

John Smith

The Papers of George Catlett Marshall

The Papers of
George Catlin Marshall

Published under the auspices of
The George C. Marshall Foundation

*To Forrest C. Pogue (1912–1996)
and Richardson Dougall (1917–2002)
Mentors and Friends*

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The Papers of George Catlett Marshall

Volume 5

“THE FINEST SOLDIER”

JANUARY 1, 1945 – JANUARY 7, 1947

Larry I. Bland, Editor

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THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS
Baltimore and London
2003

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Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper.

The Johns Hopkins University Press
2715 North Charles Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21218-4363
www.press.jhu.edu

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

(Revised for volume 5)

Marshall, George C. (George Catlett), 1880–1959.
The papers of George Catlett Marshall.

Includes indexes.

Contents: v. 1. "The soldierly spirit," December 1880–June 1939.

v. 2. "We cannot delay," July 1, 1939–December 6, 1941.

v. 3. "The right man for the job," December 7, 1941–May 31, 1943.

v. 4. "Aggressive and determined leadership," June 1, 1943–December 31, 1944.

v. 5. "The finest soldier," January 1, 1945–January 7, 1947.

1. Marshall, George C. (George Catlett), 1880–1959.

2. United States—History, Military—20th century—Sources.

3. Generals—United States—Correspondence.

4. United States. Army—Biography.

I. Bland, Larry I. II. Ritenour, Sharon R. III. Title.

E745.M37 1981 973.918'092'4 81-47593

ISBN 0-8018-2552-0 (v. 1)

ISBN 0-8018-2553-9 (v. 2)

ISBN 0-8018-2967-4 (v. 3)

ISBN 0-8018-5368-0 (v. 4)

ISBN 0-8018-7871-3 (v. 5)

The preparation and publication of this volume was made possible in part by grants from the National Historical Publications and Records Commission, an independent agency of the United States government, the Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft of Essen, Germany, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, and the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.

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Preface

THE MARSHALL PAPERS

The George C. Marshall Research Library is the repository for General Marshall's personal papers. Since 1956 this collection has been supplemented by contributions of documents by the general's friends, associates, and admirers and by the Marshall Foundation's program of copying relevant documents in other repositories, primarily the U.S. National Archives. The core of the 1945 portion of this volume was drawn from nearly fifty linear feet of material in the Pentagon Office subgroup of the Marshall Papers. A detailed description of this subgroup is given in John N. Jacob, *George C. Marshall Papers, 1932–1960: A Guide* (Lexington, Va.: George C. Marshall Foundation, 1987). The core of the 1946 portion of this volume was drawn in part from the China mission subgroup in the Marshall Papers, which amounts to one linear foot, but mainly from documents copied from the twenty-two linear feet of documents in National Archives Record Group 59 (State Department, Lot Files on the Marshall mission).

This volume reproduces 508 documents from the Marshall material available to the editors. As U.S. Army chief of staff in charge of a large bureaucracy, Marshall signed numerous documents that he had not drafted. For example, many important staff-drafted radio messages from the War Department to field commanders were sent over the chief of staff's signature to emphasize their importance. Scholars are often less concerned about who actually drafted a document than with who authorized or signed it. Thus, the World War II secondary literature has numerous citations to important documents emanating from Marshall's office and bearing his name that have not been included here. This volume does not seek to publish the papers of the Office of the Chief of Staff but only those created by the chief of staff himself.

Regardless of their importance, staff-written documents are not included except as noted in the annotation. The chief of staff carefully oversaw the contents of documents produced for his signature. Colonel William T. Sexton, an assistant secretary of the General Staff, informed Colonel Cyrus Q. Shelton of the Organization and Training Division (G-3): "When writing letters for General Marshall's signature, brevity should be the key note. The conversational style is always appealing to him, and all stereotyped expressions should be avoided, as well as all superlatives, except where obviously appropriate. His style is frank, warm, and polite regardless of the individual involved. Where a 'turndown' is involved, he is regretful. He

dislikes such expressions as 'I am pleased to advise' and 'this will acknowledge receipt of.' He definitely does not like certain words which are used in typical letters written by the AGO such as 'therein,' 'thereupon,' and 'therefore.'" (Sexton Memorandum for Colonel Shelton, December 8, 1942, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 310].)

Most of Marshall's 1945 documents were dictated by him to a secretary, usually Mona K. Nason. On occasion, however, Marshall so substantially modified a staff-produced draft that the editors have considered it Marshall's. The texts of most 1945 documents published herein were taken from carbon copies in Marshall's files. On these the drafter's initials usually appear in the top right corner of the carbon copy and the typist's initials either under this or in the bottom left corner.

During the 1946 China mission, Marshall had little or no secretarial help; consequently the mission's files contain the largest quantity in existence of documents handwritten by Marshall. The copy texts used in this volume are usually taken from the typed as-sent or file copy (carbon) version.

While Marshall was chief of staff, notes were taken at few of the many meetings he attended. One reason for this was he believed that the note-taker's presence inhibited the free discussion he desired. Minutes were produced for formal meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although these were normally terse and cautiously worded. Minutes were often taken at international conferences (e.g., Yalta and Potsdam), and Marshall's role is summarized in editorial notes.

During his mediation mission to China, meetings were the principal method Marshall had of dealing with the various parties. Consequently, minutes were normally taken. To preclude squabbles over wording and to make Marshall's work simpler, English was agreed to be the official language for documents and meeting notes. Notes on 179 meetings relating to the China mission are summarized in this volume (plus 11 meetings on other subjects).

Meetings during the China mission—many of which lasted three or four hours, given the usual need for everything to be said once in Chinese and once in English—included the mention of many subjects and ideas. The editors' meeting summaries concentrate on the key points rather than seeking to note every idea mentioned. Moreover, while the material in meeting summaries is generally given in the order discussed, if a subject was temporarily interrupted by consideration of another matter—a common occurrence—the order of the material in the summary may have been modified by the editors for greater coherence. While the meeting minutes were well done and Marshall read and edited them, quotations used in the summaries are from the minutes or notes and thus are not necessarily verbatim representations of Marshall's words.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The members of the Marshall Papers Advisory Committee offered valuable advice on the volume, and they deserve special thanks for their work. The committee consisted of Edward M. Coffman (emeritus professor of military history, University of Wisconsin–Madison), Louis R. Harlan (emeritus professor of history, University of Maryland–College Park), Roger B. Jeans (professor of East Asian history, Washington and Lee University), and Edwin A. Thompson (former director of the Records Declassification Division, National Archives and Records Administration).

Joellen K. Bland (George C. Marshall Foundation) initially keyed the documents for the volume.

The National Historical Publications and Records Commission and its staff have given the editors vital moral and financial support since the Marshall Papers project was initiated. Without this support, the project very likely could not be done.

The project has enjoyed close and beneficial relations with the Johns Hopkins University Press, and for that the editors would like to thank Robert J. Brugger, acquisitions editor.

Chan H. Yeh helped to fund the purchase of the microfilm of the China mission documents; this was of enormous assistance to the editors.

Wade L. Houston advised the editors on the role of the Marines in China during Marshall's mission. The map of Nanking on p. 539 is derived from a 1946 map of the city given to the Marshall Foundation by John R. Watson, a member of Marshall's China mission staff.

Without the assistance of historians and archivists from many repositories, no work such as this would be possible. The editors would like to express their appreciation for the help they received from the following persons: Thomas Branigar at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; Randy Sowell at the Harry S. Truman Library; William H. Cunliffe and Timothy K. Nenninger at the National Archives; and James W. Zobel at the MacArthur Memorial Library and Archives.

The editors gratefully acknowledge the permission of the following publishers and institutions to reproduce materials: Yale University Library, for the numerous quotations from the diary of Henry L. Stimson; Time Life Pictures/Getty Images; and Associated Press/Wide World Photos.

The first part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the general principles of the theory of the structure of the human mind. It is shown that the mind is a complex system of organs, each of which has its own function, and that the mind as a whole is a system of organs, each of which has its own function. The second part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the general principles of the theory of the structure of the human mind. It is shown that the mind is a complex system of organs, each of which has its own function, and that the mind as a whole is a system of organs, each of which has its own function. The third part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the general principles of the theory of the structure of the human mind. It is shown that the mind is a complex system of organs, each of which has its own function, and that the mind as a whole is a system of organs, each of which has its own function. The fourth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the general principles of the theory of the structure of the human mind. It is shown that the mind is a complex system of organs, each of which has its own function, and that the mind as a whole is a system of organs, each of which has its own function. The fifth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the general principles of the theory of the structure of the human mind. It is shown that the mind is a complex system of organs, each of which has its own function, and that the mind as a whole is a system of organs, each of which has its own function. The sixth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the general principles of the theory of the structure of the human mind. It is shown that the mind is a complex system of organs, each of which has its own function, and that the mind as a whole is a system of organs, each of which has its own function. The seventh part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the general principles of the theory of the structure of the human mind. It is shown that the mind is a complex system of organs, each of which has its own function, and that the mind as a whole is a system of organs, each of which has its own function. The eighth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the general principles of the theory of the structure of the human mind. It is shown that the mind is a complex system of organs, each of which has its own function, and that the mind as a whole is a system of organs, each of which has its own function. The ninth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the general principles of the theory of the structure of the human mind. It is shown that the mind is a complex system of organs, each of which has its own function, and that the mind as a whole is a system of organs, each of which has its own function. The tenth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the general principles of the theory of the structure of the human mind. It is shown that the mind is a complex system of organs, each of which has its own function, and that the mind as a whole is a system of organs, each of which has its own function.

Guide to Editorial Policies

STYLE

Document texts and quotations in the annotation follow the writer's style, except as noted below. The editors' style generally conforms to that suggested by *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 14th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).

TEXTUAL CHANGES AND INSERTIONS

Document Heading. The organization, sequence, and sometimes the content of the document heading have been supplied by the editors. This heading consists of between three and seven elements; these include addressee, date, originator, place of origin, message designation, security classification, and title.

The addressee for letters, telegrams, and radio messages is always in the form TO HARRY S. TRUMAN. Civil titles (e.g., Senator, Dr., The Honorable, Judge, etc.) are not included in the document heading. If the recipient was a married woman, Marshall usually used "Mrs." with her husband's name, if he knew it (e.g., Mrs. James J. Winn rather than Molly B. Winn). The editors have used the form Marshall indicated. For military personnel, including retired professionals, the rank used is that correct as of the date of the document. No distinction is made between permanent and temporary ranks in the annotation.

The addressee for memorandums is usually in the form MEMORANDUM FOR _____. The form of address Marshall used is followed, but abbreviations (e.g., A.C.S., Col., etc.) have been spelled out. If the memorandum is to an addressee's title only, that officer's last name is usually supplied in brackets or explained in a footnote (excepting the president and the secretary of war). A list of high-ranking War Department officials and theater commanders is printed in the Appendix.

Salutation and Complimentary Close. When present, these elements have been printed with the first and last lines respectively of the document text rather than on separate lines as they appear in the original. The capitalization and punctuation of the original have been retained.

Signature. Most documents in this volume have been reproduced from file (carbon) copies in the Marshall papers or in various War Department and State Department records. A name (or initials) at the end of a document published herein indicates that the editors have used the signed original as the source text.

Silent Corrections. In making silent corrections, the editors have distinguished between documents physically produced by the author and those produced by a secretary from dictation or holograph draft. No silent changes have been introduced into author-produced documents. In documents typed by a secretary, the original capitalization and punctuation have been retained, but the occasional spelling errors have been silently corrected. Marshall sometimes made minor corrections to documents prior to having them sent; these changes are accepted as the final version of the source text. (See *Radio, Telegraph, and Cable Messages*.)

Brackets. All information within brackets in document texts has been supplied by the editors. If the bracketed material is in italic type, it is to be read in place of the preceding word or letter (e.g., “fixed up for these four [*three*] divisions”). If the bracketed material is in roman type, it indicates additional rather than substitute information (e.g., “Wednesday afternoon [August 1] General Pershing”). In annotation source citations, when a document bearing Marshall’s name as author was actually written by someone else, the drafter’s name is given in brackets (e.g., Marshall [McCarthy-drafted] Memorandum for the President, or Marshall [O.P.D.-drafted] to Eisenhower).

Italics for Emphasis. Except where used in brackets, italic type appears in the text of a document or in a quotation only if the emphasis was in the original—indicated on the source text by underlining.

Cross-references. Citations to previous volumes in this series are usually given as: see *Papers of GCM*, 4: 187. References to documents within this volume are in the form: (a) letters and radio messages—see Marshall to Embick, date, p. 000; (b) memorandums—see Marshall Memorandum for the President, date, p. 000; (c) editorial notes—see the editorial note on p. 000; (d) meeting summaries—see the meeting with X, date, p. 000.

Security Classification. The security classification in a document’s heading is given in italic type beneath the sender-recipient line.

Radio, Telegraph, and Cable Messages. The term “Radio” is used to designate messages sent by radio, telegraph line, submarine cable, or some combination of these. The need for speed, the existence of transmission lines, atmospheric conditions, or simply the message center’s convenience sometimes influenced the selection of a transmission medium.

When a message is addressed to an agency, office, official, or specific person for transmission to a designated addressee, the ultimate recipient is normally given in the document heading and the routing information is deleted (e.g., TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER rather than TO SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE). The sender’s message number is included if known; when this number has been determined from a document other than the source text, the message number appears in brackets.

As prepared by the sender's office, radio messages usually included certain instructions to the recipient's message center at the beginning of the address line (e.g., "For General MacArthur's eyes alone"). To inhibit cryptanalysis by the enemy, the transmitting agency usually buried these phrases within the transmitted text. Thus the location of the address line may vary on different versions of the message. If the internal address on the source document is at the beginning of the message, it has normal paragraph indentation; if the editors have *moved* the internal address from the document text to the beginning of the published text, there is no paragraph indentation.

During the period of his mission to China, Marshall sent most of his radio messages via the War Department to his personal liaison office in the State Department; reports to President Truman, for example, began with some version of the following: "Please [retype and] have an officer deliver following by his hand to President Truman and Secretary of State or Undersecretary of State: (to WARCOS eyes alone from Marshall cite GOLD 651)." The message was given within quotation marks. This routing formula has been dropped and the message addressed simply TO HARRY S. TRUMAN, and the text is published without quotation marks.

Depending on the version used as a source text, radio messages may be in standard form (i.e., upper- and lower-case letters with punctuation marks) or in all capitals with spelled-out punctuation and numerals. In the latter case, the editors have silently converted the text to standard form, including converting spelled-out numbers (ten and above), dates, and names (e.g., C-54 instead of C HYPHEN FIVE FOUR).

DOCUMENT SOURCE CITATIONS

Source Line. At the end of each document and prior to any footnotes, the source of the text is given in the following format: Repository/Collection (Main entry, Subentry, Sub-subentry)—e.g., NA/RG 54 (Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages). Multiple copies may exist of certain documents, and these may be found in different repositories or collections. The version used by the editors as the source text is the one cited. The abbreviations used in the source citations are listed in the Glossary.

Manuscript-type Notation. With a few exceptions, the source texts for documents printed in this volume were typewritten by a clerk or secretary from dictation, notes, or a draft. Holograph source texts are designated by an "H" at the end of the source line.

ANNOTATION

The editors use three types of annotation within the section of the volume containing documentary material:

Document endnotes. Printed in small type at the end of documents.

Editorial notes. General explanatory material referring to one or more sub-

sequent documents; printed in document-size type. To distinguish these visually from documents, such notes have no heading, begin with a large dropped capital letter, and end with a star.

Editors' summaries of selected meeting texts. Summaries of the minutes or transcripts of lengthy meetings in which Marshall is a key participant (e.g., see Meeting with Members of Congress, September 20, 1945, pp. 307–8). To distinguish these visually from documents, such summaries are set in a type size between that of an editorial note and an endnote, have a centered heading, begin with a large dropped capital letter, and end with a star.

In the endnotes and editorial notes, the editors have attempted to explain all potentially obscure references, provide cross-references to important related material, and summarize the key parts of incoming or outgoing documents of relevance. The Marshall Papers project is intended to provide a cohesive, intelligible story of Marshall in his own words, not to provide a detailed discussion of every facet of the general's life and times or to examine numerous questions not mentioned in Marshall's documents.

The editors have sought to minimize the use of secondary sources in the annotation. An exception to this policy has been made for certain official military histories, particularly the indispensable series *United States Army in World War II* (Washington: GPO, 1947–93). Whenever appropriate and feasible, quotations from Marshall documents not selected for publication or from other primary sources have been used to annotate the published documents. When annotation materials are available to them in both manuscript and published forms (e.g., *Foreign Relations of the United States*), the editors normally cite published documents because of their availability to the public.

The editors have not cited individual uses of certain reference works such as: *Official Army Register*; *Cullum's Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy*; *Who's Who in America*; *China Handbook, 1935–1945*, revised ed.; and Shelby L. Stanton, *Order of Battle: U.S. Army, World War II* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1984).

Graduates of the federal service academies and the Virginia Military Institute have been identified by school and year of graduation (e.g., V.M.I., 1901) the first time that person is cited. Personal identifications normally include only the status, rank, or role at the time of the citation. Subsequent citations usually give the changes since the previous citation. The indexes to the volumes will enable the reader to follow a particular individual's development or relationship to Marshall.

Illustrations

The following are the sources for the illustrations used in this volume.

frontispiece

General of the Army George C. Marshall, January 19, 1945. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo P-11242; GCMRL/Photographs (485A).

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1. General Marshall enters Montgomery House for the first day's conference of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Valletta, Malta, on January 30, 1945. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 199716; GCMRL/Photographs (991).
2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff meet on January 31, 1945, at Montgomery House in Malta. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 199721; GCMRL/Photographs (4828).
3. British and American chiefs of staff hold a conference at Montgomery House in Malta on January 31, 1945. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 259290; GCMRL/Photographs (4825A).
4. President Roosevelt confers with Fleet Admiral Leahy, Fleet Admiral King, and General of the Army Marshall aboard the U.S.S. *Quincy* in Malta on February 2, 1945. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 199763; GCMRL/Photographs (355).
5. President Roosevelt confers with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on February 2, 1945, aboard the U.S.S. *Quincy* in Malta. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 199761; GCMRL/Photographs (198).
6. General Marshall greets Edward Stettinius, Averell Harriman, and Harry Hopkins as they arrive for the Yalta Conference in February 1945. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo; GCMRL/Photographs (4829).
7. The Crimean Conference convenes at Livadia Palace on February 4, 1945. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 199754; GCMRL/Photographs (352).
8. President Roosevelt meets with his advisers in Livadia Palace in Yalta on February 4, 1945. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 199760; GCMRL/Photographs (350).
9. Fleet Admiral Leahy, Field Marshal Brooke, General Ismay, and General of the Army Marshall converse during the Yalta Conference in Feb-

- ruary 1945. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo; GCMRL/Photographs (6159).
10. Participants at the Yalta Conference assemble on the patio of Livadia Palace for a picture on February 10, 1945. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 260501; GCMRL/Photographs (349).
 11. Generals George Marshall, Mark Clark, and Joseph McNarney salute during review at Fifteenth Army Group Headquarters in Italy on February 12, 1945. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 438964; GCMRL/Photographs (1994).
 12. General Marshall speaks with a Red Cross worker at Fifteenth Army Group Headquarters in Florence, Italy, on February 12, 1945. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 201444; GCMRL/Photographs (2068).
 13. Major General William G. Livesay points out strategic positions on the map to Generals Marshall, McNarney, Clark, and Truscott on February 13, 1945. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 202839; GCMRL/Photographs (2070).
 14. Marshall congratulates Private First Class Joe F. Tinsley after awarding him the Distinguished Service Cross on February 13, 1945. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 444161; GCMRL/Photographs (1993).
 15. Marshall talks with officers and men of Company M, Third Battalion, 338th Infantry Regiment during his visit to the Fifth Army front in Italy. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 438968; GCMRL/Photographs (2069).
 16. General Marshall meets with commanders during his visit at the command post of the Ninety-second Division in Italy on February 14, 1945. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 438970; GCMRL/Photographs (2116).
 17. Marshall, accompanied by T/5 Floyd James and Major General Edward Almond, tours the Ninety-second Division area on February 14, 1945. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 246301; GCMRL/Photographs (199A).
 18. Sergeant James W. Powder, General Marshall's orderly, stands at the door of a mobile unit provided for the chief of staff on the night of February 12–13, 1945, at Fifth Army Command Post. GCMRL/Photographs (2455).
 19. Generals Marshall and Almond pass by an honor guard of the Ninety-second Division in Italy on February 14, 1945. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 205009; GCMRL/Photographs (1999).
 20. Major General Edward M. Almond drives General Marshall to a forward observation post in the Ninety-second Division area during the chief of

staff's inspection tour of the Italian front on February 14, 1945. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 202182; GCMRL/Photographs (199).

21. General and Mrs. George C. Marshall arrive at the White House following the announcement of the death of President Roosevelt on April 12, 1945. Associated Press/Wide World Photos; GCMRL/Photographs (1773).
22. Secretary of War Stimson and General Marshall leave the White House after a conference with President Truman on April 13, 1945. GCMRL/Photographs (4585).
23. Clown Emmet Kelly visits with General Marshall's grandson, Jimmy Winn, and Colonel Pasco and his son during a circus performance in Washington, D.C., on June 5, 1945. Acme Photo; GCMRL/Photographs (2095).
24. General Marshall welcomes Dwight D. Eisenhower at National Airport in Washington, D.C., on June 18, 1945. GCMRL/Photographs (226).
25. The Combined Chiefs of Staff meet on July 21, 1945, during the Potsdam Conference. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 209469; GCMRL/Photographs (1932).
26. The U.S. and Soviet chiefs of staff meet on July 26, 1945, in Cecilienhof Palace. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 209976; GCMRL/Photographs (354).
27. General Marshall makes a point during a meeting of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Potsdam Conference, July 23, 1945. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 209509; GCMRL/Photographs (4732).
28. General Marshall listens attentively during a Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting, July 23, 1945. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo; GCMRL/Photographs (645).
29. President Truman congratulates General Marshall after awarding him an oak leaf cluster to the Distinguished Service Medal in the courtyard of the Pentagon Building on November 26, 1945. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo 216000; GCMRL/Photographs (1139).
30. General Marshall testifies before the Congressional Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack in December 1945. Associated Press/Wide World Photos; GCMRL/Photographs (957).
31. General Marshall arrives at the Capitol Building in Washington, D.C., on December 10, 1945, to testify before the joint committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack. GCMRL/Photographs (953).

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32. "Some China to Mend," drawn by Edwin Marcus and printed in the *New York Times*, December 2, 1945, sec. 4, p. 9. LC/Prints and Photographs Division (LC-USZ62-100018).
33. General Marshall and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes leave Blair House in Washington, D.C., following their December 11, 1945, meeting with President Truman. GCMRL/Photographs (2545).
34. Marshall bids farewell to Dwight D. Eisenhower as he leaves Washington, D.C., on December 15, 1945, for his trip to China. Ambassador Wei Tao-ming and Admiral Harold R. Stark are also present. Associated Press/Wide World Photos; GCMRL/Photographs (2757).
35. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek greets Marshall at Nanking airport on December 21, 1945. GCMRL/Photographs (2546).
36. Marshall talks with Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer at Chungking in January 1946. GCMRL/Photographs (7705A).
37. General Chou En-lai meets with General Chang Chun in Chungking to sign a cease-fire treaty on January 10, 1946. GCMRL/Photographs (7705C).
38. General Chang Chun and General Chou En-lai sign a truce on January 10, 1946, as General Marshall watches. GCMRL/Photographs (7705E).
39. During the Committee of Three's inspection trip, the group dines at Kalgan on March 1, 1946. GCMRL/Photographs (2519).
40. In Taiyuan on March 3, Marshall is presented with a samurai sword by Kuomintang General Yen His-shan. GCMRL/Photographs (7059).
41. General Marshall taking a review of the Communist Party Honor Guard upon his arrival in Yen'an on March 4, 1946. GCMRL/Photographs (2507).
42. During the Committee of Three's tour, General Marshall reviews the Communist Honor Guard at Yen'an on March 4. GCMRL/Photographs (2507A).
43. Chairman Mao Tse-tung welcomes General Marshall to a reception for the Committee of Three in the Communist Military Headquarters at Yen'an on March 4, 1946. GCMRL/Photographs (2501).
44. General Marshall offers a toast to the future success of the peace efforts in China during a dinner hosted by Chairman Mao on March 4. GCMRL/Photographs (2521).
45. Chairman Mao and General Marshall watch a film during the Committee of Three's trip to Yen'an on March 4-5. GCMRL/Photographs (7055).

46. General Marshall and Chairman Mao Tse-tung have a final discussion prior to Marshall's departure from Yen-an on March 5, 1946. GCMRL/Photographs (2545).
47. Madame Mao (Chiang Ch'ing) sees General Marshall and his party off at the airfield in Yen-an on March 5. GCMRL/Photographs (2503A).
48. General Marshall appears on the cover of *Time*, March 25, 1946. Copyright 1946 Time Life Pictures/Getty Images; reprinted by permission.
49. "There Must Be A Way Out," *New York Times*, April 28, 1946, p. 6.
50. Chief of Staff Dwight D. Eisenhower visits Nanking on May 9, 1946, on his way from the Philippines to South Korea. GCMRL/Photographs (2431).
51. W. Walton Butterworth, minister-counselor of embassy, is standing behind Chiang Kai-shek and George C. Marshall at Kuling in July 1946 at the time John Leighton Stuart presented his credentials as ambassador. GCMRL/Photographs (5193).
52. Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem and Colonel J. Hart Caughey stand on the front steps of House 28 (General Marshall's quarters) in Chungking, China, on April 10, 1946. GCMRL/J. H. Caughey Papers.
53. General Marshall presents the Distinguished Service Medal to Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade on September 25, 1946, at Nanking. GCMRL/J. H. Caughey Papers.
54. Colonel Marshall S. Carter ran Marshall's liaison office in the State Department between April 1946 and January 1947. GCMRL/Photographs (3295).
55. Ch'en Li-fu led the CC clique, which Marshall considered a major obstacle to his mission's success. GCMRL/Photographs (7709).
56. Vice Admiral Charles M. "Savvy" Cooke, Jr., in December 1945 took command of Seventh Fleet. GCMRL/Photographs (7708).
57. General Marshall presents Walter S. Robertson with the Medal for Merit on October 12, 1946, in Nanking. GCMRL/J. H. Caughey Papers.
58. General Marshall and Vice Admiral Stuart S. Murray relax during a picket boat trip on the Yangtze River. GCMRL/J. H. Caughey Papers.
59. General Marshall and T. V. Soong deplane at Chiuchiang's grass airstrip. GCMRL/Photographs (7092).
60. Katherine Marshall sits in her chair at Kuling. GCMRL/Photographs (1201).

61. General Marshall studies the new tactical situation resulting from Madame Chiang's Chinese checkers move. GCMRL/Photographs (1199).
62. George and Katherine Marshall walk along the Fort De Russy seawall in Honolulu, Hawaii, on January 9, 1947. GCMRL/Photographs (2544).

All maps and charts were made for this volume by Larry I. Bland.

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Map, Principal famine areas in 1946.

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Map, Communist-controlled areas in North China and the Committee of Three's inspection trip, February 28–March 6, 1946.

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Map, Nanking and locations of importance to Marshall's mission, May to December 1946.

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Map, The War's Final Phase in Europe.

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Europe, Mid-1945: Early Days of Peace.

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Map, The War's Final Phase in the Pacific.

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Map, China's regions as defined by the Military Sub-Committee on February 21, 1946.

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Map, North and Central China and the railroads, 1946.

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Map, Northeast China (Manchuria) and the key rail lines, 1946.

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Chart, Chinese Government, Nanking, Mid-1946.

Chart, Executive Headquarters, Peiping, Mid-1946.

Chronology

January 1, 1945–January 29, 1947

The following is a list of the more important events of General Marshall's life (in roman type) and of influences on his job (in italic type) during the period covered by this volume. Unless otherwise noted, between the beginning of January and the middle of December 1945, events involving Marshall took place in Washington, D.C., Fort Myer, Virginia, or the Pentagon Building. While Marshall was in China, events involving him generally took place in Chungking (prior to May 1, 1946) or Nanking (after May 1, 1946).

Marshall's secretaries kept daily lists of appointments, conferences, and trips, but these usually omit his office routine—that is, his frequent meetings with the secretary of war or General Staff officers. The appointment list for 1945 is available in GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Engagement and Visitor Records). The list for 1946 has been published in Larry I. Bland, ed., *George C. Marshall's Mediation Mission to China, December 1945–January 1947* (Lexington, Va.: George C. Marshall Foundation, 1998), pp. 597–615.

The following chronology omits most of the social and diplomatic luncheons, receptions, and dinners that Marshall attended, but it includes all White House meetings. This list does not include the normal meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J.C.S.). Beginning in late March 1945, the J.C.S. increasingly shifted from holding formal meetings with distributed minutes to informal luncheons. In 1945 the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S.) rarely met formally outside of conference venues (i.e., Yalta and Potsdam). During his mission to China, Marshall often met with individuals and delegations at his residence; only the most important of these are noted here.

January 1945

- 1 *Last major German air action on the western front (ends 2d). Germans launch Operation NORDWIND against Franco-American 7th Army in Alsace (effort abandoned 26th).*
- 5 White House ceremony commemorating Sir John Dill.
- 9 *Sixth Army invades Luzon at Lingayen Gulf (advanced units enter Manila by February 3; Luzon campaign officially ends June 30).*
- 10 White House ceremony honoring five Medal of Honor recipients.
- 11 Speech to Association of American Colleges, Atlantic City, N.J.
- 12 *Red Army launches winter offensive.*

- 16 White House conference with ranking members of the Senate and House Military Affairs committees regarding national service legislation.
- 20 Attends Roosevelt inaugural ceremonies and dinner.
- 22 *Burma Road declared open.*
- 24 Speech to members of Congress, Library of Congress.
- 25 Departs for Malta and Yalta conferences via Bermuda, Azores, and Casablanca.
- 27 Arrives Marseille to meet with Eisenhower.
- 28 *U.S. First and Third Armies eliminate the Ardennes salient, reestablishing lines held prior to Battle of the Bulge.*
- 29 Departs Marseille for Malta.
- 30 January–2 February *Malta Conference meetings.*

February 1945

- 2 Talks with Roosevelt and King; J.C.S. meets with Roosevelt; C.C.S. meets with Roosevelt and Churchill—all aboard USS *Quincy*.
- 3 Departs Malta; arrives Yalta.
- 4–11 *Yalta Conference meetings.*
- 4 J.C.S. meets with Roosevelt, 10:30 A.M.; J.C.S. present at the first plenary session (5:00 P.M.) but not at subsequent plenary sessions.
- 5, 6, 8 Meetings of U.S.-U.K.-U.S.S.R. military heads.
- 9 C.C.S. meets with Roosevelt and Churchill, noon; U.S.-Soviet chiefs of staff meeting, 3:30 P.M.
- 11 Departs Yalta; arrives Italy for troop inspection.
- 15 Departs Italy for Casablanca, Azores, Stephenville (Newfoundland).
- 16 Arrives Washington.
- 17 Departs for Pinehurst, N.C. (returns 19th).
- 19 *U.S. Marines invade Iwo Jima (island declared secure March 16).*
- 22 Departs for Pinehurst, N.C. (returns 26th).

March 1945

- 1 Speech to the Overseas Press Club, New York City.
- 2 Departs for Georgetown, S.C., for weekend with Bernard Baruch (returns 4th).
- 7 *Rhine River bridge at Remagen captured by U.S. troops.*
- 9 Departs for Pinehurst, N.C. (returns 11th).
- 16 Departs for Pinehurst, N.C. (returns 18th).
- 22 Testifies before the Senate Military Affairs Committee on general officer promotions, 10:30 A.M. Off-the-record press conference, 2:30 P.M.
- 23 Departs for Pinehurst, N.C. (returns 25th).
- 30 Departs for Pinehurst, N.C. (returns April 1).

April 1945

- 1 *U.S. invades Okinawa (island declared secure June 22).*
- 4 Speech to the Academy of Political Science, New York City.
- 5 Speech to the Annual Conference of Supervisory Chaplains.
- 6 Speech at the Army Day luncheon of the Military Order of the World Wars, Mayflower Hotel.

- 12 *President Roosevelt dies. Vice President Harry S. Truman becomes president.*
- 13 Military leaders meet with President Truman at the White House, 11:00 A.M.
- 14 Attends Roosevelt's funeral service at the White House; departs for Hyde Park, N.Y.
- 15 Attends Roosevelt's interment at Hyde Park; returns to Washington.
- 16 *Red Army launches offensive to capture Berlin (attains complete control of the city May 2).*
- 19 White House meeting with the president regarding Germany, 11:30 A.M.
- 23 White House meeting with the president and other military and diplomatic advisers regarding Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov's visit, 2:00 P.M.
- 25 *U.S. and Soviet troops meet near Torgau, Germany. United Nations conference in San Francisco opens (ends June 26; charter goes into force October 24).* Pentagon meeting with the president and others regarding Churchill's report of German peace feeler via Sweden.
- 26 Speech at the Pentagon to representatives of women's organizations concerning universal military training (U.M.T.).
- 27 White House meeting with President Truman and other military advisers regarding the German situation, 2:00 P.M.
- 28 *Mussolini killed by Italian partisans.*
- 29 *Germans sign surrender document for Italy (fighting ends May 2).* Travels to Brooklyn Navy Yard for dedication of the aircraft carrier *Franklin D. Roosevelt*; returns to Washington.
- 30 *Hitler commits suicide in Berlin.*

May 1945

- 1 White House meeting regarding postwar military and civil affairs in the Philippines.
- 8 *V-E Day declared (fighting officially ends 9th);* at White House for announcement, 8:15 A.M.; V-E Day broadcast, 1:00 P.M.
- 10 *Army announces "point system" for discharge of soldiers.*
- 11 White House meeting with president regarding problems in northeast Italy with Tito.
- 16 White House meeting with the president, 10:15 A.M.
- 17 White House meeting for the U.S. Navy's presentation on the Pacific situation, 12:15 P.M.
- 25 Testifies before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations, 10:00 A.M. J.C.S. sets November 1 as the date for the OLYMPIC landings. Remarks at Army War College ceremony commemorating Leslie J. McNair.
- 28 White House meeting with the president, 2:15 P.M. *Stalin says Soviet Far East forces ready for operations against Japan by August 8.*
- 31 Meets with the Interim Committee concerning the A-bomb.

June 1945

- 2 Departs for Leesburg, Va. (returns 3d).
- 11 Speech to the Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Md.
- 13 White House for Medal of Honor ceremony, noon.
- 16 Testifies before Woodrum Committee in support of U.M.T., 2:45 P.M.

- 18 Attends Eisenhower's return ceremonies. J.C.S. meeting at the White House with the president concerning the invasion of Japan, 3:30 P.M.
- 21 Departs for Oregon fishing trip (returns 28th).
- 28 Speech at Service Command Conference, Camp Grant, Ill.
- 29 J.C.S. meeting at White House to discuss invasion of Japan; November 1 confirmed as the date for Operation OLYMPIC.

July 1945

- 3 *James F. Byrnes sworn in as secretary of state (Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., resigned June 27).*
- 4 Speech at Governors Conference, Mackinac Island, Mich. Visits his sister in Greensburg, Pa., and returns 5th.
- 9 Visits Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., for demonstrations of new weapons.
- 10–12 Travels to Potsdam Conference via Quebec (fishing with General Arnold), Azores, and Frankfurt, Germany.
- 13–14 Fishing with Omar Bradley in Bavaria.
- 15 Arrives in Berlin (Babelsberg).
- 16 *A-bomb tested at TRINITY site in New Mexico (detailed report received in Potsdam 21st).*
- 17–26 July and 31 July–2 August *Potsdam Conference meetings.*
- 22 Meets with Leahy, Truman, and Churchill, 12:15 P.M., regarding A-bomb test report and Churchill's opinion about using the bomb.
- 24 C.C.S. meets with Truman and Churchill, 11:30 A.M. Tripartite military meeting, 2:30 P.M.
- 25 Directive ordering use of A-bomb approved by Truman.
- 26 *Churchill steps down as prime minister when Labour Party wins the British elections; Clement Attlee becomes prime minister on the 27th. Second meeting with the Soviet military staff. U.S.-U.K.-China ultimatum to Japan.*
- 27 To Berchtesgaden, Germany, for fishing.
- 30 Returns to U.S. via Paris, Azores, Bermuda; arrives Washington, D.C., 1:30 P.M., on the 31st.

August 1945

- 1 *MacArthur takes command in Okinawa preparatory to leading invasion of Japan.*
- 4 Departs for Leesburg, Va. (returns 5th).
- 6 *Hiroshima destroyed by A-bomb.*
- 7 Off-the-record press conference, 11:15 A.M.
- 8 *U.S.S.R. declares war on Japan effective 9th.*
- 9 *Nagasaki destroyed by A-bomb.*
- 10 *Japanese announce acceptance of Allied Potsdam proposal to surrender. J.C.S. luncheon to discuss measures necessary after cessation of hostilities.*
- 14 *Japan agrees to surrender unconditionally.*
- 15 *V-J Day proclaimed by Allies.*
- 20 White House meeting with president, 10:15 A.M.
- 23 White House Medal of Honor ceremonies for U.S. Army, 10:00 A.M.

- 24 Receives Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor in French Embassy ceremony, 4:00 P.M.
- 25 Attends stepson Clifton's wedding in Richmond, Va.
- 28 *U.S. occupation troops begin entering Japan.*

September 1945

- 2 *Japan formally surrenders (Truman proclaims this V-J Day).*
- 5 White House meetings: 12:30 P.M. for presentation of Distinguished Service Medal to Harry Hopkins; 3:00 P.M., Roosevelt Memorial Planning Committee meeting.
- 7 White House meeting concerning Japanese surrender documents, 10:45 A.M.
- 8 Departs for Adirondacks vacation (returns briefly on 10th for ceremonies in conjunction with Lieutenant General Wainwright's visit, White House, 3:30 P.M., and departs for Adirondacks at 4:00 P.M.); returns 16th, 5:00 P.M.
- 9 Biennial report for 1943–45 released to the public.
- 14 *Congress names committee to investigate Pearl Harbor attack (hearings begin November 15; inquiry closes May 23, 1946).*
- 20 Speech at the Library of Congress to members of Congress concerning demobilization, 10:00 A.M.
- 21 White House ceremony honoring Secretary of War Stimson on his last day in office, 1:15 P.M. (*Robert P. Patterson sworn in as new secretary on the 27th.*)
- 25 Testifies before House Appropriations Committee, 10:00 A.M.

October 1945

- 5 White House for U.S. Navy decorations presentations, 10:20 A.M. and 3:45 P.M. (for Nimitz).
- 12 White House for presentation ceremonies at 11:00 A.M. and 12:15 P.M.; departs with General Arnold on hunting trip to North Dakota (returns 14th).
- 18 Testifies at Senate Military Affairs Committee hearings on establishing a unified military department, 10:00 A.M.
- 23 *President asks joint session of Congress to pass U.M.T. legislation.*
- 25 Testifies at House Appropriations Committee budget rescission hearings, 10:00 A.M.
- 26 Speech to Business Advisory Council, Hot Springs, W.Va.
- 27 Receives Distinguished Service Medal from the Theodore Roosevelt Memorial Association, New York City.
- 29 Speech to New York Herald Tribune Forum, New York City.

November 1945

- 5 White House meeting with the president, 3:30 P.M.
- 6 Speech to American Red Cross Volunteer Special Services Committee, Statler Hotel, 10:30 A.M.
- 13 Departs with Mrs. Marshall for Philadelphia, 11:30 A.M., to attend semicentennial Military Order of Foreign Wars parade and banquet.
- 16 White House, 12:45 P.M.
- 17 Departs for Indianapolis, 2:30 P.M.

- 18 Departs Indianapolis for Kansas City, Missouri, speech at the Salvation Army Convention.
- 19 Departs Kansas City, 9:00 A.M.; arrives Washington, 3:00 P.M.
- 20 President Truman announces Marshall's retirement.
- 26 Receives an oak leaf cluster to his Distinguished Service Medal in a Pentagon ceremony attended by the president.
- 27 *Patrick J. Hurley resigns as ambassador to China.* Marshall's mission to China announced by the president.

December 1945

- 6–13 Testifies before the congressional joint committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack (total time of 26 hours and 10 minutes).
- 9 Attends State Department conference concerning China policy.
- 11 Blair House meeting with Truman, Byrnes, and Leahy concerning China policy, 3:30 P.M.
- 15 Departs for China (via Honolulu, Kwajalein, Guam, and Manila), 9:00 A.M. *Truman issues China policy statement calling for unity under Chiang Kai-shek.*
- 16 *Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers (U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R.) opens (ends 31st).*
- 18 *Truman directs Washington agency heads to conduct no negotiations with Chinese officials without Marshall's consent.*
- 20 Arrives Shanghai; meets with Lieutenant General Wedemeyer.
- 21 Arrives Nanking; meets with Generalissimo Chiang, Madame Chiang, General Wedemeyer, and others, 9:15 P.M.
- 22 Arrives Chungking, 12:30 P.M.
- 23 Meets with Chou En-lai, 4:00 P.M.
- 24 Meets with T. V. Soong, 9:00 A.M.
- 25 Christmas dinner and conference with Chiang Kai-shek.
- 26 Meets with representatives of the Democratic League, 4:00 P.M.

January 1946

- 1 Meets with Chou En-lai, 4:30 P.M.
- 5 Meets with Chiang Kai-shek (11:30 A.M.) and Chou En-lai (4:30 P.M.).
- 6 *Large-scale U.S. soldiers' protests regarding demobilization speed begin in Manila and subsequently spread to London, Paris, and other cities.*
- 7 First meeting of the Committee of Three (Marshall, Chang Chun, Chou En-lai), 10:00 A.M.
- 8 Committee of Three meetings, 10:00 A.M. and 4:30 P.M.
- 9 Committee of Three meeting, 5:00 P.M.; meets with Chiang Kai-shek, 10:00 P.M.
- 10 Committee of Three meetings, 8:00 A.M. and 3:00 P.M. *Cease-fire agreement between Nationalists and Communists announced. Political Consultative Conference opens (ends 31st).*
- 11 *Executive Headquarters formally established in Peiping. General Directive No. 1 calling for cease-fire issued (officially announced 20th).*
- 12–13 Weekend at Chiang Kai-shek's country house.

- 14 Meets with Chang Chun, 1:30 P.M.
- 16 Committee of Three dinner, 7:30 P.M.
- 17 Committee of Three meeting, 8:30 P.M.
- 19 Departs for Shanghai to see Wedemeyer and others, 10:00 A.M. (returns 21st).
- 22 Meets with Chiang Kai-shek, 11:00 A.M.
- 23 Accepts advisory position on three-man Military Sub-Committee studying the unification of armies (first formal meeting February 13).
- 24 Meets with Chang Chun, 10:00 A.M.
- 25 Meets with Chang Chun, 2:00 P.M.
- 31 Meets with Chou En-lai (9:00 A.M.) and Chang Chih-chung (10:00 A.M.).

February 1946

- 1 Meets with Chou En-lai, 5:00 P.M.
- 2–3 Weekend at Chiang Kai-shek's country house.
- 4 Meets with Chang Chih-chung (2:00 P.M.) and Chou En-lai (3:00 P.M.).
- 5 Meets with Chang Chih-chung, 10:00 A.M.
- 7 Meets with Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, 4:00 P.M.
- 9 Meeting of Committee of Three, 10:00 A.M.
- 11 Luncheon and meeting of Committee of Three, noon.
- 14 Meeting of Military Sub-Committee, 4:00 P.M.
- 15 Meets with Chang Chih-chung (10:30 A.M.) and Military Sub-Committee (4:30 P.M.).
- 16 Meets with Wedemeyer (9:00 A.M.), Military Sub-Committee (3:00 P.M.), and Chou En-lai (8:00 P.M.).
- 18 Meeting of Military Sub-Committee (3:30 P.M.). Meets with Chou En-lai (8:00 P.M.)—Marshall outlines ideas on creating a U.S.-run officer basic training school for Communist military.
- 20 Meets with Chang Chih-chung, 5:00 P.M.
- 21 Meets with Chou En-lai (10:00 A.M.) and Military Sub-Committee (4:00 P.M.).
- 22 Meeting of Military Sub-Committee, 4:00 P.M.
- 23 Off-the-record press conference for Chinese editors. Dinner with Chou En-lai, 8:30 P.M.
- 25 Meeting of Military Sub-Committee, 4:00 P.M. Formal signing of agreement reached on military demobilization and reorganization. Meets with Generalissimo Chiang, 7:00 P.M.
- 26 Meeting of Committee of Three, 4:00 P.M.
- 27 Meeting of Committee of Three, 10:00 A.M.
- 28 Departs on inspection trip with Chou and Chang; arrives Peiping (Executive Headquarters).

March 1946

- 1 Visits Kalgan and Chining.
- 2 Visits Tsinan and Hsuchow.
- 3 Visits Hsinhsiang and Taiyuan.
- 4 Visits Kueisui and Yen-an; meetings with Mao Tse-tung, Yen-an.
- 5 Visits Hankow.
- 6 Returns to Chungking.

- 9 Meeting of Military Sub-Committee, 3:00 P.M. Weekend at Chiang Kai-shek's country house.
- 11 Meets with Chou En-lai and with Chiang Kai-shek. Meeting of the Committee of Three, 3:00 P.M. Departs Chungking for Tokyo, 8:30 P.M.
- 12 Visits General MacArthur. Departs Tokyo for U.S. via Wake Island and Hawaii.
- 14 Arrives Long Beach, California, 4:00 P.M. Meets with Frank Capra and Frank McCarthy on using motion pictures to influence Chinese public opinion.
- 15 Arrives Washington, 10:00 A.M. White House meeting with president and secretary of state.
- 16 Press conference concerning China mission.
- 23 *President signs law making five-star rank permanent.*

April 1946

- 1, 3 Off-the-record testimony before House and Senate committees on foreign relations.
- 9 Testifies before the congressional joint committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack.
- 10 Meets with aid agencies (Combined Food Board, U.N.R.R.A.).
- 12 Begins return trip to China with Mrs. Marshall.
- 13 Arrives in Hollywood, California, to visit with Frank McCarthy and Frank Capra.
- 14 Departs for China via Honolulu, Wake Island, and Tokyo. Visits with General MacArthur (16th–17th). *Communists launch offensive to capture Changchun (complete control achieved 20th).*
- 17 Arrives in Peiping.
- 18 Arrives in Chungking.
- 19 Meets with Chiang Kai-shek, evening.
- 22, 27, 29 Meets with Chou En-lai.
- 25, 26, 28 Meets with leaders of the Democratic League.

May 1946

- 1 *U.S. China Theater officially inactivated.*
- 4, 13, 14, 17, 21, 23, 25, 30 Meets with Chou En-lai.
- 6 *Chinese government officially transferred from Chungking to Nanking.*
- 9 *Eisenhower arrives in Nanking (departs on the 10th).* Marshall and Eisenhower meet and establish a code to signify Marshall's acceptance of appointment as secretary of state.
- 11 Asks State Department to hold Wedemeyer's nomination as ambassador to China (Wedemeyer told he is not to have post July 8).
- 12, 22 Meets with Chiang Kai-shek.
- 13 Meets with John Leighton Stuart.
- 15–16 Visits Mrs. Marshall and Madame Chiang in Shanghai.
- 16 *U.S.S.R. notifies Chinese government that its forces are out of Manchuria except for some troops at Port Arthur and Dairen.*
- 23 *Changchun recaptured by government troops.*

June 1946

- 3, 6, 10, 12, 14, 17, 18, 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 Meets with Chou En-lai.

- 5 Accepts appointment to V.M.I. Board of Visitors.
- 6 *Chiang Kai-shek declares a fifteen-day armistice (later extended to June 30, then indefinitely). Harvard University gives Marshall an honorary degree in absentia (breaking a three-hundred-year tradition against this).*
- 12 *State Department submits draft bills to Congress providing military assistance to China. (Marshall sends "personal statement" of support on the 18th.)*
- 22 *Mao Tse-tung demands that U.S. cease military aid to China's government and withdraw its forces from China.*
- 22, 23, 24 Meetings of the Committee of Three.
- 23 *Shanghai peace delegation attacked and beaten (presumably by government police) in five-hour riot at Nanking railway station—becomes antigovernment rallying point.*
- 27, 29 Meets with Chiang Kai-shek.

July 1946

- 1 *Bikini Atoll atomic bomb test.*
- 3, 5, 8, 11, 13, 16, 17, 26 Meets with Chou En-lai.
- 5 Proposes John Leighton Stuart to be ambassador to China (confirmed by Senate on the 11th).
- 13 *U.S. Army headquarters (Shanghai) announces the completion of Japanese repatriation from China proper.*
- 14 *Mrs. Marshall moves to Chiang Kai-shek's summer residence in Kuling (departs September 21).*
- 18–21, 26–30 Meets with Chiang Kai-shek at Kuling.
- 21 *Government troops launch all-out campaign to break Communist control of North China railroads.*
- 22 Notifies State Department he no longer supports China aid bill (will not oppose, preferring that Congress let bills die in committee).
- 29 *U.S. Marine Corps supply convoy ambushed by Communists at Anping.*

August 1946

- 1 *Ambassador Stuart proposes Five-Man Committee to facilitate forming a coalition government.*
- 1, 3, 9, 10, 12, 23, 29 Meets with Chou En-lai.
- 8, 9, 16, 19, 27 Meets with Chiang Kai-shek in Kuling.
- 11 Directs State Department to halt delivery of 129 aircraft previously sold to Chinese Air Force.
- 15 *Chinese Communist party attacks Marshall personally for first time for failing to end hostilities in China.*
- 19 *Communists announce mobilization for full-scale civil war.*
- 22 *Communists announce establishment of a government in Manchuria.*
- 30 *U.S.-China surplus property sale agreement signed—grants Chinese government ca. \$800,000,000 for civilian-type goods.*

September 1946

- 4, 5, 6, 11 Meets with Chou En-lai.
- 15, 17, 28, 30 Meets with Chiang Kai-shek in Kuling.

October 1946

- 1 Part one (of seven) of Marshall's report on China mission sent to State Department. (Other parts written in China sent October 28, November 1 and 27, December 4 and 16.)
- 4, 13 Meets with Chiang Kai-shek.
- 8, 26 Meets with Chou En-lai in Nanking.
- 9 Pays surprise visit to Chou En-lai in Shanghai to press for cease-fire.
- 11 *Government forces capture of Kalgan.*
- 19 *Review copies of Mrs. Marshall's memoir, Together, mailed in U.S. (regular edition printed in early November).*

November 1946

- 5 *Republican party landslide victory in midterm elections gives them control of both houses of Congress.*
- 5, 7, 8, 14 Meets with Chiang Kai-shek.
- 11 Informal meeting of the Committee of Three.
- 15 *China's government-dominated National Assembly convenes; Communists and allies refuse to participate.*
- 18 General and Madame Chou En-lai pay farewell visit to Marshall, who arranges U.S. Army air transportation to Yen-an.
- 23 Departs for Tientsin to secure reduction of Marine forces in North China.
- 24 Departs for Peiping.
- 25 *Henry Luce's Time magazine advocates an end to Marshall's mission.*
- 27 Departs for Tsingtao to visit Admiral Cooke.
- 28 Returns to Nanking.

December 1946

- 1, 3, 7, 27, 28 Meets with Chiang Kai-shek.
- 8 Mrs. Marshall departs for Hawaii.
- 18 *President issues official restatement of U.S. policy toward China.*
- 28 Requests that president terminate mediation mission.

January 1947

- 1, 6 Meets with Chiang Kai-shek.
- 6 *Truman announces Marshall's recall to Washington.*
- 7 Releases personal statement on the results of the mission. *Truman announces Marshall will become secretary of state.*
- 8 Departs for Hawaii.
- 19 Departs Hawaii for Washington, D.C.
- 21 Arrives Washington; sworn in as secretary of state.
- 29 *State Department announces abandonment of U.S. mediation effort; all U.S. forces to be withdrawn from China and Executive Headquarters closed (officially done February 6).*

Maintaining the Momentum

January 1 – April 12, 1945

The one great element in continuing the success of an offensive is maintaining the momentum. This was lost last fall when shortages caused by the limitation of port facilities made it impossible for us to get sufficient supplies to the armies to continue their sweep into Germany when they approached the German border. Once additional ports had been captured and reopened there was a shortage of rail and transportation facilities with which to get supplies forward. Now the port facilities and the interior supply lines are adequate. Subject to the worldwide shortage of both cargo and personnel shipping, there is no foreseeable shortage which will be imposed by physical events in the field.

—Speech to the Overseas Press Club
March 1, 1945

THIS war is a terrible business and grows more so day by day,” General Marshall confided to a longtime friend’s daughter, whose husband had been reported missing in action in Europe. (Marshall to Mrs. Richard W. Ripple, January 25, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].) As the year 1945 commenced, Marshall faced another year of enormous responsibility as the welder of Allied military power. An educator responded to the chief of staff’s off-the-record address to the Association of American Colleges on January 11, 1945: “I think the strongest impression was, ‘He knows what he is talking about and is absolutely sincere.’ . . . As I sat there and realized just a little of the tremendous responsibility which must be his, it was hard to see how any human being could carry this load.” (H. Merrill Pasco Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, January 22, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, SGS (Secretariat)].)

Marshall bore the responsibility uprightly. While he operated on a global scale in world strategy, Marshall possessed one objective—to win the war as quickly as possible with the fewest Allied casualties. In March, Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill praised the chief of staff’s work: “Pray further give him [Marshall] my warmest congratulations on the magnificent fighting and conduct of the American and Allied armies under General Eisenhower, and say what a joy it must be to him to see how the armies he called into being by his own genius have won immortal renown. He is the true ‘organizer of victory.’” (Churchill to Henry Maitland Wilson, March 30, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) ★

TO BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT N. YOUNG

January 1, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Young and Sexton:¹ I was greatly pleased to receive your birthday greetings, and that you should have thought of this while so heavily engaged in operations on the front.

You fellows from this office have been scattered pretty well all over the world and all of you are doing a wonderful job. We must have a little private organization after the war for get-togethers and a riot of reminiscences all the way from the early and agonizing struggles to the moment of victory.

With my thanks to you both and with my prayers for you in the New Year, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. A copy of this letter was enclosed for Brigadier General William T. Sexton. Young and Sexton, who had both served as secretary of the General Staff, were assigned to the

Third Infantry Division in the European theater. They had sent birthday greetings to the chief of staff from France. (McWilliams to McCarthy, Radio No. 301605A, December 30, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected (CM-IN-29840)].)

General Marshall had arranged for Sexton's troop duty in spring 1944, when he wrote to Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers that he wanted Sexton "attached to a U. S. division in the line in Italy not as a liaison officer or observer but as member of division on duty with artillery. . . . What I want is to give him the experience in fighting as a final step to offset his long service to me here in the office. Thereafter he is on his own." (*Papers of GCM*, 4: 377.)

TO MRS. ROBERT M. NOLAN

January 1, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mrs. Nolan: I appreciated very much your note of Christmas greetings but was sorry to learn that Nolan had not been feeling well and that you had had such an unfortunate accident.¹ However, your morale seems to be excellent, with a triumphant spirit over misfortune.

You will be interested to know that we had a coach dog, or Dalmatian as they now call them, who looked very much like Duke. He had quite a pedigree, was the grandson of a national champion. Stettinius, the present Secretary of State, gave him to me. However, he proved to be somewhat of a traveling man and made a specialty of killing chickens, so after infuriating three neighbors of ours at Leesburg in one day while I was in Cairo and Teheran, Mrs. Marshall enlisted him in the Army down at Front Royal.² My stepdaughter Molly saw him there not so long ago and he had not proved to be a very valiant soldier, was gun-shy, and delighted to see anyone, friend or enemy. In a movie of the Army dogs the other day they had him sitting on top of his kennel, so if you see that picture you may know who this replica of Duke really is.

With my warmest regards to you both, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Retired Colonel Nolan, a career soldier who had served in the Spanish-American War and the Great War, was suffering with arthritis, and Mrs. Nolan had broken her arm. The Nolans were longtime friends from when Marshall served at Fort Clark, Texas, in 1905 on a mapping expedition. (Viola B. Nolan to Marshall, December 22, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General]. For information on Marshall's mapping expedition, see *Papers of GCM*, 1: 28-34.)

2. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., had given a dalmatian named Fleet to the Marshalls. Mrs. Marshall characterized Fleet as "beautiful but dumb" and frequently getting into mischief. They took him to the Front Royal, Virginia, K-9 School, where "he turned out to be the worst coward in the K-9 Army. . . . In a newsreel that George and I saw of the K-9 School, Fleet made his appearance as the dunce of the school." (Katherine Tupper Marshall, *Together: Annals of an Army Wife* [New York: Tupper and Love, 1946], pp. 137-39.) For further information about Fleet, see *Papers of GCM*, 2: 495-96. George and Lily Marshall are pictured with a dog named Duke at Fort Leavenworth in 1908. (*George C. Marshall*

Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue, 3d ed. [Lexington, Va.: George C. Marshall Research Foundation, 1996], p. 208[#16].)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

January 2, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: DSM and Joint Resolution of Congress regarding the
services of Field Marshal Sir John Dill.

The DSM you awarded posthumously to Field Marshal Dill has not been presented to Lady Dill nor has she received the Resolution of Congress appreciating his services which was passed on December 20th. Copies of the citation for the DSM and of the Joint Resolution of Congress are attached hereto.¹

I should suggest that in view of the fact that Lady Dill is leaving shortly for England you present her with the Distinguished Service Medal and copy of the citation over your signature and at the same time hand her the Joint Resolution of Congress.²

I should also suggest that you send a copy of the Joint Resolution to Mr. Churchill with some such comment as the following:

“I am sending you herewith a copy of a Joint Resolution of Congress enacted on December 20 last, appreciating the services of Field Marshal Sir John Dill. The fact that Congress saw fit to take this action, which is without precedent, and that the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, the Honorable Tom Connally, introduced the Resolution, is not only formal recognition of the great service rendered by Dill in promoting unity of action on the part of our respective countries, but is an evidence of a very wholesome state of mind in the midst of the bickerings that are inevitable at this stage of the war.

“I think Dill rendered both our countries a great service and I am delighted to see it written clearly into the record.”³

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The citation for Sir John Dill’s Distinguished Service Medal recognized his distinguished service to the common cause of the Allies. “The good will and concert of action which have characterized the combined achievements of the Allied forces must be attributed in an important measure to his integrity of purpose, his freedom from prejudice and his selfless devotion to the common cause, together with the warm humanity which characterized all his actions.” House Joint Resolution 317 declared that “the outstanding service rendered to the United Nations by Field Marshal Sir John Dill be, and it hereby is, recognized by the American people and the Congress of the United States.” (Public Law 516, 78th Cong., 2d

sess.) For further information regarding Dill's death, see *Papers of GCM*, 4: 652–54, 694–95.

2. General Marshall attended the White House ceremony on January 5 when President Roosevelt presented to Lady Dill the Distinguished Service Medal honoring Sir John Dill. (*New York Times*, January 6, 1945, p. 14.)

3. On January 10 President Roosevelt sent a letter to Prime Minister Churchill that included this exact wording. (Enclosed in Leahy Memorandum for General Marshall, January 10, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY

January 3, 1945
Washington, D.C.

I do not think the attached memorandum meets the situation.¹ There has been no doubt in my mind for a long time, and this animated my frequent inquiries sent from Cairo and other places, that the physical exemption business has reached the point in some cases of almost a racket.² I frequently see soldiers well up in years who, on a superficial basis alone, decidedly lack the stamina necessary to arduous service, yet they are in the Army. At the same time we have athletes engaging in the most violent sport of football and the strenuous sport of baseball—I suppose there are others in the boxing ring, I have no knowledge of this—who have been exempted.

The other day as I recall we sent out instructions that in the case of celebrities, radio and motion picture stars, etc., they would not be discharged without the approval of the War Department.³ Is there not some approach such as this that might properly be made in the case of famous athletes whom the medical officers are about to turn down? The man by his action has publicly indicated great physical prowess, therefore should not the doctor's recommendation against his being accepted in the service be cleared by higher authority?

I do not think we can rest on the statements in the attached memorandum.⁴

G. C. M.

NA/RG 165 (OCS, 327.02)

1. On December 27, 1944, Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson wrote to General Marshall that James F. Byrnes, head of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, had directed Selective Service to reexamine the draft status of professional football players and other athletes. Patterson said that parents of men fighting overseas, "like Justice Byrnes, cannot understand how a professional football player, who takes gruelling punishment before thousands of spectators, evades military service by the excuse of a punctured eardrum, wetting the bed, or some other trifling blemish." He recommended that the Army and Navy departments take firm measures to see that these athletes "are not again certified unfit by Army or Navy doctors on technicalities or hair-splitting decisions. Nothing short of the plainest disability of a major character should exempt these men from military service." (Patterson Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, December 27, 1944, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 327.02].) G-1 (Personnel) had drafted a reply to Patterson, in which Deputy Chief of Staff

Thomas T. Handy concurred. (Pasco Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, January 2, 1945, *ibid.*)

Byrnes recalled, “I asked General [Lewis B.] Hershey of Selective Service to investigate the large number of young men, between the ages of eighteen to twenty-six, allegedly unfit for military service, who were featured in professional athletics. He set the local draft boards to work. Although some ardent sportsmen were incensed at the curtailment of their pleasures, the fact that the American troops in combat were without any diversions was sufficient reason for our course.” (James F. Byrnes, *All in One Lifetime* [New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958], p. 250.)

2. In November 1943, while in Cairo, Egypt, General Marshall had notified Deputy Chief of Staff Joseph T. McNarney of his concern that prominent athletes had been deferred or placed on limited service by Army medical officers. “I fear a serious scandal in this matter if this action was taken by Army doctors. It is ridiculous from my point of view to place on limited service a man who can catch with his broken fingers a fast ball. If he can’t handle a machine gun, I am no soldier,” wrote Marshall. “I have seen dozens of men with half a dozen serious complaints, in addition to their years, passed by their Army doctors—and now to find great athletes, football and baseball, exempted is not to be tolerated.” (*Papers of GCM*, 4: 190–91.)

3. On November 29, 1944, the War Department had issued Circular Number 452 titled *Separation or Discharge of Military Personnel Who Were Prominent in Civil Life*, which stated that the discharge of nationally prominent persons was a cause for adverse public reaction and criticism of the War Department. “To discharge a well-known professional football player for physical disability when that individual is able to participate in professional games immediately after discharge is obviously inconsistent.” While not intending to discriminate against any particular group, “cases involving the discharge of nationally prominent athletes, stage, screen and radio stars, etc., which might occasion criticism of War Department discharge policies, will be referred to the War Department for final determination.”

4. The memorandum was rewritten and dispatched on January 8. Referring to the November 1944 directive that no professional athlete, celebrity, or radio or motion picture star in military service be discharged without War Department review, General Marshall replied that these individuals should be handled in the same manner. “I have accordingly directed that professional athletes will not be rejected for military service until each case has been reviewed” by the War Department’s Personnel Division. The Navy had no objection to such action by the Army, but “it will accept the above individuals only if they meet physical standards for general service.” (Marshall Memorandum for the Under Secretary of War, January 8, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

DRAFT STATEMENT FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR¹

January 3, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

The situation on the Western Front at the present time has developed to the stage where comments at the moment are very difficult to make with any sound basis for what is said. I mean by this that a general battle is in progress with both sides deployed, each on guard against a thrust by the other, the Germans still holding the power to launch new but minor actions either to the north or south of the Ardennes. They are engaged in such an action at the present time on the south side of the Saar front. Whether or

not this is a demonstration, a probe of inquiry, or a sizeable attack remains to be seen, but it is quite evidently and naturally the German purpose to hold our attention at as many points on the front as possible, other than the Ardennes, in order either to discourage the movement of divisions to the principal action or to exploit a weakness in the line created by such movements.

I might say that the situation on that front is in a state of balance, excepting of course the uncertainties of war, where the German forces are utilizing every device or diversion to cling to the offensive in order to prevent General Eisenhower from seizing the initiative again. The weather continues to be the critical factor, the troops in general having been deployed, though each side possesses uncommitted reserves.

Under these circumstances it is quite evident that I cannot engage in a critical discussion of the situation other than to make these general observations.

There is another point of view relating to this present battle that should not be lost sight of and that is its close relationship to what is going on in Italy and to the prospects on the Russian front. There are also included the considerations of the German withdrawals from Norway, the weakening of his garrisons in Denmark, and the northward trek of his troops in the Balkan salient. From that point of view Europe is a single theater, very much so for the Germans.

We have not yet received an accurate statement of materiel losses or of casualties and it will be some time before such data can be obtained from troop headquarters while the fighting is in progress. We do know that our losses in tanks were 6% greater than the monthly attrition rate which is 14%. We also know that in communications wire and in communications equipment the losses were heaviest because of the difficulty in evacuating such materiel. From the limited data available it would appear that materiel losses are far lower than we anticipated. Just what the casualties are has not yet been released by SHAEF. As a considerable retrograde movement occurred it will be some time before an accurate record can be made. When casualties remain within your own lines the problem is not too difficult except during landing operations in the dark where there may be great confusion as to the whereabouts of the individual, but in a retrograde movement the problem is exceedingly difficult.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. General Marshall prepared this draft which Secretary Henry L. Stimson used during the first part of his press conference on January 4. (Transcript of Press Conference of Secretary of War Held at 10:30 A.M., Thursday, January 4, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Stimson wrote that his press conference "went off as usual—rather satisfactorily. During these critical days Surles or I talk with Marshall before we go into the press conference and get usually a statement from him as to what he considers the situation from a military standpoint so far as we can let it out." (January 4, 1945,

Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 50: 12].) Major General Alexander D. Surles served as director of the Bureau of Public Relations.

2. After the press conference, Secretary Stimson and General Marshall talked for forty-five minutes on the subject of the adequacy of ground forces. “I have an uneasy feeling that we ought to make some more divisions and begin to do it now and have them ready by next summer or next autumn,” wrote Stimson. “Marshall is very strong against it. He feels confident that the effort to do it will so interfere with the present organization that we have got that it will stall our attack on the Germans. . . . This is an old difference between us.” (Ibid.)

Stimson had broached the subject in May 1944, and Marshall had taken the same position then as now: “that our present setup gives us a chance to keep the Germans going and to keep our troops fresh at the same time by pouring individual replacements into the divisions that we have.” (Ibid., pp. 12–13.) On May 16, 1944, Marshall had responded to Stimson’s suggestion to reconsider commitment to the ninety-division concept and begin activation of additional divisions. The chief of staff maintained that the Allies held overwhelming air superiority, and he was confident that the strength and efficiency of the Russian attack and the U.S. Army’s replacement system—which yielded a finer quality, rather than quantity, of ground combat units—would be sufficient for victory. (*Papers of GCM*, 4: 447–50.)

The secretary himself was aware that the battle over the size of the Army was “a subject upon which Stimson was more vehement than most of his military advisers; it seemed to him to involve very urgent questions as to the strength of America’s wartime resolution.” (Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* [New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948], pp. 475–76.)

“This morning I had it out with Marshall in a perfectly friendly but very firm way,” wrote Stimson. “I feel a very great responsibility in running any risk of jolting his elbow, so to speak, when he is under such great strain and we had none of that in our talk and I think that a good deal of good may come out of it. But on the main issue at present of more divisions he remained firm.” (January 4, 1945, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 50: 13–14].)

TO MAJOR GENERAL PHILIP B. PEYTON¹

January 3, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Buster, Thanks again for very gracious and inspiring birthday greetings. You have always remembered the day and never failed to express the most generous sentiments.

How distant those old VMI days seem against the perspective of the years. More frequently of late than in the past, incidents of our days—you, Nick and I, as roommates—come to mind. He sent me some oranges this Christmas and I recalled his barrels of books, and my barrel one time of canned goods and preserves that vanished under the class onslaught.²

I was sorry not to see you at the game.³ I did not get clear to go until the night before and then on the basis of in and out with no loss of time. In addition I had Sir John Dill’s widow with me.

Good luck to you in the New Year and thanks for your note. Faithfully yours,

P.S. Apropos of your comment on a *record* of my affairs. I have made a vow never to commit the error of writing any memoirs.⁴

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Buster Peyton, who was General Marshall's roommate at the Virginia Military Institute and had retired in February 1942 due to disability in line of duty, had sent birthday greetings to the chief of staff from his home in Earlsyville, Virginia. "You have made a career unique and notable," wrote Peyton, "a keen and enduring satisfaction to all of us who have watched your progress to the top. Some day I hope you will make it a subject of record—I want to live long enough to read it." (Peyton to Marshall, December 31, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Leonard K. Nicholson, heir to the New Orleans Times-Picayune Publishing Company, arranged that unused review copies of books sent to the *Times-Picayune* be forwarded to him at Virginia Military Institute. General Marshall reminisced about Nicholson's friend at the newspaper sending "us a barrel of books at a time. . . . I was a rapid reader and Peyton was a rapid reader and Nicholson was a very slow reader. Peyton and I just read through the barrel," recalled Marshall. (*Marshall Interviews*, p. 95. For General Marshall's recollections of receiving at V.M.I. a package of canned goods and delicacies sent by his father from a Pittsburgh delicatessen, see pp. 93–94.)

3. General Marshall attended the Army-Navy football game played at Baltimore, Maryland, on December 2, 1944.

4. General Marshall had previously declined all requests to write his memoirs. Assistant Secretary of the General Staff Frank McCarthy replied to a book publisher's inquiry during the fall of 1943 that the chief of staff "has made up his mind quite firmly that he can give no thought at this time to writing a book, and, in fact, he has no intention of writing a book after the war." (McCarthy to Elliott B. Macrae, October 23, 1943, *Papers of GCM*, 4: 164–66.) In December 1943, publisher Doubleday, Doran and Company had written to General Marshall on the subject: "Knowing the pressure you will be under from many different sources I do want it on your records that Doubleday Doran is definitely interested in any book you may decide to do and that we are ready to discuss terms at your convenience." (Hugh Gibson to Marshall, December 20, 1943, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].) General Marshall replied that he had no plans to write his memoirs. (Marshall [staff-drafted] to Gibson, December 27, 1943, *ibid.*)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
[Radio No. W-86550.] *Secret*

January 4, 1944 [1945]
Washington, D.C.

Personal and eyes only for Eisenhower from Marshall. Reference your E81755 January 3d.¹ We will proceed as you have indicated. However please understand this: In response to your messages regarding limitations on the travel of members of Congress, difficulties of transportation and accommodation and in order to protect you we have refused to accede to heavy pressures here particularly by the Under Secretary of War and by General Somervell² for the sending of representatives of a single item of manufacture. I anticipate now that you will inherit a flood of such observers because this precedent makes us powerless to defend you further.³

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The January 3 telegram, sent over General Eisenhower's name, stated that he agreed to allow a group of union workers from the rubber tire industry to visit his theater. "It is believed that such a trip will increase the output of urgently needed tires. I agree with this proposal and would welcome such a group in the theater." (*The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, ed. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., et al., 21 vols. [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970–2001], 4: 2398.)

2. Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell was the chief of Army Service Forces.

3. "I hope you will not think me inappreciative of the way you have protected us and am sorry I did not consult you personally before giving my promise in this affair," Eisenhower replied to the chief of staff on January 5. "I agreed to receive such a group because of the critical tire situation and provided the group was shepherded by General [Albert J.] Browning who knows the ropes and therefore makes little demand upon our time and attention." (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2397–98.) Brigadier General Albert J. Browning served as director of the Purchases Division of the Army Service Forces and as assistant director of materiel. That same day Eisenhower alerted Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee that staff responsible for dispatching telegrams "not use words purporting to express my personal opinions unless they know exactly what they are." "I know nothing about production problems at home," Eisenhower told Lee, "and the only opinion I expressed was that I was ready to cooperate, as far as we can, with people at home who do bear this responsibility." (*Ibid.*, p. 2398.)

Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith wrote from S.H.A.E.F. to Deputy Chief of Staff Thomas T. Handy in February: "I am very much embarrassed about the visitor question, and I am afraid we rather went off the deep end on this one," Smith wrote. "I hope that General Eisenhower's subsequent message straightened the situation out, but I am afraid he acted on impulse and without realizing the difficulties you have had in keeping visitors off our necks. Actually, they are a serious burden, but as these matters do not ordinarily come to Ike's attention, he does not appreciate the difficulties which we have experienced in handling trippers." (Smith to Handy, February 9, 1945, GCMRL/T. T. Handy Papers.) For further information regarding visitors to the American sector, see *Papers of GCM*, 4: 499.

TO JOHN G. WINANT
Confidential

January 5, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mr. Ambassador: I was touched by the sentiments in your letter of December twenty-seventh acknowledging my Christmas greetings. You certainly are most generous in your responses to me.¹

Most confidentially, I wish to outline for your eye alone the procedure I have followed in the case of Sir John Dill.²

There was a period commencing explosively at Cairo and more or less continuing up to the time of Dill's death, when the Prime Minister was antagonistic towards Dill. At Cairo in particular he was very emphatic in his expressions of disagreement and displeasure at Dill's forthright statements which bore on the Prime Minister's personal actions very directly. I am not familiar with the personal interchanges after that date but know that the Prime Minister was resentful of Dill's frank differences with him at a time when he, the Prime Minister, was heavily pressing his Chiefs of Staff.

To offset, at least to a mild degree, this development, I undertook to have Dill honored in this country and a regular campaign was mapped out, commencing with the award of the Howland Memorial Prize by Yale University, at which time the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. McCloy, and I, all made the trip with Dill to receive the medal (rather shocking the Yale faculty with a great deal of photography, not for United States consumption but to be sent to England).³ This was followed by the award of a degree by the College of William and Mary at which time the United States Chiefs of Staff, as well as the British Mission, all attended.⁴

While I was in the process of dickering with conservative Harvard who was reluctant to accept because Yale had taken the lead, Princeton came across on its own initiative and awarded him a degree.⁵ Meanwhile I had arranged for the same award by the University of Wisconsin but this was delayed—and finally dropped with his illness, because of their insistence that I should receive a degree at the same time. As I did not want to be too closely associated with Dill in these affairs lest there be some suspicion of the procedure, and have not accepted any degrees during the period of the war, the delay arose. We were in process of arranging for a degree by one of the principal universities on the West Coast when Dill's illness brought all of this to a close.

As I have explained above, the purpose of these moves was to impress on the British public and therefore on the Prime Minister and the Cabinet the importance of the position Dill occupied in this country.

On his death I had every possible measure taken to dignify the occasion so as to leave a lasting memorial as a reminder of a perfect example by a British official of absolutely unselfish and objective dealings with British-American affairs. We welcomed the agreement for his interment in Arlington and saw to it that the ceremony was very impressive. I also had been careful to prepare statements, prior to his death, for the Chiefs of Staff and myself and for the President and the Secretary of War along with the citation for the DSM for the President to include in his statement. All this was released to the press the morning following Dill's death. However, the election campaign made it very difficult to get appropriate publicity or treatment, but even so there was a great deal of attention focused on his passing.⁶

I arranged for a very special tract in Arlington Cemetery, a triangle formed by three roads, beautifully wooded and containing an elevation appropriate for a memorial. This has been set aside by formal direction of the Secretary of War so that when we manage the raising of memorial funds a suitable site will be available.⁷

Meanwhile I prepared a draft for a Joint Resolution by Congress and succeeded in having Senator Tom Connally introduce it, apparently on his own initiative. It was cleared through the Foreign Relations Committee and then introduced on our suggestion by [Sol] Bloom on the House side.

The speeches were not delivered on the Floor but by “permission to print.” The matter was handled in this way not only to clear it while Congress was operating under heavy pressure but more particularly to prevent some anti-British zealot from utilizing the occasion for comments engendered by strong feeling in this country over British action in Greece and lack of evidence of British activity on the Western Front.

Congress passed the Resolution and now today the President is handing Lady Dill the DSM with the citation and also a copy of the Resolution. The British and American Chiefs of Staff will be there and the British Ambassador.⁸ I imagine this will get suitable publicity on the basis of which I want to go ahead towards the raising of funds for a memorial.

Yesterday I sent Lord Halifax⁹ a volume containing the photographs of the funeral and interment, all newspaper clippings including the editorials regarding Dill, the statements by the President and the Secretary of War, etc., and the action of the Committees of Congress and of Congress itself in passing the Resolution.

I am telling you all this so that you will be aware of my purpose which is to make every possible use of Dill’s example in generous and understanding military cooperation to offset the effect of these post-war and other political recriminations. We have in mind a bronze tablet marking the general plot which will give the title of Dill’s interment there with the citation of the President and Joint Resolution of Congress, and then we have in mind an equestrian statue in bronze without pedestal; as Lady Dill says, of the Virginia hunter type of horse and not the rearing steed of the Civil War and Jacksonian period.

