 7,136 casualties between them, the 82d Airborne was withdrawn from the line in mid-November and the 101st Airborne in late November. On this operation, see Charles B. MacDonald, *The Siegfried Line Campaign*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* (Washington: GPO, 1963), pp. 119-206.

3. Gavin was promoted to major general effective October 20, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY,  
GENERAL HULL  
*Top Secret*

October 20, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

At the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff today there was a discussion of the proximity fuze matter.<sup>1</sup> In my comments I related that to what I considered an undecided question, that is, whether or not we should conduct the war in France during the next two and a half months on the basis of playing everything for a conclusion. That would have a bearing on our decisions as to proximity fuzes. It would have a decided bearing on the choice of strategical air targets. It had a definite bearing on my proposal for the forwarding of infantry regiments.

If we are to make an all-out effort to close out the war in Europe before the heavy winter weather sets in, that would govern decisions in a number of related matters, to three of which I have referred above. It also would relate to operations in practically every portion of the world.

The consensus of those present was that this appeared to be a proper subject for a directive to Eisenhower from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. I was therefore requested to have such a directive drawn, which should be in the form of expressing a general policy, and which would govern the combined Chiefs of Staff as well as General Eisenhower.

I think such a statement of policy should be in general terms with possibly an illustration or two in order clearly to convey our meaning. Will you please have this worked on as a matter of urgency in order that I can submit the draft first to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff by circulation and then in a similar manner to the British Mission for transmission to London.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Research on a radio proximity or VT (variable time) fuze had begun in Great Britain in 1939, but the version the Allies used in World War II was developed in the United States. The fuze worked by emitting a continuous radio signal that was reflected back when near a target, causing the fuze to detonate. To prevent the enemy from acquiring a dud and devising their own VT fuzes or effective countermeasures, use was initially restricted to Pacific naval actions. It was first used in the European theater in the summer of 1944 to help defend England against the V-1. See Ralph B. Baldwin, *The Deadly Fuze: The Secret Weapon of World War II* (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1980).



On October 21, Eisenhower's headquarters was notified that antiaircraft use of the VT fuze was permitted "providing that such use is limited to engagement of targets over the sea or over land areas under our control where duds cannot be recovered by the enemy." (Combined Chiefs of Staff to S.H.A.E.F., Radio No. WARX-50116, October 21, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-50116)].) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the immediate use of ammunition fitted with VT fuzes, as this would release 1,380,000 rounds of medium and heavy artillery shells. "This is the only additional ammunition we can call forth immediately to meet this emergency," Marshall told Dill. (Marshall to Dill, October 24, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. See Marshall Draft C.C.S. Message to Eisenhower, October 23, 1944, pp. 636–37. Meanwhile, John E. Hull drafted a message to Eisenhower for Marshall's signature saying: "The CCS are now considering the issuance, at an early date, of a directive for an all out effort to end the war in Europe before 1945, accepting by this decision the extraordinary measures which would be required. Such measures would include the use of the strategic air forces to get the maximum immediate tactical advantage from use of our air power, expedited movement and employment of units, and the use of the proximity fuze." Specifically rejected was the suggestion from Eisenhower's headquarters that the flow of infantry units to the theater not be increased. Marshall added at the end of Hull's draft: "Be frank with me. I will accept your decision." (Marshall to Eisenhower, October 21, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) On October 23, Eisenhower replied to Hull's message that the heavy bomber was not suited for tactical air strikes and that port and transportation facilities precluded the handling of the heavy equipment of the divisions being scheduled under the expedited unit flow. "Our logistical problem has become so acute that all our plans have made Antwerp a *sine qua non* to the waging of our final all-out battle." (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2247–48.)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL GEORGE S. PATTON, JR.  
*Confidential*

October 23, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Patton: Shortly after my return to Washington your letter to me regarding Madame Jouatte showed up.<sup>1</sup> I greatly appreciated both the promptness with which you acted and the manner in which you carried out the mission. I did not intend for you to go to so much trouble nor for you personally to do any of this. Thank you very much for the gracious manner in which you wrote Madame Jouatte. I will try to reach her from this side.

We continued to have an interesting trip after leaving you and by the time we reached the Holland frontier again I think Handy and I had a pretty good idea of the entire situation along the front and the general requirements to help matters. I only tarried in Paris twenty-four hours before flying home.

I forgot to mention to you while I was with you that the paragraphs from your letter regarding the famous \$1,000 bet I released to the papers and it made the front pages throughout the United States. I think to your advantage, especially as I understand they are raising a couple of thousand-dollar bills for you here and there.<sup>2</sup>



The news from the Philippines is most encouraging and we seem to have a solid hold on Leyte with minimum losses to date. Now if we can open up the port of Antwerp the European picture will change rapidly.

I hope I shall have an opportunity to see Beatrice in the near future to tell her in what shape I found you.

With my thanks and warm regards, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See note 1, Marshall to Patton, September 18, 1944, p. 589.

2. An Associated Press report of August 15 stated: "General Patton hit the beaches early in July, waving a \$1,000 bet that he would beat Lieut. Gen. Omar N. Bradley and Gen. Sir Bernard L. Montgomery to Paris." (*New York Times*, August 17, 1944, p. 6.) Patton wrote to Marshall: "In a clipping which just reached me from home, I saw that some mendacious correspondent had stated that I arrived in Normandy waving a \$1000 bill and making bets. There is not one word of truth to this statement. I have never seen a \$1000 bill. I arrived in Normandy incognito, and, as the result of previous experiences, I have said nothing to any correspondent at any time which can be quoted." (Patton to Marshall, September 1, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

DRAFT C.C.S. MESSAGE TO EISENHOWER<sup>1</sup>

*Top Secret*

[October 23, 1944]

[Washington, D.C.]

We consider that an immediate supreme effort in Western Europe may well result in the collapse of German resistance before the heavy winter weather limits large operations and facilitates defensive strategy. The Combined Chiefs of Staff direct that SCAEF<sup>2</sup> conduct operations with the objective of completing the defeat of Germany by 1 January. Nothing will be held back.

This course of action will require such measures as the commitment of reserves, the continuous employment of divisions, the minimum essential development of lines of communications, the employment of hitherto secret weapons and employing strategical air in all-out tactical operations wherever and whenever the advance of the ground troops can be thus facilitated. All this to be done with the single purpose of achieving the foregoing objective and all on the basis that the effort will succeed.

We will give maximum support for this all-out effort. In so far as humanly possible all requirements will be met. Nothing will be withheld which is available and can be of assistance now.

The Strategic Air Forces will operate under the policy set forth in this directive and in accordance with SCAEF's directions.

SCAEF and SACMED<sup>3</sup> will consult and together make recommendations without delay as to the course of action in the Mediterranean Theater which will best contribute to defeating Germany by 1 January 1945.



Plans and preparations for carrying on the battle against Germany beyond 1 January will be continued on the basis that they do not interfere with the all-out effort to crush German resistance by 1 January.<sup>4</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, 381, Case 538)

1. The origins of this message are described in Marshall Memorandum for General Handy, General Hull, October 20, 1944, pp. 634–35. While originally drafted in the Operations Division, Marshall extensively edited the first two paragraphs.

2. Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (i.e., Eisenhower).

3. Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (i.e., Wilson).

4. Colonel Charles K. Gailey, Jr., Operations Division executive officer, wrote on the draft's cover letter: "Approved by JCS. Not published as a JCS paper but passed to the British by Gen. MacFarland. They're still sitting on it (28 Oct 44)." British leaders, who supported Montgomery's views on the necessity of concentrating Allied power in northwest Europe under his command for a thrust into the Ruhr (see the editorial note regarding Marshall's October 8 visit with Montgomery, p. 624), were not favorably impressed by Marshall's draft. Field Marshal Brooke wrote the following in his diary about the October 26 meeting of the British Chiefs of Staff: "We had the Planners in this morning and discussed with them the wonderful telegram from Marshall in which he seems to consider that if we really set our hearts on it and bank on its happening, irrespective of what happens in the future should we fail to do so, we ought to be able to finish the war before the end of the year!" (Bryant, *Triumph in the West*, pp. 240–41.) In an undated note on the cover letter (just below his aforementioned note), Gailey wrote: "Answered by British. C/S directs 'Keep Poker Face.'"

TO MRS. GEORGE S. PATTON, JR.

October 25, [1944]  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Beatrice, Thanks for your note of appreciation for the telegram which Pasco sent you.<sup>1</sup>

I saw George the second day after I arrived in France for a short period at his headquarters. Two days later I met him at the right flank of his Army and he accompanied me through all the Corps and Divisions of the Army so I had a good chance to see him and talk with him.

He looked in splendid health and in fine fettle and full of fight.

On my return to Washington I found a letter from him detailing what he had done to meet a request of mine to have someone look up my old landlady at Gondrecourt, France, with whom I had lived for six months. Actually he went himself, found that she had moved to the south of France after the death of her husband and of her son; learnt from the Mayor what had happened to her and arranged to have the Mayor transmit a nice letter he, George, had written to Madame Jouatte. He also took her a gift of sugar and coffee, I believe, but of course could not make delivery. It was most kind of him to do this personally, which I had no idea of his taking the time for. Incidentally, he told me that he went on down to Chaumont



and looked over the chateau there and the caserne where the GHQ of the AEF was located.

Katherine has been scrapping with a bad cold which threatened sinus but I think she is on the mend now if she will just be careful.

Molly is still at Leesburg but will probably come up to Washington the end of the month. The children are well but have had the usual colds which, as a matter of fact, they passed on to Katherine. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See the list of officers with whose next of kin the acting secretary of the General Staff was to communicate in McCarthy to Pasco, October 7, 1944, pp. 622, 624. Mrs. Patton had written: "Your message that Georgie is 'well and doing a good job' came just at the time the papers were describing one of the toughest fights of the war. Can you imagine how it lifted my heart? I know you can." (Patton to Marshall, October 12, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING  
GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES<sup>1</sup>

October 26, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Army Service Force Responsibilities.

1. As a result of Circular No. 388 of 27 September 1944 General Somervell has raised with me basic questions of Service Force responsibilities and organization.<sup>2</sup> General Arnold also has discussed these questions in a memorandum of 23 October 1944.

2. I doubt the advisability of initiating any substantial organizational changes at the present time. No matter what is done now, the entire question of War Department and Army organization will have to be considered at the end of the war and at that time the comments of overseas commanders will carry great weight. If we are ever to secure acceptance of the idea of a single department, I believe that we must first demonstrate within the Army a satisfactory relation of service agencies to the combat forces.

3. It is my desire that the Commanding Generals of the three major commands meet and endeavor to resolve the over-all question of service and supply functions and responsibilities and their relation to command. It is my hope that it will be possible in this way to settle minor differences that may arise from time to time without the necessity of appealing to me for a decision. Where differences cannot be so resolved then I desire that there be made to me for my decision a combined presentation of clear-cut issues with a statement of your differences. In addition, I should like a statement giving your combined views on how the provision of supplies and the rendering of common services should operate.



The Deputy Chief of Staff is charged with the coordination of the foregoing.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. This memorandum was also directed to the commanding generals of Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces.

2. The lengthy conflict between the Army Air Forces and the Army Service Forces over control of funding, procurement, and services is examined in John D. Millett, *The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* (Washington: GPO, 1954), pp. 124–37, 157–65. Circular No. 388, which transferred most services and functions at air bases and air installations from the Army Service Forces to the Army Air Forces, was an attempt to solve the conflict.

3. The heads of the three commands—Air Forces (Arnold), Service Forces (Somervell), and Ground Forces (Lieutenant General Ben Lear since McNair's death in mid-July)—began holding a series of meetings aimed at reaching an agreement on the role of the Service Forces. On November 27, they sent Marshall a report in which they admitted that they found it impossible to reconcile the differences. Arnold wanted airmen to control all activities that contributed to operational effectiveness; he insisted that the intercession of a service command into fields the air service considered vital to its mission of aerial superiority threatened to produce “fatal divided responsibility.” Somervell and Lear argued that the combat forces should rely extensively upon a separate service force operating behind the front lines and throughout the United States. Deputy Chief of Staff Handy sought to resolve the conflict, and in a December 28 memorandum to the three commanding generals, he in essence reaffirmed the status quo established by Circular No. 388. (Ibid., pp. 165–68.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF  
OF STAFF, G-1 [HENRY]  
*Confidential*

October 26, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Let me have a first draft of the next proposal for promotion.

Do you think that there is a possibility that it will be necessary to ask for more men in the draft quota in order to meet the crisis in replacements? I have assumed that we had a fair chance of the situation in the European Theater clearing up in time to save us from making increased demands. However, we cannot continue to have the dilemmas, whatever the reason, that are presented to the troops in Italy.<sup>1</sup> Also, I assume that with the increased size of operations in the Pacific—particularly the Philippines—that we may be having replacement troubles out there, although I have had no intimation of such prospect.<sup>2</sup>

General Somervell, in connection with the Negro situation in this country, makes a rather convincing plea for additional military police battalions. Will this provoke additional conflicts regarding manpower?<sup>3</sup>

Another matter—the Infantry Combat Badge seems to me to be of an awkward size, too large. Will you have two models made, each smaller than the present badge, so that we may get an idea of what they look like?



Incidentally, ascertain how many of these are on hand at the present time in case we should change.<sup>4</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On the increasing threat of a manpower shortage, see Marshall Memorandum for General Henry, October 18, 1944, pp. 629–30. On the decision to limit the army's ground combat strength to ninety divisions, see Marshall Memorandum for the Secretary of War, May 16, 1944, pp. 447–50.

2. Henry replied that if all the planned steps were taken to economize and retrain surplus personnel, the War Department could "meet estimated replacement requirements thru April [1945], with perhaps a temporary shortage of replacements available for shipment during November or December. This will cause a reduction in theater stockages but should not result in a lack of replacements for units." G-1 did not believe that it was necessary to increase army requests on the Selective Service System. (Henry Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, October 27, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 320.2].)

3. Somervell was concerned that should the army's service commands be called on to handle civil unrest they would be unable adequately to comply, as practically all active ground combat units were scheduled to be deployed overseas by the end of 1944. He requested that four additional Military Police battalions be organized. The G-3 division recommended organizing provisional battalions from available surplus personnel. Marshall approved this. (Ray E. Porter Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, October 26, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 370.93].)

4. G-1 reported that 1,405,700 Infantry badges ("Combat" and "Expert" versions) were on hand and ready for distribution or contracted for delivery through January 1945. An additional 1,660,000 were already in the hands of units and individuals and would have to be replaced if the smaller sizes were adopted. (Henry Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, October 27, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 320.2].)

REFERENCE APPOINTMENT MACARTHUR  
HIGH COMMISSIONER IN PHILIPPINES<sup>1</sup>

October 26, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

*Secret*

His appointment as High Commissioner might be a good thing provided his command function was not terminated thereby. It is imperative that he continue in military command at least until the Philippine Archipelago has been freed of the enemy and American operations, ground or air, to the south and southwest in the Netherlands East Indies have been completed. It is to be noted that MacArthur's present theater includes Java and runs, exclusive of Sumatra, to the borders of Malaysia and Indo China.

The appointment of Admiral Yarnell or any other individual to a position of independence of MacArthur would be most unfortunate in its inevitable repercussions.

If the decision is made to appoint MacArthur High Commissioner, I think it would be wise to hold this as a highly confidential matter until the actual time of appointment. Just what the picture will be as we come to the last phase of the Luzon campaign no one can tell at this time.<sup>2</sup>



Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers (General Correspondence)

1. In an October 25 memorandum, President Roosevelt asked Secretary of War Stimson's advice as to whether he should appoint Douglas MacArthur high commissioner for the Philippines and, if he did so, whether he should appoint Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, former commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet (1936-39), as the president's unofficial representative in the Philippines. Stimson noted in his diary that he was "disturbed" by the suggestion and asked Marshall for his opinion. (October 26, 1944, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 48: 185].)

2. Using Marshall's memorandum as a basis for his reply, Stimson told Roosevelt that the proposed Yarnell appointment caused him "much anxiety" and that he foresaw "trouble" if it occurred. (Ibid., p. 186.) No high commissioner was appointed until September 1945, when the army ceased supervising civilian affairs in the Philippines. At this time Paul V. McNutt, who had served as high commissioner from February 1937 to July 1939, assumed the post. (*New York Times*, September 7, 1945, p. 4.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
FROM COLONEL FRANK MCCARTHY<sup>1</sup>

October 27, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

I talked to Colonel Green of the Infantry Journal about publishing a collection of your speeches and testimony on the organization and training of the Army instead of the biography which the Journal was planning to have written.<sup>2</sup> I think you should read the attached letter from Colonel Green. General Surles feels that the proposition is o.k. as Colonel Green outlined it, and I concur.

F. McC.

If they care to do it, OK. But when he refers to "statements to open hearings of Congress" I fear that unless heavy cutting is indulged in the volume would be too massive and dull. Attached however is a statement most of which might well be printed. There was another lengthy one on maneuvers that would be of value. The statement in early spring of 1940 reference Europe blazing and sparks reaching another is a good example. Another good example is my answer to question where American army might fight.<sup>3</sup>

G. C. M.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected); H

1. Marshall wrote his reply on the bottom and back of McCarthy's memorandum.

2. Since mid-1940, Colonel Joseph I. Greene (U.S.M.A., 1923) had been secretary of the United States Infantry Association and editor of its *Infantry Journal*. Greene's letter is not in the Marshall papers.

3. Harvey A. DeWeerd, a major in the army reserves and a professional historian, compiled and edited *Selected Speeches and Statements of General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army* (Washington: Infantry Journal, 1945). The volume included forty-eight speeches and congressional testimonies by Marshall between October 1, 1938, and June 16, 1945. It was officially released to the public on August 24, 1945.



NAVY DAY STATEMENT<sup>1</sup>

October 27, 1944  
New York, New York

I cannot imagine a more appropriate moment than this evening for the celebration of Navy Day. Even the destruction of what remains of the Japanese fleet may come somewhat as an anticlimax and I say this with due regard for the inevitable hazards of war.

Exactly two years ago on a similar occasion our then crippled Naval forces operating in the Solomons were apparently in sore distress and great peril according to the meager official information of the moment. Three days later, with all the returns in, a fine Naval victory was an assured fact. Tonight in contrast we can review a series of remarkably successful operations covering the past two months, culminating in the tremendous blows of the recent Naval battle.<sup>2</sup> The Third and Seventh Fleets have made history which will be stimulating reading for young Americans for a hundred years to come. Furthermore, it seems to me that in Admiral Halsey we have found a man with the fighting heart of a Farragut, a Nelson, or a John Paul Jones himself.

The Navy convoyed our armies to Africa, Italy and France. They have now made possible our re-entry into the Philippines. They will support General MacArthur in his campaign for the reconquest of the Islands, an operation which has had a brilliant beginning and will be carried forward with all the skill and daring heretofore demonstrated by MacArthur in his long series of advances from Australia, but fortified today by highly trained and fully equipped ground and air forces and all the vast power of the Navy in the Pacific.

I believe I am expected to make a brief report on the Army, having just returned from France. I visited the commanders along the front, from Field Marshal Montgomery in Holland to General de Lattre de Tassigny, the commander of the First French Army near Belfort. I talked with Bradley, Hodges, Simpson and Patton, with Devers and Patch. The local situations were discussed with each of our Corps commanders and I visited the leaders of the divisions in the line of battle.

Eisenhower's Armies have done amazing things in the past three months but in some respects their present aggressive front, despite limitations in supply, prolonged periods in the line, cold rain and deep mud, surpasses even the spectacular victories of the breakthrough. My admiration for the infantry rifleman who is bearing the hard brunt of the battle increased enormously during this visit to France. The bearing of all of our men, their appearance of professional competence and aggressive spirit, were immensely encouraging. The Air Forces have been magnificent in supporting our ground operations and in the strategic bombing which threatens the



collapse of the enemy's economic system and his power for organized resistance.

Everything has been put into the furtherance of the battle, even the shipment of mail has been suspended for considerable periods to permit a greater tonnage of ammunition. As a consequence our soldiers know little of what is happening elsewhere in the world. Incidentally, I hope that while they are in the present bitter grip of battle in the cold and mud, no echoes reach them from home indicating the belief that the war is practically over in Europe and we are free to turn to other interests. I am fearful of the revulsion of feeling that would follow such a disclosure in the midst of the present battle when the greatest concentration of effort is imperative if we are to bring this war to an early conclusion. I may not be expressing myself tactfully but I mean exactly what I am saying, and I am sure that every man and woman in this country would heartily agree with me could they too have visited our divisions in France and Belgium. Let's have no nonsense, no superficial thinking or selfish purposes until we have won this great struggle in which Allied forces on the western front and in Italy are attacking along almost 1100 miles of a raging battle line.

General Eisenhower has a tremendous task on his hands with inconceivable ramifications, logistical, political, and the purely human difficulties inevitable in the reestablishment of order in liberated countries of different races with conflicting views on almost every subject, not to mention his far greater responsibilities for the conduct of the battle. I am filled with admiration for the wisdom, the patience, and the military leadership he is displaying in a position almost without precedent.

The troops in Italy under Wilson, Alexander and Clark have been engaged for long weary weeks in another bitter battle, in the rain and mud of the Apennines. Their steady advances, their fortitude and losses, and the importance of their contribution to the European operations, in the Balkans, in Poland, and on the western front, receive far too little notice.

There are many things of interest that I should have liked to talk about tonight but my thoughts are dominated at the moment by the great Naval victory in the Pacific. Admiral King and I have worked side by side since our first meeting at Argentia, the historic conference with the British in Newfoundland three years ago last August. To Lord Halifax I owe my thanks—we all owe our thanks—for his fine understanding and strong influence toward the maintenance of unity in our combined national efforts.

I do not know of another instance in the history of warfare in which an Army and a Navy, each with its complex organization and system of command, have pulled together so effectively as members of a team. Neither do I recall a similar situation in which allied nations have worked in such intimate cooperation towards a common goal. We know that the



soldiers and sailors and airmen can be depended upon to do their full duty. If we foster our unity of purpose, on the farms, in the factories, on Main Street and everywhere, we will not fail them. Let's celebrate the victory in the Pacific with a stern resolution to increase our efforts here at home.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)

1. Marshall spoke following a dinner meeting at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. The Blue Network carried Marshall's speech as well as those by Admiral King and the British ambassador, Lord Halifax.

2. On October 24-25, the United States and Japanese fleets fought one of the great naval battles in history. It is officially titled the Battle for Leyte Gulf, although contemporary newspapers frequently called it the Second Battle of the Philippine Sea. The battle was a series of naval actions (Sibuyan Sea, Surigao Strait, Samar, Cape Engaño) whose objective was the defense of Leyte Gulf and the Allied landing forces there against Japanese air and naval attacks. The Japanese lost thirty-four ships, including four carriers and three battle-ships, while the Americans lost six ships, including a light carrier and two escort carriers. See Morison, *Leyte*, pt. 3.

TO MRS. E. A. H. JAMES

October 29, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mrs. James: While casually scanning the last issue of the Royal Engineers Journal I noticed the name of your husband in the series of obituaries printed in that issue. You will probably not remember me, but I have a very pleasant recollection of you and your husband in Tientsin in 1926.<sup>1</sup>

Mrs. Marshall I believe came into touch with you in connection with the charitable service you were rendering in placing orders for the Chinese orphans in convents who were doing fine needlework—or something of that sort. She was very agreeably impressed by you, and I recall in particular a dinner at your house where I came to know you and Colonel James. He made a very definite impression on me and I was much struck by the similarity of the statements in the obituary I refer to and the thoughts I had at the time.

I am very sorry to learn of his death and send you my sympathy. Mrs. Marshall, I regret to tell you, died shortly after her return from China, in September 1927. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Ernest Arthur Henry James, then a major, had been officer in charge of the Royal Engineers in Tientsin. He had died March 15, 1944. The obituary writer called him "one of the most brilliant Engineer officers of his generation, greatly respected by many friends, but comparatively little known in the Army outside his immediate circle." (Obituary in GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)



TO ADMIRAL CHESTER W. NIMITZ  
Radio. *Restricted*

October 30, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

From General Marshall to Admiral Nimitz. Please pass the following to Admiral Halsey and accept for yourself personally my warm congratulations on your responsibility for the turn of events referred to:<sup>1</sup>

“I have purposely waited until the final returns were largely in and the agreeable burden of congratulations had somewhat subsided before radioing my congratulations. You and your commanders and men have given us a splendid and historic victory. You have also given us a feeling of tremendous American pride in the fighting heart, the skill and the daring with which you lambasted the Japs and guaranteed our rapid reconquest of the Philippines. The Army owes you and your command a great debt of thanks but I expect to send you even more joyful thanks for the success of your coming operations.”

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See note 2, Marshall Navy Day Statement, October 27, 1944, p. 644.

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. WAR-55053. *Secret*

October 31, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall to Eisenhower. Reference your S 64798 regarding Bonesteel.<sup>1</sup>

He leaves San Francisco by air tomorrow morning and will immediately transship here in Washington by air for your theater.

He has been told that his duty is temporary but that it may be of prolonged duration. He will arrive with an Aide and an Orderly with directions to report at your Headquarters.