As I have said, this letter is to advise you of what we have done and why, and what we are planning to do. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. General Marshall had sent Ambassador Winant Christmas greetings with “admiration and personal appreciation for the invaluable cooperation and support you have given the Army throughout the past year. Your personal attitude and strong leadership have made a material contribution to our military successes.” (Marshall to Winant, December 23, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) To which Ambassador Winant replied: “Thank you for one of the nicest Christmas messages I have ever received.” (Winant to Marshall, December 27, 1944, *ibid.*)

2. Winant had written Marshall that Sir Henry Maitland Wilson was the “unquestioned free choice of the responsible men here” to succeed Sir John Dill as head of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, D.C. “I found that much as General [Hastings] Ismay is liked by the Prime Minister and Sir Alan Brooke and other principals, and responsible as he is for the efficient secretariat that underlies and coordinates both the work of the Chiefs of Staff and the War Cabinet,” wrote Winant, “that his independent judgment on major war problems would not receive the same consideration by those concerned as would be conceded to General Wilson, who is much his senior.” (*Ibid.*)

3. For information regarding Sir John Dill receiving the Howland Memorial Prize and General Marshall’s remarks at Yale University on February 14, 1944, see *Papers of GCM*, 4: 295–96, 304–6.)

4. Dill received the honorary degree of doctor of laws during a special convocation at the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg, Virginia, on April 3, 1944. (*New York Times*, April 4, 1944, p. 12.)

5. Princeton University awarded the honorary degree of doctor of laws to Sir John Dill on May 20, 1944.

6. For information regarding Sir John Dill's death, see *Papers of GCM*, 4: 652–54.

7. Sir John Dill's equestrian statue, "erected to a great soldier-statesman by his American friends and associates," was dedicated at Arlington National Cemetery on November 1, 1950. (Alex Danchev, *Very Special Relationship: Field-Marshal Sir John Dill and the Anglo-American Alliance, 1941–44* [London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986], p. 1.) "Here before us in Arlington Cemetery, among our hallowed dead lies buried a great Englishman, Field Marshal Sir John Dill," said Marshall during the dedication. "He was my friend, I am proud to say, and he was my intimate associate throughout most of the war years, commencing with the historic meeting at Argentia in Newfoundland, in August 1941." (Remarks by Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall at Unveiling of Sir John Dill Monument, November 1, 1950, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Secretary of Defense, Speeches].)

8. For more information regarding the Distinguished Service Medal and Joint Resolution of Congress, see Marshall Memorandum for the President, January 2, 1945, pp. 5–6.

9. Lord Halifax served as the British ambassador in Washington.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY
Confidential

January 5, 1945
Washington, D.C.

I have just been talking to the Director of the WAC, Mrs. Hobby, and she tells me that the ASF [Army Service Forces] is going after 5,000 nurses' aides.

My guess would be that this will ruin what I want to do in creating general hospital companies in the WAC organization because of the pay status and general competition with the Red Cross.¹ Please look into this.

My own opinion is that as a beginning we can create WAC companies for hospital service on a three-months basis and continue their technical training after they report for duty at the hospitals. Mrs. Hobby suggests, and I think it is a fine idea, that we call on the Governors to start a recruiting campaign for the number of women necessary to provide one of these companies for each general hospital in their State.

The Staff reported against the proposition of recruiting a company to be named the General Theodore Roosevelt Company and I think I sent this back to you with the comment that we probably were missing a good basis for recruitment. Have them reconsider this because if Governors can name the companies it may add a little zest to the campaign.²

Please look into this business and see that we are not working against ourselves in the enterprise. I want action.³

G. C. M.⁴

NA/RG 165 (OCS, 324.5 WAC)

1. During the last weeks of 1944, Surgeon General Norman T. Kirk requested eight thousand Women's Army Corps enlisted medical technicians. At the same time, the Surgeon General requested five thousand Red Cross civilian nurses' aides. Women's Army Corps recruiters could not compete with Red Cross offers of higher pay and officer privileges for identical jobs on civilian status. Official W.A.C. historian Treadwell reports that "a Wac cost from \$1,032 to \$1,368 yearly, including pay, housing, food, and clothing, while a civilian nurses' aide received \$1,752 to \$2,190 for a 48-hour week." Women's Army Corps medical technicians were working from 72 to 100 hours weekly, in addition to company duties, and upon assignment at the army hospitals were often used as kitchen police and charwomen rather than the medical positions for which they were qualified. W.A.C. Director Oveta Culp Hobby had worked to no avail with the Surgeon General's Office to better assure that enlisted medical technicians would receive the job and grade promised during recruitment. Chief of Staff George C. Marshall proposed that W.A.C. medical and surgical technicians be assigned to U.S. Army hospitals in Table of Organization companies with specified job and grade. (Mattie E. Treadwell, *The Women's Army Corps*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1954], pp. 339–59; quote on p. 353.)

2. The Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., Women's Army Corps Company began recruitment on February 1, 1945. See the following document.

3. The Personnel (G-1) Division immediately called representatives of the Surgeon General's Office and the Women's Army Corps to a meeting, and the group worked through the night preparing a plan to utilize Women's Army Corps companies at army hospitals. One company, consisting of two officers and one hundred enlisted women, was recommended for each thousand beds. "The WAC personnel now on duty at General Hospitals will be absorbed into the companies within the Table of Organization strength. No personnel will be reduced in grade during this process." Included was a publicity plan to dispatch a letter over the chief of staff's signature to all state governors requesting them to recruit Women's Army Corps units for assignment to a specific general hospital. (R. W. Berry Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, January 5, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 324.5 WAC].)

A letter over General Marshall's signature was dispatched to the state governors on January 7, to which the governors eagerly agreed. (Marshall to Governor Matthew M. Neely, January 7, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) The recruiting campaign met and passed its quota by the end of March, and the training course received praise from students and instructors. Meanwhile, under threat of a draft, the nursing profession responded with an overabundance of nurses. Although the Surgeon General's Office drew up the hospital Table of Organization (T/O), it believed that changed conditions warranted nullifying recruiting commitments. Hospital commanders objected to the W.A.C. T/O units, and pointed out that they "no longer needed Wacs to care for the sick, but were in urgent need of more orderlies, kitchen police, and charwomen." In spite of War Department protests, the Medical Department continued to utilize the Women's Army Corps enlisted units on duties as desired by the Surgeon General's Office. (Treadwell, *Women's Army Corps*, pp. 354–59.)

4. Assistant Secretary of the General Staff H. Merrill Pasco signed this document on behalf of General Marshall.

TO MRS. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, JR.
Confidential

January 6, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mrs. Roosevelt: I have delayed in answering your letter of Dec. twenty-sixth regarding the naming of a WAC company for General Roo-

sevelt as we are in the midst of a rather emergency proposal for the recruiting of over 100 new companies for assignment to specific general hospitals.¹ For the leadership in the recruiting drive we hope to enlist the Governors of the respective States, each to seek recruits for the companies to be assigned to the general hospitals within his State. Naturally the question of giving names to these companies is one of the considerations and it is important that the policy apply to all. Therefore the delay in my answering your letter.

For several reasons (one of them, most confidentially, racial complications) it is considered inadvisable for the War Department to become involved in the selection of the names of the individuals to be honored in the naming of companies.² So at the present moment I am not free to give a direct answer to your question. There is no doubt in my mind whatsoever that a company will be so named in New York. It is merely the question of the advisability of making such announcement at this particular moment and on the basis of a formal War Department approval.³

I must ask you to regard as confidential the general information I have given you above until it is released to the press.

I am sure it will interest you to know that at noon today a group of us are assembling in the Secretary of War's office where he will read the statement by Elihu Root memorializing Theodore Roosevelt the elder.⁴

With my very best wishes, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Mrs. Roosevelt had written that the Greater New York Civilian Advisory Committee for the Women's Army Corps had successfully run a recruiting campaign in October in which a W.A.C. company was formed called the General Jonathan M. Wainwright Company. The committee planned a similar campaign in which they would honor the memory of Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., and Mrs. Roosevelt asked the chief of staff to announce the W.A.C. company's formation and the vital need for recruits by the Surgeon General. (Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., to Marshall, December 26, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) For information regarding W.A.C. recruiting for general hospitals, see the previous document.

2. Bureau of Public Relations recommended that General Marshall not comply with Mrs. Roosevelt's request. "There was a minor racial incident connected with the only previous special company which has not had repercussions on the War Department. However, there is a possibility that some discussion may arise in the future in which case you should not be actively connected with such companies." (Minnich Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, January 3, 1945, *ibid.*) Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel Robert W. Berry discussed the issue with Colonel Oveta Culp Hobby and replied that "the All States campaign in which the Governors of the States were asked to raise companies is almost an exact parallel and it developed only one minor racial incident. The proposed scheme would be helpful in recruiting and I see no real objection to its adoption." (Berry Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, January 5, 1945, *ibid.*)

3. The General Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., Women's Army Corps Company, which recruited women during February 1945, trained recruits as medical and surgical technicians. (*New York Times*, February 2, 1945, p. 9; February 15, 1945, p. 8; March 8, 1945, p. 5.)

4. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson read Secretary Elihu Root's memorial address paying tribute to Theodore Roosevelt on the anniversary of Roosevelt's death on January 6, 1919. "It was a beautiful address," Stimson wrote, "and I think surprised people because it was one which, being delivered in the Century Association, had never received a wide publication and I don't think any of those present had heard of it before." (January 6, 1945, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 50: 20].)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER January 6, 1945
[Radio No. W-87829.] *Top Secret* Washington, D.C.

For Eisenhower's eyes only from Marshall. I dislike taking your attention from the battle for even a moment but have decided that one matter is so important that I must do so.

Somervell is on his way to see you in relation to Lee's command. The particular matter I shall now bring up is only one phase of Somervell's immediate interest. Barker and his people got a very clear idea of the replacement situation and its necessities while they were here and he assured me that a great improvement could be made in reconversions in ETO. However with your attention centered on the battle, with Barker the G-1 of an Allied force and not a pugnacious character and with Lee in command of affairs in England and many in France I am fearful that too much of delay will occur in bringing about the changes that appear imperative.¹

It seems absolutely clear to me that little has been done in Lee's command or in the Eighth Air Force command for that matter, vaguely approximating the drastic measures we have taken back here to obtain infantry replacements. Matchett I know and undoubtedly he is a good man for training but he is not a pugnacious character and he is under Lee.² In brief what I want to do unless you interpose strong objections is to send General Gasser with several assistants to England immediately to survey the situation in the light of the experience he has had over the past two years. We must get immediate action since we can no longer bleed ourselves much more on this side of the Atlantic to meet deficiencies on yours.³

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell served as chief of Army Service Forces. Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee, chief of the Services of Supply in the European Theater of Operations, served as deputy theater commander with responsibilities for administration and supply. Lee's duties included commanding Communications Zone in the European theater, and he was in a position to control the flow of reinforcements and supplies. (Forrest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1954], pp. 267–68, 322–23.) Major General Ray W. Barker served as chief of the G-1 (Personnel) Division of S.H.A.E.F.

2. Brigadier General Henry J. Matchett served as commander of the Replacement System.

3. "I believe that Gasser's work will do much toward getting us right down to bedrock in reaching definite and accurate conclusions," replied Eisenhower the next day. "Due to comparatively low scale of effort that the enemy is compelled to make on other fronts, an extremely high proportion of his personnel and material replacements is pouring into the Western Front. Enemy units that have been badly cut up in the salient and at other places are persistently and quickly built up." Eisenhower was convinced that "we cannot resort to cannibalization of U.S. divisions because of the strength needed on this long front. The enemy enjoys the advantage of short communications, fortified defense zones and total mobilization and our only answer is sufficient divisional strength, fully maintained." (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2408-9.)

Major General Lorenzo D. Gasser, head of the War Department Manpower Board, and his staff found duplication of services and made recommendations for substantial savings in manpower. (For further information, see Roland G. Ruppenthal, *Logistical Support of the Armies*, volume 2, *September 1944-May 1945*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1959], pp. 326, 384.) See Marshall to Eisenhower, January 8, 1945, pp. 20-22.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER January 7, 1945
[Radio No. W-88421.] *Top Secret* Washington, D.C.

From Marshall for Eisenhower's eyes only. I suppose you have seen so much of the text of the President's report on the State of the Union to Congress yesterday as refers to you and your battle. Lest you may not have seen this I am having it sent to you by teletype. Might it not be a good thing to get the sense of the President's message down to your U. S. Armies, at least to the leaders.¹ Maybe they already have this.

I received your statement regarding the situation in Alsace and de Gaulle's message to the President.² For your confidential information the President declined to see the French ambassador and notified our State Department that this was none of their business. He regarded the matter as purely strategical and tactical and had the ambassador informed that de Gaulle should take these questions up with you and not with him.³

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. President Roosevelt praised the Allied fighting during the Battle of the Bulge. "Our men have fought with indescribable and unforgettable gallantry under most difficult conditions and our German enemies have sustained considerable losses while failing to obtain their objectives," reported the president. "We have reassumed the offensive, rescued the isolated garrison at Bastogne and forced a German withdrawal along the whole line of the salient. The speed with which we recovered from this savage attack was largely possible because we have one Supreme Commander in complete control of all the Allied Armies in France. General Eisenhower has faced this period of trial with admirable calm and resolution and with steadily increasing success. He has my complete confidence," said President Roosevelt.

General Eisenhower asked his staff to make copies of the extracts from the State of the Union message for distribution, and he marked a paragraph of the president's address that warned against "the poisonous effects" of enemy propaganda for distribution to *Stars and*

Stripes. “The wedge that the Germans attempted to drive in Western Europe was less dangerous in actual terms of winning the war than the wedges which they are continually attempting to drive between ourselves and our Allies. Every little rumor which is intended to weaken our faith in our Allies is like an actual enemy agent in our midst—seeking to sabotage our war effort, there are here and there evil and baseless rumors against the Russians—rumors against the British—rumors against our own American Commanders in the field,” warned Roosevelt. (President’s State of the Union attachment, Marshall to Eisenhower, January 7, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Collection [Eisenhower].) Eisenhower replied on January 8, requesting Marshall to convey to President Roosevelt “my very deep appreciation of the personal confidence he expressed in me but more particularly for his excoriation of all efforts to drive wedges among the Allies. The frequency with which minor or extraneous subjects are seized upon by persons who are, to say the least, most thoughtless, and handled in such a way as to create mutual distrust and suspicion is one of the puzzling things of this stage of the war,” replied Eisenhower. (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2410–11.)

2. In December 1944 General Eisenhower had ordered Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers to move Seventh U.S. Army and First French Army forces from northern Alsace back to the Vosges Mountains, which would provide a S.H.A.E.F. reserve force for the Ardennes campaign but would leave Strasbourg exposed to the enemy. Devers delayed moving his forces back as signs of a German attack toward northern Alsace grew. On January 1, 1945, German forces began Operation NORDWIND by attacking Seventh U.S. Army positions south of Bitche. Eisenhower ordered Devers to shorten his line in northeastern Alsace and to hold the Alsace plain with reconnaissance forces. French General Charles de Gaulle met with Eisenhower on January 3 to protest withdrawal of American troops from Strasbourg and threatened to close French transportation routes to the Allies if they withdrew. De Gaulle ordered French forces to defend Strasbourg if U.S. troops withdrew. Ambassador to France Jefferson Caffery transmitted de Gaulle’s January 3 message to President Roosevelt (and sent a copy to Winston Churchill): “General Eisenhower has taken the decision to pull back the Devers Army group to the Vosges. This decision is equivalent to the evacuation of Alsace and a part of Lorraine without fighting,” protested de Gaulle. “The French Government cannot accept in so far as it is concerned such a retreat which does not seem to be justified strategically and which would be deplorable from the general point of view of the conduct of the war as well as from a French national point of view. I confidentially request you to intervene in this affair which risks having grave consequences in every respect.” (Caffery to President and Secretary of State, January 3, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

On January 6, General Eisenhower informed General Marshall of why he decided to call off the withdrawal of forces from the Strasbourg area. “I originally looked at the matter merely as a conflict between military and political considerations and felt completely justified in handling the matter on a purely military basis,” wrote Eisenhower. “However, when I found that execution of the original plan would have such grave consequences in France that all my lines of communication and my vast rear areas might become badly involved through loss of service troops and through unrest, it was clearly a military necessity to prevent this.” (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2399–2401.) For further information, see Pogue, *Supreme Command*, pp. 397–402.

3. “My first task was to make certain Strasbourg was protected,” Charles de Gaulle recalled. “The evacuation of Alsace, and particularly of its capital, might appear logical from the point of view of Allied strategy, but to France it was not acceptable. That the French Army should abandon one of our provinces, and this province in particular, without even engaging in a battle to defend it; that the German troops . . . should return in triumph to Strasbourg . . . would be a terrible wound inflicted on the honor of our country and its soldiers.” Retreat in Alsace “would be a national disaster” for France, de Gaulle declared to General Eisenhower. “For Alsace is sacred ground. Since, furthermore, the Germans claim that this province belongs to them, they will not hesitate to seek revenge, should they retake it, for the patriotism its inhabitants have so tirelessly revealed.” (*The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle* [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964], pp. 830–39.)

General Eisenhower recalled that at first glance, de Gaulle's insistence on defending Strasbourg was based on "political considerations, founded more on emotion than on logic and common sense. However, to me it became a military matter because of the possible effect on our lines of communication and supply, which stretched completely across France, from two directions. Unrest, trouble, or revolt along these lines of communication would defeat us on the front." Moreover, by the January 3 conference with de Gaulle "the crisis in the Ardennes was well past. . . . While I wanted to send to Bradley's front all the troops we could spare elsewhere, the motive was now to increase the decisiveness of victory, not to stave off defeat. I decided to modify my orders to Devers," wrote Eisenhower. (Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1948], pp. 362-63.)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER January 8, 1945
Radio No. W-88482. *Top Secret* Washington, D.C.

For General Eisenhower for his eyes only. All here are pressing every effort to get you what you need at the earliest possible date. The best guidance for our efforts comes from messages such as your S-74003.¹

In regard to Gasser, he and his aides are leaving at once. I believe he is the tough, experienced individual you need. However, he can only point the finger. The hatchet men must follow close behind. By the time his work is completed we should know what more needs to be done about manpower.²

If Bull and Tedder are unable to obtain a satisfactory answer in Moscow as to Russian action, I will make certain that the matter is pressed at the forthcoming conference. It may be possible to do something between now and then. It would appear that unseasonable thaws have been at least in part responsible for the delay.³

The only divisions now in the United States not already allocated to you are the 86th and 97th Infantry Divisions which are set up for another theater. Action is being initiated in the Joint Chiefs to have these two divisions allocated to you at once. They are fully trained and should be able to arrive in your theater about the middle of March. Of the divisions allocated to you which are still in the United States, the 65th and 89th Infantry Divisions sail this week, the 13th Armored and the 71st Infantry Division in late January, the 13th Airborne and 16th and 20th Armored in early February. We are investigating the possibility of accelerating the sailings of the airborne and armored divisions if you will accept a delay in the movement of service units mentioned in my W-82742 of 27th December.⁴ I presume you are moving to the Continent in the near future the two divisions now in the U.K.

With regard to the Army ceiling, this is being increased to take care of the patient factor and some other ineffectives. It seems, however, that this

action would not help the flow of replacements for nearly six months. The Defense Commands, other installations in the U.S., the Panama and Alaska garrisons are being combed for men for infantry replacements.

Somervell will tell you personally the full story of the drastic efforts we are making to speed up the flow of critical ammunition and other types of supplies. Our efforts along this line are continuous.

As we see it here, getting new French divisions quickly into the fight, is going to be dependent primarily on the ability of the French, the British and ourselves to provide the minimum essential equipment. Much can be done in providing essential equipment for these divisions by using obsolete, obsolescent, and renovated equipment and by a drastic review of the percentage of reserves held by both the British and ourselves behind critical items of equipment. Somervell's people are pressing this whole matter hard at our end. We will give you definite information very soon.

On the matter of additional divisions from Italy, it appears at first glance exceedingly doubtful that we can get real assistance for you from there in the near future. I intend to take up with the U.S. Chiefs at once the necessity of implementing to the maximum degree our agreed basic strategy that the main effort is in Europe and specifically on the Western Front.

I have given strict orders that no one here will add to the great load you carry by asking you questions. It may be, however, that we now face a situation requiring major decisions in order to prevent this war from dragging on for some time. Your personal estimates are the best guidance to crystallize ideas on actions which need to be taken. Can you some time in the next week set down and send to me for my personal use in discussions with the other Chiefs of Staff your broad personal estimate of the resources required and the steps which need to be taken to bring this war in Europe to a quick conclusion.⁵

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Collection (Eisenhower)

1. See note 3, Marshall to Eisenhower, January 6, 1945, p. 18.

2. Ibid.

3. Deputy Supreme Commander Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder and Major General Harold R. Bull, chief of the Operations Division at S.H.A.E.F., were delayed by weather en route to Moscow. Meanwhile, on January 6, Prime Minister Churchill asked Marshal Stalin if the Allies could count on a major Russian offensive during January. The next day Stalin replied that they were preparing an offensive, but the weather had been unfavorable. Nevertheless, regardless of the weather, the Russians would "commence large-scale offensive operations against the Germans along the whole Central Front not later than the second half of January. You may rest assured that we shall do everything possible to render assistance to the glorious forces of our Allies." (Winston S. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, a volume in *The Second World War* [Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953], pp. 278–80.)

4. On December 27, 1944, General Marshall had written to General Eisenhower that the War Department would accelerate the departure of the Thirteenth Airborne Division, Seventy-first Infantry Division, and the Sixteenth and Twentieth Armored divisions. While the accelerated schedule would displace an equivalent number of service units, it would not

effect the flow of replacements. (Radio No. W-82742, December 28, 1944, In Log, p. 64, DDEL/W. B. Smith Collection [Cable Log].)

5. Eisenhower replied on January 15 that requirements there depended on action along the Russian front. "If a markedly successful Russian offensive is maintained and if the Rhine can be substantially closed our planned strength *should* be sufficient, if fully maintained and supported." Requirements included "provisions of existing critical shortages in equipment and ammunition and provision of additional supporting and service troops for any additional divisions allocated." He also listed additional air forces requirements with an emphasis on jet propelled aircraft. (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2430–35.)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER January 8, 1945
[Radio No. W-88777.] *Top Secret* Washington, D.C.

For Eisenhower's eyes only from Marshall. General Macready¹ of the British Mission brought me this morning a formal proposal from the British Chiefs of Staff for CCS [Combined Chiefs of Staff] action calling on you for a report as to your proposed plan of campaign following the suppression of the present German offensive and for the conquest of Germany. With this, for my eye only, was a discussion by the British Chiefs of Staff and their arguments regarding these matters: the fact, as they put it, that the original instructions of the CCS for primary pressure to be exerted against the Germans in the north towards Berlin had not been effectively carried out and on the contrary, judging by the number of divisions employed, etc., a major offensive effort had been launched from the Saar Basin south. They discussed the advisability of a single commander for the ground troops and proposed that at least the front be divided into two groups of armies only instead of three as at present. They feel that you have too many other pressing duties of supply, of political complexity, etc.; therefore a more concentrated direction of ground operations is required.

Macready, after discussing the matter with me stated that he would only present a brief of the British COS [Chiefs of Staff] discussions and would omit any reference to a single commander of ground troops and anything that possibly might be construed as a criticism.

In a radio yesterday we asked you to give us your views at the end of the week on the general situation. Under the circumstances I now think that we should have those here by Thursday night [January 11] so that there could be some discussion by the U.S. JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] before the combined meeting Friday afternoon.²

I am assuming, I think quite correctly, that this British paper stems from the Prime Minister's visit to France and Montgomery's evident pressures to get what he wants in the way of a larger command.³ I am familiar with

his past efforts and I fully expected him to seize the present temporary assignment as a means to that end.

I see one weak point in our position which I should like you to think over and that refers to the command of the rear areas. Whether or not Lee is the right man does not answer the question. The trouble is, he is involved in both supplying the front and supplying himself. While the troops on the front suffer heavily and work with reduced numbers he has continued apparently to operate with plenty of fat meat.⁴ This awakens an inevitable suspicion in the minds of front line commanders as to the adequacy of the support they are receiving. We had exactly the same thing here, still have, though to a very mild degree at present, the continued suspicion by the Air Corps and the ground forces of Somervell's people because the ASF is performing two functions, one for the Army at large and an overlapping one both in men and materiel, for itself. We have fairly well eliminated the most critical features of this, but only in the past ten days there was a proposal from the ASF to do away with the G-4 Division of the General Staff which happens to be the bulwark or reassurance for the remainder of the Army that their interests are impartially considered.

Somervell will talk to you about supply matters after he has had a brief chance to look over the ground and I told him to speak to you about Lear. The more I think of this the more it impresses me and Handy is of the same opinion, that Lear who is loyal, stern and drastic, and very soldierly, be made a deputy of yours for command of the rear areas with the head of the Supply Service subordinate to him.⁵

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Lieutenant General Gordon N. Macready served as chief of the British Army Staff at the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington.

2. General Eisenhower replied on January 10 that "*in order to concentrate north of the Ruhr all the forces needed for a successful invasion of Germany, we must have throughout the rest of the front a very firm defensive line which can be held with minimum forces.*" By attaining the line of the Rhine River, the Allies could threaten the enemy at various points, forcing the enemy to disperse his forces, and make easier an invasion in the north. Unless the Allies held the Rhine substantially throughout its length, noted Eisenhower, "we have always to face up to the proposition that the enemy, protected by his very strong Siegfried fortifications can concentrate swiftly for counter thrusts against our lines of communications." In late October and early November, "Bradley's directive called for him to make his principal effort toward Bonn-Cologne while his attacks in the south directed into the Saar Valley were to be definitely secondary to the northern attack with the object of drawing off enemy forces." (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2415–17.) "Our ultimate plan is to cross the Rhine north of the Ruhr in great force," wrote Eisenhower. "From this we have never varied and the only differences in concepts of which I am aware involve the preliminary tasks that must be accomplished and the possible location of supporting attacks." Future operations planned "(a) to defeat the enemy west of the Rhine and close the Rhine north of the Moselle; (b) to force the passage of the Rhine; (c) to advance east of the Rhine." (*Ibid.*, p. 2418.)

3. For previous information regarding Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery's views on concentrating Allied power in northwest Europe under his command, see *Papers of GCM*, 4: 624, 636–37, and 720–21.

4. For information regarding Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee's position to control the flow of supplies, see Marshall to Eisenhower, January 6, 1945, pp. 17-18.

5. Eisenhower replied on January 9 that he welcomed the arrival of Lieutenant General Ben Lear, who had been head of Army Ground Forces since July 1944. (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2411.) For further information, see Marshall to Eisenhower, January 11, 1945, pp. 27-28.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR OLIVER LEESE
Top Secret

January 9, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear General Leese: I greatly appreciated your letter of December 23rd giving me detailed comments on operations in North Burma and concerning the excellent working relationship which exists in the combined British-American-Chinese effort.¹

We were thoroughly aware that the withdrawal of the 22nd Chinese Division would be a heavy blow to Sultan's immediate operations and to Mountbatten's plans. However, there did not appear to be much choice in the matter, and I personally felt that what we were doing in the Philippines and over the China Sea was bound to have an immediate effect highly advantageous to the Allied operations in Burma.² If the landings in Lingayen Gulf in the Philippines, which started last night, meet with no serious reverse and we are successful in driving down the central valley of Luzon I feel sure that the Japanese position in all Malaysia and the Netherlands East Indies will be so critical with regard to supply of replacements and munitions that much can be done by the Allies which heretofore has appeared quite out of the question.

I was much interested in your impressions of the Chinese troops which have been trained at Ramgarh.³ Wedemeyer is endeavoring, under great difficulties and limitations, to follow a similar method in China. How successful he will be depends on so many factors that it is hard to predict. But a strenuous effort is being made. The clearing of the trace of the Ledo Road through to the Burma Road to permit the heavy equipment of his divisions and motor transport to be dispatched into China will possibly make a great difference in the military situation in Yunnan Province.

The importance of air supply for your operations I think is fully realized here.⁴ It was this view of the matter which prompted General Arnold to organize Combat Cargo and Troop Carrier units for the China-Burma operations despite grave over-all shortages in production and trained personnel. The Allied drive across France at the time created an urgent demand against the same deficiencies.

Your Ground Forces seem to be steadily moving forward all along the front and I hope before very long to be able to congratulate you on the reoccupation of Mandalay.

With my thanks for your congratulations on my promotion, and with very best wishes to you, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Lieutenant General Sir Oliver Leese, commander of Allied Land Forces in Southeast Asia, reported that he had recently visited Lieutenant General Daniel I. Sultan, commander of the India-Burma Theater, in Myitkyina, where he found operations running smoothly. (Leese to Marshall, December 23, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. In December 1944, the Chinese Twenty-second and Fourteenth divisions were transferred from the India-Burma Theater to the China Theater, commanded by Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, who requested the troops as a means to hold Kunming, vital to the Hump air operation. Wedemeyer had initially requested the Chinese Twenty-second and Thirty-eighth divisions, both well-trained and involved in Burma operations. General Sultan suggested a compromise by offering the Fourteenth Division in reserve and either the Twenty-second or Thirty-eighth. The Twenty-second Division was selected since it was not as deeply involved in operations as the Thirty-eighth. (Charles R. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Time Runs Out in CBI*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1959], pp. 142–50.) Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten served as Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command.

3. “I have been impressed with the Chinese troops: in particular, the 22nd and 38th Divisions” trained at Ramgarh, wrote Leese. “The other Divisions are coming along well but are not so experienced. I saw one of the tank battalions yesterday, and I liked the look of them. The success of the Chinese depends largely on the type of American Officers who do the liaison work with them. I think your system is excellent. . . . Your Officers are efficient and tactful; and get the best out of the Chinese.” (Leese to Marshall, December 23, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

4. Leese reported that the Fourteenth Army was doing well in their advance toward Mandalay. “Our only concern on that front is to maintain an adequate supply of transport aircraft. Operations in Burma entirely depend for their success on efficient air or sea Lines of Communication. On the Fourteenth Army front it is entirely a question of air.” (Ibid.)

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL PASCO

January 9, 1945
Washington, D.C.

I do not think the draft of the letter from the Secretary of War to Clare Luce covers the question sufficiently clearly. Some reference should be made to the President’s Message, though she refers to it in her postscript.¹ We should particularly make the point brought out by Truscott that it is the mail from home that is raising hob with morale, the correction of this being one of the reasons we requested the President to make his statement.

She also should be told in connection with the President’s statement that we rushed it to Italy and had it immediately radioed and published in orders to all the troops.²

We should refer to the fact that the great difficulty is our inability to control the headline writers here in the U.S. or the people who read the headlines in what they write to their sons and husbands in the Fifth Army.³

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Congresswoman Clare Boothe Luce, Republican from Connecticut, wrote to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson (and sent a copy to General Marshall) that during her visit to the Italian theater with other members of the House Committee on Military Affairs she had observed low morale among the Fifth Army combat troops. "The low morale which infects our troops in Italy is not the result of a disbelief in their commanders. It is the result of widespread and deepening disbelief among the men in the purpose and importance of the whole Italian campaign," wrote Luce. Soldiers fighting in the Italian theater were disheartened because they received little attention in the press, while operations in France and the Pacific were making the headlines. Luce recommended that the morale situation could be corrected by "orienting the mind of the soldier so that he understands his own importance and his theatre's importance in the grand scheme of victory." This could be accomplished in the theater by offering intensive indoctrination and educational courses at rest camps and replacement centers, and by more frequent appearances of "big names" in journalism and radio and of V.I.P.s who visit because "they *believe* in his theatre, and not just as a place where they wind up the grand tour of the battlefronts, and hop-off to Casablanca." On the home front, Luce recommended that the radio and press be utilized to create "public enthusiasm for his present bitter tasks, and his past heroic performances. This enthusiasm would soon be reflected in his mail from home, and tend to dissipate his feeling of martyrdom, ineffectuality, frustration, and lack of important purpose." (Luce to Stimson, January 6, 1945, NA/RG 407 [AGO, 330.11].)

2. The draft of the secretary of war's letter to Congresswoman Luce was rewritten in accordance with General Marshall's memorandum to Lieutenant Colonel H. Merrill Pasco, acting secretary of the General Staff. Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott had commanded the Fifth Army since December 1944. "Our commanders in Italy have reported to us," Secretary Stimson replied to Luce, "that it is the mail from home that has had the most consistent and most damaging effect on the morale of our soldiers in the line. In most part the mail reflects a singular lack of understanding of the desperateness, the grimness, and the finality of the struggle now in progress in Italy as on all fronts. An awareness of the privations of the soldier in the line and evidence that all in the nation have their shoulders to the same wheel—the winning of the war, without regard to personal advantage—also are, in the main, not revealed in letters to these men. It was in seeking the correction of this that we so heartily favored the tenor of the President's recent address and rushed it to Italy and had it immediately radioed and published in orders to all the troops." (Stimson to Luce, January 12, 1945, *ibid.* The draft letter to which Marshall refers is also located in this file.)

President Roosevelt in his State of the Union message wished to correct any public misconception that underrated the strategic importance of operations on the Italian front. "The tremendous operations in western Europe have overshadowed in the public mind the less spectacular but vitally important Italian front," said Roosevelt. "What the Allied forces in Italy are doing is a well-considered part of our strategy in Europe, now aimed at only one objective—the total defeat of the Germans. These valiant forces in Italy are continuing to keep a substantial portion of the German Army under constant pressure—including some twenty first-line German divisions and the necessary supply and transport and replacement troops—all of which our enemies need so badly elsewhere." (*New York Times*, January 7, 1945, p. 32.)

3. "The 'headline' aspect of the matter is perhaps one of our greatest difficulties, for current activities on this front lack much of the spectacular quality which makes operations in France so rich in news value," Stimson replied. "I have often found that information released in [press] conferences later appears in headline form in a manner altogether at variance with the thesis of the conference." (Stimson to Luce, January 12, 1945, NA/RG 407 [AGO, 330.11].) Mrs. Luce replied to the secretary of war by sending the speech she made on the floor of the House on January 18, asking him to read it "*before* you judge of the exceedingly twisted reports of that speech which have appeared in the Times Herald. I find myself wholly sympathetic today with your own grievances at some of 'the headline

reporters whose stories are altogether at variance with the thesis of your conferences.’ I am sure that you will find nothing during that long 45 minute speech that was remotely said which sounded as a charge that the War Department was ‘breaking down the morale of the battlefronts.’” (Luce to Stimson, January 18, 1945, *ibid.*)

General Marshall recalled that this episode “hit morale a dreadful blow—a really dreadful blow—and some of the corps commanders told me they didn’t know what to do about their troops. . . . The troops in Italy were obsessed with the idea that they were forgotten, . . . but the great trouble was the way it was approached by some of the press. . . . The battle to maintain morale under those conditions was very, very hard, and it was quite amazing that we got through that as well as we did.” (*Marshall Interviews*, pp. 482–83.) Congresswoman Luce was soon thereafter a guest of the British at the Italian front; see Marshall Memorandum for Field Marshal Wilson, March 8, 1945, pp. 84–85.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER January 11, 1945
Radio No. W-90175. *Secret* Washington, D.C.

From Marshall to Eisenhower for his eyes only. Our first reaction to your S-74461 is agreement in the soundness of your estimate and intentions.¹ General Handy and I have been discussing the advisability of showing the message to Admiral Leahy and the President because of your last paragraph which may be taken as indicating a weakening on your part under the heavy pressure of the press and British officialdom to get some high British military official into your general management of the ground forces.² Frankly, Alexander’s appointment as a deputy would mean two things I think. First, that the British had won a major point in getting control of the ground operations in which their divisions of necessity will play such a minor part and, for the same reason, we are bound to suffer very heavy casualties; and second, the man being who he is and our experience being what it has been, you would have great difficulty in offsetting the direct influence of the PM [Prime Minister].

I have thought all the time that you have lacked qualified individuals to offset your tremendous involvements and have tried to assist you in overcoming this deficiency in your setup. Bradley was my first offer, Bull the second, Bonesteel the third, but in each case we ended with no one to be your eyes and ears and legs for a continuous observation and discussion with top commanders along the front.³ Have you a suitable individual you could use for this? Is there anyone here you would want? Would it not be wise to have also a British officer on this same job?⁴

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On January 10 General Eisenhower had sent an outline of future operations; see note 2, Marshall to Eisenhower, January 8, 1945, p. 23.

2. “Because of the great size of the land forces now engaged on this front, it would be more convenient for me if my *deputy supreme commander* were an experienced ground officer rather than air. In spite of my personal and official admiration for Tedder he is not repeat

not in position to help me by visits and conferences with troop commanders," Eisenhower concluded his January 10 message. "If I could have a man of fine personality, respected by all and willing to serve as *my deputy* and not repeat not under independent charter from my superiors, it would be most helpful. As a corollary to such a scheme I would want [Carl] Spaatz named air commander in chief. I am afraid it would be impossible to find such a deputy as I describe. The only one I could think of myself would be Alexander, and manifestly he is not repeat not available." (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2420.) Field Marshal Harold Alexander assumed the position as Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean in December 1944.

3. Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley served as commander of the Twelfth Army Group. Major General Harold R. Bull was chief of the Operations Division at S.H.A.E.F. Major General Charles H. Bonesteel was chief of the General Inspectorate Section at S.H.A.E.F., which worked to improve the morale and efficiency of personnel stationed in rear areas of combat zones.

4. "The two disadvantages mentioned by you to my use of Alexander's name had not occurred to me," replied Eisenhower on January 12. He objected to any officer named as "deputy for ground operations" and insisted that his deputy "would have to function exclusively without portfolio and in the activities that would be delegated to him by me." Eisenhower had mentioned Alexander "to illustrate the kind of man that would be acceptable" to him. "Because of the fine relationships I have had with Alexander in the past and because that so far as I know, he never in that association in any slightest way violated the requirements of personal and official loyalty." (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2422.)

Eisenhower decided "to make no shift in our present arrangements," except to request Major General Lowell W. Rooks, who was serving at Allied Force Headquarters, be transferred to his headquarters to work with Major General John F. M. Whiteley in G-3. "This will give me a team of Rooks and Whiteley, who is respected by the British, to stay on the road constantly as my eyes and ears," replied Eisenhower. (*Ibid.*)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY
Confidential

January 12, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Relationship of ROTC Activities with
Compulsory Military Training Proposals.

The other day in a conversation with General Smith,¹ I understood that the War Department was planning a 4-year ROTC course, three months of field training to be interpolated at the half-way point. That is my text for the following discussion.

I am fearful of the Staff so seeking for perfection of system that they will end by wrecking our efforts to have the law enacted for compulsory training. In my opinion, we must be very careful to consider the peace-time state of mind of the average young man and not propose plans which would fairly gorge the Officer Candidate with military obligations immediately following a strenuous year of compulsory training, and that would long delay him from entering into civilian life pursuits. If I am right as to the present idea, the man who has proved to be desirable ROTC material and who probably has been at least a corporal and more probably a

sergeant in his year of training, would be confronted with four more years of military instruction, with one vacation devoted to three months additional field training, and all this followed by a long period of active duty with the army in training the annual crop of inductees.

I do not believe such a system would work—would be accepted.

In the past we had four years of ROTC training where we had to start at zero with the most elementary training, in the midst of college or university academic work. A year's compulsory training would present an ROTC Candidate about three years in advance of his predecessor in 1939, and I think I am being over-conservative. Now the War Department, as I understand it, is still considering a 4-year course on top of which we must add a long period of active service if we are to have officer personnel with which to handle the compulsory training inductees.

My conception, on very superficial consideration I admit, would be to cut the ROTC course to two years, to drop the idea of three months' field training as a compulsory requirement, and to calculate on six months of active duty to be required before the commission which would be issued at the end of the 2-year ROTC period carried with it the qualification for commanding combat troops. I would hope that this active duty training would be taken by about half the men in one period of the year, and the other half in the remaining period.

It is my opinion that unless some such arrangement as this is made we are shooting at the moon and will only draw into active service the type of officer we least desire and not the man who probably will be a success in his profession or in business, just as has been the case in the past. And, what is far more serious, we might easily wreck our prospects for getting compulsory training.

I would have in mind giving a larger allowance to the ROTC candidate, giving the young officer who participates in six months of active duty a bonus at the end of that period, so that the men of small means would be facilitated in the progress of their college career by their army connection. These, of course, are mere details while the length of the course is a major consideration, but they all have in mind the integration of the college aspirations and civilian ambitions of the individual with our military requirements.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Brigadier General Edward W. Smith served as Executive for Reserve and R.O.T.C. [Reserve Officers' Training Corps] Affairs at the War Department.

2. The Special Planning Division held a conference on January 24 to discuss the chief of staff's memorandum. As a result, the Executive for Reserve and R.O.T.C. Affairs was directed to prepare a study based on the two-year course. (W. F. Tompkins Memorandum for the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, January 27, 1945, and Handy Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, February 14, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, SGS].)

TO GENERAL JOSEPH W. STILWELL
Radio. *Secret*

January 13, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Re yours of January 10th, delay has been due to my hope for better things.¹ However, Lear has left for ETO on permanent assignment and I temporarily in name only have taken over his job. If you so desire and wire me you will immediately be called East for this job.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. "Your flag-pole sitter has now broken all local records. The bench-warmer has worn out the seat of his pants," Stilwell wrote from Carmel, California. "Rest has changed to restlessness, and time marches on. In other words, I am anxious to leave the ranks of the unemployed." (Stilwell to Marshall, January 10, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. On January 18 General Stilwell received orders to report to the War Department to succeed Lieutenant General Ben Lear as commander of the Army Ground Forces. (H. M. Pasco to Commanding General Presidio of Monterey, California, January 18, 1945, *ibid.*)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY,
GENERAL HENRY¹
Secret

January 16, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Joint letter from Admiral King and myself
to the President.

At a meeting this morning in the President's office with the Chairmen and senior members of the Senate and House Military Committees at which Justice Byrnes, Admiral King and I were present, the following was agreed:²

That a concentrated effort would be made immediately to expedite the passage of the bill now in hearings before the House Military Committee on manpower.³

That the President would not send a message to Congress at this time (though he was prepared to do so if desired).

That the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations should address a joint letter to the President on the urgent necessity of legislation to improve the personnel replacement situation and greatly to increase production of munitions including shipping and the repair of naval shipping.

That the President would forward this letter to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Military Committees with his comments on the urgency for action.

Admiral King and I have hastily agreed to a joint letter in the following general form.

An introductory paragraph stating the urgency of action.

A paragraph by me briefly outlining the Army requirements for personnel and for munitions.

A paragraph by Admiral King containing a similar presentation from the naval side and including also the ship repair and general construction requirements.

A final paragraph summarizing the foregoing, if that seems to be desirable.

Admiral King is designating an officer to represent him in working on this letter and I am designating General Henry. It is necessary that the letter be completed this afternoon in time to be signed and sent to the White House, the earlier the better.

I am rapidly sketching below a rough idea of the opening paragraph and the paragraph for which I am responsible.

“As the agents directly responsible to you for conduct of military operations we feel that it is our duty to report to you the urgent necessity for immediate action to improve the situation as to the provision of increasing numbers of young and vigorous replacements for the Army and Navy and greatly to increase the production of certain critical items of munitions together with an increase in the rate of ship construction and provisions for rapid repairs to damaged shipping.

“The losses sustained by the Army in the past two months have by reason of the severity of the weather and of the fighting on the European fronts been considerably greater than the estimates of last September. The losses or wastage of armament and equipment have for the same reasons and especially the recent German offensive, exceeded estimates. The Army must provide 600,000 replacements of one kind or another for overseas theaters before June 30. It must maintain a load of approximately 900,000 individuals in training as replacements throughout this period. It must make good the losses in equipment recently sustained and the increasing wastage of equipment due to offensive operations under winter conditions in Europe. There must also be provided the equipment for eight French divisions and for the accumulation of a reserve in equipment which does not exist at the present time.

(Final paragraph)

“You are intimately familiar, Mr. President, with the vast importance of regaining the offensive on the Western Front and pressing it, together with operations against the Japanese, with increasing momentum in the months to come. We feel that the United States should make every conceivable effort to permit the Armed Forces to carry out your instructions to this effect.”⁴

1. Major General Stephen G. Henry served as head of the War Department's Personnel Division.

2. On the morning of January 16, President Roosevelt met with General Marshall, Admiral Ernest J. King, Director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion James F. Byrnes, Congressmen Andrew J. May and Walter G. Andrews of the House Military Affairs Committee, and Senators Elbert D. Thomas and Warren R. Austin of the Senate Military Affairs Committee to discuss national service legislation. (McCarthy Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, January 10, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. Congressman Andrew J. May and Senator Josiah W. Bailey had introduced bills requiring that men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five stay on or transfer to war jobs. While the May-Bailey bill was weaker than the Austin-Wadsworth national service bill, the War Department was convinced that it was the best they could get at the time. (Byron Fairchild and Jonathan Grossman, *The Army and Industrial Manpower*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1959], pp. 225–30, 237–40.)

4. On January 17 President Roosevelt wrote Congressman Andrew J. May, chair of the House Military Affairs Committee, urging passage of work-or-fight legislation that would make effective use of the four million men classified as 4-F for the war effort. "While this bill is not a complete national service law, it will go far to secure the effective employment in the war effort of all registrants under the Selective Service Law between the ages of 18 and 45," wrote the president. "While there may be some differences of opinion on the details of the bill, prompt action now is much more important in the war effort than the perfecting of detail." Roosevelt called for total utilization of manpower on the home front. (Roosevelt to May, January 17, 1945, NA/RG 107 [SW Safe, National Service Act].) Roosevelt enclosed the final version of the letter from Marshall and King, which was edited slightly and the Navy prepared two paragraphs calling for additional naval personnel replacements and a need for additional facilities and civilian labor to build and repair ships. "The Army must provide 600,000 replacements for overseas theaters before June 30, and, together with the Navy, will require a total of 900,000 inductions by June 30. . . . It is estimated that 700,000 industrial workers must be added to the force producing Army and Navy munitions and to supporting industries in the next six months if our urgent needs are to be met." (Marshall and King to Roosevelt, January 16, 1945, *ibid.*)

On February 1 the House of Representatives passed the May bill. The Senate proved more of a challenge as labor and industrial leaders united to challenge War Department manpower figures. The Senate passed a weakened substitute measure (O'Mahoney-Kilgore) instead of the originally proposed legislation. (Fairchild and Grossman, *Army and Industrial Manpower*, pp. 240–45.)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Radio No. WAR-22163. *Top Secret*

January 17, 1945
Washington, D.C.

For General Eisenhower's Eyes Only from General Marshall.

I have your radio of 15 January S7509 and your fine letter of 12 January.¹ Handy and Hull suggest that I stop to see you en route to ARGONAUT. I doubt if it is advisable for me to appear at SHAEF at that time. Would it be awkward for you to meet me in South of France, say Toulon area, about 26th for one day conference.² Hull and others would be with me.

We sent your congratulations to Stalin. In future I suggest that you approach them in simple Main Street Abilene style. They are rather cynically disposed toward the diplomatic phrasing of our compliments and seem

almost to appreciate downright rough talk of which I give them a full measure.³

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 5, Item 19)

1. On January 15 General Eisenhower sent a review of the European situation. (See note 5, Marshall to Eisenhower, January 8, 1945, p. 22.) On January 12 Eisenhower wrote, “the weather is abominable. It seems to me that I have fought weather for two years and a half. Right now, at my base headquarters, a foot of snow is on the ground. Flying conditions in the battle zone have been almost impossible for several days.” Then he closed the letter with “everybody is in good heart. You need have no fear that we will eventually solve our problems.” (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2424–25.)

2. General Marshall conferred with General Eisenhower at Marseilles on January 28. (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2455, 2460–61.) For further information regarding their meeting, see Marshall to Eisenhower, January 22, 1945, pp. 39–40. ARGONAUT was the code name designated for the British-American staff meetings at Malta (CRICKET) on January 30 to February 2 and the Allied Big Three meetings at Yalta (MAGNETO) on February 4 to 11. Major General John E. Hull was head of the Operations Division.

3. The following congratulatory message from General Eisenhower was transmitted to Joseph Stalin. “The momentous news that the magnificent Red Army has surged forward in a new and powerful campaign has been received by the Allied Armies in the west with enthusiasm. I extend to you and to all others directing and participating in this great offensive my congratulations and good wishes. On my part, I assure you of our intention to attack with continued vigor. Under our blows both from the east and the west, the enemy will bleed and die and his dwindling resources will be blasted until Nazi Germany is completely crushed.” (C.C.S. to Deane, Radio No. WAR-22001, January 16, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

TO BRIGADIER GENERAL ROYDEN E. BEEBE

January 18, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Beebe: I am attaching a topographical relief map of Luzon which I think will be of interest to you. During the operations of the past week my thoughts have gone back with frequency to the reconnaissance you and I engineered of the Central Valley of Luzon, and in particular the ride we took together from Bautista north towards Lingayen. You may remember my confused effort to guide you and our two horses over a rotten bridge where I confused my left with your right and almost wrecked the expedition.¹

The landings on Mindoro at San Jose also carried me back to my earliest days in the Philippines because I commanded all of that region, my first assignment, for a considerable period in 1902; being completely out of communication with other companies of the regiment except by ship and only having such service once every four months, all the details of the region are pretty firmly impressed on my mind.²

I hope you and Sally are well and that the news from the boys is favorable. Katherine had quite a bout with flu—sinus—pleurisy and mild pneumonia last November but three weeks at Pinehurst enabled her to recuperate sufficiently to buy a house there.³

With affectionate regards to you both, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. On January 9 forces of Lieutenant General Walter Krueger's Sixth Army landed and moved ashore over the beaches of Lingayen Gulf on Luzon, with the goal to recapture the Central Plains–Manila Bay area. (Robert Ross Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1963], pp. 73–87.) Twenty-nine years earlier, in mid-January 1916, George Marshall planned and participated in a staff ride up the central valley of Luzon to the Lingayen Gulf. For further information regarding Marshall's duty in the Philippines between 1913 and 1916, see *Papers of GCM*, 1: 75–97. Retired Brigadier General Beebe and Marshall were friends since their studies at the Infantry and Cavalry School in 1906.

2. Allied forces landed on southwestern Mindoro beginning in mid-December 1944 to establish airfields near San Jose to provide air cover for the convoys headed toward Lingayen Gulf and to attack Japanese air power on Luzon. The Mindoro airfields helped to speed the Allied move toward Luzon and to make the invasion less difficult. (Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, pp. 43–53.) For further information regarding Marshall's first service in the Philippines between 1902 and 1903, see *Papers of GCM*, 1: 23–28.

3. While Katherine Marshall recuperated in Pinehurst, North Carolina, at the Carolina Hotel, she became so fond of the town that she took an option to purchase a house, Liscombe Lodge. The Marshalls bought the house for their winter home. Mrs. Marshall wrote in her memoirs that the most difficult part of Army life was relocating frequently, and she and General Marshall longed to live in their houses at Leesburg, Virginia, and Pinehurst "as soon as the war was won." "Ever since he had been of age he had been wandering over the face of the globe; at each halting place he had tried to make a house into a home, always fixing a garden, and then, just as he had begun to feel at home and the things planted had taken root, orders would come to move on and he would start all over again. This had gone on for forty years. . . . Neither of us liked living in hotels or clubs. George had often said 'I prize my privacy more than any one thing I possess.'" (K. T. Marshall, *Together*, pp. 216–18.) For more information regarding the Pinehurst house, see *Papers of GCM*, 4: 686.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL SOMERVILLE¹

Secret

January 18, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

I am to talk "off the record" to the members of the House and of the Senate on January 24. No stenographic notes of what is said are to be made. However, as you probably are well aware, the fact that this will be an "off the record" talk does not mean that some member of the audience, which will be restricted exclusively to Senators and Congressmen, may not pass along some interesting item of information to a member of the press.

I have been searching for some method other than an ordinary statement to accentuate the critical necessity for Allied military teamwork during this confused period of international post-war political discussions and recriminations. It seems to me that if I could give this particular audience about a minute's glance at the V-1 and the V-2 bomb pattern on the metropolitan area of London I could make a profound impression on them in two ways, first, a real appreciation of the suffering the British nation is now enduring in its

homeland and second, the tragic injustice our writers and speakers frequently do the British under the existing circumstances, together with a humiliating appreciation of the furor aroused in this country over incidents or threats of trifling importance by way of comparison.²

I am told by my G-2 people that undoubtedly there would be a British objection to my proposal based on the information it would give to the Germans in the event that there was a Congressional leak. From my point of view I am inclined to think the Germans would learn little that they do not already know but the reaction among members of Congress might be of considerable importance to the British Government.

I am sending you a rather bulky illustration of the comparative treatment of news regarding the V bombing in England and American incidents occurring at the same time. Please look particularly at the next to the last page to see how little importance is given to your released reports in November, December and January. You need not return the exhibit.³ Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Sir James Somerville was head of the British Naval Delegation in Washington, D.C.

2. During December 1944, German V-bombs were responsible for 367 British civilian deaths and 847 serious injuries, nearly 50 percent less than November figures. Total casualties for 1944 were reported at 8,465 killed and 21,984 seriously wounded. During the 1941 blitz, England suffered 20,844 deaths and 21,788 serious injuries. (*New York Times*, January 13, 1945, p. 3.)

3. On January 22 the British Chiefs of Staff expressed concern that undue emphasis by the American press regarding the damage to London might cause pressure on the British government to divert bombers from planned operations to those against rocket installations. "If there is a leakage of the information we are giving to General Marshall and if the American press thereafter lays undue emphasis on the damage done to London it is quite possible that British press will echo American sentiments and provide valuable ammunition for those who think more of the damage done to London than of the need to put the utmost weight of bombs on Germany. Anything that General Marshall can do to minimise leakage and to damp down any exaggerated expressions of sympathy resulting therefrom in the American press would be most helpful to us in our effort to maintain the objective of the Combined Bomber Offensive." (A. W. Laybourne to Frank McCarthy, January 22, 1945, enclosure to JS-105B, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY
Secret

January 18, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Subject: Equipment of Norwegian Ground Forces.

The Crown Prince of Norway called on me today and stated that there was being taken up in London with the British Foreign Office and this afternoon with our State Department, the proposition of certain Norwegian naval, air and ground forces having their equipment completed and being transported

to the Finnmark region in extreme northeastern Norway where they already have a small naval force. He stated that the matter of the naval force was already under discussion with the British Admiralty, that the air force of one squadron of Mosquitoes, now on coastal patrol duty, required the agreement of SHAEF, and that the ground force (the equivalent of a brigade of 5,000, with 4,375 of these 75% equipped), now on duty in northeastern Scotland, also required the release by SHAEF.

Specifically what is wanted from us is our cooperation on the Combined Chiefs of Staff, with the direction to SHAEF to release the units referred to and the agreement on the U.S. part to complete the equipment of the 5,000 ground troops and to assure their maintenance. All these troops will have to operate under Russian control so long as the Russians dominate in Norway. The Norwegians wish to be able to approach the Russians with an assured basis for the statement that they have these troops and can maintain them and desire to place them in the Finnmark region subject to over-all Russian control.

While I have not the definite data regarding the equipment required for the ground force, which seems to be our only concern, I gather that what is urgently required are the following items: heavy winter clothing, complete; 100 2 1/2-ton trucks; 100 weasels;¹ 100 motorcycles; and certain minor items to make good present deficiencies. They also need skis of which I rather imagine we have a number on hand, and ski shoes and possibly clothing.

The ground force is now equipped with the British 25-pounder, so unless the gun were changed the supply of ammunition would have to be furnished by the British.

Please have someone go into the details of their desires with the proper Norwegian officer and ascertain for me in advance of a formal presentation about what is wanted and what the chances are of our being able to help them.²

G. C. M.

NA/RG 165 (OCS, 091 Norway)

1. The Weasel (U.S. cargo carrier M29) was a tracked vehicle used over snow or rough terrain that carried one thousand pounds of cargo and a crew of two.

2. Major General John E. Hull, head of Operations Division, replied that there was no objection to furnishing noncritical items. (Hull Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, January 20, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 091 Norway].) On January 20 Crown Prince Olaf presented his plan regarding operations by Norwegian forces in Upper Norway (Finnmark) at a War Department meeting conducted by Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy. Hull reported that "Crown Prince Olaf fears that if the Norwegians do not start operations soon, the Russians might accuse the Norwegian government of failure to act and then proceed to occupy Norway themselves. He stated that the Norwegians are anxious to establish a base in Upper Norway which will be independent of the Russians so that eventually U.S. and British forces can be invited to participate in the liberation of Norway." Since the operation involved forces under British operational control, the matter would be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Hull Memorandum for General Marshall, January 22, 1945, *ibid.*) While the C.C.S. appreciated the urgency to alleviate conditions in northern Norway and to assist the government in assuming control of liber-

ated areas, the proposed plan presented military objections when considered with requirements for current operations. (Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945*, 9 vols. [Washington: GPO, 1967–69], 5: 57–63.)

Norway did receive wheat and rye seed for spring planting. See Marshall Memorandum for Operations Division, March 27, 1945, p. 103. Soon after the German surrender, General Marshall congratulated Prince Olaf on his return to Norway and “the release of your country and its fine people from the German yoke. I will always remember our conversations and regret that there was so little that I could do to be of assistance. Therefore I feel all the more grateful for the fact that Norway is free again.” (Marshall to Prince Olaf, May 17, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO MIKE MANSFIELD

January 19, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mr. Mansfield: I have your letter of January sixteenth and was sorry that our interview the other day was cut short by my engagement with the Secretary of War.¹

I have wanted to visit China for the past two years and on one occasion got as far as Karachi and Ceylon but time did not permit me to go over the Hump and I continued on into Australia. As a matter of fact it is extremely difficult for me to reach, with sufficient frequency, the various theaters now so widely scattered, where our involvements are tremendous, as on the Western Front. Even so I did better than 100,000 miles last year and the same the year before. The trouble is, on my return to Washington I find the accumulation of business is so great, and just at the moment when I am most in need of a rest, that I have to be careful not to break down my endurance for the long pull.

As to General Wedemeyer’s suggestion, that is already being done on an official basis, organized in a formal manner shortly after Mr. Stettinius took office.²

I appreciate your suggestions and really am glad to have them.³ My viewpoint in this war is purely objective and so far as it is humanly possible I have no personal feelings.

I went over your report very carefully and found it most interesting. I know it will be helpful here in the War Department.⁴ Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Congressman Michael J. Mansfield (Democrat from Montana) met with General Marshall on Saturday, January 13, 1945, at 11:00 A.M. to report on his trip to China during November and December 1944 as President Roosevelt’s representative. Mansfield urged General Marshall to visit China because his presence would be a “great morale builder” and a serious “indication to all Chinese elements of our real interest in China’s ultimate victory over Japan.” (Mansfield to Marshall, January 16, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

2. Congressman Mansfield wrote that General Wedemeyer made the suggestion to him that representatives of the State Department join with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in discussions. Mansfield thought this would be very good because “the individuals who have served in the diplomatic service of this country in various parts of the world are in many instances best equipped to give the real picture of conditions with which our military are, due to the suddenness of events, perhaps not too well acquainted.” (Ibid.) A State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee consisting of representatives of those departments was established to promote coordination between the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For General Marshall’s view of the importance of coordinating the State and War departments’ objectives, see *Papers of GCM*, 4: 519–20. “Political strategy must always have in the background military fundamentals or capabilities—or else written history is a great misrepresentation of what has occurred in the past,” wrote Marshall to Edward Stettinius on July 13, 1944.

3. “These suggestions are made in the spirit of helpfulness,” wrote Mansfield, “and I know you will consider them in that way.” (Mansfield to Marshall, January 16, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

4. Congressman Mansfield had sent to General Marshall his report to President Roosevelt presenting his findings while in China. “I feel that all our supplies to China should be handled through General Wedemeyer. This will give him lever which he can use to make the Chinese armies more responsible to him. This supervision is necessary in the interests of the greatest possible efficiency,” reported Mansfield. (Mansfield to Roosevelt, January 3, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 336 China, Case 51].)

TO JAMES B. CONANT

January 21, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Dr. Conant:¹ I am deeply grateful for the decision of the Governing Boards of Harvard University to confer upon me the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws. I sincerely hope that you and your associates will understand my reasons for declining this high honor. Shortly after our entry into the war I came to the conclusion that it would not be advisable for me to accept any honorary degrees so long as the war continues.

If at some later and more peaceful time your Governing Boards should see fit to honor me with such an award, I would of course be happy to accept, but that will necessarily be determined by the course of future events.

Please express to the officials of the University my full appreciation of the honor they proposed to pay me, with most sincere regrets that I do not feel free to accept this distinction.² Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. A member of Marshall’s staff (H. Merrill Pasco) drafted the chief of staff’s reply to the president of Harvard University. On January 15 Dr. Conant wrote to inform General Marshall that the Governing Boards of Harvard University had voted to confer upon him the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws on Commencement Day, June 28, 1945. (Conant to Marshall, January 15, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

2. In March 1946, Dr. Conant again wrote to Marshall that he was invited to accept the honorary degree on June 6, 1946. General Marshall declined because he would be in China. (Conant to Marshall, March 5 and 18, 1946; Marshall to Conant, March 20, 1946, GCMRL/

G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].) General Marshall eventually received the honorary degree at Harvard University on June 5, 1947, at which time he gave his speech proposing the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan).

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Radio No. WAR-24894. *Secret*

January 22, 1945
Washington, D.C.

For the Eyes of General Eisenhower Only from General Marshall.

Your decision reference SNOWBALL is of course understood.¹ Along with the party mentioned in my WAR 24160,² I leave here Thursday, January 25 and fly by way of Bermuda and the Azores to Casablanca, arriving there Friday, January 26 and spending the night. On Saturday we move from Casablanca to the SNOWBALL location recommended in your S 76127, probably arriving there for lunch. Any arrangements you make for our conference and for accommodation of my party and me will be satisfactory. I plan to lay over at the SNOWBALL location Sunday and go to Malta Monday afternoon, January 29.

The reason for the lay over is to provide insurance against bad weather and yet not reach Malta before Monday evening.

Although I am looking forward to seeing you in SNOWBALL, do not plan to be with me there any longer than necessary to complete our talks, which can be on Saturday or Sunday as you elect and as weather favors. It might be more certainly economical of your time if you waited until certain I had landed in the SNOWBALL location before flying down, weather prospects of course being somewhat determining for you. If the weather is good throughout, I shall merely be marking time there after our conversations. I am sending [Brehon B.] Somervell a separate radio suggesting that he plan to meet me in SNOWBALL and fly over to Malta with me.³

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 5, Item 19)

1. Eisenhower notified Marshall that he would send Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith and Major General Harold R. Bull as his representatives to the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting in Malta. He recommended that he and Marshall meet on January 28 in southern France; SNOWBALL was the code name referring to their meeting at Marseilles. (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2455.)

2. The chief of staff had listed the persons to accompany him: Major General John E. Hull (chief of Operations Division), Major General Laurence S. Kuter ([U.S.M.A., 1927] representing General Arnold), Brigadier General Richard C. Lindsay (senior Air Planner), Brigadier General George A. Lincoln ([U.S.M.A., 1929] senior Army Planner), Colonel Fred M. Dean ([U.S.M.A., 1938] General Arnold's executive officer), Colonel Frank McCarthy (secretary of the War Department General Staff), Warrant Officer L. W. Thompson (clerk), and Master Sergeant James W. Powder (Marshall's orderly). (Marshall to Eisenhower, Radio No. WAR-24160, January 20, 1945, GCMRL/F. McCarthy Papers [U.S. Army 1941–45].)

3. For Eisenhower's notes on his conference with General Marshall on January 28, see *Papers of DDE*, 4: 2460–61. Laurence S. Kuter provides his account of the meeting at Marseilles in *Airman at Yalta* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1955), pp. 53–63.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF
OF STAFF, G-1 [HENRY]

January 24, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

This statement I think should be redrafted.¹ To my mind it fails to present two important points.

First, it should make clear that for a long time we assigned the young men to divisions in this country with six months or more yet to serve here, transferring older men from those divisions to meet the replacement requirements from overseas. It should be explained that today we have not the divisions in this country to permit such an arrangement but we do have a battle on tremendously increased proportions for which replacements are urgently required.

Also, get in a clear statement, brief, very much to the point, to the effect that the training being given replacements is exceedingly thorough and they are assigned to veteran "teams" so that one or two new men are invariably surrounded by a squad of eight or ten battle veterans which makes all the difference in the world.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On January 17 Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson informed General Marshall, "I have received hundreds of letters from parents of 18 year old men, strongly objecting to the use of their sons as infantry replacements and asking why men over 18 in other branches of the service are not sent to the infantry." Patterson asked would it not be well to make public the fact that older men from other branches already had been transferred into the Infantry. Marshall referred Patterson's memorandum to G-1 for a draft reply. It is that statement which Marshall thinks should be redrafted. (Patterson Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, January 17, 1945; G-1 draft statement, January 19, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 321 Infantry].)

2. For further information regarding training for eighteen-year-old Infantry replacements, see Marshall Proposed Statement for Secretary of War's Press Conference, March 1, 1945, pp. 63–64, and Marshall to Hess, March 5, 1945, pp. 74–76.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL DANIEL I. SULTAN¹
(INFORMATION GENERALS WHEELER AND WEDEMEYER)
Radio. *Restricted*

January 25, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Sultan from Marshall. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are dispatching their congratulations to Admiral Mountbatten and the entire South East Asia command on the reopening of the Burma Road. I send you my per-

sonal congratulations on the American part of the enterprise, particularly the engineers and other service troops who labored so prodigiously against extraordinarily difficult conditions to provide the connecting links and to insure the forwarding of the necessary supplies and material to maintain the troops and make possible the construction work. Great credit is due to General Stilwell for his vision in conceiving the project of the Ledo Road and fighting grit in carrying it forward towards completion. The Combined Allied Forces have made possible what I think will be considered a great milestone in the history of the Far East.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. General Marshall's handwritten draft of this message was sent to Deputy Chief of Staff Thomas T. Handy with the following handwritten note: "Gen. Handy: Here is a proposed message from Hull and my proposal in longhand. I feared Hull's would create a press or at least an adverse Mountbatten reaction. Use your judgement. G. C. M." Handy sent Marshall's proposed message. Major General John E. Hull's proposed message began: "A great landmark in history has been reached in the opening of the road to China. This is due to General Stilwell's vision in conceiving it and fighting grit in pushing it, to your splendid leadership and execution in bringing it to successful completion, and to all those officers and men of the U.S. Army who have shared these years of planning, bitter fighting, and hard work. To our Allies is due the highest praise for their important and essential part in this achievement." (The undated draft messages of Marshall and Hull are located in GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. In mid-January 1945 the Ledo Road was linked with the Myitkyina-Bhamo road, completing the overland supply route to China. Meanwhile the Allies cleared the Japanese from northern Burma, and on January 20 a supply convoy reached Kunming via Teng-chung. On February 4 the official inaugural convoy that departed Ledo on January 12 made a ceremonial entry into Kunming, with Chinese drivers leading the parade. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek suggested that the road be renamed the Stilwell Road. (Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Time Runs Out in CBI*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1959], pp. 136–41.)

ON January 29 General Marshall departed Marseilles and arrived in Malta for British-American military staff discussions scheduled for January 30 to February 2 (C.C.S. 182d to 185th meetings), preliminary to the Big Three meetings of President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin at Yalta beginning on February 4.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff held daily meetings beginning on January 30 at Montgomery House in Floriana, a suburb of Valletta, Malta. General Marshall supported the strategic concept of a main Allied effort north of the Ruhr by General Montgomery's Twenty-first Army Group and a secondary effort by General Bradley's Twelfth Army Group between Frankfurt and Kassel. Marshall "considered it essential that there should be more than one possible line of advance. The strategic reserve should be fed into either advance in the light of how well that advance

was succeeding.” (Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945* [Washington: GPO, 1955], p. 473.) The British chiefs were concerned that shifting the Fifteenth Air Force from the Mediterranean to General Eisenhower’s command would weaken the Allied troops’ ability to hold their current positions in Italy. Marshall replied that “the agreement with regard to the movement of the Fifteenth Air Force was designed to permit the commander of the strategic air forces the freedom of movement and flexibility to employ his forces temporarily in whichever theater provided the best weather at that time. There was in his mind no question of a permanent move of forces.” (Ibid., p. 475.)

While no minutes were recorded, the senior officials met in a closed session on February 1 to discuss strategy in the European theater. Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith reported to Deputy Chief of Staff Thomas T. Handy regarding the Malta meetings: “The first three days were spent, in part at least, in a bitter argument with Field Marshal Brooke who wished to revise Ike’s directive in such a way that he could hardly move a division except north of the Ruhr. I had a couple of long talks with him after we got back to our rooms, and I give him credit for complete honesty in this matter, a tribute I have never paid him before; but he is stubborn as Hell, and stood out until finally G.C.M. called a closed conference at the end of one of the sessions, spoke his mind as only he can do, for about 15 minutes, and, as a result, the matter was dropped, and our general plan which includes a secondary effort, as you know, was accepted. I think it would be criminal if we staked everything on one narrow thrust north of the Ruhr.” (Smith to Handy, February 9, 1945, GCMRL/T. T. Handy Papers.)

“At Malta we had a very acid meeting,” Marshall recalled. “[Brooke] said the British chiefs of staff were very much worried by the influence on General Eisenhower of General Bradley, and I think he mentioned General Patton. And I said, ‘Well, Brooke, they are not nearly as much worried as the American chiefs of staff are worried about the immediate pressures and influence of Mr. Churchill on General Eisenhower. The president practically never sees Eisenhower, never writes to him—that is at my advice because he is an Allied commander—and we are deeply concerned by the pressures of the prime minister and the fact of the proximity of the British chiefs of staff, so I think your worries are on the wrong foot.’ We had a terrible meeting.” (*Marshall Interviews*, pp. 540–41.)

President Roosevelt arrived on February 2 aboard the U.S.S. *Quincy*, which anchored in Grand Harbor, Valletta, Malta. At 4:30 P.M. the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff conferred with the president on board the *Quincy*. At 6:00 P.M. Prime Minister Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff came on board, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed with Roosevelt and

Churchill their interim report regarding their military discussions thus far. (*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, pp. 461–62, 540–46.)

On February 3 General Marshall arrived at Saki airfield in the Crimea and was greeted by General of the Army Alexey I. Antonov, first deputy chief of staff of the Red Army, who hosted a breakfast banquet in a large tent prior to the eighty-five-mile automobile drive to Yalta. Major General Laurence S. Kuter recalled that General Marshall “was invariably dignified, controlled, and composed in public,” but even the chief of staff “looked surprised at a big breakfast on February 3, 1945, when a tumbler which appeared to contain fruit juice proved to be full of Crimean brandy. That was neither the first nor the last surprise for General Marshall or the other members of the United States party participating in the Crimean conference at Yalta. That first surprise, however, alerted the American military party to characteristics, philosophies and ways of life which were far different from those at home and from those encountered while dealing with their other allies and wartime friends.” (Kuter, *Airman at Yalta*, p. 3.)

Livadia Palace, which had been occupied by the Germans until April 1944, served as headquarters for the American delegation and meeting place for the Crimean conference. General Marshall occupied the imperial bedroom on the second floor of the palace. The British and Russian delegations were housed at two nearby estates.

On February 4 General Marshall attended a morning meeting at which President Roosevelt conferred with his military and diplomatic advisers preliminary to the opening tripartite plenary session scheduled for later that day. Admiral Leahy said that the chiefs of staff thought it important that Marshal Stalin instruct his military staff to participate in full and frank discussions with the American and British staffs. They also desired to “get agreement to effect the needed coordination and exchange of information” between Eisenhower, Alexander, and the Red Army general staff. According to the official minutes, “General Marshall said that the establishment of direct liaison for day to day communication between the Allied commanders and the Russians was highly desirable. In his opinion the important thing was to obtain agreement to the general idea as early as possible and leave the detailed procedure to be worked out later. The difficulty had been, not with the Russians but with the British who wish to effect the liaison through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. General Marshall pointed out that with the Russians within 40 miles of Berlin there was not time enough to go through the Combined Chiefs of Staff.” (*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, pp. 564–65.) General Marshall summarized the war situation on all fronts to President Roosevelt.

Secretary of State Stettinius then enumerated seven major political topics that the president should discuss with Churchill and Stalin: (1) cre-

ation of a postwar international organization, (2) creation of an emergency European high commission to serve during the interim between the end of war and the permanent organization, (3) political and economic treatment of Germany, (4) Poland, (5) Allied control commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, (6) Iranian relations, and (7) China. At this point W. Averell Harriman, ambassador to the Soviet Union, "stated that Marshal Stalin would very likely wish to raise the question of what the Russians would get out of the Pacific war. He stated they would want the southern half of Sakhalin, and the Kuriles. They would wish to maintain the *status quo* in Outer Mongolia and to obtain control over the railroad running to Dairen. The President said he wished to have the views of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek before discussing the *status quo* in Mongolia but was ready to go ahead on the other questions." Neither General Marshall nor other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed any opinions regarding these political issues. (Ibid., pp. 566–67.) "I did not talk to the president about the need of making concessions to Russia in order to get help against Japan," Marshall recalled. "Stalin had been very specific as to what he could do if we gave him the time in which to do it. He discussed with me how long it would take to move the troops they would have to move through Siberia to get ready for the attack in cooperation with us." (*Marshall Interviews*, p. 404.)

General Marshall attended the First Plenary Meeting of the Big Three leaders held at 5:00 P.M. on February 4, at which he summarized the war situation on the Western Front. The German bulge in the Ardennes had been eliminated and in some areas the Allied forces had advanced beyond the line originally held. The Rhine River could be crossed, weather permitting, after the first of March. Opening the port at Antwerp had relieved the supply shortage by bringing in seventy-five to eighty thousand tons of dry cargo daily. Allied bombers employed against German oil supplies had reduced German oil production to 20 percent of former capacity, and heavy bombers were striking German rail communications, tank factories, and submarine assembly points. (*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, pp. 573–88.) Marshall did not attend the following second through eighth plenary meetings held on February 5 to 11; Admiral Leahy represented the American military at those plenary meetings.

Other than the first plenary session, Marshall was not present at the Crimean meetings between the heads of state. The president's log at Yalta records that General Marshall was present at an event the same time as Roosevelt on February 5 (among the dinner guests) and on February 9 when Roosevelt and Churchill met with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and again that day when all the delegates gathered for group pictures in the Lavadia Palace courtyard. (Ibid., pp. 549–61.) Marshall was otherwise attending meetings between the American, British, and Soviet military leaders.

The First Tripartite Military Meeting was held on February 5 at Yusupov Palace, headquarters for the Russian delegation. General Marshall and Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, chief of the British Imperial General Staff, stressed the need for continued Soviet operations in the East to aid the offensive in the West. General Antonov replied that “as Marshal Stalin had pointed out, the Russians would continue the offensive in the East as long as the weather permitted.” (Ibid., pp. 595–97.)

The American, British, and Soviet military chiefs held a second session the next day. The Anglo-American chiefs stressed the need for day-to-day liaison (on a lower level than Moscow) with the Soviets as a means to better coordinate action between land and air forces, a topic that they had discussed the previous day. General Antonov replied that “Stalin had pointed out that there had so far been no close contact between Soviet and Allied land forces and therefore wished that liaison should take place through the Staff of the Red Army and the Military Missions in Moscow.” The conferees agreed that the three Air staffs should meet to work out the details of Antonov’s proposed line beyond which the U.S.-U.K. air forces would not bomb. (Ibid., pp. 640–45.)

In view of the Allied proximity to the Rhine, Admiral Leahy asked General Antonov if Soviet experts on the technique and equipment employed in major river crossings could share their expertise with General Eisenhower’s headquarters. Antonov replied that “the Soviet Army was always ready to share its battle experience with its allies. However, at the moment there were no specialists in this technique available and he would like therefore time to look into this matter.” When General Marshall said that it was desirable for U.S. strategic bomber forces to operate from bases in the Vienna-Budapest area, Antonov replied that the matter “would probably be decided between Marshal Stalin and the President.” (Ibid., pp. 646–47.)

After Admiral King summarized operations in the Pacific, General Marshall said that the deployment of forces from Europe to the Pacific would begin one week after the termination of the European war, but that the total transfer would take a long time. General Antonov then said “it would be more convenient to discuss questions concerning the Far East after this matter had been considered by the Heads of State.” Sir Alan Brooke summarized operations in Burma, and General Marshall commented on the difficulties overcome in providing supply routes and lines of communication between Burma and China. “In the face of unparalleled difficulties 44,000 tons had been flown over the Himalayas last month,” reported Marshall in the official minutes. Marshall “mentioned this because to him it meant the accomplishment of the greatest feat in all history. In the face of such achievements cooperation by the staffs now seated around the table should be relatively easy.” (Ibid., pp. 650–53.)

On February 6 Admiral Leahy delivered to President Roosevelt a request from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff that the president obtain Marshal Stalin's approval for the J.C.S. to meet with the Soviet military chiefs. The American and Soviet chiefs of staff held sessions on February 8 and 9. (See Marshall to Deane, Radio No. WAR-58794, March 26, 1945, pp. 101-2.)

Meanwhile the Combined Chiefs of Staff had resumed their meetings on February 6 (C.C.S. 186th Meeting), and the American and British military chiefs held sessions on February 8 and 9 (C.C.S. 187th and 188th meetings). On February 9 Roosevelt and Churchill held a session with the Combined Chiefs of Staff in order that the C.C.S. present a draft of their final report of the results of their ARGONAUT discussions. (*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, pp. 825-26; Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill [C.C.S. 776/3] is printed on pp. 827-33.)

On February 11 General Marshall departed Saki airfield for a flight to Italy to visit the Fifth Army before his return trip to the United States. (See Marshall Memorandum for the Press, February 15, 1945, pp. 50-52.) When the chief of staff arrived in Washington on February 16, he had traveled nearly fourteen thousand miles by air since his departure for ARGONAUT on the afternoon of January 25. ★

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSEPH T. McNARNEY¹
Radio. *Top Secret*

January 31, 1945
[Valletta, Malta]

For General McNarney's eyes only from General Marshall.

This message not to be discussed with any other officer.

1. British have just submitted proposed directive for Alexander for solidly holding front already reached and at earliest possible date to transfer three Allied divisions to SCAEF. As divisions are withdrawn from Greece to transfer two additional divisions to SCAEF. There not to be any significant transfer of Tactical Air Forces. They propose for transfer two Canadian, two U.S. and two British divisions.²

2. Questions: Would withdrawal of two American divisions have seriously adverse effect on U.S. morale? Would you prefer that four British instead of two be transferred? We may agree to transfer of total of five only.

3. What is your comment regarding nonwithdrawal of U.S. Tactical Air, as to necessities of your theater with reduced mission and divisional strength? Rush reply.³

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 5, Item 18)

1. McNarney was Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations and commander of U.S. Army Forces in the Mediterranean.

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the proposed directive to Field Marshal Harold Alexander, the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, during their afternoon meeting at Montgomery House on January 31. (*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, pp. 484–88.)

3. “The withdrawal of three or more divisions of any nationality would have an adverse effect on US morale as it would point up the common expression that this is a forgotten front,” replied McNarney. The transfer of all “Empire Divisions would have greater adverse effect on US morale than if some American Divisions were included” because “our national pride makes us believe we are superior in fighting efficiency and any indication that Empire Divisions are preferred for service on an active front would not set well.” Transfer of two U.S. divisions would result in “no really serious adverse effect” on morale as long as the front “remains static with battle casualties remaining low. However, if after transfer of three or more divisions from this Theater it should become necessary to launch an all out attack against the strong natural obstacles confronting Fifth Army, it will be difficult to make our soldiers see the reasons.” McNarney concluded, “On balance I personally prefer that four British Divisions instead of two be transferred as this would more evenly balance British and American controlled divisions.” He reported a “very satisfactory” existing ratio of Tactical Air and Ground that formed a “true combat team.” If their mission and divisional strength were reduced, he recommended a proportionate reduction in fighter-bomber strength. McNarney believed that keeping the medium bombers in his theater would “pay dividends in hampering the transfer of enemy divisions.” (McNarney to Marshall, Radio No. F-18335, January 31, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 5, Item 18].) The Combined Chiefs of Staff issued a directive to Alexander on February 2. (C.C.S. to War Department, Radio No. CRICKET 3A, February 2, 1945, *ibid.* The directive is printed in *Foreign Relations, Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, pp. 832–33.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

February 5, 1945
[Yalta, Crimea, U.S.S.R.]

I suggest that you send some such message as the following to MacArthur:¹

“Congratulations to you personally and to your commanders and troops on the liberation of Manila. This is an historic moment in the reestablishment of freedom and decency in the Far East, and the celerity of movement and economy of forces involved in this victory add immeasurably to our appreciation of your success.

“Please give the men of the guerilla forces my thanks and congratulations on their gallant contribution to the campaign and especially for the years of suffering they have endured in preparation for this moment.”²

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 17, Item 15)

1. General Marshall’s handwritten draft of this message is located in NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 17, Item 15). Douglas MacArthur included this “personal message” from President Roosevelt in his autobiography. (Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* [New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964], p. 249.)

2. During the evening of February 3, the U.S. First Cavalry Division reached the northern suburbs of Manila. For an account of the race by the Thirty-seventh Infantry and First Cavalry divisions of Sixth Army closing in on Manila from the north and the Eleventh Airborne Division of Eighth Army approaching from the south, see Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, pp. 211–36. General MacArthur announced on February 6, “Our forces are rapidly clearing the enemy from Manila. Our converging columns . . . entered the city and surrounded the Jap defenders. Their complete destruction is imminent.” The battle for Manila continued for nearly a month, leaving most of the city in ruins. (D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur*, 3 vols. [Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970–85], 2: 631–46; quote on p. 637.)

Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, commander of the Eighth Army, wrote on February 21 that some people thought General MacArthur’s premature announcement of the capture of Manila was because MacArthur was “anxious to get out the announcements while the big conference was going on in the Black Sea area.” General Eichelberger toured Manila on March 3 to find there was “practically nothing that hadn’t been entirely knocked down and in ruins. . . . Manila in effect has ceased to exist except for some places that the Japanese thought were not worth defending or where our American troops got in by surprise.” (*Dear Miss Em: General Eichelberger’s War in the Pacific, 1942–1945*, ed. Jay Luvaas [Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1972], pp. 225, 230–31. For Eichelberger’s account of the Eighth Army in the Luzon area, see pp. 203–31.) For further information, see Marshall to MacArthur, March 1, 1945, pp. 65–66.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY
DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
Radio No. ARGONAUT 59. *Top Secret*

February 7, 1945
Yalta, Crimea, U.S.S.R.

Our cargo shipping position in both the Atlantic and Pacific according to the present estimates shows an almost unmanageable deficit through the first half of 1945, unless the European War ends. Hence no additional cargo shipping can be made available as you request in your C57530 without prejudice to operations already approved. As to troop shipping this could be provided.¹

As to the oil in Borneo the War Department feeling at present is that we might not during this war obtain returns for our efforts in rehabilitating the area. In any event the JCS wish to avoid the use of US troops in mopping up the Netherlands East Indies areas and are therefore in accord with your desire to employ Australian units for this purpose.

While the continuance of the European War is bound to restrict somewhat our Pacific action a policy of “do nothing” for you and your experienced commanders and troops is untenable. The campaign from the eastern tip of New Guinea to Manila has achieved maximum results against the Japanese with minimum resources and minimum loss of lives. Will you consider what can be done without additional cargo shipping now and a minimum of cargo shipping at a later time. In this connection please consider Hainan, whose seizure would close off the China Sea completely and give bases for the direct air communications to China and for air interdiction of Jap land routes through south China.

With reference to the Philippine Archipelago to what extent in time and numbers do you consider it essential for American Divisions and Air Forces to be employed in clearing up the islands.

Your message and this one are being furnished the JCS for their consideration.²

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 5, Item 18)

1. General MacArthur considered it of utmost importance to recover the British and Dutch oilfields in northern Borneo in order to provide oil to the Pacific areas eastward and northward of the Philippine Archipelago to support operations against the Japanese homeland. He anticipated amphibious forces would be available for operations into Borneo about the first of April, and he planned to use the First Australian Corps which had two divisions and corps troops on the Australian mainland and one division at New Guinea. Those units on the Australian mainland needed to be concentrated northward into the Hollandia-Morotai area, which would involve eighty-seven ship loads of troops and cargo. "Our plan calls for the use of assigned SWPA troopers, plus ten missions of one trip each of trans-Pacific troopers and the employment of 57 Liberty ships," relayed MacArthur. He estimated the program to take approximately twelve weeks to complete. (MacArthur's message C-57530 was relayed to General Hull at Yalta [ARGONAUT-IN-65], February 5, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 5, Item 19].)

2. "It is estimated that all the ground and air forces available to me will be required to clear the Philippines and that it will take at least six months," replied MacArthur. "It is deemed essential that the strength of the SWPA remain unimpaired." He reiterated the importance of employing Australian forces in southward operations soon because Australia was growing restive due to the inactivity of their troops and "the minor role the Australians feel they are now playing in the eyes of the world in the offensive campaign." The actions to the south could be initiated sometime during the Philippine operations; "whatever rate of advance may be attained will be expedited by any additional shipping that may become available to me." (MacArthur to Marshall, Radio No. CAX-50401, February 10, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-IN-9888)].)

On February 26 MacArthur reported that the Hainan operation would not produce strategic benefits commensurate with "the means required nor with the risks involved. I am in agreement with the conclusions reached by the War Department planners in their study of Hainan. I therefore recommend against the project unless its undertaking is determined to be advisable for reasons other than purely military strategy." (MacArthur to Marshall, Radio No. CA-50688, February 26, 1945, *ibid.* [CM-IN-27255].) MacArthur considered the Netherlands East Indies campaign necessary because the United States was "obligated under the international agreement establishing the Southwest Pacific Area." To not secure the Netherlands East Indies after freeing Australian and U.S. territories and reestablishing governments therein would be "invidious and would represent a failure on the part of the United States to keep faith. Under the authority of my basic directive I have always assured the Dutch that this would be done if means were available." (*Ibid.*) For further information on shipping, see Marshall to MacArthur, February 27, 1945, pp. 58–59.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER February 14, 1945
Radio No. F-26834. *Top Secret, Eyes Only* Rome(?), Italy

The 92nd Division, holding 22 miles on the left of the Fifth Army front in ITALY, has been given a final tryout in a 3 day local offensive, heavily sup-

ported by air, plentiful ammunition and tanks. It met little opposition in most parts of the front but the Infantry literally dissolved each night abandoning equipment and even clothing in some cases. The Artillery appears excellent, also the Engineers, and other divisional troops. The command and staff are superior. But as matters now stand, the division is not only of little value but weakens the front by necessitating the putting of other divisions in rear to provide the necessary security against a local German thrust through to LEGHORN and supply lines, divisions that should be otherwise disposed in the center of the Army.¹

We cannot afford this wastage of effort and jeopardy of the front, therefore, I am proposing the reorganization of one negro Infantry regiment from the pick of the three; the assignment to the division of a converted anti-aircraft regiment here with additional selected personnel. A third Infantry regiment of dependable quality is urgently required. Could you possibly spare the Japanese regiment to be transferred without equipment, utilizing transportation otherwise returning from MARSEILLES empty after movement of Canadians. This would give us a useful divisional weapon capable of strong thrusts. Address reply to reach my EYES ONLY in WASHINGTON Friday night.²

DDEL/D. D. Eisenhower Papers (Pre-Presidential 1916–52, Principal File)

1. On February 8 the Ninety-second Division crossed the Cinquale Canal and turned inland. On February 11 the division broke off limited attacks in the coastal sector, by withdrawing its bridgehead across the Cinquale Canal, and in the Serchio Valley. (Ulysses Lee, *The Employment of Negro Troops*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1966], pp. 568–72.)

2. General Eisenhower replied that the Japanese-American 442d Infantry Regiment would be transferred on March 22 from France back to Italy. (Eisenhower to Marshall, February 15, 1945, DDEL/D. D. Eisenhower Papers [Pre-Presidential 1916–52, Principal File]; *Papers of DDE*, 4: 2496–97.) General Marshall had met with the Ninety-second Division's commander Major General Edward M. Almond and visited the division on February 14. (For General Marshall's visit with the Ninety-second Division during training exercises at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, in May 1944, see *Papers of GCM*, 4: 226 [photo #22]. For information regarding African-American troops in the Pacific, see *Papers of GCM*, 4: 354–56, 543–44.)

By the first of April, the 370th Infantry Regiment was reorganized from selected personnel from the 365th, 370th, and 371st Infantry Regiments, and the 442d Infantry Regiment (Nisei) and 473d Infantry Regiment (activated from antiaircraft units of Task Force 45) were attached to the Ninety-second Division. (Lee, *Employment of Negro Troops*, pp. 572–75. For a detailed account of the African-American Ninety-second Infantry Division's service in Italy, see Hon-don B. Hargrove, *Buffalo Soldiers in Italy: Black Americans in World War II* [Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland and Company, 1985], especially pp. 82–148.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESS

February 15, 1945
[Montecatini, Italy]

The following is the text of the statement made today by General of the

Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, at Headquarters, 15th Army Group, Italy:¹

At the time of my last visit to Italy, the troops of the Fifth Army were just north of Grosseto in the final stages of the great pursuit of Kesselring's forces north of Rome.²

For the past three days, I have visited various portions of the Fifth Army front, met the senior commanders and inspected and talked to many of the troops. What I have seen and what I have learned has been very reassuring.

The difficulties of the mountainous country, with few roads and winter conditions are very real. The strength of the enemy's defensive positions in such country is equally apparent.

Under these conditions, our U.S. troops and those of our Allies have done a splendid job and made a great contribution to the war. A large German force has been held in Italy and prevented from bolstering the enemy's hard-pressed troops on the Eastern and Western fronts.

The Infantry has borne the greatest burden of the struggle, but it has been strongly supported by perfect cooperation of air, artillery and other arms and services. The supply of the troops has been made possible by the really magnificent work of the Engineers in the mountains.

The Strategical Air Force in Italy has struck an unending series of blows against the enemy production centers and communications despite the usual inclemency of the weather.

Probably the most impressive phase of the operations in Italy is the degree of cooperation of the forces. The Ground [*Guard*] of Honor which met me at General Mark Clark's Headquarters was composed of the military representatives of 12 nationalities from the 5th and 8th Armies, paraded in one body and commanded by one officer. Such a spirit of common purpose, such teamwork, makes certain the destruction of the German military power.³

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)

1. General Marshall wrote the draft of this statement on February 13, after his visit at General Mark W. Clark's headquarters on February 12.

2. For information regarding General Marshall's tour in the Grosseto area of Italy in June 1944, see *Papers of GCM*, 4: 487–89, 514 (photos #31 and 32).

3. From Yalta, Colonel Frank McCarthy notified Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney of General Marshall's impending arrival at Allied Force Headquarters in Caserta, Italy. "Chief says he wishes no conferences or formalities of any kind at Caserta, since his sole purpose is to visit Fifth Army. Suggest you have a proposed itinerary ready upon arrival," wrote McCarthy. "Usual form holds good for Chief; that is, no aides, no orderlies, no flags, no auto plates, no escort, no fanfare of any kind. He has no objection to being photographed for morale purposes with eye to release at later date to be set by him, but is unwilling to commit himself to a press conference and wishes no advance heralding of visit." (McCarthy to McNarney, Radio No. ARGONAUT 95, February 9, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 5, Item 18].)

Although General Marshall had requested no honors, a large honor guard met the chief of staff at General Clark's Fifteenth Army Group headquarters near Florence. "There were men and women from a score of units standing stiffly at attention," Clark recalled. "Marshall paused and the frown vanished from his face. Nothing could have spoken more eloquently than this

honor guard of the melding of units from all over the world into the 15th Army Group. In a single glance, he could see the problem of supply, the problem of different languages, the problem of different religions, the whole complex and tangled problem of making it possible for a dozen nationalities to live and fight as one team." (Mark W. Clark, *Calculated Risk* [New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950], pp. 423–25.)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER February 17, 1945
[Radio No. W-39014.] *Secret* Washington, D.C.

Personal for Eisenhower from Marshall. I am deeply concerned over apparent action and attitude regarding loss of truck in 28th Division containing codes.¹ After reading messages and particularly a telephone conversation to your Signal code representative I was struck with the low level on which this affair was being handled. The mere relief of a divisional Signal officer is not a cure for such a serious matter. Please place this affair under investigation by an officer of high rank.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. A truck containing cryptographic material for the Twenty-eighth Division had been missing in the vicinity of Colmar since the night of February 5–6. (Devers to Eisenhower, February 19, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. General Eisenhower replied on February 18 that once the loss was reported to Sixth Army Group on February 6, the matter was "placed definitely and specifically in the hands of General Devers" and the entire theater had been alerted. "The relief of the divisional signal officer was brought about merely because of failure in local guarding. It is a preliminary step only pending findings and fixing of responsibility that will permit appropriate action." (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2483.)

Major General Fay B. Prickett (U.S.M.A., 1916), who had commanded the Seventy-fifth Division until he became deputy commanding general of the Twenty-first Corps in January 1945, conducted the investigation. Prickett submitted his report to Devers on March 7, two days before the cryptographic materials were located, concluding that security measures for cryptographic equipment of the Twenty-eighth Division were inadequate and did not comply with regulations and instructions issued by the Signal officer. "The lack of inspections, guards for vehicles, and specific instructions for security measures reflect unfavorably on the efficiency of the 28th Infantry Division." Prickett recommended that the division's commanding general as well as his chief of staff and assistant chief of staff, G-2, be relieved of their commands. On March 9 the cryptographic equipment and material were located, apparently uncompromised. All but four documents were accounted for, and "while direct evidence cannot be produced, all known facts indicate that the cryptographic devices and material have not been examined by unauthorized personnel." Devers recommended that the officers be reprimanded rather than relieved, and Eisenhower concurred. (Eisenhower to Marshall, March 28, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected]; Pasco Memorandum for General Marshall, April 4, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, SGS]; *Papers of DDE*, 4: 2483–84.)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY ALEXEY I. ANTONOV¹
[Radio No. WAR-40408.] *Top Secret*

February 20, 1945
Washington, D.C.

For Deane's eyes only from Marshall. Please pass the following personal repeat personal message from me to General Antonov:

"From a wide variety of sources which I have carefully checked myself, our information here indicates a German effort to build up two groups for counteroffensive purposes, one of about 18 divisions, to reach that strength sometime between March 1st and 15th, in the general region of Pomerania, and the other of about 42 divisions in the general Vienna-Mährisch-Ostrau region in about the same period of time. The southern concentration would include the Sixth Panzer Army of five or six armored divisions.

The assembly areas are of a conventional pattern for a pincer attack directed from the north towards Thorn and from the south towards Lodz. It would appear from our information here that Soviet occupation of Stettin would nullify the German counteroffensive capabilities from the north. A Soviet thrust through to Mährisch-Ostrau would probably prevent the attack from the south.

It appears that Model² may direct the counteroffensive from the south. There is evidence that the German buildup is following the general pattern of that preceding their Ardennes offensive. There is also rather clear evidence of the attendant security precautions which preceded the Ardennes action. The propaganda pattern is generally similar. Information we have intercepted from Japanese sources in Berlin tends to confirm the foregoing. How much of this last is a German plant to hold Japanese confidence must be a matter of conjecture but other indications tend strikingly to confirm the plan outlined above. This plan appears likely as the Germans have little alternative. They must make such a counteroffensive or lose all.

Please treat the foregoing as extremely confidential between the two of us. Any further details I will transmit to you immediately myself."³

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Antonov was chief of staff of the Red Army.
2. German Field Marshal Walther Model commanded Army Group B.
3. A week later General Marshall reported that "reliable intelligence indicates difficulties due to continual German withdrawal and the effect of Allied air attacks against production and communications, principally ammunition and oil, will delay German counteroffensive efforts." (Marshall to Deane for transmission to Antonov, February 27, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

On March 30 Antonov, on behalf of Stalin, rejoined that while Marshall's information was "at variance with the actual course of events on the Eastern Front in March," the Soviets had obtained correct data that enabled them to meet the German offensive in the Lake Balaton area, southwest of Budapest. Perhaps certain sources of the information sought to "bluff both Anglo-American and Soviet Headquarters and divert the attention of the Soviet High Command from the area where the Germans were mounting their main offensive operation on the Eastern Front. Despite the foregoing, I would ask General Marshall, if possible, to keep me posted with

information about the enemy. I consider it my duty to convey this information to General Marshall solely for the purpose of enabling him to draw the proper conclusions in relation to the source of the information.” (*Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945, volume 2, Correspondence with Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman [August 1941–December 1945]* [Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957], pp. 210–11.)

Generalissimo Stalin later expressed his regret to General Eisenhower that he had been unduly rude by sending the message to Marshall. On August 16, Eisenhower wrote that after dinner in the Kremlin, Stalin took him aside and “specifically and earnestly requested that I repeat to you the following: ‘About last February we (the Russians) received from General Marshall certain information involving intentions of the Germans. Based on this information we made battle dispositions, and when later the information proved to be incorrect, we had considerable difficulty in readjusting our forces to meet the threat. When this occurred, I personally, and on the spur of the moment, sent General Marshall a telegram which was rude, and I have always regretted sending it. Please tell General Marshall that I have always considered him one of the great soldiers and great men of this war and that my opinion of him was not in the least affected by this occurrence. I want him especially to know that I regret the rudeness of my telegram to him.’” (*Papers of DDE*, 6: 286.)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY
Confidential. For His Eyes Only

February 21, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

General Somervell brought up to me the other day the question of Chaplain Arnold’s retirement, whether or not he was to be continued as Chief of Chaplains.¹ At the moment I believe I told him I had no thought of changing, but since then another approach to the matter has occurred to me.

There has been considerable criticism on the part of the Protestant Church group regarding the poor quality of the representation of the Protestant Church affairs in Chaplain Arnold’s office. He, Arnold, can hardly be blamed for this because he has a very delicate proposition on his hands when he deals with the senior Protestant personnel, regarding which he has talked to me several times. This same difficulty repeats itself in the various Corps Areas where the senior is not usually the most competent official. A Protestant group headed by Bishop Sherrill² of Boston informally commented on the situation and Bishop Sherrill suggested two names for appointment as Chief of Chaplains, one of whom was Luther Miller, an old protégé of mine and an unusually efficient man.

Thinking this matter over the other day it suddenly occurred to me that it might be a good thing to make Miller Chief of Chaplains and transfer Arnold to The Inspector General’s Department. We have a doctor Major General who looks after Medical matters in that department and we might well have Arnold to perform the same function for religious matters.

What do you think of this?

It still retains Arnold on active duty as a distinguished Catholic but at the same time turns to a Protestant as the head of the Chaplain Corps.³

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Major General William R. Arnold, a chaplain in the U.S. Army since 1913, had served as chief of Chaplains since December 1937.

2. Episcopal Bishop of Massachusetts Henry K. Sherrill, who had served as a U.S. Army chaplain overseas from 1917 to 1919, served during World War II as chairman of the General Commission on Army and Navy Chaplains, an interdenominational group that supervised the selection of Protestant chaplains for the armed forces.

3. The War Department announced on April 1, 1945, that Major General William R. Arnold was designated assistant inspector general in the office of The Inspector General of the Army, where his duties would relate to the Chaplain Corps and religious matters concerning the army. Chaplain Arnold formally retired at the age of sixty-four on June 30, 1945. (War Department Press Release, April 1, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Brigadier General Luther D. Miller, who served as Sixth Army Chaplain in the Pacific, was designated acting chief of Chaplains on April 12, 1945, and became chief of Chaplains in July. (TAG to Miller, April 12, 1945; Henry Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, July 5, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 201 Miller, L. D.])

For General Marshall's previous discussion of this subject, see *Papers of GCM*, 4: 699–701. See also Marshall Remarks at the Annual Conference of Supervisory Chaplains, April 5, 1945, p. 131.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING

February 22, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

SUBJECT: Army Infantry Requirements.

It is my understanding that the Navy is enlisting about 25,000 17-year-old men per month and in addition is receiving its proportionate share of the 18 to 20 age groups obtained through Selective Service. As a result of this situation, it appears that 40 per cent of the Army's intake in March and thereafter will be men above 26 years of age. This will leave us with a grave deficiency in infantry riflemen replacements. Older men cannot meet the requirements of the battlefield.

I propose that in making the division of Selective Service inductees, the Navy enlistment of 17-year-olds be taken into account and an adjustment be made accordingly in the 18 to 20 age group.¹

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. "I fully agree with the principle of equalized distribution of men in the various age groups," Admiral King replied on February 26. "However, the specific application of the principle will require consideration of the number of men under eighteen the Army is taking into the enlisted reserve for the Air Corps and its ASTP [Army Specialized Training Program] Program, along with the Navy's seventeen year old enlistments." King recommended that the matter be referred to the Joint Army-Navy Personnel Board for consideration. (King Memorandum for General Marshall, February 26, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office,

Selected].) On March 7 Major General Stephen G. Henry, assistant chief of staff, G-1, and Vice Admiral Randall Jacobs (U.S.N.A., 1907), chief of Bureau of Naval Personnel, reached an agreement that for three months "all inductees of the age group 18–20, inclusive, will, effective 15 March, be assigned to the Army, except for those who present approved letters of directed assignment to the Navy under policies approved by the Joint Army-Navy Personnel Board." (Marshall [staff-drafted] Memorandum for the Under Secretary of War, March 12, 1945, *ibid.*)

TO MAJOR CLIFTON S. BROWN¹

February 22, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Dear Clifton: I have just returned from my trip to the conference in the Crimea. En route I stopped long enough at Marseilles to see General Eisenhower for a day. On my return trip I stopped for three days in Italy which I devoted to the Fifth Army front; then flew home with only stops for gassing, via Casablanca, the Azores and Newfoundland. After two days in the War Department I flew down to Pinehurst and saw your mother's new house, staying two days. I brought her back with me as she had to go to the dentist. Intended to return this afternoon but am weather-bound; now plan to leave tomorrow at noon, I to take four days' rest.²

The house at Pinehurst is very attractive and the surroundings are most agreeable, though I hit bad weather which restricted activities.

A V-mail letter from you³ came through while I was gone and I have seen all yours to your mother. She is in pretty good shape though was rather tired when I joined her at Pinehurst.

Things have quieted down somewhat in your part of the world and I suppose before long the French spring will produce a pleasant transformation.

Thursday A.M.

It is still raining today but we take off at 11:15, lunch on plane and reach Pinehurst about one o'clock.

For lunch in my office yesterday I had your mother, and Mrs. Eisenhower, Eaker, Bedell Smith and McNarney—all of whose husbands I had just seen overseas.⁴

Incidentally, in Italy I saw Larry Ladue, General McCoy's former ADC⁵ and that Air Corps lieutenant ADC to Brown whose mathematical preparations you helped prior to his going to an engineering assignment.

With my love, Affectionately,

GCMRL/Research File (Family)

1. Major Brown, General Marshall's stepson, was serving with the Forty-fourth Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade.

2. General Marshall departed Washington, D.C., for Pinehurst, North Carolina, on Thursday, February 22, and returned Monday evening.

3. Major Brown's incoming letter is not in the Marshall Papers.

4. General and Mrs. Marshall hosted a luncheon on February 21 for the wives of Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower, Ira C. Eaker, Walter Bedell Smith, and Joseph T. McNarney. Mrs. Eisenhower wrote a thank-you note to the chief of staff and concluded, "It always helps to get first hand news about our dear ones." (Mamie Eisenhower to General and Mrs. Marshall, February 23, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

5. Colonel Laurence K. Ladue (U.S.M.A., 1924) had served as chief of staff of Fourth Corps since March 1944. Earlier he had served as aide-de-camp to Major General Frank R. McCoy at Seventh Corps Area headquarters at Omaha, Nebraska, from October 1933 to February 1935, when he transferred with McCoy to Sixth Corps Area headquarters at Chicago, Illinois, while General Marshall was stationed in Chicago.

TO MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES C. HAFFNER, JR.

February 27, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Haffner: Your letter of February twentieth was forwarded to me out of Washington and before answering it I sent word to the War Department to extend your leave if you so desired.¹

Now that I am back I shall take matters up with you direct. I am not clear as to your desires. I of course understand your desire to serve wherever your services are needed; also your desire for combat service again. However, just what your real desire is at the present time I do not know.

In the first place, I do not think you should be sent back to combat duty. Your ailment is too apt to recur and it is not good business to send men back to troop command in heavy going where there is a probability of rather limited service. Next, we are very desirous of utilizing high ranking commanders with extensive battle experience in the training of replacements in this country. You would probably be given some such assignment if you remain on active duty. But, in view of the rather sizeable number of division commanders whose health or injuries have forced their relief from combat command you need feel no qualms about not accepting such an assignment.

So, please let me know just what you wish and then I can decide what is best to do.

I envy you the warm sunshine of Arizona. I should like about two months of that myself. I was sorry not to see Mrs. Haffner and you when you were in Washington. Mrs. Marshall appreciated very much the lovely flowers the two of you sent her when she was at Pinehurst.

With warm regards,² Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On Thursday, February 22, General Marshall departed for North Carolina and returned to Washington, D.C., on Monday evening, February 26. Haffner, who commanded the Illinois National Guard's 124th Field Artillery Regiment during Marshall's service in Chicago in the mid-1930s, wrote from Phoenix, Arizona, where he was recuperating from dysentery, which he

had contracted in December while commanding the 103d Division in the E.T.O. Having relinquished command of his division when he returned to the United States to recuperate, he was considering retirement since there were plenty of Regular officers available. "My only desire has been to do something to help in this time of crisis and if you feel I should go on the inactive list do not hesitate to place me on it," wrote Haffner. "I would not want a place made for me. If however I can serve you or the war effort I would of course be happy to do so. My own desire of course would be to get my division back but know that is impossible." (Haffner to Marshall, February 20, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Haffner replied on March 2 that he preferred to remain in the service at least until the collapse of the German armies, "since I have spent almost every minute of my spare time preparing for this emergency for twenty-five years and since I feel I can still make a real contribution to the war effort in any assignment." General Haffner took command of the Infantry Replacement Training Center at Camp Rucker, Alabama, until he retired in August 1945. (Haffner to Marshall, March 2, May 9, and September 29, 1945, *ibid.*)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR February 27, 1945
Radio No. WAR-44421. *Top Secret* Washington, D.C.

Personal from Marshall to MacArthur. Records of the War Department indicate following is the shipping situation since January 15 for ships retained over 40 days in your theater:

WEEK ENDING	Number of Ships	Average Days Delay Per Ship
15 January	64	42
22 January	75	40
5 February	70	45
12 February	74	48
19 February ¹	69	50

On February 13 of the 446 ships within your theater our data shows 113 were either loading or discharging, 102 were idle awaiting to load or discharge, 62 were either servicing or repairing and 169² were en route. These figures indicate practically the same number of ships are idle as are working. You have previously been requested to invoke extraordinary measures to improve the shipping turnaround. Our global commitments cannot sustain this extraordinary tax against shipping effectiveness. Your future operations and those in other theaters are already being penalized by shipping shortages. Effective corrective action is a most urgent requirement if the war is not to be unduly³ prolonged. Please see your CAX 50687 of 26 Feb. to Nimitz.⁴ Am sending Generals Styer and Wylie to work with your people on this problem.⁵

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-44421])

1. The message version that General MacArthur received at his Pacific headquarters differed slightly from the version transmitted from the War Department printed here. The Pacific

message center clerk keyed “14 February” instead of “19 February” here. (Marshall to MacArthur, February 27, 1945, MML/D. MacArthur Papers.)

2. The Pacific message center clerk keyed “165” here. (Ibid.)

3. The Pacific message center version omitted the word “unduly.” (Ibid.)

4. On February 26, General MacArthur informed Admiral of the Fleet Chester W. Nimitz that due to reduced shipping in the Southwest Pacific Area, it would not be possible “to contemplate the staging and rehabilitation of Pacific Ocean Area divisions as planned.” (MacArthur to Nimitz, Radio No. CAX-50687, February 26, 1945, MML/D. MacArthur Papers.) Under the terms of the FILBAS [Philippine Base (Army)] agreement of November 1944, the S.W.P.A. was also responsible for providing routine maintenance of P.O.A. forces in the Philippine Islands. S.W.P.A. was also responsible for providing thirty days supply for all units and five “units of fire for Army units and emergency supply support for such POA units for sixty (60) days after these forces were mounted. . . . CINCPOA agreed to provide shipping for materiel and units from sources within POA and to assist in other shipping connected with support of POA units.” (J. H. Baumann Memorandum for General Hull, February 27, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 381, Case 52].)

5. General MacArthur replied that he welcomed Generals Styer and Wylie’s visit. (MacArthur to Marshall, February 28, 1945, MML/D. MacArthur Papers.) Lieutenant General Wilhelm D. Styer served as deputy commanding general and chief of staff of Army Service Forces, and assumed command of U.S. Army Forces in the Western Pacific in June 1945. Brigadier General Robert H. Wylie (V.M.I., 1920), assistant chief of transportation for Operations, found the Philippine ports congested with ships lying at anchor forty to sixty days waiting to be unloaded. A study of Pacific supply in June 1945 revealed that S.W.P.A. had “consistently requisitioned tonnages in excess of ability to receive and unload.” (Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larson, *The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1957], pp. 445–46, 469–70.)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
Radio No. WAR-44930. *Top Secret*

February 28, 1945
Washington, D.C.

TOPSEC for MacArthur from Marshall. Study of your CAX 50687¹ and CA 50688² both of 26 February in connection with future plans for Southwest Pacific Area and Pacific Ocean Area raises following question.

If the FILBAS agreement is implemented, what part of the plans outlined in CA 50688 would you be able to execute with the shipping presently allocated to Southwest Pacific Area?

Will you please list in the order of importance those operations that cannot be executed if the FILBAS agreement is implemented, including an estimate of the shipping required for each operation. Consider radio WAR 44421 of 27 February.³

With reference to last paragraph your CA 50688, proposal to place Army Forces in POA and SWPA under unified Army command and Naval Forces of two theater under unified Naval command is now up for final decision by JCS.⁴

In regard to Petroleum products and tankers, your message C 57530 of 3 February 1945, and our ARGONAUT 59 of 7 February 1945, based on Army-

Navy Petroleum Board reports, there is no shortage in future availabilities important enough to demand military operations for acquisition of new oil producing areas, although a source of supply close to the scene of future operations is highly desirable. Admiral Carter of Army-Navy Petroleum Board is due back here from ETO in about two days. We will then resolve the difference of views as to the rehabilitation of Borneo oil supply.⁵

On the other hand, a Combined Raw Materials Board report indicates an acute shortage of natural rubber commencing in early 1946, estimated at 10,000 long tons per month, for meeting minimum military requirements at that time. Based on an interval of six months between securing the area and arrival of the washed and dried rubber at U.S. plants, it would appear that military operations for the acquisition of new rubber yielding areas might be required during the late summer or fall of 1945.

The foregoing is a preliminary estimate of the global status of the two products. Problem is under thorough review here and you will be kept informed.⁶

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-44930])

1. See note 4, Marshall to MacArthur, February 27, 1945, p. 59.

2. See note 2, Marshall to MacArthur, February 7, 1945, p. 49.

3. See the previous document.

4. "It would be helpful if I could be informed of any developments with regard to modification of the command structure in the Pacific," wrote MacArthur. "It would orient me completely and permit the consideration of possible lines of action with consequent future planning." (MacArthur to Marshall, Radio No. CA-50688, February 26, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-IN-27255)].)

5. See Marshall to MacArthur, February 7, 1945, pp. 48-49. Rear Admiral Andrew F. Carter (U.S.N.A., 1905) served as executive officer of the Army-Navy Petroleum Board in the office of the chief of naval operations.

6. Shipping that would remain available after that required to fully implement the FILBAS agreement would be inadequate for the proposed operations in the Netherlands East Indies, replied MacArthur. The shipping to have been used for the operations would instead be employed to move service troops from the South Pacific and augment the development of bases. He pointed out that shipping statistics applicable to commercial operations could not be deemed the sole criterion for his campaign, and flexibility in shipping is as necessary as flexibility in reserves. A commander cannot be guided by strict commercial operational standards, but must utilize shipping as a combat element. (MacArthur to Marshall, Radio No. CAX-50761, March 1, 1945, MML/D. MacArthur Papers.)

General Hull drafted a message sent to MacArthur from Marshall on March 2, which summarized a memorandum submitted by Rear Admiral Carter to the commander-in-chief, U.S. Fleet, the previous day. "No statement was made to General MacArthur to the effect that oil production could be obtained in North Borneo within 3 months and that this would effect a material saving in tankers." Carter estimated a probable crude oil shortage of 100,000 barrels per day, in eighteen months, unless new resources were developed. An average of thirty-five tankers would be saved by transporting 50,000 barrels of oil per day from North Borneo to the Philippines. He estimated possible production of 50,000 barrels of oil per day, within twelve months after landing the first drilling equipment, provided oil structures are left intact and the commercial oil companies receive assistance to meet production schedules. General Marshall added the concluding sentence to Hull's draft: "We are continuing study of means available for operation into Borneo." (Marshall [Hull-drafted] to MacArthur, Radio No. WAR-46161, March

2, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM–OUT–46161)]. Draft of message is located in NA/RG 165 [OPD, 381, TS 1945, Case 52].)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT¹
Secret

February 28, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

SUBJECT: Food Relief for Belgium and Liberated Holland.
(SCAF 210)

General Eisenhower informed us in his message (SCAF 210) that a serious situation exists in the 21st Army Group (Montgomery's command) area by reason of retarded deliveries of civilian supplies and urgently requested that 100,000 tons of food be made available immediately from UK stocks for the 21st Army Group.²

In an exchange of messages between the Combined Chiefs of Staff and General Eisenhower it developed that a total of 109,000 tons of supplies were required. Provision has already been made for approximately half of this.³ The problem of meeting the remaining 69,000 tons is now being considered in London. If the 69,000 tons are taken from the stockpile now being held in England against Dutch requirements, which is the probable course, it will be necessary to secure replacement from the UK stockpile in order to protect Eisenhower against anticipated Dutch needs.

It is recommended that you communicate with the Prime Minister and there is attached a draft of such a message.⁴

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. General Marshall drafted this memorandum sent over Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson's signature.

2. On February 14 General Eisenhower notified the Combined Chiefs of Staff that he regarded "the situation produced in Belgium and Holland by the lag in the arrival of civil affairs ships as being sufficiently serious to warrant civil affairs requirements being treated as a matter of operational urgency." Unless the program of importing food was carried out as scheduled, Eisenhower warned, "the civil population will gradually receive less and less food, and the result will be increasing unrest, civil disturbances, and disorders in the rear areas of 21st Army Group." (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2477–79.) SCAF designates cables from the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed the situation was serious and called for the immediate release of fifty-five thousand tons of foodstuffs from stocks in the United Kingdom. (CCS to SHAEF, Radio No. FACS-143, February 23, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM–OUT–42289)].)

4. President Roosevelt sent the message as drafted to Prime Minister Churchill on February 28. "I hope you will see your way clear to have the U.K. agree to replace the Dutch B-2 stockpile to the extent required to protect SCAEF against anticipated Dutch civilian supply needs," wrote Roosevelt. On March 2 Churchill replied, "We cannot meet certain items at all because we have no stocks available. . . . I want to impress upon you that we shall require immediate replacement of a large part of these food stuffs, and the provision of ships to carry

them.” (*Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, ed. Warren F. Kimball, 3 vols. [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984], 3: 540–41.) Both leaders agreed that the foodstuff supply problem must be fully explored. “Meanwhile situation in North West Europe is so serious,” wrote Churchill on March 16, “that I must ask you at any rate provisionally pending forthcoming discussions, to arrange for the outstanding balance of Eisenhower’s stated requirements to be found by U.S.A.” (*Ibid.*, pp. 559–60, 570.)

Meanwhile, on January 20, 1945, the president had appointed Samuel I. Rosenman to undertake a mission to northwest Europe to examine and report the steps to be taken with respect to the flow of vital supplies other than munitions. Looking ahead to postwar concerns, Roosevelt also wanted “to ascertain what the needs of these countries will be for supplies and services to repair the destruction and devastation of the war and to build some of the economic foundations of peace in terms of possible credits or other financial assistance at hand or through recommendations for appropriate legislation.” Rosenman submitted his report on April 26 to recently sworn-in President Harry S. Truman. (*Report to the President of the United States by Samuel I. Rosenman on Civilian Supplies for the Liberated Areas of Northwest Europe* [Washington: GPO, 1945]; Roosevelt to Rosenman, p. 13.) Rosenman recalled his conference with Churchill at Chequers at around 2:15 A.M. “Churchill, prompted now and then by Lord Cherwell, his economist, poured onto me statistics of foodstuffs shipped to England, shipped out of England and consumed in England—all to prove that it would be cruel for the United States to divert a substantial amount of the food in the British Isles to the Continent. Armed with the statistics I had gathered during my weeks of study, I did my best to cope with his arguments at that late hour,” wrote Rosenman. “I was armed also with firsthand knowledge of the tragic suffering of the people in the cities of France, Belgium and Holland. While there was an adequate supply of foodstuffs in many of the rural areas of western Europe, the lack of fuel and transportation and the instability of the currency had almost stopped the flow of food from the country into the cities.” (Samuel I. Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt* [New York: Da Capo Press, 1972], pp. 542–45.)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Radio. *Confidential*

February 28, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Eisenhower from Marshall. In checking upon careers of officers in whose powers of leadership I have personal confidence I located Colonel Walter T. Scott, Infantry, in the 26th Division. His quiet demeanor is somewhat deceptive and may have caused his powers of leadership backed by thorough knowledge and unselfish purpose to be overlooked. I suggest that if you are in short supply at any moment in infantry brigadier material you inquire about his present record.¹

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Colonel Walter T. Scott graduated from the Infantry School’s Advanced Course in 1930, during the time General Marshall was stationed there, and was instructor for the Vermont National Guard when the chief of staff wrote to Scott in 1940 at the time he was overlooked for an appointment to Fort Leavenworth. “Your efficiency record to me is a very interesting study and highly illustrative of the ineffectiveness of such records for officers of a certain type who have been on a certain class of duties,” wrote Marshall. “I do not know what the cure is. In this particular case propinquity is the saving grace, but that has a very limited application.” (Marshall to Scott, March 28, 1940, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].) Scott served in the Office of the Inspector General from March 1941 to August 1943, when he

joined the Twenty-sixth Infantry Division and assumed command of the 101st Infantry Regiment. Recipient of the Legion of Merit, Silver Star, and Bronze Star, Scott retired in July 1953 as a colonel.

PROPOSED STATEMENT FOR SECRETARY
OF WAR'S PRESS CONFERENCE¹

March 1, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

In discussing this matter I wish to make clear three points. These young men are being thoroughly trained, more intensively and completely than American soldiers have ever been trained heretofore.

The War Department in no way misrepresented this matter to Congress. Some members of the Congress and the public have confused the training of a division with the training of an individual. The former requires a minimum of a year, preferably three. The training of an individual to go into a veteran unit is an entirely different matter.

So long as there were numerous divisions in this country the practice was followed of drawing from the ranks of those divisions the majority of Infantry privates who had been in training from a year to two years and sending them overseas. Their places were then filled by transfers of the young men from the replacement training camps. This procedure was very hard on the divisional teams. Nevertheless the War Department followed this practice so long as it was a practicable proposition. The movement of divisions out of the United States has progressed to such a point that such a procedure has not been possible for a considerable period of months.

The impression apparently has grown that the Army is maintaining men of great experience and training in the U.S. who might well have been sent overseas while younger men were continued longer in the service before actually committed to combat. This is not the case at all. During the past year practically every man under 35 who was physically qualified and for whose job a replacement could be found—either in the form of a physically disqualified man who had been returned from overseas or a civilian—has been ordered overseas. This process is continuing. Furthermore, the same procedure is being followed in the theaters with regard to the men in the rear areas. On service jobs during the past year a total of about 650,000 men in the higher age brackets have been thus moved out of the U.S. In addition there have been some 90,000 volunteers from other services for Infantry and paratroop assignments. The Army Air Forces and the Army Service Forces have recently transferred 90,000 men for retraining as Infantry.

Men recently inducted into the Army are given a minimum of 15 weeks of the most rigorous training which the Army has been able to devise after

four years experience. Most of the replacements since _____² received 17 weeks in the basic camps. All have received additional training in staging camps en route to the ports in this country or in replacement receiving pools overseas under veteran tutelage.

Before any man is sent overseas he is submitted to a thorough test to insure that he has assimilated his training and is in fact prepared for combat duty. As I have just mentioned, this training continues to the maximum extent practicable from the time he leaves the U.S. until he actually joins his division. There, if the division is not in the line a still more intensive period of training follows.

It is my opinion that never before have American soldiers been so thoroughly prepared for their duty in battle. Probably the best testimony regarding this matter has been given by a captive German officer who complained that no matter how heavily our units might suffer on a given day they were always back in full strength the next morning and *as tough as ever*. This is certainly a great contrast to Civil War regiments reduced to the strength of a platoon.³

Finally, I would say this: Considering the fact that the majority of our inductees during the past few months have been in the lowest age brackets, a policy which prevented the use of these men would have imposed the necessity of delaying the entire campaign in Europe, and probably also in the Pacific. This of course would mean a tremendous additional loss of life, not to mention the other parallel factors. Such a procedure would be wholly inexcusable.⁴

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. General Marshall prepared this draft for Secretary of War Stimson's press conference, at which was asked "the burning question of proper training for the eighteen year old draftees . . . which is raising a good deal of commotion now and attention," wrote Stimson. "Bob Taft has come out with assertions that the Army is not giving these boys adequate training before we send them into battle." The secretary of war asserted that the press conference "went off pretty well and I think the answer that was made was a good one, a fair one, and an adequate one." (March 1, 1945, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 50: 148].) Compared to the War Department's press release, Stimson made a few minor editorial changes. (War Department Memorandum for the Press, March 1, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) For more information about Senator Robert A. Taft's protests, see *New York Times*, February 26, 1945, p. 11; Marshall to Eisenhower, March 6, 1945, pp. 76-79.

2. "July, 1943," was inserted in the press release. (War Department Memorandum for the Press, March 1, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. The press release substituted: "That represents a very great advance over our training practice and results in any former wars." (Ibid.)

4. For further information regarding the training of eighteen-year-old Infantry replacements, see Marshall Speech to the Overseas Press Club, March 1, 1945, pp. 68-70, and Marshall to Hess, March 5, 1945, pp. 74-76.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
Radio No. WAR-45662. *Secret*

March 1, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Personal for MacArthur from Marshall. With the reoccupation of Corregidor and the opening of Manila Bay I tender my congratulations on the virtual culmination of a flawless campaign. From this distance it appears that the air, ground and naval forces joined in perfectly concerted and devastatingly powerful action to redeem our pledge to the loyal and long suffering people of the Philippines.¹

To the forces who liberated the U.S. prisoners and internees, to the troops who rushed and reoccupied Manila and to the gallant and skilful band who reconquered Corregidor I send my heartfelt thanks, and the same to Krueger, Kenney and Kinkaid and all the leaders who have pushed this initial campaign through to its victorious conclusion.²

I hope the heavy fighting on the Antipolo-Montalban line and in the mountains to the north can be carried out with a maximum of Japanese casualties and a minimum of ours. I was distressed to learn that Mudge had been wounded. I hope not seriously.³

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM–OUT–45662])

1. Allied planes began preinvasion bombardment of Corregidor on January 22, 1945. After heavy air and naval bombardment, on February 16 the 503d Parachute Regimental Combat Team staged at Mindoro landed on Corregidor, followed soon after by beach landings of the reinforced Third Battalion, Thirty-fourth Infantry Regiment, Twenty-fourth Division, from Mariveles, Bataan. The assault troops established a beachhead without serious difficulty, and after ten days of heavy fighting, Rock Force concluded operations on February 26, except for mopping up. On March 2 General MacArthur returned to Corregidor, nearly three years after his departure, for a flag-raising ceremony. (Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, pp. 335–50.)

2. On January 30, 1945, a rescue force composed of Rangers and Alamo Scouts successfully liberated 512 American prisoners of war from a stockade at Pangatian, near Cabanatuan. (Walter Krueger, *From Down Under to Nippon: The Story of Sixth Army in World War II* [Washington: Zenger Publishing Company, 1953], pp. 237–39.) In early February the First Cavalry Division liberated about 3,700 Allied internees held at Santo Tomas University campus in Manila.

Lieutenant General Walter Krueger was commanding general of Sixth Army; he was promoted to general on March 5, 1945. For Krueger's account of opening the entrance to Manila Bay, see *From Down Under to Nippon*, pp. 262–70. Lieutenant General George C. Kenney had commanded the Southwest Pacific Allied Air Forces since June 1944; he was promoted to general on March 9, 1945, and served as commander of Allied Air Forces Pacific until the end of the war. For General Kenney's account of the battle on Luzon from Lingayen to Manila during the first two months of 1945, see George C. Kenney, *General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949), pp. 507–25. Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid had commanded Allied naval forces in the Southwest Pacific Area since November 1943. General Marshall had praised Kinkaid to General MacArthur as "energetic, loyal and filled with desires to get ahead with your operations. I think he is the best Naval bet for your purpose." (*Papers of GCM*, 4: 169.)

For information regarding the recapture of Manila, see Memorandum for the President, February 5, 1945, pp. 47–48.

3. The First Cavalry Division and Sixth Division launched an attack against the Antipolo-Montalban line the last week of February. Major General Verne D. Mudge (U.S.M.A., 1920), commander of the First Cavalry Division, was seriously wounded on February 28, 1945, and Brigadier General Hugh F. T. Hoffman (U.S.M.A., 1919) assumed command of the division. For further information regarding the southern sector of the enemy's Shimbū Line, extending from Antipolo to Montalban, see Krueger, *From Down Under to Nippon*, pp. 253, 273-78.

"Deepest thanks from all ranks for your generous message," General MacArthur replied on March 3. "Nothing pleases us so much as your praise." General Mudge was badly wounded from a hand grenade burst that injured his kidney and liver. (MacArthur to Marshall, March 3, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

SPEECH TO THE OVERSEAS PRESS CLUB

March 1, 1945
New York, New York

Suggested Topics for Overseas Press Club Dinner¹
(12 to 15 Minute Talk)

1. This is good point in the progress of world affairs to review the general strategy of the war from purely military point of view and take inventory of where we stand after three years and three months of war.

a. At outbreak of war our first steps were dictated entirely by necessity of preventing any juncture of the German and the Japanese through a Mediterranean-Indian corridor.

b. Having taken measures calculated to prevent any such junction of the Axis, the basic decision confronting the Chiefs of Staff was the selection of the opponent against which we would first concentrate, the resources available to the Allies not being sufficient to permit an aggressive all-out war against both simultaneously. Germany, being nearest and most dangerous and powerful of Axis and threatening the very existence of British Empire, was selected. Taken into consideration were, the time involved before our Naval building program would approach completion and, the tremendous delay if the English and French fleet fell into German hands. However, the directing of the initial offensive effort towards Germany had at all times to be integrated with the necessity of not allowing Japan to intrench in her newly acquired and greatly expanded empire and to utilize to the fullest the rapidly growing power of the Navy.

c. The public is now in a position to judge both the wisdom and the effectiveness of this strategy and to evaluate the efficiency of the organization, training and tactical employment of the United States forces in all of the theaters.

2. Now for a brief glimpse of the current situation on the war fronts in Europe. (Time will not permit comment on the Pacific and the Far East.)

a. Beginning with the *Western Front*—it is self-evident that the December drive of the Germans in the Ardennes disrupted our lines of supply and somewhat delayed our plans. However, we have now regained the offensive along the entire Western Front and a terrific battle is now aflame all along the line from Haguenau and Saarbrücken in the Vosges to Cleve in Holland. This represents a resumption of the offensive that carried us to the Siegfried line last fall where we were halted by inflexible demands of supply.

(1) The one great element in continuing the success of an offensive is maintaining the momentum. This was lost last fall when shortages caused by the limitation of port facilities made it impossible for us to get sufficient supplies to the armies to continue their sweep into Germany when they approached the German border. Once additional ports had been captured and reopened there was a shortage of rail and transportation facilities with which to get supplies forward. Now the port facilities and the interior supply lines are adequate. Subject to the worldwide shortage of both cargo and personnel shipping, there is no foreseeable shortage which will be imposed by physical events in the field. Nevertheless it is impossible to tell from day to day what unavoidable limitations will come up. That is not the case here at home and that is why we have been urging so strenuously that every measure possible be taken to see that no shortages occur here. Extension of military momentum is the greatest single factor in shortening this war. Nothing should be permitted to interfere with it. To do so is the greatest form of extravagance and waste in men and material.

b. In *Italy* the Allied Forces have made a great and often overlooked contribution to the overall strategy in containing large numbers of German troops thus preventing their deployment to other more active battle areas. The situation in Italy magnifies one important phase of global warfare that is often missed—the realization that everything that happens in one theater has its material affect on every other theater. No action or decision concerning one theater can be wisely made without consideration of the various implications on all of the fronts.

c. There is little that might be said concerning the great offensive of the Russians which came at such a welcome time in January except that which has already appeared in the press.² While it is beyond my sphere of responsibility to speak of the political discussions at the Crimea Conference or to reveal future plans of the Allies to you, I can say that a series of very frank and helpful conferences were held

between ourselves and the British and Russian General Staff leaders concerning the conduct of the war against Germany. There was a complete understanding and mutual exchange of information between us and closer cooperation will be evident as the war progresses. That from the strictly military point of view is one of the most valuable outgrowths of these recent meetings. Also in the large aspect—the evident solidarity coming out of the Crimean meeting is a blow of tremendous magnitude to the Germans. They have always planned on a split of the Allies. They never for one moment calculated that the Allies could continue to conduct combined operations with complete understanding and good faith. They thought this impossible—now they know the truth and it adds greatly to their precarious position.

d. The word shipping continues to come up in these remarks. In this connection, there is one point which requires some explanation. There is much public clamor to increase shipment of food for people of liberated areas. One of the most difficult problems continually facing the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the question of the allocation of shipping. We are faced with constant pressure to increase the shipment of food and relief supplies to liberated areas. This pressure is quite understandable and I am in complete sympathy with its objectives. The idea is naturally a popular one for it appeals to the humanitarian instincts which are so typical of American people. However, the allocation of shipping must be done on a business-like basis, taking into consideration every aspect of the problem and realizing always that the solution of any one problem must be translated into the loss of American lives before a decision can be taken.³ It has been our policy to first provide the minimum shipping required for military operations and then to allocate the remainder to civilian use, including relief shipments. There is only one alternative—either continue our present policy of giving all of the relief we can short of lengthening the war or increase the volume of relief efforts at the cost of increasing the length of the war. It comes down to that simple decision. We are doing all we can without lengthening the war. When you realize that increasing the length of the war means increasing the loss of American lives, involving additional expenditure of millions of dollars, and the inevitable loss of momentum about which I have already spoken, I can only ask what would your decision be?

e. Because of the increasing public concern over the adequacy of the present Army training program, with special reference to the 18-year-olds who are going into the Infantry—some clarification from the Army point of view seems in order. (The concern hinges quite naturally on the normal and easily understood feelings of the families of 18-year-old soldiers, but it is twisted by the popular misconception of

what is involved in the period of training required to prepare an individual soldier for combat as an Infantry replacement.)

(1) Necessity for youth, drive, steady flow of replacements to maintain momentum and end war earlier. Our successes so far in this war have proved beyond any question the soundness of the plan to create the minimum number of divisions, thereby economizing greatly in manpower, and keeping these divisions up to strength while in combat. In this connection, there is no comparison between the drive and the effectiveness of divisions that receive replacements of young, alert, aggressive soldiers, as against those divisions whose replacements are older men who find it much more difficult to adapt themselves to field conditions and to the rigorous ways of a combat soldier's life. Not only is the 18 and 19-year-old soldier the most effective and the easiest trained, but the manpower situation in the Army has reached the pressing point where we can either utilize these men after adequately training them or we can let our emotional reasons govern and give our enemies the breathing time they so desperately need. I have spoken earlier of momentum. To maintain our momentum during the decisive battles now in progress, we must continue to provide the best possible replacements promptly. In the end this is the most economic, humane thing to do because it, more than almost anything else, will bring the war to an earlier conclusion, thereby saving countless lives, many wounds and many dollars. After a certain percentage of loss occurs to the rifle strength of a division, it immediately changes from an offensive weapon to a defensive one, or else it must be withdrawn from the line. Prompt replacement of these losses has proved of telling effect in all of our campaigns. It has been an important thing that the enemy did not plan on, and the one thing he finds hardest to match in kind.

(2) Adequacy of training. I have inspected a great number of our training centers in this country, and I have seen our soldiers fighting on practically all the fronts, and there need be no alarm that these men are being insufficiently trained. Under our present procedures, no soldier can leave this country unless he is prepared to perform his contemplated duties, and we stage his entry into combat along with seasoned soldiers and veteran units to give him the maximum possible protection and opportunity to become "battle wise." Experience has taught us that replacements for our divisions can be trained in a period of 13 to 17 weeks, and that they can be effectively integrated into the seasoned units and perform their duties satisfactorily.

(3) Distinction between time required to train Infantry Replacements and time required for Universal Military Training in Post-

War Period. This period of training must not be confused with the time required to train an entire division from its activation until its entry into combat, nor the time required to give specialist training, or to prepare a man in peace-time to be an all-around Army Reservist to include training in units up to the size of a division, with the usual delays, leaves, and other unavoidable losses of time incident to a peace-time program. This explains the position of the War Department which on one hand is sending men into combat after 17 weeks' training, and on the other, is advocating in the post-war period a full year of instruction for each individual. What we must not overlook is that in the post-war period we will be training an all-around Army, not just individual Infantry replacements. Only a part of that year will be devoted to training equivalent to what our combat replacements now receive. The remainder will include the specialist training and the unit training and maneuvers of larger units.

3. Of all the questions the members of the Overseas Press Club would like to have answered, the date of the ending of the war, particularly in Europe, is probably the most compelling. While you know as well as anyone that there is no specific answer to this question, there is one element in this war that has not been present in past wars that makes any such prognostication more difficult than ever. This is the character of the enemy we face—it differs from that of any other war. Our enemies today are imbued with a fanaticism and a complete dictatorial control that waives all rules that have applied to the termination of wars between great powers down through the annals of history. Thus all yardsticks are off in estimating the collapse of the enemy in this war. And with this goes the compelling necessity to plan and make provisions for the waging of war not only until the armies of the enemy are strategically defeated but until these forces are *actually annihilated*. To plan for anything short of this would be sheer folly in view of this great imponderable factor in the character of our adversaries.

4. Close by saying that in all of the discussions with the Russians and the British, much time of which was involved in plans extending beyond the conclusion of hostilities, it became evident that, in order to have both a voice in shaping the peace and have an influence in maintaining the peace each nation must maintain a healthy military posture. At the same time this military posture must be practical from the economical and psychological point of view of this nation. I make no public advocacy at this time of any particular means of producing this military posture, but it is my duty in my official position to point out the *urgent necessity* for considered thought and early action along definite lines now while the American people are best able to judge its necessity with the evidence all about them of the terrible price we have been forced to pay in this war for our lack of preparedness in the past.⁴

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)

1. General Marshall used these notes for his off-the-record speech at the annual banquet of the Overseas Press Club held at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City. “It was quite an ordeal,” Marshall wrote to his stepson of the event. “I did not come on until 11:15 and the speaking had started at 9:30. I flew back the same night.” (Marshall to Clifton S. Brown, March 5, 1945, GCMRL/Research File [Family].)

2. The Soviet winter offensive had begun on January 12, and by the end of January the Soviet army had reached the Oder River north of Kuestrin. (Earl F. Ziemke, *Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East*, a volume in the *Army Historical Series* [Washington: GPO, 1968], pp. 415, 421–28. For a detailed account of the Vistula-Oder operation, see Christopher Duffy, *Red Storm on the Reich: The Soviet March on Germany, 1945* [New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1991].)

3. See Memorandum for the President, February 28, 1945, pp. 61–62, regarding food relief for Belgium and Holland.

4. Since Marshall’s remarks were entirely off the record, he was able to speak with a degree of frankness that would not otherwise be possible. “What particularly impressed me last night, apart from the great knowledge and skill displayed so unostentatiously, was the generosity you showed in paying tribute to your colleagues, as well as to the simplest soldier under your command,” wrote Irene Kuhn, assistant director of information at National Broadcasting Company. Ward M. Canaday, chairman of the board of Willys-Overland Motors, wrote that Marshall’s talk “created a deep conviction of sincerity and frankness and gave increasing confidence to everyone in your audience.” (Irene Kuhn to Marshall, March 2, 1945; Ward M. Canaday to Marshall, March 9, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY

March 2, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Please take measures to reduce the present volume of radio messages. I notice this morning in Log 45800 second paragraph commencing “Request citation” etc. what to me is a wholly unnecessary statement. This should have been known to all theater AG’s two years ago or longer.¹ Some time back I believe I directed that a somewhat similar instruction be omitted. The foregoing is a very small example of what I am talking about but a typical unnecessary routine performance.²

Please have someone go through the messages of, say, the past week and collect examples of where an economy of words could well be effected.³

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff Henry I. Hodes (U.S.M.A., 1920) promptly notified War Department divisions of General Marshall’s concern over the volume of radio messages and unnecessary routine statements made in messages dispatched by the War Department. “For example, a recent message contained substantially the following: ‘Request citation copy be furnished The Adjutant General together with presentation date.’” (Hodes Memorandum for the Commanding General, AAF, et al., March 3, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 311.23].)

2. On July 28, 1942, General Marshall had directed Deputy Chief of Staff Joseph T. McNarney to investigate “the immense number of cables or radiograms being sent daily to commanders.” (*Papers of GCM*, 3: 282.)

3. Captain Allan Forbes, a cryptographer, was given the mission of reviewing outgoing messages and rewriting verbose ones “for the instruction of the agencies which were violating signal brevity.” Forbes was able to show that “messages could be cut in half and that literally hundreds of words could be saved.” (Frank McCarthy Memorandum for General Bissell, March 21, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 311.23].) Theater commanders were also notified to reduce verbosity and eliminate excessive radio traffic. Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, Jr., reported that outgoing classified messages at his headquarters had been reduced from 4,664 during March to 2,170 during April. (Richardson to Marshall, May 1, 1945, *ibid.*)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY HENRY H. ARNOLD

March 2, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Arnold: I am very late in getting off this note to you but I have made several starts and interruptions threw me off the track. Since my return from Yalta I have only been here a very few days, having gone down to Pinehurst for the first weekend and then after two days back here, returned to Pinehurst for a four-day rest. I am off again this afternoon for Baruch’s place, returning to town Sunday night.¹

Mrs. Marshall has bought quite a nice lodge or cottage at Pinehurst, comfortably furnished and fully equipped. It has ample grounds and as usual there is a tremendous amount of pruning to be done.

Your doctor has told me of your condition and I was very much relieved to find that you had actually agreed to go to bed and set about making a real recovery.² They told me you were to leave yesterday for Cat Island and I had turned over in my mind the possibility of flying down to spend the weekend with you. However, I ended up with the proposition of taking Mrs. Marshall to South Carolina for the weekend.

The trip was very strenuous and especially my four-day stay in Italy. From Italy we flew directly home, stopping only long enough to regas at Casablanca, the Azores and at Stephenville. The thermometer at the latter place was five degrees about [*above*] zero, which at a dismal three in the morning was not very cheerful. Then, as usual, we had very bad weather between there and here.

Whatever you do now don’t hurry to return here and nullify the advantage you have gained by a real rest. Giles has matters well in hand and there is little you can add to the scenario at the moment. The less you worry about it the better.³

With affectionate regards, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. General Marshall departed for Bernard M. Baruch’s home (Hobcaw) in Georgetown, South Carolina, on Friday, March 2, and returned to Washington on Sunday evening,

March 4. “There is something restful and altogether delightful about your place that makes a strong appeal,” Marshall wrote to thank Baruch. (Marshall to Baruch, March 9, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. General Arnold was recovering from a heart attack at a Miami, Florida, hospital. (H. H. Arnold, *Global Mission* [New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949], pp. 537, 542.)

3. In mid-March General Arnold left the hospital and gradually returned to work under his doctors’ care. “I have been assured by the doctors that during the next month and a half they will regulate the hours that I work with the hours that I rest,” Arnold wrote during his first week back to Washington, “depending upon their heart observations, so that when I get back I will be in such physical condition that I can give you far better service than I have been able to during the past 2 years.” (Arnold Memorandum for General Marshall, March 22, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Lieutenant General Barney M. Giles was deputy commander of the Army Air Forces.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR
Confidential

March 2, 1945
Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT: Rehabilitation of Manila.

I understand that a War Damage bill is now under consideration in Congress for the reconstitution of property and the making good of damages which have been sustained by the Filipino people.

I had in mind the possibility of Congress immediately appropriating a sum of money, possibly \$100,000,000, for the specific purpose of rebuilding the homes of the people of Manila as a memorial of our appreciation of their loyalty and sacrifices. The issue of course will be up, is up as I understand, regarding the rebuilding of destroyed or damaged homes all through the Islands but if we took Manila as a special case and as a memorial as I have suggested, we might get very much quicker action and a very favorable reaction.

The matter of course would be complicated by the factor of government buildings, city utilities and the rather elaborate homes of the well-to-do—while I was only thinking of the homes of the poor and the people of limited means. However, if something of this sort could be started it might be possible to do a great deal of the work out there without drawing on us for tonnage which of course will be a decidedly limiting factor.¹

G. C. Marshall

NA/RG 107 (SW Safe, Philippines)

1. Secretary Stimson wrote at the top of this document: “Talk this over with C/S. HLS.” Stimson did not record discussing this subject with Marshall. Three days earlier, the secretary of war had discussed with Robert Patterson and General Handy the issue of whether the assessment of war damages be handled under a War Damage Corporation, existing under the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and secretary of commerce, or turning the task over to the War Department. Stimson “told Patterson to tell the Congress that we approved of the

idea of having it stay under the War Damage Corporation.” (February 27, 1945, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 50: 142–43].)

TO WILLIAM E. HESS¹

March 5, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mr. Hess: I have carefully reviewed your response of 28 February to my letter of the preceding day. As I understand your letter, it raises three major points—first, that the War Department is on record as having assured the Congress that 18-year-olds would receive at least a year’s training before going overseas; second, that our present replacement training system does not provide 18-year-olds with adequate military preparation for combat duties; and, third, that older and fully trained soldiers here should be used as replacements instead of 18-year-olds.

As for the War Department’s previous comments on this subject, the War Department testimony at the hearings you cited unquestionably establishes our position in opposition to a statutory training limitation. I also recall statements by General [Miller G.] White, then Chief of the General Staff Personnel Division, that no assurance was possible that soldiers of any age group would receive a minimum of a year’s training before proceeding overseas. If you wish, I shall have an officer visit you in your office with a marked copy of the hearings which will reveal the War Department’s position to have been that any such restriction on Army training would be impossible of administration. In this connection I do not think it could be maintained that the remarks of Generals Reckord and Devers in 1941, five months before our entry into the war, should be accepted as the governing criteria for conducting replacement training at the present time.² Both these men are able officers but at that time they were expressing general views of their own and neither one of them was a member of the War Department General Staff. Furthermore, to accept as determining views of this nature expressed at that time would be to ignore all the combat experience we have gained and techniques we have developed during the past three years. Also, their remarks were predicated upon the peacetime concept of unit training, not the wartime replacement training to which your correspondence refers. What may be successfully demanded of soldiers in time of peace in the way of training is quite different from what may be required as a matter of course today when they work without regard to hours and accept the hardships without question.

As for the adequacy of our training, the system is based, as I have just indicated above, upon an extensive military experience specifically related to the present war. Furthermore, most of the training is now in the hands of

men who have had recent combat experience. In my opinion, the present system is adequate and I have personally inspected replacement training camp after camp to make certain that the work was being conducted in the most efficient manner practicable. Of course, one must keep in mind that we are training men to be placed in seasoned veteran units where the leadership from the noncommissioned grades upward is in the hands of veterans.

The impression has been developed that there are many other soldiers in continental United States who are available for combat assignments overseas in lieu of these younger men. The facts will not bear this out. So long as we had divisions in training in this country I required that the younger men graduated from the replacement training camps should be sent to the divisions and the ranks of these units stripped of the privates who had been in training within the divisions for a long period in this country. This procedure was very hard on the divisional team but it was one way of meeting the public and Congressional desire in this matter. Some 140,000 were so assigned and reassigned. However, with the movement of the divisions out of the United States this procedure was no longer possible.

Furthermore, in the effort to provide infantry replacements for assignment overseas at the rates demanded by the heavy fighting, approximately 500,000 men were withdrawn from assignments other than divisional, in the United States, were retrained for infantry duty and sent abroad. In addition we summarily transferred from the Air Forces and the Service Forces a total of 90,000 men who were retrained as infantry. We also converted the personnel of units for which there was no longer an urgent requirement into infantry replacements—as, for example, more than 50 battalions of antiaircraft artillery, totaling 40,000 men. For the past six months we have been combing the coastal defense commands and our bases in Alaska and the Caribbean for men who are suitable for infantry replacements, they themselves to be replaced by personnel of such physical limitations that they could not be employed in combat service. The same procedure is being followed through all the rear areas in the overseas theaters, yet we are still short in replacements and under the heaviest pressure from our field commanders to obtain them.

The choice in this matter is very clear: either we must accept delays in our operations in Europe and in the Pacific or we must follow the present procedure. There is no other course. To delay the operations now under way would in my opinion be a tragic error resulting in an inevitably increased loss in life by the prolongation of the war. I am quite certain that the people of the United States would not make this choice. The attached comments of Mr. Stimson to the press on 1 March explain the situation and our efforts to meet it.³

I wish to make one further observation. The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, and I, and others in responsible places in the War Department, are

keenly sensitive to the daily casualties we are suffering. Our constant effort has been so to conduct this war that it can be brought to a successful conclusion with a minimum of American casualties. The greatest economy will be obtained by the early termination of the fighting. We must never give the enemy a moment to recuperate his strength, to regain his balance, and the urgent requirement for replacements, strong and vigorous, must be met if we are to be successful.

I shall add this final comment, that I believe that never before in our history have the soldiers in our Army been so carefully prepared for battle as is the case at the present time. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Congressman Hess (Republican from Ohio) wrote to General Marshall on February 21 that the War Department had broken a pledge to Congress that eighteen-year-old soldiers would receive a year's training before being sent overseas. General Marshall replied on February 27 in a staff-drafted letter that the War Department had consistently opposed any statutory restriction on military training. The "rather widespread misunderstanding" owed its origin to the "lack of understanding of the difference between the training of a large military organization such as a division (which requires a year or more) and the training required for an individual, which can be satisfactorily conducted in a period from 13 to 17 weeks." While the army had previously made efforts not to send men overseas with less than a year's training, the present manpower situation prevented special consideration for eighteen-year-olds. The chief of staff assured Hess that "under our present procedures no soldier can leave this country until he is prepared to perform his contemplated duties." (Hess to Marshall, February 21, 1945, and Marshall [staff-drafted] to Hess, February 27, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

On February 28 Congressman Hess reiterated his charge that the War Department had promised Congress that eighteen-year-olds would receive a year's training by quoting from testimony during 1941 and 1942 hearings on the draft. (Hess to Marshall, February 28, 1945, *ibid.*)

2. Congressman Hess had quoted excerpts from July 1941 hearings before the House Military Affairs Committee regarding extension of the draft. When asked how long it would take to properly train selectees, Major General Milton A. Reckord replied eighteen months, and Major General Jacob L. Devers replied one year and eight months because "we waste a month getting them in and we waste a month getting them out." (*Ibid.*) In July 1941, Reckord was commander of the Twenty-ninth Division training at Fort Meade, Maryland, and Devers was commanding general of the Ninth Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

3. See Marshall Proposed Statement for Secretary of War's Press Conference, March 1, 1945, pp. 63–64.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Secret

March 6, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Eisenhower: I received several letters from you, which were much appreciated and gave us an excellent idea of the general situation. Your people are certainly doing fine work and seem to be trembling on the verge of still greater things. With your successes in Europe and MacArthur's suc-

cesses in the Philippines the public is greatly encouraged; however, there is a terrific drive on against the use of 18-year-old men in combat which has been fulminated by a speech by Senator Taft on the floor of the Senate, citing the case of the son of a friend of his.¹ I was impressed yesterday with the difficulties of my position in the necessity of simultaneously answering attacks on the use of these young men and alleging the inadequacy of their training, and at the same time answering several radios, one in particular from MacArthur emphatically protesting against the shortage in replacements, and further, meeting the appeal of some of our commanders against further conversions of their men to infantry replacements. The combined circumstances could hardly present a more illogical pressure.

We are under attack of course for the inadequacy of our winter clothing and now for the charge that 75% of our materiel is inferior to that of the Germans. They grant that the jeep and the Garand rifle are all right but everything else is all wrong.² Making war in a democracy is not a bed of roses.

On February 21 I sent a radio commenting on what I thought was a failure of adequate publicity regarding a specific operation of the Third Division. Later a message from your headquarters dated February 22 recited a long series of publicity releases regarding the fighting in which the Third Division was concerned. My comment on this is that I am not much interested in the explanation. What I am interested in is the result and I go back to my usual comparison, that had it been a Marine Division every phase of a rather dramatic incident would have been spread throughout the United States. They get the result, we do not. Our technique therefore must be faulty.³

The Secretary of War told me yesterday that Mr. [John J.] McCloy would probably go to your headquarters soon, whether or not on a permanent mission or a prolonged temporary mission I do not yet know, but having to do with the plans for control of German production, etc. I know you will welcome McCloy and that he will welcome the opportunity.

I received an interesting study this morning from Stilwell reporting on a series of experiments by the Ground Forces in methods for interdicting enemy movements under cover of darkness. The experiments were carried out with the L5 liaison plane which is capable of carrying a bombload of 500 pounds. The test would indicate that not only can the planes find their way along the highways close to the front much better than our fast-moving ships but the work can be done without undue hazards from antiaircraft. I will send you a copy of his report marked for your personal consideration—not that I want you to read it but that I do want to be certain that it goes to the proper person for consideration.⁴

The Secretary now has in his hands the proposal for promotions to the grade of full General. There are eight on the list and I could not figure out

how to reduce the number without stirring up very hard feeling here and there. He is inclined to add Patton's name and is studying the matter now on the ground that it will give great popular support to the entire list. My hesitation in this would relate to the effect on Hodges.⁵

The general list of promotions will not be submitted to the President until Congress has acted on the nominations of the full Generals—if the President sends it forward. I have included in the general list most of your battlefield proposals.

Would it not be good publicity now to release some mention of Collins and McLain and their work in the advance to Cologne and Dusseldorf?⁶

Good luck to you in your next effort. We will all be pulling for you.⁷
Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. "I have now heard of numerous cases of boys sent into active combat after 7 months in the Army and without the vestige of any training except the basic 13 weeks," declared Senator Robert A. Taft on February 27. He cited the case of Private Robert R. Pogue of Cincinnati who was "inducted the end of June, only a few days after his 18th birthday, left for a port of embarkation Christmas night and was killed in France on February 3." (*Congressional Record*, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, 91, pt. 2: 1475.)

2. "It is pure bosh to say that 75 per cent of our equipment is inferior to the German materiel," Eisenhower replied on March 12. "Speaking generally the reverse is true although, of course, if you take the present Sherman and the Panther and put them in a slugging match the latter will win. One trouble is that even many of our professionals do not understand that a compromise in tank characteristics is necessary if we are to meet our own complex requirements in this type of equipment." (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2520.)

3. On February 21 the chief of staff observed that the Third Division's outstanding job in the reduction of the Colmar Pocket had not been publicized. "The 3rd Division has suffered more casualties since it went overseas than any other division in your theater. Could not some reference have been made to the spectacular nature of the performance, etc. such as a Marine show invariably gets." While resigned to the oblivion surrounding the Army Band, Marshall felt that "many opportunities have been missed in not publicly recognizing outstanding accomplishments of some of our divisions. There is a field here which, if properly exploited, will assist greatly in the maintenance of the combat efficiency of a division through recognition of its accomplishments." (Marshall to Eisenhower, Radio No. WAR-41075, February 21, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-41075)].) Eisenhower replied, "One of our difficulties in publicity for particular persons or units is making distinctions on such a big front where all have done extremely well." It was easier for the Marines to publicize units and personalities because "the Army here has fifty divisions on a battle front; the Marine Corps normally has one or two in an island battle." (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2520-21.)

4. "Have received study on night use of L-5 plane and am pressing investigations at once both by air and ground forces," replied Eisenhower. (*Ibid.*, p. 2519.)

5. Lieutenant General Courtney H. Hodges commanded the First Army. "I trust that the Secretary of War will wait for my recommendation before putting in Patton's name for promotion. There is no one better acquainted than I with Patton's good qualities and likewise with his limitations. In the past I have demonstrated my high opinion of him when it was not easy to do so," replied Eisenhower on March 12. "In certain situations both Bradley and I would select Patton to command above any other general we have, but in other situations we would prefer Hodges." (*Ibid.*, p. 2520.)

6. Major General J. Lawton Collins commanded the Seventh Corps, and Major General Raymond S. McLain commanded the Nineteenth Corps.