I gather from this last message of yours and previous message that you are rather doubtful regarding Bonesteel. I may be wrong but I think you are going to find him a great asset, a man of sober judgment who will not irritate others and one who may be of great help to you in doing exactly the same thing that I proposed Bradley and Bull for in Africa.<sup>2</sup> My own reaction is that you need several men of this type whose personalities do not excite irritation and yet who are men of sound judgment and are able to penetrate through the haze of conflicting causes and interests.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-55053])

1. Eisenhower's headquarters had asked for the services of Major General Robert H. Lewis, commanding general of the Northwestern Sector, Western Defense Command. On October 30, Marshall told Eisenhower: “When notified that he [Lewis] was to go to your theater on an important assignment, he immediately asked for a 15 day delay in complying



with orders to see his family, pack up, etc. I am sure I was wrong in my estimate. He is not the man for the job. He will not be sent. You stated in your number S 64218 that you did not want Bonesteel. He does not speak French but he is a man of poise and sound judgement. Why not try him in the job?" (Marshall to Eisenhower, Radio No. WAR-54461, October 30, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-54461)].) Eisenhower requested that Bonesteel be sent. (Eisenhower to Marshall, Radio No. S-64798, October 31, 1944, *ibid.*, [CM-IN-29277].)

2. Major General Charles H. Bonesteel was initially attached to Bradley's Twelfth Army Group headquarters as assistant to the commanding general. On December 22, Eisenhower appointed Bonesteel chief of the newly created General Inspectorate Section at S.H.A.E.F. to concentrate particularly on improving the "efficiency and morale of personnel stationed in rear areas of combat zones and in the communications zone." (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2343.)

Marshall told his authorized biographer in 1956 that a problem in the rear of combat areas was that "the headquarters naturally was looking ahead. They were looking to the front. They were looking to the fighting, and their rear was largely controlled by officers who were relieved from combat duty. . . . They had a knowledge of administration that we could not lose. For that reason they accumulated in the SOS and also for that reason they were generally senior, which was the main trouble in utilizing older officers." Rear area senior officers tended to be disgruntled and not the most efficient officers. In 1943 Marshall "sent Bradley and then [Harold R.] Bull to help straighten up the rear areas" in Northwest Africa. (*Marshall Interviews*, pp. 532-33, 578.)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. WAR-55663. *Top Secret*

November 1, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall for Eisenhower's eyes only. I have just had a conversation with General Hildring in which he makes the proposal that supply matters and combat troops reactions to supply services would be greatly improved if some general officers rode the line of supply, boat, rail and motor, more frequently instead of as is the usual time-saving practice of flying from point to point. He cited a number of instances of the reactions of RCT [regimental combat team] commanders and others to conditions on the ground under control of colonels as a rule, on the lines of communication.<sup>1</sup>

I take this up with you first on the basis that you will not even mention it to Smith and others, and second because he is stating what I personally stated to General McAndrew in 1919. I fought a heavy fight against the SOS treatment of soldiers and conditions on the line of communications and made particularly the point that general officers were unaware of the conditions because the star on their car freed them from any complications of movement and the outrageous conditions that existed with RTO [Railway Traffic Officer] officers and at various points in France continued without their knowledge. Most of them would have been settled in a day by a man with authority. Hildring's comments so exactly parallel my reactions in France in the old days that I am quite certain his suggestion is of great



importance. I don't think you can get your cure by a single officer like Bonesteel but I do think that your G-4 generals and some others should be required to travel on the ground as a colonel does with sufficient frequency to know what is happening.

Please do not be irritated by the views of a visiting fireman and also please do not explain to me that you are not irritated. Just don't answer this message.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-55663])

1. Marshall told his authorized biographer in 1956: "I was much concerned at the reports I got from a few trusted officers of what was happening in the rear areas of General Eisenhower's command. . . . And I sent a very splendid officer [Hilldring] over to France, and because he had trouble with his heart, he was not allowed to fly. So he motored through the rear areas and the minute he came back, he gave me this terrible report on the conditions he found." (*Marshall Interviews*, p. 532.)

2. Eisenhower replied: "All right, I won't answer your message. But, it sounds like a darned good idea." (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2277.) Eisenhower followed this with a November 6 letter to his senior American commanders citing soldiers' complaints and making recommendations for closer supervision, including the directive that "General officers frequently make trips by road rather than by airplane," that their vehicles not show the stars of their rank, and that "defects noted should be corrected on the spot." (*Ibid.*, pp. 2291–92.)

TO MRS. THOMAS MONAGHAN

November 1, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mrs. Monaghan, I must tell you that I appreciated very much your letter of October twenty-eighth and was deeply impressed by the courageous attitude you show in meeting the loss of your husband.<sup>1</sup> There could be little doubt regarding the early end of the war were all those at home animated by the same patriotic and self-sacrificing spirit which you display.

Please accept again my deepest sympathy. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. The letters that Marshall had his office send to the next-of-kin of soldiers killed in action early in the war (see *Papers of GCM*, 3: 49–50) had by this time become printed sympathy cards. Of the one she received concerning her husband, a Rhode Island private killed in France, Mrs. Monaghan wrote: "I know how busy you must be, and yet you have time to send out a card of sympathy. That alone proves what a great man you are, and with a man like you leading our men into battle, I know this terrible war will be over soon, and all the boys over there will come home and start anew. My soldier will never come home, but knowing that he did his best, brings a little comfort to my heart. We, on the home front, are trying to do our best on the homefront, although we'll never be as great as the boys over there." (Monaghan to Marshall, October 28, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)



TO SAM HOBBS

November 2, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Judge Hobbs: Since my meeting with you and Congressman Sparkman the other day I have had the matter of Fort McClellan looked into.<sup>1</sup> I find that there are no plans at present for the abandonment of Fort McClellan; that it is classified in the list of installations that may or may not become part of the regular post-war military establishment; and that the housing of this particular installation may be required for the maximum enlisted strength of the mobilized post-war Army.

It would appear at the present time that its employment as a training and maneuver center appears a certainty; because of the type of construction available and the extent and character of the reservation as compared to other available reservations, it could not be favorably considered as a divisional station.

However, the entire problem of post-war installations is in a most elementary and formative period and it will be quite a long time before any definite conclusions can be arrived at. The type and size of Army we are to have will necessarily have much to do with the installations retained. At the present time the best that can be done is to release those temporary installations which we are certain will not be involved in the transfer of strength from Europe to the Pacific and which plainly do not present the qualities to be desired for the peacetime demands of the Army. McClellan is not in this category.

I must ask that you respect my confidence in the handling of this information. I know you realize the difficulties that would devolve upon me if it were released to the public.<sup>2</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. See Marshall Memorandum for General McNarney, September 26, 1944, p. 607.

2. Marshall's original paragraph read: "I must ask you to treat this information as confidential because, as you will clearly understand, the publication of these comments would lead to a deluge of political pressure from all over the country, and frankly I haven't time for that at the present moment. The war is absorbing all my attention." Handy suggested the paragraph that was actually sent to Hobbs.

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio No. WAR-56145. *Top Secret*

November 2, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall for Eisenhower's eyes only. Answering your S 64987 regarding an officer to work the rear areas for you:<sup>1</sup> Handy and I think the best man available, that is, one who enjoys sufficient prestige and has had a



great deal of experience in this particular business, is General Gasser. However, he is performing a vital function here which requires a great deal of backbone as he heads the War Department War Manpower Board which means that he takes from everybody and therefore is constantly on the spot in forcing reductions of personnel within the War Department and all over continental America. We do not feel we can lose Gasser permanently as things stand at the present moment but we are willing to loan him to you for two months and during that time we can look for a replacement or several of them if you so desire. A number of names have been considered but almost none of them in my opinion and Handy's meets your requirements. J. W. Anderson now commanding a corps and former commander of the 3rd Division when it arrived at Casablanca is available. I don't think he would irritate but whether or not he would inspire the necessary respect for his opinions in representing them to your staff I don't know.<sup>2</sup> I find some difficulty in doing it myself. This seems to amuse Handy.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-56145])

1. On October 26, 1944, Marshall had sent Eisenhower and the other theater commanders a letter about a poll of enlisted military personnel returning from overseas concerning their treatment and experiences while abroad. "The complaints are too numerous and too serious to be considered as typical of the normal soldier's discontent. . . . Although our soldiers believe they are the best fed and best equipped in the world, they are often unhappy and discontented in rear areas where they should be finding relief from the hardships of the front. This condition not only has a bad effect on our efforts against the enemy but will present an unfortunate reaction when these men return to civilian life." (Marshall [G-1] to Eisenhower, October 26, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

Eisenhower replied in Radio No. S-64987 on November 1: "What I am personally looking for at the moment for my own use is a man of tact and intelligence who could be useful in circulating through my rear areas, including replacement and convalescent camps, to correct the conditions reported in your letter to me involving discontent on the part of returning enlisted men." He asked for "a list of people that have returned to the United States from operational areas" who might be considered for the job. (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2274–75.)

2. Major General Jonathan W. Anderson had returned to the United States from Morocco in early 1943 and had successively served as commanding general of Tenth Corps, Third Corps, and (since July 1944) Thirty-sixth Corps. In mid-November, Eisenhower decided to give the job to Major General Albert W. Kenner, "one of the finest medical officers I have ever met," and chief of the Medical Division at S.H.A.E.F. (*Ibid.*, pp. 2196, 2275.)

TO BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN MCA. PALMER  
*Secret*

November 3, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear John: I have just read your note of November second and I am interested to know that you are making a specific study of the JCS matter.<sup>1</sup>



I was glad to learn that the Saturday Evening Post took your article. It was proposed that it be put up to the Atlantic Monthly, but that would get you almost nowhere with the people who would exercise the greatest influence in the matter of the post-war Army. Now that the Saturday Evening Post will publish it there should not be much difficulty in placing a follow-up article, to which you refer in your note to me.<sup>2</sup>

I felt after our conversation the other day that I had been too discursive in my discussion of the matter. My trouble is that the thing is so clear-cut in my own mind because of my experience from 1920 to 1924, the two years and a half I served before the JCS organization was created, and practically three years of service on the JCS, that I fail to make clear to the other fellow so many considerations and procedures that are subconscious with me, and there are too many holes in my argument to be convincing.

I do not think you can get at this business from the point of view of "putting it over" unless you are thoroughly aware of the major ulterior motives or remote reasoning that creates opposition. For example, the Navy Line is definitely afraid of any common supply and construction service because of the difficult years it took them to get away from the arbitrary action of the Staff in supplying things for the service of the Line. My conception does not include the transfer of purely Naval construction from the purely Naval branch of the new Department and for the same reason it does not propose the transfer of purely airplane construction from the Air branch.

On the Navy side there is great fear of the Air component adversely affecting their carrier-borne air forces as well as special sea reconnaissance plane types and technique. Nothing should be done to deter the efficiency of these two forces, nor would it be done under a single Department of the type I am talking about. These are special considerations which are easily adjusted under a fundamentally sound organization.

The Naval concern also is with regard to the Marine Corps. Again this is a special consideration which requires no law of Congress and would be handled within the Department according to the requirements.

The most important factor in the whole set-up is to have an organization in time of peace (the JCS) which is so constituted that it can and must under the law, submit a purely military, non-political, annual proposal for the maintenance of the National Defense, or whatever you choose to call the Department. The fact that such a body is set up under the law to submit such a recommendation makes it imperative, in my opinion, that this same group be shorn in time of peace of all power to issue directives on any subject. Here in effect is a pure General Staff without any operating functions.

As I told you, members of the War Department feel that the Minister of



War or National Defense should have a large General Staff. I do not see this at all and as a matter of fact I think half the tribulations of the old General Staff beginning with the Ainsworth period would have been eliminated had it been possible to set up the organization on a basis remote from the exercise of operational control.<sup>3</sup>

There would be operating General Staffs, as it were, in the Air Branch, the Naval Branch and the Ground Force Branch, but these would perform exactly as do divisional General Staff officers with troops, only in the larger sphere necessitated by the over-all problem.

The Secretary of National Defense for War would be the operating head of the forces, the selector of commanders and the issuer of directives to them in time of peace. He would merely do as we do now, designate a particular branch, Naval, Air, or Ground, as the executive for a particular region or theater or a particular affair. The responsibility would be the Secretary's and no super-Staff would be required.

In brief, the budget must be based on a sound plan and for a plan to be sound it must have the formal approval of the President and to obtain this there must be an agency of respectable prestige which cannot be ignored, though its recommendations may not be adhered to. The Secretary would be aware of the development of the annual recommendation, would be concerned in it so far as the budgetary calculations are required, and would have complete freedom and opportunity to debate it on the Cabinet level where the decision must be made by the President. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Palmer had met with Marshall on the morning of November 1. The following day, Palmer wrote to Marshall that he "had a feeling that I had let you down on the JCS matter," and accordingly he would "give it more deliberate thought. . . . I am satisfied that what you want to do in the JCS matter, ought to be done. But so far, I have not been able to see just the right 'formula' to accomplish it without repercussions on account of the long-accepted status of the civilian head of the War Department." (Palmer to Marshall, November 2, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Studies and debates on the advisability of reorganizing the United States military into a single department of national defense and creating a statutory basis for the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been going on since late 1943; see the editorial note on p. 416.

2. On Palmer's "General Marshall Wants a Citizen Army," see note 4, Marshall to DeWitt Wallace, September 20, 1944, p. 595.

3. On the power of Major General Fred C. Ainsworth (The Adjutant General, 1904–12) and his conflicts with the General Staff system, see Otto L. Nelson, Jr., *National Security and the General Staff* (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), pp. 94–166. The General Staff, the New Orleans *Picayune* asserted in early 1905, was a soft assignment for officers "who perform no duty commensurate with the rank and influence they enjoy, but who are able to override their superior officers, embarrass divisional and department commanders and even wield a baneful influence over the freedom of action of generals commanding in the field." The paper also accused the General Staff of usurping the functions of the civilian secretary of war. (Ibid., p. 100.)



DRAFT PRESS RELEASE

[November 3, 1944]  
[Washington, D.C.]

General Stilwell arrived in Washington late this afternoon by air. After a brief conference with War Department officials he will take advantage of a short leave of absence. General Stilwell stated that he had no public statement to make and therefore would prefer not to be interviewed by Press or Radio.

General Surles: I am in doubt as to "would prefer" in last sentence. Would it not be better to say "and therefore would not give any interviews to representatives of Press or Radio"?<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected); H

1. Accepting Marshall's alternative wording for the final version, Surles issued the press release over his own name. Secretary Stimson recorded: "At present we are trying to keep him [Stilwell] out of reach of all newspaper men and not give them an opportunity to catch and distort any unwary word just before Election." (November 3, 1944, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 49: 4].)

Stilwell arrived in Washington, D.C., on November 3 and was met by his wife. For her reactions on Stilwell's return and what she considered his cold reception, see *Stilwell Papers*, pp. 351-54. Her belief that this occurred on November 2 is incorrect. After a meeting with Marshall that lasted more than an hour, and a night at Fort Myer, Virginia, they departed for their home in Carmel, California. In January 1945, Stilwell was appointed commanding general, Army Ground Forces.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESS

November 4, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

The following is a statement by General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, on the death of Field Marshal Sir John Dill:<sup>1</sup>

The fact that Allied Forces stand poised at the gates of Germany is due in no small measure to the breadth of vision and the selfless devotion of Field Marshal Sir John Dill to our common cause.

I know of no man who has made a greater contribution to that most vital requirement to an Allied victory, the complete military cooperation between British and American forces. His death signals a loss of no less magnitude for the United States than for his own country, for the direction of his matchless efforts towards combined victory gave him strength to lay aside all other considerations.

I speak for all ranks of the Army in mourning him as a great soldier and military statesman, one to whom both nations could look for wisdom and guidance through difficult days. I speak for myself in mourning the loss of a dear friend.<sup>2</sup>



GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)

1. Dill died on November 4. Regarding his illness, see Marshall to Dill, July 12, 1944, pp. 518–19. On November 6, Marshall recorded the statement printed here for the British Broadcasting Corporation.

2. Marshall wrote to Lady Dill: “I know that it is not necessary for me to tell you of my distress of mind at this moment. Officially the United States has suffered a heavy loss, and I personally have lost a dear friend, unique in my lifetime, and never to be out of my mind.” (Lady Dill to Heather Dill, November 24, 1944, quoted in Alex Danchev, *Very Special Relationship: Field-Marshal Sir John Dill and the Anglo-American Alliance, 1941–44* [London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1986], p. 3.)

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESS<sup>1</sup>

November 4, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

*TO THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF*

The United States Chiefs of Staff feel they share equally with you the loss to our combined war effort resulting from the death of Field Marshal Sir John Dill. His character and wisdom, his selfless devotion to the Allied cause, made his contribution to the combined British-American war effort of outstanding importance. It is not too much to say that probably no other individual was more responsible for the achievement of complete cooperation in the work of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

During the dark period when we were on the defensive on all fronts and continuing through the rising tide of victories, we have looked to him with complete confidence as a leader in our combined deliberations. He has been a personal friend of all of us and a keystone in the British and American cooperation which is now sweeping us to victory.

We mourn with you the passing of a great and wise soldier, and a great gentleman. His task in this war has been well done.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall edited an Operations Division draft to produce this document.

TO WINSTON S. CHURCHILL  
Radio. *Secret*

November 7, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Please deliver the following personal message immediately to Prime Minister from General Marshall:<sup>1</sup> “Reference your OZ 6528:<sup>2</sup> Your personal message to me regarding Sir John is acknowledged with deep appreciation. Few will ever realize the debt our countries owe him for his



unique and profound influence toward the cooperation of our forces. To be very frank and personal, I doubt if you or your Cabinet associates fully realize the loss you have suffered, and the United States also has suffered for that matter, in purely post war adjustments by his death. I am hopeful that his interment in the American Valhalla of Arlington where his services may be memorialized will result in a continuation of his great and beneficent influence in the troubled years to come.”<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The message was addressed to the U.S. military attaché in London.
2. Churchill's message said: "I read with emotion the message which the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff have addressed to their British colleagues about the death of our friend Sir John Dill. Let me express my own thanks for all your kind thoughts. He did all he could to make things go well, and they went well." (Churchill to Joint Staff Mission, Radio No. OZ-6528, November 5, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)
3. Dill's funeral was held on November 8. Marshall found a way around regulations against the burial of foreign soldiers in Arlington National Cemetery. Marshall also arranged to have a joint resolution praising Dill's services introduced into Congress (H. J. Res. 317). (See Marshall to Lady Burghley, December 16, 1944, pp. 694-95.) The biographer of the Marshall-Dill relationship has observed: "The fervent acclaim of official America was by no means echoed in Britain. To say that Dill was not without honour, save in his own country, would be something of an exaggeration, but not much of one. . . . Official Britain was parsimonious in word and deed." (Danchev, *Very Special Relationship*, pp. 3-4.)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSEPH T. MCNARNEY  
Radio. *Top Secret*

November 9, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

For McNarney's eyes only from Marshall. Only one copy of this message, when decoded, should be made to be taken personally to General McNarney. With reference to Wilson's MEDCOS 205 concerning operations into Dalmatia,<sup>1</sup> the U.S. planners propose a reply to Wilson substantially that: Major operations in the Balkans are not favorably considered. The objective should be to take Bologna, followed by securing the Ravenna-Bologna-Spezia line and then continuing operations with a view to containing and destroying the enemy army. Withdrawals of forces for rest and rotation should be consistent with this objective. MEDCOS 205 air plan is approved on the understanding that Balkan air operations will not divert air support necessary for Italy. Commandos and light units should be introduced through Dalmatian ports to exert pressure and attrite the enemy. Forces available as a result of withdrawals from the line should be transferred to Eisenhower or used as a strategic reserve. Eisenhower and Wilson should confer and make recommendations on transfer of forces and resources. This ends proposed message to Wilson.

The U.S. planners in their proposed memorandum to the British give both logistical and strategic reasons for the proposed directive to Wilson.



They point out that for some time Italian operations have been designed to break the mountain barrier of the Appenines. Now that this has practically been accomplished, Wilson proposes to embark on another mountain campaign in winter weather in Balkan terrain worse than Italy. The primary objective of the Italian operation is to support Eisenhower by keeping German forces away from his front. It is not apparent how a course of action which splits our resources on two sides of the Adriatic and lessens pressure in Italy will help to hold down or destroy the enemy army. On the logistical side there is the problem of ports and communications in Dalmatia, service troops, the world wide critical shipping situation which will extend through early 1945, and our experience that major operations in new areas always mean demands for forces and resources in excess of original estimates. The planners specifically recognize the need to withdraw divisions for rest and rehabilitation.

Our impression is that when MEDCOS 205 was prepared you had not yet had time to estimate the situation completely.<sup>2</sup> Now that you have had time to look over the situation can you give me, without embarrassment, your personal views on the foregoing, and any additional thoughts you have to offer on our course of action in the Mediterranean. Will you consider this problem under two separate assumptions:

- a. that we try now to end the war in the near future by an immediate all out effort, and
- b. that the war will extend into and perhaps through next spring.

If you feel comment by you would embarrass you or compromise in any way your relations with Wilson, please say so very frankly.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. In mid-October 1944, it appeared that the German position in the Balkans was about to collapse. Yugoslavian Partisans were steadily enlarging their territorial control, Red Army and Bulgarian forces had entered Yugoslavia from the east and had captured Belgrade, and the Germans had withdrawn from much of Greece and the Dalmatian coast. On the other hand, Allied advances in Italy appeared increasingly likely to halt soon. On October 21, Churchill met with Wilson and Alexander in Naples. As a result of this meeting, Wilson was directed to report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff calling attention to the favorable developments in the Balkans and suggesting a plan for a British landing on the Dalmatian coast with the objective of capturing Fiume and then cutting German communications between Austria and the Balkans. Once the Spezia-Bologna-Ravenna line in Italy had been secured, the plan called for Italian operations to pass to "an offensive defensive" while divisions were withdrawn for rest and reorganization. In February 1945, two to four divisions would land in Dalmatia and attack overland to secure Fiume. After Fiume's fall, the force would be increased to six divisions and would advance north toward Trieste and Ljubljana. Allied air forces in Italy would concentrate on disrupting German communications and escape routes. This was the plan outlined in MEDCOS 205 of October 26, 1944.

But while Wilson proposed that the operation begin in February 1945, Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff believed that this was too late to accomplish anything important and proposed that the operation occur much earlier. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were informed of



this on October 31, but as of the time Marshall sent the message printed here, the J.C.S. had not formally replied to the British. (Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, 6: 44–52.)

2. Marshall deleted what had been the beginning of the first sentence in this paragraph: "There is a desire to avoid embarrassing you in any way whatsoever but." McNarney, who had just arrived in the Mediterranean theater, told Marshall that as regards MEDCOS 205: "I was asked to concur in that plan about thirty minutes after I arrived. I concurred in principal but reserved the right to comment after seeing Alexander's basic plan. I discussed the operation with Alexander and believe it offers the best prospect of getting somewhere next spring." (McNarney to Marshall, October 27, 1944, GCMRL/ G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. McNarney's reply is not in the Marshall papers, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff replied to the British on November 17 substantially along the lines Marshall outlined in the document printed here. By this time, the Germans had managed to stabilize their positions in central Yugoslavia. See Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, 6: 52–53.

TO FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

November 10, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mr. President: Please accept my warm congratulations on your great victory at the polls.<sup>1</sup> From a purely personal point of view I look forward to the meeting of the inevitable difficult problems of the coming months with renewed assurance, in confidence that they can be handled as successfully as recent victories would indicate they had been in the past.

Believe me, with great respect and complete loyalty to your leadership,  
Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/ G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Roosevelt won the November 7 election with 53.3 percent of the total vote. He carried thirty-six of forty-eight states, defeating Thomas E. Dewey by 432 to 99 electoral votes.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SOMERVELL  
*Confidential*

November 11, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

I have just been discussing with Mr. Morgenthau the basis for his appeal for the new War Loan; something a little different from the statements in the past and of a nature that can be readily understood by the public.<sup>1</sup>

It seems to me that the best text would be an illustration of the fact that with the virtual completion of the deployment of the Army, air and ground, and particularly with the opening of the port of Antwerp, the consumption of munitions, gasoline and clothing and similar items as well, will be on a tremendously increased scale. As an illustration the comparison



between the consumption of four divisions in the Tunisian battle with the present consumption in France and Italy would be very effective.

He will need telling paragraphs that make clear the great difference in our necessities between a division training here in the United States or in England and that same division actively occupied on the front.<sup>2</sup>

A further effective comparison would relate to the Pacific where the operations at Tarawa, Kwajalein, Saipan and in the Palau Islands, while difficult and vicious, were of short duration but from now on the action will be continuous in the Philippines and the consumption in munitions accordingly greater.

I mentioned the port of Antwerp. I think a very telling play can be made on this without involving ourselves in security control, and that is that from now on the consumption will be tremendously increased because of easier deliveries through the Port and because of the fact that we shall be free to deploy a maximum number of divisions which has not been the case in the past.

Mr. Morgenthau suggested that we could cite as a single example the consumption of ammunition required to take Aachen and then carry that comparison along the line that the entire front will be a series of Aachens from now on.<sup>3</sup>

Will you have someone work up data on this purely as such and then also some suggested paragraphs for Mr. Morgenthau.<sup>4</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., was preparing to open the Sixth War Loan Drive on November 20. The goal was to borrow \$14,000,000,000.

2. The statistics gathered for Secretary Morgenthau stated that a division used seventy-five hundred tons of supplies per month while in training in the United States and forty thousand per month while in combat. In training, for example, the average man wore out a pair of shoes in six months and a pair of trousers in eight months; in combat the time was two and a half and three months respectively. (Wilhelm D. Styer Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, November 13, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. The U.S. Army fired three hundred thousand 105-mm howitzer shells in the Aachen sector in two weeks during October—one every four seconds. (Ibid.)