7. Eisenhower told the chief of staff of “the pleasant feeling of ‘misery loves company’” he had received by reading a few of Marshall’s troubles. “Sometimes when I get tired of trying to arrange the blankets smoothly over several prima donnas in the same bed I think no one person in the world can have so many illogical problems. I read about your struggles concerning the eighteen year old men in combat, and about the criticism of our equipment, and went right back to work with a grin.” (Ibid., p. 2521.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR
Secret

March 6, 1945
Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT: Bombing of Dresden.¹

Dresden is a communication center of major importance, through which reinforcements pass to reach the Russian Front. On March 4 a London announcement stated that Dresden “as the center of a railway network and a great industrial town, has become of the greatest value for conducting any defense the Germans may organize against Marshal Konev’s² armies”. Dresden is closely related with the German potentialities for launching a counterattack against the southern wing of the great Russian Bulge.

February 13/14. 796 Lancasters bombed Dresden on this night. The attack is stated to have taken place in two waves, the first wave bombed on accurate markers starting fires and the second wave reported fires and accurate bombing.

February 14. Dresden was bombed by 311 U.S. heavy bombers. The target was the marshalling yard and both H2X³ and visual methods were used. Visual results appeared excellent.

February 15. 211 U.S. heavy bombers bombed the Dresden marshalling yard. Pathfinder methods were used and results were unobserved.

March 2. Dresden was bombed by 540 U.S. heavy bombers using Pathfinder methods. Oil installations were the primary targets but due to overcast conditions the marshalling yard was bombed as a target of opportunity.

Attached is the clipping giving the statement from the German Transocean News Agency.⁴

G. C. Marshall

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Anglo-American bombing of the city of Dresden in mid-February resulted in the press questioning the action because of the large number of civilian casualties. “Today we can only speak of what once was Dresden in the past tense,” reported a German Transocean News Agency correspondent, referring to the massive air attacks in mid-February. (*New York Times*, March 5, 1945, pp. 1, 4.) On March 5 Secretary of War Stimson asked the War Department to investigate the matter. Marshall issued the following memorandum based on statistics from Army Air Forces headquarters. (March 5, 1945, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary,

50: 163]; Joe L. Loutzenheiser Memorandum for General Giles, March 6, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 384.5].)

2. Marshal Ivan Stephanovich Konev was commander of the First Ukrainian Front.

3. The H2X was a bombing radar developed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

4. Stimson replied in a handwritten note: "I doubt this report makes the case any better—on the face of it the British on Feb 13 bombed the city. While our bombing was said to be aimed at military objectives the results were practically unobserved. I think the city should be photographed carefully and the actual facts made known." Stimson's reply was forwarded to General Arnold's office for action, which dispatched a message (W-49485) to General Carl Spaatz's headquarters at U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe. (Stimson to Marshall, [March 6, 1945], and Frank McCarthy Memorandum for the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, March 6, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

General Spaatz's headquarters prepared a report on Allied air attacks on targets in Dresden. "The heaviest attacks were made by the R.A.F. on the night of 13/14 February 1945 and by Eighth Air Force the following day. Due to the proximity of these two attacks and the absence of intervening photographic coverage, it has been impossible to allocate damage to the attacking air forces." According to the report, "very substantial damage was done to the communications targets which were the targets of the Eighth Air Force, as well as to other industrial objectives and public buildings. In addition, the city itself suffered very heavily as a result of widespread fires presumably caused by incendiaries. In this connection, it is to be noted that the R.A.F. dropped 1181.6 tons of incendiaries, whereas the Eighth Air Force dropped only 296.5 tons of incendiaries." (U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe Headquarters to Commanding General, Army Air Forces, n.d. [reply to W-49485], and George C. McDonald Digest of "Report of Air Attacks on Targets in Dresden," March 28, 1945, NA/RG 18 [USSTAF Historical Division Film, 519.523].) For more information regarding the Allied air attack on Dresden, see Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day, January 1944 to May 1945*, a volume in *The Army Air Forces in World War II* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 725–32; Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939–1945*, volume 3, *Victory*, a volume in the *History of the Second World War* (London: HMSO, 1961), pp. 99–117.

TO ROBERT WOODS BLISS¹
Confidential

March 6, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Bliss: I had thought that I should probably see you at the Alibi dinner Saturday night but as I find I shall not be there I purpose taking up in writing what I had intended to discuss casually with you when next I saw you.

The various moves we made in connection with Sir John Dill have all been carried out except the last one I had in mind, that is, the question of a suitable memorial.

Most confidentially, I prepared a resolution which was introduced by Senator Connally and passed by Congress; I also prepared before his death

a citation for the Distinguished Service Medal by the President.² Copies of both of these are inclosed.

I have had in mind that with his interment in Arlington and with the reservation of a considerable area surrounding his grave—which has already been done by order of the Secretary of War—the final move would be to arrange for a bronze plaque carrying the presidential citation and the resolution of Congress, which last is unique as it is without any precedent. These two statements would satisfy all the purposes of such a plaque. However, both Nancy and I felt that it would be a wonderful thing if we could have an equestrian statue of Dill erected immediately over his grave and without any pedestal, so that it would have very much the appearance of a man in real life riding between the trees at the location of his grave. The plaque should probably be placed at some point near one of the two road junctions bordering the lot so that the passerby would be inclined to read the statements thereon in satisfying curiosity as to the statue.

In all of these matters I have had in mind the perpetuation of Dill's influence on British-American relations as being an important consideration towards the future.³

When I first prepared the draft of the resolution for Congress I had in mind including an appropriation but Senator Connally was much opposed to this and I think he was right. Now the question is the raising of the necessary funds which are estimated to be approximately \$25,000. Nancy was rather fearful of raising any funds because she thought the control of what the statue might be would get out of hand and she was very anxious that it should be pretty much the opposite of those equestrian affairs we see about Washington, specifying a Virginia hunter type and an ordinary posture.

I had in mind the possibility that at least in name if not in working fact the matter might be handled through the English-Speaking Union and it was regarding this that I wished to get your views.

This is a very hastily dictated note and I shall be glad to talk to you about this at some later date.⁴ Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Bliss, a retired diplomat, served as a consultant to the secretary of state.

2. For information regarding the White House ceremony at which time President Roosevelt presented to Lady Dill the awards honoring Sir John Dill, see Marshall Memorandum for the President, January 2, 1945, pp. 5–6.

3. The chief of staff outlines his campaign to honor Dill in Marshall to Winant, January 5, 1945, pp. 11–14.

4. General Marshall met with Bliss the next day to discuss an appropriate statue of Sir John Dill. (McCarthy Memorandum for Miss Nason, March 7, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Bliss served as chairman of the Dill Memorial Committee responsible for raising the necessary funds. For more information regarding the memorial to Dill, see Marshall to Angell, December 9, 1945, pp. 381–82.

TO CHARLES J. GRAHAM¹

March 8, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Charlie, I received your note of the sixth with your gracious invitation for dinner prior to the showing of "Winged Victory". I am sorry that I do not believe I should accept.

My reasons are these, which I ask you to treat as confidential. In the first place, openings somewhat on this order occur with great frequency in Washington and I could not possibly make such commitments. But what is more important, I am under constant attack by those, including certain newspapers, who oppose what I propose or urge. They are constantly on the lookout for some vulnerable spot at which to strike against me. My appearance at a hotel party or at a theater is very apt to lead to such a reaction. They go so far as to count me present at some official very special occasion, for instance at the Russian Embassy, when I have not been present and refer to my Washington social life in contrast to that of the hardpressed leaders in the field.

It is very easy to understand the soldiers' point of view which I must always have in mind. In the heat of the tropics, in the snow or the mud on the various fronts he cannot be expected to understand any good reason why I, who am largely responsible for his being where he is, his sufferings and his hardships, should be a participant in dinners and theater parties, whatever the purpose. There is a further point to this, in that explanations are of no purpose, and simply a sign of weakness of position.

Finally, I did attend the premiere of "Winged Victory" in New York.²

I am sorry not to feel free to accept your fine invitation and I hope you will understand. When you are here call up my secretary because I should like to see you, and Mrs. Graham too, if she is with you. Mrs. Marshall is at Pinehurst, North Carolina.³ Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Graham, president of the Pittsburgh and West Virginia Railway Company headquartered in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, invited General Marshall to join a small group for a dinner party when *Winged Victory* opened at the National Theatre in Washington, D.C., on March 26. "I know you told me a long time ago that you were making no social engagements during the war period," wrote Graham, "but, for such an event as this, thought you might make an exception." (Graham to Marshall, March 6, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Generals Marshall and Arnold had seen Moss Hart's patriotic Broadway play *Winged Victory* on January 26, 1944. "One of the chief disappointments of my life was that I could not be present the evening you and General Arnold saw my play," wrote Hart, "but it was so gracious of you to go back and talk to the cast, that I wanted to add my personal thanks to theirs, and tell you how much it meant to all of us." (Hart to Marshall, February 4, 1944, *ibid.*)

3. Graham replied that unfortunately "those who accomplish the most are usually those who have to suffer from criticisms and innuendoes on the part of those who accomplish nothing." (Graham to Marshall, March 9, 1945, *ibid.*)

NOTES FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR'S
PRESS CONFERENCE¹

March 8, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

The War situation today is clearly depicted in the communiques from the various fronts. There is nothing I could add except to forecast future operations which would not be permissible. However, I might comment on the vigor of the attacks launched by the various American Armies on the Western Front, and particularly on the skilful manner in which the various Army Corps have been handled. While the intimate details of the operations cannot now be made public I think it should be said that the skilful tactical manner in which the numerous bridgeheads were exploited is deserving of high commendation. The direction of attack frequently, it might be said usually, took the Germans by surprise and facilitated the rupture of very strong defensive positions which were not only protected by river line moats but were virtually littered with concrete machinegun nests and gun positions.

I should pay tribute to the remarkable endurance and aggressive gallantry displayed by the infantry of divisions which have been fighting in the line almost constantly since last June. The same units which captured Aachen, met Von Rundstedt's drive into the Ardennes and abolished his salient, are now deployed along the Rhine at Dusseldorf and Cologne, hammering the Germans in the outskirts of Bonn and driving into his bridgehead at Coblenz. Their morale and performance have been magnificent and I should refer especially to the 106th Division which made a deep thrust into the enemy's lines yesterday.²

Our troops in Italy have endured the extreme hardships of a winter in the Apennines and are now ejecting the Germans from one mountain peak after another. It is rather interesting to know that the mountain troops carrying out these operations of the moment were specially trained for this work in the high Rockies of Colorado.

The campaign in the Philippines has gone forward with machinelike precision and great rapidity, forecasting the reconquest of the Philippines at a much earlier date than we had ever thought possible. The trying weather of the hot season calls for great endurance and fortitude on the part of the troops but nothing seems able to slow down their progress or lessen the zeal with which each operation is undertaken.

Here at home the Army is operating under the heaviest pressure in the effort to meet the insistent demands of the various theaters. At no time since we have been in the war have the pressures been so heavy and the requirements so great, and at no time has it been so important that we meet these demands without delay or discussion. Our great purpose is to maintain the momentum of the present operations in a tremendous effort to bring the war in Europe to a prompt conclusion. The post-war discussions now underway

are of the greatest importance to the future of this and all other countries. Those phases of the discussions which pertain exclusively to American affairs are of equal importance, maybe, but there can be no post-war affairs until we first have a victory. There can be few economies in lives and dollars until we bring this fighting to a successful conclusion.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Secretary Stimson made minor editorial changes to and used all but paragraph three of Marshall's draft as part of his March 8 press conference. (War Review by the Secretary of War at Press Conference, March 8, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. The Allied drive to the Rhine River is discussed in Charles B. MacDonald, *The Last Offensive*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* (Washington: GPO, 1973), pp. 163–207. On March 7 the U.S. Ninth Armored Division crossed the Ludendorff railway bridge at Remagen, and riflemen established a bridgehead across the Rhine. (Ibid., pp. 208–35.) With the loss of the Remagen bridge, Hitler replaced German Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, commander-in-chief in the West, with Field Marshal Albert Kesselring.

The 106th Infantry Division's 424th Infantry Regiment advanced eastward toward the Simmer River. On March 7, "as the 69th Division lunged forward in a wide southeastern swing down the ridge lines from the north towards Dalheim, 1st and 2d Battalions, 424th Infantry, pushed almost five miles across the hills to make contact with it, the 3d Battalion following fast. . . . The 69th Division's move had pinched out the 106th, making contact with Third Army near Stadtkyll." (R. Ernest Dupuy, *St. Vith, Lion in the Way: The 106th Infantry Division In World War II* [Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1949], pp. 219–23; quote on p. 223.)

MEMORANDUM FOR FIELD MARSHAL WILSON
Confidential

March 8, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

I am attaching a memorandum to me from General Persons, my liaison officer with Congress. As you will see, it relates to the travel of members of Congress abroad.¹

I am also inclosing the President's memorandum to the leaders in Congress regarding the visits by Congressmen to active theaters and the directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff upon whom has been placed the responsibility for determining whether or not such visits are justified.²

I am giving you this information in connection with the increasing embarrassment that we suffer from the travel of individual members of Congress on the invitation of the British Government. As you will see from General Persons' memorandum, the War Department will probably be attacked by the Republican Floor Leader of the House tomorrow on this subject, due to the fact that Congressman Dirksen was denied by the War Department, in accordance with policy and instructions, a permit to enter the Italian Theater and at the same time the press announces that Con-

gresswoman Clare Luce will proceed to Italy. She, I understand, was given this invitation by Field Marshal Alexander.³

I can talk to you about this later but I thought that at the moment the complications and embarrassments in the matter would be better understood if I sent you the inclosed.⁴

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Major General Wilton B. Persons, chief of the Legislative and Liaison Division, wrote that Republican leader Joseph W. Martin, Jr., was upset because Congresswoman Clare Boothe Luce was permitted to go to Italy, while Everett M. Dirksen (Republican from Illinois) had been refused a military permit to Italy and China. Congresswoman Luce was traveling at the invitation of the British, and the War Department had nothing to do with her trip. Congressman Dirksen had been refused a military permit by the Joint Chiefs of Staff because he was not eligible to tour active theaters; however, he had been appointed a subcommittee of one by Clarence Cannon, chairman of the Appropriations Committee, to report on Federal activities within the committee's jurisdiction. Persons believed that Martin's motives in raising the question were political, as a means "to get at the Administration through us." Colonel Frank McCarthy added a handwritten note to General Marshall at the bottom of Persons's memorandum: "This may involve an attack on you personally. I pointed out to Mr. Martin that the matter was for JCS action—not your action alone. He said 'Come on, now, everybody knows who runs the JCS.' F. McC." (Persons Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, March 8, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected]. Cannon to Dirksen, February 19, 1945, and Marshall [staff-drafted] to Martin, February 27, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].) Secretary of War Stimson had met with Congressman Dirksen on February 10, and wrote, "I don't see any way of allowing him to go without making a precedent which will give us eternal trouble. The ban against single Congressmen going has been carefully fabricated between the President and the Congress and has held tight thus far except in three cases where personal representatives of the President were sent." (February 10, 1945, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 50: 102].)

2. In March 1943, General Marshall recommended that congressional visits to overseas military establishments be limited to one committee (restricted to four members) from each house. President Roosevelt concurred and notified the leaders in Congress. (*Papers of GCM*, 3: 595–96.) In November 1943 President Roosevelt issued a directive that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be authorized to approve travel by civilians into or through areas of active operations. (Roosevelt Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 20, 1943, NA/RG 407 [AGO, 230].)

3. Clare Boothe Luce, who had recently returned from a visit to the Italian theater with members of the House Military Affairs Committee, was now in England, en route to the Italian front at the invitation of Field Marshal Harold Alexander, supreme commander in the Mediterranean theater. (*New York Times*, March 7, 1945, p. 9. For Mrs. Luce's previous trip, see Marshall Memorandum for Colonel Pasco, January 9, 1945, pp. 25–27.)

4. As part of his world trip, Congressman Everett M. Dirksen toured the United States Fifth Army front in early May 1945. (*New York Times*, February 27, 1945, p. 4, and May 5, 1945, p. 11.) On March 11, Major General Wilton Persons notified General Marshall that Speaker Sam Rayburn recommended that the War Department permit Congressman Dirksen to tour Italy or face a damaging attack by Minority Leader Joe Martin or even pressure from the White House. Persons recommended that Field Marshal Alexander arrange for Dirksen to be invited by the British to enter Italy as Congresswoman Luce was invited. (Persons Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, March 11, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO GENERAL CARL SPAATZ
Radio No. WAR-51724. *Top Secret*

March 12, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Spaatz from Marshall. Archer and Deane in Moscow report following from Marshal Khudyakov:¹

"According to information which we have, the General Staff of the German Army is situated 38 kilometers south of Berlin in a specially fortified underground shelter called by the Germans The Citadel. It is located on the territory of Stammlager at a distance of 5 1/2 to 6 kilometers south-south-east from the town of Zossen and from 1 to 1 1/2 kilometers east of a wide super highway which runs parallel to the railroad from Berlin to Dresden.

The area occupied by the underground fortifications of The Citadel covers from about 5 to 6 square kilometers. The whole territory is surrounded by wired entanglements several rows in depth and is very strongly guarded by an SS Guard Regiment.

According to the same source the construction of the underground fortifications for the German General Staff was started in 1936. In 1938 and 1939 the strength of the fortification was tested by the Germans against bombing from the air and against Artillery fire.

I ask you, dear General, not to refuse the kindness as soon as possible to give directions to the Allied Air Forces to bomb The Citadel with heavy bombs.

I am sure that as a result of the action of the Allied Air Forces, the German General Staff, if still located there will receive damage and losses which will stop its normal work and the installation shall have to be moved elsewhere. Thus the Germans will lose a well organized communication center and headquarters.

Enclosed is a map with exact location of the German General Staff."

Deane adds: "On the British map 1: 500,000 Europe (air), the area located is on the right side, about half to 3/4 of a mile east, of the road between Zossen and Neuhof with the southwestern corner of the area at 52 degrees 11 minutes north and 13 degrees 28 minutes east." This completes message from Deane.

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff have recommended to the British Chiefs of Staff "That orders be given Spaatz and Bottomley² to carry out promptly action requested by Marshal Khudyakov unless they consider it impracticable of successful execution. In latter case report to be made accordingly to Combined Chiefs of Staff with statement of reasons."³

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-51724])

1. Major General John R. Deane, chief of the United States Military Mission to Moscow, had sent to the War Department a letter from Soviet Marshal of Aviation S. V. Khudyakov, asking him to direct the Allied air forces to bomb the German General Staff headquarters. (Deane to War Department, Radio No. MX-23173 [CM-IN-11902], March 11, 1945,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Rear Admiral Ernest R. Archer was chief of the British Military Mission to the Soviet Union.

2. British Air Marshal Norman H. Bottomley.

3. On March 14 General Marshall informed Deane: "Spaatz has just informed me that this target will be attacked with the best means available as soon as conditions permit." (Marshall to Deane, Radio No. WAR-52766, March 14, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-52766)].) Allied bombers targeted the headquarters of the German high command at Zossen, long regarded as invulnerable, on March 15, as a "gesture of collaboration" in reply to the Soviets' request. "The bombers dropped almost 1,400 tons visually on Zossen," wrote official Army Air Forces historians Craven and Cate, "blanketing the area with bombs and destroying most of the buildings above the ground." (Craven and Cate, *Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day*, p. 743.)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER March 14, 1945
Radio No. WAR-52767. *Top Secret* [Washington, D.C.]

TOPSEC eyes only Marshall to Eisenhower. It would be asking a good deal to take one of Clark's six dependable American divisions at this particular moment, your FWD 17807, especially when he knows you have nearly 90 already available and when you have now closed to the Rhine over a good deal of its length, making it relatively easy for you to rest your divisions.¹ Before expressing my own views, I would like to know the whereabouts of the proposed operation, etcetera. The date you give seems quite distant considering your present prospects. If it comes to transferring a U.S. division from Italy, would the Tenth Mountain be of any use to you? (You might get Bull's views on this.)²

NA/RG 165 (OPD, 370.5 TS, Case 34)

1. "On the most highly secret basis we are considering, as a feature of our whole campaign, an airborne operation on a scale of seven to ten divisions. Our tentative target date is May 1 but this looks rather optimistic from viewpoint of weather and unit readiness," wrote Eisenhower on March 12. "What would you think of my taking up with SACMED and McNarney the possibility of their sparing one American division from that front to be sent as quickly as possible?" (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2524–25.) General Joseph T. McNarney served as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean theater. General Mark W. Clark had commanded the Fifteenth Army Group since mid-December 1944.

2. "I withdraw my suggestion," Eisenhower replied on March 15. "So long as plans and the current situation in Italy make undesirable any further weakening of our forces there, it would be unwise to transfer a division here to prepare for an operation that of course may never eventuate." (*Ibid.*, p. 2529.) On March 27 Eisenhower explained to Marshall that he had asked for the additional division while considering deploying an airborne operation in the Kassel area. "The only thing we must guard against is the possibility that the German may still find enough strength to oppose our penetrations along some line fairly deep in his own country where our stretched maintenance might allow him to stalemate us for a period of time. When I requested you some time ago to give me the possibilities of moving another division here I was looking forward to an airborne operation in the Kassel area which would have made it impossible for the German to do this." (*Ibid.*, pp. 2547–48.)

MEMORANDUM FOR FLEET ADMIRAL KING

March 15, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear King: I have received a letter from the Secretary of the Washington American League Baseball Club inviting me to participate in the opening of the baseball season on April 16 by marching with you and Clark Griffith to the flagpole at the end of the field in connection with the raising of the flag.¹ I have been told that you had accepted.

It seems to me in the present state of the fighting that we are bound to get a pretty bad reaction from overseas following the inevitable publicity advertising our formal participation on the ball field in such a ceremony. There is a considerable difference between raising the flag at Griffith Park and raising it at Ehrenbreitstein or on Iwo Jima.²

I see no objection to possibly going to the game and sitting in a box but I don't like this idea at the present time of being sucked into the publicity formalities of the procedure.

What is your reaction? Have you committed yourself?³

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Edward B. Eynon, Jr., had written on behalf of Clark C. Griffith, president of the baseball club, "to ask if you with Admiral Ernest J. King would officially open our Baseball Season by marching to the Flag on our Flag raising on Monday, April 16." (Eynon to Marshall, March 12, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

2. The U.S. Marines reached the summit of Mount Suribachi on the island of Iwo Jima on February 23, 1945, where the American flag was raised. While Marine combat photographer Louis R. Lowrey photographed the first flag raising, Associated Press photographer Joe Rosenthal took his well-publicized photograph as Marines replaced the initial flag with a larger one.

The Sixty-ninth Division captured the Luftwaffe citadel at Ehrenbreitstein, on the east bank of the Rhine River opposite Koblenz, on March 27. Nearly twenty-two years earlier, on April 23, 1923, the American flag had been lowered at the Ehrenbreitstein fortification, signifying the end of the occupation of Germany following the First World War. During a ceremony held on April 6, 1945 (Army Day), that same flag was raised over the fortress. (*Pictorial History of the 69th Infantry Division: 15 May 1943 to 15 May 1945* [Germany: n.p., 1945], pp. 70–71.)

3. Admiral King agreed with Marshall's memorandum and did not attend the game. (Frank McCarthy Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, March 17, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR
Secret

March 15, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Please note the attached message from Eisenhower regarding General Clay, which has just been received.¹ It appears to fit in perfectly with your ideas on this subject.

There is a further, very important consideration in this matter subsidiary to the main purpose. Persons tells me that there is a growing antagonism in Congress against the War Department to the fact that General Clay occu-

pies so influential a position in connection with civil matters at the present time.² For this reason there is added importance to sending him to France at the earliest possible date.

What would you think about taking this up personally with Justice Byrnes in order to bring the matter to a head? Incidentally I should tell you that in my original agreement for Clay's assignment to Justice Byrnes we spoke of a tentative date of the middle of March for the completion of his work. However, since then the difficulties of Justice Byrnes' affairs have greatly increased and Admiral Leahy stated at the JCS meeting the other day that Justice Byrnes said that Clay was the most efficient man of any kind that he had ever met. So I anticipate that he will be very loath to let him go, but I think it is important that he should do so.³

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. "I have heard a rumor that Lucius Clay may become available for assignment to a theater," Eisenhower wrote to General Somervell on March 14. "If it should develop that this is so, I have a very urgent need for him for a job of the greatest responsibility and urgently request that you give this theater first consideration. My idea is that he would be the Herbert Hoover of this war and would have the job of handling civil affairs in Germany." (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2528.)

2. Major General Lucius D. Clay was serving as deputy to James F. Byrnes in the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. For Clay's account of how his assignment to Byrnes's office came as a surprise, see Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1950), pp. 2–4.

3. Secretary Stimson recorded on March 16 that he "saw Byrnes and told him of our need for Clay, telling him that he was wanted by Eisenhower and Marshall and on Byrnes' inquiry I explained the importance of the task for which he was wanted in Germany. Byrnes was very nice about it and said that Clay, he thought, was the most able man he had ever worked with and he didn't know how he could get along without him; but he recognized that this was a superior opportunity." (March 16, 1945, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 50: 194].)

"When Justice Byrnes told me that I was to go to Germany as deputy military governor," Clay recalled, "I drove to the War Department to ask both General Somervell and Assistant Secretary McCloy to try to find someone else. I did so because it looked then as if the Japanese war would last for some time and I hoped for a tour of duty in the Pacific which would carry with it some combat experience." On April 8 Clay reported to Eisenhower's headquarters at Reims, and on April 17 he received notice of his promotion to a lieutenant generalcy. (Clay, *Decision in Germany*, pp. 4–8.)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER March 16, 1945
[Radio No. W-53969.] *Secret* Washington, D.C.

Eisenhower from Marshall. I have here General Brereton's recommendation in which you concur for the citation of the 82d Airborne Division for its action in Holland.¹

The War Department policy regarding citations established in War Department Circular 333 of 22 Dec. 1943 had for its purpose the avoidance of divisional citations except under most unusual circumstances, since the

past practice and that developed in the Guadalcanal campaign had been to cite divisions in such a way that inevitably every division in the battle was cited and it literally meant nothing more than a battle participation, the poor being cited along with the best. The policy also had for its purpose the encouragement of citations without long delays for smaller units, preferably company and battalion, and platoon if possible for which the theater or army commander has the power to act and for which the individual combat soldier won the right to wear a distinguishing ribbon.²

The recent citation of the 101 Division for its action at Bastogne was a very proper exception to the general policy. Now I fear that the 82d recommendation has been inspired by reason of the 101 citation for the Bastogne action. Also I wonder if the 101 in Holland didn't do enough to merit a citation there if the 82d is to receive one. And further I wonder if once the 82d is cited, we will not immediately be involved with a succession of divisions, the First, the Fourth Armored and so on.

What is your personal reaction?³

I assume you have cited some unit for the Remagen bridge affair. Certainly a citation apparently would seem to be called for though I suppose the Fourth Armored Division's penetration to the vicinity of Andernach and the Ninth Armored Division or Ninth Infantry Division's thrust south towards Remagen also played a distinguishing part in the general affair.⁴

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton commanded the First Allied Airborne Army in the European Theater of Operations.

2. War Department Circular No. 333, December 22, 1943, stated: "It must be clearly established that the unit distinguished itself in battle by extraordinary heroism, exhibited such gallantry, determination, and esprit de corps in overcoming unusually difficult and hazardous conditions as to set it apart and above units participating in the same engagement. As a unit, it must have distinguished itself by conspicuous battle action of a character that would merit the award to an individual of the Distinguished Service Cross. . . . It is desired that the great majority of units cited will be companies and battalions (Army Air Forces squadrons and groups), or units of comparable size. The standards are such that only on rare occasions will regimental or divisional units qualify for such award."

In October 1943 General Marshall expressed similar views to General Douglas MacArthur: "A long delayed and very general appreciation of the services of a division was of less importance than a prompt citation of small units, companies, or battalions." See *Papers of GCM*, 4: 170–71.

3. "I did not know personally that the recommendation for the 82d Division had been forwarded to you," replied Eisenhower on March 17. "I will have the matter handled by requiring the airborne commander to enumerate the units that should be cited." Eisenhower agreed to "limiting unit citations to the smaller formations except in most unusual circumstances. Even in the case of the 101st Division we had to say 'less one battalion'. Recommendations have been submitted to me for citations for both the 4th Armored and the 90th Divisions and this is only an indication of what will come unless we stick closely to a policy." (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2530–31.)

4. For further information regarding the Fourth Armored Division, see Marshall to Eisenhower, March 27, 1945, p. 102.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HULL
Top Secret

March 19, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

I had a two-hour discussion with Admiral King on the Pacific.¹ I am inclined to think that he will accept the Army command proposal, but I found that he was still concerned over the question of whether or not we were opposing Nimitz' control of the Ryukyu operation and the Chusan operation. I told him this was not the case, that we were in accord with them.² There were other points of detail that came up which moved me to make this suggestion to Admiral King: that instead of redrafting the directive to include these special matters we make a statement in the minutes regarding these various matters, that statement to be furnished theater commanders concerned.

For example, that the minutes covering the action on the directives should have a paragraph reading about as follows:

In the interpretation of the directives now being issued regarding command and operations in the Pacific, the following is to be understood by all concerned:

That the actual offensive operations in seizing holdings in the Ryukyus will be under CINCPOA;

That if an operation is undertaken on the China coast it will likewise be under CINCPOA;

That once the landings have been made good in the Ryukyus and construction of the air strips and similar measures gotten well under way, the control of this area will pass to CINCPAC;³

That the 20th Air Force will continue to operate under JCS directions until the time has come for the concentration of all efforts against the Japanese homeland, when it will pass to the control of CINCPAC, etc. etc.

Please have someone attempt such a minute.⁴

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. General Marshall and Admiral Ernest J. King held a meeting at 2:00 P.M. on March 19, 1945. (GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Engagement and Visitor Records].) On February 26 General Marshall had presented the army's plan for command in the Pacific to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration. "All Army forces in the Southwest Pacific and Pacific Ocean Areas should be placed under a single Army commander. At the same time, all elements of the Navy should come under direct command of a single Navy commander. Each of the two commanders, cooperating intimately under operational directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should plan and conduct his own service's part in the Pacific war. The command of specific major operations should continue to be prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." To avoid disruption, the existing area boundaries and responsibilities should remain unchanged for the present. "However, the two commanders should be directed to work toward the eventual objective of each having under his own control (subject only to the coordination authority of the area commander) all resources of his own service no matter where located and to recommend progressive adjustments accordingly." (Memorandum [OPD staff-

drafted] by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Command in the Pacific [J.C.S. 1259], attached to Lieutenant Colonel Florence T. Newsome Memorandum for the Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 26, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 384 TS, Case 1].)

2. The continuing question of unity of command in the Pacific surfaced as plans for the invasion of Japan, within Admiral Chester W. Nimitz's geographical authority as the commander in chief of the Pacific Ocean Areas, grew closer. Army staff planners believed that U.S. Army forces and resources would be more efficiently employed during the final assault on Japan if placed under the control of General Douglas MacArthur. (Louis Morton, *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1962], p. 249. Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943–1945*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1968], pp. 579–84. For previous correspondence with MacArthur regarding Pacific command, see *Papers of GCM*, 4: 701.)

"To King, Leahy, Nimitz, and naval officers in general, it had always seemed that the defeat of Japan could be accomplished by sea and air power alone, without the necessity of actual invasion of the Japanese home islands by ground troops," wrote Admiral King after the war. "In 1942, 1943, and 1944, while the attention of most of the Allied political and military leaders was concentrated on Europe, and while the war against Japan was left largely to King to manage with what forces he could muster, the Pacific war had proceeded largely upon this assumption. With the approaching victory in Europe a larger amount of attention was concentrated on the Pacific by people who had not previously been too greatly concerned with the problems of that war. . . . Upon Marshall's insistence, which also reflected MacArthur's views, the Joint Chiefs had prepared plans for landings in Kyushu and eventually in the Tokyo plain. King and Leahy did not like the idea, but as unanimous decisions were necessary in the Joint Chiefs meetings, they reluctantly acquiesced." (Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, *Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record* [New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1952], p. 598.)

3. Admiral King insisted on unified command by proposing that a third Pacific area be established for the Japanese home islands with a commander in chief, Japan Area (CINC-JAPA) to plan and execute the final invasion. On March 8 the Joint Chiefs of Staff met in closed session to consider a memorandum and directive presented by Admiral King, in which he proposed that the Japan area be "delimited by the shoreline perimeter (and adjacent coastal waters) enclosing the islands of Kyushu, Shikoku, Honshu, Hokkaido, and the other islands and waters included therein. . . . The prospective Commander in Chief, Japan Area, will be assigned duty also as Commanding General, Army Forces Pacific Theater (ComGen-Pac), in which capacity he will have administrative responsibility (command) for all U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific Theater." (King Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 8, 1945, NA/RG 165 [ABC, 323.31 POA, Section 3-A (1–29–42)]. Coakley and Leighton, *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943–1945*, p. 581.)

4. For further discussion of command in the Pacific, see Marshall Memorandum for Admiral King, March 22, 1945, pp. 94–97.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY
Confidential

March 20, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Justice Byrnes called me up this morning with regard to the 12:00 o'clock closing hour for certain types of cafes and the fact that the Eighth and Ninth Service Commands have issued orders on the subject of military personnel checking in, at 12:00 o'clock, I believe, in the Eighth Service Command and at 1:00 o'clock in the Ninth Service Command.

Justice Byrnes was hopeful that we would establish uniform instructions in regard to this matter which is now the subject of so much debate in the press. Confidentially he stated that Mayor LaGuardia's action in New York was contrary to that of his Board of aldermen or supervisors, and that it would be very helpful to him if the Army was consistent in its support of the presidential desire. He suggested that possibly we might issue instructions that Army personnel would not patronize any of the entertainment establishments placed under the ban of the 12:00 o'clock curfew. He felt that there was no objection whatever to their going about their pleasures after 12:00 o'clock so long as they did not patronize the particular establishments which the Government desires closed at that hour.¹

Will you figure out what might be done in the matter. I think that some action should be taken during the day.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Effective February 26, Director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion James F. Byrnes had requested that all places of entertainment close by midnight each day, "primarily to save coal consumed in heating and in providing electricity." (*New York Times*, February 20, 1945, p. 1.) On March 18 New York City Mayor Fiorello H. La Guardia extended the curfew by one hour. Byrnes repudiated the 1:00 A.M. curfew, and he asked for the "full cooperation of all local officials and of the public in support of this request." He insisted that it was "one of a series of conservation measures designed to save coal, manpower and transportation at a crucial period in the war. We cannot expect to obtain voluntary savings in the home unless we take other measures to convince the public that such savings are necessary. We must convince our fighting forces that the home front is prepared to sacrifice for their support." (Ibid., March 19, 1945, p. 1; March 20, 1945, pp. 1 and 15.) Byrnes recalled that Mayor La Guardia telephoned him and "talked as if New York City would secede from the Union if its night clubs were forced to shut down so early." (Byrnes, *All in One Lifetime*, pp. 250–51.)

2. On March 20 a letter regarding curfew instructions was dispatched over the chief of staff's signature to military personnel in the Military District of Washington, and the commanding generals of all the continental Service Commands were telephoned with regard to the curfew. (Lieutenant Colonel F. Gorham Brigham, Jr., Memorandum for Miss Nason, March 21, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 353.8].) All military personnel were advised of the following: "The Director of War Mobilization has requested that patrons of all places of entertainment leave such places in time to permit closing at twelve o'clock midnight. Places of entertainment include night clubs, sport arenas, theaters, dance halls, road houses, saloons, bars and other similar enterprises, whether public or private, excluding restaurants engaged exclusively in serving food. The purpose of this request is to conserve coal, electricity, transportation, manpower, etc., to facilitate the war effort." (Marshall Memorandum for All Military Personnel of the Five War Department Groups, March 20, 1945, *ibid.*)

Byrnes resigned his position effective April 2, having no intention to remain in the post to supervise reconversion. With victory in Europe "not far distant" he believed that the person to direct the reconversion program should now assume the office.

In his quarterly report, Byrnes recommended removal of the curfew after V-E Day, and his successor Fred M. Vinson (experienced congressman and judge who most recently served as head of the Federal Loan Agency and the Office of Economic Stabilization) lifted the midnight entertainment curfew on May 9. (*New York Times*, April 3, 1945, p. 1; May 10, 1945, p. 1. James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* [New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947], pp. 46–48.) See Marshall to Byrnes, April 4, 1945, p. 119.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING¹
Top Secret

March 22, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

SUBJECT: Draft of Directive for reorganization and
future operations in the Pacific theater, dated 20 March.

I have had General Hull and my Planners go over this directive with a view to its possible amendment towards producing a directive that would meet both the Army and Navy points of view and I have personally gone into the matter in some detail. After very careful consideration it seems to me that it would be necessary to amend this particular directive to a point where it would look substantially like one of the directives already presented after extensive study and effort by the Joint Staff Planners.²

In my opinion this particular directive is too complicated and too indefinite, and lacking in a direct approach to the main issue in the Pacific. The commanders in chief of the respective forces appear to have indefinite but enormous responsibilities, and yet have no clearly defined command powers. The Army commander, in effect, would have no area in which to hang his hat and no resources and no land area with which to initiate the preparations which he is told to carry out.

There appears an indefiniteness regarding the powers of the Army commander, and possibly the Navy commander, to provide the necessary resources and it is not apparent just how they would make this provision.

Nothing definite appears to be accomplished by this directive in the immediate future towards alleviating the present diffuse and disorganized situation in the Pacific with regard to the conservation and economical use of Army resources. There would be five major headquarters (six with the CG, Twentieth Air Force) all involved in decisive operations against Japan, but all with their powers, responsibilities and relationships unbelievably complicated, and I think, obscure.

With relation to the apparent difference of opinion regarding force commander and area commander, the directive seems to involve an inconsistency in that it sets up a *force* commander, CINAFPAC, who is to undertake plans and preparations on the Army side for the operations against Japan, whereas he is directed to cooperate with CINCPAC, a Navy *area* commander, who is to undertake the Naval plans and preparations. This is rather difficult to understand, and it makes it seem all the more reasonable to have a parallel set-up with CINAFPAC undertaking the Army side and the Commander in Chief of the naval forces, CINCPAC, undertaking the Navy side. This would in effect produce the Army solution for organization in the Pacific.

As to issuing a directive for operations prior to a directive defining the command and organization, this to me is unacceptable. The two are inti-

mately related, and obviously the organization should come first in order that the responsible commanders may know what their powers and responsibilities are and may command the tools essential to plans and preparations. The more difficult the transition period, if it is difficult, the more important it is that the reorganization should be undertaken immediately in order that the transition be completed and the organization tested and experienced before the final stages of the softening up process start against the Japanese homeland.

The whole question of organization and command, as well as future operations, has been under exhaustive study for a long time. The most intricate problem of Army redeployment may be upon us any day. The required preparations for this last, as well as the other complicated Army logistical steps, are to a certain extent stalled or proceeding with inadequate guidance and control awaiting solution as to organization for the Pacific.

The involved problem of Army logistics is extraordinarily difficult when applied to extensive land campaigns far from home, particularly with the added complication of redeployment. The interpolation of excessive joint organization and airtight area compartments into this problem complicates an already difficult matter with controls which cannot share what is obviously an Army responsibility. Coordination required between the Army and Navy on the other hand, is a comparatively simple matter to be worked out between the commanders concerned and checked here in Washington.

There appears to be some confusion as to what is meant by unified command. The application of the idea of unified command in the proposal under consideration is not understood since the result seems to be to diffuse and compartmentalize resources under somewhat obscure control rather than concentrating these resources on Japan under two strong commanders. The impression I get is that starting from a general principle, not clearly defined in detail, we are attempting to warp a huge organization and enormous resources to fit the idea.

Finally, I think that under the system of the proposed minutes which I submitted the other day, amended copy attached, most of the complications, at least doubts or uncertainties in our minds, can be obliterated, permitting the directives to be couched in rather simple language. I get the impression that up to this time we are permitting mere details of arrangements and duties of individuals, Richardson³ for instance, to fog the fundamentals concerned in this organization.

[Enclosure]

PROPOSED MINUTES

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the following message be sent out in connection with the issuance of the directives which they had approved.

In the interpretation of the directives now being issued regarding command and operations in the Pacific, the following is to be understood by all concerned:

The actual offensive operations necessary for seizing holdings in the Ryukyus will be undertaken under the command of Admiral Nimitz and forces allocated to him for this purpose will not be withdrawn from his command until such time as determined by mutual agreement or by directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

If developments of the war require an operation in the Chusan-Ningpo area this will be undertaken under the command of Admiral Nimitz.

Once the landings have been made good in the Ryukyus and construction of the air strips and similar developments gotten well under way, the control of this area will pass to General MacArthur.

Admiral Nimitz will continue to control the Hawaiian Group and the Marianas.

With regard to these same directives the following development of command set-up and territorial boundaries is contemplated:

A speedy reorganization of the command set-up for the Pacific Theater is essential. This reorganization must be accomplished progressively, however, to the end that there be no loss in the present momentum of operations against the Japanese.

General MacArthur will establish a Joint Staff for the invasion of the Japanese homeland.

If an operation can be organized against the Island of Borneo its completion should be followed by the progressive release to the South East Asia Command of the areas in general south of the Philippine Archipelago and the Island of Hainan, with possible specific exceptions, such as Manus Island.

The completion of the mopping up operations in the Philippines and the build-up of the necessary bases in that area preparatory to operations against Japan should be organized under a command set-up not involved in SWPA affairs as relate to Australians, Dutch, British and other Allies and their territories.

Requisitions covering all supplies and equipment common to both Services will be coordinated in the theater insofar as practicable to avoid duplication and will be screened in Washington.⁴

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall dictated this memorandum to his secretary, Mona Nason, on March 21. He incorporated information from Joint Staff Planner Brigadier General George A. Lincoln's comments on the latest directive prepared by Admiral King's staff. (Lincoln Comments on Attached [not attached] Memorandum for Chiefs of Staff, March 21, 1945, NA/RG 165 [ABC, 323.31 POA, Section 3-A (1-29-42)].) The triple-spaced typed draft edited by the chief of staff is located in NA/RG 165 (OPD, 384 TS, Case 1).

2. Staff Planner Lincoln reported on March 12 that “discussions are proceeding amicably. . . . The Navy Planner [Rear Admiral Donald B. Duncan (U.S.N.A., 1917)] and I have agreed that after careful study of the matter by ourselves jointly, we will not spend time arguing any basic differences developed but will present a clean-cut problem to the Chiefs of Staff for decision. As I see it, the basic problem for decision will be the question of area command versus primary responsibility to commander of forces.” (Lincoln Memorandum for General Hull, March 12, 1945, NA/RG 165 [ABC, 323.31 POA, Section 3-A (1–29–42)].) The staff planners held seven sessions from March 10 to 16 to discuss operations and command in the Pacific. (Minutes of the Joint Staff Planners 192d Meeting, NA/RG 218 [CCS 334, JPS Minutes].)

The Joint Staff Planners reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 16 that they were in agreement on the results of their work “except for the fundamental difference as to the basic idea underlying future organization in the Pacific. The Navy proposal continues the emphasis on area command, control and responsibility for operations under the principle of unified command, creates a third area in the Pacific, and leaves Commanders in Chief of the Army forces and the Navy forces in a role which is primarily administrative and logistical. The Army proposal places emphasis, including command responsibility for operations (to be undertaken under the principle of unified command), on the role of the Commanders in Chief of the Army forces and Navy forces respectively and while retaining for the present the two area commands, concentrates most of the command and control of forces and operations in two commanders. The Planners do not consider they can resolve this basic difference.” (Report by the Joint Staff Planners, March 16, 1945, Enclosure to J.C.S. 1259/3, Directive for Reorganization and Future Operations in the Pacific Theater, *ibid.* Hull Memo for General Marshall, March 17, 1945, and attached Lincoln Notes on J.C.S. 1259/3, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 384 TS, Case 1].) For previous correspondence regarding command in the Pacific, see Marshall Memorandum for General Hull, March 19, 1945, pp. 91–92.

3. Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, Jr., army commander in the Pacific Ocean Areas, resented Admiral Nimitz’s control of military shipping and the subordination of the army in the area. (Coakley and Leighton, *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943–1945*, pp. 579–80. For previous information regarding the domination of navy authority in the area, see *Papers of GCM*, 4: 553.)

4. “The Navy did not once mention unified command,” Lincoln reported on March 26, and “are backtracking on their basic directive, which includes the Japan area, and now state they do not accept that idea. The reason may be that on further consideration they have discovered how much power it would eventually give General MacArthur.” Vice Admiral Charles M. “Cooke is now laying great stress on the ‘amphibious phase’ of the operations and implies that this includes command and control of practically everything by Admiral Nimitz until such time as General MacArthur is able to step dry-shod on the soil of Japan. . . . The Navy wish is obviously to get out a directive for operations and leave the matter of command and control to some other time.” (Lincoln Memorandum for General Hull, March 26, 1945, NA/RG 165 [ABC, 323.31 POA, Section 3-A (1–29–42)].) On April 3, 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued J.C.S. 1259/4, Command and Operational Directives for the Pacific. (*Ibid.*) For further information regarding command in the Pacific, see Marshall to MacArthur, March 29, 1945, pp. 104–5.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Radio No. WARX-57751. *Secret*

March 23, 1945
Washington, D.C.

For Eisenhower’s EYES ONLY from Marshall. Please pass the following from me to General Bradley: “I am filled with admiration over your handling of the operations involved in the development of the Remagen

Bridgehead and the clearing of the Saar Basin. I want General Hodges and General Patton and their Corps and Division Commanders to know that their great military successes of the past few weeks have registered a high point in American military achievement. Incidentally I am profoundly impressed with the remarkable logistical support of the Remagen Bridgehead and the supply of Patton's Forces which made possible the rapidity of their bold advances."¹

If you think it wise, that is, without offense to Devers' group or to Simpson's Army, and as a possible antidote for an overdose of Montgomery which is now coming into this country, you have my permission to release this in Paris.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On March 7 the U.S. Ninth Armored Division captured the strategic Ludendorff railway bridge at Remagen, allowing U.S. troops to cross the Rhine River and establish the first Allied bridgehead on the east bank of the Rhine. General Omar N. Bradley gives his account of Lieutenant General Courtney H. Hodges (First Army commander) notifying him of American troops crossing the Rhine in *A Soldier's Story* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951), pp. 510–11. While elated that American troops had captured the bridge, Bradley was aware that plans had called for Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's troops to first cross the Rhine in the north. "The Plan had been predicated upon a major crossing by Monty north of the Ruhr. If, after satisfying Monty's priority requirements, SHAEF could then support a diversionary offensive, a secondary crossing *might* be made by Third Army between Mainz and Karlsruhe. Indeed this secondary crossing was essential to the Ruhr pincer for which I had fought since the previous September," wrote Bradley. "Although Eisenhower had not yet made a decision to restrict the Rhine crossing to Monty, his British-dominated staff at SHAEF so favored the Montgomery proposal that this single thrust had already become established in their minds as The Plan, SHAEF's irrevocable plan for the assault of the Rhine." Lieutenant General George S. Patton's Third Army crossed the Rhine River on March 22 south of Mainz. Elements of Montgomery's Twenty-first Army Group crossed the Rhine on March 23/24 near Wesel. (Ibid., pp. 511–24.) For a detailed account of the Allies capturing the Ludendorff Bridge amid German confused command and failed attempts to demolish the bridge, see MacDonald, *Last Offensive*, pp. 208–35.

Patton recalled: "The First Army seemed to be doing very well at the Remagen bridgehead. We were quite happy over it, but just a little envious." He was determined to secure a crossing over the Rhine before Montgomery or probably lose divisions to Montgomery's command and "have to go on the defensive. If, however, we could get across before the British attack, we could carry the ball." (George S. Patton, Jr., *War As I Knew It* [Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947], pp. 254, 264.) On March 23 Patton congratulated the Third Army: "In the period from January 29 to March 22, 1945, you have wrested 6484 square miles of territory from the enemy. You have taken 3072 cities, towns, and villages, including among the former: Trier, Coblenz, Bingen, Worms, Mainz, Kaiserslautern, and Ludwigshafen. You have captured 140,112 enemy soldiers, and have killed or wounded an additional 99,000, thereby eliminating practically all of the German 7th and 1st Armies. . . . And remember that your assault crossing over the Rhine at 2200 hours last night assures you of even greater glory to come." (Ibid., p. 269.)

2. General Jacob L. Devers's Sixth Army Group was clearing the Saar-Palatinate area, along with Patton's Third Army. (For more information on this campaign, see MacDonald, *Last Offensive*, pp. 236–65; Pogue, *Supreme Command*, pp. 424–27.) Lieutenant General William H. Simpson commanded the Ninth Army, which was part of Montgomery's Twenty-first Army Group Rhine crossing. (MacDonald, *Last Offensive*, pp. 294–320.)

Eisenhower replied on March 24 that he was releasing Marshall's message and that Bradley held a press conference outlining Twelfth Army Group operations carried out the "last few weeks in accordance with my fixed plan for eliminating the enemy forces west of the Rhine," at which time Bradley complimented individual commanders and praised American equipment. "I cannot quite understand why Montgomery should be getting a big play at this time in the States," replied Eisenhower. "It seems that even when operations carried out under his direction are of considerably less magnitude than those in other parts of the front, and even though large American forces cooperate, there is some influence at work that insists on giving Montgomery credit that belongs to other field commanders." (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2540–41.)

MEMORANDUM BY THE U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF¹
[*Top Secret*]

March 23, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF ABLEBODIED BRITISH AND GERMAN
PRISONERS OF WAR (Ref. CCS 794, 794/1)

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff have given consideration to all the factors regarding this subject. They note that owing to additional shipping availability the British Government has now transmitted a note to the Swiss Government for communication to the German Government proposing that the number to be repatriated on each side be increased at this time from 5,000 to 7,000. They further note that the foregoing has been taken as an interim measure and they have now been informed that it is the desire of the British Government to accept in toto the German proposal for the exchanges, aggregating 25,000 on each side. They also note that the British Government does not propose to inform the Soviet Government regarding this matter until the exchange is arranged.

Should the contemplated exchanges be conducted on the same basis as the interim exchange of 7,000, the result would be to return to the German forces 25,000 combat trained personnel only recently captured. It is the view of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that to do this in the present state of the war would have such an adverse effect on the war effort that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff do not feel free to recommend to their Government that it concur. They further feel that it would be a mistake which might have critical repercussions to proceed in this matter without informing the Soviet Government.

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff are conscious of the problem presented by the plight of the British prisoners who have been so long in captivity and of the pressures that are brought to bear on the British authorities in this matter. However, they feel that when this transfer becomes a matter of public knowledge the reaction in this country will be immediate and most unfor-

tunate, whatever the merits of the case appear to be in the opinion of the British authorities. The number of troops the United States now has involved in heavy battle, the number of casualties it is suffering daily, will have a decided bearing on this matter. With reference to this last statement it has been calculated on the basis of prisoners captured since D-day that the U.S. troops suffered a loss of approximately 3,000 killed, 12,000 wounded and 2,000 missing for every 25,000 German prisoners taken.

In consideration of the fact that this issue involves on the Allied side only troops of the British Commonwealth the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, having expressed their views in this matter, will refrain from any further participation in the considerations leading to a decision.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The chief of staff wrote at the top of this document: "This is my draft for proposed action by U.S. Chiefs of Staff. G. C. M." Marshall's dictation to his secretary Mona K. Nason is located in GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Shorthand Notebooks).

2. General Marshall went to Field Marshal Wilson's office for a 12:15 P.M. meeting and luncheon on March 23. The Combined Chiefs of Staff cancelled their meeting scheduled for 2:30 P.M. that day.

TO GLADYS CHAMBERS BANDONY

March 24, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mrs. Bandony: I have your letter of 13 March, and I can well understand your intense desire to have your son returned home. I am distressed that you should be having such a hard time.¹

The Government has made a very determined effort to provide for the dependents of American soldiers. Only in most exceptional cases, such as extreme illness or the maintenance of large families, has it been possible to approve discharges on the grounds of dependency.

The prosecution of the war demands tremendous sacrifices from the men who are serving overseas. They not only have the hazards and hardships of battle but the natural concern for their loved ones at home. For this reason we are deeply concerned over cases such as yours, particularly because of its effect on the soldier, and we have depended necessarily on the Red Cross to examine into the family situation where requests for dependency discharge have been made. The Selective Service boards are also our advisors in such matters. I suggest that you discuss your situation with the local Red Cross official who will certainly give you every consideration.

I repeat again that it is of the greatest importance to the morale of the Army that the soldiers be strongly supported in spirit by those at home. The war has been demanding a constantly increasing sacrifice by everybody in

the nation, and under the circumstances it is exceedingly difficult to make exceptions without automatically affecting hundreds of thousands of soldiers, which we cannot afford to do. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Mrs. Bandony, a widow living alone in New York City, wrote to request that her son, an infantryman in Germany, be discharged because she was in poor health and “living on the sole income of \$50. per month.” (Bandony to Marshall, March 13, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

TO MAJOR GENERAL JOHN R. DEANE
Radio No. WAR-58794. *Top Secret*

March 26, 1945
Washington, D.C.

This is a LOCKUP message.¹ Top Secret, Personal to Deane from Marshall.

If in your judgment you consider that the following message will help the situation please hand it to General Antonov informing him that it is from General Marshall personally.

“Dear General Antonov: Among the important items we discussed at Livadia Palace on 8 February was the question of entry of a United States survey party into OUTGOING. The next day following your meeting with Marshal Stalin you informed me that the advanced reconnaissance and survey parties may be sent to that area without delay.²

“On March 14th, General Deane advised me that the Red Army General Staff had given him a plan whereby the officers of the survey party were to proceed to Fairbanks, Alaska arriving there on March 16th or 17th and contact Major Gen. Obraskov requesting him to send the party on to Moscow by air as quickly as possible. General Slavin assured General Deane that instructions would be issued to the Soviet Embassy in Washington for prompt approval of the survey party’s visas.³

“The Soviet Embassy informs us that no such approval has been given. The survey party reached Fairbanks on March 17th and contacted General Obraskov. He states that he has received no instructions concerning the survey party. I think that these delays constitute a real danger due to the continued presence of the survey party in Fairbanks. Please see that instructions are given to clear this present block to agreed plans and procedure.”⁴

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 5, Item 20)

1. Code name LOCKUP referred to a series of top secret messages handled by a minimum number of individuals. They were sent in a double-sealed envelope, and the only individuals in the Office of the Chief of Staff authorized to open or read LOCKUP messages were Frank McCarthy, Merrill Pasco, and Mona Nason. LOCKUP messages that originated

in the chief of staff's office were dictated by General Marshall to his secretary Mona Nason, who was the only typist authorized to prepare such a message. (McCarthy Memorandum for Colonel Pasco, March 1, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 334 JCS Lockup].)

2. OUTGOING was the code name for the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area in the U.S.S.R. During the Yalta Conference, Stalin had agreed that the Amur River survey could proceed, but a survey party to Kamchatka would be deferred "until the last moment." (*Foreign Relations, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, pp. 766, 835. For further information, see *ibid.*, pp. 757–839.)

3. Major General Nikolay Slavin was assistant to the chief of staff of the Soviet army.

4. Deane reported that the American survey party arrived in Fairbanks on March 16, and "they reported to General Obraskov in accordance with instructions given me by Slavin. Obraskov knew nothing of their proposed visit and refused to approve their entry. The party remained at Fairbanks until April 6, a period of twenty-one days, hoping from day to day to receive clearance." On April 6 Deane notified Washington that he was "convinced that the delay resulted from Soviet displeasure over the Polish situation, the Bern peace negotiations, and incidents resulting from air clashes in Europe." He recommended that the party be returned to the United States. "My recommendation was approved, and the prospect of B-29's being based in the Amur River district receded still further." (John R. Deane, *The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Co-operation with Russia* [New York: Viking Press, 1947], pp. 251–54.)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER March 27, 1945
Radio No. W-59318. *Top Secret* Washington, D.C.

From Marshall to Eisenhower for his eyes only. Reports indicate the Fourth Armored Division is again carrying out a particularly brilliant operation, with the same dash and power it demonstrated in the drive to the Rhine and that to the south of the Moselle. Might it not be well to cite it now on the success of these three specific actions?

If a citation is believed by you, Bradley and Patton to be merited by this division, now appears to be the time. If there is any delay in acting there may well be a number of divisions spearheading advances all along the front and serious resentment would be engendered. An immediate citation would act as a spur to all.

If you have the same view this is your authority to act.¹

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. "Bradley, Patton and I are all in full agreement with your suggestion for citing the Fourth Armored Division," replied Eisenhower. "This will be done immediately and the citation will include the operation for the advance on Bastogne, the penetration to the Rhine, the attack across the Mosel and the later advances across the Rhine." (Eisenhower to Marshall, Radio No. FWD-18258, March 28, 1945, DDEL/D. D. Eisenhower Papers [Pre-Presidential 1916–52, Principal File].) For previous information regarding unit citations, see Marshall to Eisenhower, March 16, 1945, pp. 89–90.

MEMORANDUM FOR OPERATIONS DIVISION
Confidential

March 27, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Prince Olaf of Norway spoke to me about a matter which he said had been taken up with General Eisenhower and, he thought, cleared by his Staff regarding the transfer of wheat and rye seed now in Sweden, to Norway, in time for spring planting. The issue apparently was whether or not the Germans would seize and eat it. The amounts I imagine are not large and it may be that some planting would be accomplished.

Please check up on this.¹

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Major General John E. Hull replied that President Roosevelt favored the shipment of 6,700 tons of grain, including spring and fall wheat, fall rye, oats, and barley. The grain would be shipped as Swedish property and distributed through the Norwegian Corn Monopoly to farmers, a method that had not been interrupted previously by the Germans. (Hull Memorandum for Chief of Staff, March 29, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SURLES

March 28, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Attached are two photographs of a German pillbox on the Siegfried Line, showing the *limited* effect of 90 mm. shells. They were sent to me by Patton.¹ Being excellent photographs they may be of interest in illustrating what a stiff series of positions we had to pass through, as there were hundreds, possibly thousands of these pillboxes.

There are also attached a series of photographs sent to me by Patton of his first crossing of the Rhine. They do not appear to be suitable for press use.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. "I trust that you do not get bored with my personal efforts as a photographer, but after all, you do not have to look at them if you do not like them," wrote Patton on March 23. "The two pictures of the cupola of a pillbox in the Siegfried Line are of interest in showing the lack of effect of our 90-mm. gun firing at about 1000 yards. The cupolas in question were 10-inches thick, and with the exception of the bullet which went through the embrasure, our fire had no effect beyond the fact of silencing the machine guns—not through putting them out of action but through scaring the crews—for pillboxes are always taken by blowing in the back door." (Patton to Marshall, March 23, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. "Last night, General Eddy sent the 5th Infantry Division across the Rhine in one of the most successful operations of the war. We got to the Rhine the day before yesterday, and I immediately directed him to cross it by whatever way he could, because it is my experience that the Germans react slowly and expect us to do the same thing. The result was highly successful," wrote Patton. (Ibid.) Major General Manton S. Eddy commanded the Twelfth

Army Corps, which spearheaded most of the operations of Patton's Third Army through France, Luxembourg, and Germany. For further information regarding the Rhine River crossing, see Marshall to Eisenhower, March 23, 1945, pp. 97-99.

TO ELBERT D. THOMAS

March 29, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Senator Thomas, I attach a series of paragraphs appearing in the press relating to my appearance before your Committee last ____.¹ My clear understanding at that time was that I was talking in executive session, yet I find a rather complete report of what took place appearing in the public press.

If there can be no assurance that the rules governing executive sessions are to be observed, it seems to me that you and your associates deny to themselves a wealth of information which otherwise could be put at your disposal by the officers of the War Department.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Senator Thomas was chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee. The chief of staff had appeared before the committee on Thursday, March 22, for three hours at a secret session. The committee was considering the nominations of nine lieutenant generals to four-star rank, and "requested an explanation of Army promotion policy." (*New York Times*, March 23, 1945, p. 4.)

2. This letter was not sent to Senator Thomas. At the bottom is written: "Not used. Gen. Persons took up orally with Congress." Major General Wilton B. Persons was chief of the Legislative and Liaison Division.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR¹
Radio No. WAR-60363. *Top Secret*

March 29, 1945
Washington, D.C.

TOPSEC personal for MacArthur for his Eyes Only from Marshall.

Command in Pacific is under consideration but complete solution with respect to command and future operations has not as yet been resolved.²

For your information the following portions of the future directive seem in general to be agreed upon although JCS formal approval has not yet been given, the delaying being due to failure so far to reach agreement as to certain details referred to below.

I. The over-all objective in the war against Japan, to be brought about at the earliest practicable date, is:

To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by:

a. Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardments, and destroying Japanese Air and Naval strength.

b. Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.

It is expected that the JCS will assign you the responsibility to:

(1) Complete the occupation of Luzon and conduct such additional operations in the Philippines as required for the accomplishment of the overall objective in the war against Japan. Further to the foregoing, conduct such additional operations toward completing the liberation of the Philippines as can be mounted without prejudice to the accomplishment of the overall objective.

(2) Make plans for occupying North Borneo, including Brunei Bay, using Australian combat and service troops and make preparations at such time as resources can be made available without detriment to the accomplishment of the overall objective. Units of the British Pacific Fleet may be allocated for this operation.

(3) Provide forces and support to Nimitz to assist him in completion of the seizure and development of positions in the Ryukyus as required in his current directive under provisions of Part II below.

(4) Establish bases in the Philippines to support further advances for the accomplishment of the overall objective in the war against Japan.

II. It appears that agreement will be reached by the JCS placing Army resources in Pacific under you. The point at issue which has so long delayed a final agreement is the degree and manner of control that you as Army Commander will exercise as to Army troops throughout the Pacific which are of necessity closely integrated in Naval Base and other operations and in the Naval Logistical problem.

You will be given responsibility for planning, preparation and conduct of actual invasion of Japan. Nimitz would be given responsibility for amphibious phase of the operation.³

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 2, Item 1c)

1. The version of this message showing General Marshall's editorial changes to the O.P.D. draft is located in NA/RG 165 (OPD, 384 TS, Case 1).

2. For previous information regarding work on the Joint Chiefs of Staff's directive for reorganization and future operations in the Pacific, see Marshall Memorandum for Admiral King, March 22, 1945, pp. 94–97.

3. The J.C.S. directive issued on April 3 designated MacArthur commander in chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific. See Marshall to MacArthur, April 4, 1945, pp. 117–18.

MEMORANDUM BY THE UNITED STATES
CHIEFS OF STAFF¹
Top Secret

March 30, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
PLAN OF CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN EUROPE
Reference: C.C.S. 805 Series

The United States Chiefs of Staff are not in agreement with the views of the British Chiefs of Staff expressed in C.C.S. 805 and 805/1.²

As to the procedure of General Eisenhower's communicating with the Russians for the purpose of coordinating the junction between his advancing armies and those of the Soviets, this appears to have been an operational necessity in view of the rapidity of the advances into Germany.

The United States Chiefs of Staff are not in accord with the proposal of the British Chiefs of Staff to send a directive to the Chiefs of our missions in Moscow reference General Eisenhower's message to Marshal Stalin. To discredit in effect, certainly to lower the prestige of a highly successful commander in the field does not appear to be the proper procedure. If a modification of his SCAF 252 is to be made, it should be communicated by General Eisenhower and not by the Combined Chiefs of Staff over his head.

General Eisenhower's course of action outlined in SCAF 252 appears to be in accord with agreed major strategy and with his directive, particularly in light of the present development of the battle in Germany. The information we have is that General Eisenhower is deploying east of the Rhine and north of the Ruhr the maximum number of forces which can be employed. We now appear to have a development in which the northern effort is making good progress, while the secondary effort has, thus far, achieved an outstanding success which is being exploited to the extent of logistic capabilities. These efforts of the central and southern armies should quickly make it possible for the northern advance to accelerate its drive eastward across the north German plain.

The United States Chiefs of Staff consider that to disperse the strong forces which probably would be required to reach and reduce the northern ports before the primary object of destroying the German armies is accomplished, would seriously limit the momentum of a decisive thrust straight through the center. We are confident that his course of action will secure the ports and everything else mentioned in C.C.S. 805 and 805/1 more quickly and much more decisively than the course of action urged by the British Chiefs of Staff.

The battle of Germany is now at the point where the commander in the field is the best judge of the measures which offer the earliest prospect of destroying the German armies or their power to resist. Deliberately to turn

to the region where the German resistance has appeared to be most successful and more or less abandon or seriously limit operations exploiting enemy weakness does not appear to be a sound procedure. General Eisenhower now has the enemy off balance and disorganized and should strike relentlessly with the single objective of quick and complete victory.

While the United States Chiefs of Staff recognize that there are important factors which are not the direct concern and responsibility of General Eisenhower they consider that his strategic conception is sound from the over-all viewpoint of crushing Germany as expeditiously as possible and should receive full support.

It is also the view of the United States Chiefs of Staff that General Eisenhower should continue to be free to communicate with the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Army.

The United States Chiefs of Staff propose that the following message be dispatched to General Eisenhower:

“The Combined Chiefs of Staff request you furnish them with an amplification of the views expressed in your SCAF 252.

“They further request that you delay in furnishing further details regarding SCAF 252 in response to message of inquiry to you from General Deane until you hear further from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.”³

The United States Chiefs of Staff are now of the opinion that in all probability the amplification of SCAF 252 will not cause a revision of their views as expressed in this paper.⁴

NA/RG 165 (OCS, ABC 384 Europe [August 5, 1943])

1. This document was circulated as C.C.S. 805/2.

2. Prime Minister Churchill and the British military chiefs were concerned that General Eisenhower had sent on March 28 a message directly to Marshal Stalin, bypassing high-level military and political channels. (For Eisenhower’s message [SCAF-252] to Stalin, see *Papers of DDE*, 4: 2551.) “The chief criticism of the new Eisenhower plan is that it shifts the axis of the main advance upon Berlin to the direction through Leipzig to Dresden, and thus raises the question of whether the Twenty-first Army Group will not be so stretched as to lose its offensive power, especially after it has been deprived of the Ninth United States Army,” wrote Churchill. “It also seems that General Eisenhower may be wrong in supposing Berlin to be largely devoid of military and political importance. . . . The idea of neglecting Berlin and leaving it to the Russians to take at a later stage does not appear to me correct.” (Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 460–61.) For more information regarding the British view, see John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, volume 6, *October 1944–August 1945*, a volume in the *History of the Second World War* (London: HMSO, 1956), pp. 131–38.

3. General Eisenhower had sent his March 28 message for Stalin directly to Major General John R. Deane at the U.S. Military Mission to Moscow. Deane then requested Eisenhower send him more information regarding his military plan. (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2557–58.) Eisenhower sent an amplification of his views to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on March 31. (*Ibid.*, 2568–71.)

4. When Marshall was asked in 1957 whether the Allies should have tried to capture Berlin, he replied, “No, I do not think we should have gone into Berlin at that time. . . . They [the Russians] had played a great part in the fighting and the wearing down of the German

strength, and we had to take that all into careful regard. At that time, toward the close of the struggle, they were exceedingly sensitive, looking all the time for something that would indicate that the British and Americans were preparing to go off alone and to settle the thing in a way to their—British and American—satisfaction and to the disadvantage of the Russians.” Marshall concluded, “It is very much a Monday quarterback business, because all sorts of things have happened since those days and our relations with Russia at that time were quite different.” (*Marshall Interviews*, p. 416.)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALTER BEDELL SMITH
[Radio No. WAR-60889.] *Confidential*

March 30, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Smith from Marshall. Reference your S 83420 regarding field directors of American Red Cross being awarded theater ribbon:¹ I probably am entirely wrong but this would rather indicate that ribbons are being awarded to high rank rather than to the fellow who lives and works under shell fire. Isn't there some girl somewhere there who has served long under the hardships of an advance post who might be added to such a list?²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. In February 1945 President Roosevelt authorized the award of theater ribbons to war correspondents, Red Cross personnel, civilian technicians, and others in exceptional cases where they shared the hardships and dangers of combat with U.S. troops. The number of ribbons awarded was to be restricted, however, because the president thought they should only go to military personnel. (Captain Lawrence A. Minnich, Jr., brief for the chief of staff, August 17, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, SGS, Memorandums and Briefs to the Chief of Staff].)

In his message to Marshall, Smith reported that European Theater of Operations ribbons had recently been awarded to eight Red Cross field directors and an assistant field director, all men. (Smith to Marshall, Radio No. S-83420, March 29, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. “I agree entirely that some of these girls operating the mobile doughnut units should be awarded the theater ribbon and this will be done,” Smith replied. He added that the titles of the personnel listed in their referenced message were “rather misleading as these field directors are actually attached to combat regiments and operate further to the front than any other Red Cross personnel.” (Smith to Marshall, Radio No. FWD-18404, March 31, 1945, NA/RG 319 [OPD, Message Files 1945 [CM-IN-33222].) For further information regarding theater ribbons awarded to civilians, see Marshall to McNarney, August 18, 1945, pp. 279–80.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL
ROBERT C. RICHARDSON, JR.
Secret

March 30, 1944 [1945]
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Richardson: I have been concerned over the cost of the new General Hospital being erected on Oahu, which I understand has practically

doubled the estimates you gave me at the time we talked this over in Honolulu.¹ I am told that a portion of the increase is due to the enlarged requirements that the Medical Corps brought forward but that the major increase has resulted from the final estimates of the engineers.

This places me in an embarrassing position with the Appropriation Committees of Congress, the more so because I desire to ask their acquiescence to other permanent items of construction.

Will you please give me the basis for a written statement that I can make to the Appropriation Committees putting myself on record as officially informing them of the increased cost and making some explanation of why this increase has developed.

The statement will have to be brief because it is not wise for me to go into a great many details. Others will have to do that if called upon for the information by the Committees.² Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. After attending the Cairo and Teheran conferences, General Marshall had toured Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, in December 1943 on his return to the United States.

2. Richardson replied that the project was not under his control since the hospital was being designed and constructed by the Army Service Forces directly through the chief of Engineers and the Honolulu Engineer District. While he was not in the position to provide exact cost differentials, he listed primary reasons for the increases. The original estimate was based on a proposal to construct two hospitals of five hundred and one thousand beds respectively located in a developed area where roads and utilities could be established inexpensively. An Army Service Forces Board, representing the surgeon general and chief of Engineers, concluded that a single fifteen hundred-bed hospital with considerably expanded installations should be constructed on an undeveloped site. Labor costs had risen due to a shortage of common laborers; construction time had been lengthened to avoid diversion of materials and shipping from the Pacific operations; and sub-surface conditions had created difficulties with the structural design meeting earthquake conditions. (Richardson to Marshall, April 6, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 632].) General Marshall then requested General Somervell to provide a statement, which the chief of staff edited for delivery to the Appropriations committees. (Marshall Memorandum for General Somervell, April 9, 1945, and Somervell Memorandum for General Marshall, April 13, 1945, *ibid.*) See Marshall to Thomas, April 28, 1945, pp. 160–61.

For information regarding efforts to improve military hospitals in 1944–45, see Clarence McKittrick Smith, *The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of Interior*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* (Washington: GPO, 1956), pp. 286–99.

TO HARRY G. STODDARD

April 2, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mr. Stoddard: Mrs. Marshall handed me your letter of March 29th which I have given very careful reading. Also I have discussed some

of your points with the particular sections of the War Department concerned in these matters.¹

In the first place, I am not involved in questions of the demobilization or conversion of industry from its war production basis to a peace-time status. So far as the War Department is concerned that comes under the Under Secretary of War, Judge [Robert P.] Patterson, and his office. Of course the General Staff becomes involved in such matters as to reserves of munitions which must be available, and when further production is no longer necessary.

In the talks I had with you the other day, my mind was turned to a problem that has worried me for several years, and that is, not only the terrific expense of maintaining an airforce, as compared to the armed forces, but what should be the procedure, from the Army point of view, once the fighting has ceased or been placed by circumstances on a much reduced basis. You see, I am given the totals of weekly and monthly production of various types of planes and also the rate of production, say six months hence of these same planes. The numbers of course are astonishing, and when one turns to the problem of what is to be done the day after the fighting ceases there is presented a terrible prospect of apparently unavoidable waste unless some special measures can be taken to save the situation.

I have also had in mind the necessity for us to gain control of the commercial air situation in the Western Hemisphere and to do that means decisive action rather than endless debates. It was in this connection that my mind turned to the possible temporary commercial use of heavy bombers, which I told you was generally opposed by airline officials with whom I have discussed the matter. However, as I also told you, there is a transition period which I do not believe they have quite visualized, during which we have to do something and do it fast.

As to the other points raised in your letter, with the explanation given above that almost all of them are of immediate concern to another section of the War Department, I find myself in general agreement with your conclusions. We must have sound policies, decided on promptly and answered with equal promptness if we are to go forward with the minimum of disorder and confusion. The place of the War Department in this transition will, of course, be far different from what it is today because of the vastly reduced demand we shall be making, and the fact that most matters pertaining to post-war economy fall entirely outside our jurisdiction.

I do not understand where the idea could have arisen that we, or anyone else, were proposing that the production of war products should continue beyond the time of actual needs for the armed forces. Our needs for the war against Japan will be such that production cutbacks will not be drastic after the fighting in Germany collapses. We have the prospect of consuming more ammunition per man in the Pacific than in Europe because

that is the only way we can keep down casualties against the fanaticism of the Japanese.

Referring to your numbered paragraphs:

1. War Production will cease as soon as the need ends.
2. Industry will be told in advance insofar as the War Department is concerned as soon as we have determined with reasonable certainty a future date when any part of its production will no longer be needed for the war effort.²

3. Only a segment of industry needs reconversion. The first loss to the labor force will be among those who do not wish to work any more and who are now employed simply because of the great national need. Secondly, there is a stored up demand which should yield a very substantial number of jobs as production of civilian items gets under way. There appears to be cash in the hands of civilians to support that demand. A third source of employment will lie in some of the activities of railroads and many other major service industries which have substantial deferred maintenance as well as expansion projects. The situation with regard to the returning veterans is very clearly stated in the law.³

4. With reference to the disposal of surplus war supplies, we have been trying to expedite the sale of all such surpluses which have developed as a result of War Department activities. We agree with your philosophy with respect to prices.⁴ It will be extremely helpful to the War Department if you could secure the wide acceptance of such views among business men and among the general populace. What you say represents sound economic theory and practice. However, there is nevertheless a decided general feeling that the Government should not dispose of anything which shows up on the books as a loss and this will prove to be one of the principal handicaps in preventing the disposal of surpluses. As you know, the responsibility has been given by Congress to the Surplus War Property Board which it created for that purpose. The Board in turn has designated certain agencies—the Treasury Department, the R.F.C. [Reconstruction Finance Corporation] and others, to dispose of this property. The War Department is responsible only for the sale of its scrap and surplus property abroad.

The disposal of surplus aircraft is a peculiar problem. It is now being attacked vigorously. Although the strictly combat planes have no commercial value, the War Department will possess on the termination of hostilities by far the largest and best fleet of transport aircraft in the world.

The War Department faces a difficult period during redeployment for the final attack against Japan. Our plans call for conservation and economy to the maximum degree consistent with the most rapid deployment and build-up of a force powerful enough to bring the war to a conclusion at the earliest possible date. Quick success means saving of American lives and the earliest possible return to the ways of peace.

I was sorry not to see you again and I would have liked to meet Mrs. Stoddard. We saw you in church Palm Sunday but did not come in contact with you after the services. Mrs. Marshall has returned to Washington and will soon be busy in opening up our place at Leesburg so I do not expect I will see Pinehurst before next November or December. Should you come to Washington I hope you will give me a call—War Department Branch 2077. Particularly I would like to get ahold of that letter of your son's. His people are heavily engaged on Cebu, as you doubtless have seen in the press.⁵ Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Harry G. Stoddard, a business executive in Worcester, Massachusetts, had informally talked with General Marshall at the country club in Pinehurst, North Carolina, on Saturday, March 24. On March 29 Mr. Stoddard amplified and recorded some of the thoughts he had expressed regarding postwar production. "My general thesis is that the Nation's business is so vast that efforts to cushion the shock of the change from war to peace can at best have but slight effect and such efforts unless very carefully considered may easily retard the ultimate return to normal economic conditions," wrote Stoddard. "I do not mean there should be no planning but there should be as little artificial regulation as possible and too much must not be expected from it." He then enumerated four main ideas, to which Marshall responded by editing information in a draft reply prepared by Army Service Forces. (Stoddard to Marshall, March 29, 1945; Marshall to General Somervell, undated, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General]. The draft reply to Stoddard prepared by Army Service Forces is located in NA/RG 165 [OCS, 370.01].)

2. "Industry should be told promptly that it is on it's own and that it's war effort does not end until the conversion period is over," Mr. Stoddard wrote. (Stoddard to Marshall, March 29, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

3. "It is very important that the extent of preferential employment for veterans be clarified and on a practical basis," wrote Stoddard. "If returning soldiers are led to expect more than seniority protection they will be disillusioned and war workers who have remained on their jobs for patriotic reasons will suffer great injustice." (Ibid.)

4. "Surplus war supplies should be offered promptly for sale that they may not hang over the market for a long period. Prices should be on a sound economic basis and when not saleable on such a basis surplus should be scrapped and the so-called loss be considered a part of the war cost," wrote Stoddard. (Ibid.)

5. Mr. Stoddard promptly sent an extract from his son's letter (written from Leyte) to the chief of staff, who then sent a copy to the editor of the *Saturday Evening Post*, and it was published in the June ninth issue. His son, Lieutenant Colonel Lincoln W. Stoddard, served in the Americal Division engaged in operations on Cebu, Philippines. (Stoddard to Marshall, April 5 and June 9, 1945; Marshall [staff-drafted] to Ben Hibbs, April 11, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].) For information regarding the Americal Division's assault on Cebu, see Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, pp. 608–17.

TO WINSTON S. CHURCHILL
Top Secret

April 3, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

MEMORANDUM FOR FIELD MARSHAL WILSON:

Please transmit the following to the Prime Minister in answer to his personal message to me dated 302330Z.¹

There is complete agreement on the American side with your desire to continue the momentum of Admiral Mountbatten's present offensive to effect the early capture of Rangoon.

Mountbatten has informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that in his opinion he will be able to capture Rangoon by 1 June. Based on this statement the U.S. Chiefs of Staff informed the British Chiefs that they do not intend to remove U.S. air resources from Burma prior to the fall of Rangoon, or 1 June, whichever date is earlier. It is our purpose to leave with Mountbatten all that he requires to secure Rangoon this dry season, but reserving the right to transfer U.S. air resources to China if Mountbatten is not in fact successful in his attempt to capture Rangoon before the monsoon. In this last case his operations in Burma might drag on indefinitely and it does not seem wise, in view of the urgent needs of the China Theater, particularly in relation to prospective Pacific operations, to make a firm commitment to leave all U.S. resources in Burma for the conduct of a campaign for such an indeterminate period of time. It is for this reason that the limiting date of 1 June was mentioned by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, following Mountbatten's prediction. A more recent message from Mountbatten states a necessity to retain all transport aircraft for two months after the capture of Rangoon. We have not yet been given his reasons for this long retention and we are therefore not prepared at this time to agree.

Furthermore, we are awaiting Wedemeyer's estimate on his requirements for the preparation of five selected Chinese divisions, in addition to those trained in Burma, for an offensive operation starting between 1 July and 1 August. Wedemeyer is now en route to China.²

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff intention is to permit Mountbatten's employment of all the U.S. resources now at his disposal which are essential to the success of his current operations in Burma.

I greatly appreciate your very generous congratulations and comment on my past relationship with the armies now fighting in Germany. I feel very remote from any part in their great triumphs, but filled with confidence in their leadership and overwhelming striking power. Our greatest triumph really lies in the fact that we achieved the impossible, Allied military unity of action.³

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Churchill had sent a message to Field Marshal Wilson at the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, D.C., for transmittal to Marshall. "Please convey orally and unofficially to General Marshall the following views which I hold." The prime minister pointed out that three British-Indian divisions, which Mountbatten had wanted for the Burma campaign, were retained in Italy in order that five British-Canadian divisions be transferred to General Eisenhower's front. "Although the prolongation of the German war has withheld from Mountbatten the three British-Indian Divisions on which all his hopes were built, he has succeeded far beyond our hopes. The Burma Road has been opened and Mandalay has been taken." Churchill concluded: "I feel therefore entitled to appeal to General Marshall's sense of what is fair and right between us, in which I have the highest confidence, that he do all in his power to let Mountbatten have the comparatively small additional support which [h]is air force requires to enable the decisive battle now raging in Burma to be won. It will be a terrible thing if Mountbatten has to try to go on to Rangoon with only four instead of six divisions and thus fail to achieve a victory in the campaign which will liberate all forces in Burma for other and closer action against the Japanese." (Churchill to Wilson, Radio No. 2058, March 30, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) For further information regarding the transfer of resources from Burma to China, see Romanus and Sunderland, *Time Runs Out in CBI*, pp. 224–28, 321–25.

2. Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, China Theater commander, had been in Washington, D.C., to meet with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and upon his return to China, sent a lengthy report to the chief of staff. En route back, he had "a series of conferences" with Admiral Mountbatten (Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command) and his British staff members. "They all assured me that they are doing their utmost to capture Rangoon by June 1st, although Japanese resistance might delay them. In discussing air resources they indicated that they were already short of the air lift required to support the operation," reported Wedemeyer. "I investigated their statements and learned from key Americans in SEAC that the situation was not at all as depicted by Mountbatten. The Americans stated that my requirements were not unreasonable and that I should not feel concerned about asking for the transport aircraft after June 1st for operations envisaged in China." (Wedemeyer to Marshall, April 13, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. "Pray further give him my warmest congratulations on the magnificent fighting and conduct of the American and Allied armies under General Eisenhower, and say what a joy it must be to him to see how the armies he called into being by his own genius have won immortal renown. He is the true 'organizer of victory.'" (Churchill to Wilson, Radio No. 2058, March 30, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HULL

April 3, 1945

FROM BRIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE A. LINCOLN¹

[Washington, D.C.]

Top Secret

SUBJECT: General Edwards' Conference with General Marshall
on the Troop Basis²

The following points are pertinent:

a. The Chief of Staff wants to get more men to be demobilized. He questions the proposed induction rate which was to be 60,000. He pointed out that although the proposal cuts the Army in strength by only

1,200,000 the actual number of individuals to be demobilized will be much higher than this if a high induction rate were maintained.

My comment on this is that it is certainly the fair thing to do and sound psychologically, but the increase in pipeline strength of a high induction rate will mean an increase in the paper strength of the Army. This point must be recognized.

b. The Chief of Staff asked General Edwards to examine all possible means of introducing replacements into units to let men with long service come home. He mentioned replacements meeting units going through Panama. My comment on this is that there is certainly something in the thought, but probably the best way to do it would be to send skeleton units from Europe directly to the Pacific while at the same time moving replacements out of the West Coast using some of this APA³ lift we have so much difficulty jarring out of the Navy.

The Chief of Staff pointed out that divisions might be brought home complete and then the long service men dropped out at once and the divisions filled up with replacements. A comment on this is that it will probably work and a study may show that the time element would allow the divisions to remain below strength for some time in the U.S. while still leaving sufficient time to fill them up before they could possibly be moved out of the West Coast. This is a point, however, that General Edwards will have to work out.

c. The Chief of Staff made the point that people being brought back to the U.S. shouldn't be told that they are going into the strategic reserve for the Pacific. They should be left with the idea that it may develop; that requirements for the Pacific war will cause them to go on out across the Pacific.

d. The Chief of Staff emphasized his point that we should get more people other than Americans into jobs where they get killed in this Japanese war. He had particular reference to the British VLR [very long range] air forces, the British Fleet and the Australian and New Zealand air forces. The latter he apparently considers should take over all operations south of the Philippines.

e. The Chief of Staff accepted the strategic reserve of 21 divisions for the time being, pointing out it in fact was also a reserve for demobilization and that we might be demobilizing it long before the end of 1946.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, 320.2, Case 27)

1. Brigadier General George A. Lincoln served in the Operations Division as a member of the Joint and Combined Staff Planners.

2. Major General Idwal H. Edwards, assistant chief of staff, G-3, during 1942–43 and reassigned to that position in February 1945, met with General Marshall on April 3. (GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Engagement and Visitor Records].) For Edwards's previous role in demobilization plans, see *Papers of GCM*, 3: 633–34.

3. APA designated U.S. Navy attack transport.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HULL
Top Secret

April 3, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

SUBJECT: Pacific.

Admiral Leahy OK'd the proposed Pacific directive, which formally accepts it. He telegraphed the general sense of the directive to the President and stated that it was contemplated that MacArthur and Nimitz would be the two leaders. The President replied, approving this.

I am returning your statement regarding Ningpo-Chusan.¹ Admiral King desires that a memorandum be prepared stating the various views regarding what he called "siege" operations against Japan, an actual invasion of Japan, and a combination of siege or encircling operations preceding invasion.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Hull submitted O.P.D.'s estimate (accompanied with a marked map) of the navy's Ningpo-Chusan encircling operation plan versus the army's plan to strike directly at the heart of Japan. "One of the basic points in this 'round the Yellow Sea' idea vs. that of striking at once at Japan's heart is the comparative cost. The Ryukyus operation, if carried through Miyako and Kikai, will involve about 450,000 troops in the type of island operations which have to date cost so high in American lives. We can choose as the next step Kyushu, where the battleground is more like those on which we have achieved victories with minimum losses. . . . Kyushu accomplishes much more effectively than Chusan the object of cutting off Japanese movement, if any, from the mainland, which appears to be the Navy's main point." Chusan was considered "only the first step toward committing large resources to bloody, indecisive operations." Hull concluded, "we should for the present concentrate on going directly into Japan after the Ryukyus." (Hull Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, March 28, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 381 TS].)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HULL
Top Secret

April 3, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Regarding publicity as to the recent Pacific Directive, Admiral King agreed with me that if any announcement is made it should be a joint announcement and he is having the matter looked into on his side of the house and I should like the same done here. We added to the Directive the further direction that no publicity would be given in the theaters regarding this matter.¹

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See the following document.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
Radio No. WAR-63196. *Top Secret*

April 4, 1945
Washington, D.C.

TOPSEC to General MacArthur for his eyes only from General Marshall.

A directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff reorganizing the Command set-up in the Pacific Theater is being dispatched. This solution to the problem has been reached after prolonged and exceedingly difficult discussion.¹ The final document has, however, been amicably agreed upon. It constitutes a major retreat by the Navy from their original stand. It has been necessary for us to make minor concessions in order to secure agreement on the major matters. Throughout, Admiral King continually expressed fears that the change in the command arrangements and the reorganization brought about by the directive would initially retard operations against the Japanese rather than add to the impetus now under way and might result in disruption and duplication in our logistics. I have assured him that such was not the case but for a time it appeared that it would be necessary to amplify the directive by means of JCS minutes designed to allay these fears. Fortunately, we were able to arrive at agreement without resort to any qualifying minutes. I have felt that you and Nimitz could work out most of the details harmoniously and that close coordination between your Headquarters and the War Department would prevent difficulties from arising.

The reorganization must necessarily be effected progressively and in such a manner as not to interfere with the impetus of operations or to provide any basis for assertions that the changes insisted upon by the Army have at least temporarily slowed down the war in the Pacific.²

You may be in need of additional high caliber officers due to the greatly increased burden of responsibilities, particularly logistical, falling to you under the new organization. If you do not have available all of such personnel you require I will endeavor to find them for you. Would you care for a man of the caliber of General Styer, Somervell's Deputy and Chief of Staff, or Lutes, his number 2 man, to head up your supply and logistics?³ We can furnish you some additional planners if you have need for them. Topnotch personnel remaining in the United States at the moment is somewhat limited but if there are any officers in particular you would like to have, send in their names and we will try to make them available. As soon as the war in Europe ends we can give you almost anyone or anything you want.

In the first phases of this reorganization we will have an extremely delicate problem in handling jealousies arising between the services and difficult personalities in various posts. There has been a great deal of most unfortunate rumor and talk in this country, which has made the War Department task in reaching a satisfactory agreement most difficult. I sin-

cerely hope we can raise the level of cooperation above the personal basis and that of trivial rumor, to one of sound procedure respected by all. Please do your best to suppress such critical comments in subordinate echelons and I will do the same here with a heavy hand.

You will soon be formally called upon for an expression of your views as to the character of the campaign leading up to the actual invasion of Japan. At the moment the Navy, not necessarily Nimitz, appear to favor a gradual encirclement or siege approach including operations on or off the coast of China and even possibly extending north to islands west of Kyushu.

As soon as the directives are formally issued you will be designated Commander-in-Chief of the Army Forces in the Pacific Theater.⁴

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. J.C.S. 1259/4 issued on April 3 was sent to MacArthur, Nimitz, and Arnold in Radio No. WARX-62773. The directive designated General MacArthur commander in chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific (CINCAFPAC), and placed all U.S. Army resources there under his command, except those in the southeast Pacific and Alaska. "CINCAFPAC will be responsible for the provision of army resources to meet the requirements for operations in the Pacific directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Likewise, all naval resources were placed under Admiral Nimitz as commander in chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC). (Joint Chiefs of Staff Command and Operational Directives for the Pacific [J.C.S. 1259/4], April 3, 1945, NA/RG 165 [ABC, 323.31 POA, Section 3-A [1-29-42]. Joint Chiefs of Staff to MacArthur, Nimitz, and Arnold, Radio No. WARX-62773, April 3, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 384 TS, Case 1].) For previous information regarding the Pacific command discussions, see Marshall Memorandum for General Hull, March 19, 1945, pp. 91-92, and Marshall Memorandum for Admiral King, March 22, 1945, pp. 94-97.

2. The J.C.S. directive provided that "until passed to other command by mutual agreement or by direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the localities under command of CINCSWPA and the Naval Forces allocated to him will remain under his command and similarly, the areas under command of CINCPAC and the Army Forces allocated to him will remain under his command. Changes in command of forces or localities and changes made in existing Joint logistical procedures will be effected by progressive rearrangements made by mutual agreement, or as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." (Joint Chiefs of Staff Command and Operational Directives for the Pacific [J.C.S. 1259/4], April 3, 1945, NA/RG 165 [ABC, 323.31 POA, Section 3-A (1-29-42)].)

3. Lieutenant General Wilhelm D. Styer assumed command of U.S. Army Forces in the Western Pacific (AFWESPAC) with headquarters at Manila in June 1945. Major General LeRoy Lutes had served with the Army Service Forces since January 1943.

4. "My heartiest congratulations on your great success in reorganizing the Pacific Command," replied MacArthur. "To have accomplished as much as you did amicably is a masterly performance. This represents an outstanding contribution not only to the Army, but to the country. You may be confident of complete support from this Command. I do not anticipate any difficulties in achieving complete and harmonious cooperation with Admiral Nimitz." (MacArthur to Marshall, Radio No. CA-51389, April 5, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) For the chief of staff's reply, see Marshall to MacArthur, April 6, 1945, pp. 133-34.

TO JAMES F. BYRNES

April 4, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Justice Byrnes: I am distressed that you have resigned your position as Director of the Office of War Mobilization though I am glad that you will be, at least for a time, relieved from the terrific strain under which you have had to work.¹

Speaking for the Army, I wish to express our thanks for your leadership and for your generous attitude in reaching an understanding of our necessities.²

I personally shall miss very much your wise counsel which has been of great assistance to me in the past, not only in your present office but also during your days in the Senate. You have made a great contribution to the war effort and I know no one in high position who has made the personal sacrifices you have made.

With my very best wishes and with affectionate regards,³ Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Byrnes had assumed direction of the Office of War Mobilization in May 1943. Charged with developing unified programs and policies for the maximum use of resources, the office coordinated the activities of the federal agencies dealing with military and civilian materials and supplies. All functions assigned to the Office of War Mobilization were transferred to the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, when it was established in October 1944. The O.W.M.R. was charged with providing a unified program for war mobilization and reconversion. Responsible for the transition from war to peace, the director coordinated planning of the federal agencies to insure orderly and prompt demobilization and conversion to a sound peacetime economy. Byrnes resigned effective April 2 and was succeeded by Fred M. Vinson. (Herman Miles Somers, *Presidential Agency, OWMR: The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950; reprint, New York: Greenwood Press, 1969], pp. 76–85 [reprint edition].)

2. For Marshall's recommendations to Byrnes soon after he became director of the Office of War Mobilization, see *Papers of GCM*, 4: 50–52. For information regarding Byrnes's recent midnight entertainment curfew, see Marshall Memorandum for General Handy, March 20, 1945, pp. 92–93.

3. "I shall always treasure your letter with its more than generous references to my service," Byrnes replied. "There is no one in the United States from whom I would rather have a word of praise." (Byrnes to Marshall, April 6, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

DRAFT OF SPEECH TO THE ACADEMY OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE¹

April 4, 1945
New York, New York

While I did not come here tonight to enter into a discussion of the present war situation, it is a little difficult to ignore the tremendous events that

are now in progress. The details of the various battles are so well reported that there is no need for me to recite them. There are, however, a few aspects not generally recognized, which may be of interest.

Our present successes east of the Rhine are in a large measure due to the destruction of German fighting power west of the Rhine, especially in the Saar Basin. Apparently Hitler's unwillingness to give up a foot of ground involved the German armies in that costly fighting where the overwhelming resources of the Allies in men and materiel were close at hand.

The present situation in many respects almost duplicates that which immediately followed the Avranches breakthrough last August in Normandy, with the development of the Falaise pocket, the rush of the Third Army east and southeast across France, and the whirling course of the First Army eastward along the southern border of the pocket and thence north to Mons before turning east towards Aachen. It is rather remarkable that the same Army, the Third, has been carrying out the direct dash while the First Army, as before, has executed the great encirclement from the south and east. Actually the same Army Corps in the First Army, the VII under General Collins, which landed on the Utah Beach, took Cherbourg, made the opening at Avranches and moved along the southern edge of the Falaise pocket and north to Mons and on to Aachen, has been carrying out a similar action around the present great pocket south of the Ruhr in which some 100 to 150 thousand German troops are cut off.

Our situation today, though, differs from that of last summer and greatly differs from that of last fall in that we have adequate ports, railroads, divisions and supporting troops. There has been a marked advantage over the fall and winter in the operations in the air which have been much favored recently by good weather along with their improved technique and equipment for bombing through overcast and guiding planes to safe landings by means of instrument installations on numerous fields in France as well as in England.

The leadership of Divisions, Corps and Armies under the Allied command, I think history will show, has been of unusual and uniform excellence never before attained by us in war. It has been truly magnificent. The staff work and the handling and forwarding of supplies, which has had to be on a colossal scale in view of the distances and rapidity of movements, are a great achievement and a reflection of the highest standards of efficiency.

The conquest of the Philippines has proceeded in a very rapid manner and with a minimum of casualties. We virtually control every key point in the Islands and we have been greatly assisted by the guerrilla activities of the Filipinos. They themselves have conquered large areas, as well as cooperated aggressively with American troops, to our advantage.

The loyalty, the suffering endured by the Filipinos, and their present aggressive fighting spirit, are fine tributes to them as a people and also in

part a tribute to the American Government as an evidence of the confidence the Filipino nation have displayed in us under desperately trying circumstances.

Incidentally, the Japanese might profit from some of the discussions of the Academy of Political Science because it is quite evident that they have completely lacked, from a military and governmental standpoint, the ability to inspire the confidence of other peoples or to gain their friendship.

Speaking of the Pacific, I should like to point out that we are approaching one of the most difficult periods of the war, at least from the viewpoint of the military authorities, that is, the transfer of power from the European Continent to the Far East, or the redeployment, as we term it. This period will be one of extreme difficulty for a number of reasons. The transfer represents, I believe, the greatest administrative and logistical problem in the history of the world, so it is not an easy matter for us. We have been working on the details for more than a year and I think are prepared to carry out the procedure in a thoroughly businesslike manner. That is not what worries us.

Once the fighting ceases in the European Theater the natural reaction of almost every man will be an overwhelming desire to return home, to get clear of the tragic scenes of destruction and the surroundings of discomfort in which he has labored so long, to rejoin his family and resume his civil occupation. His family will be equally impatient and probably even more articulate. Appeals will be made to our representatives in Congress to bring pressure on the War Department to do this or that, for this person or that person. The papers, the columnists, the broadcasters, will carry the reflection of this great impatience. At the same time we will be under the necessity of carrying out with the greatest possible rapidity the initial movement of certain large forces from Europe to the Pacific. Some will go by way of the Suez, others by way of Panama; all will wish at least to return to the U.S. long enough for a furlough visit. But the stern necessities of maintaining the momentum of the war in the Pacific in order to shorten it by every possible day, will not admit of a deviation from the plans which we consider essential to the operations in prospect.

Then there will be the reaction from the men who have been informed that they are the first to be demobilized and yet will have to endure a considerable delay before transportation will be available to return them to the States for discharge. There are many permutations and combinations of dilemmas involved in this matter, but we must move with the greatest possible speed towards the shortening of the war, we must economize in lives and billions by thus shortening the war, and the interest of the individual must give way to the interest of the country, and the millions of men who will be carrying our battles forward in the Pacific.

Ship tonnage is our trouble and will continue to be our trouble for a long time to come. The statement is frequently made that we have more

ocean tonnage now than ever before in the history of the world. That is true. But we have almost 7 million men overseas engaged in a tremendous expenditure of supplies, ammunition and equipment, generally. It used to be a problem of supplying three or four divisions fighting in Tunisia and a few groups of planes which we had painfully gotten together and transported to some distant shore. Today it is a problem of supplying almost 100 divisions, most of which are constantly engaged in action and every one of which has been in action. At the same time our colossal Air Forces are expending gasoline and bombs at a rate that defies the imagination. I was told the other day that we were dropping an average of 6 tons of bombs a minute day and night and have since been informed that this rate has been considerably increased.

In connection with this redeployment I have not mentioned two other very important factors, one is the possibility of a general letdown in this country on the basis of their own respective calculations of what is required to put the Japanese out of action. I shall only make this comment: that we intend to expend far more ammunition and similar supplies in the Pacific than we did in the Atlantic, as being a necessity in dealing with the Japanese fanaticism and at the same time avoiding heavy casualties. The other factor which is of great importance, is the effect of the public reaction on the morale of the Army during this period of redeployment. Morale is a word that is very carelessly used. It is one that means much to me. I can best explain it briefly in this way: no matter how good and plentiful the weapons, no matter how large the numbers of men or divisions, or Air Forces, without morale they are worthless, little more than an expensive encumbrance, and the confidence and morale of an Army can be very quickly and adversely affected by the thoughtlessness of the people behind that Army in their political actions, in their public statements, and in their letters to the soldiers. We recently had a very difficult situation in Italy due almost entirely to the mail from home reflecting the speeches and other ill-considered statements that were being made.²

I talked to the Academy of Political Science about two years and a half ago at a very critical moment in the history of our war effort. I think it would be pertinent to my further comments tonight to read to you what I said at that time, just two days after our landings in Africa.³

In the past two days we have had a most impressive example of the practicable application of unity of command, an American Expeditionary Force, soldiers, sailors, and aviators, supported by the British Fleet, by British flyers and by a British Army, all controlled by an American Commander-in-Chief, General Eisenhower. They are served by a combined staff of British and American officers. Officers of the British Army and Navy senior to General Eisenhower, men of great distinction and long experience, have, with complete loyalty, subordinated themselves to his leadership. The instructions of the British Cabinet to

guide their Army commander serving under General Eisenhower furnish a model of readiness of a great nation to cooperate in every practicable manner. I go into detail because this should not be a secret. It will be most depressing news to our enemies. It is the declaration of their doom.

My particular interest at this time in your affairs rests on the fact that after a war a democracy like ours usually throws to the winds whatever scientific approach has been developed in the conduct of the war. This is an historical fact. It is the result of the immediate post-war aversion of the people to everything military, and of the imperative demand of the taxpayer for relief from the burden imposed by the huge war debt.

We are in a terrible war and our every interest should be devoted to winning the war in the shortest possible time. However, in view of your interest in the science of government and the intimate relationship that it bears to military requirements, I would ask your very careful consideration of these related military factors in whatever studies you make regarding the readjustments which must follow this war. The theories on the subject will have to be compressed into the realities. The attitude of the taxpayer is human and inevitable. The differing reactions of the people in the center of the country, of those along the coasts, of the people who face the Pacific and the people who face the Atlantic, must be considered. The extreme distaste for things military to which I have already referred and which always follows an exhausting war will have to be taken into account. Then with all of these reactions, how can we so establish ourselves that we will not be doomed to a repetition of the succession of tragedies of the past thirty years? We must take the nations of the world as they are, the human passions and prejudices of peoples as they exist, and find some way to secure for us a free America in a peaceful world.

In the midst of great victories and the rapid crumbling of the German military power I find myself profoundly depressed over the evident prospect of another repetition in our history of an impractical idealism or a submission to ulterior motives or a frank avoidance of burdensome taxes, in the statements which are now appearing regarding the military posture to be adopted by this country in the post-war period. I stated that I would come here tonight if I could talk off the record and had two reasons for this specific request: first, I do not have the time these days to make a careful preparation of a public statement in which every sentence is weighed and frequently without regard to the context. But my most important reason was that I wished to talk to you a little about our post-war military affairs and I do not feel it proper for me to make public statements (I am regarding this as a private statement to a select group) until I have first discharged my official responsibilities by reporting my views to such Committee of Congress as goes into the matter. In view of the purposes of your Society, I feel it important that you should have at least a little in advance of the main debate, some idea of the military point of view.

I referred to my feeling of depression over what I now read and hear regarding our post-war military posture and I think I am justified in a depth of feeling such as few others can appreciate.

I sailed for France in the last war on the first transport of the first convoy along with one of the most complete exhibitions of utter unpreparedness I have ever imagined. I personally saw the first American dead on the ground, east of Luneville. I wrote the order for the first American offensive and I wrote the order for the cessation of hostilities by the First Army at the close of the Meuse-Argonne offensive. I saw all about me the delays and losses, the confusion due to our previous unpreparedness. Most of the lesson was lost in the illusion of oratory here at home.

I returned here to General Pershing and participated with him in the hearings which led to a really excellent beginning of a national military policy, though it lacked the backbone of an adequate training system. I saw the Congress enact this law and the Army start to build up under its provisions and then during a period of three years I witnessed the complete emasculation of what little Army we had left, the practical destruction of almost every provision of the new law by the limitation of appropriations.

Out with the troops I struggled with this situation through the succeeding years, here in the U.S. and in the Far East, and finally I came to Washington in the summer of 1938, when because of the tragic sacrifices then occurring in China and the fighting developing in Spain, and the reports of the development of a great German military force, our people were just beginning to have a feeling that maybe the U.S. was not properly prepared for the situations which might develop in this war. I finally became Chief of Staff in the summer of 1939 when the struggles of the mountain were just giving forth little more than the proverbial mouse. The past 6 years are familiar to all of you in a general way but I do not believe any but a very few of you dimly comprehend the struggle we have gone through to save ourselves from utter defeat and to build up the great fighting force we have today. How narrow the margin was will be judged by history but quite evidently it will not be either realized or remembered by the present generation whose thoughts are so quickly turning to more pleasant considerations.

I spoke of feeling justified in a depth of feeling such as few others can appreciate and I particularly refer to the daily agony which must be mine over the casualties that we suffer, the letters I receive from mothers, the protests against using our fine young men, the criticisms of this, the deploring of that, all this is my daily burden and now, judging from what I hear and read I sense that our people are going back to the same utterly illogical, impracticable, visionary concept which had led us into these ghastly tragedies in the past. No one hates war more than I do and I think few hate it as much, but somehow we must not repeat every single weakness we displayed in 1920 to 1939.

All of this has to do with your considerations as an Academy of Political Science, if I understand the term, and the use of the word Science implies a certain exactitude in the fundamentals upon which decisions are

reached. I beg of you to be intolerant of the superficial statements, the specious reasonings, and above all, of this devilish ulterior motive that would destroy our best efforts to do something towards securing the future peace of the world.

I am told that we should not raise any question, for example, regarding compulsory training until after the peace. Now that to me means a complete lack of comprehension of what is going on in this country today. For example, I have a responsibility for three million command installations. Now I mean by that three million places of varying size, such as Governors Island here in New York, Camp Upton, Fort Bragg, Fort Benning, Fort Myer—three million. That number seems hardly finite and I am told that we should do nothing about this. We shall know nothing of the use to which this is to be put, we shall have no basis of determining to what extent we can close this or close that and return it to civil use, no basis for determining what repairs we are justified in putting on this place or that place, no understanding in a business sense of anything regarding three million installations, in many cases almost cities. We must wait for one, two or three years. We cannot wait. That would be one of the greatest wastes that I can imagine.

There is another consideration. I think everyone recognizes that if you allow a great enterprise to disintegrate, it is an extremely expensive and difficult task to recreate such portion of it as you wish to maintain. If you dismiss a faculty, let the roof leak and the rains pour in, the student body be dispersed, I submit you are going to have a very difficult time in reconstituting that installation. We have a great machine, so great it is very difficult properly to describe it. Is that to fall apart? Certainly we cannot afford to keep it all while we are waiting to find out something of what is to [be] done.

I maintain this. That it is not conceivable that any form of peace that may be established will render unnecessary a definite military strength on the part of the U.S. and of Great Britain and of Russia. We do not propose that details shall be decided now but I do feel that we must determine on general policies so that there will be some guidance in the handling of these millions of men and these vast properties or installations.

Governments are proverbially unbusinesslike, but this would be on a scale that has never been dreamt of before and I am not mentioning the tragic consequences of a failure properly to appreciate the general requirements for a world peace. I am not talking about details or definite numbers. I don't know them myself, and I wouldn't attempt to guess at the present time but I do feel this, I was about to say, I know this, but that would not be tactful—that unless you have some form, and by form I mean a really efficient form, of compulsory military training you cannot possibly maintain any adequate military force. We can't buy it. We can't pay for

it. You can't persuade the men to join the ranks. Therefore if my judgment is correct and the decision is not to have compulsory training you are not going to have any military force worthy of the name, but even so it will cost you a sizeable portion of your budget and to little consequence.⁴

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. General Marshall delivered his off-the-record speech at the Hotel Astor dinner meeting of the Academy of Political Science, and he wrote at the top of the first page: "delivered without notes but approximately as below."

2. For information regarding low troop morale at the Italian front, see Marshall Memorandum for Colonel Pasco, January 9, 1945, pp. 25–27.

3. On November 10, 1942, General Marshall had spoken to the Academy of Political Science during their annual meeting held in New York City at the Astor Hotel; see *Papers of GCM*, 3: 432–35.

4. "In addition to demonstrating yourself a master of your subject," wrote A. N. Kemp, president of American Airlines and sitting in the audience, "you have the faculty of presenting it with a clearness and enthusiasm which indeed impresses the listener. Your task is an enormous one—far from complete, as you pointed out—but you sold yourself thoroughly to us all so that *you have our full confidence*." (Kemp to Marshall, April 6, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].) James A. Farley, chairman of the board of the Coca-Cola Export Sales Company and former postmaster general, wrote that the chief of staff "made a mighty fine speech. . . . Without any attempt to flatter you, I think it can be truthfully said that there is no man in the country today, with the possible exception of Secretary Hull, who enjoys the confidence of the American people as you do. That position you have merited because of your splendid leadership, and the simple and humble manner in which you have officiated." (Farley to Marshall, April 10, 1945, *ibid.*) For General Marshall's comment regarding the event, see the following document.

TO ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET ERNEST J. KING

April 5, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Dear King: On the plane for New York yesterday afternoon I completed my reading of your report to the Secretary of the Navy and I want to congratulate you on a beautiful presentation of a period of vast and triumphant actions. I delayed writing this note until I had had an opportunity to go over the report with some care.

I was glad to see in this morning's papers that the press had carried the important sense of your fine presentation last night of sea power, particularly in its relation to the post-war period. We always seem to get a good reception for remarks under circumstances similar to those of last night.¹ However, I come away a little depressed because the group we talked to is so limited these days in its effect on public opinion in general. Our pleas in effect go over the heads of the great mass of the people who are mainly influenced by the more direct or practical approach of the political leaders. Somehow or other we must reach that great majority whose views,

however ill-informed, will probably be determining.² Faithfully yours,

G. C. Marshall

LC/E. J. King Papers (General Correspondence)

1. General Marshall and Admiral King had spoken to the Academy of Political Science on April 4; see the previous document.

2. Assistant Secretary of the General Staff H. Merrill Pasco sent a copy of this letter to Major General Alexander D. Surles, director of the Bureau of Public Relations. "Without General Marshall's knowledge I forward you a copy of his letter which he dictated to Admiral King. I think it states clearly one of the biggest problems that is worrying him and it occurred to me that the Bureau might be giving some thought to it with the idea of beating him to the punch by submitting some recommendations in the near future," wrote Pasco. (Pasco Memorandum for General Surles, April 6, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

MEMORANDUM FOR JUDGE PATTERSON

Confidential

April 5, 1945

[Washington, D.C.]

General Handy brought to my attention your proposed plan for utilizing the services of general prisoners in combat units overseas.¹ It seems to be generally agreed that the experiment would be a practicable proposition only if these men were segregated from other combat troops by organization into special units. The problem seems to be one of whether or not we utilize these men as individuals along the present lines of restoration, or in separate units. I gather that the records at present show that as many prisoners as can be restored to military service in an individual capacity are now being granted that privilege.

The organization of separate combat units, selection, guarding, training, transporting, etc., would require time and personnel considerably exceeding that required for similar units on a normal basis. But to me the most critical consideration relates to the conditions under which such a special unit could be employed in the theater where the responsibility would be the theater commander's and which I fear he would be most reluctant to accept.

I am putting up the problem to General Eisenhower, General McNarney and General MacArthur to get their reactions.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson had asked Deputy Chief of Staff General Thomas T. Handy to have the General Staff study the advisability of forming a combat unit from prisoners held in the United States. "Based on recommendations from Ground Forces and Service Forces, G-3 recommended that general prisoners be employed in a special unit but not as individual replacements." (Minnich Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, April 3, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 322].) Patterson's adviser agreed that the plan would not work for individuals but that they must be kept in a separate unit. "When General Handy spoke to you

about this, you expressed the view that the prisoners should be used as individuals and that they should not be tagged as criminals. Accordingly, the proposal was disapproved on the Staff level by General Handy." (Ibid.)

2. Asked about the feasibility of utilizing prisoners in combat units, Eisenhower replied that it would be inadvisable, McNarney believed it would affect troop morale unfavorably, and MacArthur wanted only the best troops as long as there was a shortage of shipping. (Pasco Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, April 19, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) On April 19 Marshall notified Patterson that the theater commanders did not desire prisoners in combat units. "In view of the reaction of theater commanders, I believe it would be inadvisable to put the proposed plan into effect." (Marshall [staff-drafted] Memorandum for Judge Patterson, April 19, 1945, *ibid.*)

REMARKS AT ANNUAL CONFERENCE
OF SUPERVISORY CHAPLAINS¹

April 5, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

I am glad to have the opportunity of seeing you gentlemen before you conclude your conference, as there are one or two things about which I wish to speak to you directly.

What has been accomplished by the Corps of Chaplains in this war has been most gratifying. We are not through by a long way, and there has to be a great improvement. Our divisions get better as they fight on. The same is true of the Corps of Chaplains. It should become better and better, more virile and more effective. Starting from the level of 1939 I think the progress has been remarkable.

There is no doubt the Corps has been a great help to the War Department by the confidence it has instilled in the God-fearing public, the great mass of our people. The work accomplished under Chaplain Arnold's direction and guidance represents a masterly achievement. What I am particularly impressed with is the way the standards of efficiency have been raised. To be perfectly frank, in the long past that had been the weakest point in the conduct of religious activities in the army. I always felt it came from this state of mind: If you had a poor colonel, you could get rid of him; if you had an ineffective chaplain, you accepted that fact as your cross to bear without thought of remedial action as in the case of an officer of the line.²

In all questions touching the army, I must never allow myself to be overconcerned about the interests of the individual whose effectiveness is in question. My concern must be more concentrated on the effect of his inefficiency on the rank and file. In 40 odd years of service I have seen outstanding examples of splendid leadership on the part of army chaplains. I have observed many innocuous, ineffective men, hardly noticed by others. A highly effective man has always impressed me deeply. I found this true as a post commander, as an area commander, and very much the case when I was charged with responsibility for CCC [Civilian Conservation Corps]

groups. An outstandingly effective chaplain was my most valuable staff officer, for a very able leader in the chaplaincy solved a great portion of the individual problems of command and control. It has been a matter of gratification to me and great relief to know that, during this war, everything connected with the Chaplain Corps has been on a high standard.

To go back to my first comment, the Chaplain Corps has still to grow, to do more. An ineffective minister will empty a cathedral; a good one does not require a church. He can take his men in the woods and fields and do a grand job. You must not rest on your laurels because you have excellent chapels. The War Department, indeed the entire army, requires important assistance from the Corps of Chaplains, particularly in the European Theater of Operations.

We are rapidly approaching the moment for the initiation of redeployment to the Pacific. That will probably be the most difficult period in the history of the army. It involves one of the greatest administrative and logistical efforts ever undertaken. The various aspects of it, affecting morale and the efficiency of the army, are so compelling and so numerous that it is going to require masterly handling on the part of everyone in positions of command, control or influence. The moment actual hostilities terminate in Europe, the most natural reaction will be an overwhelming desire on the part of every man to rejoin his wife and family, to see his girl friend, to return home, to get away from the scenes of destruction and misery where he has hazarded and suffered so much. He will want to leave immediately. But what will actually happen to him?

The army must turn, almost within an hour—and it is prepared to do so—to move critical units through the Panama and Suez Canals as fast as possible to the battlefield in the Pacific. A 12,000-mile transfer lies ahead. It must be accomplished without delay. The next operations scheduled are hinged on prompt action. We will be juggling with the seasons. One season lost can delay operations—and victory—six months. Every day this war is delayed, every hour it is delayed, men are killed and wounded. From a purely economic point of view, delay will mean millions and may mean billions expended to harass us in future taxes. We would much rather use the money for the benefit of the people. If you look to the individual in Europe, he will tell you how long he has been overseas and how much he desires to go home. It would be an outrage to the troops in the Pacific, however, to prejudice their chances by delaying operations while others are brought home. The soldier in Europe must be made to realize that. The Chaplain can play a large part in solacing his outraged feelings and in giving spiritual guidance, bringing him down to a philosophical acceptance of where his duty lies. He has been willing to die for his country. Many of his companions have died. It will be difficult for him to accept this situation without turbulent reaction. That will constitute one of the problems you must face.

The urge to get back is tremendous. The conditions surrounding the soldier are not conducive to patience or philosophy. Fortunately, it appears that this period will be in the summer season and in the fall. After the last war it was just as we entered the disagreeable, uncomfortable northern European winter; December, January and February. The lot of the soldier in Europe who lived under those conditions was far from pleasant.

In addition there is the problem of feeding the suffering people of devastated regions. It matters not whether they are enemy or liberated people. To you as chaplains they are human beings in the charitable, benevolent view that must be yours. But you must have in mind that shipping, or rather the lack of it, stands partially in the way of our national impulse to do more than we are doing for these people. It determines how much we can allocate for carrying supplies to Europe without leaving more men to die in the Pacific. It is this delicate balance that will be so difficult to maintain. If redeployment is delayed, the enemy is given an opportunity to recover and the battle is prolonged. The enemy is permitted to re-establish himself, which he is capable of doing quickly. There will be heavy pressure from numerous countries for shipping to relieve their suffering—one of the greatest tragedies in the history of mankind.

The great influence of the Chaplains will be needed, particularly during this redeployment period. There is a large number of chaplains in the European Theater who can contribute much toward easing the sacrifice which the individual soldier in Europe must now make. Notwithstanding the fact that earlier he was willing to sacrifice his life, he will be less willing to endure delay in his return to the United States. It will be difficult for the men in their place to recognize that meeting their individual desire or impatience will prolong the war and involve additional death and mutilation for others. I find in talking to men of one theater or locality that they are only looking down their own particular slot, one of many slots in this global war.

Reactions from the soldiers' families at home will not help to combat impatience. The pressure on the War Department here in the United States will be terrific. Countless demands based on conflicting influences, the desire of the single individual of our eight millions, misrepresentation and ulterior motives will be made. Many will be without a solid foundation of fact or logic. The help of everybody, including the ministry at home, will be needed; otherwise the morale of army will suffer, a fatal weakness in war. It does not matter how much an army possesses in quantities of munitions and numbers of men, without morale it is a weak tool without much value. We need the unremitting and understanding support of every chaplain to maintain morale and stimulate the spirit of the army. Their success in this great service will be a triumph for the Corps of Chaplains.

The thought has just occurred to me that the influence of the chaplains might be amplified by giving them temporarily several really qualified

assistants. Since the fighting will be finished in Europe, the manpower problem will not present quite the usual obstacle. It may be a good idea, worth looking into. A chaplain might use a half-dozen picked men with profit. They would have to be carefully selected or more antagonism than good would result.

I do not want you to think my view of the Chaplain Corps has been based on abstract or theoretical considerations. It is based on concrete or definite experiences, sometimes exciting and often amusing.³ I am deeply interested in results. The problem now before us concerns me deeply. It gives you an opportunity to render a great service beyond that ordinarily conceived for your cloth. I am quite certain you will succeed in rendering this service to the army. The difficulty will be to gain a real understanding of the complex tasks that lie ahead, and getting across to the millions of men concerned some conception on their part of that understanding.

While we are here together with Chaplain Arnold, I should like to express my gratitude to him and my high regard for the tremendous job he has accomplished during his long years of service as Chief of your Corps, and for his outstanding personal efficiency. I am very glad it has so developed that I can arrange to have him at least for the present as my immediate personal representative in the Inspector General's Department regarding all matters pertaining to the religious activities or responsibilities of the army.⁴

Before this present conflict, the Inspector General was occupied largely with inspecting accounts, administration, personal delinquencies, and matters of that kind. As soon as we approached the first phase of mobilization, I had the Inspector General take in men suitable for inspecting construction and production matters, hospitalization, training, etc. The duties of the Department were diverted largely into those channels. As mobilization progressed and Selective Service was initiated, I had a general officer of the Medical Corps assigned to the Inspector General's Department. That provided an overall inspection service under the Chief of Staff for all medical matters. The same idea was being carried out along other lines—production, camp construction, Selective Service operations. The regular bureau of department organization does not always foster a fully balanced insight into the general problems of the army. In times of great activity it must be possible to have a quick over-all inspection made along any line.

It is possible now we have the services of Chaplain Arnold, who has been freed of the time-consuming work and responsibilities of the administration of the Corps. He can travel and determine for me what is occurring in the Chaplains Corps all over the world. I hope he likes his task. I know his observations will be very helpful.

Can you think of anything I have said that might confuse these gentlemen, or anything else I might say?

CHAPLAIN ARNOLD: Nothing, sir.

GENERAL MARSHALL: Thank you, gentlemen, for your cordial reception and attention.⁵

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)

1. General Marshall edited his address, which was recorded by a stenographer, and authorized this version for distribution to army chaplains. (Chaplain Luther D. Miller Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, May 21, 1945, and Pasco Memorandum for the Chief of Chaplains, June 6, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 353].)

2. "The time has come now to see that chaplains maintain the same level of efficiency that is demanded of all the other arms and services," General Marshall wrote to General McNarney in August 1942. The chief of staff wanted to establish a general understanding that "local commanders and those above them will consider themselves responsible for the effectiveness of the chaplain organization, just as they must in regard to tactical or administrative and supply organizations." (See *Papers of GCM*, 3: 293–94.)

3. General Marshall recalled observing a Decoration Day ceremony in Tunisia conducted by the chaplain, who was tone deaf. "It [the singing] was a very agonizingly pathetic performance, added to which the men were in deep column, so that only a few were close enough to hear anything. Above all, they were facing the setting sun—it was square in their eyes—and it was not a cool day. . . . At the end of the ceremony, I took over and faced the men away from the setting sun and had them sit down, and then gave them a talk describing what was going on with the American forces in the various portions of the world, trying to take the curse off part of this miscast ceremony." (*Marshall Interviews*, pp. 323–24.)

4. For background information regarding Chaplain Arnold's transfer to the Inspector General's office, see Marshall Memorandum for General Handy, February 21, 1945, pp. 54–55.

5. "Your talk to the supervising chaplains made a profound and lasting impression," Chaplain Arnold wrote from the Inspector General's office. "Two remarks were typical—'What a fine Bishop the General would be', and 'God bless Marshall and keep him with us to the end'." (Arnold to Marshall, April 6, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Radio No. WAR-64236. *Top Secret*

April 6, 1945
Washington, D.C.

For Eisenhower's EYES ONLY from Marshall. Discussion here by G-2 and Mr. Stimson relates to effect of complete destruction of Ruhr industry and economic future of Europe, destruction that would result from further Allied offensive action.¹ Admiral Leahy, King, Handy and Hull are opposed to asking you any question.

Aside from purely military considerations concerned with advancement of campaign to destroy the German Army there are two schools of thought in high government circles here regarding a post war pastoral Germany and a policy of leaving some industrial capability to benefit the related economy of other European countries lacking Ruhr resources.

We naturally assume that you are proceeding in the manner best adapted to the security and rapidity of your thrusts into Germany.

Without thought of compromising yourself or in effect limiting your present military intentions will you please give me for no other eyes but Mr. Stimson's, mine, Handy's and Hull's, most confidentially your present intentions as to Ruhr pocket and your view as to desirability or feasibility of any procedure by which the Ruhr proper might be sealed off.

I assume your forces are already deeply committed to operations directed against the pocket. This message must not in any way embarrass you or have the slightest effect in limiting your present point of view or intentions. As yet I have no views whatsoever in this matter, except that I think the fat is probably now in the fire and whatever the political conclusions it is too late, too impracticable to take any action for such reason.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Secretary of War Stimson reported that the April 6 meeting with Operations and Intelligence (G-2) staff had brought up the "problem of the Ruhr." Major General Clayton L. Bisell, assistant chief of staff, G-2, pointed out that American troops encircled the Ruhr. "Should we clean the pocket up now or should we bypass it and let it starve into submission, using the rest of our troops to conquer the rest of Germany? It was a vital big question which lies before Eisenhower today and one in which Marshall apparently felt and I felt it was a case where we should at least discuss it with him." If we conquer the Ruhr now, "we must smash practically everything in it, . . . wipe out the most important industrial area in Europe, the source of Europe's trade and commerce more than any other one spot; the factories, even the mines, will all be smashed perhaps into irreparable ruin if our troops have to take it in the way we are taking the other cities of Germany today." However, "if we bypass it, simply containing it, and finish up with the rest of Germany, it will take time; the Ruhr will ultimately fall in our hands but we may endanger quick success in the rest of Germany by the absence of the troops which we will be obliged to leave around the perimeter of the Ruhr." (April 6, 1945, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 51: 13].)

2. "I regard the substantial elimination of the enemy forces in the Ruhr as a military necessity," replied Eisenhower on April 7. "At the very least we must compress his remaining elements into a relatively small area where they may be contained with a few divisions and so that our problem of maintenance may be minimized our main attacks against the pocket are coming from the east and southeast." Eisenhower reported that while "accomplishing the substantial destruction of the enemy in the Ruhr area we have no intention of inflicting useless or unnecessary damage on existing facilities." (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2588–90.) Marshall forwarded Eisenhower's reply to Secretary Stimson with the note: "General Eisenhower has transmitted the attached radio regarding the Ruhr for the eyes only of yourself, General Handy, General Hull, and me." (Marshall Memorandum for the Secretary of War, April 8, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
Radio. *Top Secret*

April 6, 1945
Washington, D.C.

For MacArthur's eyes only from Marshall. Thanks for your message of 5 April CA 51389.¹ The public reception of our solution for the Pacific has been gratifying and I hope that mischievous cogitations and suggestions are now a thing of the past.

As we enter into the detailed plans for what I hope will be the final operations of the Pacific there are a great many personnel complications that occur to me and which must be handled by the War Department I hope without unfortunate reactions.

For example, on the Normandy beach the fourth day after the landing, General Bradley asked me to have him in mind for service in the Pacific, incidentally, the only personal request of any kind he has ever made. Since then I have received formal applications from some of the leading officers in the European theaters; one came in a few days ago from Patton asking for any command down to a division that would give him an opportunity to fight in the Pacific.²

We have some superb commanders on the Atlantic side, proven in numerous, almost continuous, and very large operations, and their staffs have been in my opinion exceptional in the rapidity and smoothness with which they have handled great masses of troops under rather extraordinary circumstances. This ability must not be lost to the Pacific war and just how the integration is to be managed I do not know but I should like you to have it carefully in mind so that we not only can employ great proven ability but can meet the problem of redeployment, so far as high ranking personnel is concerned, without too much of bitter disappointments on either side and hurt feelings generally.

From my point of view we should select the very ablest people in the Army, general, colonel, major, captain, etc., for the Pacific war and ease out everyone who has not demonstrated a high standard of battle, staff or administrative efficiency.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. For MacArthur's message, see note 4, Marshall to MacArthur, April 4, 1945, p. 118.

2. "When the operations against Germany are brought to a successful conclusion," Patton notified the chief of staff, "I should like to be considered for any type of combat command from a division up against the Japanese. I am sure that my method of fighting would be successful. I also am of such an age that this is my last war, and I would therefore like to see it through to the end." (George S. Patton to Marshall, March 13, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

SPEECH TO THE MILITARY ORDER
OF THE WORLD WARS¹

April 6, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Army Day this year is being observed by nine American field Armies simultaneously engaged with the enemy, and all successfully. It is being signalized by 26,000 American combat planes,² daily, almost hourly, engaged in strikes against the enemy. It is being celebrated by a million

individual officers or soldiers in continental United States, each being trained as a replacement for the Air or Ground forces overseas, and it is being honored by a million more of officers and soldiers laboring here at home to meet the hourly demands of the gigantic operations now in progress, for supplies and men and ships and planes.

The parades of other days are not possible. The combat troops are overseas paraded against our enemies. The last of our divisions and brigades left these shores months ago, so the citizen at home must find his stimulation in the reports of the victories which the sons and husbands of America are now winning for us with each succeeding day.

When one turns back to the military poverty of four short years ago it is difficult to realize how vast and how successful our military forces are today and it is almost inconceivable that they could have reached such heights of efficiency and power, and have been deployed so far from home in such widely separated theaters. The American characteristics of leadership, energy, courage and determination, magnified a hundred-fold by a feeling of outrage over the crimes of the Axis against the people and peace of the world, have made this possible.

We have come to accept the general aspects of global war somewhat as a matter of course and yet I recall being questioned by a Committee of Congress as to where an American Army might be expected to fight. I named all the foreign shores on which it had fought in the past and was rather surprised myself to realize how far afield our military activities had previously taken us. But I am frank to confess I did not then anticipate that the time would shortly come when almost every reach of land on the globe, even within the Arctic circle, would find American troops carrying out the purpose of our people to suppress the crimes and tyrannies of nations denying free governments and individual liberty to unfortunate people throughout the world.

These are momentous days for us. Our Armies in Germany are at this moment fighting with astonishing success in probably the greatest battle of all time, and I hope the most decisive. Yet, paradoxical as it may seem, more critical days are soon to come. I refer to the great transfer of power from the European continent to the Pacific, the redeployment as we term it, which must immediately follow the cessation of hostilities in Europe with the greatest possible speed.

For more than a year the War Department has been working on the plans for this transfer which constitutes, I believe, the greatest problem in administration and logistics in history. We have constantly kept our plans up to date, we have been prepared to put them into action literally on an hour's notice whenever that hour strikes. The task will be one of great difficulties, but I am confident that it will be carried out in a thoroughly workmanlike manner. We are not worried over that phase of the redeployment.

The moment hostilities cease in Europe there will be an overwhelming urge in every man to rejoin his wife or his family or to see his girl, to leave the scenes of destruction and desolation in which he has fought and labored at such great risks to life and limb. Yet at that very moment it is imperative that we start the movement through the Suez and through the Panama Canal of the units needed in highest priority for the acceleration of the campaign in the Pacific. Any delay, any loss of momentum in that campaign means the unnecessary loss or mutilation of more young Americans. It is not merely a question of how long would be the delay in terms of days, but rather one of how much of reorganization for renewed resistance the Japanese would be able to effect by reason of that delay.

The period of redeployment presents other very human reactions as well as international pressures. Consider the man who has been notified that he qualifies at the head of the list for demobilization and yet must be held in Europe for a time because of the lack of sufficient ocean shipping to get him home. His impatience will be intense, his attitude can easily become intolerant even to the smirching of a fine and soldierly fighting record. Much of the mail from home will not help the situation because the protests will be more articulate on this side of the Atlantic from the wives and the families and the sweethearts.

Unless we are to accept an avoidable increase in our casualties, unless we are to leave our millions of young men in the far Pacific waiting for the final support they will so urgently need, we shall be unable to meet these very human desires.

To a constantly increasing degree we shall have urgent requirements for food to feed the starving in Holland and to meet the stark necessities of other occupied areas, demands for raw material to get factories going and to put restless and poverty-stricken men to work. All of these involve ocean tonnage. The pressures from each area will be local to that area and quite naturally without much regard for purely military considerations in a distant part of the world. But we shall have our men undergoing the hazards of battle in the Pacific. That must not for a moment be forgotten.

During this period of redeployment the attitude of the people at home will be of the utmost importance to the morale of the Army, which means its fighting efficiency. They must be brought to understand the urgent requirements of the situation, they must be persuaded to support us in a last great effort to hasten the end of this war.

I know that each one of you who appreciates the situation will support us through this difficult period preliminary to the final victory.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)

1. Marshall spoke to nine hundred members of the Military Order of the World Wars during the Army Day luncheon held at the Mayflower Hotel. (Colonel Edwin S. Bettelheim, Jr., to Marshall, April 6, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. The figure of 26,144 combat planes included 4,205 transport planes operating in the combat areas in addition to 21,939 actual combat-type planes. (Pasco Memorandum for General Marshall, April 6, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Categorical].)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL PERSHING¹

Secret

April 12, 1945
Washington, D.C.

My dear General: Inclosed is a map of the Philippine Archipelago indicating the portions occupied by U.S. troops, and that which the guerrillas have gained control of—the remaining portion being still under Japanese domination. There is also indicated in red figures the reported strength of the Japanese in the various areas and in white the numerals of the U.S. Divisions.

As to the last-named, the U.S. Divisions, the rule of thumb is now to calculate a total of 38,000 combat troops for each division and about 46,000 combat and service troops for each division, the figures including divisional strength in each case. Our infantry divisions number about 14,000, the armored divisions 10,000 and the airborne divisions 11,000. There is no armored division in the Philippines but there is a headquarters and a considerable number of tank units in addition to the armored vehicles with the First Cavalry Division and the armored vehicles with corps reconnaissance outfits.

The total of Japanese troops can be reduced by at least 30% to allow for wounded and sick. Another sizeable operation is soon to be launched.

There are also inclosed two air photographs of the damaged portions of Manila.² Faithfully yours,

G. C. Marshall

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. General John J. Pershing was residing at Walter Reed General Hospital.

2. Colonel Frank McCarthy notified Colonel James R. Hudnall at Walter Reed General Hospital: "The attached envelope is for delivery to General Pershing. It contains secret information. I do not think it would be appropriate for me to ask for return of the map contained in the envelope, but it is suggested that, when the map seems to have served its purpose, you or Major Gilbert might suggest the advisability of returning it to the War Department. Please keep this matter entirely confidential." (McCarthy Memorandum for Colonel J. R. Hudnall, April 12, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) The map of the Philippine Islands and the two photographs of Manila were returned to G-2 by April 17; the attachments are not in the Marshall Papers.

The following information was obtained from the records of the George C. Marshall Foundation, Lexington, Virginia, and is being furnished to you for your information.

The records of the George C. Marshall Foundation, Lexington, Virginia, contain information regarding the activities of the Foundation and its various programs. This information is being furnished to you for your information.

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A Great Victory

April 12 – July 10, 1945

Today we celebrate a great victory, a day of solemn thanksgiving. My admiration and gratitude go first to those who have fallen, and to the men of the American armies of the air and ground whose complete devotion to duty and indomitable courage have overcome the enemy and every conceivable obstacle in achieving this historic victory.

—Marshall V-E Day Radio Address
May 8, 1945

A Great Victory

April 12 - July 10, 1942

The Japanese submarine I-57, which was sunk by the USS O'Brien (DD-405) on April 12, 1942, was the first Japanese submarine to be sunk by a United States destroyer. The O'Brien was part of the 1st Fleet, and was on patrol in the Pacific Ocean. The I-57 was on a mission to deliver supplies to the Japanese forces in the Philippines. The O'Brien was able to sink the I-57 because of its superior speed and maneuverability. The sinking of the I-57 was a major victory for the United States Navy.

—Official U.S. Navy Release
May 4, 1942

WE have lost a great leader,” said General Marshall in response to the announcement of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s death on April 12, 1945, in Warm Springs, Georgia. At Mrs. Roosevelt’s request, Marshall was in charge of Roosevelt’s funeral arrangements: the journey by train from Warm Springs to Washington, D.C., for the funeral service at the White House on April 14 and then to Hyde Park, New York, for burial the next day. Tall Sergeant James W. Powder, Marshall’s orderly and at times chauffeur, was in command of the pallbearers and walked behind the horse-drawn caisson bearing the late president’s body. (McCarthy Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, April 13, 1945, GCMRL/F. McCarthy Papers [U.S. Army 1941–45].)

“My dear General,” Eleanor Roosevelt wrote the evening of the funeral, “I want to tell you tonight how deeply I appreciate your kindness & thoughtfulness in all the arrangements made. My husband would have been grateful & I know it was all as he would have wished it. He always spoke of his trust in you & of his affection for you. With my gratitude & sincere thanks.” (Roosevelt to Marshall, April 15, [1945], GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

Meanwhile, the military chiefs met with President Harry S. Truman at the White House on the morning of April 13 for about an hour. Secretary of War Stimson noted that the president “was very friendly in his manner and words. He made a brief statement telling us that he was very much gratified with the way that the war had been carried on by the two Departments” and he wished “us to stay on and carry on just as we had been doing.” Then “Marshall gave a very good statement as to the affairs on the European and Burma fronts and King followed with a statement on the war in the Pacific. The President listened intently and had evidently been following the war very closely. . . . On the whole my impression was favorable although, as General Marshall said in the car coming back with me, ‘We shall not know what he is really like until the pressure begins to be felt’.” (April 13, 1945, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 51: 30].) ★

STATEMENT BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF

April 12, 1945
Washington, D.C.

General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, tonight issued the following statement:

“We have lost a great leader. His far-reaching wisdom in military counsel has been a constant source of courage to all of us who have

worked side by side with him from the dark days of the war's beginning. No tribute from the Army could be so eloquent as the hourly record of the victories of the past few weeks."

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)

TO LOUIS B. MAYER

April 13, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mr. Mayer: Thanks for your note of April 2nd concerning the use the Army is making of the films which the motion picture industry is so generously furnishing to the Army Pictorial Service.¹ I have considered the showing of motion pictures, particularly to the front line troops, a very vital element of sustaining morale, and the job we have been able to do has been made possible in large measure by the complete cooperation of you and the other leaders of the motion picture industry.

I must tell you that I only learnt about two weeks ago that you had suffered a dreadful accident in a fall from a horse. Arnold happened to mention seeing you in the hospital. Evidently this occurred while I was traveling somewhere and did not see the press reports. I do hope you have made a complete recovery. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. In charge of production at Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Mayer wrote that Private Mickey Rooney had written praising the U.S. Army for providing motion pictures for the troops overseas under difficult conditions. He quoted actor Rooney (Joe Yule, Jr.): "Saw MGM's TWO GIRLS AND A SAILOR four times, once in the street when it was ten below, once in a barn, and twice in hospitals. The GI's loved it." Mayer said that he had received several excellent reports of the job done by the army in distributing films that the motion-picture industry gave to the Army Pictorial Service. (Mayer to Marshall, April 2, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].) Released in April 1944, *Two Girls and A Sailor* (directed by Richard Thorpe) starred Van Johnson, June Allyson, and Gloria De Haven, as well as other entertainers in the setting of a World War II canteen. (Ken D. Jones and Arthur F. McClure, *Hollywood at War: The American Motion Picture and World War II* [New York: Castle Books, 1973], p. 243.)

Mickey Rooney was assigned to the 6817th Special Services Battalion in the European Theater of Operations. Part of a three-man jeep show composed of a musician, singer, and master of ceremonies, he moved with the troops, "armed with battery-powered megaphones and accordions, saxophones, clarinets, and trap drums." Rooney recalled, "We put on our first show between two Sherman tanks in a Belgian snowstorm, with sixty guys in the audience, three miles from the front, with the sound of howitzers booming in the distance." (Mickey Rooney, *Life Is Too Short* [New York: Villard Books, 1991], pp. 211-17.)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER¹
[Radio No. W-68632.] *Restricted*

April 14, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Personal to Eisenhower from Marshall.

Dear Eisenhower: It is becoming increasingly apparent that the task of readjusting the Army and promptly releasing to civilian life those people who are surplus to the needs of the Japanese war is one which will demand the most unselfish and conscientious efforts on the part of everyone. I fear that the weight of public opinion in the United States will be such that unless the task is handled properly, we may be forced to take measures which will interfere with redeployment and result in a prolongation of the Japanese war.

It is important that we discharge promptly every man who can be spared. It is of equal importance that these men be selected with extreme care. I think it is very important from a psychological point of view that the first shipments of men to be demobilized should be drawn from combat troops and from the divisions deepest in Germany,² resorting to air transport service to get them to points of ship embarkation, if necessary.

The manner of selecting and preparing units for redeployment is also of critical importance. Upon the conclusion of World War I, it was too often the case that the most convenient unit was the one shipped back to the United States for demobilization at the expense of a unit which was more deserving. This must not happen again. Furthermore, even though it involves a lot of hard staff work and inconvenience to commanders all the way down the line, those units which are shipped direct to the Pacific theaters must contain to the maximum extent practicable only those people who are least eligible for discharge.

I have in mind that many units can be maintained considerably below authorized strength without harm to your military requirements. Those for reshipment through continental United States can be filled up with replacements here.

I wish that at the proper time you would advise all your people of my deep personal concern as to the responsibility of all commanders for a thorough and intelligent application of our readjustment and redeployment regulations. The Army will be severely criticized unless everyone gives his best efforts to this problem. Also please see that staffs do not get too much into blue print designs without sufficient thought for human reactions.³

NA/RG 165 (OPD, 370.9, Case 127)

1. This message was also sent to General Joseph T. McNarney. (Marshall to McNarney, Radio No. W-80438, April 14, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 370.9, Case 127].)

2. The message to McNarney reads instead: "divisions deepest in Italy." (Ibid.)

3. "I share your concern over the human problem involved in redeployment," replied Eisenhower. "I recognize that these problems must be solved promptly and with human

understanding if the Army is to retain the confidence of the people at home for the continuation of the war against Japan as well as for the future. Our soldiers must be convinced that the system is fair and impartial." Transfer of troops was under study at his headquarters, where a control group was to give "undivided attention to assure a complete coordination of effort and to give appropriate consideration to the human element." (*The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, ed. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., et al., 21 vols. [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970–2001], 4: 2621–22.) See Marshall Statement to the Troops, May 8, 1945, p. 173.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY HENRY H. ARNOLD
Radio. *Top Secret*

April 16, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Eyes Only for Arnold from Marshall.

Reference your UA 67521 of April 14, the crux of your message is in the third paragraph. I quote: "or if I continue leisurely and restfully, etc".¹ Each statement you have given me regarding leisurely and restful movements has not been in accord with your subsequent movements and I assume that the same will happen in this case.²

I certainly would not have you hurry back to Washington for the strain of action here and on the other hand I am rather depressed at seeing you start on another of your strenuous trips, this time carrying you around the world.³ It may demonstrate to the Army and to the public that you certainly are not on the retired list but also it may result in your landing there. I will have to trust to your judgment though I have little hope that you can curtail your wasteful expenditure of physical strength and nervous energy.⁴

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Arnold had left Washington, D.C., on March 31 for a tour of France and Germany. On April 14 he wrote from France, "I find myself rapidly approaching the end of a period of rest and relaxation and recovering my physical well being." He would soon be traveling to Italy, and he was debating whether to return to Washington or continue on to the Pacific theater. "Changed conditions in Washington add materially to the load which you are carrying. The Army Air Forces should do their utmost to bear their part of it and to relieve you as much as they can. The question that comes to my mind is whether considering the long pull I can give better service if I return to Washington direct or if I continue leisurely and restfully and visit the CBI, MacArthur, Nimitz and go to Washington via San Francisco." (Arnold to Marshall, Radio No. UA-67521, April 14, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) For Marshall's previous advice to Arnold on March 2, 1945, see p. 72.

2. "I read of your presence and statements with various active commands," General Marshall had written to Arnold on April 8. "Where is the Bermuda rest, the lazy days at Cannes, the period of retirement at Capri? You are riding for a fall, doctor or no doctor." (Marshall to Arnold, April 8, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Arnold mentions Marshall's message in his memoirs and responds: "He [Marshall] was right and wrong. He didn't realize I was in bed for an hour and a half every day after lunch, in bed at nine o'clock at the latest every night, and didn't get up until about

eight o'clock each day. However, I was glad he was solicitous of my well-being." (H. H. Arnold, *Global Mission* [New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949], pp. 547–48.)

3. Arnold reported that he had not visited the Pacific theater for over two years. "Therefore, there are certain attractions and advantages to my taking that route home. The doctors looking me over say that physically I could go either way. Accordingly I would appreciate an expression of opinion from you as to your desires on this matter." (Arnold to Marshall, Radio No. UA-67521, April 14, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

4. Arnold continued his inspection tours in Italy and Brazil before returning to the United States on May 8. He left Washington on June 6 for his trip to the Pacific theater. (Arnold, *Global Mission*, pp. 552–75.)

TO ELBERT D. THOMAS

April 17, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Senator Thomas: My attention has been called to certain amendments which I understand are to be proposed to H.R. 2625.¹ One would prohibit the employment of men inducted under 19 years of age in actual combat service until they have been given at least six months of military training, and the other would preclude such service of men under 19 years of age until they have been given at least one year of training.

I am gravely concerned over the effect of either of these proposals upon military operations. Such statutory restrictions are evidently inspired by the belief that our soldiers are not properly trained before being assigned to combat units. The responsible military authorities, however, are of the opinion that the training is adequate to the requirements.

The training program is very intensive and equally thorough. Furthermore, most of the instructors now concerned with this work are veterans of actual combat experience. Under the present procedure the newly inducted soldier who is being prepared as a replacement for the ground forces undergoes a training course of from 15 to 17 weeks. He is taught how to care for himself in the field; how to employ both his primary and secondary weapons; and how he and his weapons fit into the squad and platoon. Satisfactory completion of the course means that he is qualified for service to which he is to be assigned.

I have personally inspected many replacement training camps to make certain that the work is being conducted in the most efficient manner practicable. General Lear, and now General Stilwell, give their entire time to the direction and supervision of this work, Lear in Europe and Stilwell here at home.²

After the training period is finished, the men are placed in experienced units where the leadership from the noncommissioned grades upwards is in the hands of veterans. En route to assignment overseas the men are

given further training in the staging areas here and abroad, and actual assignment in divisions, so far as possible, is made to reserve units where further training is given. Carefully developed training tests, supplemented by combat reports from overseas, have clearly indicated that the proficiency of the soldier is brought to such a level during this period of training that he is fully capable of properly filling a vacancy in a seasoned organization.

The majority of the men now being received from Selective Service are in the 18 and 19 year old group, and we are in urgent need of their services. Once an individual under 19 years of age has been fully trained as a replacement, it would be most undesirable under present conditions to hold him unassigned for an additional period of six or seven months. We would, in effect, have to hold thousands upon thousands of men on a waiting list after their essential training had been completed before we could utilize their services.

The War Department has made every possible effort, consonant with the military situation, to hold to a minimum the number of 18-year-olds entering combat. In February 1944, instructions were issued requiring the use of 18-year-olds with less than six months' service only after all other replacement resources were exhausted. During June of that year, it was ordered that no Infantry or Armored Force replacements would be sent overseas before they had attained 19 years of age. This procedure was only made possible by the assignment of these men to divisions in this country balanced by heavy drafts—up to 5,000 men—drawn from these divisions to supply the replacements required overseas. Once all our divisions had left the United States, or were within three months of their scheduled departure date, this procedure was no longer practicable.³ The crisis of last December and January caused by the losses sustained in the Ardennes fighting necessitated the shipment of replacements after 15 weeks' training, otherwise our divisions would have been impotent at the moment their full power was needed to crush the enemy's final offensive effort—in preparation for the crossing of the Rhine and the great victories now being gained to the eastward.

Just as soon as the military situation will permit, it is the purpose of the War Department to stop shipping men overseas who have not yet become 19 years of age, and I am hopeful that this condition will develop in the near future.

A steady flow of trained replacements has enabled our armies to continue a course of relentless pressure on all fronts far beyond the anticipation of the enemy. This was made possible only through the unhampered use of men 18 and 19 years of age. If we had been prohibited from employing these men in the required numbers at the necessary time, I am certain that our casualties would have been much heavier, and our armies would have been denied the historic successes they have recently gained.

In my opinion no restrictions should be placed by law on the time when soldiers may enter combat. It is impossible to foresee all of the exigencies which may arise in the waging of war. Carefully laid plans are frequently upset. The administration of the affairs of eight million men is a tremendous task which prohibitions of this nature, particularly in view of the constant uncertainties involved in waging war, would make almost impossible of efficient management. Should an emergency develop, such as last December, the War Department would in effect be powerless to avert the failure of an operation or a possible disaster.

Finally, I wish to submit this comment. Never before in our history have our men been so thoroughly prepared for their duties and hazards as soldiers. I, personally, and every commander in the field, are even more intent on adequate training than any other group, I believe. We are too well aware of the costs of unpreparedness.⁴ Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The Senate was considering the bill, H.R. 2625, to extend the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended.

2. In January 1945 General Joseph W. Stilwell succeeded Lieutenant General Ben Lear as commander of Army Ground Forces, headquarters in Washington, D.C., when Lear went to General Eisenhower's headquarters as deputy commander of U.S. Army forces in the European Theater of Operations.

3. On February 26, 1944, the War Department directed that no eighteen-year-olds with less than six months' training be shipped overseas as long as replacements were available from other sources. On June 24 the rule was further strengthened by providing that none younger than nineteen be sent overseas as an infantry or armored replacement "under any circumstances," and "no inductee younger than 18 years and 6 months should be assigned to an infantry or armored replacement training center." The age rules created administrative difficulties and deterioration in physical quality of infantry and armored replacements as the oldest inductees and borderline physical cases were used to maintain replacement quotas. The ban on shipping eighteen-year-olds overseas was rescinded on August 4. (Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1948], pp. 204–7.)

4. On May 9, 1945, the Selective Training and Service Act was amended and extended to May 15, 1946. Public Law 54 provided that "no man under 19 years of age who is inducted into the land or naval forces under the provisions of this act shall be ordered into actual combat service until after he has been given at least 6 months of military training of such character and to the extent necessary to prepare such inductee for combat duty." (*Congressional Record*, 79th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 91, pt. 4, pp. 4424–25. U.S. Selective Service System, *Age in the Selective Service Process* [Washington: GPO, 1946], p. 35.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Top Secret

April 17, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Attached is one of the daily TOP SECRET summaries of extremely secret information. It is based on a purely British source, which incidentally involves some 30,000 people, and we have bound ourselves to con-

fine its circulation to a specific and very limited number of people.¹ Therefore I request that this be "For Your Eye Only".

I am sending this particular sample to you because it contains authentic information regarding two very important matters.

First, Hitler's instructions for the defense of the "Fortress Zone" of Holland. As the British Army approaches this Zone we are confronted with the probability, almost the certainty, that the Germans will flood with salt water a large area of occupied Holland.² It would then be about 10 years before this land could be put again into cultivation. It is also probable that great destruction will be carried out not only in the port areas but in most of the communities as well. The situation of these people at the present time is tragic, as they have been starved to the point that some of them are going blind.³

The second item I wish to call to your attention is the report of the German commander in Italy, Von Vietinghoff, concerning the situation there.⁴ We have been in process for some days of the progressive launching of a general assault; the initial attacks were by the division on the west coast heading north towards Spezia and at the same time attacks eastward by the French divisions in the Alps on the western borderline of Italy. Next the British Eighth Army on the right of General [Mark W.] Clark's front (he being in command of the whole) and now commencing yesterday the main attack by our troops in the center directly towards Bologna or to the west of that city.

With the Russians launching a general offensive along their central front, as well as continuing their thrust west and northwest from Vienna, with the attack of Clark's two Armies along the Italian front, and considering the statements made by Von Vietinghoff in this secret document, you can see that we have the possibility of sudden and violent changes in the situation on the European continent.

The secret matter on the situation in the Ruhr pocket, reported on by General Model (former commander of the central group of western Armies) is interesting, but merely reflects the situation which we had anticipated.⁵

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Cryptographers working at Bletchley Park deciphered German signals enciphered on the Enigma and other cipher machines. ULTRA denoted the highly secret intelligence derived from the decryption of intercepted German signal messages as well as the Japanese armed forces messages. For recollections of the intelligence work performed at Bletchley Park and the plan for its protection and dissemination, see F. W. Winterbotham, *The Ultra Secret* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1974), pp. 17–25. According to Ronald Lewin, "The name Ultra, which came to cover loosely both the intelligence-system and the intelligence itself, was evolved by Winterbotham after discussion with the Directors of Intelligence of all three services. Beyond Secret, or Most Secret, or even Top Secret lay Ultra Secret. Ultra seemed simpler." (Ronald Lewin, *Ultra Goes to War: The First Account*

of *World War II's Greatest Secret Based on Official Documents* [New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1978], pp. 63–64.)

2. The Allies decrypted a German message of April 13 that ordered “ruthless use of flooding for the defence of Fortress Holland.” (F. H. Hinsley et al., *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations*, volume 3, part 2, a volume in *History of the Second World War* [London: HMSO, 1988], pp. 725–27. The editors were unable to locate the attachment sent to President Truman.)

3. An Allied delegation met with the Germans on April 30 and worked out an arrangement by which relief would be provided to the Dutch citizens. Allied planes began dropping food on May 1. Arrangements were made to open one road into the occupied zone for Allied supply trucks and to allow food ships at Rotterdam. (Forrest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1954], pp. 457–59.)

4. General Heinrich von Vietinghoff, commander of Army Group C, reported on April 14 that the Allies had “launched an all-out offensive with a superiority in material which was on a scale not hitherto experienced and which could not be counterbalanced” by his troops. (Hinsley, *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, vol. 3, pt. 2, p. 704. SUNSET 899 [April 16, 1945] and SUNSET 900 [April 17, 1945], NA/RG 457, Entry 9026.)

5. Field Marshal Walther Model reported on April 13 that the situation was “extremely critical,” the “northern part of industrial zone had been lost” and the area south of the Ruhr “could be held only for limited time.” Short on arms, ammunition, and fuel, Army Group B would “fight to last cartridge in order to tie down as long as possible strong elements of American Army facing it.” (SUNSET 899, April 16, 1945, NA/RG 457, Entry 9026.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

April 17, 1945

Top Secret

[Washington, D.C.]

I thought you would be interested in the following extract from our most secret source.¹

“On 14 April the following circular instructions were sent out to Japanese officials in the Far East for propaganda dealing with the death of President Roosevelt:

‘a. Do not make personal attacks on Roosevelt.

‘b. Do not convey the impression that we are exultant over Roosevelt’s death.

‘c. Avoid observations such as that Roosevelt’s death will have an immediate effect on the fighting spirit and war strength of the United States.

‘d. Emphasize persistently and in detail the fact of Roosevelt’s perseverance in the war, in connection with the various plans of the United States both before and during the war.

‘e. Lay great stress on such things as the mistakes and discords that will now arise in the anti-Axis camp, which even with the driving force of Roosevelt has had great difficulty in maintaining cooperation.’”

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The source was a deciphered Japanese diplomatic communication, typically designated as MAGIC; while ULTRA designated deciphered Axis military communications of the German as well as the Japanese military.

TO MAJOR CLIFTON S. BROWN

April 18, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Dear Clifton, I received a V-mail from you and have read a number of yours to your mother.¹ You seem to be having an interesting time and I suppose with its moments of excitement.

Your mother is well, also Molly and the children. We hope to get down to Leesburg late this afternoon so that I can get in some of the later vegetables before it is too late. Henry has attended to the planting at Myer but it is rather difficult to manage it down at Leesburg.

I broke my rule about dinners last night and went to the British Embassy for a dinner of six, Anthony Eden being the reason. He is coming over this morning at 9:15 to hear the resume of the war situation before starting off for the meeting at San Francisco.²

I have ridden very little of late because I have gotten my exercise in field work or gotten no exercise at all. President Roosevelt's death involved us in a great many formalities which took practically all our time for three days. The final interment at Hyde Park was very impressive particularly as there was a clear blue sky and all the spring blossoms were out. The West Point cadets made a picturesque background for the ceremony. I flew up, taking Admiral King with me, and we spent the night at West Point, flying back the next morning immediately after the services. We were supposed to go up on the special train but that would have been too time-consuming in view of the momentous happenings which have to be attended to almost from hour to hour.³

I hope the spring has found you in Germany and that the mud is drying up and you will soon be complaining about the dust.