4. Marshall's response to the Army Service Forces' 1,550-word (plus three pages of statistics) draft was a handwritten note to Secretary of the General Staff McCarthy on the draft's cover letter: "This has too lengthy a detailed statistical account. It does not clearly make the great point that *now* that the armies are finally deployed and almost every division engaged, *for the first time* the *daily* expenditures of munitions will be tremendous and will be *increasingly* so up to the moment of the armistice. Tell Mr. Morgenthau the statement is not what I intended, but contains data he can use. Tell him I will endeavor to give him to-morrow a short summary of the situation—*also* a statement of our present critical shortages—arty. amm, etc. G. C. M." On November 14, Assistant Secretary of the General Staff Pasco composed a 640-word memorandum for Secretary Morgenthau. (Ibid.) Marshall also dictated a statement; see Marshall Memorandum for Colonel McCarthy, November 14, 1944, pp. 660–61.



TO COLONEL STUART A. HOWARD

November 12, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Howard: I have your letter of October 31st regarding the disapproval of a number of recommendations for the award of a Legion of Merit to senior retired Army officers.<sup>1</sup>

Each recommendation for such an award receives careful consideration by the War Department before it is approved or disapproved. The Decorations Board evaluates each case and submits a recommendation to G-1. G-1 takes final action if it is in agreement with the Decorations Board. Otherwise, the case is submitted to the Deputy Chief of Staff for final decision.

Many of the officers with whom you are concerned performed their duties in an excellent or superior manner, and the War Department greatly appreciates the loyal support they gave during the rapid expansion of the Army. However, superior performance of duty does not in itself justify the award of the Legion of Merit. Otherwise, on the liberal basis of efficiency report appraisals of services, the distribution of the Legion of Merit would be far too general to give it appropriate value. The War Department has endeavored to maintain the value of the award at a high level, and it has been awarded only where the recipient has rendered exceptionally outstanding service.

I hope that this explanation will assist you in understanding the War Department policy in the matter. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Howard (U.S.M.A., 1903) had retired from the army in 1935, returned briefly to active duty in 1942, and retired again. He had written to Marshall asking if there was any way of appealing "the cases of some 500 senior retired officers, mostly Colonels, cited by their Commanding Generals for the Legion of Merit, & the great majority of whom were turned down by the Board." (Howard to Marshall, October 31, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

TO MAJOR GENERAL JOHN W. O'DANIEL<sup>1</sup>

November 13, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear O'Daniel: I have your letter of the twenty-fourth inviting me to contribute a foreword to the "History of the Third Infantry Division", on which your people have just commenced work.

My first reaction was that it would not be advisable for me to undertake this because of the possibility of similar requests from a number of divisions, all of which I could not hope to meet—for of necessity I must be quite careful in what I say and I have very little time. However, in view of my



past intimate association with the Division, and particularly with the Infantry regiments in the Division, I will prepare a foreword and send it to you as soon as practicable.<sup>2</sup>

I have been following your operations in the difficult terrain and trying weather that you are now experiencing. I hope that you can clear your skirts of the mountains in the near future and enjoy some good German billets.<sup>3</sup>

It was most interesting to me to see you the other day on my brief tour of the front.<sup>4</sup>

With warm regards, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. O'Daniel, who had entered the Regular Army from the Delaware National Guard during World War I, had attended the Infantry School in 1928, while Marshall was assistant commandant. He had commanded the Third Infantry Division since February 1944.

2. During World War II, the Third Infantry Division included the Seventh, Fifteenth, and Thirtieth Infantry regiments. The first paragraph of the foreword stated: "I have a very special interest in the history of the 3rd Division. My first assignment in the Army was with the 30th Infantry, later I commanded the 15th Infantry in China, and my last command in the field was the 5th Infantry Brigade, then a part of the Division." (Foreword enclosed in Pasco to O'Daniel, November 23, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

3. The division had been involved in assault landings in North Africa (November 8, 1942), Sicily (July 10, 1943), Anzio (January 22, 1944), and southern France (August 15, 1944). At this time it was with the Sixth Corps in the Vosges Mountains preparing to launch an attack over the Meurthe River toward Strasbourg.

4. Marshall had visited the Third Division on October 9. See the editorial note on pp. 624–25 regarding his visit to the western front.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR,  
SPECIAL PLANNING DIVISION  
*Secret*

November 13, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Saturday I gave instructions for the recall of the Minutes of the General Council which gave the estimates of post-war troop and air strength and the probable costs. I did this because it appeared to me that the estimates were so unrealistic—or rather, improbable of accomplishment, however desirable—that I thought it would do great harm to the entire War Department post-war program—particularly Selective Service, if any rumor of such conception were to get abroad.

I am rather of the opinion that the estimates of officers on post-war military set-ups have gotten considerably out of focus by reason of the present influence of dealing in the tremendous numbers and unlimited appropriations that are now available. Also, it appears to me that the estimates are not based on a sound appreciation of the world situation we



should envisage, assuming that the terms of the peace are reasonably within our present desires.

Following an Armistice, and over a period of a year or possibly two years, we probably of necessity will be maintaining a rather large force due to the fact that we cannot either evacuate the troops from overseas theaters as rapidly as we should desire to do or the local conditions in the overseas theaters *for the time being* make it necessary to hold the troops longer than would otherwise be necessary.

I wish that the entire matter of post-war strengths be re-surveyed, having strictly in mind the debilitation of the Axis powers, the huge resources for a long period of years that we shall possess in the form of Army and Navy materiel, and the vastly increased power which will be given us by an annual program of universal military training—something we have never previously enjoyed.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall later ordered that copies of the galley proofs of John McA. Palmer's forthcoming "General Marshall Wants a Citizen Army" be distributed "to all who should see it in connection with the resurvey and with the general policy governing plans for a post-war peace establishment." (Marshall [McCarthy] Memorandum for the Director, Special Planning Division, November 22, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

Palmer's essay was published in the *Saturday Evening Post*, December 23, 1944, pp. 9–10, 56–57. After surveying the history of the struggle over the size and organization of the peacetime army and its ability to expand during war, he concluded: "The Army of the future . . . would comprise a relatively small Regular Army, subject to prompt reinforcement, when necessary, from a great citizen-army reserve composed of trained citizen officers and soldiers." (*Ibid.*, p. 57.)

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL MCCARTHY  
*Confidential*

November 14, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Following are proposed paragraphs for Mr. Morgenthau's use:<sup>1</sup>

The war in Europe and in the Southwest Pacific has now reached the stage where the consumption of munitions will far exceed any previous totals, and production must therefore be maintained accordingly.

Until the latter part of last summer the Allied fronts were comparatively short and in many localities the action was intermittent. The deployment of our forces has now reached the point where the majority of Allied divisions are continuously engaged in a day by day battle. In Europe the Allied front exceeds a thousand miles and not only is the battle continuous throughout that distance but the number of divisions on the front is being constantly



increased. Therefore in the great assaults which we hope will bring the war to a final conclusion in that theater, the consumption of ammunition and wastage of materiel will be on a vast and constantly increasing scale up to the hour of the Armistice.

In the Southwest Pacific much the same situation is developing, where the American divisions are engaged in a continuous battle which will be prolonged until the principal strongholds of the Japanese in the Philippines have been abolished. Here again then we have a consumption of munitions and inevitable wastage of materiel far beyond that involved in the capture of isolated island strongholds.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. For Marshall's ideas regarding the proper public approach the secretary of the treasury should adopt toward the Sixth War Loan Drive, see Marshall Memorandum for General Somervell, November 11, 1944, pp. 656-57.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY,  
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1 [HENRY]

November 14, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

With reference to the report of the G-1 Division in the Minutes of the General Council of the 13th of November regarding officer candidates: I am inclined to think there will be some confusion in the requirement situation overseas unless it is clearly understood in the theater that divisions which have been milked of most of their top personnel will not be held to the positive direction that 50% of their vacancies must be filled by promotions from the ranks.

For example, General Truscott made very clear to us in the VI Corps when General Handy and I were in France, that those divisions had so many casualties, which too frequently include the conspicuous leaders, and had made so many promotions from the ranks that they would be unable to meet the requirements that 50% of their vacancies should be secured by promotions of men from the ranks.

On the other hand there are divisions on the Western front that have had very limited casualties and therefore presumably would have material available but not many vacancies.

Please make perfectly clear in the instructions that there is no arbitrary direction to a specific division that 50% of its particular vacancies must be filled from its own ranks.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)



TO ADMIRAL SIR JAMES SOMERVILLE<sup>1</sup>  
*Top Secret*

November 14, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Admiral Somerville: I have your letter of 11 November 1944 which forwarded Admiral Mountbatten's comments regarding the assignment of Major General Fuller as Deputy Chief of Staff, SEAC.<sup>2</sup> General Fuller is vigorous, both physically and mentally and I am confident that his temperament is such that the matter of age pointed out by Admiral Mountbatten would not be detrimental to his state of contentment in the assignment.

If Admiral Mountbatten desires a younger officer for the position of Deputy Chief of Staff, I suggest that he give consideration to the appointment of Brigadier General Thomas Timberman. General Timberman has been ill in India, but I am informed that he will be fully recovered and available for duty the latter part of November. General Timberman is known to Admiral Mountbatten and was, prior to his assignment to the China-Burma-India Theater, Chief of the Asiatic Section, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, where he performed his duties in an outstanding manner. I have a high regard for his ability, tact and selfless devotion to whatever task is assigned him. He was sent to the Far East because of these qualities in an effort to harmonize matters. Wedemeyer asked for him in China but the doctors thought that assignment inadvisable.

Request that you communicate the above to Admiral Mountbatten for his further comments.<sup>3</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Somerville was commander in chief of the British Eastern Fleet and naval commander in chief of the Southeast Asia Command.

2. On November 7, Marshall had recommended Major General Horace H. Fuller (U.S.M.A., 1909), who was fifty-eight years old, to replace Major General Albert C. Wedemeyer, who had left for Chungking to take command of U.S. Forces, China Theater. Marshall noted that Fuller, who had commanded the Forty-first Infantry Division in the Southwest Pacific Area since early 1942, "has a distinguished combat record and is an excellent administrator and organizer, in addition to possessing marked diplomatic talent." Mountbatten replied: "I shall be glad to accept him but feel that General Marshall's attention should be drawn to the fact that until recently the Chief of Staff was 56 and the Deputy Chief of Staff 47. The ages of the new candidates offered to me for these two posts are Chief of Staff 47, and Deputy Chief of Staff 58. Provided that General Marshall is confident that General Fuller is still young minded and vigorous and that he would be happy in such circumstances, I shall be delighted to accept him." (Marshall to Somerville, November 7, 1944, and Mountbatten to Somerville, Radio No. SAC 9870, November 10, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. "Please tell General Marshall that I gladly accept Major General Fuller as Deputy Chief of Staff now that I know he will be content to serve with Chief of Staff several years younger than himself," Mountbatten replied. (Mountbatten to Somerville, Radio No. SAC 10268, November 18, 1944, *ibid.*)



MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT  
SECRETARY OF WAR  
*Secret*

November 14, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear McCloy: At JCS lunch today Admiral Leahy stated, with regard to his conversation with you yesterday, I believe, that he had taken up with the President the memorandum of the Secretaries of War and Navy to the Joint Chiefs of Staff—copy attached, and that the President had declined to approve it.<sup>1</sup> I assume that this information will come to you in more formal fashion. However, I wanted to give you without delay a summary of our discussion of the matter at luncheon today.

It seemed to us, particularly in view of the President's action, that the first step to meet the desire of the Secretaries of War and Navy would be to create a businesslike organization which would insure that the group composed of the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, and Secretary of the Navy<sup>2</sup>—and possibly the Secretary of the Treasury, could act effectively in all matters having a political rather than a purely military aspect. This group, in effect, would then refer to the Joint Chiefs of Staff their proposed directives or action for comment regarding the military implications. To make this a practical working proposition, having in mind the conditions that now exist, it appeared to us that if for such purposes the Secretary of State could be prevailed upon to designate a particular individual on a lower level than Mr. Stettinius to act as working secretary for the Cabinet group and he had under him a joint working committee to prepare the necessary studies or propositions to implement the desires of the three Cabinet officers concerned, then the problem of handling political questions would be largely solved.

We thought, for example, that Mr. Dunn would be an ideal person, and of sufficient prestige to act as secretary for this small Cabinet committee.<sup>3</sup> Admiral Leahy suggested that the Chiefs of Staff might well detail a military representative to be an ex-officio member of the working committee. But it would be very important that the working committee be pure workers rather than men occupied with many other interests and more inclined to discuss rather than to laboriously develop ways and means.

I pass this on to you as an immediate comment regarding this business, and shall be glad to talk to you about it.<sup>4</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The memorandum noted that given the growing number of political problems coming before the Joint Chiefs of Staff (e.g., occupation policies), the military needed to coordinate its views with other government agencies, particularly with the Department of State. The J.C.S. was considering establishing a Joint Civil Affairs Committee, and the memorandum recommended that this be done promptly and that representatives of the service secretaries and the secretary of state be made members. The memorandum further recommended expanding this associate membership to other J.C.S. committees when they considered



"problems having aspects as to which the views of the Secretaries might profitably be taken into account at the planning stage." Finally, whenever the heads of government departments desired the armed services' view on political or military matters, they would communicate with the service secretaries, who would ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff for guidance. (Stimson and Forrestal Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, no date, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. High-level civil-military coordination in the United States government was an old problem. The Standing Liaison Committee (under secretary of state plus the army chief of staff and the chief of naval operations) had operated between 1938 and 1941, achieving some success in Latin American policy. This committee was displaced in early 1941 when Secretaries Hull, Stimson, and Knox agreed informally to meet weekly (the State-War-Navy Committee). The problem was that for various institutional and personality reasons, the State Department found itself increasingly on the sidelines after Pearl Harbor. (On the history of civil-military coordination prior to Marshall's memorandum, see Walter Millis, *Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy* [New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958], pt. 1, and Ray S. Cline, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1951], chap. 16.)

3. James Clement Dunn, a Foreign Service officer since 1920, was the adviser on political relations to the secretary of state with reference to European affairs. He became assistant secretary of state for European, Far Eastern, and Near Eastern and African affairs on December 20.

4. The official Operations Division history states: "The crisis in Washington staff work on German surrender and occupation pointed the way to the major development of World War II in administrative procedures for handling politico-military affairs, the creation of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). This committee, with its standing subcommittees for particular areas and important topics, finally provided a basis for interdepartmental staff work that brought foreign policy formulation into close connection with joint committee work and JCS deliberations." The committee was established in December 1944 with three civilian members, each holding the position of assistant secretary in his own agency. (Cline, *Washington Command Post*, p. 326.) The interaction between U.S. government organization and the policy-making process regarding the occupation of Germany is discussed in Paul Y. Hammond, "Directives for the Occupation of Germany: The Washington Controversy," in Harold Stein, ed., *American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies* (Birmingham: University of Alabama Press, 1963), pp. 311-464.

TO MAJOR GENERAL EWING E. BOOTH

November 14, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Booth: Your autobiography reached me yesterday morning and as I was partially housebound by a flu germ and only spent a few hours at the office, my time here at home has been devoted to re-reading it—I had previously read the MS.<sup>1</sup> You gave me a great deal of pleasure with the book and by your gracious deed of gift on the flyleaf. Thank you for remembering me so.

Many portions of your story carried me back through the years and awakened fond memories. The period of your boyhood fascinated me, as I wrote you before. Incidentally, Senator Alva Adams and I became warm



friends during the period he was Chairman of the Senate Sub-Committee on Deficiency Appropriations before which I spent many hours in obtaining authorizations for many billions. I last saw him at the airport in Denver shortly before his death.<sup>2</sup>

I have always been distressed that my sudden and very secret departure for the Casablanca conference prevented me from serving you at Mrs. Booth's last rites, and also prevented me from seeing you.<sup>3</sup> Some months ago I passed through Los Angeles in the final stage of a trip around the world. I hoped to see you, but was occupied so long in going through four of the large airplane plants in the few hours I was in the vicinity that I did not find the time.<sup>4</sup> If I get out that way again I shall certainly make a special effort to see you.

Incidentally, Sally Garlington is one of my secretaries and looks after Mrs. Marshall's voluminous semi-official correspondence. She is very efficient and agreeable to deal with.<sup>5</sup>

With my thanks again and affectionate regards, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Regarding *My Observations and Experiences in the United States Army*, which Booth had recently printed, see *Papers of GCM*, 2: 127–29.

2. The Colorado Democrat died in Washington, D.C., December 1, 1941.

3. Marshall was to have been an honorary pallbearer for Mrs. Booth at Arlington National Cemetery on May 26, 1943. At that time, however, Marshall was traveling with Churchill to a conference in Algiers with Eisenhower. See the editorial note on p. 3.

4. Marshall was in Los Angeles December 21–22, 1943; see the editorial note on p. 200.

5. Mrs. Sally Garlington Chamberlin was Mrs. J. Franklin Bell's niece. She handled some of Marshall's personal correspondence, becoming, as Marshall's authorized biographer observed, "an authority on information required to answer Marshall's boyhood friends from Uniontown, inquiries on the family tree, or men who had served with him in the Philippines, at Leavenworth, or in World War I." (Pogue, *Organizer of Victory*, p. 61.)

TO CAPTAIN DONALD HOUGH

November 14, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Captain Hough: I happened to read your book "Captain Retread" and should like you to know that I not only enjoyed it thoroughly but found it, in my opinion, an amazingly accurate, as well as amusing appreciation of Army life and soldier reactions. It was especially interesting to me in the point of view of an old AEF veteran, regarding this great new Army which is now proving itself magnificently overseas.<sup>1</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Hough, who had enlisted in World War I and completed the war as a first lieutenant, had rejoined the army in 1942 as a captain—a forty-seven-year-old "retread," as those who



returned to duty were called, a reference to putting a new tread on old tires. A writer, he described his recent experiences in the Army Air Forces in the southwestern United States. The book was published by W. W. Norton and Company in the spring of 1944. (See Orville Prescott, "Books of the Times," *New York Times*, May 12, 1944, p. 17.) At the time Marshall wrote, Hough was in the Philippines.

TO COLONEL WILLIAM H. DRAPER, JR.<sup>1</sup>

November 15, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Draper: I just learnt yesterday that your boy had been lost in France and I want you to know that you have my deep sympathy. This war has reached a stage where it is sparing few families in this country and I fear that worse is still to come before we reach a victorious conclusion.

I have had you in mind for a long time, feeling that you had suffered very hard luck in being deprived of troop opportunity. However, General Somervell tells me the services you are now rendering are of such great importance that he does not feel that he can release you at the present time. Should an opportunity arise you may be sure that I will try to further your chances for overseas service.

Again with my sympathy, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. In peacetime, Draper was a Reserve officer and a partner in the New York banking firm of Dillon, Reed and Company. He was at Army Service Forces headquarters working on a joint study of army-navy procurement relationships, including the termination of purchasing contracts.

TO W. O. EDWARDS

November 15, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mr. Edwards: I have delayed replying to your letter concerning the death of your son until the case could be looked into thoroughly.<sup>1</sup>

I find that your son received the complete training course given to all replacements before they are sent overseas. Upon completion of the prescribed training all these men are given tests to determine if they have satisfactorily completed the training. The fact that your son was sent overseas indicates that he met all the standards which are based upon lessons we have learned in combat in this war. While replacements are not fully seasoned soldiers when they go overseas, we feel that they are adequately trained to take their places in seasoned units. Reports from overseas commanders in every theater substantiate this position. The success of our armies all over the world has been due in considerable measure to the high



caliber of replacements and to the fact that our units are thereby kept constantly up to full strength.

You refer to the large number of fully trained soldiers remaining in this country. This charge is not justified. Over a year ago instructions were issued that every man in the Army who was physically qualified for overseas duty and had not been overseas was to be assigned to a combat zone as a matter of first priority. Exceptions were granted only in the cases where release of these men from assigned duties would be detrimental to the organization because of some special skill or training, this referring principally to flying and special equipment instructors. As a result of a vigorous follow through on this program, there are relatively few fully trained, physically qualified soldiers remaining in the United States except those in units which are scheduled for early sailing.

I share your dissatisfaction concerning the lack of information you have received on the circumstances surrounding your son's death. It is regretted that when the notice of the death of a soldier in action goes out more details cannot be given, but the confused situation normally incident to front line activities and the burden on our limited communication facilities make it impossible for full information to be sent by radio. Up until a few months ago we depended upon the initiative and the judgment of the unit commander and the chaplains to write parents of soldiers who had died overseas. I have recently directed these letters be made mandatory and undoubtedly you will receive in the near future a communication from your son's company commander or his chaplain giving all the information available. However, this must be taken into account: casualties among company officers of infantry are very high; the situation during continuous fighting remains very confused, and rearrangements for almost daily attacks as well as life in foxholes and under limited cover present great difficulties to platoon, company and battalion commanders in writing the desired letters to parents or wives.

While I realize there is little I can say to relieve your grief in the loss of your son, I want you to know that the War Department has left no stone unturned in its efforts to fully train its soldiers, provide them with the best possible equipment, and take every other step to insure their safety in combat.

Again my deep sympathy and my hope that this letter will help you to realize at least to some extent that your son gave his life not by reason of inadequate training or faulty leadership, but as one of the unfortunate but inevitable results of this terrible war. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. An Illinois lawyer and a member of the state legislature, Edwards had written to Marshall on October 21 saying that the War Department had twice notified his son's wife that her husband had been killed on September 17 in Germany. "Your card of sympathy,



received yesterday, to the widow was about the last straw." Edwards complained that his thirty-four-year-old son had enlisted in January 1944, was sent to Camp Blanding, Florida ("where they had the most ruthless and inefficient officers that the boys claim there could be found"), received inadequate training, and was sent to France in July. "My family feels that he was actually murdered for lack of sufficient training." Edwards was displeased that the army had used men like his son as "cannon fodder" while there were "thousands having been trained three years still travelling the railroads in America." (Edwards to Marshall, October 21, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

TO BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT E. WOOD  
*Confidential*

November 16, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Wood: I have your letters of November eighth and tenth and appreciate very much the constructive and illuminating comments you make.<sup>1</sup>

In the planning that is going on towards the post-war Army very careful thought is being given to the amount of funds that might reasonably be allocated for national security in peacetime budgets. As a matter of fact, and most confidentially, I returned all the plans to the planners just the other day with the direction that the whole matter be reconsidered because I felt that they were unrealistic, both as to the size of the Army required considering a reasonable expectation of the peace terms as to what the military strength of the world would be, and especially as to the size of the military budget required.<sup>2</sup>

I felt after hearing the comments of some of your business associates after my talk at Hot Springs, that I had failed to make plain the nature of my appeal to them. It was not my intention to propose any particular size Army or any particular organization, Army and Navy, though I did state specifically that universal military training from the financial point of view was an absolute necessity, because otherwise no respectable military posture could be taken by this country.

What I was endeavoring to say to your associates, as suggested by listening to their morning discussions on taxes, was that unless they gave very careful thought and the closest attention—meaning continuous influence on groups and on legislators—towards the character of the military organization we set up after this war they would find themselves either suffering taxes from the purely military point of view, which would make the matters discussed by them the other morning of trivial importance, or that we should have no respectable or practical posture of military strength, whatever it might be considered to be.

To my mind it is a matter of first interest to your particular group to see that there is no damned nonsense about the character of the organization we set up, that it is as businesslike as it is possible for a government agency



to be and not a welter of bureaus involving interdisputes, duplications, agonizing delays and fallacious arguments before Congress, having in mind some ulterior motive nine times out of ten.

Therefore I was glad to receive your letter and I am having it considered by the planners in order to be more certain that their view is sufficiently realistic. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. On November 4, Marshall had made a speech to the Department of Commerce's Business Advisory Council at the Homestead resort at Hot Springs, Virginia. He spoke on current military operations and the postwar military establishment. Wood, chairman of the board of Sears, Roebuck and Company, attended the meeting. He wrote to Marshall expressing his support for universal military service and his belief that sentiment in the country also supported it. The real problem, he thought, was "to find the balance between the defense establishment that we need and the funds that this country can afford to allocate to that defense." Wood noted that the United States developed its powerful industrial machine largely because of relatively light taxation and that the industrial machine was vital to modern warfare. The postwar national budget would probably be "somewhere between \$23,000,000,000 and \$25,000,000,000 of which \$4,000,000,000 to \$5,000,000,000 would probably be allocated to military, naval and air establishments. If you go beyond that total budget I think you will get beyond the safe limits of taxation and fetter our industrial progress." Two days later, Wood sent Marshall a copy of a poll taken in Iowa that indicated strong public support for the general idea of postwar compulsory military training. (Wood to Marshall, November 8 and 10, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

2. See Marshall Memorandum for the Acting Director, Special Planning Division, November 13, 1944, pp. 659-60.

TO MRS. JEROME G. PILLOW

November 16, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mrs. Pillow: Thank you for your gracious little note which reached me a few days ago. You were very sweet and thoughtful to send me your good wishes on my birthday. However, to be very honest I had been hoping that we could end this war in Europe and somebody else could take my place for the finish in the Pacific. Six years of this business is far too long. It was my intention when first appointed, to retire at the end of two years and it has continued to be the almost daily thought of Mrs. Marshall and mine.

I hope you are in good health. If I should be flying in the vicinity of Atchison I certainly shall try to look you up.

With my thanks again and very best wishes, Faithfully yours,

P.S. I always remember our intimate social contacts more or less in the Packard Plant or in the garage basement of 2400 16th Street. All that seems a long time ago, doesn't it?<sup>1</sup>



GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. The Marshalls lived at 2400 Sixteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., from late 1919 to mid-1924. Between mid-1919 and mid-1920, Pillow (U.S.M.A., 1901), a Cavalry major at the time, was a member of the War Department General Staff. He retired in 1938 and became a vice-president and director of the Exchange National Bank of Atchison, Kansas.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HULL  
*Top Secret*

November 16, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

I have glanced through these papers regarding Indo-China and Hainan. They present to my mind a very confusing estimate.

Please have your people prepare a paper for Admiral Leahy purely on the basis of the occupation of Hainan with the consequent results, that is, the air coverage it would provide not only over China and Indo-China but finally to cut the throat of Japanese shipping north and south towards Malaysia and the Netherlands East Indies; also the fact that it might possibly be made a British enterprise though the desirable date involved probably would not permit them to make their arrangements accordingly.

It seems to me that this operation would provide a very good follow-up on the Ryukyu affair unless the Japanese in the meantime reinforce Hainan. It is very important, incidentally, that no reconnaissances be made that would excite their suspicions, because at the present time they apparently have no idea that we would attempt such a move.

Have your planners avoid making such statements as: "This could not be done without interfering with the Bonins or the Ryukyus", but rather present the time that it might possibly be done.<sup>1</sup>

G. C. M.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The Joint Staff Planners had been considering J.W.P.C. 272 (Operations for the Defeat of Japan). One contingency was an operation to seize Hainan Island, which separates the Gulf of Tonkin from the South China Sea. A study of this operation was presented to Marshall on November 22, but Major General John E. Hull noted that the Pacific theater was short of cargo shipping and service and support troops. The planners thought that any resources that became available should be utilized in extending U.S. control in the Ryukyus beyond Okinawa. (Hull Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, November 22, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 381, Case 575].)

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING

November 16, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

I have read the enclosures with your memorandum of November 8th concerning the travel of dependents outside the United States.<sup>1</sup> It does not



seem to me that conditions have changed sufficiently to warrant departing from the Joint Army-Navy Personnel Board's recommendation of August 5th on the subject.

The morale of our personnel in the Caribbean and similar areas presents no problem as those who have been in these areas for long periods are steadily being withdrawn, while others have only recently arrived. In any event, the lot of these people has been luxurious as compared with that of the men in active combat areas.

There is the further factor that we frequently order officers out of these stations on a few hours' notice. The presence of families would complicate this procedure both for the particular officers and for those who, of necessity, would temporarily have to look out for the families.

I am inclined to believe we should not relax our restrictions in this matter at this time, but suggest that we wait until after our re-deployment is completed and then consider placing the travel of dependents to these areas back on a peacetime basis.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Admiral King wanted to permit the dependents to join naval personnel stationed in such places as the Caribbean and Newfoundland. (King Memorandum for General Marshall, November 8, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 512].)

2. In March 1945, Marshall suggested that travel restrictions on dependents be relaxed in the Caribbean and Brazil. (Marshall Memorandum for Admiral King, March 6, 1945, *ibid.*)

STATEMENT ON UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING<sup>1</sup>  
*Secret*

November 16, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Under plans now in preparation in the War Department, all able-bodied young men are to be trained in special training units.

They will not be legally subject to military *service* in time of peace, that is, they can only be employed in training exercises.

They will be trained in special units by carefully selected officers more than half of whom (probably 90 percent) will be reserve or citizen-officers who volunteer for a year of temporary active service in order to acquire further experience in the important duty of training and leading younger citizen soldiers.

After this training they will be enrolled as reservists for a few years, but during this reserve period they will not be subject to military *service* except in the event of a national emergency proclaimed by Congress and then only such members and under such conditions as the Congress may prescribe. This in effect, will be the status of every young able-bodied male citizen,



but under a system of Universal Military Training practically all such men will have been so trained.

The outlines of our feature [future] military system under universal military training are given, as a basis for planning, in paragraph 3, War Department Circular Number 347, dated 25 August 1944. A reading of that document will reveal that it specifically repudiates and rejects the European conscript system.<sup>2</sup> In fact, it proposes a modern adaptation of the democratic military system which *President George Washington proposed to the First Congress, a proposal for the future security and welfare of this country before any of the European conscript systems were established or even thought of.*

The national army proposed in War Department Circular No. 347 would comprise a small regular army and a large citizen army reserve. The officer corps of this national army, as a whole, would comprise comparatively few professional officers and a relatively large number of citizen or reserve officers. Every young man who reveals the gift of leadership during the training period would be given an opportunity to qualify as a reserve officer or non-commissioned officer, and therefore would be eligible for promotion to any rank for which he could qualify under sound and equitable standards.

The military forces which, under the law of the land, would be available for actual field service would of necessity be composed entirely of volunteers, but volunteers who had received their basic training under the provisions of Universal Military Training.

Any person who alleges that there is anything militaristic, undemocratic, or un-American in the universal training system proposed in War Department Circular No. 347 is obviously ignorant of an important phase of American history.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. This statement was drafted by John McA. Palmer and extensively rewritten by Marshall. It was inspired by Congressman James W. Wadsworth, a member of the House Select Committee on Post-war Military Policy, which was headed by Clifton A. Woodrum, Democrat of Virginia. On November 10, a delegation of labor leaders had visited Marshall to discuss universal military training. The union leaders also met with Stimson, Woodrum, Wadsworth, and Palmer. Palmer told Marshall: "Congressman Woodrum and Congressman Wadsworth informed the Secretary of War that they would prepare a simple statement of policy and principles as coming from civilian sources and not as coming from the War Department." Palmer gave Wadsworth a copy of the statement printed here. "He was greatly pleased with it and said that he would put the same ideas in language of his own and submit it to Judge Woodrum as a basis for the statement proposed in the conference." (Palmer Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, November 22, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) For further developments, see Marshall Memorandum for General Tompkins, November 26, 1944, p. 677.

2. The War Department statement on the postwar military establishment observed that there were "two types of military organization through which the manpower of a nation may be developed": the standing army type (based upon conscription) and the citizen army



reserve type (based upon universal military training). The former, used by Germany and Japan, produced “highly efficient armies,” but it limited the “common citizen” to the enlisted ranks in war and left leadership and policy making to “a special class or caste of professional soldiers. . . . Under such a system only the brawn of a people is prepared for war, there being no adequate provision for developing the latent military leadership and genius of the people as a whole. It therefore has no place among the institutions of a modern democratic state based upon the conception of government by the people.” (War Department Circular No. 347, August 25, 1944, pp. 4–5.)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SOMERVELL  
*Secret*

November 22, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Yesterday at the JCS luncheon with representatives of the principal civil sections (Land, Justice Byrnes, Harry Hopkins, a representative for Krug, etc.) there was a detailed discussion regarding the ocean tonnage shortage and specifically the tie-up of ships awaiting unloading in the European theater—200 odd I believe. Land gave the unloading rates per month in the European theater, and as I recall the highest figure was 90.<sup>1</sup> The feeling was that something ought to be done to control shipments from this side when there was no prospect of unloading on that side. This has been the subject of a great deal of continuous discussion of course for a long time and I am at the moment not familiar with all the detailed complications. However, when Clay and his party arrive here will you go into this very carefully and have in mind Clay talking to Justice Byrnes about it as he, Byrnes, has great confidence in Clay and is deeply concerned over the present situation.<sup>2</sup>

One of the considerations at the moment is the pressure being exerted by Kaiser to tell his people at some early date what the demobilization dates will be in the shipyards.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand there is the question of just what additional ship construction we should authorize—particularly as to propelling engines—for the first six months of 1945, and for the second. This factor is involved with the unloading tie-up in shipping.

You are familiar with all these affairs and what I am asking you now is to see that Clay gives us specifically his view as to the troubles abroad and their relationship to our problem here.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The minutes of this meeting have Vice Admiral Emory S. Land stating that there were some 350 ships being held idle in all theaters awaiting discharge and 400 more being held in theaters for various uses by theater commanders. Mr. Byrnes noted that unloading rates were: August, 79; September, 90; October, 67; November (up to the twentieth), 50. (Minutes of Meeting Held by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Heads of Civilian War Agencies, November 21, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS 334, JCS Minutes].)

2. On December 6, Byrnes announced that Major General Lucius D. Clay, who had been in charge of procurement for the Army Service Forces since March 1942, would become the deputy director for war programs and general administration of the Office of



War Mobilization and Reconversion, which had been created in March 1944 out of the Office of War Mobilization. Clay had been in the European theater during the autumn improving cargo unloading at Cherbourg and later touring the front and investigating the artillery ammunition shortage.

3. Henry J. Kaiser's shipyards built about one-fifth of the Maritime Commission's ships. He was, a leading business magazine noted in late 1943, "indisputably the No. 1 businessman of the hour." Furthermore, "day and night he thinks and talks postwar planning." ("Henry J. Kaiser," *Fortune* 28 [October 1943]: 147, 258.)

TO CLARENCE FRANCIS

November 22, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mr. Francis: Thank you for your note and the pleasant things you had to say regarding the Hot Springs meeting. I am much interested in the statistics you forwarded regarding universal military training.<sup>1</sup>

After my talk at Hot Springs and following conversations with a number of you people I felt that the point I had in mind had not been made clear. I was not trying to outline what sort of an organization we should have after the war, how large an Army, etc. What I was trying to do was to impress you people with the importance of following through the development of policies regarding our post-war military organization, otherwise we should either completely lack a respectable military posture or we should be financially bankrupt in maintaining what appeared to be an adequate Army and Navy. I meant by this that your discussion of taxes that morning did not involve a single reference to what would be the greatest headache of all regarding taxes, that is, the military program.

Therefore, whatever we do (and I am not undertaking at this time to say what we should do) we must approach the problem in the most businesslike manner possible and you as businessmen, with an inevitable heavy obligation in taxes, must display far more than a passing interest in the development of the post-war system. It is very much your business from the purely selfish point of view as well as from that of a citizen who is interested in the stability of his country in this troubled world. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Francis, chairman of the board of General Foods Corporation, wrote that the meeting of the Business Advisory Council at Hot Springs, Virginia, was "one of the high spots of my career." In his letter he enclosed the results of a questionnaire sent by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to its members concerning universal military training. Of 2,394 who expressed an opinion, 90.8 percent favored such a system. (Francis to Marshall, November 21, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General]. For another letter on this theme as a result of this meeting, see Marshall to Wood, November 16, 1944, pp. 668-69.)



TO ELMER DAVIS  
*Confidential*

November 24, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mr. Davis: General Surles tells me that you are of the opinion that the War Department demobilization film, "Two Down and One to Go," should not be released to the public unless it is revised to include a serial from the Navy Department as to their plan.<sup>1</sup>

A great deal of thought and planning has been given to this film, since it must serve the purpose of presenting clearly to the troops and to the American public a very important, but very complicated, subject. While the principles of the demobilization plan are quite simple, the mechanics of its operation in the several theaters of war are necessarily involved, and for that reason the thread of logical explanation running through the film should not be interrupted. Moreover, it seems to me particularly important that the film shown to the public should be identical with that shown to the troops.

The Navy Department is facing an entirely different demobilization problem than the Army and its treatment of the subject should not be confused with the Army's plans. Rather, I think, it should be handled in a separate picture produced and distributed by the Navy.<sup>2</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. For previous consideration of this film, see Marshall Memorandum for the Secretary of War, September 29, 1944, pp. 614–15.

2. Davis replied that even though the navy had no desire to be included in the film and had no similar film of its own, "probably thirty percent of the theater audience would have relatives in the Navy and they would naturally wonder what happens to their boys. I think the omission of any explanation of the Navy's attitude from such a showing would be likely to leave a considerable amount of uncertainty if not of soreness in many minds." (Davis to Marshall, November 25, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Secretary Stimson ultimately had to take the matter directly to Secretary Forrestal and get a formal statement that the navy did not desire to participate in the film in any way. Davis then withdrew his objections. Showings of the film began at noon on May 10, 1945. (Stimson to the Secretary of the Navy, December 18, 1944; H. Merrill Pasco Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, January 2, 1945; and Brigadier General R. W. Berry Memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Staff, May 10, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 062.2].)

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL SOMERVILLE

November 24, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Admiral Somerville: Your note of 21 November 1944 regarding a proposal to confer certain British awards on United States officers for



services in the South and Southwest Pacific crossed with my memorandum to you of the same date on the subject of British awards to Generals Stilwell, Wedemeyer, Stratemeyer, Wheeler and Sultan. I refer to the latter memorandum as it sets forth our policy under which United States theater commanders are authorized to clear operational awards made to members of our forces in the field by any of the British Commonwealth of Nations.<sup>1</sup>

Of the Army officers listed in the attached file, Generals Harmon, Thompson and Smith have been relieved from duty in the areas indicated and therefore clearance of their awards is a proper War Department function. I assure you that there will be no objection to these awards if they are presented officially. Smith, by the way, was on duty in the Central Pacific rather than the Southwest Pacific.

Since the remaining Army officers listed are still in the Southwest Pacific, I should prefer not to express a view on the proposed awards unless you wish to authorize me to consult General MacArthur. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Somerville had been instructed to ascertain from Marshall and King "privately, in advance of official proposals," whether the service chiefs had any objections to British awards of various degrees to thirty-eight men, including Major Generals Millard F. Harmon, Jr. (commanding general of army forces in the South Pacific Area, July 1942-July 1944, and since August 1944 in Hawaii as commanding general of U.S. Army Air Forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas), Charles F. Thompson (commanding general of Islands Command in Fiji between October 1942 and May 1944, and since September 1944 the commanding general of the Military District of Washington), and Ralph C. Smith (commanding general of the Twenty-seventh Infantry Division in the Central Pacific between November 1942 and June 1944, and since July 1944 in the European Theater of Operations). (Somerville to Marshall, November 21, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

Marshall's memorandum (written in G-1 and revised by Major Pasco) stated that the War Department had no objection to awards to Joseph W. Stilwell, Albert C. Wedemeyer, or George E. Stratemeyer, but Raymond A. Wheeler and Daniel I. Sultan were "precluded from accepting at this time as their duties are intimately connected with Lend-Lease activities. Washington clearance is not necessary for operational awards made to members of our forces in the field by any of the British Commonwealth of Nations[.] United States theater commanders are authorized to give the necessary concurrence provided the recipient is not engaged in Lend-lease activities. In accordance with our agreement, awards will, of course, be limited to personnel in theaters of operation which have forces actively engaged with the enemy and will be restricted to cases of heroism or service directly connected with combat operations. We have been placing a rather strict interpretation on what constitutes 'service directly connected with combat operations' and are withholding presentation when the services rendered were of the high level planning type in a senior headquarters, even though in an active theater. While this may appear unduly restrictive, I consider it extremely desirable in order to insure that, at least until Germany falls, decorations go almost entirely to the men who are conducting or participating in combat operations." (Marshall Memorandum for Admiral Somerville, November 21, 1944, *ibid.*)



MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TOMPKINS

November 26, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

I have read Senator Wadsworth's draft with the statement on universal military training to be presented to the labor leaders and find it acceptable.<sup>1</sup> However, I think the portion that refers to the status of the individual after the completion of training might be presented in a better light. As I understand it practically every physically fit male would be under the same liability for service in a national emergency, therefore why imply that only the graduates of the universal military training course would be called upon for such service?<sup>2</sup> Would not practically all of the physically fit males have had the universal military training? Therefore, why feature their status in the reserves, unless we still have in mind that some such continued relationship as is involved in a return for further training at stated intervals.

If 18 years is believed to be the age at which all men should be called for universal military training, the statement is acceptable. However, I was under the impression that we had in mind the period 18 to 20 years inclusive, allowing some option on the part of the individual.

Might it not be well to include somewhere in the statement the fact—under the premises—that the ranks of the Army and Navy under the system proposed would be maintained entirely on a voluntary basis as heretofore? The difference would be that while the individual volunteered for such service, he would have had under the law a year of purely training.

Penned note: By all means clear this with S/W and Mr. McCloy.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. For background on Wadsworth's statement, see note 1, Marshall Statement on Universal Military Training, November 16, 1944, p. 672.

2. Congressman Wadsworth (who had been a United States senator from 1915 to 1927) had written: "After completion of the training, they shall be passed to and enrolled in appropriate reserve components of the Army or Navy, including the aviation branches of those services, and should remain in the status of reservists for several, let us say 4, 5, or 6, years. As reservists they shall not be subject to active military service except in the event of a national emergency proclaimed by the Congress. Concurrently with such a proclamation, the Congress will determine how many of the reservists are to be called to active duty and under what conditions. It is highly probable, almost certain, that in such a situation the Congress will, by appropriate enactment, set in motion the process of selection, closely paralleling our present wartime processes." (Statement on Universal Military Training Prepared by Senator Wadsworth for Labor Leaders, no date, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 353 (November 24, 1944)].)

3. This postscript was typed on the copy retained in Marshall's papers.



TO BEN HIBBS

November 27, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mr. Hibbs: I received the five Philippine guerrilla articles and gave two of them a very careful reading—scanned the rest.<sup>1</sup> Then I had the Public Relations Bureau go into the matter very carefully, General Surles himself taking the lead.<sup>2</sup>

I am sorry to tell you that it does not appear possible to arrange for their release prior to the occupation of Mindanao. I had hoped that by making certain changes—as suggested in part by you—it would be possible to publish an article with sufficient interest, at the same time without doing damage to us in the Philippines. I am now convinced that this is not possible, and I am therefore sorry to inform you accordingly.

If you care to and will provide me with the copies, I will send them out to MacArthur, to see what he has to say in the matter.<sup>3</sup> Faithfully yours,

P.S. I am returning the MS. herewith.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall had lunch with John McA. Palmer and Hibbs and his associate editor at the *Saturday Evening Post*, Forrest Davis, on November 16 in connection with the article Palmer had written about the postwar army. (See note 4, Marshall to Wallace, September 20, 1944, p. 595.)

2. Marshall sent the manuscripts of the five articles—"The Philippines Never Surrendered," by Edward M. Kuder and edited by Pete Martin—to the Bureau of Public Relations, which returned them to the magazine suggesting that they "be resubmitted if, and when, Mindanao was liberated." Marshall again requested a review, which resulted in the same recommendation and the observation that "General MacArthur has not released anything on guerrilla activities except that they do exist." (Marshall Memorandum for the Director, Bureau of Public Relations, November 21, 1944; Surles Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, November 23, 1944; and Pasco Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, November 25, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. Marshall wrote to MacArthur enclosing the manuscripts and asking that his staff review them to "see if there is any possibility of making them acceptable for publication without killing most of the interest." MacArthur returned the articles saying that he had no objection to their publication. (Marshall to MacArthur, November 30, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 000.76], and Marshall to Hibbs, December 27, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) The articles appeared in the magazine in the five weeks between February 10 and March 10, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ARNOLD,  
GENERAL HANDY, GENERAL HULL

November 28, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Governor Sewall of Maine.

The Secretary of War brought to my attention the desire of Governor



Sewall of Maine to render some service either in or out of uniform in connection with the war, at the expiration of his present term as Governor—which I assume will be the first of the year. He was a World War pilot and I am told is a very fine character; age about 40 (the Secretary of War said he was a young man either of 40 or in the 40s!).

Please have him in mind when some vacancy develops for a man of his stature.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Sumner Sewall, a former ace in the First Pursuit Group, had been governor of Maine since 1941; he was forty-seven at the time of Marshall's memorandum. Associated with the airline industry for many years, Sewall became president of American Export Airlines on May 3, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SOMERVELL

November 28, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

General Hines of the Veterans Bureau called to see me today.<sup>1</sup> He had two items in particular:

One referred to the transfer of Colonel Griffith from General Hershey's office to the Veterans Bureau in connection with the rehabilitation mission of General Hines, in which General Hines was hopeful that Griffith could be maintained on active duty as he had been in Hershey's office. He had a letter from the Secretary of War stating this was against the policy. He was not pressing hard in the matter but I wondered if we were leaning over backwards in this case considering the fact that the man was already on active duty while serving in Hershey's office.<sup>2</sup>

The second point was in relation to deficiency in nurses. He had a number of different propositions that might help the Veterans Bureau in this matter, but none of them I thought, so far as they applied to the Army, were acceptable—but this one: he said he had been discussing, I presume with the Surgeon General, the possibility of having the Army obtain nurses and loan them to the Veterans Bureau, as it were, much as is now done with Medical officers. He stated that his trouble was, the nurses in the Veterans Bureau were on a Civil Service status and do not profit by the Veteran legislation, as do the WACs and the Army Nurse Corps. He was very desirous of continuing the Veterans Bureau on a purely civil basis but was under such pressure now that unless some arrangement of the nature of that referred to above was adopted, the Veterans Bureau would probably become involved in the establishment of a Corps having the same character of protection as discharged veterans.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)



1. Brigadier General Frank T. Hines was head of the Veterans' Administration, the Federal Board of Hospitalization, and the Retraining and Reemployment Administration.

2. Colonel Paul H. Griffith was chief of the Veterans Personnel Division of the Selective Service System. Somervell agreed with Marshall that the War Department was perhaps being unduly difficult with regard to Griffith's transfer. G-1 objected, however, that they had been charged with reducing the number of officers on duty with civilian agencies and making an exception for Griffith would make it more difficult to turn down the many other requests for exceptions. Marshall wrote to Hines: "I find that the pressure is so great from a number of sources that if an exception is made in this case I shall greatly embarrass the Deputy Chief of Staff and the Personnel Division, which I do not feel that I should do. Incidentally, they tell me that they have made exceptions in Medical personnel to the extent of 60 officers and 255 enlisted men, in the month of October alone." (Somervell Memorandum for General Marshall, November 30, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected]; Pasco Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, December 4, 1944, and Marshall to Hines, December 6, 1944, *ibid.*, [Pentagon Office, General].)

3. The army was eighty-five hundred nurses short of meeting its own requirements for nurses, Somervell replied, and it was achieving a net gain of only four hundred per month; consequently, he recommended against Hines's proposal. Marshall returned Somervell's memorandum with a note at the bottom saying that Hines thought he needed army status to facilitate his own recruiting—"may be older personnel who do not feel up to being involved overseas." (Somervell Memorandum for General Marshall, November 30, 1944, *ibid.*) Somervell, however, did not want to lower standards for army nurses or to create different standards for the home front versus overseas. Moreover, as members of the Army Nurse Corps were counted against the army's authorized strength ceiling, he did not wish to give up part of the army's quota for the Veterans' Administration. (Somervell Memorandum for General Marshall, December 1, 1944, *ibid.*)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HULL

*Top Secret*

November 30, 1944

[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Atlantic Coast Defense.<sup>1</sup>

I am rather uncertain regarding the advisability of the letter to Admiral King in its present form.<sup>2</sup> It seems to me it would be better if we stated the matter in more concise terms:

1. What the present situation is.
2. What the trouble was.
3. What should be done.

It seems to me in this particular matter that the whole correspondence, particularly if signed by me as suggested, presents a very poor picture of efficiency, particularly the hiatus between the War and Navy Departments which neither of our operational groups checked up or followed through on regarding each other. Discussing this is one thing, committing it all to paper is another.



I also question seemingly accepting as being satisfactory the statement that the Army Air Forces had directed the C.G., First Air Force to render all possible support to C.E.S.F. [Commander Eastern Sea Frontier], etc. It seems to me that divided command here was being accentuated in a most unfortunate manner.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On November 1, the commanders of the navy's Eastern Sea Frontier (Vice Admiral Herbert F. Leary) and the army's Eastern Defense Command (Lieutenant General George Grunert) were notified that the Germans might be planning an attack on New York City by V-1 rockets fired from a new type of submarine. On November 3 Leary was told that an attack might occur in the very near future. On November 7 the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that a high-level (Condition 2) alert be initiated, but this was removed on the tenth. The whole affair "proved to be a very valuable exercise," Leary noted, pointing up not only the "paucity of forces" but numerous command and coordination weaknesses within and among the local navy, army, and air force commands and the Army and Navy departments in Washington. (Leary to Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, November 17, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 471.94]. Grunert made similar observations.) King, noting that the army and navy had been "criticized because of alleged lack of close cooperation at Pearl Harbor in 1941," asked Marshall to "suggest for discussion a scheme that you consider suitable for integrating defense measures on the seaboard of the United States." (King to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, November 20, 1944, *ibid.*) Concerning the settlement of a similar problem in mid-1942, see *Papers of GCM*, 3: 241–42.

2. This Operations Division draft is not in the Marshall papers.

3. Marshall first clarified the conditions under which the commanding general of the Defense Commands could, in the event of an emergency, assume command of all army forces physically located within the boundaries of his command. (During the November emergency, Grunert's authority to assume tactical control of the First Air Force had been unclear.) Marshall then wrote to King that "the confusion incident to the recent robot bombing threat appears principally to have been due to the lack of a coordinated procedure here in the War and Navy Departments for placing the existing joint plans in effect." He suggested that the Joint Staff Planners be directed immediately to study the existing command organizations and current plans and make recommendations. King suggested that the army and navy operations and intelligence divisions should cooperate in drafting a joint directive, and Marshall agreed. (Colonel P. W. Edwards to The Adjutant General, December 1, 1944; Marshall to Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, December 4, 1944; King Memorandum for Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, December 13, 1944; and Marshall Memorandum for Admiral King, December 22, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 471.94].)

TO CHARLES R. HOOK

December 1, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mr. Hook: I have your letter of November seventeenth and have read the copy of your letter to Mr. Seibert on compulsory military training. In it you discussed several points which I feel require some modification if we are to have a program of universal training and secure the utmost benefit from it.<sup>1</sup>



Collateral benefits such as you described will undoubtedly result from universal training. However, the basic need for this training is *defense of the nation* and it should in no way be subordinated to other possible advantages which can be obtained by non-military means.

I can readily understand your reluctance to express a final opinion on the length of such training without a very complete understanding of the objectives and the time required to reach them. There are a number of factors involved which while well understood by experienced military authorities are overlooked or little appreciated by the general public. For one thing, when you measure the time requirement it is inevitable, however perfect the system, that there is a loss of an appreciable number of weeks because of the necessary routine required in which to examine a man, induct him and get him off to a firm start, because of the time which must be accorded him here in America at certain seasons of the year and because of the time involved in releasing him from service under a well-defined status. So when we speak of a year these things have to be considered as well as the time absorbed in traveling to maneuvers and returning to bases, and similar unavoidable time-consuming procedures.