With my love, Affectionately,

GCMRL/Research File (Family)

1. Marshall's stepson's message is not in the Marshall Papers.

2. British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Anthony Eden had attended President Roosevelt's funeral service at the White House on April 14 and was preparing to attend the United Nations Conference on International Organization scheduled to convene in San Francisco on April 25. On April 18 Eden recorded: "Up early and motored with Edward [Halifax] to War Department where Marshall showed his maps and graphs. This is a function that takes place every morning and it is very well done by specially trained young staff officers. Better than any map room." What interested Eden most was the chief of staff's view of the Far East campaign. "Marshall's stern report forecast a prolonged struggle in the Far East, if conventional weapons only were used. The sober reserve with which he recited

his appraisal made it all the more disturbing. He was, I knew, no alarmist.” (*The Reckoning: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon* [Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965], pp. 610–14.)

3. For more information regarding President Roosevelt’s death, see the editorial note on p. 141.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR
Confidential

April 20, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

The President’s purpose in sending for me yesterday morning was merely to express his confidence in the Army and his good will towards me personally.¹ However, a number of different matters were discussed which I list below.

Control of Occupied Germany

The President expressed a particular interest in the method of taking over control in Occupied Germany and said that at some later date he would like me to go over the procedure with him. I therefore thought it desirable that you include a brief comment on this matter today and also that you hand him for his later consideration a short memorandum outlining the general procedure. Both of these I had prepared last night and General Hilldring has them ready for you if you care to use them.²

Liaison between White House and War Department

Apropos of a comment of the President’s regarding his address to the fighting forces last Tuesday, I explained to him the extreme importance of keeping the White House relations with the War Department carefully in channels and gave him a number of examples of embarrassing incidents which had resulted from short-circuiting the procedure, starting with the dog incident of Elliott Roosevelt.³ I emphasized this by stating that from now on I thought there would be a constantly increasing flood of direct appeals to the White House from the Hill and from people generally regarding personnel aspects of the redeployment to the Pacific, regarding the increasing complications of the negro question,⁴ and several other matters. He agreed with me as to the importance of this.

I told him that we had had a very able man, Colonel Davenport,⁵ for more than a year as the channel of communication for such business, a man who understood all the workings of the War Department and could see that the matters were cleared so that he, the President, in making any decision would be aware at the time of the various precedents involved and the possible repercussions. He stated complete agreement with me, asked for Colonel Davenport’s name and wrote it down and told me that he accepted him as the channel of

communication for such matters. This of course has no reference to your personal relationship with the President though I think even here your Aide⁶ should keep a close check to see that we are both not working on the same thing at the same time without a complete knowledge of what is going on.

Current Operations in Germany

I explained to the President the complexity of the task General [Omar N.] Bradley has had for the past two weeks—thrusting at top speed toward the Elbe, fighting in the opposite direction with 18 divisions around the Ruhr pocket and handling hundreds of thousands of displaced people between these two great operations. It was in connection with my comments on the effective handling, in my opinion, of these displaced people under extraordinarily difficult circumstances, and the general efficiency, in my opinion, of the military government procedure despite the various attacks by Dorothy Thompson⁷ and other authoritative sources, that the President expressed his very special interest in the procedure we are now following and propose to follow immediately on the termination of actual fighting.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall met with President Truman at the White House on April 19, 1945, at 11:30 A.M.

2. "The quickest Cabinet meeting that I remember since I came into the War Department in 1940," Stimson wrote of President Truman's meeting with the Cabinet on April 20. "The President took command and galloped . . . through the meeting in an hour, having heard from all the regular Cabinet and the irregular Cabinet." The secretary of war was able to provide Truman with the memorandum prepared by Major General John H. Hilldring, director of the Civil Affairs Division at the War Department. "It was a businesslike and rather galloping Cabinet meeting—a rarity compared with what we have had hitherto," commented Stimson. (Stimson Notes After Cabinet Meeting, April 20, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 337]; April 20, 1945, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 51: 60].)

3. Having recently assumed office, President Truman informally called to his office a colonel working in the Bureau of Public Relations to ask him to prepare a draft of a speech, embodying Truman's and his advisers' expressed ideas, for the president to deliver to the armed forces on Tuesday, April 17. Colonel Frank McCarthy expressed his—as well as other members of the chief of staff's office—concern that White House advisers would "consult with lower echelons directly." McCarthy recommended, "We should attempt immediately to draw the Military Aide and other White House advisors into our usual channels and try to get them to do their business through this office. In no other way can we maintain any consistency of operations." (McCarthy Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, April 16, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

In January Colonel Elliott Roosevelt's dog, Blaze (an English bull mastiff), made the newspaper headlines when three servicemen with class "C" air priority were bumped off their flight aboard an army cargo plane in Memphis in order to make room for "B" priority cargo, while Blaze (assigned "A" priority) remained on board. Blaze was on a flight from Washington, D.C. (the White House), to California for delivery to Mrs. Elliott Roosevelt (actress Faye Emerson). During a Senate Military Affairs subcommittee investigation, an Air Transport Command report revealed that Colonel Ray W. Ireland, assistant

chief of staff for priorities and traffic at Air Transport Command headquarters, had assigned an “A” priority for the dog shipped on a military cargo aircraft leaving Washington, D.C. The report concluded: “The fundamental basis for the establishment of any priority, whether for passengers or cargo, is that the mission of the passenger or the need for the cargo is of such urgency that transportation by air is necessary to the prosecution of the war. Therefore, establishing an ‘A’ priority for the dog was unauthorized under regulations relating to air priorities. A serious mistake was made and it cannot be justified.” (*New York Times*, January 18, 1945, p. 21; February 11, 1945, p. 34.) Elliott Roosevelt was promoted to a brigadier general in February 1945. (*Ibid.*, February 13, 1945, p. 1.)

4. The disappointing performance of the African-American Ninety-second Division under fire earlier in the year had prompted the War Department to send Truman K. Gibson, Secretary of War Stimson’s civilian aide on Negro affairs, to visit the division in Italy. Gibson reported that a large percentage of the division’s men scored among the lower two classifications on the Army General Classification Test and many came from civilian backgrounds providing little opportunity for “an inculcation of pride in self or even love of country.” Negro officers were excluded from the white officers’ club. He reported that appeal to racial pride in the training program had been successful for two artillery battalions commanded by Negro officers. He concluded that “the lesson of the 92d for the future employment of Negro troops lay in recognizing correctable deficiencies rather than in forming generalizations from the career of this particular unit.” The more militant Negro press attacked Gibson for his remark about the lower test scores and his agreeing with any criticism of the unit’s combat abilities. (Ulysses Lee, *The Employment of Negro Troops*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1966], pp. 575–79.) For previous information regarding the Ninety-second Division, see Marshall to Eisenhower, February 14, 1945, pp. 49–50.

5. For Marshall’s views of Lieutenant Colonel Bradfute W. Davenport, see Marshall to Eisenhower, September 4, 1945, p. 294.

6. Colonel William H. Kyle served as aide to Secretary of War Stimson.

7. American journalist Dorothy Thompson had been expelled from Germany for her outspoken opposition to Hitler and the Nazis during the 1930s. After returning to the United States, Thompson reached a wide audience through her syndicated “On the Record” column published in the *New York Herald Tribune* and other newspapers, a monthly column for *Ladies Home Journal*, and her radio broadcasts over NBC.

REMARKS ON UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING TO THE WOMEN’S CONFERENCE ON UMT

April 26, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

After listening to these effective and rather conclusive presentations of the Under Secretary of State and Admiral King, I am puzzled as to how best to discuss this question with you.¹ I find it extremely difficult for several reasons. In the first place, the general discussion of the past few months has been filled with paradoxes and what seem to me to be glaring inconsistencies. So much of what I have read and so much of what I have heard appears purely destructive and offers no adequate solution whatever to the tremendous problem that faces us, despite the fact that we have endured so much and have suffered so bitterly in the last war and in this present conflict. Because of these two tragic misfortunes our people have been denied many good things due to the resulting burdens of taxation. It

seems inconceivable that, despite these burdens and the sufferings, we should be faced with such negative or such destructive attitudes on the part of so many in our efforts to avoid similar disasters in the future.

The problem this morning is to state the case for a sound post-war military policy without becoming involved in a welter of side issues and in controversies over minor details. Certainly nobody wants another war. Certainly women, above all others, wish everything within reason to be done to avoid another war. The paramount question of the moment is what is to be done to reach this goal, which all of us agree is absolutely necessary.

I should like to explain my position in this matter by dwelling briefly on my personal experiences. Such experiences dominate to quite an extent the individual's reasoning in relation to such vital matters as we are now discussing. This is particularly true as regards mothers and wives. It just so happens that my own experiences have had a close relation to what we have suffered in a military way through our lack of a reasonable military policy. In brief, in the last war I sailed for France on the first U.S. convoy as a member of the First Division. I saw our first dead on the ground where they fell. I was the only officer present at the burial of the first American soldiers to die in battle in 1917. Also, it was my duty, in my position later on, to write the order that stopped the fighting in the Meuse-Argonne. I returned to the United States in September 1919 with General Pershing and was with him in Washington during the period Congress conducted hearings and adopted the very reasonable National Defense Act of 1920, though the backbone of training had been eliminated. I continued with him for four years afterwards to witness the complete emasculation of the Army under that Act, leaving little more than the wording of the law. Then, out with troops, I saw at close hand the results of that tragedy. Finally I returned to Washington fourteen years later in the summer of 1938 and unfortunately have been here ever since. At first hand I have experienced the tremendous difficulties we have had to go through in preparing the country for war. I saw much of the same difficulties in the last war where our situation of unpreparedness was pathetic to the extent of being almost ridiculous at the time of our first appearance overseas. When I sailed for France we didn't even know the exact character of our organization until shown photostatic copies after we boarded the transports.

With all this in mind I find myself today in the center of the discussions and clamor concerning the alleged inadequacy of the training of the young men, whom we have of necessity sent overseas. By comparison, 80% of the division which I accompanied to France in the last war were untrained recruits, many of whom were issued their guns en route to the port of embarkation. Many thousands of them were killed or wounded not long afterwards in the battle lines in France.

There is nothing theoretical about this problem which we face. It is an extremely practical one and fraught with terrible implications if we fail in its solution. My attitude now in my official position is to do my best to see that we do something reasonable and that we do not become involved in plans based largely on emotional reactions without regard to practical requirements.

As Chief of Staff I have an excellent opportunity to become witness to the impact of emotion in such matters. I am being attacked daily by floods of letters from all parts of the country protesting the use of young men in combat.² I am receiving floods of letters every day from mothers and wives who have lost their sons and husbands. I am hourly involved in the constant agony of this business. While I cannot get a stay of execution from the Germans or the Japanese, I am at the one and the same time being restricted as to the use made of the younger men and at the same time restricted as to the number of men in their twenties who might be brought into the Army. The point that seems to be completely missed in all this is the fact that any delay in the prosecution of the war means a tremendous increase in casualties. Most of the arguments, representations, and misrepresentations I have seen concerning the selection of men for combat are inconsistent with the necessity of terminating this war with the minimum cost of life. On the one hand I am assailed for sending men into combat with too little training—they say, and on the other I am being criticized for proposing such a lengthy period of training as one year.

I now return to the question we have met here to consider. It involves the future—that is, what will take place 10, 20 or 50 years hence. It can be said, I think, that all previous measures to avoid wars have failed. The plan that the War Department now proposes is little more than the plan advocated by General Washington. He proposed compulsory training under little different terms in keeping with the situation and requirements of his day.

The plan employed by the Swiss is a good example, but it must be understood that their procedure is based to an important extent on their peculiar geographical location and topographical setting.

One of the glaring inconsistencies of the present discussions is the fact that I have been proposing a small regular or standing army, with a backing of compulsory military training, while the opponents of the training proposal imply or propose a large standing army. As a practical matter, I am certain that we cannot raise a large volunteer army in time of peace. There could not be made sufficient money available to hire the necessary men for a sizeable peacetime army on a volunteer basis. As a matter of fact, I do not think the country could possibly financially support a large standing army under any conditions, or would accept such a force, and I am certain that we could not recruit such an Army. The substitute that we

offer for a large permanent army is the citizen soldier, like the citizen of Switzerland trained in peace to take his place in the ranks when his country is in danger. It involves the simple principle that we go as far as we can go in the way of converting our potential military strength in the form of manpower into an actual fighting force, without legally committing the citizens to service in the fighting ranks of the Army. We would give our young citizens sufficient training in times of peace so that in the event that a national emergency is declared by Congress, they can forthwith be drawn into the army under such terms of selection as may be prescribed by the Congress at that time and then can be rapidly organized into first-class fighting units. The citizens will be given the *training* but will be under army control only for that purpose and will not be obligated to actual army *service* while undergoing training.

The effect of such a procedure would be that, instead of having to endure again the agonizing situation which was ours in 1940 of being forced to initiate the training of large groups of men without adequate instructors, of being harassed by attacks from every direction because camps were not ready, or of having the proposal to suspend training at the end of a year being violently pressed to an extent which was wrecking the morale and discipline of the troops, we would have large numbers of young men who, without having to wait for an Act of Congress establishing a national emergency before their training could begin, would be ready for employment in a very few months, probably even ahead of the time that we could arrange ships to transport these men overseas, if that happened to be necessary. On the other hand, in this war, even with the relatively long preparatory period given us while our Allies did the fighting, we were faced with the situation of sending troops overseas who were only partially prepared for combat. This was the case of units sent to Australia, New Guinea, and Tunisia. There was no choice in the matter. The fault lay here at home. Its source went back to the emasculation of the National Defense Act after the last war. And in the midst of all of the criticism that was directed at the War Department for its apparent delays and inability to deploy the Army overseas with speed, no reference was made to the real roots of the evil.

In discussing the subject of universal military training, minor issues are usually introduced obscuring the simple fundamentals of the problem. It isn't for the military official to discuss the advantages to democracy involved in this proposal, but I will make this statement of my personal convictions as a citizen: a system of universal training would be one of the greatest assets to successful democracy. The evidence from our experiences in this war and the last war indicate that the friendships, the intimacies that develop between the rich and the poor and between men from the west and men from the east, or between the northerner and the south-

erner, make for a homogeneous people with generous understanding of the other fellow's point of view. They dispel much of bitter feelings and differences that are the result of ignorance of conditions and groups. However, we are not advocating this process of training because of the value of the by-products. Our recommendations must be confined to considerations regarding the security of America and the maintenance of peace.

I have been impressed by another inconsistency that invariably arises in the discussions of this program. We are told that we should wait until after the peace to decide what sort of post-war training program we are to establish. There is no prospect of peace in the immediate future and no one actually knows when the final peace is going to come and how long a time will elapse before the terms of a peace treaty are agreed upon. Meanwhile, I am faced with great problems that demand decisions. Should we permit our entire set-up to disintegrate? The greater part of our training phase has been completed and we have camps which we can close, training areas which we can turn back, and large installations which will rapidly deteriorate unless we know now approximately what use is or is not to be made of them. If we have a clear-cut decision on this question now, not as to details but as to general policy, we can save millions, more probably billions of dollars, by an intelligent procedure in managing these thousands of installations. In explaining this point to one of the Congressional committees I pointed out some time ago that from the purely business side of the proposition, ignoring all other considerations, a decision was required without delay as to what the general policy of our program would be. To illustrate, I am responsible for some three thousand command installations in the United States. By command installations I mean places such as Fort Myer, Fort Benning, Fort Bragg. The army has three thousand of these. Now what is to happen? Do we allow all the roofs to disintegrate? Do we permit this vast set-up to fall apart, to melt away? Would your husbands permit their business to disintegrate before they undertook any rearrangement or adjustment? The most extravagant course we could follow is to sit back and wait until exact terms of the peace have been determined before making a decision on the general policy to be followed in this vital matter.

I have no opinion at the present time on what size the army should be in the post-war period, but I know full well, and I think everybody is reasonably disposed to accept as a fact, that we must have some form of military establishment of respectable strength, yet of a character that we can support financially. This is a very practical proposition. We have a huge war debt to consider, and because of this and in view of the ever-increasing expenses incident to the peacetime burdens of the federal government, it appears hopeless to think that the army or the National Defense

Program can receive any amount approaching the large percentage of the national income that would be required to support a large permanent military establishment. I could state the proposal I have expressed as a purely business proposition. If you do not have universal military training, you cannot have an army adequate to the inevitable requirements of this country whatever the terms of the eventual peace treaty. We are clearly faced with that alternative.

In addition, we must have in mind the effect on the world at large that Mr. Grew has outlined to you. Unless we have a trained potential of manpower such as I have described, we will be unable to impress the other nations of the world with our ability to back up our national policies or proposals. Everyone recognizes our wealth in resources and in manpower. If our manpower is trained along the lines we propose, that fact, taken together with our exceptional geographical position, presents the best possible method of forestalling future aggression. I believe that if we do this we will be in a very strong position despite the possible development of rockets, larger long-range planes, and other scientific developments that now tax the imagination.

I wish to emphasize again in closing that the type of system we are proposing is a system for military training and not for military service. The various compulsory programs in Europe in the past have involved service. That is not our proposal. I repeat, I receive the impact of the tragedies of war every day. My wife also receives it in tremendous volumes. I think that it is very important that you step clear of your emotions and regard this problem from the practical and a logical point of view for the safeguarding of the coming generations from the tragedies suffered by the young men of the present day. If you yourself do not have a practical solution, then I beg of you to hesitate before you sweep aside the solution we propose.

I might add one final comment. If compulsory military training is accepted on a basis so full of compromises that they make it a "half-baked" affair, then I would oppose such a procedure as a waste of public funds. If it is not real military training such as we propose, it will be a costly irritating measure of little effect.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)

1. General Marshall spoke at the Pentagon to an off-the-record meeting of approximately forty representatives of women's organizations on the military necessity of universal military training. Stenographic notes of his remarks were edited by H. Merrill Pasco and the chief of staff, and the final version approved by Marshall for release to the representatives present at the meeting. (Pasco Memorandum for General Marshall, May 2, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, SGS]; Walter L. Weible Memorandum to General Marshall, April 28, 1945, and Pasco Memorandum for General Weible, May 12, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew, Admiral Ernest J. King, and Under Secretary of the Navy (since June 1944) Ralph A. Bard had already talked to the group. “Grew made a good speech but not a brilliant one, reading most of it,” Secretary of War Stimson, chairman of the session, noted. “King made a rather poor speech, brief and being read also partly. Bard made a speech on the usual lines using papers too. And then Marshall when I called him at the last made one of his really good speeches perfectly extemporaneously. When he got through he had put a little more life into the rather dismal looking lot of ladies that confronted us.” (April 26, 1945, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 51: 73–74].)

2. On the day Marshall spoke, the summary of mail received showed twenty-four letters from the general public forwarded to the Office of the Adjutant General for action, of which five criticized the use of eighteen-year-olds in combat. (Summary of Mail Received April 26, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Categorical].)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Radio No. WAR-74256. *Top Secret*

April 28, 1945
Washington, D.C.

TOPSEC EYES ONLY to Eisenhower from Marshall.

The British Chiefs of Staff state that in the opinion of His Majesty's Government there would be “remarkable political advantages derived from liberation of Prague and as much as possible of Czechoslovakia by U.S.-U.K. forces.” They therefore propose dispatch of a message to you which recognizes that an operation into Czechoslovakia is unsound on military grounds if it detracts from the weight of your efforts against Austria and Denmark outlined in SCAF-280. British propose, however, in light of political advantages to be derived, that you be directed to take advantage of any improvement in your logistical situation on any weakening of enemy resistance to advance into Czechoslovakia provided such action does not hamper or delay final German defeat.

Request your comments on the above. Personally and aside from all logistic, tactical or strategical implications I would be loath to hazard American lives for purely political purposes. Czechoslovakia will have to be cleared of German troops and we may have to cooperate with Russians in so doing.¹

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-74256])

1. Eisenhower replied that he intended to destroy “remaining organized German forces. If a move by us in Czechoslovakia is then indicated as desirable, and if conditions there are as our present estimate indicates, our logical move would be on Pilsen and Karlsbad and possibly Budweis initially and to effect firm junction with the Russian forces.” He assured the chief of staff: “I shall *not* attempt any move I deem militarily unwise merely to gain a political prize unless I receive specific orders from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.” (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2662.)

TO ELMER THOMAS¹

April 28, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Senator Thomas: Last June I asked your committee to authorize the construction of a new permanent hospital installation in Hawaii to be known as Tripler General Hospital, in preference to spending three or four millions for urgently needed hospital capacity on a temporary basis. The preliminary estimate was for \$16,000,000 for the hospital buildings, quarters for the staff, including doctors, nurses, and enlisted men, utilities and utilities buildings, patients recreation building and post exchange.²

Since that time I find that the cost of the installation as described to you last June will approach \$24,000,000. The increase is based on detailed engineering investigations and the precise specifications. In addition, for better aerial protection and for the welfare of the patients, it was found advisable to locate the hospital at a new site, which was at some distance from existing installations, thus requiring a greater extension of utilities and related facilities than at the initially chosen site. Increased expenses have also been incurred because of labor shortages, rising materiel costs and prolongation of the construction so as not to interfere with the requirements of shipping for tactical operations in the Pacific Ocean Area.

I find, however, that the \$16,000,000 will enable us to complete the hospital buildings, and part of the nurses quarters, and to provide for the utilities and the utilities buildings. So I have issued instructions to go forward with the construction on this basis.

It will require until early 1947 to complete this part of the construction. Even though the construction of the additional facilities may properly begin before that time, I see no pressing necessity for requesting authorization for additional funds at this time. Later when the labor, materiel and shipping situations have become more favorable, the additional requirements can be discussed with your committee.

This letter is for the purpose of accounting to you for the difference between the original estimates and the actual cost of this special construction which you authorized at my request.³ Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Senator Elmer Thomas (Democrat from Oklahoma) served as chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Military Appropriations. General Marshall prepared an identical letter to Congressman J. Buell Snyder (Democrat from Pennsylvania), who occupied the comparable position in the House. (Marshall to Snyder, April 28, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) This letter was the result of Marshall editing a draft prepared by Lieutenant Colonel H. Merrill Pasco, based on information provided by General Brehon B. Somervell's office. (Somervell Memorandum for General Marshall, April 13, 1945; Pasco Memorandum for General Somervell, April 21, 1945; Pasco Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, April 27, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 632].)

2. For previous information regarding the chief of staff's concern over the rising cost of the new hospital on Oahu, see Marshall to Richardson, March 30, 1945, pp. 108–9.

3. On April 1, Marshall had been advised against sending any letter to the Appropriations Committees. (Handy Memorandum for General Marshall, April 1, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 632].) Major General George J. Richards (U.S.M.A., 1915), War Department budget director, again recommended that the letters not be sent. "In the next few days he [Richards] will be defending our future estimates before the Committees and if in the midst of these a letter comes focusing a rather bad error in estimates that was made in the past, it will increase the difficulty of getting the new estimates approved." (Pasco Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, April 27, 1945, *ibid.*) The letters were dispatched to Major General Richards for delivery to Senator Thomas and Congressman Snyder. There is no reply from either committee chairman in the Marshall Papers.

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO CHARLES DE GAULLE
Top Secret

April 30, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

General Eisenhower's message to you regarding Stuttgart, dated April 28th, has just been brought to my attention.¹ In a matter of this importance I must be frank in stating that I am shocked by the attitude of your Government in this matter and its evident implications. Also I am deeply concerned, in view of the publicity already given the matter in this country from French sources, that the American public will become aware of what has actually transpired as I know this would awaken a storm of resentment which would be most unfortunate in its results.

If the time has come, in your opinion, when the French Army is to be considered as engaged in carrying out the political desires of the French Government, then an entire rearrangement of command will have to be made, but I should deplore such a crisis and I am certain it would be deeply regretted by you and your Government.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On April 28 General Eisenhower protested to General Charles de Gaulle: "Instructions were issued by General Devers to General de Lattre de Tassigny to evacuate Stuttgart because this city was in the *operational zone* of the Seventh Army, and was urgently needed as a link in the supply and communications system supporting the current military operations of that Army. I regret to learn that because of instructions received direct from you General de Lattre has declined to obey the orders of his Army Group Commander." (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2657.)

The First French Army had occupied Stuttgart soon after General Devers had redrawn his sector's boundary lines to include the city within General Patch's Seventh Army. De Gaulle, head of the French Provisional Government, had ordered General de Lattre to maintain the French garrison at Stuttgart until the French zone of occupation in Germany was established by the Allied governments. General de Lattre refused to hand over the city to U.S. forces but informed Devers that the Sixth Army Group could use the city. On April 27 General Devers visited Stuttgart and decided to readjust the interarmy boundary to include the city within the French area because it was "too badly damaged to be of use" to

the Sixth Army Group. (Charles B. MacDonald, *The Last Offensive*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1973], pp. 427–30, 432–33.) “I will never personally be a party to initiating any type of struggle or quarrel between your government and troops under my command,” Eisenhower wrote to de Gaulle, “which could result only in weakening bonds of national friendship as well as the exemplary spirit of cooperation that has characterized the actions of French and American forces in the battle line. Accordingly, I am seeking another solution for the maintenance of the Seventh Army.” (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2657–58.)

De Gaulle insisted that since the French were not represented in the Combined Chiefs of Staff meetings, he was forced “to step in sometimes, either with respect to plans or their execution. . . . While agreeing to place French operational forces in the western theater under your Supreme Command, I have always reserved the right of the French Government eventually to take the necessary steps in order that French Forces should be employed in accordance with the national interest of France which is the only interest that they should serve.” (Pogue, *Supreme Command*, pp. 459–61.)

While relating the successes of the French forces during April, General de Gaulle recalled the Stuttgart incident in his memoirs. “But in the coalition, the roses of glory grew thorns as well. As we expected, the interallied command opposed the presence of our troops in Stuttgart.” (*The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle* [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964], pp. 859–63; quote on p. 862.)

2. President Truman sent the message as drafted to General de Gaulle on May 1. (Marshall to Eisenhower, Radio No. W-76554, May 3, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-76554)].) De Gaulle replied to the president that “in the same spirit of frankness with which you were pleased to address me, I believe it my duty to express the wish that such unfortunate incidents may be avoided. To that end the Allies of France need only recognize that questions so closely touching France as the occupation of German territory should be discussed and decided with her. As you know, this unfortunately has not been the case thus far, in spite of my repeated requests.” (Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945*, 9 vols. [Washington: GPO, 1967–69], 4: 685.)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TOMPKINS¹

May 1, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

President Truman today talked to me about a post-war military force.² He wished to know whether or not I thought it possible to reach any agreement with the National Guard and Reserve forces regarding what we consider necessary. I told him that we had reached agreements as to general policies with the Reserve Committee and the National Guard Committee here in the War Department.

We then discussed compulsory military training and the prohibitive cost of an adequate volunteer Army as compared to the great potential force of compulsory military training.

The President would like a memorandum setting forth the basis for a post-war Army as we now visualize it. What he particularly would like to see is the basis on which the National Guard comes into the picture and the Reserve forces, as well as the ROTC.

Please prepare for me a triple-space draft that would type down to not to exceed two pages of single-space. Use underlined side headings in order to make the matter easy for him to understand. Don't drown the presentation in detail.

I do not think any elaboration of compulsory training is required, other than the statement that the following is based on a foundation of compulsory military training.³

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Major General William F. Tompkins served as director of Special Planning Division at the War Department.

2. General Marshall conferred with President Truman at the White House at 3:00 P.M. on May 1.

3. Tompkins's draft reply is not in the Marshall Papers; it was returned to him, and the editors have not located a copy. See Marshall Memorandum for the President, May 5, 1945, pp. 165–68.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
Radio No. WAR-75548. *Secret*

May 1, 1945
Washington, D.C.

General Marshall to General MacArthur EYES ONLY.

The President has just talked to me regarding Civil Affairs in the Philippines.¹ He is to see Osmena on Friday [May 4] and will probably see Mr. Stimson Wednesday or Thursday.²

Mr. Truman is being pressed by Mr. Ickes to appoint a High Commissioner but is opposed to such action.³ Osmena proposes that Mr. Truman designate some civilian to be his special representative in the Philippines but without the title of High Commissioner. He doubts whether this should be done.

He proposed to me the following procedure: The immediate appointment of a special commission headed by Senator Tydings and to be composed of one representative each of the War Production Board, the Shipping Board, the Veterans Bureau, and the Foreign Economic Administration, to proceed to the Philippines and prepare a report for his guidance. He felt that Senator Tydings and this board would make unnecessary the appointment of any special representative as suggested by Osmena, though their stay in the islands would only be temporary.⁴ Radio me EYES ONLY your reaction to this procedure.⁵

NA/RG 165 (OCS, 093, Philippines)

1. On May 1 General Marshall met with President Truman at the White House at 3:00 P.M. They discussed issues regarding the Philippines such as providing relief supplies, whether there should be an American resident representative there, postwar bases, and reconstruction. (Marshall took to the White House meeting a map and three double-spaced

pages of notes drafted by O.P.D. titled "Philippine Islands," May 1, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. President of the Philippines Sergio Osmeña had first met with President Truman on April 19, and they were scheduled to meet again at the White House on May 4. (Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. 1, *Year of Decisions* [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1955], pp. 65–66, 275–76.) Secretary of War Stimson met with President Truman on May 2, and among the topics discussed was the Philippines. (May 2, 1945, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 51: 91–92].)

3. Harold L. Ickes had served as secretary of the interior since 1933. When the Japanese forces occupied the Philippines, President Roosevelt transferred to Secretary Ickes the duties of the U.S. high commissioner there. (T. H. Watkins, *Righteous Pilgrim: The Life and Times of Harold L. Ickes, 1874–1952* [New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1990], pp. 781–83.)

4. Senator Millard E. Tydings (Democrat from Maryland) served as chairman of the Filipino Rehabilitation Commission and had supported Philippine independence.

5. See the following document.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Secret

May 2, 1945

[Washington, D.C.]

In conformance with your expressed desires, I notified General MacArthur yesterday of the situation as to high commissioner and special representative, and your plan for sending a special commission headed by Senator Tydings, directing him to radio me his reactions.¹ He replies this morning "I am in full agreement with the plan proposed by President Truman", that is, not to appoint either a high commissioner or a special representative but to send a special commission headed by Senator Tydings to represent you.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See the previous document.

2. Truman appointed Senator Tydings head of a commission to proceed to Manila and report on conditions in the Philippines. (Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 276–77; *New York Times*, May 24, 1945, p. 3, and June 8, 1945, p. 3.) For information regarding American military bases in the Philippines, see Memorandum for the Secretary of War, May 11, 1945, pp. 181–82.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
Radio. *Top Secret*

May 4, 1945
Washington, D.C.

For MacArthur's Eyes Only from Marshall. After considering the messages concerning the progress being made in the reorganization in the Pacific, I believe that you personally should meet with Admiral Nimitz in the near future in a personal effort to resolve between yourselves the

problems which have arisen rather than depending upon your respective staff officers. This seems particularly important since the JCS are considering the immediate issuance of a directive to execute OLYMPIC not later than 1 November.

Informal reports that come to me from various sources indicate so much of opposition and expression of strong feelings in staff meetings that situation should be gotten under firm control before great harm is done. I feel certain that you personally can handle the situation and avoid a breach that might well have tragic consequences.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

May 5, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

SUBJECT: Basis for a Post-War Army.

With reference to our talk on the first of May,¹ the outline herewith reflects the basis of the post-war Army as we now visualize it.

General Assumption:

Universal Military Training

As a corollary, it is accepted that with universal military training our professional peacetime establishment can be immediately raised in time of emergency to full strength and reenforced by *units* drawn from the National Guard and the Organized Reserve.

General Organization:

The basic pattern of the National Defense Act of 1920 will remain unchanged; a small professional Army, a National Guard really constituting an *effective* first-line reserve and useful to the separate states, and an actually Organized Reserve which can be made available within a reasonable time. The plan with respect to universal military training is designed both to fill in the gaps that existed in the pattern of the National Defense Act and vastly to improve the quality of the citizen components.

The Regular Army:

The Regular Army will provide qualified personnel for instruction of the citizen components; supervise universal military training; provide personnel to formulate tactical and strategical doctrine and concepts; and conduct research and development of military weapons. In addition, the professional personnel, assisted in a large measure by reserve personnel

on temporary active duty, must provide those units necessary for our security, but which cannot be maintained by the citizen forces, such as essential overseas garrisons and our share of the forces, especially Air units, required to support the proposed world organization.

The National Guard:

The National Guard, as a first-line reserve, will provide units which can actually be made ready for employment shortly after mobilization so that they can be deployed with the Regular Army to cover our general mobilization. To accomplish this, National Guard units should be kept near full strength, be fully equipped and their ranks composed of highly trained men. A unit should be complete within a state; it should not be divided between several states as this divides responsibilities.

State Use of the National Guard:

The need of the states for forces within their borders will mean that sufficient units of a type useful to a state must be provided.

The National Guard Bureau:

This organization will function substantially as heretofore as the agency of the War Department in dealing with the States and Territories.

The Organized Reserve:

The Organized Reserve will be capable of furnishing, in time of emergency, the required number of units effectively organized for rapid mobilization, expansion, and deployment, and in addition, trained commissioned and enlisted personnel for necessary replacements and expansion of the Army of the United States. The Organized Reserve will possess three types of units:

Units Completely Organized:

Such units will be those which it is impracticable to maintain in the Regular Army or the National Guard, but which are necessary for a balanced initial force.

Units Partially Organized:

Units partially organized, with their officers and key enlisted men, which could attain full strength in an emergency by absorbing graduate trainees from the universal military training program.

Units for which little or no degree of organization is necessary

Officers:

The National Guard and Organized Reserve officers will be obtained from ROTC or officer candidate schools and from qualified AUS [Army of the United States] officers of World War II. Officers for the Regular

Army will be selected from those developed in the current war, by the ROTC and officer candidate system, as well as from the USMA.

ROTC:

This proven system will be the source of the bulk of our new citizen officers for both the National Guard and the Reserve forces. Material expansion of the ROTC will be necessary. With universal military training, a two-year course should suffice, thus opening the way for our larger junior colleges to maintain units.

Officer Candidate Schools:

A system of officer candidate schools, similar to that tested successfully in this war, will permit young men unable to take ROTC training an opportunity to become National Guard and Reserve officers, and eventually for those who qualify, to become Regular officers.

Enlisted Men:

Enlisted men for the Regular Army and the National Guard will be obtained in peacetime by voluntary enlistment, but they will have had compulsory training. Ex-trainees will be assigned to an Organized Reserve unit only if they volunteer for further training. While a young man might voluntarily elect to become a member of any of the components, the plan contemplates his completion of the universal military training program. The completion of universal military training is the only mandatory requirement and any further training or enlistment will be on a purely voluntary basis.

Training System:

The war-time organization of the major forces (Air, Ground, and Service Forces) will remain in the post-war Army. These major forces will be responsible for the training of units and elements identified as belonging to their respective forces. In addition, these major forces will supervise training of the National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps under general supervision of the War Department. The National Guard will be trained by a system involving periodic drills and attendance at camps. Wherever practicable, the Organized Reserve will train by unit. Extensive use of Army schools, with special courses, is contemplated for National Guard and Organized Reserve personnel with emphasis on the training of officers, non-commissioned officers, and technicians.

The General Staff Committees:

These Committees as provided in Section 5 of the National Defense Act which requires that policies and regulations affecting the National Guard will be prepared by a committee consisting of an equal number of Regular and National Guard officers, and policies and regulations affect-

ing Organized Reserve consisting of an equal number of Regular and Reserve officers, will be retained. The material relating to the National Guard and the Organized Reserve in this outline *was approved* for planning *on the recommendation of these Committees*.

With universal military training, the National Guard and the Organized Reserve Corps will be able to assume their role on a very much higher plane than has been possible in the past. The important mission proposed for the National Guard can be accomplished because its members will be products of a year of intensive training. This applies with equal force to the Organized Reserve. Without universal military training, their proposed missions cannot be accomplished. To gain comparable security, it would be necessary to maintain permanent forces so large that the cost would be prohibitive. Furthermore, it would be impossible to maintain such an establishment by voluntary recruiting.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See Marshall Memorandum for General Tompkins, May 1, 1945, pp. 162–63.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER May 7, 1945
Radio No. W-78438. *Confidential* Washington, D.C.

Personal for Eisenhower from Marshall. You have completed your mission with the greatest victory in the history of warfare.¹

You have commanded with outstanding success the most powerful military force that has ever been assembled.

You have met and successfully disposed of every conceivable difficulty incident to varied national interests and international political problems of unprecedented complications.

You have triumphed over inconceivable logistical problems and military obstacles and you have played a major role in the complete destruction of German military power.

Through all of this, since the day of your arrival in England three years ago, you have been selfless in your actions, always sound and tolerant in your judgments and altogether admirable in the courage and wisdom of your military decisions.

You have made history, great history for the good of all mankind and you have stood for all we hope for and admire in an officer of the United States Army. These are my tributes and my personal thanks.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. "The mission of this Allied force was fulfilled at 0241, local time, May 7th, 1945," Eisenhower notified the Combined Chiefs of Staff and British Chiefs of Staff from S.H.A.E.F. headquarters in Reims. (*Papers of DDE*, 4: 2696.) At that time General Alfred Jodl signed the document of unconditional surrender of the German armed forces. Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith signed the document on behalf of Eisenhower (Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force); Major General Ivan Susloparoff signed on behalf of the Soviet high command, and Major General François Sevez of the French Army signed as witness. (For a more detailed account of the surrender proceedings at Reims, see Pogue, *Supreme Command*, pp. 485–90.) After signing the surrender, General Jodl was taken to General Eisenhower's office, where Jodl affirmed that he understood all provisions of the document. (Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1948], p. 426.) For Smith's account of the surrender, see Walter Bedell Smith, *Eisenhower's Six Great Decisions* [New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1956], pp. 203–6.)

2. "I truly thank you for your message," Eisenhower replied on May 8. Meanwhile, he had prepared a message to Marshall, but dispatched it as originally drafted. "Since the day I first went to England, indeed since I first reported to you in the War Department," Eisenhower revealed, "the strongest weapon that I have always had in my hand was a confident feeling that you trusted my judgment, believed in the objectivity of my approach to any problem and were ready to sustain to the full limit of your resources and your tremendous moral support, anything that we found necessary to undertake to accomplish the defeat of the enemy." Eisenhower further disclosed: "This has had a tremendous effect on my staffs and principal subordinate commanders. Their conviction that you had basic faith in this headquarters and would invariably resist interference from any outside sources, has done far more to strengthen my personal position throughout the war than is realized even by those people who were affected by this circumstance. . . . Our army and people have never been so deeply indebted to any other soldier." (*Papers of DDE*, 6: 14.)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
[Radio No. W-78505.] *Secret*

May 7, 1945
Washington, D.C.

For Eisenhower's Eyes Only from Marshall. The cessation of hostilities in Europe brings up the question of what procedure to follow in the return of senior officers to this country. Hodges is returning in the near future to go on to the Pacific. Others will follow him to participate in the war against Japan. Some will return to this country for duty, while others may remain in Europe indefinitely. Those in this last category should probably come home for a short rest. The question of handling reception and publicity for officers returning to this country who have done an outstanding job in Europe is one which requires some consideration. Some are natural headliners and others who have contributed to an equal extent have not been played up so much in the newspapers. If one is honored more than another the adverse reaction extends right down to the newest replacement that has joined the latter's organization. It is surprising how much men in one organization, like an army or an air force, resent the acclaim

and publicity that the commander of another army or air force may receive from time to time.

When General Pershing returned from France he was mobbed by enthusiastic greeters. The first units received tremendous ovations. Units returning later were met by tired reception committees and bored publics.

We have been discussing here the possibility of bringing back in four or five groups senior commanders and representative delegations from units of different commands. One proposal is to have Hodges, accompanied by possibly Spaatz or Vandenberg,¹ Truscott and several selected corps commanders who so far as Japanese could gather would be with the First Army hastening to the Pacific but actually might be here merely for a rest before returning to their commands, and a small group of enlisted men and some platoon and company commanders and pilots all highly selected for outstanding combat leadership repeat leadership; maybe a sprinkling of Medal of Honor men among enlisted men.

Then might follow another group two weeks later, say, Bradley, Clark, Spaatz, Patton and Cannon² with a similar group of corps commanders and young company officers and men. Many of these might be due to return to Europe after a fine rest here. Then possibly Devers, Patch³ and Simpson, etc. You to come with an escort of selected division and regimental commanders and outstanding young officers and men.

The time of your return as it affects the return of others is important. Following you any reception would be an anticlimax.

In discussing this with my immediate advisers I find one or two who fear the resentment that may occur, for example, among Truscott's men due to acclaim given to Patton.

Have you any views on the subject? If so I should appreciate them as this problem is going to be on our hands very shortly.⁴

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg (U.S.M.A., 1923) had commanded the Ninth Air Force since August 1944.

2. Lieutenant General John K. Cannon, who had served as head of the Twelfth Air Force, assumed command of the Allied Air Forces in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations in March 1945.

3. Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch had assumed command of the Seventh Army in March 1944.

4. "I agree with every word," replied Eisenhower on May 8. He asked if the receptions could be held in different cities within a close period of time and what size of party did Marshall have in mind. "This I deem most important because of the necessity of avoiding slackening off in intensity of our effort against Japan," wrote Eisenhower. "To drag out receptions would be to emphasize over too long a period what we have done rather than what we still have to do." (*Papers of DDE*, 6: 21-22.) For further information regarding the receptions, see Marshall to Eisenhower, May 10, 1945, pp. 177-78.

SECRETARY OF WAR'S REMARKS TO
GENERAL MARSHALL ON V-E DAY
MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL MCCARTHY
FROM COLONEL KYLE¹

May 8, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Following are the remarks as near as I can recall as stated by Mr. Stimson:

"I want to acknowledge my great personal debt to you, sir, in common with the whole country. No one who is thinking of himself can rise to true heights. You have never thought of yourself. Seldom can a man put aside such a thing as being the Commanding General of the greatest field army in our history. This decision was made by you for wholly unselfish reasons.² But you have made your position as Chief of Staff a greater one. I have never seen a task of such magnitude performed by man.

It is rare in late life to make new friends; at my age it is a slow process but there is no one for whom I have such deep respect and I think greater affection.

I have seen a great many soldiers in my lifetime and you, sir, are the finest soldier I have ever known.

It is fortunate for this country that we have you in this position because this war cuts deeper into the eternal verities than any other.

We have reached the milepost at the first half of this war. I may not live to see the end of the war with Japan but I pray that you do."³

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On May 8, 1945 (V-E Day), Secretary of War Stimson called General Marshall into his office, where the leaders of the General Staff had gathered. "Then placing Marshall in the center," Stimson wrote, "I told him in a few words of the debt of gratitude which I felt we all owed to him for the victory announced this day and my own strong personal feelings for his unselfishness, integrity, and ability. He responded with about two sentences and the thing was over, but no meeting was ever held where the sentiment was more unanimous." (May 8, 1945, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 51: 106–7].)

"The Secretary had forbidden us to have his remarks recorded," stated Colonel Frank McCarthy. Three days after the event, Colonel William H. Kyle, Secretary Stimson's aide, presented the following memorandum to McCarthy. (McCarthy Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, May 24, 1945; Kyle Memorandum for Colonel McCarthy, May 11, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Stimson was referring to General Marshall's meeting with President Roosevelt in Cairo in December 1943, when the question of who would be designated Supreme Allied Commander of the European theater (and commander of OVERLORD) was decided. See *Papers of GCM*, 4: 195.

3. "Mr. Secretary you have paid me the finest tribute I could ever receive," replied Marshall. "You have been a buttress of integrity and resolute determination behind me. I am deeply grateful." (General Marshall's Reply [undated], attached to Kyle Memorandum for Colonel McCarthy, May 11, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

V-E DAY RADIO ADDRESS¹

May 8, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Today we celebrate a great victory, a day of solemn thanksgiving. My admiration and gratitude go first to those who have fallen, and to the men of the American armies of the air and ground whose complete devotion to duty and indomitable courage have overcome the enemy and every conceivable obstacle in achieving this historic victory.

To their commanders who organized and led the invasions of Europe across the seas, in the air and on the ground, through Africa and Italy and France into the heart of Germany, I pay tribute. They have been superb, superb in their courage and in the efficiency of their leadership. History and the returning veterans will give them far more of praise than we will accord them in the celebrations of the day.

For the Allied fighting men, for their officers and great leaders who fought with us, who cooperated so wholeheartedly, so generously with us, especially in the critical moments of the war, I express profound admiration and deepest appreciation. They have proved conclusively, with us, that democracies can successfully cooperate in unity for a great and common purpose.

We owe thanks² and acknowledgment to the Naval forces and seamen who gave faultless support to the landings on hostile shores and who guarded the millions of men and their supplies across the Atlantic and into the Mediterranean.

The success of every campaign and operation has depended upon those who labored day and night to supply our Armies, to establish their communications, to perform miracles of engineering in advancing the fighting men. The record of the tasks in organization, supply and equipment, in tactical and strategical triumphs compose too vast a pattern of remarkable achievements to summarize today or in any one day. The world has never dreamed of such undertakings, just as the world has never witnessed such a victory. The enemy and the pessimists together have been swept from the board by a long succession of victories culminating today in the final triumph, the complete destruction of German military power.

Let us celebrate the victory and say our prayers of thanksgiving, and *then* turn with all the power and stern resolution of America to destroy forever and in the shortest possible time every vestige of military power in the Japanese nation.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)

1. General Marshall prepared this statement on May 7, 1945. (Marshall Draft of V-E Day Radio Statement, May 7, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Marshall's draft reads: "We owe our thanks." (Ibid.)

STATEMENT TO THE TROOPS¹

May 8, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

As the destruction of the forces of the Axis in Europe is completed I extend my warmest congratulations and personal thanks to the leaders and soldiers whose indomitable spirit and magnificent fighting have made this historic victory possible. I deplore with you the absence of the comrades who gave their lives in our behalf.

There are those in your ranks who have been in the fighting since the first American blow was struck at Germany from the air, others since the landing in North Africa opened the way into the Mediterranean. Others joined your ranks in Sicily and Italy and several million of you have carried the battle lines across France and the Rhine into the heart of Germany. With the soldiers of our Allies you have composed the greatest military team in history.

Unfortunately, the conclusion of the European battle does not establish the peace for which we have been fighting. A bitter struggle is now in progress in the Pacific. We must continue to do all in our power to terminate the fighting, to end the sacrifice of lives and the starvation and oppression of peoples all over the world. Those veterans who have been long overseas and have suffered the hazards and hardships of many battles should be spared further sacrifices, but others must move in an overwhelming flood to the Pacific to bring that war to the earliest possible conclusion, as well as to relieve the war-weary veterans in that theater.

To those men now bearing the burden of the fighting against the Japanese barbarians go our appreciation of their splendid achievements of the past two years on land and in the air, with the encouraging news that the destruction of the German Army now makes it possible to deploy mighty forces in the Pacific to crush the enemy without fail and we hope with little of delay. The transfer of troops, planes, and supplies to the Pacific will be carried out with the utmost speed to return the long-term veterans and to secure an early and final victory so that you may return to your homes and enjoy again the blessings of peace and America.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)

1. This message was sent to the Bureau of Public Relations on May 3, 1945, to be released once Germany surrendered. (Pasco Memorandum for the Acting Director, Bureau of Public Relations, May 3, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 001].)

2. General Marshall used an abridged version of this statement during the sound recording of a motion picture produced on May 5 by the U.S. Army for release to the newsreels after Germany surrendered. The motion picture entitled *Secretary Stimson and General Marshall Make V-E Day Statement* (Army Pictorial Service, Combat Bulletin, No. 53) is located at NA/RG 111 (SFR, 53). (Abridged Marshall Statement, May 5, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected]; Luther L. Hill Memorandum for the Secretary, General Staff, May 4, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 001].)

TO GENERAL CARL SPAATZ
Radio. *Confidential*

May 8, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Spaatz from Marshall. Please accept for yourself, your commanders, and the officers and men of the Eighth Air Force my congratulations on the magnificent work of the Air Forces from the day the strategical daylight bombing of Germany was initiated until the final hour of the German collapse. You have made a great and historic contribution to the victory. I can only regret that those men who lost their lives in bearing the heaviest burden of the fight in the early days of the operations cannot be with us to enjoy the triumph of this day.

My personal thanks go to you and your staff and principal commanders for the splendid manner in which the air campaign has been conducted.¹

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. For Marshall's earlier praise of the Eighth Air Force, see *Papers of GCM*, 4: 237.

TO WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

May 9, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER CORNWALL-JONES
FROM COLONEL MCCARTHY

General Marshall requests that the following message from him to General Ismay be transmitted through British channels:

"I shall appreciate your passing the following to the Prime Minister after he has read the deluge of congratulations from his own people and the heads of state throughout the world:

'It has been a long and terrible road for you, Sir, since the fall of France. I can bear personal witness to the grandeur of your leadership since the meeting in Newfoundland in 1941. The long succession of conferences which followed, notably that in Washington in December of the same year and in London with Harry Hopkins and me in April of 1942, are clear in my mind as great mileposts in the evidence of your vast contribution to the reestablishment of a civilized peace in Europe.

'I can never forget, there will always be in my mind, the breadth of your vision and your generous attitude in effecting the coordination and final crystallization of our combined plans. Personally I will cherish the friendship and confidence you gave me during the seemingly slow and tortuous progress to the greatest, the most complete victory in modern history. G. C. Marshall' "¹

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. “It has not fallen to your lot to command the great armies. You have had to create them, organise them, and inspire them,” replied Churchill. “Under your guiding hand the mighty and valiant formations which have swept across France and Germany were brought into being and perfected in an amazingly short space of time. . . . You have been the main-spring of that marvellous organisation, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, whose conduct and relationship will ever be a model for the planning and supervision of Allied and Combined operations.” The prime minister concluded, “There has grown in my breast through all these years of mental exertion a respect and admiration for your character and massive strength which has been a real comfort to your fellow-toilers, of whom I hope it will always be recorded that I was one.” (Churchill to Marshall, May 17, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

When the prime minister’s office requested the chief of staff’s permission to release his message to Churchill and the prime minister’s reply, General Marshall had no objection to the prime minister releasing Marshall’s May 9 message to Churchill. On the other hand, “General Marshall feels that the release of the Prime Minister’s message, while very complimentary to General Marshall, would be embarrassing to him in relation to his Chief of Staff associates.” (Frank McCarthy Memorandum for Brigadier Cornwall-Jones, May 17, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL IRA C. EAKER¹

May 9, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Eaker, In the midst of the celebrations of the European victory and the numerous messages of congratulations to the various leaders, I have felt that you, by reason of your transfer to a post of great importance in the War Department, have been denied much of the personal and official satisfaction which is your due.

You organized and initiated the great air attack on Germany and the Continent. You carried through those most difficult phases. In the Mediterranean theater you directed the strategical bombing operations from the bases in that region and commanded the Allied Air Forces in Italy.

All these duties and great responsibilities you discharged with conspicuous success and you also displayed marked efficiency in the effectiveness of your dealings with our Allies.

For these great services I tender you my personal congratulations and appreciation.² Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Eaker was acting commanding general of Army Air Forces at the Pentagon.

2. “Truly, there never was another Commander so thoughtful of the feelings of his subordinates as you always are,” Eaker replied. “I had rather have your letter and its generous references to the character of my late military service than any or all of the decorations I have received.” (Eaker to Marshall, May 9, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALTER BEDELL SMITH
Radio. *Confidential*

May 9, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Smith from Marshall.

Dear Smith: I do not want the celebration of the European victory to close without an expression of my admiration for the manner in which you have discharged your vast responsibilities. I think I am aware of how vital and trying your job has been and I know I am aware of the extraordinary efficiency with which it has been carried out. There is much more for you to do and I imagine in some respects your duties and responsibilities will now be more seriously complicated by issues foreign to operational problems than was the case during actual hostilities, but I have complete confidence in your ability to meet the problems of the day.

You have rendered a great service to General Eisenhower and taken your place in the history of a great and terrible epoch.¹

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Smith replied that having the chief of staff's confidence had strengthened their position. "It has been possible for us to do our work well because we always had you solidly behind us," wrote Smith. "Every time we have needed help, it has been given immediately and in full measure." (Smith to Marshall, May 9, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY
Secret

May 10, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

General Stilwell saw me this morning to find out if there is any possibility of his getting active service.¹ I told him what the situation was as to MacArthur's commanders and said that I did not think that as matters now stood there was any prospect of success in proposing him. However, I had been thinking of sending him out to the Pacific, ostensibly to check up on the requirements of infantry and artillery operations against the Japanese, to see if our training of replacements back here was just as it should be and also to carry the same information to the troops being retrained in Europe. I said that possibly if he went into the theater on that basis, to Okinawa and to the Philippines, it might be that he would make a place for himself in MacArthur's command and that offhand I thought that I would immediately agree to any such proposal from MacArthur.²

Stilwell accepts the proposition and will probably suggest a date between the 15th and the 20th of the month. Meanwhile I think we should have a message prepared to MacArthur and to Nimitz stating what Stilwell's function is and what I desire him to do, for the reasons stated above, and asking their acquiescence to his visit to the theater.³

Incidentally I am attaching some notes of his regarding fighting against the Japanese.⁴

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. General Joseph W. Stilwell, commander of Army Ground Forces since January, met with Marshall in the chief of staff's office at 8:45 A.M. on May 10.

2. Stilwell noted in his diary that the chief of staff "had nothing to offer except that I could go and make my own arrangements. . . . Doug obviously out of control; W.D. [War Department] afraid of him. So I'll go out and look around." (Barbara W. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–45* [New York: Macmillan Company, 1971], pp. 518–19.)

3. Stilwell departed on May 21 for his tour of the Pacific theater. He met with MacArthur, who "urged Stilwell to go everywhere, see everyone, talk to Krueger and Eichelberger, commanders of the Sixth and Eighth Armies, make suggestions and give him ideas." Greeted cordially by MacArthur, Stilwell noted: "Says he wants a friend to speak up for him." (Ibid., 519.)

On June 23 Stilwell took command of Tenth Army following the death of Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner on Okinawa. (Ibid.)

4. The attachment is not in the Marshall Papers.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Radio. *Secret*

May 10, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Eisenhower from Marshall. We have been making a rough survey of the possibilities regarding receptions for distinguished officers returning from Europe. Your suggestion as to various cities is an excellent one to which we subscribe.¹

We did not have in mind companies or battalions returning but rather a group of, say, a half dozen company officers and 25 or 30 men, all of whom should be available for demobilization on the completion of reception procedure here. Possibly a slightly larger group might be desirable, but in line with your suggestion these men should come from that section of the country where the principal reception is to be given.

Also we feel that the senior officer should have some connection with the section of the country selected in the same manner.

Colonel McCarthy now is sending a message to you requesting that General Young of the Third Division, who knows my methods, be returned to the U.S. on a temporary status to work on this thing from this side, but to familiarize himself with your point of view and the conditions on your side of the Atlantic.² I hope this does not embarrass other arrangements of yours for Young if there happen to be any.

At the moment the following has been suggested, which I have not at all accepted as satisfactory. I merely pass it on to you.

Atlanta, Georgia: Hodges, Vandenberg, Patch.

Chicago: Clark, Truscott, Cannon.

Washington: Bradley, Devers, Spaatz.

San Francisco: Doolittle, who will be arriving there from the Pacific, with probably somebody else sent out from this side.

San Antonio: Simpson, Brereton.

Washington, New York, West Point, Kansas City, Abilene repeat Abilene: Eisenhower, Smith (though we might excuse Smith from Abilene and West Point).³

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See Marshall to Eisenhower, May 7, 1945, p. 170.

2. Brigadier General Robert N. Young had served as assistant to the secretary and then secretary of the War Department General Staff from June 1942 to March 1943.

3. For further information on the receptions in the United States for senior commanders, see *Papers of DDE*, 6: 22, 60–61.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR
Confidential

May 10, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Sir Henry Wilson told me that Mr. Anthony Eden will be in Washington on Monday on his way back to England.¹ Wilson suggested that it might be a good thing if Eden could have a talk with you regarding the special project so that he could carry your comments on to the Prime Minister.²

NA/RG 165 (OCS, 095)

1. Field Marshal Wilson met with the chief of staff at the Pentagon on May 10 at 3:00 P.M.

2. "I had a short talk with Marshall on rather deep matters—the coming program of strategy for the operations in the Pacific," recorded Stimson on May 10, "where I wanted to find out whether or not we couldn't hold matters off from very heavy involvement in casualties until after we had tried out S-1. I found that probably we could get the trial before the locking of arms came and much bloodshed." (May 10, 1945, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 51: 117].) S-1 was the code name for the atomic bomb.

British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden met with Secretary Stimson on Monday, May 14. "I had about forty-five minutes with him on general matters but especially S-1," Stimson wrote of the meeting. "He brought me messages of congratulation from the Prime Minister and said that he would be very glad to convey to him anything that I wanted to tell him about S-1 in which he was deeply interested. I then outlined to him the progress which we have made and the timetable as it stood now, and told him my own feeling as to its bearing upon our present problems of an international character." (May 11, 1945, *ibid.*, p. 125.) For further information regarding Eden's visit, see Marshall Memorandum for General Handy, May 14, 1945, pp. 188–89.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR
Top Secret

May 11, 1945
Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT: Visit of General Juin.

I understand that Juin is to see you this morning, and immediately afterwards will see me. I saw him before his departure for San Francisco and since then have seen General de Saint-Didier who called on me at the urgent direction of General Juin.¹

I assume that he will discuss with you the matter of the equipment of French troops. The entire field of this problem is a complicated one, involving a great many considerations—the policy the Chiefs of Staff have followed that their direction for distribution of materiel would be confined to troops who would be prepared to participate in the fighting (this eliminated French troops, so far as the Chiefs of Staff were concerned, whose prospective state of readiness was believed to be too late to permit participation in the fighting);² the stand of Mr. Roosevelt regarding Indo-China which obligated the Chiefs of Staff to at least hold back on issues of equipment to French units for employment in Indo-China (there was the further fact that neither the equipment nor the shipping was available and there has been no plan for operations in Indo-China);³ the priority to be given to the equipment of U.S. and British units (this is very pertinent to the present discussion as we are in short supply of numerous items to re-equip U.S. divisions and supporting troops in Europe due for the Pacific campaign).

General Juin is pressing for the completion of the equipment of three French divisions and the proportional slice of supporting troops—combat and service. A portion of the equipment for these divisions had been shipped and reached France. However, when the fighting ceased General Eisenhower's people turned to the major problem of listing all equipment for a check to develop the shortages in the requirements for redeployment. We do not yet know just what the shortages will be and the matter is further embarrassed by reason of the fact that the rush of service troops to the Pacific will reduce the ability to repair and salvage equipment in the European theater—this is unavoidable.

I have been in a radio discussion with General Eisenhower about the three divisions and am prepared to go into the matter with Juin.⁴ I suggest that you do not commit yourself in any way but merely hear his plea. He alleges that we have broken faith. I find that quite incorrect. We have been very specific in our statements in every case. Juin is a fine fellow but he is under terrific pressure from his Government and does not stand strongly with them. As a matter of fact it would appear that he was made Chief of Staff because of my violent protest over his relief from Corps

command in Italy, and I was virtually told this at the time of the announcement.

Behind the discussion in this matter is the question of the equipping of two special divisions for the Far East which I previously referred to and for which there is no equipment and no prospective availability of shipping and no plan of campaign in Indo-China.

I am dictating this hurriedly so that you will have a rough idea of the situation. If you go into it yourself it will require at least a full morning if not longer to have all the various factors properly outlined.⁵

G. C. Marshall

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Major General A. M. Brossin de Saint-Didier, chief of the French Military Mission in Washington, D.C., had met with General Marshall in the afternoon of May 3 on behalf of General Alphonse Pierre Juin (chief of staff of the Ministry of National Defense), a French delegate at the United Nations Conference on International Organization held in San Francisco, California. Juin had received a cable from Paris saying that S.H.A.E.F. had ordered a halt to grants of equipment and supplies to the French Army because of the approaching end of the campaign in Europe and the need for U.S. materiel for the deployment to the Pacific campaign. (Marshall Memorandum for General Hull, May 3, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected]; Captain F. S. Johnson Memorandum for Record, May 4, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 091].)

2. On April 20, 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that "equipment which cannot be used against the German forces will not be shipped from the U.S. to complete the French Metropolitan Rearmament Program." (Hull Memorandum for General Marshall, May 4, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 400 TS, Case 7].) On April 8 General Eisenhower had received a message from the Combined Chiefs of Staff stating that French "units not equipped prior to termination of hostilities would not be equipped." (Smith to Marshall, May 11, 1945, NA/RG 331 [USFET, SGS]; C.C.S. to Eisenhower, Radio No. W-64547, GCMRL/National Archives Project [Reel 186, SHAEF CM-IN-Log].)

3. President Roosevelt had long been unhappy with French rule in Indochina. Throughout 1943 he had favored postwar administration of the French colony "by an international trusteeship." He told Secretary of State Cordell Hull on January 24, 1944, that "France has milked it for one hundred years. The people of Indo-China are entitled to something better than that." The French, British, and Dutch, however, were not anxious for the United States to pursue such a solution to colonial issues; France pressed for a U.S. statement that it recognized French sovereignty in the colony and for military aid to its resistance forces there. On January 1, 1945, the president again delayed making any statement on the future of Indochina. "I still do not want to get mixed up in any Indochina decision. It is a matter for post-war. By the same token, I do not want to get mixed up in any military effort toward the liberation of Indochina from the Japanese." (Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944*, 7 vols. [Washington: GPO, 1967-69], 3: 773, 780; *Foreign Relations, 1945*, 6: 293.)

4. General Eisenhower had furnished to the chief of staff what he had informed the French regarding the rearmament program. "A. Rearmament program is being reviewed and revised to determine what units, if any, can be equipped in time to operate against German forces. B. Pending revision of program, issues of equipment have been suspended. C. Except for some 21 service units it is probable that further issues will not be made." (Eisenhower to Marshall, Radio No. FWD-20647, May 5, 1945, GCMRL/National Archives Project [Reel 187, SHAEF CM-OUT-Log].)

5. General Juin, accompanied by de Saint-Didier, met with General Marshall at 11:30 A.M., at which time he expressed his appreciation for "aid rendered by the United States

not only in the liberation of France but also in equipping the French Army, thus permitting it to share in the combat against Germany.” He then reminded Marshall that S.H.A.E.F. had directed that no more materiel be delivered to the French Army, thus leaving three activated divisions without necessary equipment. Since the French government desired to utilize the three divisions as occupation troops in the French Occupation Zone, they did not require full combat equipment. Juin then stated that France wished to participate in the campaign against Japan, and offered “to place two divisions at the disposal of the U.S. Army for participation in the Pacific War, preferably in French Indo-China.” (Captain F. S. Johnson Memorandum for Record, May 12, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 336 France].)

The stop-delivery order from S.H.A.E.F. had resulted from the War Department’s urgent request to commanders in Europe to submit a report of materiel available for transfer to the Pacific. General Marshall replied. While it was not possible to promise delivery of specific supplies to the French Army, he nonetheless anticipated that once stock totals and requirements were ascertained, the U.S. Army would be leaving some equipment in Europe. Marshall informed Juin, however, that the U.S. Army could not spare materiel to equip and transport two French divisions to the Pacific. “U.S. strategy was to avoid large-scale operations on the continent of Asia, and to strike directly at Japan proper. Our aim was to hit the Japanese homeland as hard and as quickly as we could. . . . All our shipping and supplies were being immediately diverted to this purpose, and none could be released until it had been accomplished.” Marshall concluded that “there would probably be no need to fight in French Indo-China.” (Ibid.)

As for Juin’s visit with the secretary of war, Stimson succinctly recorded: “He came in merely to pay his respects and to say goodbye.” (May 11, 1945, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 51: 119].)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR
Top Secret

May 11, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

I recommend that the attached letter concerning Philippine Bases be presented to the President.¹

I understand that Mr. Forrestal has already submitted the Navy proposal to the President. However, I suggest that you send a copy of the attached letter to Mr. Forrestal with the proposal that he have his people amend it to include the Navy requirement so that a joint letter from the two of you can be submitted. This of course would simplify matters for the President.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The enclosures (drafted by the Operations Division) included a single-spaced, one-and-one-half-page letter, for the secretary of war’s signature, with attached statement of general principles and list of bases under U.S. Army consideration. “For the ‘full and mutual protection’ of the Philippines area after independence is granted, close cooperation by the Filipinos with United States military forces will be required,” stated the letter to the president. U.S. military responsibilities should be “limited to those which are beyond the capabilities of the Filipinos,” and it was contemplated that “the Filipinos will take over a large proportion of the ground responsibilities as the military effectiveness of their forces increases.” (Stimson to Truman, May 11, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. "I received the completed proposal on behalf of the Army in regard to Philippine bases this morning," Stimson recorded, "and sent the original to the President and copies to the Navy and to Joe Grew. It is a good paper." (May 11, 1945, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 55: 119].) On May 14 Stimson, Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew, and Senator Millard E. Tydings met with President Truman at the White House. "The Navy had accepted our statement of principles as perfectly satisfactory to them for themselves," wrote Stimson, "so the two reports of the two Services were consolidated into a single statement of principles for both as well as the list of the localities where the bases would be placed for both." Philippine President Osmeña then came in and accepted the statement, whereupon President Truman signed it. (May 14, 1945, *ibid.*, p. 125. The statement of principles as accepted is annexed to this day's diary entry.)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY;
GENERAL EAKER; GENERAL HULL
Top Secret

May 11, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

SUBJECT: Venezia-Giulia area.¹

I have just had a conference with the President on the subject of Alexander's last message regarding his negotiations with Tito, followed by a discussion conducted by the President with the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Phillips, and Admiral Leahy.²

It was the decision that a draft of a dispatch to our diplomatic representative in Belgrade should be prepared for presentation to Tito's Government, stating in forcible terms the situation, the Allied rights and the Allied intentions (not implying shooting) and indicating the effect of the loss to Tito of the support in many ways of the British and American Governments. This draft to be proposed to Mr. Churchill for similar action by the British Government and when that decision is reached that Russia be informed.³

Meanwhile, Admiral Leahy stated, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff would prepare a proposed instruction to Field Marshal Alexander stating the transfer of pressure from military to a high governmental level and giving him any instructions that seem appropriate. It is on this last that I request action.⁴

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Venezia Giulia was the four-province region of northeastern Italy that lay between the 1914 border with Austria-Hungary and the 1939 boundary with Yugoslavia. Except for Italian majorities in the coastal region facing the Italian peninsula (including the key port of Trieste), the population was largely Slavic. The Allies in Italy were aware by July 1944 that Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito's forces were already in the area and intended to seize Venezia Giulia when the Germans surrendered. In late April and early May 1945, the issue of who would occupy this disputed region came to a head. The British and American gov-

ernments insisted that, pending a peace settlement, only their forces occupy the region within Italy's 1939 borders. Tito would not agree to this, but Field Marshal Alexander (Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean) sought a compromise that would protect Allied communications and supply lines through the region to Austria.

On May 2 Tito announced that his forces would occupy the area up to the Isonzo River. The following day British forces seized the port and old town Trieste; Tito's troops already occupied the rest of the city and most of the disputed area. On May 7 the Combined Chiefs of Staff permitted Alexander to seek a local military compromise regarding occupation areas that would protect his supply lines and avoid an armed confrontation between Allied and Yugoslav forces. (Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1964], pp. 587–98; *Foreign Relations*, 1945, 4: 1103–45.)

2. In his memorandum on the White House meeting, Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew noted: "General Marshall felt the importance of a strong joint communication to the Yugoslav Government by the American and British diplomatic representatives in Belgrade before General Alexander was given any definite instructions with regard to action." (*Foreign Relations*, 1945, 4: 1155.) William Phillips was special assistant to the secretary of state.

3. For the communications between Truman and Churchill and the agreed final text—delivered to the Yugoslav government on May 14—see *ibid.*, pp. 1156–62.

4. In a subsequent memorandum for Admiral Leahy, Marshall said that militarily the United States had "no interest in the Venezia-Giulia area," but "for political reasons the U.S. has now committed themselves to a joint occupation force in the Trieste-Isonzo area and hence will be militarily involved in any difficulties in that area." Nevertheless, "from the military standpoint, it is vital that no hostilities should break out in this area. Even minor shooting might grow into a conflagration which would spread open the whole area of contact between the Yugoslavs and ourselves at the head of the Adriatic and might reasonably gravely involve us with the Russians. The next step appears to be to stand our ground militarily, with our forces disposed much as they are, *while* the U.S. and British governments bring the strongest political pressure on Tito." (Marshall Memorandum for Admiral Leahy, May 11, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) For further developments, see Marshall to Eisenhower, May 16, 1945, pp. 193–94.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER May 11, 1945
Radio No. W-80614. *Secret* Washington, D.C.

Elmer Davis¹ tells me that there has developed an intense public reaction, approaching and in many cases reaching bitterness, as a result of press reports on the treatment which Goering and certain other German Officers have received upon capture.²

He cites especially reports of our Officers shaking hands and drinking with Germans and points to the variance between such actions and the Non-Fraternization Policy.³

DDEL/D. D. Eisenhower Papers (Pre-Presidential 1916–52, Principal File)

1. Elmer Davis served as director of the Office of War Information.

2. On May 8 Marshal Hermann Goering surrendered to the U.S. Seventh Army. The press reported that Brigadier General Robert I. Stack, assistant commander of the Thirty-

sixth Division, shook hands with Goering when the German officer surrendered. (*New York Times*, May 10, 1945, pp. 1, 3.)

3. Directives calling for nonfraternization with German officials and civilians were issued in September 1944 and April 1945. The April 26, 1945, directive listed among the basic objectives of the occupation forces in a post-defeated Germany: "Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated enemy nation. Your aim is not oppression but to occupy Germany for the purpose of realizing certain important Allied objectives. In the conduct of your occupation and administration you should be just but firm and aloof. You will strongly discourage fraternization with the German officials and population." (*Foreign Relations*, 1945, 3: 487. For the similar nonfraternization policy issued in the September 1944 directive, see Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945* [Washington: GPO, 1955], p. 144.) For further information regarding this subject, see Marshall to Eisenhower, May 13, 1945, pp. 185-86.

TO HARRY L. HOPKINS

May 13, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Harry: I have just read your note of May 12th and appreciate your writing. I will treat the matter as most confidential.¹

As a matter of fact I was not at all surprised to get your news. Political repercussions seemed to indicate such action and your state of health would make it advisable, because you have literally given of your physical strength during the past three years to a degree that has been, in my opinion, heroic and will never be appreciated except by your intimates.²

For myself, I wish to tell you this, that you personally have been of invaluable service to me in the discharge of my duties in this war. Time after time you have done for me things I was finding it exceedingly difficult to do for myself and always in matters of the gravest import. You have been utterly selfless as well as courageous and purely objective in your contribution to the war effort.³

I am very glad that you are actually to be released from further obligations except of your own personal choosing because I think you owe it to yourself and your family, and I might also say to your friends. Incidentally, if you would care to go down to the White Sulphur again before you are released from Federal service, I would be very glad to have the necessary arrangements made.⁴ I can't give you a cottage because they have all been signed up for some time to meet the regurgitation of generals from Europe. But I can have you and Mrs. Hopkins given a normal Greenbrier Hotel room and you would have available the medical service of the hospital. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Presidential adviser Harry L. Hopkins had written to the chief of staff: "Personal and Confidential. My dear George: Before it is announced and in the hope that you will not

have heard it from anyone else, I want you to know that I am leaving the government in the next few weeks.” (Hopkins to Marshall, May 12, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Hopkins had conferred with President Truman at the White House in early May. “Asked about his future status,” reported the *New York Times*, “he replied that he was still Special Assistant to the President but advised that no inference should be drawn from that.” (*New York Times*, May 5, 1945, p. 16.)

3. “He rendered a service to his country which will never even vaguely be appreciated,” Marshall wrote to Hopkins’s widow on January 30, 1946. (See Marshall to Mrs. Harry L. Hopkins, p. 434.) Writer Robert Sherwood reflected, “Despite all the differences between their characters and experience, Roosevelt and Hopkins were alike in one important way: they were thoroughly and gloriously unpompous. The predominant qualities in both were unconquerable confidence, courage and good humor.” (Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* [New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948], pp. 8–9.)

4. “Mrs. Hopkins told me recently that the time Mr. Hopkins spent at White Sulphur when you sent him down there a year or so ago had been most beneficial from every point of view,” Frank McCarthy reported to the chief of staff. “Particularly since he felt, in those surroundings, a complete detachment from anything official or annoying.” (McCarthy Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, May 12, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Hopkins had recuperated in early May to July 4, 1944, while staying at the U.S. Army’s Ashford General Hospital at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia. See *Papers of GCM*, 4: 275–76, 460–61.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER May 13, 1945
[Radio No. W-81797.]¹ *Secret* Washington, D.C.

To Eisenhower from Marshall. Reference your FWD 21264 replying to message regarding protests in United States over friendly manner in which Goering and other Nazi leaders have been received:² by mail and wire I am being deluged with violent protests and the radical press, as well as numerous conservative papers, carry bitter editorials on the subject.³

For your information I think the serious error lay in Dahlquist,⁴ Stack, etcetera, permitting themselves to be photographed in apparently intimate and friendly greetings, shaking hands, as well as in press statements going out with the implication at least of lunching or dining with these men.

The original protests were touched off by your official communique of May 9 which stated that Stack shook hands with Goering at their first meeting.⁵

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall’s handwritten draft of this message is located in GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected).

2. General Eisenhower’s Radio No. FWD-21264 is not in the Marshall Papers; see *Papers of DDE*, 6: 42. For previous information, see Marshall to Eisenhower, May 11, 1945, pp. 183–84.

3. For an example of letters to the editor protesting too lenient treatment of Goering, see *New York Times*, May 12, 1945, p. 12.

4. Major General John E. Dahlquist served as commander of the Thirty-sixth Division.

5. "The only thing for me to do is to issue a short public statement saying that I disapprove of all fraternization and especially between senior officers," replied Eisenhower on May 14. "I have done this, saying, in effect, that any such incidents were against my express orders and that expressions of my definite disapproval have been brought to the personal attention of the offenders. In addition, I have stated formally that I regret these occurrences." (*Papers of DDE*, 6: 42.) For General Eisenhower's public statement, see *New York Times*, May 15, 1945, pp. 1, 5. See Marshall to Eisenhower, May 15, 1945, p. 189.

TO MRS. JOHN J. SINGER

May 14, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Marie, I don't recall the roster on our correspondence but as a rule you write to me after I write to you, so I shall stir up a letter with this note.

The weather has finally turned summerish today, though it is still not very warm.

Katherine and I went to Leesburg Sunday morning after a couple of hours here in the War Department for me, to attend the prayer service directed by the President.¹ I read the Second Lesson.

We had a picnic lunch on the stone court afterwards and worked at transplanting all afternoon. Specifically I got in two dozen tomato plants (some earlier ones had been frostbitten), three dozen perennial phlox, about four dozen annual phlox, two dozen chrysanthemums, a row of corn and half a dozen blackberry bushes. Katherine put in quite a bit of border stuff in the way of small plants, portulaca, etc. The job was rather hard because I had to do a great deal of heavy weeding and uprooting of perennials which had spread too much, notably Bouncing Bet.

My garden is coming along very well. We have been eating lettuce and radishes and onions for some time and I have peas, string and lima beans, beets, and squash, well up. My potatoes were not caught by the frost and the first planting of corn is about four inches high.

I think that Molly will go down with the children about Wednesday or Thursday now that it is turning warmer. Katherine will go with her but will probably come back for two or three days a week with me. Most confidentially, I may be off to the Pacific for a considerable period, three or four weeks and she will stay at Leesburg during that period.

I suppose you will be leaving for Pike Run early in June when your morale will be raised accordingly.²

With my love, Affectionately,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On May 8, 1945, President Truman announced Germany's unconditional surrender, and he issued a proclamation that Sunday, May 13, be a day of prayer. "I call upon the people of the United States, whatever their faith, to unite in offering joyful thanks to God for the victory we have won and to pray that He will support us to the end of our present struggle and guide us into the way of peace," proclaimed Truman. "I also call upon my countrymen to dedicate this day of prayer to the memory of those who have given their lives to make possible our victory." (*New York Times*, May 9, 1945, p. 5; May 14, 1945, p. 1.)

2. Marshall's sister had written in mid-April that she would soon be with her friends and golfing at Pike Run Country Club in Jones Mill, Pennsylvania. General Marshall visited his sister at the club on July 5. "I thoroughly enjoyed my brief stay with you and was delighted to see you looking so well and in such agreeable surroundings," Marshall wrote on July 6. "Anyone who shoots 9 holes on their third try of the season in 41 requires no sympathy from me, or worry on my part, especially when I think of the views, cool breezes and the pleasant company that are yours." (Singer to Marshall, April 17, 1945, and Marshall to Singer, July 6, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO MAJOR GENERAL HENRY CONGER PRATT

May 14, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Pratt: First, I have just received your note regarding the matter of the expense account for the trip and Halifax's insistence on handling his share personally. That is perfectly agreeable to me so long as he knew we desired to be the hosts, which he did.¹

With reference to your other note of May tenth regarding your embarrassment because of the proposal to urge your advancement to the grade of Lieutenant General. Nothing of the sort has come to me and if it had I should have felt that you had no part in it. So do not concern yourself over my possible misunderstanding of your attitude.²

Frankly, and confidentially, the situation is this: we have now due the return of a large number of officers of high rank who have performed brilliantly in the fighting in France. Very few of these will get to the Pacific. Positions in reasonable keeping with the records of the individuals will have to be found in this country. While there will be a gradual demobilization, or rather grade by grade reduction in high rank, it should not begin with the outstanding leaders. Therefore, during the coming months places will have to be found for these officers, notably Army and Corps commanders, of whom there are a great many that will not be required for the occupation period in Germany and, as I have commented above, probably will not be employed in the Pacific.