I can best illustrate this by telling you that in spite of the urgency of the situation and the heavy pressure we can apply in time of war, yet the replacement being trained at the present time in a 17-week course practically does not reach his division overseas under six months. The training time as I have stated is only 17 weeks. In this case of course there is a greater loss of time in moving to and away from the ports and through staging areas.

We regard it as an imperative feature of such a system that the citizen-soldier have a high standard of training—not only for his own protection but to make the system adopted the most impressive factor in our potential military power in the eyes of the world. I use the word “potential” because these men could not be woven into the Army until after the declaration by Congress of a national emergency.

To give you an interesting sidelight on the state of mind of the soldier at the present time regarding training: we use professionals of the Gallup Poll type to obtain unobtrusively for us the reactions of the rank and file on various aspects of the Army. Regarding training this interesting reaction is developed. In continental United States the men state that there is too much of rather monotonous types of training. When we sample opinion overseas they then state that there was not enough of this type of training and are unanimously of that opinion.

If the world sees us doing a thorough job of this training they will recognize us from the point of view of military power as a Republic of Switzerland raised to the nth power—and yet our actual Army and Navy will be on a purely voluntary basis.

There are certain fundamental considerations regarding our conception



of compulsory military training which seem to be little understood. We are talking of training only, with no legal liability for service. Service in the Army, other than volunteer, would depend first on an approved Act of Congress declaring the existence of a national emergency and it would further depend on the action of Congress in determining in what manner the citizens were to be called upon for service in the active Army, by lot or by age, for example; but the point would be that all men who are physically fit would be trained to such an extent that a strong military force could be developed more rapidly than we could obtain shipping to move it beyond the Western Hemisphere.

Another factor of dominant importance in our opinion would be that the training would be applied on an absolutely democratic basis, that is, both rich boy and poor boy would be subject to the same period and character of training. Countless exceptions and modifications will inevitably be proposed but I fear that almost any one of these would not only open a floodgate but would do violence to the great principle of democracy.

There are two general considerations which I think should be carefully kept in mind. One of these in my opinion is the fact that twice our military power, backed by great wealth and industrial efficiency, has been the determining factor in a world war and on each occasion we were afforded the time to generate our power. We shall never be permitted a third opportunity. Another consideration in my opinion is that aside from all the political factors, using the term in its largest sense, it will be absolutely impossible for us financially to maintain an adequate military posture either for our own security or to back whatever views we may have regarding the perpetuation of peace in the world, except on the basis of compulsory military training. In other words, without such a system it would mean financial bankruptcy to purchase or rather hire on the open peacetime market the personnel required.

I must ask you not to quote me as I am merely giving you privately my views in the matter. I feel that it is very important that the proponents of such a measure be representative citizens rather than military leaders. We shall come into the picture when hearings on such a bill are undertaken by the Congress.

Sorry the weather prevented you from reaching Hot Springs. I went down by train on account of bad weather but was able to fly back to Washington.

I appreciate your allowing me to see Mr. McCabe's comments regarding my talk. He is far too generous in his appreciation.<sup>2</sup>

With my thanks for your letter and apologies for the length of my reply, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)



1. The president of American Rolling Mill Company, Hook had been unable to attend the Business Advisory Council meeting on November 4 (see note 1, Marshall to Wood, November 16, 1944, p. 669). He wrote to express his disappointment at missing Marshall's talk and to enclose a letter he had written to Herbert D. Seibert, editor and publisher of the New York *Commercial and Financial Chronicle* in support of universal military training. Hook believed that "nine months of training would be sufficient" for young men after they had completed high school. He thought that the program should be planned to improve the trainees' health, that the aptitude tests and education they received would help to prepare them for future work, and that the restraint and discipline "would help to demonstrate that their recognition of authority is essential in the successful operation of any organization whose objective is to get a specific job done." (Hook to Marshall, November 17, 1944, and Hook to Seibert, November 14, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

2. Thomas B. McCabe, president of Scott Paper Company and chairman of the Business Advisory Council, had written: "I hate to tell anyone what they missed, but I cannot refrain from saying that General Marshall's speech Saturday night was one of the finest things I ever heard. He spent the day with us, listened to the discussions on taxation and foreign economic policy, chatted with many of us informally at lunch, and then had an afternoon of horseback riding through the mountains. I am sure that he is America's Number One Citizen, and I think history will give him a place with Washington and Lee. If he had been a candidate for President this time I could have voted for him on either ticket because I sincerely believe that he is as great a statesman and administrator as he is a soldier." (McCabe to Hook, November 7, 1944, *ibid.*)

MEMORANDUM FOR G-3  
*Secret*

December 4, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Reference message to Eisenhower regarding possible reorganization of 13th Airborne Div. and delay to summer 1945—I will not accept this delay. Two delays (one already) are too destructive of morale to be considered.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The Operations Division had sent S.H.A.E.F. a message regarding the proposed changes in organization and equipment of airborne divisions. "In view of the above do you desire to effect the reorganization of the 13th Airborne Division after its arrival in the theater, or do you desire that it be reorganized here and its sailing thereby delayed until the summer of 1945." (Marshall [OPD] to Eisenhower, Radio No. WARX-72140, December 3, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-72140)].) The division arrived in France on February 6, 1945, but it never entered into combat.

TO CORDELL HULL

December 6, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mr. Secretary, I was greatly distressed to learn of your resignation as Secretary of State and I am equally distressed that poor health has been the cause.<sup>1</sup> Realizing the flood of expressions of sympathy and regret



which you would receive I have purposely delayed somewhat in writing this note, for I want you to be aware of the admiration I have had for your leadership and the appreciation I have felt for the great consideration you gave to me personally, and the Army through me, in the discharge of your most difficult and critical duties.

It is my hope, along with that of Americans generally, that you will have an early convalescence so that you can sit back in comfort, free from the heavy pressures of the past years, and so that you may survey the world situation with greater freedom and continue to give the country the benefit of your wisdom.

With great respect and admiration, and my affectionate regards to both Mrs. Hull and you, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Hull later wrote: "On October 2, my seventy-third birthday, I left the State Department a very ill man. I spent eighteen days at my apartment trying vainly to recover, during which I carried on my work to some degree, and was then taken to the Naval Medical Center at Bethesda Maryland, where I remained for about seven months, at times in very grave condition." He wrote his letter of resignation on November 21; the president accepted it and announced it on November 27. His tenure ended officially on November 30, and he was succeeded by former Under Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. (*The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 2 vols. [New York: Macmillan Company, 1948], 2: 1715-16, 1719.)

TO ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK

December 8, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Betty, I have just this moment read your generous note of congratulations on the Army-Navy game,<sup>1</sup> with its gracious postscript regarding my retention on the active list. You always are thoughtful and overly generous in your expressions to me. I did not know about the resolution continuing me on the active list until it had been reported out of the Committee. As a matter of fact, between you and me, I should have preferred not to have had this action. Up to the present time since I took over my job in July, 1939, there has been no change in my status of any kind and I am quite certain it would be better for me if it continued that way so that I would feel under no obligations to anyone about any thing, and therefore not be embarrassed in some of the tough things that have to be done.<sup>2</sup>

We are engaged in a good many heavy battles now, with the great problem of munition deficiencies here at home to meet the tremendously increased demands. However, I am decidedly optimistic rather than pessimistic about the progress of the war and I think anyone is bound to be who analyzes for a moment the predicament of the enemy. By comparison our



situation is a rosy one in contrast to the desperate plight of the Germans and the clear evidence of disaster facing the Japanese.

Katherine made a bad start on the winter; had the flu and was imprudent in her convalescence, in developing sinus. As this improved temporarily she again was imprudent and ended up with pleurisy and a mild attack of pneumonia. I sent her down to Pinehurst for three weeks. I had hoped she would remain there until Christmas but she returned last Tuesday, over her cold but still quite vulnerable to a Washington winter in that she has already exhausted her reserves.<sup>3</sup> But whatever I may be able to do in command and control within the Army I seem to be quite impotent on the home front.

I am sorry to see so little of your Kitty but we have not gone out at all and most of the time Katherine has been at Leesburg with Molly and the children.

With my affectionate regards and every possible good wish for you in the New Year, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The Military Academy defeated the Naval Academy 23 to 7 in Baltimore on December 2, ending the football season undefeated. Marshall and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff attended the game. Stark, commander of the European theater's Twelfth Fleet, had heard the game on radio and wrote: "I gather the better team won, and as you can guess it is a joy for me to think of the kick you must have gotten out of it; almost worth losing." (Stark to Marshall, December 2, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Secretary Stimson talked with Congressman James Wadsworth on November 15 regarding the possibility of getting Congress to extend Marshall's active service. As Marshall would be sixty-four on December 31, 1944, he would automatically be retired from the army. The president could order him back to active duty without loss of seniority or rank, but Stimson believed that "it would be far better to have him continued by the Congress until the end of the war without losing his active status at all," especially considering that the statute governing navy retirements did not apply to officers above the rank of rear admiral and thus not to Admiral King, who had already reached the age of sixty-four. (November 15, 1944, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 49: 27-28].) On December 2, President Roosevelt signed the bill retaining Marshall on active duty. In a postscript to his letter, Stark wrote: "When about to sign the above I happened to recall the action of Congress a day or two ago and of its fully merited tribute to you—and still more, the whole country would have voted likewise, and one Betty Stark in particular." (Stark to Marshall, December 2, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. Mrs. Marshall had gone to Pinehurst, North Carolina, in mid-November; by the time that she returned to Leesburg, Virginia, she had taken an option to purchase a house in the town: Liscombe Lodge. She wrote in her memoirs: "My husband often complained about my desire to buy houses here, there and everywhere. He had several stories on this subject and declared that at every place we had stayed long enough I had begun to look for a home and would come to him all excited about the marvelous place I had found—well within our means! He said it was only due to his Army orders that we were not swamped with houses all across the United States from the Atlantic to the Pacific. This was more or less true." At the end of December, she purchased the house, and the Marshalls spent their winters there until the general died in 1959. (K. T. Marshall, *Together*, p. 217.)



TO GEORGE G. SADOWSKI

December 9, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mr. Sadowski: After my return to the War Department following our telephone conversation yesterday I went into the matter of an appointment for General Sosnkowski which you requested.<sup>1</sup>

I do not think it advisable that I should see him for the reason that the discussion must necessarily be political, at least by implication, and I must studiously avoid any action which might be interpreted as injecting me into problems of purely political considerations. That business is done on a higher level. My only concern with it is when called upon to express a view as to the military implications of proposed action.<sup>2</sup>

I am sorry not to be more accommodating, especially so in declining to meet a man of General Sosnkowski's distinction. But I feel certain you will understand. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. A four-term Democrat representing part of Detroit, Sadowski had told Marshall that that city's *Polish Daily News* was pressing him to secure an appointment with Marshall for General Kazimierz Sosnkowski. The United States and Great Britain were involved in the protracted and difficult negotiations between the Polish government-in-exile in London and the Soviet government (representing the Polish Committee of National Liberation) regarding the creation of a new Polish government of national unity. The Soviet government had insisted that if serious negotiations were to take place, the government-in-exile had to remove several of its leaders from office; one of these was Army Chief of Staff Sosnkowski, who was replaced at the end of September 1944. (On this aspect of the Polish question, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, 3: 1216–53.)

2. Regarding the proposed meeting with Sosnkowski, Marshall asked the head of the Civil Affairs Division, Major General John H. Hilldring: "Is it important that I do see him or that I do not see him?" Hilldring was opposed to the meeting: "It is safe to assume that Mr. Sosnkowski wishes to speak to you either about civil affairs operations of the Soviet Army in Poland, or Soviet political policy with regard to Poland. In neither of these matters has the U.S. Army any participation or responsibility. The relationship between the Polish Government-in-Exile . . . and the Soviet Government is presently most tense. . . . The State Department, after informal discussion, prefers that you not grant the appointment." (Marshall Memorandum for General Hilldring, December 8, 1944, and Hilldring Memorandum for General Marshall, December 9, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

REMARKS BEFORE PENNSYLVANIA SOCIETY<sup>1</sup>

December 9, 1944  
New York, New York

I am deeply moved by the honor conferred by the award of the Gold Medal of the Pennsylvania Society. I need hardly say in this company that there is a special pride which goes with the fortunate accident of being born



in Pennsylvania. However far afield the career of a man may take him in this world, it is the respect of his home people that means most to him. To earn your approval is a very great honor, indeed, and one that is highly appreciated.

The life of a soldier leaves little opportunity to call any place home for long. Since I left Fayette County in the fall of 1897 to enter Virginia Military Institute, I have seldom had the opportunity to break bread in Pennsylvania. My school vacations were few and brief, entirely confined in those days to July and August when my family as a rule was away from home. On graduation I accepted a position in Virginia and shortly thereafter was commissioned in the Army and sailed immediately for the Philippines. Thereafter for many years my duties and stations were invariably west of the Mississippi and my first and only post in the East prior to the first World War was in New England. No military assignment has ever given me the good fortune of a station in Pennsylvania. Yet I venture to say that there is no one here tonight who has a stronger feeling of pride in its beauty and richness and power.

During my boyhood there were a number of things with which I was familiar that left an indelible impression on my mind. The countryside where I lived had all the beauty of rich, rolling country and nearby mountains. I was always fond of the open field and spent a great deal of my free time fishing and hunting, and it was here and not in school—I regret to say—that I first came into contact with history which later led me into careful searches after the facts of great events which impinged on the soil of Pennsylvania and which deeply affected the history of the world.

The pheasant or grouse we hunted in those days frequented the glades in the forests and mountains and it was along the trace of the Braddock Trail that I often hunted for these birds. My fishing took me to the vicinity of Jumonville's grave, where the shot fired by Washington's small reconnaissance party set the flame which swept all over the continent of Europe in a prolonged war, which thus had its beginning in the remote forest of southwestern Pennsylvania. The spring where Nemacolin was supposed to have met Washington was along the route of my expeditions in the vicinity of Dunbar's camp, a bald knob where Colonel Dunbar of Braddock's command ignominiously buried his ammunition and retired to Philadelphia, leaving the western frontier at the mercy of the French and Indians.<sup>2</sup> All of these associations stimulated my interest, first, as a boy, in what actually had happened and later, as a man, in just why it happened and what might have been done to change to better advantage the course of human progress in this turbulent world.

My school teachers bored me to death with dates and dry facts, even regarding as fascinating and unique a character as Benjamin Franklin. It was not until years later that I became aware of the character and courage



of William Penn in defying the trend of his times and risking the vengeance of the King in his, Penn's efforts to raise the standard and opportunities of life for all men. Aside from the fact that Benjamin Franklin wandered through the streets of Philadelphia a poor boy and later gained wealth by frugality and industry and finally world fame by his scientific investigations, highlighted by his kite and key in the thunderstorm, aside from the casual interest this aroused in my mind, I absorbed little or nothing at that time of the lessons to be learned. I was more bored than impressed.

In these present days I find much food for reflection and lessons for my guidance in the methods and role of Franklin during the critical periods of the Colonies and the newly created United States of America. His life gives some excellent illustrations of how to meet some of the many problems of unity of command, of convincing citizens of the necessity for organizing in time of peace for the home defense. His diplomatic experiences furnish many guides that might be extremely useful to our representatives today, particularly when in the stress of circumstances one's judgment is apt to be warped either by lack of perspective for the moment or temper arising from the profound irritations of such occasions.

The wilderness of Pennsylvania was the University which in a large measure qualified Washington for his great role in the years to come. During the most formative years of his life he received a beautifully rounded education in the art and problems of command and leadership, in the difficulties, the negotiations and the seeming impossibilities, at times, of securing desperately needed support from the authorities and the people whom he represented. It is possible I think, that we might never have had a Washington to lead the Colonies into the crystallization of this Government without the gruelling experiences he passed through as a very young man which involved almost every problem of a commander, including even the surrender of his forces.

Incidentally, I have long felt that much more could be done for the preparation of our young people to be intelligent citizens in a democracy such as ours, if the teachers of history in our grammar and high schools—and possibly our colleges—devoted more time to cause and effect than to dates and the dry chronology of events.<sup>3</sup> Certainly they bored me to death in my youth, though I must admit I was very easily bored on all school subjects, but I do think I could easily have been fascinated by the events and meaning of the history of southwestern Pennsylvania during those days when the power of England and France was at stake and the future of the United States of America was our goal.

I should much prefer to talk tonight exclusively about the Pennsylvania I knew as a boy and some of the daring deeds and complex tragedies of those days, but I have been asked to make some comments on the progress of the war which I shall endeavor to do, but of necessity very briefly:



\* \* \* \* \*

As we approach the climax of the war in Europe there has been a tendency to assume that our current operations in the Pacific have reached the size of a full-scale offensive against the Japanese. There was a time when it was frequently said and with considerable feeling that only a trickle of supplies was being sent into the Pacific. There was much of criticism at the time because of our alleged failure to initiate important operations in the Far East, and it now seems to me that when we are engaged in a formidable campaign, the fact that this has been planned and has been carried on over a considerable period is being somewhat overlooked.

It has always been the view of the Chiefs of Staff that this war must be accepted as a whole and not as two separate conflicts. We must therefore in our strategy plan for blows which would be most rewarding at the time to the overall result. In warfare your objective is the annihilation of the enemy's military forces, and it is usually obligatory to eliminate the strongest or closest, especially if one enemy appears to be both of these, as is the case with Germany.

There were of course many factors which I have not time to discuss tonight, though it should be obvious to all that large scale offensives could not be undertaken in the Pacific until the Navy construction program had had time to reinforce our crippled Fleet.

While we were engaged in the most formidable offensive the world has ever seen, that in the European theater, we were quietly amassing the striking power to launch an invasion of the Philippines. The forces, military, air and naval, assembled for the assault on Leyte were second only to those of the Normandy operation and far exceeded them in actual naval power. As a matter of fact, the war in the Pacific is approximately 6 months ahead of schedule at the present time.

The problems of supply in the Pacific are even more staggering than those in Europe; approximately 3 ships are required to perform the task which one will do in the Atlantic and each operation has to be continually supported by far-flung units.

The total tonnage required in the present state of this global war is beyond ordinary comprehension. The amount of ammunition and equipment consumed in the tremendous scale of the fighting today is appalling, and the demands are daily on the increase.

When it comes to casualties we are daily confronted with the bitter human cost of this great struggle. We do not have the destroyed homes of England or daily casualties among our peaceful civil population as they do; but because of our expanding battlefield our military casualties are steadily increasing.

And right here I should like to make this point, the soundness of which



seems to have been questioned in a recent printed discussion of the efficiency of the Army in France. It is our intention to utilize ammunition and planes and other materiel to the very limit of availability in order to reduce casualties. We intend to call on the American people for all the ammunition our artillery can fire if it will in any way reduce the casualties as well as expedite the progress of our offensives towards the final victory. Any other policy to my mind is unthinkable. That we should enjoy a high standard of living, high wages, and comforts here at home and begrudge ammunition in France to those men in the mud and sleet and rain, just could not be the desire of the American people. War is necessarily appalling and wasteful but we are determined that the waste in this case shall be in materiel and not in human lives so far as our Armies are concerned.

The great battles now in progress must be kept going, every front must be kept blazing until we break the Nazi control of the German Army and people. They must have no avoidable respite. They are doomed men, fighting for time, regardless of the effect on the lives of their people. They hope to hold us in check until the heavy weather of a north European winter makes lifesaving tank operations and air support largely impracticable. They must not be given an hour of relaxation, regardless of the difficulty of our problem. We must not permit our Armies to suffer the rapidly accumulating casualties which result from a stalemate with its daily attrition. Far better to accept heavy casualties for a brief period than the much greater total which inevitably accumulates from the daily attrition of prolonged periods of inactivity on a battlefield.

We are now facing another problem which will grow more difficult day by day and that is the demand in supplies for the people of those countries our advances free from Nazi domination. I can best illustrate the difficulty of the problem by telling you, and most confidentially, that we are short in shipping all over the world because of the vast forces that we must daily maintain overseas and the tremendous extent of active operations along almost 2000 miles of British, American and French front in Europe and in the Far East. At the same time we are under daily urgent demands for shipping to transport relief supplies and it so happened the other morning that the demand for Italy of a certain number of sailings per month exactly to a ship equalled the shortage in the Pacific of sailings in a month. I was at the time endeavoring to find some solution to the Pacific shortage in order that our scheduled operations could go ahead according to the agreed upon dates but here was another pressure to double that shortage for the people of Italy. The latter consideration will undoubtedly appeal to your humanitarian instincts which are typical of those of the American people, but when you translate the delay in the Pacific into the increased loss of American lives, not to mention billions, by the lengthening of the war, even more than the arithmetical delay because of the loss of momentum involved



and the better opportunity for the Japanese to prepare for the next stroke, then what is your decision? Problems of this nature are pressing us every day and in increasing number and it must be always remembered that the man on the ground in the particular place sees his problem but probably does not translate its solution into the loss of American lives in some other part of the world.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)

1. An organization of prominent Pennsylvanians living in New York, the Pennsylvania Society presented Marshall with its Gold Medal at the meeting at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. At the top of a copy of his speech, Marshall wrote "used in part only."

2. In the spring of 1754, George Washington—at times assisted by an Iroquois chief the British called Half-King—led a 159-man Virginia expedition to secure the colony's claim to the Forks of the Ohio (modern Pittsburgh), but they discovered that the French had already erected Fort Duquesne on the spot. Washington led a force which attacked a party of French soldiers; one of the ten Frenchmen killed was the group's leader, Joseph Coulton, Sieur de Jumonville. In response, the French sent a force of 800 Frenchmen and 400 Indians to defeat Washington, who erected a small stockade called Fort Necessity, approximately ten miles southeast of the site of Marshall's childhood home of Uniontown, Pennsylvania. The battle developed on July 3, 1754, and Washington was soon forced to surrender. The next year, two regiments of British regulars plus some colonial militia were led by General Edward Braddock to capture Fort Duquesne; the force was ambushed and defeated near their goal on July 9, 1755. Braddock was wounded and died during the retreat; he is buried near the site of Fort Necessity. (James Thomas Flexner, *Washington: The Indispensable Man* [Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974], pp. 11, 15–17, 23–26.)

3. For example, see Marshall's 1923 speech to the Headmasters Association and his 1939 speech to the joint meeting of the American Military Institute and the American Historical Association in *Papers of GCM*, 1: 219–22, 2: 123–27.

TO GENERAL JOSEPH W. STILWELL

December 12, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Stilwell: I am sorry to be leaving just as you arrive, but I have to be in Chicago tonight and from there I am going on to a series of Replacement Training Centers.<sup>1</sup>

The Chicago date was fixed some time ago and could not be changed.

I have talked to General Handy, who will discuss your own personal-official problems with you, as he understands the whole situation.

I am dictating this over the telephone so it is a rather hurried note. Again with my regrets at missing you, and particularly Mrs. Stilwell, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Stilwell had been at his home in Carmel, California, since early November. Marshall was speaking that evening to the Illinois Manufacturers' Association's fifty-first annual dinner in Chicago. His talk on the war situation and the need for postwar universal military training was similar to the one he made to the Pennsylvania Society on December 9. The



day following his speech (December 13), Marshall flew to Fort McClellan, Alabama, then to Camp Wheeler, Georgia (near Macon). On December 14 he inspected Camp Wheeler then flew to Camp Croft, near Spartanburg, South Carolina, and returned to Washington, D.C.

TO MRS. ALEX G. SMITH

December 15, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mrs. Smith: I received your letter of November 29th regarding your son who has been overseas nearly three years.<sup>1</sup>

The choice of the individual to be returned from overseas, either permanently or for leave or furlough, is the prerogative of the theater commander. He is the only person familiar with circumstances and the claims of various individuals. His ability to return personnel depends on the number of replacements being sent to him, as well as the military situation at the time in his theater. He selects personnel for return according to their relative length of overseas service and degree of fatigue they have suffered in combat or under other circumstances. The War Department must necessarily refrain from intervening in the theater commander's decisions in this matter, for he has available first-hand information and is responsible not only for the military operations in his theater but also for the morale of his command.

The present rotation policy authorizing the return of a limited number of individuals each month was made effective last March. The length of time elapsed since then and the shortage in shipping and in trained replacements have not permitted the return of all soldiers who have served overseas for an extended period. There are approximately 9,000 air force enlisted men alone who have been in the Southwest Pacific Area as long or longer than your son. In addition, as I have already indicated, the character of the service, hardship of locality, etc., all bear on the selection of individuals.

Frequently it has been necessary to utilize for combat operations transportation which had been assigned to return personnel to the United States. Under such circumstances the men awaiting transportation are temporarily assigned to training centers for additional training during the delay. This may be the case in regard to your son and would explain the disappointment expressed in his letter to you.

I hope the foregoing explanation will make the situation more understandable for you. This is a great war that involves us in affairs all over the globe, and it is consequently very difficult to meet all the desires of individuals concerned.



The fact that your family has made such a heavy contribution to the war, with four sons in service, makes it very important to me that you and your husband should understand the working of the War Department policy in this matter. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. A columnist for the *Latrobe* [Pennsylvania] *Bulletin*, Mrs. Smith wrote that her son had enlisted in the Air Corps three years before Pearl Harbor and had been in the Southwest Pacific Area. She quoted a letter from him: "Today starts my thirty-fifth month over here and they've put me in a 'Training Center'. I don't ask favors of anyone but just a fair deal and it looks as though that's exactly what I'm not getting. After all the rotten deals I've received from this army is it any wonder I'm turning bitter, even against my country itself?" Mrs. Smith noted that personnel with shorter service periods and less combat were constantly returning to the United States from the Southwest Pacific. (Smith to Marshall, November 29, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

TO LADY BURGHLEY

December 16, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Lady Burghley: Your charming little Christmas remembrances have given me a great deal of pleasure, particularly the Kentucky cardinal reminiscent of the Sunday morning on your lawn in Bermuda.<sup>1</sup> I do wish that poor Dill could have this same pleasure that I enjoy of your thoughtful reminder of a most delightful weekend.

Incidentally, yesterday the Congress completed its action on a resolution of esteem and appreciation regarding Dill's services which was introduced by the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. This is an action without precedent in our Congressional history. I am enclosing a copy of the bill which does not indicate the final action concluded yesterday.<sup>2</sup>

As you no doubt know, Dill was, at his request, buried in Arlington National Cemetery, our military Valhalla. I have arranged to have a considerable plot of ground surrounding his grave set aside because we have in mind a memorial that will serve as a reminder to the many who daily visit Arlington that a great British soldier made a remarkable contribution to the unity of allied effort in this war. With all the bickerings that are going on and are inevitable in the future it to me is most refreshing to have his wonderful example of a great service not restricted solely to his own country but extended to the United States and the world in general.

Please give my Christmas greetings to the young ladies who I hope have forgiven me for the injections in which I involved them,<sup>3</sup> and with all my best wishes for the New Year to you and Lord Burghley, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)



1. The wife of the governor-general of Bermuda had sent Marshall a set of painted metal matchbox covers.

2. House Joint Resolution 317 was titled: "Recognizing the outstanding service rendered to the United Nations by Field Marshal Sir John Dill." President Roosevelt signed the resolution on December 20 (Public Law 516, 78th Cong., 2d sess.).

3. See Marshall to Lady Burghley, March 29, 1944, p. 379.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SOMERVELL

December 17, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

I noted this morning your memorandum regarding permanent construction and I am in agreement with the logic of the present policy.<sup>1</sup> However, I would like to get your views regarding a situation such as I described at Bragg, where there can be no doubt, as far as is humanly possible to perceive, that military activities will continue after the war on a larger scale than at all but a few other installations in continental United States. I am not referring to new construction but to repairs.

In this classification, off hand I would place Benning, Sill, I suppose Ord on the West Coast, and Knox.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Somervell's memorandum stated that "major construction for the Army within the Continental United States was completed several months ago," but "numerous requests are being received for the construction of family quarters for officers, swimming pools, service clubs, and other facilities not originally provided because War Department Policy contemplated only the minimum facilities which were essential to the war effort. Many such requests are for permanent-type construction, on the theory that we know fairly definitely what installations will be retained for post-war use and that it will be an economic saving to the Government to construct permanent facilities at this time." General Somervell, however, believed that the army's postwar needs were still unclear, that it was unwise to use scarce manpower and materiel "to provide extra conveniences," and that such permanent construction would tend to violate the army's "Gentleman's Agreement" with Congress. Under Secretary of War Patterson concurred. (Somervell Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, United States Army, December 12, 1944, NA/RG 160 [Office of the Commanding General, Desk File, Chief of Staff U.S. Army].)

2. Somervell reiterated his recommendations and was supported by G-4's Supply Division. Marshall seems to have dropped the matter.

TO MAJOR GENERAL MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY  
*Confidential*

December 18, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Ridgway, I have had several letters from you regarding airborne troop operations and organization, the last of December fourth.<sup>1</sup> These have been circulated through the operation and organization sections of the General Staff and have been given very serious consideration. Prior to



the receipt of your letter of December fourth I had directed that the preliminary proposal be prepared for reorganization based on the recommendations received from you and General Eisenhower and the close-up proposals of General Chapman who was brought to Washington for this purpose.<sup>2</sup> This work was being gotten under way at the same time that instructions were sent overseas for a representative from your force to be hurried over here, General Taylor being the man you chose.

As a result of these various moves, a new organization has been adopted which I understand from General Taylor is in all probability wholly acceptable to you and your associates who have had full experience in such matters.<sup>3</sup>

Regarding you personally, I should be very glad to see you over here when your services over there can be spared. Or it may be that I shall have the opportunity of seeing you over there though I can never be certain about dates or the direction of my movements. Just now it would appear that you could not leave the theater. In January the situation should be much clearer.

Your people have done great things and I feel certain that with the profit from the experience already gained your next endeavor will meet a tremendous success. The courage and dash of airborne troops has become a by-word and is a great inspiration to all the others.

With warm regards and the hope that you find some cheer in the Christmas season, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On August 27, 1944, Ridgway had assumed command of the newly created Eighteenth Airborne Corps (17th, 82d, and 101st Airborne divisions). Ridgway had written to Marshall on November 1, 1944: "With minor exceptions, all efforts over the past two years to reorganize the airborne division on the basis of combined training and battlefield experience have met with War Department disapproval. . . . The arbitrary limitation of the airborne division to its present strength has been demonstrated to be unsound. . . . These divisions entered action with a strength far in excess of the 8600 authorized by present T/O [Table of Organization]. The 82d Airborne Division, in Normandy, had roughly 13,000, and in Holland, nearly 14,000. The 101st Airborne Division had only slightly less." The greater strength—approaching that of an infantry division—was essential due to the large initial losses in air drops and the large base echelon remaining behind at the departure airfields. (Ridgway to Marshall, November 1, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

The G-3 division argued that "The War Department, the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces and the Airborne Center believe that an airborne force should be a highly trained light combat unit which lands by parachute and glider at a critical point and that this force must be reenforced by other ground force divisions within a period of two to five days." But, G-3 asserted, Ridgway wanted airborne divisions to "fight in the line as an Infantry Combat Division when not being employed as an Airborne Unit"; G-3 saw no evidence that "any fundamental changes in our airborne doctrine or organization" were needed. (Porter summary of memorandum, November 8, 1944, *ibid.*)

Ridgway wrote on December 4 to thank Marshall for permitting Maxwell Taylor to



come to the Pentagon to discuss airborne division reorganization. (Ridgway to Marshall, December 4, 1944, *ibid.*)

2. Major General Elbridge G. Chapman, Jr., had been commanding general of Airborne Command since 1942.

3. Ridgway later wrote: “General Marshall received General Taylor, listened to our presentation—and granted a very material increase in the strength of the airborne divisions. From that time on, we had no more trouble with this problem. . . . If General Marshall had adopted any other attitude than the one he did I would have been profoundly surprised. The combat soldier never had a better and more understanding friend than George C. Marshall. With the burdens of a global war upon his shoulders, he never forgot the man with the rifle, the man whose task it was to kill and be killed.” (Matthew B. Ridgway and Harold H. Martin, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway* [New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956], p. 126.)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SOMERVELL  
*Confidential*

December 18, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

On all of my inspection trips I have endeavored, though in a very superficial and hurried manner, to determine whether or not the permanent post or camp personnel command was being run to the best advantage of the combat troop personnel and command. In most places that I have visited it seemed to me that matters functioned satisfactorily, however I am uncertain about the situation at Camp McClellan though I have few facts to go on.

My guess is that the Post Commander hews so closely to the line in regulations that too frequently reasons are found for not doing things which are desired by the troop commander. As a small example, I have the question of the painting of the frames of certain targets which had become so weathered that it was practically impossible for the troops to see them. No paint could be used because of some regulation. I am quite certain this was not the intent of the regulation for training of troops is the purpose of the camp.

While I have no specific other example, the general impression I got was that there should be a check-up on the camp commander.

I ascertained another item in my questioning, this relating to the Post Exchange. It appears that during two months, July and August, no dividends were paid to the troops. I understand there was a change of regulations which necessitated building up of local reserves and funds, however my inquiries at two other posts in the next 36 hours did not develop any failure to pay dividends. Again I am curious to know whether or not this cessation of dividends in one place and continuance in another rested on the interpretation of the Post Commander, who was leaning over backward on the regulations and certainly not forward as regarded the troops.



As I understand it, in July certain Army Regulations regarding Army Post Exchanges were considerably altered, which necessitated building up of reserves in local Post Exchanges, which was reported to have caused dividends to have ceased until another change took place in October. Considering the fact that a sum of over one hundred thousand dollars was paid by the Camp McClellan Exchange to the Army Exchange Service in October and the Army Welfare Fund received about seven thousand dollars at the same time, it does not seem reasonable that no provision was made for the dry period of July and August and most of September when dividends to the local personnel were restricted.<sup>1</sup>

I do not want to set up an elaborate investigation of pros and cons, but I do want you to find out whether or not the commanding officer at McClellan is all that he should be in his attitude toward the welfare of the command. While looking into this matter it might be well to check up on the quarters, permanent buildings, etc., occupied by the Station Complement.<sup>2</sup>

I do not wish my name brought into this matter.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. A change in army regulations "to effect a reorganization and more business-like procedure in connection with non-appropriated funds and of exchange finances" and not a misinterpretation by the post commander caused the temporary cessation of dividends to the troops at Fort McClellan, Somervell reported. Some other posts had already built up the working capital required; thus they continued to pay dividends. (Somervell Memorandum for General Marshall, December 21, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. An investigation indicated that the post commander, executive officer, and post engineer should be replaced, according to Somervell. (Ibid.)

TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

December [18], 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Eisenhower: This note carries my Christmas greetings to you with sincere expressions of personal appreciation for the magnificent job you have done for the Allies and for the prestige and glory of America and the United States Army during the past year. Largely through your leadership, in force, in wisdom, and in patience and tolerance, you have made possible Allied cooperation and teamwork in the greatest military operation in the history of the world, complicated by social, economic and political problems almost without precedent.

Good luck to you in the New Year. May the Lord watch over you. You have my complete confidence.<sup>1</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)



1. Eisenhower replied on December 23: "Receipt of your Christmas letter to me was the brightest spot in my existence since we reached the Siegfried Line. Short of a major defeat inflicted upon the enemy, I could not have had a better personal present." (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2378.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR  
*Confidential*

December 18, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Army Chaplain Corps.

I have read the attached resume regarding the Chaplain Corps by Mr. Burlingham.<sup>1</sup> With most of the points he raises I was already familiar. I will check up on the matter of appointments of Catholic chaplains to certain key positions.

There has been no question in my mind from the start that we labor under the serious disadvantage of mediocrity in the senior ranks of the Chaplain service. It has not been an easy thing to handle and could not be met in quite the same drastic fashion I followed with troop commands. Chaplain Arnold is well aware of this and has been, I am quite certain, embarrassed by the fact that certain of his assistants were not up to the desired standard. He himself, in my opinion, has been splendid. I doubt if many realize the terrific pressures under which he has been forced to operate and the successful manner in which he has met these pressures and preserved a unified front in the Chaplain Corps. He is an excellent administrator and in my opinion, a strong character, therefore I place great dependence on him.

While I have not the data to support this statement I rather imagine he has used Catholic chaplains sometimes in key positions because of his inability to get the right man in the Protestant ranks. In my opinion, and speaking very frankly, the great weakness in the matter has been that of the Protestant churches in the selection of their ministry. The Catholic system provides a much higher average of leadership, judging by my own experiences, and the Protestant churches are too kindhearted in their admission of lame ducks. On a number of occasions in the past I have had to lean on Catholic chaplains for strong support in what I was trying to do. This same condition has proved to be the case in this war. However, I will turn to this to see what we might do in the near future in the senior ranks of the permanent Corps.

Mr. Burlingham mentions two names of men to be considered as a possible Chief of Chaplains (I had no notion up to the present time that Chaplain Arnold might be retired), Milton O. Beebe, a Methodist, and Luther Miller, an Episcopalian (I am quite certain this is wrong because at



the time I knew Miller he was a Lutheran).<sup>2</sup> Miller has been rather a protégé of mine. I had him with me in China and between us we ran the church up from an attendance of 8 men to standing room only. I say between us because I took a very active part in the arrangements, but of course his natural ability as a leader and a chaplain was what did the trick. I had him in mind when considering men for the position of Chief of Chaplains. I hoped that he would be selected as the chaplain for the Military Academy where he was sent for by the Superintendent for a trial appearance about five years ago. If there was to be a change he would be my choice as Chief of Chaplains, though I do not think he possesses the necessary administrative knowledge to the extent that Chaplain Arnold does—and I am not talking about a mere knowledge of the regulations but rather of the ability to administer a tremendous organization in a businesslike manner.<sup>3</sup>

G. C. Marshall

NA/RG 107 (SW Safe, Chaplains)

1. Charles B. Burlingham, an attorney in New York City and a trustee of the Episcopal Cathedral of St. John the Divine, was described by Stimson as "a very old friend of both the President and myself." Burlingham had written a memorandum for Stimson commenting on the Chaplain Corps' field service based upon letters he had received from a friend in the field. (Pasco brief for Marshall, December 18, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Stimson sent a summary of Burlingham's comments to Marshall.

The basic difficulty in the corps, Burlingham stated, was the caliber of the chaplains recruited, which varied greatly. Second, the quality of the Regular Army chaplains, who held practically all of the key administrative posts in the corps, was too often below that of the chaplains from civilian life that they supervised. Third, a disproportionate share of key administrative posts in the corps were held by Roman Catholics, and too often they were incapable of appreciating the viewpoint of the Protestant churches. For example, there were continual complaints about the distribution of literature by Catholic chaplains which attacked the Protestant faith, and William R. Arnold, the chief of Chaplains since 1937, had taken only mild action to stop this. Burlingham recommended that as Arnold was nearing retirement, the new chief should be a vigorous man with field experience. He recommended two Regular Army officers: Colonel Milton O. Beebe, a Methodist serving as chief chaplain of the North African Theater of Operations; or Colonel Luther D. Miller, an Episcopalian who was chief chaplain of the Sixth Army in the Philippines. (Stimson Memorandum re Army Chaplains, undated but written between December 11 and 15, 1944, NA/RG 107 [SW Safe, Chaplains].)

2. Miller had become an Episcopalian in the early 1930s.

3. Arnold retired effective February 14, 1945, and Miller became chief of Chaplains on April 12, 1945. Meanwhile, Marshall ordered G-1 to conduct a confidential survey of the denominational distribution of army chaplains and the selection and assignment of supervisory chaplains. Major General Henry reported that the denominational proportions of chaplains had been established in the mid-1920s, that these were close to the proportions of the various religious groups in the total population, and that religious leaders agreed that readjustments should be postponed until after the war. Supervisory chaplains were selected by the commanding general involved, not the War Department, but distribution in the army (and in the civilian population) was: Jewish, 1% (3%); Protestant, 68% (69%); Roman Catholic, 31% (28%). Henry also noted: "I could not find any data that would lead one to believe that any particular church group can be charged with providing poorer quality



chaplains than any other group." In summary, Henry wrote, "I found no condition of any kind which would require correction." (Henry Memorandum for the Eyes of General Marshall Only, January 3, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY  
DOUGLAS MACARTHUR  
Radio No. WAR-79291. *Top Secret*

December 19, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

TOPSEC to General MacArthur from General Marshall. Your message of December 17 regarding command received.<sup>1</sup> Your conception has been pressed for sometime without securing naval agreement. A further proposal along same general lines was in process of being submitted to JCS at time of receipt of your message. We are involved in complications difficult to adjust regarding Hawaii, shipping, etc.<sup>2</sup>

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-79291])

1. The northern boundary of the Southwest Pacific Area ran just above the Philippines; consequently, under the March 30, 1942, directive establishing two Pacific theater commands (see *Papers of GCM*, 3: 144), Admiral Nimitz would be in charge of the invasion of Japan, the largest ground forces action of the Pacific war. MacArthur's chief biographer observes that in late 1944 there was growing realization among Pentagon leaders of both services that unity of command in the Pacific was necessary, but service rivalries and personality differences continued to make this unachievable. On December 17, 1944, MacArthur wrote to Marshall: "I do not recommend a single unified command for the Pacific. I am of the firm opinion that the Naval forces should serve under Naval Command and that the Army should serve under Army Command. Neither service willingly fights on a major scale under the command of the other." (D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur*, 3 vols. [Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970–85], 2: 722–23.)

2. When Secretary Stimson asked Marshall about MacArthur's desire for unified army command in the Pacific, he recorded the chief of staff's response: "He said that in principle MacArthur was right but that he failed to recognize the limitations and exceptions to these correct principles; and he said what we both knew, that MacArthur is so prone to exaggerate and so influenced by his own desires that it is difficult to trust his judgment on such a matter. The problem is further complicated by the bitter hostility which the Navy has for MacArthur, arising out of the early months of the war. He told me, however, that the matter was now under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and he was trying to work out a correct solution of it." (December 27, 1944, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 49: 127].) Pacific command negotiations continued until a new directive was issued on April 3, 1945, designating MacArthur commander in chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific.

TO MAJOR GENERAL RAYMOND S. McLAIN<sup>1</sup>

December 19, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear McLain: This note carries my Christmas greetings, with great



hopes for the success of your Corps in the present heavy fighting in the advance to the Rhine.

I have followed your career since the landing in Sicily, particularly in the fighting from the Normandy bridgehead up to the present moment when you are commanding an Army Corps engaged in one of the world's greatest battles and against a desperate foe. Throughout you have displayed outstanding characteristics of a leader and it is my earnest hope that you will find the same opportunities for your talents in Corps command that you did with a Brigade and a Division.

There is little possibility that you will enjoy any of the proverbial cheer of the Christmas season but you at least will have the satisfaction of knowing that you are making history and adding to the prestige of America and the glory of American arms.

My hopes and best wishes go to you for the New Year, with my prayers for your safety. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. An investment banker, McLain had risen from private to brigadier general in the Oklahoma National Guard (Forty-fifth Division). He commanded the division's artillery brigade in Sicily and Italy, including the Anzio campaign. In the Normandy campaign he commanded the Thirtieth Infantry Division's artillery brigade until promoted to major general and given command of the Ninetieth Division in Patton's drive across central France. He took command of the Nineteenth Corps in mid-October, during the battle for Aachen, and led it in the drive to the Roer River.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR  
*Secret*

December 21, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Before receiving your note suggesting that it might be a good thing to send Deane's letter to the President I had already considered this and had in mind speaking to you about it after you had read the letter.<sup>1</sup> Since receiving your note I have had Handy and Hull consider the matter and they both recommended against sending it to the President for the reason that they feel it might prejudice him against Deane,<sup>2</sup> and also that it might irritate Mr. Harriman to find Deane's views were going direct to the President instead of through him.

I agree with them, though I am sorry that we can't send the letter to the President because his [Deane's] ideas are very well expressed and I agree with them in toto.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. John R. Deane published his letter of December 2, 1944, in his memoir, *The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Co-operation with Russia* (New York: Viking Press, 1947), pp. 84-86. He wrote to give Marshall his "general reactions" after a



year in the Soviet Union as head of the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow. He recommended that the United States modify its policies regarding lend-lease aid to the U.S.S.R. to insist that the Russians provide justification for their requests and that the Americans receive a quid pro quo on some of their requests of the Russians. “When the Red Army was back on its heels, it was right for us to give them all possible assistance with no questions asked. It was right to bolster their morale in every way we could. However, they are no longer back on their heels; and, if there is one thing they have plenty of, it’s self-confidence. The situation has changed, but our policy has not. We still meet their requests to the limit of our ability, and they meet ours to the minimum that will keep us sweet.”

2. The president had steadfastly opposed using U.S. aid to seek concessions of any kind from the Soviet Union, because the Red Army would be needed against Japan and the wartime alliance would be needed to keep the postwar peace.

3. On January 2, 1945, Marshall asked Deane if he and Ambassador Averell Harriman were “agreeable to the State Department’s seeing this letter and possibly the President? I do not want to take any step that would lead to embarrassing you or weakening your hand. The Secretary of War was very anxious to use your letter as he feels it was a splendid presentation with sound recommendations.” Deane replied that he and Harriman agreed that the letter might be distributed as Marshall suggested. The letter was sent to President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Stettinius on January 3. (Marshall to Deane, Radio No. 85669, January 2, 1945; Deane to Marshall, Radio No. M-22248, January 3, 1945; and Stimson Memorandum for the President, January 3, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

December 21, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mr. President: Yesterday I received the commission you have bestowed on me as General of the Army.<sup>1</sup> I appreciate very much this further evidence of your confidence and assure you that I will continue to concentrate all I have towards the furtherance of our war effort. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. President Roosevelt signed the bill creating five-star rank positions (Admiral of the Fleet and General of the Army) on December 14, 1944. Secretary of War Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal agreed that the ranks would be bestowed in the order of current seniority: Admiral Leahy (December 15), General Marshall (December 16), Admiral King (December 17), General MacArthur (December 18), Admiral Nimitz (December 19), General Eisenhower (December 20), and General Arnold (December 21).

The navy had wanted to press Congress for the new rank in November 1942, but Marshall had been opposed. (See *Papers of GCM*, 3:455–56.) When his authorized biographer asked him about the rank in 1957, Marshall replied: “I didn’t want any promotion at all. I didn’t need it. The chiefs of staff on the British side were already field marshals, so they would be senior to me whatever I was made. I didn’t think I needed that rank and I didn’t want to be beholden to Congress for any rank or anything of that kind. I wanted to be able to go in there with my skirts clean and with no personal ambitions concerned in it in any way, and I could get all I wanted with the rank I had. But that was twisted around and somebody said I didn’t like the term *marshal* because it was the same as my name [i.e., Marshal Marshall]. I know Mr. Churchill twitted me about this in a rather



scathing tone. I don't recall that I ever made the expression. But my reason for not wanting it was, I thought it was much better that I personally shouldn't be beholden to anything for Congress except for fair treatment—which they gave me.” (*Marshall Interviews*, p. 456.)

NOTES FOR SECRETARY OF WAR'S  
PRESS CONFERENCE<sup>1</sup>

December 21, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

(Possible answer of the Secretary of War to any inquiry regarding the use of Army engineers to clear away debris and construct temporary shelters for the British homeless in London)<sup>2</sup>

Inquiries have been made of the War Department, rather critical in tone, of General Eisenhower's action in authorizing American Army engineers to assist in clearing away the debris in the London area caused by the rocket bombs and in erecting temporary shelters for those rendered homeless.

It is incomprehensible to me that any American would question the wisdom and decency of General Eisenhower's action in employing these men, who otherwise would stand idle while awaiting transportation to France, to succor the injured and homeless British citizens who have borne in such a Stoic manner the heavy losses of life and destruction of their property. It is not conceivable to me that the American people would permit their Army authorities to stand idle in such circumstances. It would not be in keeping with the instincts of the American people. Furthermore, the morale and the good order of the London area is a matter of great importance to operations on the Western Front. London and England are in the battle and their civil population has suffered severely. I should have severely condemned General Eisenhower had he acted other than he did in this matter.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Secretary Stimson was scheduled to hold a press conference at 10:30 A.M. For another note by Marshall for this conference, see p. 706.

2. Eisenhower had authorized the release of approximately three thousand U.S. Army Engineers with supplies and machinery to tear down bombed houses and assemble temporary, prefabricated, one-family huts in London. A group of a hundred Engineers working in the borough of Lambeth had recently received considerable British press and newsreel coverage and “effusive” thanks. (*New York Times*, December 17, 1944, p. 23.)

3. Secretary of the General Staff Frank McCarthy wrote across the top of the file copy: “Question was not asked, so S/W did not use this today.”

ON the morning of October 11, Marshall had traveled through the quiet Ardennes sector in relative safety and ease from Bastogne to



Saint-Vith, Belgium, and on toward Aachen, Germany, visiting units on the U.S. First Army front. Less than ten weeks later, for him to have made this journey would have meant fighting his way across the line of attack of three German armies—five armored and a dozen infantry divisions: over two hundred thousand combat troops—that had smashed into the American lines on a sixty-mile front on the morning of December 16. Allied military leaders had anticipated some sort of German autumn or winter counter-thrust, but they had generally assumed that it would occur north of the Ardennes. The Germans' initial objective was to seize bridgeheads over the Meuse River between Liège and Namur. Hitler directed that his forces ultimately retake Antwerp, which he hoped would thus divide the Anglo-American armies and allow him to destroy the trapped forces; such a success, he hoped, would cause the coalition opposing him to disintegrate under the shock of defeat. (Regarding Marshall's October inspection trip, see the editorial notes on pp. 621–22, 624–25. For a history of the Ardennes offensive, see Hugh M. Cole, *The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1965]. See also Pogue, *Supreme Command*, pp. 359–97.)

More than a day elapsed before intelligence officers were able to establish that this attack constituted a major German offensive and another day and a half before they could assemble an accurate estimate of the size and identity of the German forces engaging them. December 19 was the German armored spearhead's best day, but even then their speed was less than planned, largely because the American response had been quicker and more vigorous than German planners expected. Tenacious delaying actions, such as the one holding up the German right at Saint-Vith (which was finally abandoned only on December 23) or at the key road junction of Bastogne (which the Germans surrounded on the twentieth), bought time for American reorganization and reinforcement. Between December 20 and 22, American forces "jammed" the salient's shoulders so that it could not expand; this constricted German transportation and communications and left the advanced elements increasingly exposed to flank attacks, such as the one George Patton's Third Army was launching south of the salient. (Cole, *The Ardennes*, pp. 332, 422, 459, 670.)

Marshall's initial reaction to the Ardennes offensive was cautious. There was a general inclination in the War Department and in the European theater to regard the Ardennes activity, as Bradley noted in his memoirs, as merely "a spoiling attack . . . to force a halt on Patton's advance into the Saar." Secretary of War Stimson noted in his diary that he and Marshall "agreed that the Germans could not get very far." The attack would at least "help our cause of waking up Americans to better production." Stimson was optimistic that the offensive would result in a more rapid German collapse. (Omar N. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story* [New York: Henry Holt and



Company, 1951], p. 455; December 18, 19, and 20, 1944, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 49: 99, 103, 105].)