Walker, whose Army Corps under Patton, has played a leading part in the movement across France through Germany into contact with the Russians in southern Czechoslovakia, will return shortly to take over a Corps Area, or rather an Army Service Command, that of the Eighth in Texas.³ There will be similar changes and while there are no plans at all at the

present time for alterations in the Eastern and Western Defense Commands it is possible that something of this sort may have to take place in the future. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Major General H. Conger Pratt, who served as commander of the Western Defense Command in San Francisco, had accompanied Lord and Lady Halifax on a trip (which General Marshall had instigated) through the Redwood groves in California. (Pratt to Marshall, May 7, 1945, and Halifax to Marshall, May 7, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. Pratt had written that two individuals, not in the army, had informed him that they proposed to "take action in an endeavor to secure a third star for me." He had urged them not to pursue the matter because it would be most embarrassing for him and the War Department. "I hope I have quashed the thing. . . . I have had nothing to do in any way, either directly or by implication, with the origination or the prosecution of this move," insisted Pratt. "I have never in my Army career sought political or outside influence and I do not propose to do so now." (Pratt to Marshall, May 10, 1945, *ibid.*)

3. Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, commander of the Twentieth Corps, assumed command of the Eighth Army Service Command in Dallas, Texas, in June.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY

Confidential

May 14, 1945

[Washington, D.C.]

I had lunch with Anthony Eden today.¹ He somewhat explained the Prime Minister's indirect references to his concern over "American withdrawals" from the European theater in connection with the retirement of the Allied forces to the agreed upon boundaries.

There has been so much in the press about the rapidity of redeployment and demobilization that the Prime Minister has become upset, thinking we were leaving Europe. I explained to Mr. Eden that it was a slow process at best. He asked me if I would be willing to give the British Chiefs of Staff an outline of the proposed schedules. I told him I saw no objection to that.

Therefore, what I would like is an outline of our present schedules for moving Air and Ground troops to the Pacific and individuals to this country for demobilization.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. General Marshall had lunch with Stimson and Eden on May 14 in Secretary Stimson's office. During lunch "we had a talk in general about matters in Europe and particularly Germany and the complications which are being made by Russia's difficulties." (May 14, 1945, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 51: 125-26].) For information regarding Eden's meeting with Stimson before lunch, see Marshall Memorandum for the Secretary of War, May 10, 1945, p. 178.

2. The Operations Division prepared for General Marshall's signature a letter and itemized schedule for troop withdrawals from Europe during the remainder of 1945. "We now have in Europe a total of 3,500,000 troops. Of these 1,200,000 are required to be moved

from Europe to the Pacific,” Marshall informed Field Marshal Wilson on May 16. About 400,000 troops would be deployed directly to the Pacific through the Panama Canal. “Service and construction troops are the first requirements of the Pacific and with some few exceptions this 400,000 will consist of this type of unit. It is planned to move these between now and 30 September.” (Marshall Memorandum for Field Marshal Wilson, May 16, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER May 15, 1945
[Radio No. W-82396.] *Secret* Washington, D.C.

Personal for Eisenhower from Marshall. Your statement regarding the treatment to be accorded high ranking German officials came just in time and has had an excellent effect.¹ Only in one or two instances have editorials reflected on what they called the “delay” in your announcement.

This brings to my mind the necessity of a better arrangement to keep you advised as to what the reactions are in England and the United States. It is quite evident that an effective service of this nature is not rendered you. I had thought that BPR [Bureau of Public Relations] here kept you advised but evidently that is not the case or the data gets lost in your staff.

I think it is very important that you are kept briefed (not deluged) and I suggest that an officer be designated here whose sole job is to prepare a daily message for your eye, digesting reactions important for you to be aware of and also to send you personally selected editorials or news comments with a brief which would avoid the necessity on your part of reading them through. Your aide could check on these papers and bring the vital parts to your attention.

I not only see the papers but the telegrams and letters which flood in on me quickly apprise me of public and political reactions in time for me to take corrective action without appearing to be on the defensive.

Please let me have your wishes in the matter.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See Marshall to Eisenhower, May 13, 1945, pp. 185–86.

2. “I would be most grateful to have you institute the system suggested,” replied Eisenhower. “Such material as I do get reflecting public reactions at home usually arrives too late to be of any use or is too voluminous for me to read. A selection at home such as you suggest with rapid transmission of those things in which speedy action is indicated, would be most helpful.” (*Papers of DDE*, 6: 60.) Marshall requested the Bureau of Public Relations to assign the task of providing reports to Eisenhower’s headquarters to an officer able to “handle this assignment . . . in a superior manner.” (Marshall [McCarthy-drafted] Memorandum for Colonel Hill, May 17, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SOMERVELL
Restricted

May 15, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

At the JCS meeting today Admiral Leahy talked at considerable length of the pressure being exerted on Judge Vinson regarding civilian production, and Judge Vinson's situation in not yet knowing exactly what the Army production requirements would be for the war in the Pacific.¹ I explained to Admiral Leahy that until we had completed our taking of stock in the European Theater we were unable to give a definite reply. His point of view was that the pressure was going to be so great that some decision of some kind would have to be made almost immediately.

On my return to the office Judge Vinson called me up and asked if he could talk to me this afternoon or tomorrow. I put him off until tomorrow.

Please let me have by 10:00 o'clock tomorrow a statement in the matter that can guide me in my discussion with Judge Vinson, particularly if there are any items regarding which we can give him at least a partial decision at the present time, such as bombs and octane gas, for example. Have we the data to give him the requirements in summer clothing, for example, this being related to the cotton cloth situation.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Frederick M. Vinson was director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion.

2. General Brehon B. Somervell, chief of Army Service Forces, replied that Vinson's office had been provided with the War Department's requirements insofar as they could be computed with available data on the strategic situation and troop basis. "It is well to remember that the reduction in Army personnel during the coming year will be only 5 percent. In other words, the average man-years during the past year amount to 8,100,000 whereas the budget for the next fiscal year is computed on the basis of 7,700,000. Men will continue to eat, wear clothes, travel and get sick. Many of the procurement items will remain much the same wherever the troops are." (Somervell Memorandum for General Marshall, May 15, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

The army's requirements for cotton textiles, food, and shoes had been reviewed by various agencies and approved by them, reported General Somervell. "The production of cotton textiles was 11,200,000,000 yards in 1942. It has dropped to only 9,200,000,000 yards in 1944. The Army is at present taking about 20 percent of this smaller figure. If Judge Vinson's office and the War Production Board can increase production to what it was two years ago, the stringency in cotton textiles would be removed. Instead, the pressures are being put on the Army to reduce its requirements." Yet the army's cotton textiles requirements had been reviewed by the Truman Committee, the Inspector General, and the War Production Board and approved. "Our requirements for cotton textiles disclose the fact that troops are to be deployed through the United States and to the tropics, and since these troops from the European Theater have not been equipped with cotton, this will make these demands for the one-front war greater than for the two-front war," reported Somervell. The army's food requirements had been "scanned and rescanned with the War Food Administration" and approved. "Our shoe requirements have likewise been screened thoroughly with the War Production Board and have been reduced to a point where our stocks will be, in the opinion of the Quartermaster General, dangerously low," reported Somervell. "I concur in the opinion that we should have more but I am willing to take the risk we are taking because of the unquestioned civilian need." (Ibid.)

The air forces' bomb program had been reduced to the "available capacities" and its requirements for high octane gas reduced to "within the capabilities of existing facilities." Somervell concluded, "It appears that Judge Vinson wants to know enough about the plans in the Pacific to convince himself that the Army which is planned for the next year is not in excess of needs and that full utilization is being made of available resources in Europe, and that the remaining program is properly phased into the deployment schedule." (Ibid.)

On May 22 Vinson reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff his concern over domestic labor unrest and said the people "were in a unique position due to lack of information in regard to the war status after VE Day, matters of reconversion, unemployment, and the distribution of food." (Minutes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Heads of Civilian War Agencies Meeting, May 22, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS 334, JCS Minutes].) "General Marshall pointed out that to save lives in the war against Japan it was planned to be more prodigal in the use of troops and aircraft crews as reserves and replacements. An extra regiment for each division of troops will improve a man's chances thirty five percent. B-29's should have 2.5 crews, instead of 1.3 crews as they have at present." The chief of staff "said that we cannot speculate on the Russians coming in or on the Japs quitting, and that production must be kept up." (Ibid.)

TO GILBERT DARLINGTON¹

May 16, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mr. Darlington: I am encouraged to learn from your letter to me of May 4 that you are strongly in favor of Universal Military Training. The opponents of such a measure apparently must favor a large Regular army to which the people of the United States have always been opposed and which I would deplore, even if it were a financial possibility, which it is not. Universal Military Training is absolutely necessary in my opinion if the citizen reserve force is to be effective, that is, to provide the country with adequate security.

Detailed study of the problem and the extensive experience we have had both with intermittent and continuous training periods leads directly to the conclusion that the training will be less burdensome and much less expensive, yet far more thorough and effective if it is given in one continuous period of a year rather than piecemealed over several years.

The War Department is aware of the desirability to have the training adjusted to family needs permitting the continuation of home ties, and would make every effort to permit young men engaged in such training to maintain frequent contacts with their families.

Answering your question regarding my comments on the Twenty-third Psalm, the incident I referred to took place in October of 1918 during the Meuse-Argonne battle. A very fine, I might say saintly character, Colonel James Shannon, on General Pershing's staff at GHQ at Chaumont, while on an inspection of the fighting front, took over command of a regiment of the 28th Pennsylvania Division which was having very difficult fight-

ing on the eastern edge of the Argonne. Shannon, in the front lines, was directing the fighting of his troops at Chateau-Thierry when he was struck by a bullet which, I think, injured his spinal column. He was moved to the rear to a hospital in the vicinity of the Army Headquarters where I was located, and he died shortly after arrival. I was told at the time that just before his death the chaplain was reading at his request the Twenty-third Psalm and when he got to that portion that referred to "He leadeth me beside the still waters. He restoreth my soul", Shannon interrupted to say, "That is great stuff", and very shortly after that, died. Faithfully yours, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Darlington—treasurer of the American Bible Society in New York City, a navy chaplain during World War I, and a strong supporter of universal military training—had talked with Marshall at the dinner prior to the general's April 4 speech to the Academy of Political Science. Several weeks earlier, Marshall had accepted the society's invitation to become one of their sponsors; he noted that his favorite Bible verse was the Twenty-third Psalm. When Darlington asked why that was his favorite, Marshall told him the Colonel Shannon story in the letter printed here. Darlington subsequently wrote to ask that Marshall write down this anecdote for him. (Darlington to Marshall, May 4, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER May 16, 1945
Radio. *Top Secret* Washington, D.C.

For Eisenhower's eyes only from Marshall. What follows is most confidential and I do not wish it discussed with any one other than as indicated below.

President Truman is much concerned over the developing situation in relation to veterans and the Veterans' Bureau particularly in relation to the labor organizations and the congressional attitudes. He wants to supplant the present head of the bureau¹ and put in charge an outstanding Army figure who would hold the loyalty of all the veterans and command the respect of the country and the politicians. He considers that Bradley is outstanding for this purpose from what he knows of him as to character, administrative ability and his leading role in the fighting. The President stated that he would not for the world adversely affect Bradley's military career; that such an appointment would not be for a prolonged period, probably a year or two; and that he would like to have him in about a month.

I told the President this would of course be a shock to Bradley and I presume a great disappointment. On the other hand as matters now stand he will not go to the Pacific and the only very responsible post available for him would be command in Germany after your departure if and when

you are recalled, and your recall I assume will depend upon my success in securing the President's release of me from active duty which I have not yet mentioned to him but which I intend to propose and urge in the next two months.

Under the circumstances my own estimate is that Bradley would not only do a superb job in a very difficult position and be acclaimed by the veterans and highly respected by the Congress and the people, but that he would enhance his military career instead of harming it. I do not think he would be bound to the post for any long period and I think that thereafter he could command almost any position within reason within the appointive power of the President. In other words I think his future career would be enhanced rather than harmed though the job would be most difficult, but it will be on a tremendous scale and serving the men who have fought under him.

Please let me have your reaction and Bradley's.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Brigadier General Frank T. Hines—an artilleryman, a veteran of the Philippine Insurrection campaigns, and a transportation administrator during World War I—had been head of the Veterans Administration and predecessor agencies since 1923. In September 1945, he became ambassador to Panama.

2. Two days later, Marshall told President Truman that Bradley would accept the position. "I do think, however, he should be given at least a month's rest if that would be acceptable to you as he has been under continuous terrific pressure since his arrival in Africa in February, 1943." Truman professed himself "exceedingly happy over the report on General Bradley." (Marshall Memorandum for the President, May 18, 1945, and Truman Memorandum for Marshall, May 19, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) The president announced Bradley's new role on June 7, but Bradley was not sworn in until August 15.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Radio. *Top Secret*

May 16, 1945
Washington, D.C.

For Eisenhower's eyes only from Marshall. I have just talked to the President who consulted me regarding the increasingly acute situation with Tito and the Yugoslavs.¹ I saw Alexander's message to you requesting that you take over control of certain Austrian provinces that are in his bailiwick.

The President is naturally most anxious to avoid the tragedy of an open fight; at the same time he feels that the actions of the Yugoslav Government and of Tito have become so aggressive and contemptuous of the Allied authority and responsibility in the matter that there is a limit to how far we can go in tolerating further adverse development of the situation. He asked me my views, I having previously urged him against committing himself to action which might, in my opinion, provoke fighting

and which was being urged on him. I told him that we might play another card by strongly reinforcing Alexander with armored forces and that, for example, if three or four or even five armored divisions moved into the region and if Patton's name could be connected with them it might solve the problem without an open rupture. He was particularly enthusiastic over the psychological effect of Patton's name and was in accord with my suggestion that I communicate with you on the basis that if you could make such a force available you might informally discuss the matter with Alexander and if you and he were in agreement it could then be confirmed by the [Combined] Chiefs of Staff.

There would be command complications because Alexander has the Fifth British Corps in control of the situation operating in the Eighth British Army with our 91st Division as part of the corps and the Eighth Army under Clark. However, these are details, the main issue being the desire of the President to make this sort of an effort in the hope of reconverting the Yugoslavs to a more reasonable and tractable course. We do not know here to what extent you could free armored divisions for this work and how long it would take them to move, speed of action being very necessary.

Please let me have your reaction.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. For previous consideration of the Venezia Giulia problem, see Marshall Memorandum for General Handy et al., May 11, 1945, pp. 182–83.

2. Eisenhower replied on May 17 that his staff and Patton were urgently studying the logistical problems of moving an armored force into the mountains of southernmost Germany. He noted, however, that such a disposition would be awkward for the Allies should the Soviet Union begin increasing its demands elsewhere along the East-West dividing line. (*Papers of DDE*, 6: 57–59.)

On May 21, the Yugoslav government informed the U.S. and U.K. ambassadors in Rome that it would accept the establishment of an Allied Military Government on the basis of a demarcation line proposed by Alexander's headquarters on May 8. The three nations signed an agreement on June 9 that, pending completion of a peace treaty with Italy, divided the disputed area into a small zone under Allied Military Government control—i.e., primarily the Trieste area and coastal transportation routes from Italy to it—and the rest of Venezia Giulia under Yugoslav control. (See *Foreign Relations*, 1945, 4: 1170–71, 1182–83.)

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY
Secret

May 18, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

I have been working on a scheme to handle the “appreciation phase” of the fighting in Europe along with our redeployment in the Pacific. I do not want the men who have done a splendid job over there to feel they are immediately forgotten, therefore the following plan is under way.

Hodges, commanding the First Army, is under orders for the initial move to the Pacific of the ground forces to get out to MacArthur as soon as possible. We plan to use his arrival with the headquarters of the First Army for two purposes, (1) cheering notice to the Japanese that we are on the way with large forces, and (2) an initial home-coming greeting.

To carry out (2) above, Hodges and a selected group of people most of whom are to be demobilized, about 40 in all, will move direct to Atlanta, that being in the vicinity of Hodges' home.¹ There we are confidentially arranging for his entertainment. He will have with him a distinguished airman, a Corps commander, two or three Division commanders, four field officers, four company officers of junior grade, a number of aides, and 24 enlisted men largely non-commissioned officers who have won great distinction in combat and who are to be demobilized.

Similarly, but without the transfer to the Pacific being an involvement, we are planning to do something with similar groups in Chicago, San Antonio, Los Angeles, and finally with General Eisenhower himself in Washington, New York, and Kansas City. His return to be about June 17th and the company officers and men with him, as in all other cases, to be from those regions.

The General Officers in almost every case return to Europe in about two weeks and the intervals between groups are about 5 days, so that we can continue the command establishment abroad without undue complications. Of course in some instances a great deal will depend on what occurs with the Yugoslavs.

Will you please inform the President, but ask him not to give any publicity whatever in order to avoid a deluge of requests which we cannot possibly meet at this time. We intend to develop the publicity gradually, having it done from each locality, where nothing will be known about the matter until just a few days beforehand.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The U.S. Senate approved Courtney H. Hodges's promotion to full general on April 25, the same day that First Army troops established contact with the Red Army on the Elbe River at Torgau, Germany. He arrived in the U.S. on May 23 and went to Atlanta, Georgia, the following day.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WEIBLE¹
Confidential

May 20, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Reference the attached memorandum from Bishop O'Hara to the Special Planning Division for consideration.²

Bishop O'Hara has represented his views in this matter since the initial mobilization. There exists a difference of view between the Bishop

and the War Department as to the practical measures to control this menace to armies.³ The inference that the War Department has, in effect, deceived the public by its representations of statistics, etc., is without foundation and I know would be deeply resented by the Secretary of War, as it is by me.

While some measures might be conceived that will smooth the way in regard to this particular issue, yet at the same time it must be borne in mind that in effect Bishop O'Hara is opposed to a measure which we hope will secure the peace of the world because of his disapproval of a single measure which has the approval of the Secretary of War after long consideration and considerable experience.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Walter L. Weible, who began his service as a private in 1917 and rose to major general by 1944, was director of training for Army Service Forces.

2. On March 18, Weible had met with Archbishop Francis J. Spellman, military vicar for the United States, and John F. O'Hara, auxiliary bishop of the Army and Navy Diocese, "in an attempt to determine the position of the Catholic church on the question of Universal Military Training." He found Spellman open-minded on the subject but O'Hara "quite frank and out-spoken in his objections." Weible asked O'Hara "to enumerate for me in a memorandum the reasons why he objected to Universal Military Training." (Weible Memorandum for General Marshall, May 17, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 353 Training 1944-46, Sec. IV].)

3. O'Hara, who had been promoted to Bishop of Buffalo on May 8, particularly objected to the army's policy of distributing condoms to its troops in order to hold down the venereal disease rate. Most recently, he had written to protest the arrival in Hollandia, New Guinea, of "three hundred tons of rubber contraceptives, consigned to the Army there." (O'Hara to Marshall, March 7, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) In his May 17 memorandum, Weible had recommended that O'Hara's letter be sent to the Special Planning Division with a directive from Marshall to recommend action that would meet O'Hara's objections.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SOMERVELL
(OR HIS DEPUTY)

May 22, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Attached is a draft of a letter General Somervell proposed that I send to Mr. Smith of the Budget, with certain exhibits.¹ I did not choose to use this for two reasons—I think Mr. Smith would be quite certain that the presentation was more or less purely General Somervell's rather than mine, because of the detailed form in which the matter is stated. Also, being single-spaced I could not do much in amending it to my taste.

Therefore, I dictated a new draft which is also attached and which I wish you would look over and see if there is anything that I have said that might be misleading or do harm and if there is anything I have not said that you feel it is imperative that I should mention.² What I am trying to

do is introduce the personal note of my direct concern in this matter rather than the elaborate statement that would normally come from me as Chief of Staff, therefore the style of the letter.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Somervell's lengthy letter to Harold D. Smith, director of the Bureau of the Budget, is in NA/RG 165 (OCS, 600.3).

2. Somervell returned Marshall's redraft (see the following document) with the note: "I think your draft is OK without modification. B. S."

TO HAROLD D. SMITH

May 22, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Smith: I wish to bring to your personal attention what I understand is the present situation, in preparing the budget, with regard to certain repair and maintenance factors.

I have been much concerned over the dilemma in which I find myself regarding just what should be done in this matter because of the apparent unwillingness of the Congress to make a decision as to policy regarding compulsory military training. If there is to be no compulsory military training I can make a fairly accurate estimate of what we need to maintain in the Army but if no such decision is made as to general policy—the details need not be firmly established at this time—then we are in a dilemma which may cost the country countless millions. When disrepair reaches a certain point, particularly with temporary or semi-permanent buildings, a renewed effort to maintain the structures involves heavy and unjustified expenditures. A piecemeal procedure gets us nowhere. Therefore it is important to us to know which way to turn in dealing with the tremendous number of installations we have in this country.

As indicated above, I have no firm decision to meet the foregoing. The best we can do is pick out the most likely establishments and see that the repairs we put on them are not on such a skimpy scale that it will amount to more or less waste of effort. On the other hand, I am equally concerned over the policy which is to be followed regarding posts or installations which we know must serve the Army in the post-war period. In the main these have been dealt with on a hand-to-mouth basis, especially because of the lack of material and labor shortages. Now I think it is very important that the painting and other repair work be done with a view to future as well as present economies. I witnessed the dilemma in this matter from 1919 through the '20s and the inexcusable waste which resulted. I do not want to have this happen again if I can avoid it.

Accordingly last December I personally instructed Somervell to provide a higher type of maintenance for posts which we were reasonably certain, after lengthy studies, would be retained. To accomplish this he tells me that requests for \$43,000,000 were made in order to place the permanent buildings in a condition in line with normal maintenance. Of the forty-three, \$20,000,000, I understand, was to have been from FY 1945 and \$23,000,000 from FY 1946 funds.¹ The 1945 funds have now practically all been approved to the field but have had to be suspended, I am told, because it is understood from your office that the former proposal to transfer \$20,000,000 to "Barracks and Quarters" subappropriation may not be authorized.

As to the temporary quarters of the total item of \$234,000,000 in the FY 1946 budget, \$56,000,000 is for utilities. The Engineers, Somervell tells me, have estimated that their proposals under this heading will amortize themselves, on the average, in less than three years and 50% of them within fifteen months. There are a number of other aspects of this matter but I do not wish to go into details.

The whole thing appears of such great importance to the Army that if serious cuts are to be made in the proposed program, I would like to discuss the whole affair with the President, but I do not wish to do so until I thoroughly understand your point of view.² Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. U.S. federal government fiscal year (FY) 1945 covered the period July 1, 1944, to June 30, 1945; FY 1946 covered the same dates in 1945 and 1946.

2. Smith responded on June 5 that he was "disturbed by the proposal that the Army embark upon an extensive program of special maintenance, estimated to cost \$277,000,000, on its permanent and temporary housing facilities. I feel that the War Department should continue to maintain its facilities according to rigid wartime standards." (Smith to Marshall, June 5, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 600.3].)

Marshall replied to Smith on June 16 that the purpose of his May 22 letter had been "to bring to your personal attention the effect on our installations and the extra expense ultimately involved in continuing much longer the policy of rigid wartime standards adopted as a military necessity immediately after Pearl Harbor. It was not my purpose to embark on an extensive program of special maintenance to apply indiscriminately to all permanent and temporary housing facilities. What I did have in mind was that maintenance on continuing military installations be put on a basis of true and actual economy. . . . While I am not unmindful of the pent-up demands of the civilian economy and the desirability of meeting them at the earliest possible moment, I feel that the requirement for placing our continuing military facilities in first-class condition must also be promptly met." He also observed that he probably could transfer a certain amount of funds from other items to cover maintenance. (Marshall to Smith, June 16, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

Smith rejected Marshall's assertion that a substantial deficit of maintenance had accumulated: "my field reports and other reliable evidence convince me that a quite adequate level of maintenance is being carried on." While he recognized that certain temporary structures could deteriorate rapidly, "it seems to me questionable to go all-out on maintenance of these structures until it is rather clear as to what will be the size and composition of our postwar military establishment in the continental United States." He also warned

against abusing the funding flexibility, because this would encourage Congress to adopt “more rigid controls.” (Smith to Marshall, June 20, 1945, *ibid.*)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER May 24, 1945
[Radio No. W-87181.] *Top Secret* Washington, D.C.

General Marshall to General Eisenhower for his eyes only. Please look over your E 45603, our W 84079, and your last message on this subject FWD 22093.¹

Somervell is much concerned for the reason that he feels that (1) it is going to be difficult to determine requirements on both sides of the Atlantic because of the semi-divided status of supply matters which will be created in your theater and (2) what is much more important to us here, the transfer of staff chiefs, such as QMG, Ordnance etcetera, to the status indicated in your message will inevitably result in a similar demand by the corresponding staff chiefs here in the War Department. As you will understand, we have had constant pressure to break down the Army Service Forces command by raising bureau chiefs to Navy Department standard where I would have to deal with them individually or they would bypass me to the civil secretariat. These pressures have been continuous and have involved outside campaigns, in the press and otherwise, where this was the ulterior motive but it was not so stated.

From the foregoing you can understand our concern over your arrangements and I wish to be certain that we here are not going to be embarrassed by your arrangement there which may have been affected by personalities more than by the logic of organization.

Do not permit me to embarrass you into taking a course which is inadvisable in your opinion but I wish to be assured that you understand some of the implications involved.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Eisenhower proposed to eliminate organizational overlap and difficulties in clearly fixing leaders' responsibilities in the European Theater of Operations by merging the theater and rear area (Com Z or Communications Zone) commands. In E-45603 of May 16 from Eisenhower's headquarters in Frankfurt, Germany, was a list of general officers and their assignments. Marshall responded on May 18 (W-84079) that he did not understand certain of the assignments. “Appears essential that the Army Service Forces be maintained as a unit and not broken up into its component Services reporting to miscellaneous Staff Officers.” To this, Eisenhower replied on May 21 (FWD-22093) that the assignments of chiefs of services in the European Theater of Operations was the result of the creation of a Joint Staff. “The Special Staff will not report to Miscellaneous Staff Officers but will in fact be the Special Staff for the Theater Commander,” there being no need for a separate service force unit in Germany in the immediate future. (All three documents are in DDEL/D. D. Eisenhower Papers [Pre-Presidential 1916–52, Principal File].)

2. On May 27, Eisenhower observed that Marshall's "comments on our proposed reorganization brought up considerations that I must say had escaped my mind." His staff would restudy the matter. (*Papers of DDE*, 6: 97-98.)

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE WAR
DEPARTMENT SUBCOMMITTEE

May 25, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Last year, when General McNarney appeared before you in connection with Estimates for the fiscal year 1945, he stated that the present fiscal year would be the first to see the Army at its full effective strength of 7,700,000 throughout the twelve months' period. However, he pointed out that the deployment overseas would continue to mount throughout 1945, since our full strength could not be exerted upon the numerous battlefields until many months after attaining our planned mobilization strength.

General McNarney predicted that the current fiscal year would be one of offensive operations. Actually, United States forces have retained the initiative against both Japanese and Germans throughout the period, except for the brief and unsuccessful German counteroffensive in the Ardennes last December. The measure of our success is indicated by the collapse of resistance in Europe and by the forward progress of our forces in the Far East.

MUNITIONS

The preceding year saw the initial equipment of our forces almost completed. Production during the past year has been devoted chiefly to maintaining our armies in the field, the replacement of combat losses, and to equipping and maintaining Allied forces. Our preponderance in equipment and in fire power has held down our casualties, our losses in offensive operations having in most cases been smaller than those of the enemy fighting from prepared defensive positions. The policy has been that so far as possible material would be expended to the maximum degree practicable in order to conserve the lives of our men.

During the past year requirements for guns and for permanent equipment items have decreased, while our requirements for ammunition of various types have increased. In aircraft, the emphasis placed upon very heavy bomber [i.e., B-29] operations resulted in increased requirements in terms of air frame weight without a corresponding increase in the number of planes.

The success of our military operations of the past year, and the accomplishments in production and in supply, were enhanced by the experience gained during the war years preceding. Since 1941 the resources of Amer-

ica have been devoted to the defeat of the Axis. The nation has kept its shoulder to the wheel; and our mighty military machine has moved forward, slowly at first, then with gathering momentum, until today there is behind our war effort a terrific drive, a cumulative momentum which is reflected in a continually accelerated thrust forward toward final victory.

It is of utmost importance that the tremendous power of that momentum be sustained until world peace is actually within our grasp. It would be a costly mistake, a hideous injustice to our men in the Pacific to relax now in optimistic estimates of the situation. The final victory on the battlefields will be ours, but it must not be delayed by optimistic errors of judgment or impatient demands for a return at home to the conditions of peace.

PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS

There is little of military secrecy as to the general nature of our plans for the coming year. The offensives in the Pacific are to be intensified to the maximum degree possible. Air strikes of constantly increasing power will devastate the Japanese homeland and pave the way for invasion.

A swift redeployment against our remaining enemy in the Pacific is our most pressing problem. Economy in lives and materiel, as well as the psychology of the American people, demand that we mount a swift, powerful offensive, forcing a victory at the earliest possible date. To this end, the basis for our planning has been not what is necessary to defeat Japan, but rather, how much of our power can we effectively employ against her. We aim to use every man and every weapon practicable.

Until the victory is finally achieved, it is obvious that a large army must be maintained. However, our plans do contemplate the return to civilian life of a large number of men now in uniform who have contributed their share in the armed services of this country. To permit the release of these war-worn men, the induction of those who have heretofore been deferred, and those reaching the statutory age, should continue at a high rate.

BUDGET ESTIMATES

To support these operations, the War Department is submitting a Budget Estimate of \$40,000,000,000 of which \$25,000,000,000 represents required new money and \$15,000,000,000 a carry-over of funds available from prior appropriations. The estimates represent carefully computed requirements. They provide for all procurement, operation, and maintenance costs to support an average strength of 7.7 million men. It is estimated that the strength of the Army will be 8.3 million men on July 1st at the beginning of the new fiscal year, with a target strength of approximately 7.0 million at its close. If this planned reduction can be achieved, it will enable us, with the aid of continuing inductions, to return to civil life some two million men who have earned their right to demobilization.

But top priority must be given to the redeployment against Japan of our fighting forces and, to the maximum extent practicable, of their equipment. While we are concurrently engaged in redeploying large forces from Europe to the Pacific, an average of 167,000 per month is about the maximum number of men who can be transported home for discharge and handled through our separation facilities. It is hoped that this separation objective can be attained.

FOUR MAJOR CATEGORIES OF PLANNED STRENGTH

The proposed strength of 6,968,000 embraces four major categories:

1. The forces required in the Pacific for future operations which are now planned and for which the commitments are firm.

2. A strategic reserve earmarked for certain eventualities in the Pacific War which may or may not materialize. This reserve will be composed of the last troops to come back from Europe and probably will not be available for effective use until 1946. It may well be that as this force is moved back to the United States, circumstances will be such that all or a part of it will not be needed. In that event an additional demobilization will be ordered.

3. Occupation forces. The eventual strength of forces which must be retained in Europe and elsewhere (other than in the Pacific) of course is not known at this time. Present plans call for a strength of approximately 500,000 of which the occupational force in Germany will be about 400,000. These forces will be reduced as soon as that can safely be done.

4. The forces required in the Zone of the Interior, that is, Continental U.S., and in pipelines, will be discussed in detail by General Handy.

The Army will exercise the strictest possible economy in the use of manpower. However, until such time as the extent of necessary operations against Japan is more definitely known, it would not be prudent to undertake plans for a further demobilization.

INTERNATIONAL AID

In addition to funds required to support the Army, the estimates include International Aid commitments to be supplied in 1946, and civilian supplies for liberated and occupied areas. These civilian supplies in our estimates are restricted to those requirements considered to be essential to prevent disease and unrest during the military period, before civilian agencies take over.

PLANT FACILITIES

The estimates of preceding years provided for the expansion of plant facilities necessary to attain required munitions production capacity under the appropriation "Expediting Production." For 1946 no further expansion of over-all production capacity for existing items is contem-

plated. But as the war progresses, newly developed weapons and other items of equipment are added to our requirements and some of these necessitate additional new production facilities. It is only this required production capacity for newly developed items that we include in the 1946 Estimate under "Expediting Production".

HOSPITALIZATION

We now have, in Army hospitals all over the world, more than half a million patients. Many of these are suffering from battle injuries, and many will require all the help which modern surgery and medicine can provide. A large number will necessarily have to undergo a prolonged period of convalescence and physical and mental rehabilitation. Our hospital facilities must be ample and must guarantee that each patient receives any necessary specialized attention to the full extent that modern medical science is able to assist his recovery. During the period of convalescence, we must be mindful of his need for pleasant surroundings and for the exercise and recreation so helpful in speeding recovery. Mind and body must be kept occupied. Our Army hospital system is designed to accomplish these needs.

WELFARE OF ENLISTED MEN

Now that Allied victory has been achieved in Europe, it is of utmost importance that millions of American soldiers in that theater have their time fully utilized while awaiting the ships which will carry them to the far Pacific or bring them home. An idle soldier becomes a discontented soldier. Just how much time will be allotted to continued military training must be the decision of the theater commander. But in all inactive theaters, time will be allotted to athletic, recreational, and particularly to educational programs.

The Army has made careful and elaborate preparations to facilitate the continued education of the young soldiers whose school work was interrupted by military service. The textbooks were shipped overseas months ago. Literacy courses, upper elementary school subjects, standard high school curricula, vocational courses, and junior college course are being provided. Army university study centers are being established, and arrangements have been made with foreign colleges and universities for attendance of American soldier students on a temporary duty basis. I think that in many cases the soldier will return home with his educational standard above that which would probably have been the case had he not been inducted into the Army.

CONCLUSION

The estimate presented represents the War Department requirements for the successful prosecution of the war throughout 1946. We do not, we

cannot assume a final victory as of any given date. The energies of the Army will be devoted to victorious warfare. But to the extent that we are blessed with victory within the new fiscal year, the reduced requirements of the resulting situation will be reflected promptly in our plans.¹

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)

1. Following his formal presentation, and without waiting for questions, Marshall began to elaborate on matters he thought would interest committee members; this off-the-cuff lecture was two-and-a-half times as long as his prepared remarks. He began by examining the imponderables affecting the army's size in the future (e.g., "whether or not Russia will enter the war with Japan"), plans for redeployment to the Pacific, and replacement personnel needs. He noted that the fighting in the Pacific and East Asia raised the question of how best "to extinguish this Japanese military power." He reiterated the army's determination to minimize U.S. casualties. "We plan to gain the victory speedily by an overwhelming application of force—fire power and men." (U.S., House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, *Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1946: Hearings* . . . [Washington: GPO, 1945], pp. 5–13.)

George H. Mahon, a Texas Democrat, asked Marshall's opinion of the idea that it would be cheaper to defeat Japan through a blockade. That was largely a political decision, Marshall responded; he warned, however, that such a "scheme proposes a very much prolonged war, a much prolonged tax bill, the endurance of a burden through a long period, and it also proposes, on the political level, whether or not we would have left Japan in a position where she would be incapable of doing this thing all over again." Moreover, the United States would have to consider the Chinese reaction to leaving the Japanese army in their country for a prolonged period. Finally, the United States had to avoid a war of attrition. A blockade "would mean we have got to take other places in order to establish such a blockade. How many people will you lose in taking these other places; and how many would you lose if you went at it as we did in Normandy and settled the job." The size of the U.S. Army needed to be maintained at the high level the War Department proposed in order to defeat Japan, Marshall concluded. (Ibid., pp. 13–18.)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HILLDRING
Confidential

May 28, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

The President did not talk to me regarding the food situation in Europe.¹

A few minutes ago General Somervell telephoned us that General Macready of the British Army had notified him that advice had been received from the Secretary of State for War in London that the British Government would announce tomorrow certain reductions in the calorie value of the rations issued German prisoners in British hands, one amount for those working and a lesser amount for those not working.²

I told General Somervell to tell General Macready that we felt that time should be given us to survey their proposal to see if a joint announcement could not be made, and specifically to state that I personally thought it would be most unfortunate for the British Government to go ahead with such an announcement without regard to us.

I believe this is largely in your bailiwick so I am notifying you accordingly.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Secretary of the General Staff Frank McCarthy sent Marshall the following note: "I have just had a call from the White House saying the President would like to see you at 2:15. You are only one to be present and meeting is on the record. I could not determine the subject." Marshall left no record of the meeting's contents. (McCarthy Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, May 28, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, Memos to Chief of Staff].)

"The food situation in Europe" in the spring of 1945, President Truman noted in his memoirs, "gave me increasing cause for concern." On May 16, Eisenhower told the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the food situation in Germany was "critical," and it was "necessary for me to take timely action to meet emergency conditions." (Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 308–9; *Papers of DDE*, 6: 53–54.)

2. Allied policy since late 1944 had been: (1) the Germans had to feed themselves; (2) the consumption level in Germany was not to be above that of liberated countries. The Allies also established maximum daily calorie levels for Germans: 1,000 for children under three; 1,550 for normal consumers; 2,250 for heavy and night workers; and 2,800 for workers doing very heavy labor. (*Papers of DDE*, 6: 54.)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

FROM JOHN J. MCCLOY

Top Secret

May 29, 1945

[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Objectives toward Japan and methods of
concluding war with minimum casualties.

The Secretary of War referred to the earlier meeting with the Acting Secretary of State and Mr. Forrestal on the matter of the President's speech and the reference to Japan. He felt the decision to postpone action now was a sound one. This only postponed consideration of the matter for a time, however, for we should have to consider it again preparatory to the employment of S-1 [i.e., the atomic bomb].¹ The Secretary referred to the burning of Tokyo and the possible ways and means of employing the larger bombs.² The Secretary referred to the letter from Dr. Bush and Dr. Conant on the matter of disclosing the nature of the process to other nations as well as to Dr. Bush's memorandum on the same general subject. General Marshall took their letters and stated he would read them and give his views on their recommendations as soon as possible.³

General Marshall said he thought these weapons might first be used against straight military objectives such as a large naval installation and then if no complete result was derived from the effect of that, he thought we ought to designate a number of large manufacturing areas from which the people would be warned to leave—telling the Japanese that we

intended to destroy such centers. There would be no individual designations so that the Japs would not know exactly where we were to hit—a number should be named and the hit should follow shortly after. Every effort should be made to keep our record of warning clear. We must offset by such warning methods the opprobrium which might follow from an ill considered employment of such force.

The General then spoke of his stimulation of the new weapons and operations people to the development of new weapons and tactics to cope with the care and last ditch defense tactics of the suicidal Japanese. He sought to avoid the attrition we were suffering from such fanatical but hopeless defense methods—it requires new tactics. He also spoke of gas and the possibility of using it in a limited degree, say on the outlying islands where operations were now going on or were about to take place. He spoke of the type of gas that might be employed. It did not need to be our newest and most potent—just drench them and sicken them so that the fight would be taken out of them—saturate an area, possibly with mustard, and just stand off. He said he had asked the operations people to find out what we could do quickly—where the dumps were and how much time and effort would be required to bring the gas to bear.⁴ There would be the matter of public opinion which we had to consider, but that was something which might also be dealt with. The character of the weapon was no less humane than phosphorous and flame throwers and need not be used against dense populations or civilians—merely against these last pockets of resistance which had to be wiped out but had no other military significance.

The General stated that he was having these studies made and in due course would have some recommendations to make.

The Secretary stated that he was meeting with scientists and industrialists this week on S-1 and that he would talk with the Chief of Staff again after these meetings⁵ and the General repeated that he would shortly give the Secretary his views on the suggestions contained in the letter above referred to.

J. J. McC.

NA/RG 107 (SW Safe, S-1)

1. At mid-morning on May 29, at President Truman's suggestion, Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew requested a meeting in Secretary of War Stimson's office "to decide upon an announcement to the Japanese which would serve as a warning for them to surrender or else have something worse happen to them." The atomic bomb—the "something worse"—could not be mentioned, however, because some of the assistants present did not know about the project. Grew read the statement the State Department had written and asked for comments. Stimson favored modifying the unconditional surrender formula hoping thereby to induce the Japanese "to practically make an unconditional surrender without the use of those words." Nevertheless, Stimson thought it was the wrong time to issue such a warning. "I was backed up by Marshall and then by everybody else." (For more on the unconditional surrender warning, see McFarland Memorandum for Admiral Leahy,

Admiral King, General Arnold, June 4, 1945, pp. 211–12.) Following the meeting, Marshall and John J. McCloy stayed behind to discuss “the situation of Japan and what we should do in regard to S-1 and the application of it.” (May 29, 1945, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 51: 143–44].)

2. In early 1945, Major General Curtis E. LeMay, commander of Twentieth Bomber Command, converted his B-29s from high-altitude missions over Japan to low-level (i.e., under ten thousand feet) night fire-bomb attacks on Honshu Island urban areas aimed at burning as much of the cities as possible. Tokyo had been the first target: a 334-bomber raid on the night of March 9–10 that burned 15.8 square miles of the capital. (Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *The Pacific: MATTERHORN to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945*, a volume in *The Army Air Forces in World War II* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953], pp. 614–16.)

3. Vannevar Bush was the director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development in Washington, D.C. James B. Conant was chairman of the National Defense Research Committee. Marshall may have been referring to a September 1944 memorandum and a subsequent summarizing letter to the secretary of war concerning release of information about the atomic bomb and its development. “We cannot emphasize too strongly,” Conant and Bush wrote, “the fact that it will be quite impossible to hold the essential knowledge of these developments secret once the war is over.” They hoped to avoid an atomic arms race “by complete international scientific and technical interchange on this subject, backed up by an international commission acting under an association of nations and having the authority to inspect.” (Bush and Conant to the Secretary of War, September 19 and 30, 1944, in *Correspondence [“Top Secret”] of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942–1946* [Washington: National Archives, 1980], microfilm M1109, reel 3, Subseries I file 26L.) The French government’s beginning work on an atomic energy project in May 1945 and the approaching bomb test doubtless stimulated a renewal of interest in this issue. See Leslie R. Groves, *Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), pp. 228–29.

4. For an examination of the background and potential use of gas and other chemical weapons during the proposed invasion, see Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar, *Code-Name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan—and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), pp. 174–79.

5. Stimson spent most of May 30 working on atomic bomb issues, and the following morning he met with Marshall prior to that day’s meeting of the Interim Committee, which the Secretary had appointed in early May 1945 to advise and report to him on atomic energy issues. The eight-member committee held its fourth meeting on May 31; also invited were Marshall, Leslie Groves, and a four-man panel of scientists. The scientific panel talked about the way the bomb might be employed and its likely effects. Stimson concluded that the bomb should be used without advance warning and in a way to maximize the weapon’s psychological impact on the Japanese. By this meeting, Marshall had come to agree, despite the opinion he expressed to McCloy cited in the document printed here. (May 31, 1945, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 51: 146]; Vincent C. Jones, *MANHATTAN: The Army and the Atomic Bomb*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1985], pp. 531–32.)

DRAFT LETTER TO CLARENCE CANNON¹
Restricted

May 29, 1945
 [Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mr. Cannon: The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the Office of Strategic Services will continue to be useful in the conduct of the war.²

Replies from various theater commanders have been forwarded to your committee. In the areas where OSS has been utilized, there is agreement as to the value of its contribution to the war effort. It appears desirable that the OSS be permitted to continue its operations in accordance with the desires of the responsible commanders.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are not in a position to offer any detailed statement as to the appropriations required to support the organization during the coming year. It appears, however, that with termination of hostilities in Europe, the requirements for the next fiscal year should be appreciably less than those for the past year.³

NA/RG 165 (OCS, 334.8, OSS)

1. This letter to the House Appropriations Committee chairman was drafted in the Operations Division but considerably edited by Marshall. The as-sent version is not in the Marshall Papers.

2. Earlier in the month, the J.C.S. had solicited opinions on the usefulness of the O.S.S. from various theater commanders. Responses are in NA/RG 218 (Records of the Chairman, William D. Leahy, Folder 54).

3. Among the funding cuts for wartime agencies President Truman recommended to Congress on May 21 was \$14,000,000 from the O.S.S. budget for fiscal 1946. By Executive Order 9621 (September 20, 1945), the president terminated the O.S.S. as of October 1, moving most of its duties to the State Department.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER May 29, 1945
Radio. *Confidential* Washington, D.C.

Personal for Eisenhower from Marshall. The publicity to date emanating from your theater gives very little regarding the elaborate plans and preparations repeat preparations for the educational program. Instead the emphasis has gone to recreational, athletics and theatricals. I think it is very important that you yourself release to the press in your capacity as U.S. theater commander a rather detailed statement of all that has been done in the way of preparation and is now in process of fulfillment in the way of educational advantages for the men of your armies.¹

Will you please bring this to General Osborn's attention.² He should be able to work this up so that the people of the country will form some conception of what a tremendous and important undertaking has been under way for the past year and is now being carried into full effect. To indulge in a little levity, the publicity on this subject has been almost as bad as that of the Army Band. It couldn't quite equal that fiasco.³

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Just four days previously, Marshall had told the members of the House Appropriations Committee's War Department Subcommittee how pleased he was with the "careful and elaborate preparations to facilitate the continued education of the young soldiers" in

Europe. See Marshall Testimony Before the House War Department Subcommittee, May 25, 1945, p. 203.

2. Director of the Morale Services Division, Major General Frederick H. Osborn had worked since January 1941 on the War Department's educational and informational programs.

3. Concerning Marshall's efforts in early 1944 to generate publicity for the Army Band, see *Papers of GCM*, 4: 340–41, 348. Marshall had recently ordered the band to return to the United States for use in connection with Eisenhower's scheduled "homecoming" in mid-June 1945. (Pasco Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, June 8, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, SGS, Memorandums and Briefs to Chief of Staff].) On June 15, Marshall directed the Bureau of Public Relations to make "a determined effort . . . to play up the return from abroad of the Army Band." (Marshall Memorandum for the Bureau of Public Relations, June 15, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALTER BEDELL SMITH
[Radio No. WAR-11448.] *Top Secret*

June 4, 1945
Washington, D.C.

For General Smith's eyes only from General Marshall. With reference to the British urgent desire to destroy everything pertaining to V weapons in the Nordhausen Caverns,¹ we feel that due to the punishment already suffered by England and the dangerous proximity of the British Isles to any future use of such weapons, it will be very difficult for us to refuse agreement to the British request. On the other hand it appears to us that such destruction will certainly become known to the Russians and will definitely stir up not only hard feeling but increased suspicion regarding our good faith for the future. If we were to accede to the British proposal the onus for the destruction would be ours as Nordhausen is well within the present American zone.

Under the circumstances our position would be very much better if Nordhausen were within the British zone. From my map of present and future boundaries and showing the location of our divisions, it would appear that Nordhausen is about 60 miles south of the present British-American boundary and that to the north of Nordhausen there are four American divisions. Would it be impracticable of arrangement to change the temporary boundaries and regroup troops so that Nordhausen would lie within the British area. I am inclined to think such a procedure is impracticable but as it offers apparently the best solution for us I send this query.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. These were in the Harz Mountains about seventy miles west of Leipzig and ten miles east of the border designated at the Yalta Conference between the U.S.-U.K.-U.S.S.R. zones of occupation in Germany. Troops of the U.S. First and Ninth armies were in portions of the British and Soviet zones and had not yet pulled back.

2. Eisenhower replied on June 7 that U.S. troops were scheduled to move out of all territory north of the British-Soviet zone border on June 8, and soon thereafter they would move out of the Soviet zone. This would leave the British only ten miles west of Nordhausen, so temporary British control of the caves was "believed to be practicable." Meanwhile, British and U.S. intelligence agencies did not wish to leave Nordhausen for another week, although the critical intelligence data and equipment had already been removed. Furthermore, destroying Nordhausen in order to keep the information from the Soviets was "futile since similar information is believed to have been uncovered through the capture of the research center at Peenemunde and of practice firing sites in eastern Europe." (*Papers of DDE*, 6: 143-44.)

"We should continue intelligence work," Marshall responded, "but expedite all that needs to be done within area and arrange that any further tests and examination of equipment be carried out outside the area possibly in this country." He reiterated that if the British were determined to go ahead with the destruction, the area should be turned over to them. (Marshall to Eisenhower, Radio No. WAR-13701, June 8, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-13701)].) The British command (Twenty-first Army Group) was not interested in destroying the installations. (*Papers of DDE*, 6: 145.)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY
Confidential

June 4, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

SUBJECT: Section 8, Basic Plan for Post-War Army¹

In general I am in agreement with the G-3 recommendation and yours, otherwise I have these comments to make:

It seems to me there is far too much of detail in this sort of a paper at this particular time. One has to search through a series of little paragraphs to make sure that this, that or the other great fundamental is covered. For example:

I think it very important to clearly state certain fundamental policies in very general terms as an introduction. I attach great importance to a broad understanding by everybody of the vital necessity in our Army to continuously strive for the development of more expeditious methods of instruction. By this, I mean the development of methods which facilitate the preparation of an Army for war in an emergency and also which permit the adequate instruction of the citizen soldier without too great a loss of time from his civil pursuits. Along with this would go the importance of developing expertness on the part of Regular personnel in methods of instruction. Benning [i.e., the Infantry School], I feel, made a great contribution in this war through the education of officers in the art of instructing. I found great deficiencies in other services which had to be corrected over a long period of time. There is, I think, a natural tendency at the present time to assume everybody has an understanding and a general capacity as of the present date, forgetting the deficiencies of four and

five years ago. There has always been a lack of understanding on the part of the War Department of the great importance of facilitating the instruction of the citizen components, individual soldiers and units. As our Army is bound to be one of citizen soldiers, this phase of our training is of first and fundamental importance and should be so stated.

I would like the entire Section 8 gone over again with a view to generalizing more and particularizing less. There will be plenty of time in the future to get down to details.

There is another portion of the report that is open to question in my mind. I refer to Paragraph 1D of Part 2, with regard to the operation of schools in which more than one component of the Army is involved. What I do not like about the paragraph as now phrased is charging the War Department with the operation of the school. The War Department should determine the policy, the course and the allocation of students, though the proposal of the individuals should come forward from the Ground Forces, Air Forces and Service Forces. But I do not think it a wise business to involve the War Department in operations as has been the custom in the past. The War Department is seldom a successful operator.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. In mid-March, Marshall had approved Sections 1 through 4 and 7 (5 was nearly complete) of the War Department Basic Plan for the Post-War Military Establishment. Section 8 was titled "Training Organization Plan"; Part 1 concerned training of a balanced army and Part 2 army schools. Records pertaining to the Basic Plan are in NA/RG 165 (OCS, 370.01).

2. An August 17, 1945, summary memorandum signed by Major General Ray E. Porter, director of the Special Planning Division, which had been drafting the Basic Plan, noted that Section 8 had "been rewritten in accordance with the Chief of Staff's directive to General Handy dated 4 Jun 45." (See NA/RG 165 [OCS, 370.01, Sec. V, Case 46].)

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY,
ADMIRAL KING, GENERAL ARNOLD
FROM BRIGADIER GENERAL ANDREW J. MCFARLAND¹
Top Secret

June 4, 1945
Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT: Immediate Demand for the Unconditional Surrender
of Japan.²

J.C.S. 1340/1 having been submitted informally, General Marshall approved subparagraphs a and b as presented in SM-1737 subject to the amendment of the new paragraph 3 on pages 7 and 8 as indicated in the enclosure.

Your action is requested.

A. M.

ENCLOSURE

AMENDMENT TO PARAGRAPH 3 ON PAGES 7 AND 8 OF J.C.S. 1340/1
PROPOSED BY GENERAL MARSHALL

3. If Japan should make a public peace proposal while we are redeploying men from the European Theater to the Pacific Oceans ~~Areas~~, it might have considerable effect on the American people. War weariness in the United States ~~may demand the return home of those who have already fought long and well in the European war regardless of the effect of such return on the prosecution of the Japanese war. It may be politically and psychologically difficult to refuse a Japanese offer which prevents an actual invasion of the home islands with the incident saving of American casualties.~~ might then lead to some public demand for acceptance of a Japanese offer designed to prevent both invasion of the home islands and our prosecution of the war to a point which would destroy Japanese capacity to start a new war. A demand for unconditional surrender now would tend (a) to keep before the American public the national importance of rendering Japan impotent to commit further aggression and (b) to reduce the psychological injury to our effort to win the war which might be the result of any tempting Japanese offer for a peace falling short of destruction of Japan's war potential. These advantages would be in addition to the obvious advantages of the proposal in serving as a useful vehicle of our propaganda and in providing a possible foundation for a surrender which would not lead to an inconclusive peace.³

NOTE: Deletions are lined out.

Additions are underlined.

NA/RG 165 (OCS, 387 Japan [5-9-45])

1. McFarland was U.S. Army representative on the Joint Chiefs of Staff's joint secretariat and U.S. representative on the Combined Chiefs of Staff's combined secretariat.

2. For previous consideration of an "unconditional surrender" demand on Japan, see note 1, McCloy Memorandum of Conversation, May 29, 1945, pp. 206-7.

3. King and Arnold approved Marshall's suggested modification. Leahy returned his copy of the document printed here with the handwritten note: "I prefer action after the capture of Okinawa."

TO COLONEL FRANK CAPRA

June 5, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Capra, There has just this moment come to my attention your application for release from active duty since you have about completed the special task which we assigned to you. When the matter comes to me in more formal fashion, I will express myself more formally, but in the

meantime I wish you to know how much I value and how much I appreciate the work that you have done for the Army.

Your “Why We Fight” series had a tremendous influence on morale and understanding and I think “Prelude to War” and “The Nazis Strike” will stand as motion picture classics of that character. “Know Your Ally—Britain” has played a very definite part in facilitating cooperation between the British and American armies and is a remarkably well done film in my opinion. “Two Down and One to Go”¹ has had a splendid reception by the Army and apparently by the American public, judging from the reports I have received. I am particularly appreciative of the rapidity with which you turned out “On to Tokyo” and the excellence of the production. It should be very helpful.

Altogether you have done a grand job and I want you to know that I am very grateful.² Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. General Marshall narrated the motion picture *Two Down and One to Go*, which had been produced by mid-September 1944. Addressing the demobilization process and transfer of troops to the Pacific, the film was distributed to each theater command in sealed containers with instructions that they not be opened and viewed until the cessation of hostilities in Europe was officially announced. (Colonel Edward L. Munson, Jr., Informal Memorandum for Colonel Frank McCarthy, September 15, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) For Marshall’s special interest in the film, see *Papers of GCM*, 4: 425, 614–15, 675.

2. Capra had received the Legion of Merit on April 21, 1943, for his wartime film work to that point. Frank McCarthy initiated work on the award of a Distinguished Service Medal that would cover Capra’s entire war service. Marshall approved the award and it was presented on June 14. (McCarthy Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, June 5, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

MEMORANDUM FOR FIELD MARSHAL

SIR HENRY WILSON

Top Secret

June 5, 1945

[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Sir Henry: Since our conversation the other morning [June 1] I have had the Operations Division digest the essential points, from our point of view, in the present difficulties between Mountbatten and Wedemeyer.¹

As I remarked to you the other day, there must be an extraordinary importance to the clandestine operations being carried out by Mountbatten in Indo-China to justify the possible creation not only of ill will but of a feeling that there is a lack of good faith, which if exploited in the press, as there is always a danger, would react to our serious disadvantage all over the world.

In view of the previous exchange of messages between the Prime Minister and the President² and our discussions of this matter, there does not seem to be anything to be gained by having the Combined Chiefs at this distance from the scene attempt to resolve the difficulties.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. In late April, after China Theater commander Albert Wedemeyer had begun to question Admiral Mountbatten's authority to gather intelligence and conduct activities in French Indochina, Field Marshal Wilson had presented Marshall an *aide memoire* concerning the oral "gentleman's agreement" Mountbatten had made with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at the first Cairo Conference in November 1943 that gave the Southeast Asia Command leader the authority. Chiang confirmed this agreement at a November 30, 1943, meeting with Mountbatten at Ramgarh, India, according to Mountbatten. The Generalissimo also promised to keep Mountbatten informed of Chinese activities in Indochina and Thailand; Mountbatten assured him that the British would "do the same as you do." Thereafter, the Southeast Asian Command had received no information concerning Chinese activities. Consequently, according to Field Marshal Wilson, Mountbatten had "refrained, in view also of the known lack of security in China, from telling the Generalissimo anything about his activities." Marshall's view at the time was to stop arguing about the verbal agreement and see if the two commanders could achieve a *modus vivendi* based on new C.C.S. directives. (Wilson Aide Memoire for General Marshall, undated, and Marshall Memorandum for Field Marshal Wilson, April 27, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 336 TS, File 1].)

The Operations Division's lengthy "Extract of Messages from Wedemeyer"—which Marshall appended to his memorandum for Wilson—examined the China Theater commander's views on Great Britain's role in Indochina. Wedemeyer thought that the gentlemen's agreement had long been inoperable, but Mountbatten had informed him in mid-May that, using it as his authority, he intended to launch a number of French-led sorties into Indochina. Consequently, Wedemeyer desired a "high level decision . . . to preclude continued friction and misunderstandings." He was unhappy that Mountbatten was "using badly needed resources that might otherwise have been used for orthodox operations or for coordinated clandestine operations within China Theater." Moreover, British military organizations in the China Theater "are confusing in their composition and operations." (Extract, undated, *ibid.*)

2. On March 22, 1945, President Roosevelt had told Prime Minister Churchill that—since Indochina was part of the China Theater—the two of them should "agree that all Anglo-American-Chinese military operations in Indo-China, regardless of their nature, be coordinated by General Wedemeyer as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo, who is Supreme Commander of the China Theater." Churchill replied on April 11 that Wedemeyer and Mountbatten had "come to a very satisfactory agreement and have settled all difficulties outstanding between them." He had written to Mountbatten to direct that should further disagreements arise, they should be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In any event, Churchill thought it essential that the United States and United Kingdom support French forces in Indochina. (*Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, ed. Warren F. Kimball, 3 vols. [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984], 3: 582–83, 626–27.)

TO MRS. JOHN J. SINGER

June 5, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Marie, I was sorry to learn the other day that you had been having

a rather hard time physically. I hope that now you are completely recovered and about on your way up to Pike Run,¹ though it has been so very chilly that I imagine you would wait until the warm summer weather really develops.

Katherine is down at Leesburg where I spent the last weekend. Molly comes up this afternoon with Jimmy to go to the circus with me, a box having been placed at my disposal.² They go back to Leesburg tomorrow morning.

I have been due to leave for the Pacific for the last two weeks but have not yet gotten off and I am still uncertain as to just when I might go. Strange to say, I have been busier and having a harder time since the shut-down in Europe than at any period for a long time. The affairs of the Army and global war matters in general can be very difficult, not to mention a hundred side details which come to the front almost daily. However, I should be very grateful for the outcome to date.

Molly received a letter from Mrs. Smith who had apparently recovered entirely from her bout with pneumonia. She was very nice to Katherine and Molly and the children while they were at Pinehurst, and did a great deal for their pleasure.³

Give my love to Mary Bovard.⁴ Affectionately,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Concerning his sister's summer quarters at Pike Run Country Club, see note 2, Marshall to Singer, May 14, 1945, p. 187.

2. For a photograph of Marshall, H. Merrill Pasco, and Pasco's son at the circus, see #23 following p. 224.

3. The editors have been unable to identify the Mrs. Smith to whom Marshall refers.

4. Bovard was a family friend from Greensburg, Pennsylvania.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MACARTHUR
Top Secret

June 6, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear MacArthur: This will be handed to you by Arnold who leaves here today. He can discuss the details and various ramifications of the matter with you in person.

In connection with the command arrangements in the Pacific, Admiral King is very much interested in a special command set-up from the communication point of view, particularly during the preliminary period of OLYMPIC.¹ He hopes that you will agree to have established on Guam three or four months before D-day at least a skeleton set-up so far as personnel is concerned but complete so far as communications are concerned. Then he is strongly in favor of your being personally established on Guam during the lead-up phase of the operations, if I can term it that,

meaning the period of the gradual concentration of the naval and convoy forces.

He feels that in that manner during the period when the movements are almost purely naval, and Nimitz therefore must be at the center of his communication system, it would tend to smooth coordination if Nimitz were in immediate personal touch with you.

I assume that as the convoys approach Kyushu preparatory to the landings, you would feel it necessary to be present which would terminate your personal contact with Nimitz, as I also assume he would probably have to remain at Guam for the better coordination of the various naval forces.

Arnold has listened to most of the discussions and can supply the details that may be lacking in the foregoing outline.² Faithfully yours,
GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. After a lengthy struggle, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had issued a directive on April 3 reorganizing the U.S. command in the Pacific. MacArthur was designated Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific—thus controlling all U.S. Army and Air Forces resources except those in Alaska, the southeast Pacific, and the Twentieth Air Force. Nimitz was named Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, controlling nearly all the navy's resources in the Pacific. The gradual transition to this new system was to be "by mutual agreement" between the commanders and to begin after the current operations in the Philippines and Ryukyu Islands. Nimitz's headquarters was directed to work on the naval and amphibious phases of the assault on Japan; MacArthur's on the ground attack. Dividing up the logistical responsibilities—particularly control over shipping—proved to be more intractable, so the J.C.S. "shuttled" the issue "out of Washington to the theaters." From April on, consequently, sharp disagreements were common between the two headquarters over the transfer of resources between them. (Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943–1945*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1968], pp. 581–84, 609–10. See also D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur*, 3 vols. [Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970–85], 2: 724–26.)

2. Arnold visited Manila between June 16 and 19. On the seventeenth, he had a lengthy meeting with MacArthur. Arnold noted in his diary MacArthur's response to the Marshall memorandum he delivered: "As far as moving his Headquarters to Guam for coordination and cooperation are concerned, the lid blew off—there was every reason why it should not be done, not one good reason for doing it." (Quoted in James, *MacArthur*, 2: 729–30. See also Arnold, *Global Mission*, p. 569.)

MacArthur replied to Marshall's memorandum that Admiral King's suggestion "is impracticable of accomplishment," as Guam was fifteen hundred miles from the location of the proposed landings. In the preparatory phase of the landings, he would be with his air commander on Okinawa; in the assault phase, "I shall be afloat. It is no more possible for me to separate myself from my command than it would be for Admiral Nimitz to do so." (MacArthur Memorandum for Marshall, June 19, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER June 8, 1945
[Radio No. WAR-13700]. *Top Secret* [Washington, D.C.]

TOPSEC from Marshall to Eisenhower. The instructions to you to cease

issues of military equipment and munitions to French troops immediately remain in effect.¹ (Reference Smith's message FDW 23981 of 8 June.) Regarding gasoline restricted issues sufficient for the normal life of troops and for such movements as you direct may be authorized until further instructions are received. Also are included French liberated manpower units supplied from U.S. resources.

In anticipation of acceptable answer from de Gaulle to the President, you should be prepared to resume the issuance of supplies to the French but only upon specific instructions from here.²

NA/RG 165 (OPD, 336, Item 117)

1. Rumors of French plans to annex certain areas of Italy along the frontier defined in 1860 had begun reaching Allied Force Headquarters in Italy and the Italian government during the winter of 1944–45. In early May 1945, the United States requested that the French government return its troops to their side of the prewar frontier, because U.S. troops were available to carry out the occupation agreements concerning Italy. The French rejected this and the potential for an armed clash escalated, as U.S. and French troops were intermingled at many places in the disputed area.

Secretary of War Stimson found, for "almost the first time in my experience with him," that Marshall "seemed to be rather inclined towards the belligerent side" on the issue. Moreover, "Marshall was very much troubled over the possibility of a clash with France interfering with the redeployment of our armies in the Pacific. Our nearest communications run right across France and it would be extremely difficult to change them and go up through the North Sea, and our plans involve the utmost speed and cooperation with the French in the use of the French railroads." (June 5 and 6, 1945, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 51: 156, 157].)

Stimson had Marshall and John J. McCloy draft a letter from President Truman to French President Charles de Gaulle. Sent on June 6, it protested what appeared to be threats by the local French commander to take military action against U.S. troops, who were supporting Italian local government in the area. Consequently, the United States would cease supplying military equipment and munitions (but not rations) to French forces everywhere "while this threat by the French Government is outstanding against American soldiers." (*Foreign Relations*, 1945, 4: 735; June 6, 1945, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 51: 161]. See also C. R. S. Harris, *Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943–1945*, a volume in *The History of the Second World War* [London: HMSO, 1957], pp. 317–28, and the map of the disputed area on p. 322.)

2. On June 8, General de Gaulle sent Alphonse Juin, chief of staff of the French Ministry of National Defense, to Italy to talk with the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, Field Marshal Alexander. Juin assured United States and United Kingdom representatives that the French would withdraw—just not publicly and immediately. On June 11 an agreement settling the occupation dispute was signed, and over the next month French forces left the disputed regions. (*Foreign Relations*, 1945, 4: 736–40.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR
Top Secret

June 9, 1945
Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT: Basic Objective in the Pacific War [J.C.S. 1366]

With reference to your suggestion that we change the Combined Chiefs statement of our objective in the war against Japan from “unconditional surrender” to “complete defeat and permanent destruction of the war making power of Japan,” this seems acceptable from the strictly military viewpoint with one possible exception. That is the necessity for having in the statement a formal provision that the objective must be pressed to limit the duration of the Pacific war as much as possible. The expression “at the earliest possible date” should therefore be included.¹

Viewing any proposed change from the political and psychological standpoint and remembering that we have held to the “unconditional surrender” wording for so long, it appears probable that a deviation at this time would occasion an undesirable amount of questioning and doubt as to the nature of our changed intentions. Our military difficulties arising from the problems of holding not only our own people but particularly our Allies, the British, to the task of achieving our objective in the Japanese war at the earliest possible date might thereby be increased.

Instead of trying to change the wording of this top secret paper which eventually, as a Combined Chiefs paper, must involve British agreement, but which will *never come to the eyes of the Japanese*, it would seem better that we take action to discourage public use of the term “unconditional surrender,” which we all agree is difficult to define, and encourage instead more definitive public statements concerning our policy and war aims. We should cease talking about unconditional surrender of Japan and begin to define our true objective in terms of defeat and disarmament. We should, however, diligently avoid giving any impression that we are growing soft. It is believed that this course would answer the objections raised by Mr. McCloy.

The nature of the objective, whether phrased as “complete defeat” or “unconditional surrender”, is going to be determined by the detailed instructions, and the suppression of the statement “unconditional surrender” will have little practical effect on the final result.

NA/RG 107 (SW Safe, Japan [After Dec. 7, 1941])

1. Assistant Secretary of War McCloy had read J.C.S. 1366 and on May 28 he wrote to Stimson about the attitude the United States intended to take toward Japan after the war. “Unconditional surrender is a phrase which means loss of face [to the Japanese] and I wonder whether we cannot accomplish everything we want to accomplish in regard to Japan without the use of that term.” Secretary Stimson told Marshall on May 30: “I have been thinking about this matter for some time and my views accord with those of McCloy.” (McCloy Memorandum for Colonel Stimson, May 28, 1945, and Stimson Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, May 30, 1945, NA/RG 107 [SW Safe, Japan (After Dec. 7, 1941)].)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BUREAU
OF PUBLIC RELATIONS

June 10, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Changes in Careers of Secretariat of
the General Staff.

As one of the press releases leading up to General Eisenhower's arrival I would like a resume of the changes in the Secretariat of the General Staff since I became Chief of Staff and the distinguished careers the various individuals have made. It might be well to lead off with some such paragraph as the following:

"General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General W. Bedell Smith, who has been his intimate right hand, as it were, throughout the operations in the Mediterranean and Europe, as a former Assistant Secretary and Secretary of the General Staff suggests an interesting comment on the conspicuous careers of the men who have also held these same positions for General Marshall during the course of the war.

"The positions of Secretary and Assistant Secretaries of the General Staff have always been held as very important, as they process and usually interpret to the Chief all the studies and recommendations of the General Staff. When General Marshall took office, Lt. Colonel Orlando Ward was Secretary of the General Staff. He was wounded in Africa as Commander of the 1st Armored Division and commanded the 20th Armored Division in the final phase of the fighting leading up to the capture of Munich and the Bavarian Alps. He had as Assistant Secretary Major J. Lawton Collins, the Lieutenant General and Corps Commander who landed on the Utah Beach, captured Cherbourg, won the Battle of Mons, took Aachen and drove through Cologne and the Remagen Bridgehead up to the Elbe. He also commanded a division on Guadalcanal and in the New Georgia operation.

"Another Assistant Secretary was Major Edward H. Brooks, Jr. [Sr.] etc., etc."¹

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The senior Brooks (Norwich, 1916), a major general since August 1942, had been chief of the Statistics Branch of the General Staff between September 1939 and September 1941 (with the rank of major until promoted to lieutenant colonel in August 1940). He later commanded the Eleventh Armored Division, the Second Armored Division, and Sixth Corps. His son (U.S.M.A., January 1943), a B-17 pilot, had been promoted to major effective May 25, 1945, but had never served on the General Staff.

SPEECH TO THE MARYLAND HISTORICAL SOCIETY¹

June 11, 1945
Baltimore, Maryland

I approach this evening without written notes, or any special preparation, because as a matter of fact when Senator Radcliffe called me on the telephone and arranged in a matter of two minutes for me to talk to a group of the Maryland Historical Society I thought I was accepting an invitation to talk over the dinner table to a small group of members of the Association. It was not until four days ago that I learned from Mrs. Marshall that I was involved in talking to a rather large assembly. It was then too late for me to alter my plans or rather lack of plans.

I was quite pleased by Senator Radcliffe's invitation to address the Society because of my intense interest in history; my interest was a natural one in the first place. Early in life I acquired a fondness for the subject but when I came to realize the tremendous importance of a knowledge of world history to the citizens of a democracy my interest became greater. My greatest concern for some time now has been war, the most terrible pestilence of mankind. We all recognize war as a horrible disease of civilization; Americans especially, of the peoples of the world, hate war and inveigh against it, particularly after a war has been ended, but we do very little to avoid it. There must be specific causes for wars, and there must be a way to eliminate them. The question is, what can be done that has not been done?

Most persons, particularly those of my generation, react to what has occurred in the past largely in accordance with the beliefs and impressions they derived from grade and high school histories. I am not referring to those who were fortunate enough to pursue advanced courses in history at college or university. I have in mind the great numbers of people with a casual secondary school knowledge of history who have unfortunately acquired much misinformation because they were taught according to the prevailing local prejudice. I recall clearly my high school beliefs concerning the Boston Massacre and my great surprise when later in life I learned the facts.

Another factor contributing to general misunderstanding is the manner in which history is taught. I came out of school with some dates in my mind—1066, for example—but without any, or certainly very little, idea of cause and effect. I had no conception of the underlying causes of the endless repetitions of wars, that have plagued mankind for centuries and set us back the Lord knows how many years in our progress towards a peaceful civilization.²

It has seemed to me, especially during the latter part of my 43 years of Army service, that something very definite was required beyond the casual approach to the problem we have taken heretofore. As I said

before, we recognize war as a terrible pestilence, we deplore it, and inveigh against it, but we do little to determine its exact causes and to establish what might have been done to avoid war. I think that one of our most serious mistakes is that while we are in the throes of war, and immediately after the close of a war, we consider the subject of avoiding future wars in a too highly emotional and intense state of mind. Later when that great factor of all political campaigns, the annual budget, is under consideration, whatever good resolutions we have had regarding measures to avert war, whatever lessons we thought we learned in the most recent war, all are abandoned almost completely. I am speaking now from very specific knowledge.

I sailed for France—please pardon these personal references—in the last war, on the first ship on the first convoy. Eighty percent of the men were recruits. Many had received their weapons on the trains en route to the port of embarkation. We didn't know what equipment our unit had, since it was spread over a number of ships and had embarked hastily. I first learned the organization of this unit, the First Division, which made a famous reputation later on in that war and again in this one, from a photostat of an organizational chart which I received after we had sailed. And I was a member of the general staff of that Division. Another member of the general staff was General [Lesley J.] McNair, who was killed in this war. We examined the photostat of our organization during the voyage, but could not know whether the units on other vessels were organized or equipped as indicated on the chart. It was not until we landed in St. Nazaire, and I proceeded to check up, as the vessels docked, that I found that some of the troops had never heard of the weapons with which they were supposed to be equipped. That is the way we went to the war in France in June of 1917. The Lord was good to us and so were our Allies who held the line, as in this present war, until we had an opportunity to get ourselves organized and trained.

We were very fortunate in this present war in the action of Congress—reflecting the will of the people—which gave us Selective Service more than a year in advance of Pearl Harbor. But do not forget when you study the history of this war, the tribulations and trials the Army suffered in carrying out its preparations, the numerous attacks that were made on almost everything we attempted. Don't forget the misunderstandings of those days and what they cost us later in delays of preparation. We could not get our plans under way as rapidly as the dire emergency required, even though we knew it was all but upon us.

I returned from the last war with General Pershing and spent a month with him in the Adirondacks during September and early October of 1919, studying the hearings which had been in progress before the Military Committees of Congress since the previous spring. Virtually every

phase of national defense, of the peacetime character of the Army, had been treated in those hearings, which were to close with General Pershing's testimony in October. I sat with him during those hearings, during the presentation of his advice regarding the post-war Army. The Committees then worked on the draft of a Bill which was debated during the spring and came to a vote in June 1920. A very respectable measure for national defense was enacted. It was a formal military policy, except that the backbone, or teeth of the program was omitted, the training phase. There was a period from the Armistice in 1918 to the summer of 1920, when everybody seemingly was aware of the tragic lessons of the war. Though Congress did not take the full measures for security thought advisable by the Army, it did enact a very wise piece of legislation which, had it been supported by the required appropriations through the years immediately following, might possibly have prevented this present war.

The thought I should like to leave in your minds is this: within either nine or fourteen months—I might have the two periods reversed—Congress took action, through the annual budget, to cut the Army it had just authorized from 18,000 officers and 285,000 men, down to about 175,000 men and 14,000 officers; either nine or fourteen months later another cut in the military budget which pared the Army down to 150,000 men followed; the next blow reduced the Army still further to 125,000 men about a year later, and cut the officer strength to 11,000. None of the provisions of the law of June, 1920, had been changed but the result was that the field Army of the United States had nearly vanished. The only places where we still had sizeable garrisons for training were in Hawaii and the Philippines and a smaller force in the Panama Canal Zone. Please remember that these governmental reactions occurred almost immediately after the wise efforts which had resulted in the Act of June, 1920. I mean to suggest by this discussion that we have to face the high probability of the same thing happening again however much we may feel today that we have learned our lesson. I have very little faith in the accuracy of that statement I now hear so frequently that "We have learned our lesson."

It is important for us to realize, how close a squeeze this country had at several times during this war. My own embarrassment in talking in this manner is that I am naturally regarded as a prejudiced witness concerned with only one side of the picture. Although in my position I may not be able to qualify as a strictly unbiased witness, I can qualify as an expert witness regarding the military situations of this war. I know how close were the calls. I am keenly conscious of the agonizing periods through which we passed when we couldn't explain, and yet explanations were demanded; of how we suffered reverse after reverse, knowing the fault was basic and involved the fundamental failure of the people of the United States to prepare themselves against danger. I repeat—the people

of the United States and their point of view from 1920 to 1940. I felt time and again in the years of peace that our position, supported by public opinion, was untenable and I knew well what it was to mean. In a war, every week of duration adds tremendously, not only to the costs, measured by appropriations, but in casualties measured in lives and mutilation.

The struggles for existence that we had in Africa and in New Guinea, were the direct responsibility of the policies of the people of the United States in the years from 1920 to 1939.

Our history records victories. We have triumphed in each of our wars, except for those of our states who were on the Southern side in the Civil War. As a result I feel that many of our people have been misled into a feeling of false security by the teaching or talk of those in certain positions of authority or responsibility. Finally the resulting reaction misled the Japanese and tempted them into a war against us. The Japs were led to think that our young men would not fight, that they were soft and unwilling to defend their country. It was a terrible thing to advertise a disgraceful weakness—if there was such a weakness, and tempt the highwayman to try for the kill. If there is any other way of defending one's country except by force of arms, God knows I should welcome it.

The full impact of the war comes more to me, I think, in some respects than it does to anyone in this country. The daily casualty lists are mine. They arrive in a constant stream, a swelling stream, and I can't get away from them. When you feel, as I do, that they might have been avoided, it is a terrible thing to contemplate. And when you know what can happen again if some definite, practical preventive action is not taken, that all this endless horror and colossal waste may be repeated, it is even more tragic.