On the morning of December 21, Stimson went to see Marshall about developments in the Ardennes salient (or, as it was increasingly being called, the battle of the Bulge) in order to prepare himself for his 10:30 A.M. press conference. "I wanted Marshall's views of the fortunes and prospects of the field so as to give me perspective for my weekly review of events. I found that he had already been alive to that possibility for my wanting it and had prepared a short summary of his views. . . . Like all his work it was very good. I took it and made it the beginning of my weekly review." (December 21, 1944, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 49: 108].) Marshall's draft statement follows. ★

NOTES FOR SECRETARY OF WAR'S  
PRESS CONFERENCE

December 21, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

(Possible reply of Secretary of War at Press Conference this morning to queries regarding situation on the Western Front)

At this time we have not available here sufficient information to permit a well-founded estimate of the situation on the Western Front. However, it seems clearly apparent that the Germans are making an all-out effort to halt our advance into the Cologne Plain and the Saar Basin. They appear to have accepted the hazard involved in such an effort which, if it fails, will definitely shorten the war.

The willingness to accept this hazard is not difficult to understand. Our Armies are being steadily reinforced along with the great improvement in the movement of supplies to support them. Germany, with the winter upon her, is being subjected to a steadily increasing aerial attack which has assumed vast proportions. But menacing as the situation has been on the Western front the German High Command must be prepared to meet the Russian winter offensive wherever it may strike. Under the circumstances the Nazi regime has not a great deal to lose and might gain a few months extension of time before being called to an accounting for the misery they have inflicted on the world.

I have the utmost confidence in the wisdom, energy, and aggressive fighting attitude of General Eisenhower and his leaders.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)



TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY  
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
[Radio No. W-81088.] *Top Secret*

December 22, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

For Eisenhower's eyes only from Marshall. I received your proposal to promote Bradley and Spaatz and am sorry that it does not appear feasible to do this at the moment.<sup>1</sup> Congress has adjourned[,] and without some measure of success I doubt if the President would hazard a recess appointment regarding which he has always been reluctant to take action.<sup>2</sup> I was glad to get your comment on Bradley but it was exactly what I anticipated, his leadership would be in a crisis.

I gave instructions to the staff that you were not to be bothered with any questions regarding the operations without my express approval though one slipped through yesterday with reference to the Germans shooting prisoners.<sup>3</sup> I did this because I want you left entirely free from such irritations during a period that demands your complete concentration. I shall merely say now that you have our complete confidence.

I have been wondering if the vicissitudes of the fighting might not develop a requirement for replacements in division commanders or brigade commanders. At the present time I have in mind General Porter whom I will release if you want him and General A. E. Brown. He was relieved of his division on Attu but McNarney felt this was not altogether fair to him and he, McNarney, and a series of other officers from time to time have urged on me giving Brown another chance as he has displayed so much ability in his training command here in the States which is outstanding. I reserved action until I myself inspected the command. I now propose him as valuable material for division command.<sup>4</sup>

Another officer who was reduced from major general and division commander during maneuvers and subsequently elevated to brigade command, is performing with conspicuous efficiency, I think, General Paul Ransom. He was a great and level headed fighter in the First Division in my day. He has never asked me for anything. I inspected his command the other day. I think he would make a fine brigade commander.<sup>5</sup>

For your rear area business you might find Major General Forrest Harding, now in command of the Caribbean arch with headquarters in Puerto Rico, a good man. He lost out during the desperate fighting at Buna, New Guinea, where the troops had little or no equipment and long arduous marches overland. His relief was based on his unwillingness to relieve certain subordinates. He felt that tanks were required rather than changes of command to get the Japanese out of their bunkers. MacArthur recommended him for division command at home for a new trial but we sent him to Panama. He knows nothing of this proposal.<sup>6</sup> If there are other



men you think of that you want, send me their names and I will see what I can do to help you out.<sup>7</sup>

I am sorry your Christmas Day must be one of storm and stress.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. In a December 21 message, Eisenhower asked Marshall to "consider promotion to four star rank" of Bradley and Spaatz. While admitting that there had been an intelligence failure prior to the German Ardennes offensive that had begun on December 16, Eisenhower wrote: "Bradley has kept his head magnificently and has proceeded methodically and energetically to meet the situation. In no quarter is there any tendency to place any blame upon Bradley. I retain all my former confidence in him and believe that his promotion now would be interpreted by all American forces as evidence that their calm determination and courage in the face of trials and difficulties is thoroughly appreciated here and at home. It would have a fine effect generally." (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2367-68.)

2. In a message the following day, the two preceding sentences were changed to read: "Congress has adjourned and it would therefore be unwise to promote Bradley without some measure of success as a basis for exceptional action. Under the circumstances I doubt if the President would hazard a recess appointment regarding which, etc." (Marshall to Eisenhower, Radio, December 23, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) The second session of the Seventy-eighth Congress adjourned sine die on December 19, 1944.

3. Word had spread of several December 17 executions of U.S. prisoners of war by elements of Kampfgruppe Peiper (First SS Panzer Division); the most famous of these was the Malmédy massacre. (Cole, *The Ardennes*, pp. 261-64.)

4. Porter was War Department assistant chief of staff, G-3. Brown was commanding general, Infantry Replacement Training Center, Camp Wheeler, Georgia; Marshall had inspected his operation December 13-14, 1944. Regarding Brown's relief from command in May 1943, see *Papers of GCM*, 3: 704-5.

5. Brigadier General Paul L. Ransom, who had commanded the Ninety-eighth Infantry Division between September 1942 and November 1943, was commanding general of the Infantry Replacement Training Center, Fort McClellan, Alabama. Marshall had inspected his operation December 13, 1944.

6. Regarding Harding's relief, see *Papers of GCM*, 3: 478, 553.

7. Eisenhower replied on December 23 that he and Bradley wanted to have Brown, Porter, and Ransom "over here at once," but that they did "not need Harding at this particular moment as I have placed Bonesteel, with a small staff, on my rear areas." (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2371.) Neither Harding nor Ransom was sent to the European theater during the war, but Porter took command of the Seventy-fifth Infantry Division on January 24, 1945, and Brown took command of the Fifth Infantry Division on April 20, 1945.

TO LIEUTENANT COLONEL H. MERRILL PASCO

December 25, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Pasco: You have assisted me in drafting many letters of Christmas greetings and appreciation to various leaders in the war effort. Quite naturally you omitted your own name from the list of those to whom such letters should go. I have stirred my memory many times for lessons out of my past experience, particularly of the first World War period, and the parallel to your situation occurred to me yesterday in recalling that as the



various members of General Pershing's GHQ Staff took their final leave of duty with him I prepared appropriate and rather generous statements of his appreciation for the services they had rendered. Being the last to go I was the only one not to receive such a letter, though lack of appreciation was far from General Pershing's intention—it was that the habit had been formed of receiving suggestions for such communications from me. Hence the omission.

I want you to know that I am conscious of the heavy burden of duties that you carry, not only as Assistant Secretary and frequently Acting Secretary of the General Staff, but in relation to more personal services for me. I appreciate very much all that you have done and the highly efficient manner in which you have done it.

With my Christmas greetings to Mrs. Pasco and you and with very best wishes for you both in the New Year, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

TO ARCHIBALD MACLEISH<sup>1</sup>  
*Secret*

December 25, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear MacLeish: Apropos of our conversation of the other day a message has just come to me from General McNarney, Deputy Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean Theater, the general sense of which is that the morale of troops in the Fifth Army in Italy "is suffering for lack of appropriate treatment of importance of Italian campaign. Inactive period in Italy during great activity in France, spectacular forays of B-29s and political implications of the Balkan situation is not only detracting from but obscuring all importance of the Italian campaign in the press in the United States, *which is reflected in mail received by troops at the front.*"

The factor that has been overlooked is that the containing and attrition of the enemy in the greatest possible numbers in Italy is a mission of paramount importance of the troops in this theater. The issue is not one of territory.

General McNarney believes that a statement from the Chief of Staff or the Commander in Chief relative to this subject would do much at this time to counteract the relegation of the Italian campaign by the press to, in their terms, a "forgotten theater." He states this is being reflected in the mail received by troops at the front and the reaction is "a terrific lowering of morale," expressed succinctly in a typical comment—"Why fight in a theater relegated to such an unimportant role that the Government has seen fit to take away most of their troops and equipment and place it on the lowest priority for supplies, troops and ammunition."



For your sole information additional troops are now landing in Italy and are en route and are at sea. There is more to be said along this line that I cannot commit to paper.

It occurred to me that in the President's message an important reference might be made to the Italian campaign calculated to buck up the men fighting under such difficult conditions in the Apennines. Our press is so freehanded in its comments, without regard to world strategy or the possibility that they do not understand the importance of this mission or that, and our people are so quickly saturated with headlines of this variety that the mail to the troops presents a very difficult morale problem. My mail similarly contains attacks against abandoning our forces in Italy.

I will have someone prepare a draft of what might possibly be said by the President to the advantage of morale in Italy without compromising us. Whether or not this can be used is, of course, for you to decide.<sup>2</sup> Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. A poet and former Librarian of Congress (1939–44), MacLeish had been appointed assistant secretary of state for public and cultural relations on December 20. He was working with Samuel I. Rosenman on the president's annual message to Congress on the state of the Union.

2. The Operations Division's Current Group produced an eighteen-page draft of material for possible inclusion in the president's address; much of this was incorporated by the president's writers. Regarding the Italian campaign, the January 6, 1945, address stated: "What the Allied forces in Italy are doing is a well-considered part in our strategy in Europe, now aimed at only one objective—the total defeat of the Germans. These valiant forces in Italy are continuing to keep a substantial portion of the German Army under constant pressure—including some 20 first-line German divisions and the necessary supply and transport and replacement troops—all of which our enemies need so badly elsewhere. Over very difficult terrain and through adverse weather conditions, our Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army—reinforced by units from other United Nations, including a brave and well-equipped unit of the Brazilian Army—have, in the past year, pushed north through bloody Cassino and the Anzio beachhead, and through Rome until now they occupy heights overlooking the valley of the Po. The greatest tribute which can be paid to the courage and fighting ability of these splendid soldiers in Italy is to point out that although their strength is about equal to that of the Germans they oppose, the Allies have been continuously on the offensive. That pressure, that offensive, by our troops in Italy will continue. The American people—and every soldier now fighting in the Apennines—should remember that the Italian front has not lost any of the importance which it had in the days when it was the only Allied front in Europe." (Annual Message on the State of the Union, January 6, 1945, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1944–45 Volume*, ed. Samuel I. Rosenman [New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950], p. 488.)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SURLES

December 25, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

I wish you would have and quickly a summary made of the number of



prisoners we have taken since the start of the German offensive so that you will be prepared to announce tomorrow that on a certain date, (whatever is the date up to which the prisoner reports are carried) we captured our eight hundred thousandth prisoner and have taken \_\_\_\_\_ prisoners "at least so far as reported" since the launching of the German offensive.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. A Bureau of Public Relations press release on December 26 stated that the 800,000th German prisoner on the western front had been taken on Christmas Eve and that 13,273 had been taken since the beginning of the German Ardennes offensive. (NA/RG 165 [OCS, 383.6].)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY

*Secret*

December 26, 1944

[Washington, D.C.]

I had Kirk and one or two of his people and Maxwell and one or two of his people in for a conference with me regarding the adequacy of hospitalization and evacuation in the European Theater.<sup>1</sup> Since the drafting of the brief by Bell for my information, the G-4 comments have been modified as shown by the substitution of the second page of General Maxwell's memorandum for that attached, marked cancelled.<sup>2</sup>

I gathered from the discussion that the situation as to fixed beds in the European Theater had been improved since General Kenner had outlined his necessities, and that by the end of January or in February, without considering the field hospital phase, Kenner would have approximately his 7% allowance. However, Maxwell felt that a certain definite number of field hospitals should be charged to him as fixed beds, say 20%, and he would have to consider the preparation of his requisitions accordingly.

General Kirk made a point of the fact that not only were men who had laboriously been trained for medical service being transferred to the infantry, but trained and experienced men returning from overseas of his Corps were being diverted to other duties. He thought this last was most unfortunate because of the practical experience the men had gained was being wasted at a time it was badly needed.<sup>3</sup>

I wonder if it would not be a good thing to send Maxwell to France for a hurried visit to look into this and related matters.<sup>4</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Surgeon General Norman T. Kirk and Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel Russell L. Maxwell met with Marshall at 11:00 A.M. on December 26. The issue of the proper ratio of fixed beds (i.e., beds in facilities other than forward area surgical hospitals) in theater hospitals to troop strength was related to theater evacuation policies, since the more patients evacuated to facilities in the United States the fewer beds, doctors, nurses, and so forth needed in the theater. In the fall of 1944, the fixed-bed ratio for the European theater had been set at 7 percent. By late 1944, due to various policy changes, a backlog had begun



to accumulate of patients scheduled for evacuation, while at the same time the theater actually had fewer fixed beds than it was credited with. These issues are examined in Clarence McKittrick Smith, *The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of Interior*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* (Washington: GPO, 1956), pp. 214–37.

2. Captain G. F. Bell, a member of the General Staff secretariat, had written a brief on “Adequacy of Hospitalization and Evacuation, ETO” describing the recommendations of the theater’s chief medical officer (Major General Albert W. Kenner), General Somervell’s recommendations, and G-4’s comments and recommendations. A key issue was how to count the beds under its authorized 7 percent ratio, and consequently whether changes were needed in policies regarding evacuation and shipping new personnel. (Bell brief on the Adequacy of Hospitalization and Evacuation, December 23, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 632, Case 20].) Maxwell’s memorandum is not in the Marshall papers.

3. For further developments, see Marshall Memorandum for General Handy, December 28, 1944, pp. 714–16.

4. As Maxwell had recently returned from Europe, Marshall approved sending Colonel Crawford F. Sams, a member of the Medical Corps and chief of G-4’s Program Branch. (See the handwritten notes on Bell Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, December 28, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 632, Case 20].)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY  
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Radio. *Top Secret*

December 26, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Eisenhower from Marshall. We are searching the world for a replacement for General Porter as G-3,<sup>1</sup> who not only can handle the routine G-3 business but can take the lead for us in the matter of selling both to Congress and to various groups the necessity for compulsory military training as well as protect us from the inevitable assaults on personnel which will follow the cessation of hostilities in the European Theater, not that there is any immediate indication of a cessation at this holiday season. Among the men being considered is Arthur Wilson, now your supply man for Devers’ group, whose assistant is Brigadier General Ralph Immell, former Wisconsin National Guardsman. Wilson is particularly able and skillful in dealing with Congress and outside organizations and of course knows the War Department staff like a book, having been shot at from most of its compartments. There are a number of individuals being considered but I should like to get your preliminary reaction to the possible release of Wilson.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Porter was soon to command an Infantry division in the European theater; see note 7, Marshall to Eisenhower, December 22, 1944, p. 708.

2. Major General Arthur R. Wilson had been in G-4 between 1938 and 1942; he commanded supply organizations in North Africa and Italy in 1943 and 1944 before being assigned to logistical support of Devers’s Seventh Army in France. There is no reply from Eisenhower’s headquarters in the Marshall papers. On December 26, Marshall asked



Arnold if Major General Idwal H. Edwards, who had served as head of G-3 for a year (1942–43) prior to Porter's term, should go back to G-3. (Marshall Memorandum for General Arnold, December 26, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) At this time, Edwards, as Ira Eaker's deputy, was in actual practice running the headquarters of Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Edwards officially became assistant chief of staff, G-3, on February 14, 1945.

NOTES FOR SECRETARY OF WAR'S  
PRESS CONFERENCE<sup>1</sup>

December 28, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

The situation on the Western front continues critical. So far the Germans have been unable to expand the base of their salient which is a vital requirement for the security of their present gains or a deeper penetration. Further advances at the tip of the salient are relatively unimportant by comparison with the urgent German necessity for expanding the base, which they must soon endeavor to do as time is now working against them.<sup>2</sup>

The weather has favored us recently and rather unexpectedly. The past few days have permitted our crushing air superiority to be directed against the enemy troops, tanks, trains, and communications. His marshalling yards are being blown to bits. Aside from the fighting spirit of our troops, no other factor means so much to us in the present situation as flying weather.<sup>3</sup>

For the past two days the German gains have been negligible and their losses in men and armored vehicles heavy. On the Allied side gains, some very important, have been made along both flanks of the salient. Meanwhile our attacking forces are increasing in strength and organization. The enemy has committed almost all of his crack Panzer divisions to the battle. The situation, as I have said, is critical, but as much so for the Germans as for the Allies.<sup>4</sup>

There remains the possibility of diversionary attacks on General Devers' front north and south of Strasbourg, against the 9th Army, or even possibly in a smaller way at some chosen point on our lines in Holland. But the enemy must renew his assault with a tremendous effort. He has no choice. Most of the cards are on the table.

I should like to emphasize one very important factor, undoubtedly one of the considerations the Germans had in mind in hazarding this all-out effort. Since we entered the war the enemy has exerted all his cleverness of propaganda to effect a cleavage in the British-American front of a free press, to stir up strife and discord, and he has been particularly vicious and ingenious in his efforts to effect a division between the Russians and ourselves in the coordination of our military enterprises. The Germans are utilizing their present offensive to further this effort and I note in his



morning's press that they are achieving at least a little of success.<sup>5</sup> Though I must say that the attitude of the press and radio commentators and reports in this country has been rather remarkable for restraint and freedom from the usual violence of criticism which follows closely on any reverse. There are very few wolves in full cry and the continued confidence displayed in the Allied arms and command is most reassuring. They deserve our complete support and our cheers for their successes and our stern resolution in backing them through periods of storm and stress. War is not an easy game to play and you can't always win, but I feel personally that we are winning and time will reveal that this German throw of the dice will have fatal consequences for him.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall dictated this document to his private secretary. With some editing, it served Stimson as a general introduction, which he followed with a lengthy survey of events on each of the major fronts. Stimson's revision of Marshall's memorandum is printed in his diary for December 28. (Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 49: 131-32].)

2. The German salient's base had stabilized at approximately forty-seven air miles by December 18; its greatest depth—about sixty air miles—was achieved on December 26 (however, by this time the average width had been reduced to thirty miles). (Cole, *The Ardennes*, p. 651.)

3. The German Ardennes offensive had been launched when Allied air superiority over the western front had been negated by bad weather. Between December 23 and 28, however, good flying weather allowed the Allies to make crippling strikes against the attackers. On December 26, elements of Patton's Third Army, advancing from the south, had broken through to the trapped American units at the key communications town of Bastogne. By the evening of December 26, the official U.S. Army history of the battle concludes, the battlefield "initiative had passed from German to American hands." The German armies "never came close" to success. (Ibid., pp. 672-73, 674.)

4. Stimson deleted this sentence.

5. The phrase "I note in this morning's press that they are achieving at least a little of success" Stimson changed to "it is most important to avoid falling into their trap." In general, Stimson softened Marshall's characterization of the press.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY

*Top Secret*

December 28, 1944

[Washington, D.C.]

Reference so much of the attached brief by Captain Bell as refers to medical equipment and service for P/Ws in the European Theater, and regarding the organization of WAC units to alleviate medical personnel shortage:<sup>1</sup>

I think the reference to captured equipment for P/W hospitals may be misleading. My understanding at the conference I had with G-4 and the medical people was that we should furnish the equipment, of course less that portion which can be obtained otherwise—by capture, but the theater commander should be



instructed to utilize Germans for the service of these hospitals. Specifically, that he would have the obligation of training the necessary men to act as nurses, ward attendants, etc., etc., to meet requirements beyond those which can be serviced by captured medical personnel.<sup>2</sup>

With regard to the WAC recruiting: what I had in mind was this, in the first place, they have WACs on this duty at the present time but without any particular organization and therefore without representation, as it were, and undoubtedly without appropriate ratings.<sup>3</sup> Now what I want them to do, and advertise accordingly, is to recruit WAC organizations for practically every Army hospital in the United States, to replace male ward attendants with women, given some special training that would make them much more valuable assistants to nurses than the average male attendant; also to take over as many other jobs in the hospitals, particularly administrative ones, as possible. I thought it important that their ratings be carefully determined to be in line with those of other WAC organizations, but that there would be a necessity for only one officer, she being for the purpose merely of looking after their interests rather than directing their work. I think to meet the present heavy shortage of nurses more can be done quickly in this manner than by any other method. I also think that it lends itself well to recruiting.<sup>4</sup>

I am accepting the fact that this will be an increase in our troop strength, which I regard as an unavoidable necessity.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Concerning Marshall's involvement in European theater hospital and patient-evacuation issues, see Marshall Memorandum for General Handy, December 26, 1944, pp. 711–12. In his memorandum, Bell had stated that Handy had written to Somervell suggesting that: "a) Maximum use be made of captured medical equipment and personnel to provide medical service for the P/ Ws [prisoners of war]. b) Trained Medical Department returnees now 'Branch Immaterial' be returned to Medical Department for duty and WAC units be organized to alleviate medical personnel shortage." (Bell Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, December 28, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 632, Case 20].)

2. In the autumn of 1944, the War Department stopped (with few exceptions) the transfer of German prisoner-of-war patients to the United States. By the end of December, this had resulted in the accumulation of fourteen thousand German patients in European theater hospitals. The War Department informed the theater that it would have to care for German patients in hospitals manned primarily by captured German medical personnel. By February 1945, the European theater had in operation or in the process of organization prisoner-of-war hospitals containing thirteen thousand beds. (Smith, *Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of Interior*, pp. 234, 236.)

3. The problems of using Women's Army Corps enlisted personnel in army hospitals had been under discussion for several months. In late September 1944, the Surgeon General's Office had requested that W.A.C. recruiters discontinue the Female Medical Technicians Campaign; in fact, on December 20, the War Department had issued a directive to curtail



all W.A.C. recruiting. In December, the problems of W.A.C. members' status in the hospitals had caused Colonel Hobby to protest to Marshall against recruiting W.A.C. personnel for hospital work under prevailing conditions. (Mattie E. Treadwell, *The Women's Army Corps*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1954], pp. 349-52.)

4. For further developments concerning the use of W.A.C. personnel in military hospitals, see Marshall Memorandum for General Handy, January 5, 1945, *Papers of GCM*, volume 5.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY,  
GENERAL ARNOLD, GENERAL BISSELL  
*Confidential*

December 28, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Mr. Rockefeller saw me today regarding Latin-American affairs.<sup>1</sup>

First, he wishes to secure an approved policy outlining the desired objectives in Latin-America. This of course will include the military objectives relating to Air and other matters.

Next, he brought up the question of coordinated relations and suggested the possibility of having detailed in his office an officer of the Army to keep him, Mr. Rockefeller, in the closest touch with the War Department ideas and concerns in Latin-America, as well as to keep the War Department informed of Mr. Rockefeller's point of view. I suggested that it probably would be best to give the officer now in G-2 responsible for Latin-American affairs, or in OPD, I don't know which, a desk in Mr. Rockefeller's office alongside that of the principal civil individual who would be aware of the various complications and desires. Our man to remain a member of his War Department General Staff section with a desk here as well. I don't know which would be the most effective arrangement.

Mr. Rockefeller then brought up the question of harmonizing the procedure in relation to the various missions, particularly as related to their control by General Brett in Panama. I gathered that in his talk with General Brett the latter stated that he had very little information regarding War Department policies generally as to objectives in Latin-America.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, Mr. Rockefeller cited several cases where things had not gone too well. There is bound to be a confused administrative problem in relation to missions in any event and particularly so when they operate under the commander in Panama and at the same time we have attaches operating with the ambassadors or ministers in various countries largely under the State Department and partially under the War Department. Just how all this can be arranged to produce a more unified course of action I don't know but it is a problem that Rockefeller is anxious to have solved.

He assured me that he would see that the State Department representatives in Latin-America cooperate in every way in what we are trying



to do, without the usual irritating incidents that have confused matters in the past.

He cited as an example of his uncertainty, the difficulty of knowing how to go about, from his side of the fence, matters pertaining to General Arnold's Air Corps proposals for Latin-America.<sup>3</sup> He, Rockefeller, is apparently much in favor of General Arnold's plan but the point Rockefeller was after was, with whom should he deal in the War Department machinery, is it somebody in G-2, is it the Latin-American man in OPD, is it the Deputy Chief of Staff, is it General Arnold, or is it all of them?

Mr. Rockefeller is very desirous of building up an effective bond between the War and State Departments with adequate machinery and plainly determined objectives and I want on our side to lend him every possible assistance.<sup>4</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Formerly the coordinator of Inter-American affairs, Nelson A. Rockefeller had become the assistant secretary of state for American republic affairs on December 20, 1944.

2. Lieutenant General George H. Brett had been head of the Caribbean Defense Command since November 1942.

3. On November 15, 1943, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved and later sent to the president a paper entitled "U.S. Requirements for Post-War Military Bases" (J.C.S. 570/1). One example of the diplomatic results of this policy paper was the successful effort to negotiate a military aviation agreement with Brazil (June 14, 1944)—and the impact of this on the State Department's efforts concerning a civil aviation agreement—which may be seen in the documents in *Foreign Relations, 1944*, 7: 543–66.

4. For further developments, see the following document.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
OF STATE [FOR AMERICAN REPUBLIC AFFAIRS]  
*Confidential*

December 30, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Rockefeller: After our conversation the day before yesterday I gave the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Handy, General Arnold, General Hull and General Bissell a summary of your views and my statements.<sup>1</sup> This morning we had a brief discussion of the various points.

While we are just entering into the problem of what had best be done, if agreeable to you, I thought it wise to give you our views at the moment in order that you may, if you have a different slant, let me know before we get too deep into the preparation of proposals to you.

In the first place, there is a very effective officer in Brazil, I have forgotten his name, thoroughly familiar with all of the Latin-American affairs, and who commands our confidence.<sup>2</sup> Our idea is to bring him here and centralize all War Department matters concerning the missions in



Latin-American under him; he would be in the Operations Section of the War Department General Staff, though we think that he should have a desk in your office so that he would [be] thoroughly familiar with both sides of the fence.

We believe that the attaches must remain for Army coordination under G-2, General Bissell. However, in line with what I said to you about missions and the confusion they create in the ordinary organizational set-up, I have this proposal in mind, that we put up to the Committee composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy who in turn have working groups under them, a statement of the purpose for each of these missions as now established or that may be established later. Once this statement is cleared by the Cabinet officials referred to, we should prepare a directive to be similarly cleared by that Committee which would in effect place all activities, in a general way, in each state under our ambassador or minister. He would be given the policy or purpose of the mission and it would be his duty to forward this program in every diplomatic way possible. In turn the head of the mission would receive instructions from the War Department outlining his specific mission, giving him the directions for its implementation but also directing him to report to the ambassador with relation to his, the Chief of Mission's, contacts with the officials of the country in question.

I should be curious to get your reaction to the above.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. For previous consideration of the coordination of civilian-military policy with regard to Latin America, see Marshall Memorandum for General Handy, General Arnold, General Bissell, December 28, 1944, pp. 716-17.

2. Brigadier General Kenner F. Hertford (U.S.M.A., 1923), had been deputy commander, U.S. Army Forces, South Atlantic, in Recife, Brazil, since early 1942.

3. Rockefeller replied that he was "delighted" with Marshall's suggestions. "As a matter of fact, it seems to me that the objectives and assignments of all missions in the field, regardless of their nature, should be handled in a similar way, thus placing the Ambassador in a position to support and direct all United States activities being carried on within the area under his responsibility. Then, if the Ambassador does not carry out his responsibility, a change should be made." Furthermore, he was "anxious as rapidly as possible to develop a complete program of our long-term objectives" in Latin America. (Rockefeller to Marshall, January 5, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 091 South America (January 10, 1945)].)

On April 1, 1945, the Operations Division established a Pan American Group with Hertford as its chief. Its job was to "serve as the central agency within the War Department for formulation, subject to overall War Department and Joint Chief[s] of Staff objectives, of plans and policies specifically pertaining to other American Republics." It would coordinate with other governmental agencies, monitor War Department actions pertaining to Latin America, provide Operations Division membership on relevant boards and committees, and "investigate and determine the justification" of requests for troops, supplies, equipment, and operational plans from the Caribbean Defense Command and the U.S. Army Forces, South Atlantic. (Lieutenant Colonel James Stack Memorandum for Groups and Sections, OPD, March 31, 1945, *ibid.*)



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
*Secret*

December 30, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

General Eisenhower sent me a message stating that General Juin is very anxious to pay a visit to the United States for the particular purpose of seeing our industrial set-up in connection with future French rearmament.<sup>1</sup>

General Juin commanded the French Army in Italy prior to the entry of those troops into South France. His service as a combat commander has been outstanding, and his cooperation with American commanders was perfect. They all like and admire him very much, as I do personally. He is now Chief of Staff of the French Army and is one of our staunchest supporters.

I am informing General Eisenhower that such a visit by General Juin would be most welcome. We will arrange a trip for him to see our industrial set-up and Army facilities.<sup>2</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See Eisenhower's December 29 message in *Papers of DDE*, 4: 2385.
2. General Alphonse Juin visited the United States between late April and late May 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY  
*Secret*

December 30, 1944  
[Washington, D.C.]

I sent you in today General Henry's adverse opinion on the question of additional permanent promotions.<sup>1</sup> Probably he is right. However, there are these considerations:

I agreed to MacArthur's proposal, at the time the nominations were submitted for you and others, to include Sutherland on the next list. I did not do it with Bradley but I did have a feeling of the obligation to do it at some time or other. There is also the question of Palmer Swift, close to retirement age and still a Colonel. It would seem too bad to let him come up to that point if he is successful in the next operation and still only holding a temporary general officer's grade.<sup>2</sup>

Of course there are others whose work has been outstanding and the great problem is one of differentiation along the fighting front as well as between staff and continental U.S. jobs and those in active theaters.

I told Henry to consider another matter and let me hear from him. That is the possibility of creating a certain number of four-star generals. This is going to be a very difficult proposition because once you start it involves a great spread or otherwise creates a decided bitterness, and with some justification. I should like you to be turning this over in your mind.



I hope we will soon be faced with the necessity of handling the business of demotions involved in partial demobilization. This will also be a very difficult problem. I told Henry to study this but I should like you to be thinking of it and talk to me about it. I have had in mind that we should appoint a board—the difficulty is to find the appropriate officers for the board—to consider carefully all the interests involved and to propose a list for our guidance either of officers to be demoted or of priorities for those to be maintained in their present rank. We must have some definite policy in this matter and we cannot afford to wait until the last moment, because at best it will be a very trying thing to manage and will have definite effect on morale one way or another in the higher commands in the Pacific. Please be thinking about this.<sup>3</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The memorandum from the head of G-1 (Stephen G. Henry) is not in the Marshall papers.

2. Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland was a lieutenant colonel in the permanent establishment; he was promoted to colonel effective October 1, 1945. Another of MacArthur's subordinates, Major General Innis Palmer Swift (U.S.M.A., 1904), had commanded the First Cavalry Division from mid-April 1941 to mid-August 1944, when he became commanding general of the First Army Corps; he was not promoted prior to his retirement.

3. Handy replied that G-1 thought it "inadvisable now to process nominations for permanent promotion" because of "the difficulties of getting nominations through Congress." He recommended that a board be constituted from the active-list permanent major generals in the United States to draw up an eligible list for promotions to permanent brigadier general. For any contemplated promotions to full general, Handy noted, a delicate balance had to be maintained between air and ground, Europe and the Pacific. He proposed that the list of potential four-star generals be: Somervell, Spaatz, Bradley, and Kenney. Marshall's idea of creating a board to handle the demotion of officers from their temporary to their permanent ranks seemed to be the best idea, according to Handy; he suggested that Marshall consider sitting on the board himself. (Handy Memorandum for General Marshall, January 5, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY  
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
[Radio No. W-84337.] *Top Secret*

December 30, 1944  
Washington, D.C.

For Eisenhower's eyes only from Marshall. I am violating somewhat my own orders to the staff here in bringing up some question with you while you are in the turmoil of this German offensive. However, as you seem to be succeeding and my guess is that you will without much delay seize the offensive yourself, I feel free to make these comments:

They may or may not have brought to your attention articles in certain London papers proposing a British Deputy Commander for all your



ground forces and implying that you have undertaken too much of a task yourself. My feeling is this: under no circumstances make any concessions of any kind whatsoever. You not only have our complete confidence but there would be a terrific resentment in this country following such action. I am not assuming that you had in mind such a concession. I just wish you to be certain of our attitude on this side. You are doing a grand job and go on and give them hell.<sup>1</sup>

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On the British press's criticism of Eisenhower and assertions that operational command should revert to Montgomery, and American press's reaction to this, see Bryant, *Triumph in the West*, p. 280, and *Papers of DDE*, 4: 2391. Montgomery had been outspoken in his belief that Eisenhower's overall strategy was flawed; for example, see his comments to Marshall on October 8 in the editorial note on p. 624. Montgomery considered the German Ardennes offensive proof of the correctness of his views. But he also knew the gist of Marshall's message printed above and how "het up" Eisenhower was about the command issue, so he decided to "pipe down." (Montgomery, *Memoirs*, pp. 282, 284, 286.) Eisenhower replied to Marshall on January 1: "You need have no fear as to my contemplating the establishment of a ground deputy." (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2390.)







# Appendix and Maps

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## Appendix

# Principal War Department Officials and Major Theater Commands June 1943–December 1944

Organization charts and officials lists were published in *Papers of GCM*, 2: 697–702, and 3: 712–20. The persons listed below served in the designated capacities during the period covered by this volume. The dates given here are from the official beginning to the official end of service in the position. It was not uncommon for an official to take several weeks of accumulated leave prior to the official termination of his duties; designated successors often served as “acting” officials during this interim. The War Department listing is derived in large part from James E. Hewes, Jr., *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900–1963* (Washington: GPO, 1975), pp. 379–409.

### OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR

#### *Secretary of War*

Henry L. Stimson ..... July 10, 1940–September 21, 1945

#### *Under Secretary of War*

Robert P. Patterson ..... December 16, 1940–September 26, 1945

#### *Assistant Secretary of War*

John J. McCloy ..... April 24, 1941–November 29, 1945

Robert A. Lovett (Asst. for Air) .... April 26, 1941–December 15, 1945

#### *Bureau of Public Relations*

Alexander D. Surles ..... August 6, 1941–December 31, 1945

### WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

#### *Chief of Staff*

George C. Marshall ..... September 1, 1939–November 18, 1945

#### *Deputy Chief of Staff*

Joseph T. McNarney ..... March 9, 1942–October 21, 1944

Thomas T. Handy ..... October 22, 1944–June 9, 1946

#### *Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division*

Thomas T. Handy ..... June 24, 1942–October 21, 1944

John E. Hull ..... October 22, 1944–June 15, 1946



*Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (Personnel)*

Miller G. White .....September 2, 1942–August 18, 1944  
Stephen G. Henry .....August 19, 1944–October 22, 1945

*Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence)*

George V. Strong .....May 5, 1942–February 6, 1944  
Clayton L. Bissell .....February 7, 1944–January 25, 1946

*Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Organization and Training)*

Ray E. Porter .....May 16, 1943–February 13, 1945

*Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 (Supply)*

Raymond G. Moses .....March 9, 1942–September 1, 1943  
Russell L. Maxwell .....September 30, 1943–March 14, 1946

*Secretary of the General Staff*

William T. Sexton .....March 14, 1943–January 14, 1944  
Frank McCarthy .....January 15, 1944–August 21, 1945

WAR DEPARTMENT SPECIAL STAFF

*The Inspector General*

Virgil L. Peterson .....December 24, 1939–June 5, 1945

*The Judge Advocate General*

Myron C. Cramer .....December 1, 1941–November 20, 1945

*Chief of Finance*

Howard K. Loughry .....April 23, 1940–June 1, 1945

*Legislative and Liaison Division*

Wilton B. Persons .....March 9, 1942–July 28, 1948

*Civil Affairs Division*

John H. Hilldring .....April 7, 1943–March 19, 1946

*Special Planning Division*

William F. Tompkins .....July 23, 1943–June 29, 1945

*New Developments Division*

Stephen G. Henry .....October 23, 1943–August 17, 1944  
William A. Borden .....August 18, 1944–March 27, 1946

WAR DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATIVE  
AND TECHNICAL SERVICES

*The Adjutant General*

James A. Ullo .....March 3, 1942–January 31, 1946

*Chief of Chaplains*

William R. Arnold .....December 23, 1937–February 14, 1945

*Provost Marshal General*

Allen W. Gullion .....July 31, 1941–April 27, 1944  
Archer L. Lerch (acting) .....December 16, 1942–June 20, 1944  
Archer L. Lerch .....June 21, 1944–December 3, 1945



*Chief of Engineers*

Eugene Reybold .....October 1, 1941–September 30, 1945

*The Surgeon General*

Norman T. Kirk .....June 1, 1943–May 31, 1947

*The Quartermaster General*

Edmund B. Gregory .....April 1, 1940–January 31, 1946

*Chief of Ordnance*

Leven H. Campbell .....June 1, 1942–May 31, 1946

*Chief Signal Officer*

Dawson Olmstead .....October 1, 1941–June 30, 1943

Harry C. Ingles .....July 1, 1943–March 31, 1947

*Chief of the Chemical Corps*

William N. Porter .....May 31, 1941–November 28, 1945

*Chief of the Transportation Corps*

Charles P. Gross .....July 31, 1942–November 30, 1945

## MAJOR ZONE OF THE INTERIOR COMMANDS

*Army Air Forces*

Henry H. Arnold .....September 28, 1938–February 9, 1946

*Army Ground Forces*

Lesley J. McNair .....July 9, 1940–July 13, 1944

Ben Lear .....July 14, 1944–January 20, 1945

*Army Service Forces*

Brehon B. Somervell .....March 9, 1942–December 31, 1945

## MAJOR UNITED STATES THEATER COMMANDS

During the course of World War II theater commands sometimes overlapped and their designations and boundaries frequently changed. At times United States Army commanders were deputies to British theater commanders; these are indicated by an asterisk. These nuances are described in Ray S. Cline, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* (Washington: GPO, 1951), pp. 374–81.

### EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, U.S. ARMY

Jacob L. Devers .....May 10, 1943–January 8, 1944

Dwight D. Eisenhower .....January 15, 1944–July 1, 1945

### NORTH AFRICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Dwight D. Eisenhower .....February 4, 1943–January 8, 1944

Jacob L. Devers\* .....January 8, 1944–October 22, 1944


(Theater Commander: General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson,

December 1943–October 1944)



Joseph T. McNarney*	October 22, 1944–October 23, 1945
(Theater Commander: General Sir Harold Alexander after October 1944)	
MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, U.S. ARMY	
Joseph T. McNarney	November 1, 1944–October 23, 1945
GHQ, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA	
Douglas MacArthur	April 18, 1942–September 2, 1945
U.S. ARMY FORCES IN SOUTH PACIFIC AREA	
Millard F. Harmon	July 26, 1942–July 8, 1944
U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA	
Robert C. Richardson, Jr.	August 14, 1943–August 1, 1944
U.S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC OCEAN AREA	
Robert C. Richardson, Jr.	August 1, 1944–March 17, 1946
U.S. ARMY FORCES IN THE CHINESE THEATER OF OPERATIONS	
Joseph W. Stilwell	March 4, 1942–October 21, 1944
SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND	
Joseph W. Stilwell*	November 16, 1943–October 21, 1944
Raymond A. Wheeler*	November 12, 1944–October 4, 1945
(Theater Commander: Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten)	
U.S. FORCES, CHINA THEATER	
Albert C. Wedemeyer	October 31, 1944–May 1, 1946
U.S. FORCES, INDIA-BURMA THEATER	
Daniel I. Sultan	October 27, 1944–June 12, 1945
U.S. ARMY FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST	
Lewis H. Brereton	January 31, 1943–September 10, 1943
Ralph Royce	September 10, 1943–March 10, 1944
Benjamin F. Giles	March 10, 1944–March 1, 1945
PERSIAN GULF COMMAND	
Donald H. Connolly	December 10, 1943–December 24, 1944
U.S. ARMY FORCES, SOUTH ATLANTIC	
Robert L. Walsh	November 20, 1942–May 15, 1944
R. H. Wooten	May 16, 1944–October 30, 1945
CARIBBEAN DEFENSE COMMAND	
George H. Brett	November 12, 1942–October 15, 1945
ALASKA DEFENSE COMMAND	
Simon B. Buckner, Jr.	February 4, 1941–October 31, 1943
ALASKA DEPARTMENT	
Simon B. Buckner, Jr.	November 1, 1943–June 12, 1944
Delos C. Emmons	June 21, 1944–June 30, 1946






*U.S. Army Theaters and Commands, 1943-1944.*




### Pacific Landings by U.S. Forces June 1943–December 1944

15 March 44 = Landing date  
 = areas under Japanese control as of December 31, 1944

0 200 400 600 800 miles  
 0 200 400 600 800 1000 kilometers












# **Southeast Asian Operations** **June 1943–December 1944**






# Normandy Landings and Breakout June 6–September 25, 1944

26 Aug ..... approx. front lines  
(Aug. 6) = date liberated by Allies     = airborne operation

0 25 50 75 100 mi.  
0 50 100 150 km.





# Glossary

If an abbreviation is used only once in the volume, it is explained in brackets in the text or in a footnote. Repeatedly used abbreviations and code names are listed below.

- A.A. = Antiaircraft
- A.A.F. = Army Air Forces (U.S.)
- A.B.D.A. = American-British-Dutch-Australian Command,  
January-February 1942)
- A.C.S. = Assistant Chief of Staff
- A.E.F. = American Expeditionary Forces (World War I)
- A.F.H.Q. = Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, 1943-44
- AG = Adjutant General, U.S. Army
- AGC = U.S. Navy designation for amphibious command  
ship or flagship
- A.G.F. = Army Ground Forces (U.S.)
- AK = U.S. Navy designation for cargo ship
- AKA = U.S. Navy designation for attack cargo ship
- ANAKIM = Code name for proposed Allied invasion of Burma,  
1943-44
- ANVIL = Code name for the invasion of southern France,  
summer 1944 (renamed DRAGOON)
- AP = U.S. Navy designation for transport ship
- APA = U.S. Navy designation for attack transport
- ARGUMENT = Code name for U.S.-U.K. air attacks on German air-  
craft production facilities, February 19-24, 1944
- A.S.F. = Army Service Forces, U.S. Army
- A.S.T.P. = Army Specialized Training Program
- ASW = Assistant Secretary of War
- AVALANCHE = Code name for the Salerno, Italy, landing operation,  
September 9, 1943
- AVG = U.S. Navy designation for aircraft escort vessel
- AXIOM = Code name for the mission sent by Southeast Asia  
Command to the U.S. and U.K. to gather support  
for CULVERIN, 1944
- BAYTOWN = Code name for the British Eighth Army landing  
operation in southern Italy, September 3, 1943
- B.B.C. = British Broadcasting Corporation



- Bigot = An access restriction marking placed on certain secret documents indicating that they should be handled only by specifically designated persons
- BOLERO = Code name for the buildup of U.S. forces in U.K.
- BUCCANEER = Code name for an amphibious assault on the Andaman Islands
- BUFFALO = Code name for the May 1944 U.S. breakout from Anzio beachhead
- CAIMAN = Code name for French army-Resistance seizure of the Massif-Central area of France following OVERLORD
- CAPITAL = Code name for the three-phase operation in north Burma toward Mandalay, 1944-45
- CARTWHEEL = Code name for the Allied drive against Rabaul, 1943-44
- C.B.I. = China-Burma-India
- C.B.S. = Columbia Broadcasting System
- C.C.C. = Civilian Conservation Corps
- C.C.S. = Combined Chiefs of Staff
- C.F.L.N. = Comité Français de Liberation Nationale (French Committee of National Liberation)
- C.G. = Commanding general
- C.I.G.S. = Chief of the [British] Imperial General Staff
- CINCPAC = Commander in Chief, Pacific
- CINCPOA = Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas
- CINC SWPAC = Commander in Chief, South West Pacific Area
- CKS = Chiang Kai-shek
- CM = Classified Message (-OUT, -IN)
- COBRA = Code name for U.S. breakthrough at St.-Lô, July 1944
- COMGENCENTPAC = Commanding General, Central Pacific Area
- COMSOPAC = Commander, South Pacific Area
- C.O.S. = Chiefs of Staff (British)
- COSSAC = Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander
- COTTAGE = Code name for the invasion of Kiska Island, August 15, 1943
- CTO = China Theater of Operations
- CULVERIN = Code name for the plan for attack on northern Sumatra, Netherlands Indies
- CV = U.S. Navy designation for aircraft carrier
- DDEL = Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kans.
- DRACULA = Code name for the British plan to capture Rangoon, Burma



- DRAGOON = Code name replacing ANVIL after July 27, 1944  
 D.S.M. = Distinguished Service Medal  
 DUKW = 2.5-ton amphibious truck  
 E.S.T. = Eastern Standard Time  
 E.T.O. = European Theater of Operations  
 E.T.O.U.S.A. = European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army  
 EUREKA = Code name for Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin talks in Teheran, November-December 1943  
 Exec. = Executive Group File, O.P.D. files in NA/RG 165  
 F.B.I. = Federal Bureau of Investigation  
 FDRL = Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.  
 FOREARM = Code name for the occupation of Kavieng, New Ireland (cancelled)  
 FORTITUDE = Code name for the Allied diversionary feint at the Pas-de-Calais in conjunction with OVERLORD  
 FREEDOM = Code name for A.F.H.Q.  
 G-1 = Personnel Division, U.S. Army General Staff  
 G-2 = Intelligence Division, U.S. Army General Staff  
 G-3 = Organization and Training Division, U.S. Army General Staff  
 G-4 = Supply Division, U.S. Army General Staff  
 GALAHAD = 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional)—“Merrill’s Marauders”—north Burma, 1944  
 GCMRL = George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Va.  
 G.H.Q. = U.S. Army General Headquarters (1939–42)  
 GPO = Government Printing Office (U.S.)  
 GRANITE = Code name for tentative plan for operations in the Central Pacific Area in 1944  
 H = document handwritten by author  
 HMSO = His/Her Majesty’s Stationery Office (U.K.)  
 HUSKY = Code name for the Allied invasion of Sicily, July 1943  
 ICHIGO = Code name for Japanese operations against Allied air bases in China, mid-1944  
 J.C.S. = Joint Chiefs of Staff  
 J.L.C. = Joint Logistics Committee  
 J.N.W. = Joint New Weapons Committee  
 J.P.S. = Joint Staff Planners  
 LRPG = Long-range penetration group (i.e., Wingate’s Chindits and Merrill’s Marauders in north Burma, 1943–44)  
 LSD = Landing Ship Dock



- LSE = Landing Ship, Emergency Repair
- LSH = Landing Ship Headquarters
- LSI(L) = Landing Ship, Infantry (Large)
- LST = Landing Ship, Tank
- M.A.A.F. = Mediterranean Allied Air Forces
- MAGIC = Name for intelligence derived from the decryption of messages encrypted by the Japanese "Purple" machine (i.e., high-grade diplomatic traffic)
- MARKET-GARDEN = Code name for the operation to establish a bridgehead across the Rhine River in the Netherlands, September 1944; the airborne phase (MARKET) occurred in the Nijmegen-Arnhem area; the ground phase (GARDEN) was intended to open a corridor connecting the drop sites to British Twelfth Army lines
- MERCANTILE = Code name for the occupation of Manus Island (Bismarck Archipelago), March 1944
- M.P. = Military Police
- NA/RG = National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C./Record Group ###
  - RG 77 = Office of the Chief of Engineers
  - RG 80 = Department of the Navy, 1798–1947
  - RG 107 = Office of the Secretary of War
  - RG 160 = Headquarters, Army Service Forces
  - RG 165 = War Department General and Special Staffs
  - RG 218 = Joint Chiefs of Staff
  - RG 337 = Headquarters, Army Ground Forces
  - RG 407 = The Adjutant General's Office, 1917–
  - RG 457 = National Security Agency
- N.B.C. = National Broadcasting Company
- N.C.O. = Noncommissioned Officer
- No. = Number
- OCS = Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (cited in some sources as WDCSA)
- OCTAGON = Code name for the second Quebec Conference, September 12–16, 1944
- OF = Official File, FDRL
- O.P.D. = Operations Division, U.S. Army General Staff
- O.S.S. = Office of Strategic Services
- OVERLORD = Code name for the cross-Channel invasion, spring 1944
- O.W.I. = Office of War Information



- PBY = U.S. Navy designation for Catalina patrol bomber  
P.M. = Prime Minister  
POA = Pacific Ocean Area  
POINTBLANK = Code name for the U.S.-U.K. strategic bombing assault on German-controlled areas  
PRICELESS = Code name for Mediterranean operations subsequent to HUSKY (Sicily)  
PSF = President's Secretary's File, FDRL  
QUADRANT = Code name for the first Quebec Conference, August 14–24, 1943  
R.A.A.F. = Royal Australian Air Force  
R.A.F. = Royal Air Force (U.K.)  
RANKIN = Code name for a possible emergency cross-Channel invasion in the event of a German collapse prior to OVERLORD  
RENO = Series of five plans for the Allied advance from New Guinea to the Philippine Islands, 1943–44  
RG = Record Group  
R.O.T.C. = Reserve Officers' Training Corps  
S.E.A. = Southeast Asia Command (also S.E.A.C.)  
SEXTANT = Code name for C.C.S.-Churchill-Roosevelt-Chiang talks in Cairo, November-December 1943  
SGS = Secretary, U.S. Army General Staff  
S.H.A.E.F. = Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (Europe, 1944–45)  
SHINGLE = Code name for the landings at Anzio, Italy, January 22, 1944  
SLAPSTICK = Code name for the British Army landings around Taranto, Italy, September 9, 1943  
SOAPSUDS = Code name for air attack on the oil production facilities around Ploesti, Romania, August 1, 1943 (later redesignated TIDALWAVE)  
S.O.E. = Special Operations Executive (U.K.)  
S.O.S. = Services of Supply  
STALEMATE = Code name for the invasion of the Palau Islands, September 15, 1944  
SW = Secretary of War  
SWPA = Southwest Pacific Area  
TARZAN = Code name for the Allied seizure of north Burma  
TIDALWAVE = Code name replacing SOAPSUDS  
T/O = Table of Organization (U.S. Army)  
TOENAILS = Code name for the assault landings in the New Georgia island group, June-July 1943



- TORCH = Code name U.S.-U.K. landings in Morocco and Algeria, November 1942
- TRIDENT = Code name for the Washington Conference, May 12-25, 1943
- TS = Top Secret (sometimes TOPSEC)
- ULTRA = Name for the decryption of messages encrypted by the German Enigma machine; also a security classification (Top Secret Ultra) for documents containing information derived from such cryptanalysis
- U.S.M.A. = United States Military Academy (West Point)
- U.S.N.A. = United States Naval Academy (Annapolis)
- VLR = Very Long Range [B-29] bomber
- V.M.I. = Virginia Military Institute
- W.A.A.C. = Women's Army Auxiliary Corps
- W.A.C. = Women's Army Corps (successor to W.A.A.C.)
- W.P.B. = War Production Board
- W.P.D. = War Plans Division, U.S. Army General Staff
- Yale = Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, New Haven, Conn.



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