If we had done the things that might have been done, if we had heeded the lessons of history, I think we could have been spared the greater part of our losses.

I may be in error in this historical example. The Romans had a peace of some 250 years. The entire life of this country since the adoption of the Constitution involves little more than 150 years. Yet the number and size of our wars make quite a contrast with the famous Roman Peace. It seems we clearly could have avoided some if not all of these wars, especially since we have had the best of advice from our greatest American, George Washington, who both as a citizen and a soldier, understood so well the people of this country and the hazards which they should guard against.

It would be a fine thing if a way were found to amplify or improve the teaching of history through the medium of the motion picture in our grammar and high schools. I believe a man with the talents of Frank Capra could present outlines of certain broad phases of history in such a manner that it would make a deep impression on the schoolboy. He did a

superb job along this same line for the army. The student would acquire an understanding that would stick in his mind. Some better means of teaching the salient lessons of history to the majority of the people is an inherent necessity for a democracy. We urgently need a more effective system of instruction and I am sure the motion picture medium can be of much assistance. There is an obligation, it seems to me, to explore these possibilities, that rests on a society such as yours.

I loathe war. No one in my position could feel otherwise. I have finished my military career, but I feel that I must do my best to have us avoid a tragic repetition of our past neglect, our past failures. Situated as we are between the Atlantic and the Pacific, with all the resources and wealth we have, and with the courage of America, it would be a tragedy to civilization if we should again be blindly stupid and expose the coming generations to a repetition of this grim business. It must not be. If Americans can be brought to understand history it will not be.

I was asked to say something about the course of the war. You are familiar with the immediate events leading up to the cessation of hostilities in Europe, but I doubt if many of you realize the rapidity of the action. As we lived through the struggle it seemed terribly long to all of us. Our combined Intelligence Headquarters sent me the other day a map showing in solid colors on the map of Europe the progress each week beginning shortly before the landing in Normandy. What seemed so torturously slow at the time was in fact remarkably rapid. The little pin-point representing the Normandy bridgehead suddenly blooms and spreads all over the map of France like a garden, and then comes the further expansion as the army crossed into Germany. There were the long Russian gains—showing the tremendous territory they covered. And there were the successive surges up through Italy, though we recall mostly the delays in the mountains. Out in the Pacific the successive advances covered tremendous distances in the vast reaches of that region.

It took me some time to understand Australia. Although I am familiar with maps and was trained in making maps, it was difficult for me to appreciate the coast line distances of Australia. We found ourselves in December 1942 [1941], faced with great difficulties of communication and transportation. We had but one American soldier in the whole of Australia, I think. Here was this country with its vast coastal perimeter, with railroads of various gauges that took you forever to go from one place to another, and with few roads and limited electric communications, judging by our standards. Our army and supplies were being dumped on that continent without previous preparation. I selected an officer in whom I had great confidence and told him to drop his work within the hour and prepare to leave for Australia. I instructed him to select about fifty men, experts in transportation, communication, port



(1) U.S. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall enters Montgomery House for the first day's conference of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Valletta, Malta, on January 30, 1945.



(2) The Combined Chiefs of Staff meet on January 31, 1945, at Montgomery House in Malta.

(3) British and American chiefs of staff hold a conference at Montgomery House in Malta on January 31, 1945. Left to right: Rear Admiral Lynde D. McCormick, Vice Admiral Charles M. Cooke, Admiral of the Fleet Ernest J. King, and General of the Army George C. Marshall.





(4) President Roosevelt confers with Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, and General of the Army George C. Marshall aboard the U.S.S. Quincy in Malta on February 2, 1945.

(5) President Roosevelt confers with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on February 2, 1945, aboard the U.S.S. Quincy in Malta. Left to right: Fleet Admiral King, Fleet Admiral Leahy, President Roosevelt, General of the Army Marshall, and Major General Laurence S. Kuter (representing General Arnold).





(6) General Marshall greets Edward Stettinius (without hat), as well as Averell Harriman (extreme left) and Harry Hopkins (back to camera), as they arrive for the Yalta Conference in February 1945.

(7) The Crimean Conference convenes at Livadia Palace on February 4, 1945. Marshal Joseph Stalin is pictured on the left, President Franklin Roosevelt on the right, and Prime Minister Winston Churchill is seated with his back to the camera. Seated with President Roosevelt are General Marshall and Admiral Leahy.





(8) President Roosevelt meets with his advisers in Livadia Palace in Yalta on February 4, 1945. Left to right: Secretary of State Stettinius, Major General Kuter, Fleet Admiral King, General of the Army Marshall, Ambassador Harriman, Fleet Admiral Leahy, and President Roosevelt.



(9) Fleet Admiral Leahy, Field Marshal Brooke, General Ismay, and General of the Army Marshall converse during the Yalta Conference in February 1945.



(10) General Marshall (with fur collar) is among the participants at the Yalta Conference assembled on the patio of Livadia Palace for a picture on February 10, 1945. Seated, left to right: Prime Minister Winston Churchill, President Franklin Roosevelt, and Marshal Joseph Stalin. Standing behind the three leaders: Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke (partially hidden), Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (partially hidden), Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir Charles Portal, Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, General of the Army George C. Marshall, and Major General Laurence S. Kuter.



(11) Generals George Marshall, Mark Clark, and Joseph McNarney salute during review at Fifteenth Army Group Headquarters in Italy on February 12, 1945.

(12) General Marshall speaks with a Red Cross worker at Fifteenth Army Group Headquarters in Florence, Italy, on February 12, 1945.





(13) Major General William G. Livesay (commander, Ninety-first Division) points out strategic positions on the map to U.S. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney (Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean theater), Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark (commander, Fifteenth Army Group), and Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott (commander, Fifth Army) on February 13, 1945.

(14) Marshall congratulates Private First Class Joe F. Tinsley (Thirty-fourth Infantry Division) after awarding him the Distinguished Service Cross on February 13, 1945. (For a similar World War I portrayal, see Papers of GCM, 1: 223.)





(15) Marshall talks with officers and men of Company M, Third Battalion, 338th Infantry Regiment during his visit to the Fifth Army front in Italy.

(16) General Marshall meets with commanders during his visit at the command post of the Ninety-second Division in Italy on February 14, 1945. Left to right: Major General Alfred Gruenther, Lieutenant General Mark Clark, Chief of Staff George Marshall, Lieutenant General Lucian Truscott, Major General Edward Almond, Lieutenant General Joseph McNarney, and Major General Willis Crittenger.





(17) Marshall, accompanied by T/5 Floyd James and Major General Edward Almond, tours the Ninety-second Division area on February 14, 1945.



(18) Sergeant James W. Powder, General Marshall's orderly, stands at the door of a mobile unit provided for the chief of staff on the night of February 12–13, 1945, at Fifth Army Command Post.

(19) General Marshall and Major General Edward Almond pass by an honor guard of the Ninety-second Division in Italy on February 14, 1945. Lieutenant General Mark Clark is seen in the background.

(20) Major General Edward M. Almond drives General Marshall to a forward observation post in the Ninety-second Division area during the chief of staff's inspection tour of the Italian front on February 14, 1945. Seated in the rear seat is General Almond's driver, T/5 Floyd James.





(21) General and Mrs. George C. Marshall arrive at the White House following the announcement of the death of President Roosevelt on April 12, 1945.



(22) Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and General Marshall leave the White House after a conference with President Truman and other military leaders on April 13, 1945.



(23) Clown Emmet Kelly visits with General Marshall's grandson, Jimmy Winn, and Lieutenant Colonel H. Merrill Pasco and his son during an evening performance of the Ringling Brothers-Barnum and Bailey Circus in Washington, D.C., on June 5, 1945.



(24) General Marshall welcomes Dwight D. Eisenhower at National Airport in Washington, D.C., on June 18, 1945.



(25) The Combined Chiefs of Staff meet on July 21, 1945, during the Potsdam Conference.

(26) The U.S. and Soviet chiefs of staff meet on July 26, 1945, in Cecilienhof Palace.





(27) General Marshall makes a point during a meeting of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Potsdam Conference, July 23, 1945. Left to right: Generals Somervell, Arnold, and Marshall.



(28) General Marshall listens attentively during a Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting, July 23, 1945.



(29) President Truman congratulates General Marshall after awarding him an oak leaf cluster to the Distinguished Service Medal in the courtyard of the Pentagon Building on November 26, 1945.

(30) General Marshall testifies before the Congressional Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack in December 1945.



(31) General Marshall arrives at the Capitol Building in Washington, D.C., on December 10, 1945, to testify before the joint committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack.

operation, and all the services of supply, and be ready to leave for Australia in ten days. He left in eleven days with the fifty men, civilians, picked for their various qualifications from all over the United States. I was trying to capitalize on the initiative and talents of America. Congress provided funds—and in doing so they gave me a fine vote of confidence, first by placing twenty-five million dollars and later one hundred twenty-five million dollars at my complete disposal. On two days' notice I started Mr. Hurley off for Australia with some of this money to expedite the blockade running of supplies to MacArthur.³ The Japanese had reached Borneo. I then discovered that checks were not acceptable to prospective blockade runners. Those hard-bitten men wanted cash on the barrel for their families and for themselves. Our funds were in the bank at Melbourne several thousand miles away. I had to find some way to get cash in a hurry to the Celebes, Java, and North-western Australia. I managed this by loading lots of \$250,000 each in bombers en route across Africa, Arabia and India.

It was necessary to occupy Iceland before the Germans could beat us to that strategical post for guarding and controlling convoy movements. The laws then on the books introduced all sorts of complications; we couldn't use this man because the law prohibited for one reason, and we couldn't use that man because of still another legal restriction. There were various provisos regarding reserve officers, this one could go and that one could not; this private could go, that one could not. We dismantled sixteen companies to organize one small quartermaster company for service in Iceland. We shook the entire regular army and emasculated it to provide instructors and cadres for other units. We had to send overseas National Guard units that were only partially trained. We did our best under the appalling circumstances of unpreparedness. That's another example of the way we went to war.

I am sure people do not realize how close we came to catastrophe. Shortages of personnel forced us to strip division after division that we had trained. This drove the division commanders to strenuous protests. Just as those new units were reaching an excellent standard of efficiency, we would rip them to pieces in order to provide men as replacements for the growing battles overseas. We lacked sufficient replacements because deliveries from Selective Service were short in terms of a hundred thousand or more. We were confronted with a terrible problem for which the armies in the field paid the price, but we finally got things straightened out. We screened every non-combatant unit here and abroad, going through them like a sieve, to get men to be converted into infantrymen, and, incidentally, I think I heard from the mothers of most of these men who were taken from other branches of the service, and from every father whose son I was forced to take out of college. After all these struggles,

the last division to reach France landed there April 1, and the end came on May 8. We had just enough and no more, and it all went in.⁴

The interesting part of this was that just as we got the great European army completed, we started to dismantle it within two weeks of the time it had reached its peak. That's about as rapidly as such large matters can be handled or as close a computation as one can make. We had a close squeak with the enemy. I am a little afraid that in the tremendous emotional rejoicing over the victory and the cessation of the tragic daily lists of casualties, we shall forget almost completely the lessons of that early struggle, and that we shall forget also the special conditions which made it possible for us to carry through to a successful finish.

Then there is the matter of our international dealing. It is very, very important to understand the other man's point of view. I am talking now about the British, the French, the Russians. You may disagree with everything they contend, for that is perfectly normal expression of human and racial differences. You have disagreements in your own State, town, counties, cities. But, however much you disagree if you understand the other man's point of view you can usually work out a reasonable adjustment.

I secured the permission of the British—and they were very loath at first to give it to me—to show the members of Congress what was going on in England. I showed them a chart giving the V-bomb strikes on the metropolitan district of London. Each bomb was represented by a dot—a very small dot—yet you could hardly make out the great metropolitan district for the multitude of those black dots. Fifty per cent of the houses had been destroyed or badly damaged, and the casualties had mounted to 70,000 since June 10, 1944. The point I was trying to make was this: every speech in Parliament, every statement by men in British public life and most of the newspapers of England were, in effect, delivered from the rostrum of that suffering city. Though practically no reference was made by them to the bombing, yet the views of the individual or paper were naturally colored by the surrounding destruction. At this very time, the front pages of our papers carried large headlines regarding the “tragic loss of life” in the Mid-West from floods, eight or ten lives, as I recall. England was silent, stoically silent. The enemy was not to know of his success and they accepted their tragedy in silence. But the man speaking from that rostrum would inevitably have a somewhat different point of view from the man who voiced his international policies or criticism from the peaceful rostrum of Washington or New York.

What is going on now in San Francisco,⁵ and what comes next, makes it especially important historically to understand the other fellow's point of view. I seem during the past three years to have spent most of my time disagreeing, but I have made a very conscious effort to understand the

background of the other fellow's situation before voicing my disagreements.

Somehow or other these different points of view must be merged. I know no other way than by a thorough knowledge of the lessons—not the specific dates—of history. My present interests are centered in two things, the early completion of this war and the measures this country will take to avoid future wars.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)

1. Marshall had been invited to address the Maryland Historical Society by its president, George L. Radcliffe, the junior senator from Maryland and a member of the Democratic party. The remarks printed here are from a Marshall-edited transcript made by the historical society. It was published as "Some Lessons of History," *Maryland Historical Magazine* 40 (September 1945): 175–84.

2. Marshall had spoken several times during his career on this theme of the effect of poor teaching of U.S. military history in the secondary schools. For examples, see his speeches to the Headmasters Association, February 10, 1923, and the American Historical Association, December 28, 1939, in *Papers of GCM*, 1: 219–22, 2: 123–27.

3. Patrick J. Hurley's official position had been U.S. minister in New Zealand between April and August 1942. On the War Department's efforts to procure blockade-running vessels, see *ibid.*, 3: 87–88, 108–9, and Chapter 22 (pp. 390–404) in Louis Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* (Washington: GPO, 1953).

4. "Of all the calculated risks taken by General George C. Marshall in World War II," Maurice Matloff wrote in his classic essay on the issue, "none was bolder than the decision in midwar to maintain the U.S. Army's ground combat strength at ninety divisions. Students of warfare will long debate whether the decision was as wise as it was courageous, as foresighted as it was successful." Matloff, "The 90-Division Gamble," in Kent Roberts Greenfield, ed., *Command Decisions* (Washington: GPO, 1960), pp. 365–81; quote on p. 365.

5. The inaugural meeting of the United Nations (more formally known as the United Nations Conference on International Organization) was held in San Francisco between April 25 and June 26, 1945.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER June 13, 1945
[Radio No. W-16154.] *Secret* Washington, D.C.

From General Marshall to General Eisenhower. I have just been reading of the splendid reception given you in London which reminds me that so far in the preparation of the arrangements for your return home, you have only been consulted on rather precise details in the formulation of the general program. It occurs to me that you may have some general observations you wish to make in the matter. Please let me have them in all frankness.

Yesterday I formalized the first phase of your moves here in Washington in this manner. I will meet you at the airport and ride with you to the Pentagon. I think I will have Handy ride with Smith. The column of cars

containing your party will enter the inner court of the Pentagon where the workers in the War Department can see and greet you either from the ground or from the adjacent windows. Your car will stop in front of a balcony where the Secretary of War will greet you using a loud speaker, you to reply from the car and I suggest that here you can make a very brief appreciation of the work of these many people in the War Department in supporting your activities in Europe. I will leave you there and so will Handy, and I had in mind that Smith would then join you in your car and we would have a young officer in the front seat who understands the entire program. Admiral Kirk would follow in the next car.¹ The remainder of the program will be detailed to you by General Young,² but I wanted you to know at an early date of this first phase. As matters now stand you would drive through the city with Smith and no other person save the young officer referred to. I will join the Chiefs of Staff who will be present at the reception at Congress.

I say again, let me have any personal reactions you may have in a general way regarding the business of your return. General Young is machining the entire program for your formal approval but of course there are many other things involved which may be important but are too detailed to go into a general statement of the program.³

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Vice Admiral Alan G. Kirk (U.S.N.A., 1909) was commander of U.S. Navy forces in the European Theater of Operations.

2. Brigadier General Robert N. Young, assistant commander of the Third Division, was coordinating Eisenhower's trip arrangements.

3. Eisenhower replied on June 14 that he had "no general suggestions to make," although he did hope to see a baseball game in New York. Eisenhower and his party departed from Frankfurt, Germany, on June 16 and arrived in Washington shortly before noon on June 18. He headed a parade to the Capitol, spoke before a joint session of Congress, and went to the White House to receive the second Oak Leaf Cluster for his Distinguished Service Medal. He subsequently visited New York City; the U.S. Military Academy; Kansas City, Missouri; his family home in Abilene, Kansas; and Roosevelt's grave at Hyde Park, New York; before departing for Frankfurt on the evening of July 10. (*Papers of DDE*, 6: 162-63.)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER
Radio No. WAR-17951. *Secret*

June 16, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Wedemeyer from Marshall. I submit the following as merely an idea regarding which I wish your completely frank reaction. Naturally I am being pressed very heavily by returning commanders from ETO for participation in the war with Japan. Very few can be accommodated with MacArthur's forces, at the present time only Hodges as an

Army commander with five corps commanders and staffs. The thought occurred to me that possibly we might find a use for one or two of them in China with their staffs in this manner: You to continue as Theater Commander and as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo; in other words the drafter and promulgator of the orders, but one or more Army commanders to be turned over to the Generalissimo to coordinate his troops in groups, having with them a full or skeleton staff. You could probably select from Simpson of the Ninth Army who has done a wonderful job in fighting in Germany, Patton whom you know about and who might by chance make a great impression on the Chinese, certainly he has prestige though they couldn't understand his swearing; Devers, who is another type, Truscott, etc.

I had in mind that they would handle the groups or be alongside the Chinese equivalent commanders. They in effect would have nothing to do with the general plans for campaign nor with the general logistical problem.

Let me have your reaction.¹

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. "Idea is excellent and would receive favorable reaction by Chinese leaders and people," Wedemeyer responded. He was already attempting to place cadres of about forty-five U.S. officers with certain Chinese divisions and higher commands. Nevertheless, "Just how I could integrate leaders of the stature of Devers, Patton, Patch, Simpson and Truscott is problematical," he thought. "Patton's temperament would make it difficult for him to accept conditions inherent and at present unavoidable in China. . . . My chief concern is that these officers coming from the ETO theater and accustomed to a tempo and scale in modern combat wholly untenable in China would become impatient and discouraged." (Wedemeyer to Marshall, Radio No. CFB-39527, June 17, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Marshall decided to have Lieutenant General William H. Simpson visit China to "talk over matters with you and be looked over by the Generalissimo." He also suggested that Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., might have an army command in China. (Marshall to Wedemeyer, WAR-24820, June 30, 1945, *ibid.*)

TESTIMONY ON UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING¹

June 16, 1945
Washington, D.C.

The problem of the maintenance of the future peace of the world directly involves the problem of the post-war military policy of the United States. The decision regarding the military policy of the United States is directly related to the democratic processes of the Government, really meaning the reactions of the people to the services the individual citizen might be required to render the Government. Another factor is heavily though indirectly involved and that is consideration of the taxes to be imposed on the citizen for the maintenance of the military policy, to

which must be added the very positive reaction of the citizen regarding the taxes to which he must submit to meet the huge existing war debt. Any fixed legal demand on the citizen for services to the community, the state, or the federal Government, is quite naturally questioned by the majority and is usually bitterly opposed by at least an articulate minority.

The question of universal military training involves all of the foregoing factors, and the great difficulty as I see it, in reaching a correct decision, will be to avoid details and to get clearly focused in our minds what are the real necessities of the situation, and what will be the best method for meeting them, having in mind our traditions, our national characteristics and the military experience of this Government during its short life of 156 years among the nations of the world.

I think it would be best for me to state in the briefest possible form my own personal conclusions in the matter, which are as follows:

A decision regarding the general military policy of the Government is a matter of urgent necessity at this time.

A large standing Army is not an acceptable solution for three reasons: Its cost would be prohibitive; the necessary men to fill its ranks could not be hired in time of peace; and it would be repugnant to the American people. Therefore some other solution must be found.

To support our determination to maintain the peace, the world must recognize our military power as realistic and not as a remote potential.

Whatever military system we plan we must have a thorough understanding of the practicability of obtaining the annual appropriations necessary.

I know of no system other than universal military training that will meet the requirements I have just outlined, together with an effective program for industrial mobilization and continuous scientific research.

Until the settlement of the terms of the peace it will be impossible to determine the strength of the post-war military forces to be maintained on an active status. We shall not know until then just what our military obligations or requirements are to be. But it is clear to me that whatever the terms of peace, the fundamental basis of our defense must be universal military training. No other practical solution has been offered.

The acceptance at the present time of a general policy recognizing the necessity for universal military training would in my opinion have a far-reaching effect in obtaining a satisfactory international agreement for the terms of the peace. It would certainly be in keeping with the tragic lessons of our history. It would be a supremely democratic procedure, and would not involve the individual in military service except by further Act

of Congress and approval of the President. It would be far more economical than any other method for maintaining military power. If we are to have an effective and economical transition from our vast war establishment to our peace establishment, we must now decide on the fundamental basis on which we are to proceed.

While I have not been able to read the testimony that has been given before this Committee and have obtained my information largely from the press and by hearsay, it appears to me that those who object to compulsory military training have offered no practical solution for obtaining what is in all our minds today, and that is some guarantee for the future peace of the world.

Whether or not Army training methods would have an unfortunate influence on the individual can be determined I think from the experience of this war. I assert that we have produced a democratic Army, one composed of self-respecting soldiers whose spirit has not been crushed and who have shown splendid evidences of high morale. I submit that the Army has demonstrated that it can efficiently and expeditiously instruct men and that it does this without detriment to the mind and character of the individual, rather the contrary. I firmly believe that universal training would be a stimulant to education rather than a deterrent. It would be a perfect demonstration of democracy, with rich and poor alike, side by side, rendering a common service.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The House Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy—called the Woodrum Committee, after its chairman, Democrat Clifton A. Woodrum of the Sixth District of Virginia—had been holding hearings on Universal Military Training since June 4. Marshall appeared about 2:45 P.M., following Admiral King.

2. Mr. Woodrum asked Marshall to give his reaction to those who said that even the discussion of military preparedness would indicate the United States's lack of faith in the United Nations organization. His own reaction, Marshall stated, was the opposite. "In many conversations I have had with officials, leading officials of other countries, I find always the fear that we will withdraw into our shell and at the same time endeavor, as they put it, to inflict on the world an idealistic policy without, on our own part, showing any basis for maintaining or backing up such policy of idealism." (U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, *Universal Military Training: Hearings . . . Pursuant to H. Res. 465*, pt. 1 [Washington: GPO, 1945], p. 569.)

ON June 18, 1945, President Truman hosted at the White House a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, Secretary of War Stimson, and Assistant Secretary of War McCloy in order to learn the details of the proposed assault on Japan. The minutes of the meeting are summarized below. (Minutes of Meeting held at the White House on Monday, 18 June 1945 at 1530, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS

334, JCS Minutes]. A version of these minutes containing three omissions is in Department of State, *Foreign Relations: The Conference of Berlin [The Potsdam Conference]*, 2 vols. [Washington: GPO, 1960], 1: 903–10.)

Marshall did a majority of the talking. “The present situation with respect to operations against Japan,” he noted, “was practically identical with the situation which had existed [in early 1944] in connection with the operations proposed against Normandy.” He read a staff précis of J.C.S. Memorandum 1388, which had been prepared for the president. No further operations to seize positions south of Japan were needed since U.S. naval and air power had already greatly reduced Japanese ship movements and would further reduce them in the next few months. The Pacific commanders (MacArthur and Nimitz) and the Joint Chiefs agreed on November 1 as the target date for the Kyushu assault.

The Kyushu operation is essential to a strategy of strangulation and appears to be the least costly worth-while operation following Okinawa. . . . [It] is essential, both to tightening our strangle hold of blockade and bombardment on Japan, and to forcing capitulation by invasion of the Tokyo Plain.

We are bringing to bear against the Japanese every weapon and all the force we can employ and there is no reduction in our maximum possible application of bombardment and blockade, while at the same time we are pressing invasion preparations. It seems that if the Japanese are ever willing to capitulate short of complete military defeat in the field, they will do it when faced by the completely hopeless prospect occasioned by (1) destruction already wrought by air bombardment and sea blockade, coupled with (2) a landing on Japan indicating the firmness of our resolution, and also perhaps coupled with (3) the entry or threat of entry of Russia into the war.

Marshall knew that the president was very concerned with U.S. casualties in the nearly completed Okinawa campaign (i.e., about seventy-five thousand battle and nonbattle at this time, including over twelve thousand killed in combat). Moreover, Truman had recently circulated to Secretary of War Stimson and a few others a memorandum by former president Herbert Hoover suggesting that an assault upon Japan might cost a half million to a million U.S. casualties. (Army planners thought this estimate too high, given their assumptions about the size and quality of the defending forces and their expectations about the development of the battle. See the various memorandums in NA/RG 107 [SW Safe, Japan (After Dec. 7, 1941)].) Marshall observed that “our experience in the Pacific war is so diverse as to casualties that it is considered wrong to give any estimate in numbers.” Consequently, he sought to establish a likely *ratio* of American

to Japanese casualties. The ratios for the four most recent Pacific campaigns were: Leyte—1:4.6; Luzon—1:5; Iwo Jima—1:1.125; Okinawa—1:2. Marshall thought that “the first 30 days in Kyushu should not exceed the price we have paid for Luzon” (i.e., a 1 to 5 casualty ratio). “It is a grim fact that there is not an easy, bloodless way to victory in war and it is the thankless task of the leaders to maintain their firm outward front which holds the resolution of their subordinates.” Marshall made it clear that he was referring to Prime Minister Churchill’s attitude in 1943 and 1944, “which clouded and hampered all our preparations for the cross-channel operation.”

The Kyushu operation “was the only course to pursue,” in Marshall’s opinion, and MacArthur agreed. Moreover, “air power alone was not sufficient to put the Japanese out of the war,” just as it alone had been insufficient to defeat the Germans. He believed that the Kyushu operation “offered the only way the Japanese could be forced into a feeling of utter helplessness. The operation would be difficult but not more so than the assault in Normandy”—i.e., 42,000 U.S. casualties in the first thirty days.

Admiral King “agreed with General Marshall’s views and said that the more he studied the matter, the more he was impressed with the strategic location of Kyushu, which he considered the key to the success of any siege operations.” Admiral Leahy observed that casualties among U.S. troops on Okinawa had been 35 percent. The total assault forces (i.e., the number of men landed within the first forty-five days), Marshall noted, would be 766,700. Japanese troops on Kyushu were estimated to be about 350,000. “Divisions were still being raised in Japan and reinforcement from other areas was possible but it was becoming increasingly difficult and painful.” President Truman thought that the Kyushu operation “was practically creating another Okinawa closer to Japan, to which the Chiefs of Staff agreed.” Air casualties, according to General Eaker, who was substituting for General Arnold, were “averaging 2 percent per mission, about 30 percent per month.” (Nonbattle casualties, which could easily exceed 25 percent of battle casualties, were not included in the discussions.)

Secretary of War Stimson said he thought that invasion was the only choice, but he warned that the Japanese masses, who did not favor the war, would “fight tenaciously if attacked on their own ground.” Secretary of the Navy Forrestal agreed that the Kyushu operation was a “sound decision.”

The group briefly discussed the merits of the “unconditional surrender” policy. Marshall briefed them on the situation in China. Marshall and King agreed that there was little possibility of appointing an over-all commander in the Pacific. President Truman concluded by saying that he had called the meeting “to know definitely how far we could afford to go

in the Japanese campaign. He had hoped that there was a possibility of preventing an Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other. He was clear on the situation now and was quite sure that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should proceed with the Kyushu operation." Consideration of Japan ended with a discussion of "certain other matters"—i.e., the atomic bomb project. ★

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING
Secret

June 20, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

SUBJECT: Accidents Resulting from Careless Flying.

I have your memorandum of 15 June¹ and I deeply regret a careless Army pilot has caused the death of four and seriously injured fourteen others, as well as damaged the U.S.S. Randolph.

Investigation reveals this plane was being ferried from Clark Field, Luzon, to Dulag, Leyte, on a routine non-tactical flight. The dangerous maneuvers in which the pilot was indulging were in direct violation of Army Regulations as well as the principles of flying safety. General Kenney has ordered that aircraft will not approach surface craft in a suspicious manner and will not indulge in stunting, low or dangerous flying in the proximity of ships or harbors unless required to do so by tactical necessity. Subordinate commands are being required to report when all pilots of their command have been informed and understand these instructions. I believe these measures will prevent recurrences of this kind in the future.

We have tried and dismissed from the service a number of pilots found guilty of violating flying safety regulations. In this particular case the pilot was killed.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. King had written that on June 7 a P-38 had crashed into the flight deck of the aircraft carrier *Randolph* at anchor in Leyte Harbor, Philippines, resulting in structural damage, a serious fire, ten planes destroyed, four men known dead, fourteen seriously injured, and an undetermined number missing. The plane was "one of several engaged in zooming ships in a dangerous manner." (King Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, United States Army, June 15, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 569.14].)

TO MRS. JOHN J. SINGER

June 21, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Marie: Yesterday Katherine received your Thursday letter asking

her to secure an autographed photograph of me in payment of your doctor's bill. I will be glad to do this but please be a little more definite. What is the fellow's name? It is customary to inscribe a photograph to the individual if any particular compliment is intended.

As I am leaving tonight on a week or ten-day trip¹ there will be some delay in sending on the photograph. Also, since you are to be at Pike Run, would it not be better to have the photograph mailed direct to the doctor from here? Address your reply to these questions to the office and not to Fort Myer as my mail is opened here and promptly attended to.

Katherine is down at Leesburg and Allene and Tris are with her.² The first cook quit, the dog ran off, and in locating the dog Molly found another cook who had a reputation for both drinking and stealing. Nevertheless she was hired. I am afraid Katherine became unduly considerate and gave her all Sunday off so she did not return until Monday night and drunk, but willing at least to break china. She hasn't been seen since. Maybe the dog will get lost again.

With my love,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. That afternoon Marshall flew to Detroit, where he attended a reception and dinner honoring Lieutenant General William S. Knudsen—former president of General Motors, wartime production adviser and expeditor, and, until recently, director of Army Air Forces Materiel and Services—who had returned to work in the automotive industry. After the ceremonies, Marshall flew to Oregon, where he visited friends and fished for six days. On the twenty-eighth, he flew to Rockford, Illinois, where he delivered some luncheon remarks at an army service command conference at nearby Camp Grant. That evening he returned to Washington, D.C.

2. Allene Tupper Wilkes was Mrs. Marshall's sister, and Colonel Tristram Tupper was their brother.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

Top Secret

July 2, 1945

Washington, D.C.

Harry Hopkins sent me a note in which he stated that he had discussed with President Truman the question of General Eisenhower making a trip to Moscow either just before the Berlin conference or immediately thereafter, and indicated that the President was anxious to have the matter of General Eisenhower's visit to Moscow and a possible visit by Marshal Zhukov to the United States worked out.¹

General Eisenhower's present plans call for him to return to Europe from the United States, arriving in Germany about July 12. Unless the President desires an earlier return on his part, it appears that General Eisenhower's visit to Moscow should be made sometime after the meet-

ing of the heads of state is over. General Eisenhower is perfectly willing to go to Moscow for a day and will go whenever the President wishes it, which I understand he does, but I personally do not think his limited rest period here in the States should be shortened by as much as a day for that purpose.

General Eisenhower feels that a visit to the United States by Marshal Zhukov might be very beneficial and suggests that he be invited to come to this country. If Marshal Zhukov is to visit the United States it would probably be advisable that his visit should also take place after completion of the Big Three conference.

If the President approves of such arrangements, I will inform Ambassador Harriman in Moscow along the lines of the attached draft message.²

G. C. Marshall

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The Battle for Berlin had made Marshal Georgi Zhukov perhaps the most famous Red Army leader in the West.

2. Marshall's attached draft message to W. Averell Harriman informed the ambassador of the possibility of a visit by Eisenhower to the U.S.S.R. If Stalin extended such an invitation, Harriman was to invite Zhukov to visit the U.S. Admiral Leahy returned Marshall's memorandum on July 4 with the notation: "The President approves."

Eisenhower visited Moscow August 11 to 14 and Leningrad August 15, 1945; see *Papers of DDE*, 6: 260–61. Concerning Marshal Zhukov's proposed visit, see Marshall to O'Daniel, August 8, 1945, pp. 258–59.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HULL

Confidential

July 3, 1945

[Washington, D.C.]

Admiral Leahy took up with the President the memorandum regarding the return of Italian prisoners from the U.S. to the homeland, in which we took the stand that those organized in service units were very important to our preparations in the Pacific and for whom we had no replacements except to prolong the service of high score men returning from Europe. The President stated that he desired the return of these men to Italy "as could be arranged." I am not quite certain of what his real intention is as to the speed of return. However, Admiral Leahy felt that there would be no objection to our proceeding slowly at the present moment but of course making a start. He also felt that there would be no objection to our considering the question of taking up the issue with the men of the Italian units to see how many might volunteer to remain in this country for an appreciable period.¹

I should like this last phase looked into to get an opinion on what the probable reaction would be and how advisable such a procedure would be.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The first Italian prisoners of war disembarked in the United States in December 1942; 50,052 had arrived by the end of June 1945. (By comparison, 371,505 Germans had arrived.) After Italy became a co-belligerent with the Allies in September 1943, Italian prisoners were permitted to work, under a limited parole, on military installations and certain civilian projects. In early 1944, the U.S. Army organized voluntary Italian Service Units, and by the middle of 1945 there were 195 of these with a total of 32,449 officers and enlisted men working at various military installations, ports of embarkation, and quartermaster depots. In late May 1945, the War Department announced a policy of returning all prisoners of war to Europe at the earliest possible date consistent with labor needs. (George G. Lewis and John Mewha, *History of Prisoner of War Utilization by the United States Army, 1776–1945*, Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-213 [Washington: Department of the Army, June 1955], pp. 90–91, 93, 96–97, 172.)

2. The Operations Division reported on July 6 that polls indicated that “the majority of Italian prisoners of war desire to return to Italy as soon as possible and that comparatively few would volunteer to remain for an appreciable period.” A minority would volunteer to remain—perhaps 30 percent, according to one Italian officer. Asking for volunteers to remain probably would cause the prisoners to infer that those not volunteering could return home at once; they would be disappointed when they were not repatriated quickly, which would damage morale in the service units. (Brigadier General Edward S. Greenbaum Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, July 6, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 336.2 Italy (July 3, 1945)].) Large-scale repatriations began only in September 1945, and nearly all Italians had been returned by February 1946. (Lewis and Mewha, *History of Prisoner of War Utilization*, p. 91.)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HULL
Top Secret

July 3, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

The matter of gas was again discussed today but it was decided to delay the matter a little longer.¹ Admiral King felt that we should not make an early decision in regard to the further production of gas. He regarded that as a more urgent issue than the one of ocean tonnage.² I had in mind taking this up in the form of a paper as to production before my departure.³

Okinawa

As I noted on the draft of my proposal this morning this was discussed. Leahy is in favor of our point of view and of course Arnold. King was surprised at the reference to the directive of 1942. The whole question will be gone into on a regular basis, McFarland having been given the paper.⁴

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had held a luncheon on this day; as usual, no notes were taken. Twice in the early years of U.S. participation in the war, President Roosevelt had stated publicly that the United States would not initiate gas warfare but would retaliate against use by the Axis. Consequently, the U.S. Army had accumulated a large inventory of chemical weapons by 1945. Moreover, by this time Marshall and others were reconsid-

ering the idea of initiating limited gas warfare. On May 29 Marshall told Stimson that the army might use mustard gas, for example, on the last pockets of Japanese resistance during operations—"just drench and sicken them so that the fight would be taken out of them." (See McCloy Memorandum of Conversation, May 29, 1945, p. 206.) On June 14, Marshall had given Admirals King and Leahy a War Department memorandum on "U.S. Chemical Warfare Policy." (Brooks E. Kleber and Dale Birdsell, *The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1966], pp. 652-57; Allen and Polmar, *Code-Name Downfall*, pp. 176-78.)

2. Replying to Leahy's response to "U.S. Chemical Warfare Policy," Marshall observed that since U.S. forces were close to Japan, they had the capability of using gas without casualties to friendly populations. "The result is a greatly increased requirement for gas munitions if we are to be prepared to use the huge capabilities, principally in the air, which we have to deliver these munitions. Because of the very considerable requirements in service troops, storage facilities, port capacity and shipping involved in providing a forward stockage equal to our recent greatly increased capabilities, there is a serious question in my mind that a military justification exists for moving this stockage forward, principally to the Marianas and Ryukyus, unless we are contemplating its use on other than a retaliatory basis." (Marshall Memorandum for Admiral Leahy, June 21, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. Marshall was scheduled to depart on the morning of July 4 with Admiral King for the annual Governors' Conference at Mackinac Island, Michigan. He delivered some off-the-record remarks at lunch. That evening he stayed with his sister, Marie Singer, at Pike Run Country Club near Greensburg, Pennsylvania, before returning to Washington, D.C., on the evening of July 5.

4. The question of turning over control of Okinawa to MacArthur for use as the headquarters for the Kyushu invasion was not settled until the Potsdam Conference. See note 3, Marshall to MacArthur, July 19, 1945, pp. 245-46.

TO ROBERT WOODS BLISS

July 10, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mr. Bliss: Colonel McCarthy tells me that you telephoned him regarding Dorothy Thompson's article of the sixth of July.¹

To a casual observer, conditions in Paris would seem to leave much to be desired. However, the War Department and the theater commander are making every effort to prevent the presence of our troops from being oppressive to the French.

Since Paris is the hub of road and rail communications, many of our headquarters centered there during the period of active operations as was necessary to the efficient prosecution of the war. At the present time headquarters are being moved to other points and the remaining headquarters personnel in the city is being drastically reduced.

American troops do occupy many of the better hotels and billets, largely for the reason that most of these had previously been occupied by the Germans and there was less disruption of the existing housing situation therefore involved. The rapid outflow of headquarters personnel will

do much to alleviate the hotel and billet situation. At the same time the usual antagonistic reaction to soldiers the moment the fighting ceases, which results in their being shoved into a decidedly secondary position as to comfort and advantages generally, is not the policy of the War Department. I might add that within a comparatively few days after our soldiers had liberated Rome, and lost quite a few lives in doing so, the proposal was formally made that none of our soldiers be permitted in Rome for recreational purposes.²

The black market situation has given us all much concern as well as the general scarcity of food, fuel and clothing in Paris. To prevent the activities of our forces from further complicating this situation, strict orders have been issued, and are enforced, to forbid the military from engaging in black market negotiations. Incidentally, the French took over as of May first complete responsibility for the implementation and distribution of food in France. Prior to that time the Army had made large importations of food and clothing for Paris civil relief. Coal is now being shipped to France in ever-increasing quantities. In other words, we are doing our best without calling a halt to operations in the Pacific.

In connection with the alleged incident involving French officers in the American club, there are certain clubs set up in Paris by each nation for its own exclusive use. In general, however, most of the clubs are open to the personnel of all Allied nations. I therefore do not know the basis of this particular incident but I hazard the guess that the facts are probably not as represented. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Thompson was a syndicated newspaper columnist. The Operations Division summarized her article as deploring U.S. armed forces activities in Paris and other French cities: civilians lacked coal and food while U.S. Army personnel had ample amounts of both; the best hotels had been requisitioned as billets; Allied offices in Paris were over-staffed; French officers were prohibited from entering U.S. officers' clubs; U.S. officers patronized black market restaurants. (Hull summary of article, July 8, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 336 France (July 7, 1945)].)

2. For another comment on the Rome situation, see Marshall to McCloy, August 21, 1945, p. 283.

TO MRS. MARJORIE L. MAY

July 10, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mrs. May: I have your letter concerning the death of your husband and regret very much the feeling of bitterness you expressed.¹ The suffering experienced by American families as a result of casualties caused by this terrible struggle is most distressing to me personally. It was my

intent in sending a card of condolence to express my personal sympathy. The heavy daily casualty list made any other procedure impracticable. The envelope was addressed by a Major in the War Department with the thought that this personal action would be more appropriate than a type-written address.²

The War Department has never received a recommendation for the promotion of your husband to the rank of brigadier general. As you know, officers are recommended for promotion to that grade by the theater commanders and the commanding generals of the three major commands.

In order to insure prompt recognition of heroic accomplishments on the field of battle, the theater commanders are authorized to award in the field all decorations except the Medal of Honor and the Distinguished Service Medal. They have augmented this policy still further by delegating similar authority to subordinate commanders. By far the greatest number of all awards presented during this war have been to officers and men in the field.

I realize that your grief at the loss of your husband is overwhelming, but I hope that your pride in his gallant record and the faith and confidence in his patriotic service to his country will prove some solace for your grief.³ Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. The widow of Colonel Edwin T. May, who had been killed on Okinawa, wrote to the chief of staff after receiving the condolence card sent out over Marshall's signature. She expressed bitterness over the "form or formal calling card" and that her husband had neither been promoted to brigadier general nor given decorations when lesser men had. (May to Marshall, no date [received July 1, 1945], GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

2. Marshall asked his staff to check on the woman's charge that the condolence card "was addressed in the hand of an illiterate. The address and everything about it was obnoxious." Captain Lawrence A. Minnich, an assistant secretary of the General Staff, told Marshall that since the recipient's reaction to the hand-addressed card was not what was desired, "instructions have already been issued to have all cards addressed on the typewriter without exception." (Minnich Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, July 4, 1945, *ibid.*)

3. Mrs. May replied to Marshall's letter to ask that he "please forgive me for writing you that awful letter. My husband would have been so ashamed if he could have seen it." She also wrote why her husband had been expecting a promotion. Marshall replied on July 23 saying that he wished "to thank you without delay for writing me so frankly." He noted that his own son-in-law had been killed and briefly explained the backlog in promotion requests from overseas commanders. (May to Marshall, no date [received July 20, 1945], and Marshall to May, July 23, 1945, *ibid.*)

The Future Peace

July 11 – November 27, 1945

The maintenance of the future peace of the world will depend in a large measure on the attitude of the United States, its policy as to the international relationships involved, and its ability to back up that policy. . . . I am strongly convinced that unless there is a single department for the armed forces within which the difficult and numerous complexities can be ironed out prior to a presentation of requirements to the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress, there can be little hope for the future of maintaining a military posture that the world will respect, and will respond to our peaceful overtures accordingly.

—Marshall Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff
October 10, 1945

SINCE early May, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had been pressing President Truman to hold a Big Three meeting in Berlin soon. He was especially worried about the likelihood that British-American military power in Europe would quickly decline: “Time is on his [Stalin’s] side if he digs in while we melt away.” Churchill had already begun to talk about an “iron curtain” that excluded non-Soviet influence from areas occupied by the Red Army. Truman and Stalin, however, preferred a mid-July meeting. (Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conference of Berlin [The Potsdam Conference]*, 2 vols. [Washington: GPO, 1960], 1: 5, 9, 10, 85–87, 90–93.)

Even more than February’s conference in the Crimea, the conference in Berlin would be almost entirely political, as few crucial military decisions remained to be made. (See the list of agenda items agreed to by President Truman in William D. Leahy, *I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time* [London: Victor Gollancz, 1950], pp. 454–59.) Stalin had assured Harry Hopkins on May 28 that Soviet forces would be ready for operations in the Far East by August 8. (*Foreign Relations, Potsdam Conference*, 1: 42.) The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that a Soviet attack in Manchuria was not essential to victory over Japan, but it might be the final evidence needed to convince the Japanese that surrender was necessary, and if not it would tie up Japanese resources and manpower, thereby reducing U.S. invasion casualties.

The chief unresolved military issue between the United States and the British Commonwealth was the extent of the latter’s participation in the final attack on Japan. Marshall, consequently, doubted that the Combined Chiefs of Staff needed to or ought to go to the Berlin meetings, in part because Stalin might not approve of their presence. Only on June 24 was it certain that Stalin approved of the C.C.S.’s coming. The British and American chiefs of staff agreed to bring only small staffs. (*Ibid.*, p. 110, 125, 133.)

The president and his party left Washington, D.C., on July 6, taking the heavy cruiser *Augusta* to Antwerp and flying on to Berlin. Marshall left with General Arnold at midnight on July 10 and flew in Arnold’s plane to Mingan, Quebec, to get in a day of salmon fishing on the eleventh. That evening, Marshall boarded his own C-54 for the flight to Frankfurt, Germany, by way of the Azores. On July 13 and 14, Marshall and Omar Bradley went to Bavaria for some more fishing. Marshall arrived in Berlin on the afternoon of July 15 and went to the house on Berlinerstrasse in Babelsberg that he was to share with Arnold and their aides.

Big Three plenary sessions were to take place in the Cecilienhof Palace in heavily damaged Potsdam. Delegation housing was located across the Tetlow Canal from Potsdam in the largely undamaged resort town and film

colony of Babelsberg—approximately a dozen miles southwest of the Brandenburg Gate in central Berlin. Marshall and the other members of the C.C.S. attended none of the plenary sessions, spending most of their time at meetings and dinners in Babelsberg or sightseeing. Marshall also worked on his 1943–45 biennial report to the secretary of war.

The usual Anglo-American conference pattern of alternating meetings of national chiefs of staff and Combined Chiefs of Staff was followed in Babelsberg. The Joint Chiefs of Staff met on the morning of July 16 and discussed the idea of having the Soviet chiefs of staff meet with the C.C.S., France's desire to participate in the Pacific campaign, lend-lease problems, and Pacific command—which they agreed must be reserved to the United States. At that day's C.C.S. meeting, the conferees agreed to consider having Churchill raise with Truman the issue of the Japanese emperor's status under the unconditional surrender policy. Marshall reported on China Theater operations, and the group talked about the Pacific war "and what we could and could not do to bring it to a close sooner." In all, Arnold noted, the meeting was "a very peaceful one and went well, with no untoward incidents." After the meeting, Marshall and Arnold had tea with Field Marshal Alan Brooke; afterwards they drove to Berlin to visit the ruins of the Reichstag and the Chancellery. (H. H. Arnold, *Global Mission* [New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949], p. 583.)

At the July 17 J.C.S. meeting, Marshall pointed out that he did not want anything said publicly with regard to removing the Japanese emperor from office prior to Japan's unconditional surrender, because Hirohito's continuation in office might influence the cessation of hostilities in areas outside Japan. The J.C.S. agreed to have a memorandum on unconditional surrender drafted for the president that included the statement that the Japanese people were to be free to choose their own form of government. (On this memorandum, see *Foreign Relations, Potsdam Conference*, 2: 1268–69.) The Americans also agreed in principle to British participation in the attack on Japan—which, Brooke noted in his diary, "was far better than we had hoped for." Regarding command in the Pacific, however, Brooke noted: "There I foresee more trouble ahead. We want a greater share in the control of the strategy in the Pacific and they are apparently reluctant to provide this share." At the C.C.S. meeting that afternoon, the British accepted the general U.S. program for the Pacific war headed by an American supreme commander. The J.C.S. agreed that the British should appoint a corps-level commander who, with his staff, would go to MacArthur's and Nimitz's headquarters to discuss plans. (*War Diaries, 1939–1945: Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke*, ed. Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001], p. 706; *Foreign Relations, Potsdam Conference*, 2: 39–42.)

The July 18 Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting was the last one of marked significance at the conference. The British were pleased with the outcome vis-à-vis their role in the Pacific. Brooke noted that

Marshall made a very nice speech, pointing out the difficulties of control in the Pacific, and the desirability to simplify the control and avoid delays. They would be prepared to discuss strategy but final decisions must rest with them. If the plan for the invasion of the Tokyo Plain [Operation CORONET, tentatively scheduled for March 1946] did not suit us we could withhold our forces but they would still carry on. On the whole I think that the discussion cleared the air a good deal and that the secretaries should now be able to draft out some form of agreement between us. (Brooke, *War Diaries*, pp. 706–7.)

The C.C.S. agreed to work out a change in the boundaries of the Southwest Pacific Area in order to give the British Commonwealth control (and responsibility for handling Dutch, French, and Portuguese requests for participation) of the mopping-up operations south and east of the Philippines. ★

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

Radio No. VICTORY-OUT-93. *Top Secret*

July 19, 1945

Babelsberg, Germany

To AGWAR and MacArthur from Marshall. CCS conference Berlin now discussing date for readjustment to boundaries defining new SEA [Southeast Asia Command] and Australian Command and relinquishment of areas south of Philippines by SWPA.¹ We propose August 1st as date for initiating readjustment. British feel that Mountbatten should not be called upon to accept responsibility for new area to be taken over until after occupation of Singapore. British are also uncertain of additional burdens to be assumed by their people in way of men, material, ships, etc. by withdrawal of your control over areas in question.

What is your reaction to this? What reply should U.S. JCS make? . . .²

I think Ryukyus-Okinawa matter has been settled reasonably to your satisfaction.³

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 17, Item 21)

1. Negotiations between the J.C.S. and the British Chiefs of Staff to expand the area covered by the S.E.A. Command had been ongoing since April 1945. Such modifications were judged necessary by the British due to plans for operations to liberate Singapore. By June 7, the J.C.S. had proposed specific new borders. (See the British memorandum of July 9 in *Foreign Relations, Potsdam Conference*, 1: 921–23.) S.E.A. Supreme Commander

Louis Mountbatten was ordered to come to the Potsdam Conference for discussions. There he was directed to reopen the Straits of Malacca as soon as possible and to “assume command of the additional areas as soon as convenient after 15th August, 1945.” (John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, vol. 6, *October 1944–August 1945*, a volume in *History of the Second World War* [London: HMSO, 1956], pp. 233, 253.)

2. The omitted portion specified the longitude and latitude of various points on the proposed border. MacArthur replied with some suggested modifications to conform to the 1939 Philippine boundary line; he noted that nearly all U.S. units were already out of the area to be given to the British and Australians. (MacArthur to Marshall, Radio No. C-27265, July 21, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 17, Item 21].)

3. Marshall had told MacArthur on July 9: “For some time I have been concerned over the orientation of base development at Okinawa, doubting that the arrangements give adequate recognition to your needs in support of OLYMPIC” (the proposed Kyushu invasion). Consequently, Marshall proposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that MacArthur take over in Okinawa and the Ryukyus on August 1. Admiral King was initially opposed, however, because that would hurt navy readiness for the invasion. At the J.C.S. meeting of July 18, King acquiesced to Marshall’s ideas regarding Okinawa command. (Marshall to MacArthur, Radio No. WAR-29003, July 9, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File, CM-OUT-29003]; J.C.S. meeting of July 18, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS 334, JCS Minutes].) MacArthur told Marshall: “The Okinawa solution is a good one and will undoubtedly facilitate OLYMPIC. Your sound professional judgement as usual prevailed to the ultimate benefit of all concerned.” (MacArthur to Marshall, Radio No. C-27265, July 21, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 17, Item 21].)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS
MACARTHUR AND ADMIRAL OF THE
FLEET CHESTER W. NIMITZ
Radio. *Top Secret*

[July 21(?), 1945]¹
[Babelsberg, Germany]

Coordination of plans for the procedure to be followed in the event of Japanese governmental surrender is now a pressing necessity.² Early information is desired regarding the conference reported to be in progress at Guam on this subject.³

It appears to JCS that immediate naval occupation of critical parts of Japan is desirable to include in each case, if practical, an operational airfield to facilitate communication and permit airborne landings.

It also appears to JCS that it would be highly desirable for similar procedure to be followed on the Asiatic mainland in following order of priority: Shanghai, Fusan [*Pusan*] in Korea, Chefoo, Chingwangtao on the Manchurian border. Also that preliminary landings on Asiatic continent might best be carried out by Marines. A landing at Taku to permit the blocking of the critical communication points of Peiking-Tsintsein [*Tientsin*] would be more desirable than at Chingwangtao but probably is impractical from the viewpoint of naval craft. It is not the desire of the JCS to become involved in the campaign in China on the mainland other

than by air, but it is considered highly desirable to seize the ports in order better to facilitate the reoccupation of the country by the Chinese forces. The occupation of north tip of Formosa would be great aid to air operation and communication to Japan and China.

There appears to be a necessity for an early decision as to the movement of the First Army divisions now in the United States, particularly as concerns complication regarding their equipment now en route to Philippines.⁴ It might be desirable to route some of those divisions directly to Japan as follow up units, thus avoiding the shipment of divisions from the Philippines for the same purpose.

The formal surrender or enforced submission of the Japanese government will be received jointly by _____ and _____. But in order to pursue a continuity of policy of procedure in dealing with the Japanese Imperial Headquarters or its Ministries a representative of General MacArthur will be designated to perform this function until General MacArthur has actually landed in Japan and personally assumed this responsibility. The foregoing provisions will not be allowed to interfere with conduct of local surrenders by Naval or other U.S. commanders concerned.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, 387.4, Case 10/6)

1. It is not clear from the records the editors have examined when or even whether this message was sent.

2. In mid-June, MacArthur and Nimitz were told: "Although there is at present no evidence that sudden collapse or surrender of Japan is likely, the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct that plans be made to take immediate advantage of favorable circumstances, such as a sudden collapse or surrender, to effect an entry into Japan proper for occupational purposes." (J.C.S. to Commander in Chief, Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas [MacArthur] and Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet [Nimitz], Radio No. WARX-17064, June 14, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File, CM-OUT-17064].)

A select group of United States leaders knew from reading MAGIC intercepts that Japan's foreign minister, Shingenori Togo, had been engaged in cautious negotiation feelers since May. These Japanese diplomats' activities increased in mid-July with efforts in Moscow to get the Soviet Union to help end the war. At the Potsdam Conference, Marshall and others received background information and detailed extracts and explanations of this July correspondence. (See "'MAGIC' Diplomatic Extracts, July 1945: Selected Items Prepared by MIS [Military Intelligence Service], War Department for the Attention of General George C. Marshall," SRH-040, NA/RG 457 [Records of the Predecessors of the National Security Agency].)

3. An army-navy conference to arrange the details of MacArthur's taking command in Okinawa (see the previous document) was scheduled to convene on July 21. (Headquarters, U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces, Guam, to War Department, Radio No. VICTORY-IN-386, July 20, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 2, Item 17].)

4. First Army, commanded by General Courtney H. Hodges, was scheduled to effect the first assault landing in the Tokyo area as part of Operation CORONET, tentatively scheduled for March 1, 1946. Troops for the invasion of Japan had been accumulating in the Philippines, but the majority of First Army troops, then being redeployed from Europe, were in, or scheduled to be in, the United States. (Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943–1945*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1968], pp. 585–87.)

TO ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET
WILLIAM D. LEAHY
Top Secret

Sunday a.m. [July 22, 1945]
[Babelsberg, Germany]

My dear Admiral Leahy: Yesterday a.m. the U.S. JCS, in your absence, acted favorably on a proposal to the President through the Secretary of State, and to the CCS for the *Internationalization of the Danube River*.¹

It is the opinion of Admiral King, General Arnold and me that this matter is of urgent importance as a practical requirement for the support of the American forces in their Zone in Europe. The Danube is now blocked as a supply route. We have practically all the barges but the Russians can block free passage along the river. Yet I am told that the local Russians desire a regularized arrangement as much as we do.

The necessity for American supply use of barges along the river is increasing daily and the importance of a decision at the earliest date is therefore indicated. Please see if Mr. Byrnes cannot get an agreement out of the Russians, and if not, have the President take it up direct with Marshal Stalin.² Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The right of passage through and control over the banks of certain key waterways in Europe (the Kiel Canal, Rhine River, Danube River, the Dardanelles/Bosphorus, etc.) had become an important issue during the weeks after Germany's surrender. On July 3, General Eisenhower had sent the J.C.S. a message asking that the controversies with the Soviet Union over the Danube be taken up at the Potsdam Conference and that United States policy seek to reestablish the river's international character. (*Foreign Relations, Potsdam Conference*, 2: 653–54.)

2. Section XVIII, International Inland Waterways, of the Potsdam Conference's August 1 final Protocol of Proceedings noted that: "The Conference considered a proposal of the U.S. Delegation on this subject and agreed to refer it for consideration to the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London." (*Ibid.*, p. 1497.) The issue of international control of the Danube festered until the mid-1950s, when a Soviet-dominated commission was established.

TRINITY was the code name for the atomic bomb test site in central New Mexico where, at 3:30 A.M. on July 16, the uranium-235 fission device was successfully tested. The War Department notified Secretary of War Stimson, who received the message at 7:30 P.M. in Babelsberg, that the TRINITY test was a success. Stimson hurried to President Truman with the news. The next morning (July 17), he called Marshall and Arnold to his quarters, showed them the message, and discussed with them the bomb's use. (July 16, 1945, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 52: 23]; Arnold, *Global Mission*, pp. 584–85.)

Shortly before noon on July 21, a special courier brought the secretary a detailed report on the test by Major General Leslie R. Groves, head of the MANHATTAN Project. “At three o’clock,” Stimson recorded, “I found that Marshall had returned from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to save time I hurried to his house and had him read Groves’ report and conferred with him about it.” After reading the document, President Truman felt “tremendously pepped up.” The next day, Prime Minister Churchill was even more enthusiastic, telling the British Chiefs of Staff that the weapon would help the West redress the balance of power in Europe that seemed so favorable to the Soviet Union. (July 21, 1945, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 52: 31]; Alanbrooke, *War Diaries*, p. 709.) Further messages from Washington indicated that two bombs would be ready for combat use by August 1. (Vincent C. Jones, *MANHATTAN: The Army and the Atomic Bomb*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1985], pp. 234, 236.)

Did this new weapon eliminate the need for Soviet intervention in the Pacific war, the president asked of Marshall. “Of course Marshall could not answer directly or explicitly,” Stimson noted.

We had desired the Russians to come into the war originally for the sake of holding up in Manchuria the Japanese Manchurian Army. That now was being accomplished as the Russians have amassed their forces on that border, Marshall said, and were poised, and the Japanese were moving up positions in their Army. But he pointed out that even if we went ahead in the war without the Russians, and compelled the Japanese to surrender to our terms, that would not prevent the Russians from marching into Manchuria anyhow and striking, thus permitting them to get virtually what they wanted in the surrender terms. (July 23, 1945, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 52: 36].)

Marshall believed that the United States did not *require* Soviet assistance to conquer Japan, but it would be *useful* in saving time and casualties. In the Combined Chiefs of Staff’s “Agreed Summary of Conclusions Reached” at Potsdam—approved by Truman and Churchill on July 24—paragraph 7a stated that the Allies should “encourage Russian entry into the war against Japan.” (This report is in *Foreign Relations, Potsdam Conference*, 2: 1462–73; quote on p. 1463.)

Marshall regarded using atomic bombs as necessary to shorten the war, and he never thereafter altered his belief. Extraordinarily destructive U.S. air raids on Japan and disastrous Japanese losses in the Pacific islands campaigns had not appeared to undermine Japanese morale, and U.S. planners expected the invasion of the home islands to be costly in American and Japanese lives. Marshall was aware that Japanese diplomats

were extending some peace feelers, but the evidence indicated that the Imperial Japanese Army not the Foreign Ministry was in charge, and the army “could only apparently be slugged into submission”—which they would be if they ignored the Potsdam Declaration’s July 26 call for unconditional surrender. (*George C. Marshall Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue*, 3d ed. [Lexington, Va.: George C. Marshall Foundation, 1996], pp. 424–25. The declaration or proclamation is in *Foreign Relations, Potsdam Conference*, 2: 1474–76.)

On July 24, Marshall received Groves’s draft directive ordering the use of the bomb. Marshall approved it; the following morning he secured Secretary Stimson’s approval and discussed it with President Truman. That same day (July 25), the message was sent from General Thomas T. Handy (acting chief of staff) to General Carl Spaatz (commanding general, U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces); the directive began: “The 509 Composite Group, 20th Air Force will deliver its first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki.” (A facsimile of this document is in Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *The Pacific: MATTERHORN to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945*, a volume in *The Army Air Forces in World War II* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953], facing p. 697. President Truman told Dr. Cate in 1953 that he made the final decision on the bomb while at sea on August 2 or 3. [Ibid., p. 714.] See also Jones, *MANHATTAN*, p. 534.)

By July 24, with the Combined Chiefs of Staff’s conference report approved and the ultimatum to Japan nearly ready, there was little left for British and American military leaders to do, and they prepared to depart. First, however, that afternoon they held their only meeting with the Soviet chiefs of staff. Red Army leader General A. I. Antonov described preparations for an attack on Japanese forces in the Far East. Marshall followed with a comprehensive explanation of Japan’s military position in the Pacific and China. He concluded by giving Antonov a book analyzing the United States’s experiences in fighting the Japanese. Admiral King and General Arnold made brief supplemental remarks. The British Chiefs of Staff explained the military situation in Southeast Asia. (See the minutes of this meeting in *Foreign Relations, Potsdam Conference*, 2: 344–53.)

The Potsdam Conference took a brief hiatus between July 25 and 30. Winston Churchill and other British civilian leaders returned to London on the twenty-fifth to observe the vote counting from the recent election. The British Chiefs of Staff likewise departed that day, and Admiral Leahy flew to London to visit friends. Secretary of War Stimson left for Munich to visit General Patton before returning to the United States. General Marshall and Admiral King planned to fly separately to Salzburg, Austria, on the twenty-seventh to do some sightseeing around Hitler’s former

headquarters at Berchtesgaden, Germany. Marshall and his aide, Frank McCarthy, also hoped to do some trout fishing. ★

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Top Secret

July 26, 1945
Potsdam, Germany

In Admiral Leahy's absence, Admiral King, General Arnold and I feel that we have completed our military business here at Potsdam. The second meeting with the Russian Military Staff this afternoon finishes, so far as we can see, such business as we might possibly transact at this time with them.¹ Further, we feel that our departure tomorrow morning would have the advantage of indicating to the Russians that we were not in a position of soliciting their support nor dependent upon their participation in the war in the Far East.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The July 26 meeting did not include the British Chiefs of Staff, who had already returned home, but was called in order that the Soviets could answer five technical military questions put to them at the previous meeting by the J.C.S. (For minutes of the meeting, see *Foreign Relations, Potsdam Conference*, 2: 408–17; the memorandum containing the questions is on pp. 1327–28.) Arnold later noted that the Soviets' agreeing to all five U.S. requests and making decisions without needing to refer everything to Stalin "was an innovation." (Arnold, *Global Mission*, p. 591.)

TO WINSTON S. CHURCHILL¹

July 31, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mr. Churchill, I have so often expressed appreciation and regard for the leadership which you have given to all of us in this war that I shall not repeat myself at this time. But I do wish to tell you that you are held so highly in the esteem of the American Army that I feel free to speak for all ranks in expressing a deep appreciation of your great services.

For myself, I hope very much for and shall look forward to a continuation of our association and of the discussions which we have had during the past three years. I am particularly glad that I had an evening alone with you at Potsdam.

With my affectionate regards to you and to Mrs. Churchill, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Churchill had resigned as prime minister on July 26, following his party's over-

whelming election defeat. The voters of Great Britain had cast their ballots for a new government on July 5, but counting was delayed until July 26 to permit the soldiers' vote to arrive from overseas. General Arnold observed in his memoirs that at the various social gatherings during the Potsdam Conference, the election had been a common topic of conversation. "The British were quite confident Churchill would be re-elected; the only question seemed to be how much of a majority he would receive." Americans predicted a significantly greater majority than the British. (Arnold, *Global Mission*, pp. 590–91.) Churchill managed to carry his own constituency, but not by his usual overwhelming majority. The Labour party won 390 of 640 seats, the Conservative party only 195—almost reversing their positions in the previous Parliament. The new prime minister was Clement R. Attlee, who had accompanied Churchill to the Potsdam Conference.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

July 31, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Eisenhower: After seeing your Berchtesgaden rest center in full operation and also something of what had been done in Paris I came away with an impression that a splendid job is being done for the morale of the men. However, in my opinion, there is one phase that has not yet been touched which I think is highly important from the viewpoint of typical American reactions.

The movements to the great rest centers have to be handled with large groups of men and even though they are given a choice of what they want to do at each center, wherever they go there are again considerable groups being shown about. This is absolutely necessary and is beautifully handled. However, it leaves the man short of that feeling of independence which all Americans crave. Therefore I have this suggestion to make:

Would it be practicable to permit each regiment or similar unit to send out once a week, for a week, one or two small groups of men, about ten, each with a responsible noncom, with a truck, basic elements of the ration and a definite mileage or gasoline allowance. These men to be allowed to go wherever they chose except to the organized leave areas or into a Russian zone, for example; the point being that they could plan their own affairs and for a brief period be on their own. They would have to subscribe to all local regulations though it might be possible to permit them to buy certain things that are otherwise forbidden, such as milk and eggs and vegetables, that cannot be put up for the winter.

I realize that the head of the Military Police organization, probably Army commanders and almost certainly local area commanders, would not view such a prospect with approval. However, that does not greatly impress me. In my experience I have found that officers and men alike crave a feeling of at least temporary independence and while the sugges-

tion above could only apply to a very few people, nevertheless it would be a leaven to the general tenor of the command.

Don't let my proposal embarrass you. It is merely an idea.¹ Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Eisenhower replied on August 17: "I think your idea . . . is a good one," and said he would send instructions to his army commanders to carry it out. (*The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, ed., Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., et al., 21 vols. [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970–2001], 6: 293–94. An example of Eisenhower's implementing letter is on pp. 298–99.)

TO MRS. JOHN J. SINGER

August 1, [1945]
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Marie, I returned yesterday at 1:30 from Europe. Katherine met me and we had lunch together here at the office. She seemed in much better health than when I left; she had a four-day stay in New York with the Frank McCoys and Allene, following a week's stay there by Molly.

I had breakfast at Berchtesgaden, lunch in Paris, dinner in the Azores and breakfast in Bermuda, but I was delayed there four hours because of a low ceiling at Washington. While I had eaten my breakfast at 5:00 o'clock and worked on the War Department pouch of four days' business until 8:30, I then drove to Government House and joined Lord and Lady Burghley¹ for breakfast and had a half hour with them.

The conference at Potsdam was hard work and rather trying but we were comfortably set up and had some very pleasant evenings. The pleasantest part of the trip was my stay at Berchtesgaden. While Hitler's establishment high up in the mountains had been destroyed² the town itself, which is in the heart of the mountains, was untouched and is exceedingly picturesque. I had Himmler's suite in the hotel,³ with a broad balcony giving an outlook on a marvelous view. Did some unsuccessful trout fishing—too much rain had muddied the streams. I am now getting back to work.

I hope your golf score is improving.

With my love, Affectionately,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Lord Burghley had been governor and commander in chief of Bermuda since 1943.

2. Hitler's retreat in the Bavarian Alps was called the Berghof; the "Eagle's Nest," a small house on the mountain peak above the Berghof, survived the war.

3. Heinrich Himmler had been head of the Nazi SS (*Schutzstaffeln*), which included the Nazi party's special police and, by 1945, 800,000 men in combat units (*Waffen-SS*).

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SURLES

August 1, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

We are undoubtedly going to have a considerable reaction from the soldiers against restricting them in the matter of trophies, war souvenirs.¹ I should like the War Department attitude to be considered immediately from the viewpoint of our doing something first and not being thrown on the explanatory defensive. At the moment I have this thought for a possible early release.

A transport recently arrived at Norfolk not only carrying Marlene Dietrich with 11 revolvers of one type or another, for which she had a certificate of permission, but I am told there were 35,000 trophy weapons on the vessel² and also that the FBI were much concerned over this rate of distribution of such firearms about the United States.

I was talking to Patton three days ago at Berchtesgaden and he told me that he had been greatly shocked to receive the statistics of his Headquarters showing that in a single week in the Third Army 70 soldiers had been killed and 500 wounded in fooling with the German machine pistol. As a result these pistols have been called in for safekeeping, labeled with the man's name.

Now with Marlene Dietrich as the saleslady for the publicity, the 35,000 weapons on the vessel and what Patton has just told me, certainly a very newsy release could be turned out based largely on confiscating Marlene's trophies despite the fact that she had a certificate authorizing her to keep them. The presentation of the story need not concentrate on depriving the soldier of his trophies, to his profound irritation and probably to the encouragement of political reactions as usual. On the other hand the implication would be very clear. Possibly it would be better to give the story to a single individual rather than have a general release, provided immediate publicity would result. Couldn't something like the following be done:

"The Army finds itself in a difficult position with relation to a glamorous moving picture star. Global warfare has been productive of many complications but the most recent is rather unique.

"A transport recently arrived at Newport News with Marlene Dietrich as its most conspicuous personality. She had been 11 months overseas and had worked valiantly for the entertainment of the soldiers. The complications in the matter grew out of the fact that she arrived with 11 weapons in her possession, mostly pistols, all trophies given her and for which she had an official permit signed by an officer in Europe.

“Investigation revealed the fact that there were approximately 35,000 weapons, trophies, in the possession of the troops on the transport. The FBI people were much disturbed at such a wholesale distribution of highly dangerous firearms. Marlene’s 11 trophies were taken over by the Army and she has submitted a formal protest.

“The general complications in this matter are increasing daily and the soldier of course is deeply resentful of any restrictions regarding his trophies of the fighting in which he risked his life. However, the consequences of unrestricted permission in this matter can be very serious as evidenced by the fact that recently in a single week in one of our Armies in Europe 70 men were killed and 500 wounded in mishandling German machine pistols which had been seized as trophies.”³

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Army Service Forces headquarters had recommended that the section on war trophies in *War Department Circular 155* (May 28, 1945) be amended to prohibit an individual from bringing into the United States more than one serviceable authorized type of enemy firearm. This was done in late August. (See the documents in NA/RG 165 [OCS, 332.2 (July 29, 1945)].)

2. There were approximately 4,500 men on the vessel. Dietrich, a film star since 1922, had been born in Berlin in December 1901, but since 1937 she had been a United States citizen. In 1944 and 1945, she spent months entertaining Allied troops in North Africa and close to the front in western Europe, sometimes at considerable danger to herself.

3. Marshall’s statement (corrected to note that Dietrich had been overseas ten months and had only ten pistols in her possession) was given to *Time*, but the magazine did not run the story. Several months later, a brief item in *Newsweek* noted that the Treasury Department’s Alcohol Tax Unit (which enforced the National Firearms Act) estimated that there were 2.5 enemy firearms in the United States for every soldier who had returned from overseas. (“Souvenirs of Death,” *Newsweek* 27 [April 29, 1946]: 24.)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
Radio. *Secret*

August 2, 1945
Washington, D.C.

For MacArthur from Marshall. WAR 42453 canceled and following substituted therefore.¹ “Reference your C-25042 the War Department is requesting aid from Public Health Service. Recent theater statistical health reports submitted to the War Department indicate that incidence of venereal disease in the Philippines has reached such proportions as to adversely affect efficiency of command. Is there any assistance other than that referred to above which the War Department can give you?”

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. "It was not easy to draft a cable to General MacArthur," Robert Cutler (a lawyer in civil life and a colonel in the War Department's Legislative and Liaison Division in 1945) wrote after the war. "He was regarded in the Pentagon and elsewhere, not as a Person but as a Personage. Cables to him, like his own replies, were often works of art. One did not cable to General MacArthur by ringing for a secretary and saying: 'Take a cable, Miss Jones.'" On August 1, someone in O.P.D. had done just that, however, in a cable that read:

Data contained in theater medical reports indicate incidence of venereal disease in Philippines among your troops has reached such proportions as to interfere with efficiency of your command. War Department requesting aid from Public Health Service re C-25042 [of July 12, 1945]. Please advise as to seriousness of conditions, possible operational implications, and any further assistance War Department can give.

(Cutler to Forrest C. Pogue, February 26, 1961, GCMRL/Reminiscences About Marshall; WARCOS to MacArthur, Radio No. WAR-42453, August 1, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) The document printed here is Marshall's more artful version of the original message.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
Radio. *Secret*

August 2, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Personal for MacArthur from Marshall. We are in the midst of considering reassignments of officers returning from ETO which present many complications, your needs, the desirability of putting combat officers at the head of various school and other activities here in the United States which are preparing men for your campaigns, etc. In considering the various proposals the thought has occurred to me that you might desire to have selected high ranking men given you on what might be called a supernumerary basis for possible use in case of casualties or where it appears desirable to you to change command. Having this last in mind I wish to bring up the names of some of the outstanding divisional leaders to see if you wish them sent to your theater, otherwise we shall go about their assignment here at home.

The first of these is Major General Maxwell D. Taylor now in command of the 101st Airborne Division. He was among the half dozen most conspicuously successful division commanders in the heavy fighting in Europe, displaying great personal courage and leading his division aggressively through exceedingly hard fighting, following the first air jump into the Cherbourg Peninsula, later on a similar jump into Holland and again in the closing phases of the fighting at Bastogne. He speaks Japanese and was in that country from 1935 to 1939.

Another officer in the category of exceptional leadership is Major General Anthony C. McAuliffe who was with Taylor in the 101st Division and made the principal fight at Bastogne in command of that division and later performed conspicuously in command of the 103d Division.

Still another is Major General James M. Gavin, now commanding the 82d Airborne Division, a young man of extraordinary powers of leadership and conspicuous personal courage.

Another is Major General Robert T. Frederick who originally commanded a special commando force of Americans and Canadians conspicuously in Italy, later commanded a division airborne into the landing in southern France and still later commanded the 45th Division in the heavy fighting on the Maginot Line and in the crossing the Rhine and advance into Czechoslovakia.¹

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The editors have not found a response from MacArthur.

TO COLONEL CASSIUS POUST¹

August 7, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Col. Poust: I have your letter of 23 July concerning the relief from active duty of Lieutenant Colonel George A. Wiltrakis of the Medical Corps and understand your desire to have him return to his duties with the Illinois Department of Public Welfare.²

The War Department has established a procedure whereby officers may be relieved from active duty to accept civilian employment when their relief for this employment is in the national interest. I have, therefore, directed that a copy of your letter be referred to Colonel Wiltrakis for initiation of the necessary request for relief from active duty if he so desires. The request, when submitted, will be carefully considered and if it is determined that the officer can render more valuable service to the nation in a civilian capacity, his relief from active duty will be authorized.

I am sorry that I cannot be of more immediate assistance to you, but I believe you can readily understand why it is impossible for me to direct Colonel Wiltrakis' release from here. An impossible situation would be created if I were to intervene for personal reasons in matters of this sort concerning an individual when the responsibility has been specifically delegated to other authorities.

With best wishes for your success as director of the Illinois Department of Public Welfare. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Poust had commanded the Illinois National Guard's 129th Infantry when Marshall was senior instructor in Chicago (1933–36). He recently had become director of the Illinois Department of Public Welfare.

2. Dr. Wiltrakis, one of Illinois's top physicians and medical administrators, had been on active duty since early 1941. Poust desired that he become director of the medical and

surgical services in the twelve state hospitals. (Poust to Marshall, July 23, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

TO MAJOR GENERAL JOHN W. O'DANIEL¹
Confidential

August 8, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear O'Daniel: Confidentially, there is quite a probability that in the near future Marshal Zhukov may visit Benning.² He will probably be under the guidance of General Devers³—who also incidentally does not yet know of this possibility. I should like you to do a little advanced thinking on what would be most impressive to a Russian in our set-up and procedure.

Zhukov will undoubtedly feel that our arrangements are on too extravagant a scale, considering how such matters are handled in Russia, so it is not a question of impressing him with the vastness of our arrangements but more as to the thoroughness of our methods and the expeditious manner in which they are carried through; also the quality of our men. We wish to do him honor just as the Russian Government in a week or ten days is planning to do for General Eisenhower and a portion of his staff in Moscow, but I am concerned with the impression he gets of American potential power. Please turn this matter over in your mind to see how best my purpose can be carried out at Benning.

You will hear from General Devers direct in this matter once he has been advised of Marshal Zhukov's prospective visit. Until then, have nothing to say to other people.⁴ Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Former commanding general of the Third Infantry Division (1944–45), O'Daniel had recently become commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia.

2. Zhukov had become military governor of the Soviet zone of Germany on August 1. Eisenhower had been expecting an invitation to visit Moscow, and he noted in a message to Marshall on July 31: "In this connection you informed me that upon receipt of such invitation you intended to issue one to Marshal Zhukov to visit the United States"—which Zhukov was anxious to do. President Truman was thinking along similar lines, and at the end of the Potsdam Conference he extended an invitation through Stalin. (*Papers of DDE*, 6: 228–29.)

3. Jacob Devers, who had been promoted to general in March 1945, had become commanding general, Army Ground Forces, on July 1.

4. Marshall had rather elaborate ideas regarding the program for the marshal's visit: New York City, West Point, Washington, ground and air installations, the Grand Canyon, and possibly Yellowstone National Park. (Marshall to Bradley, August 2, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) On September 17 the Soviet government accepted the invitation. The visit was scheduled for early October, but about that time Zhukov fell ill, and the trip was postponed until the spring of 1946. By that time, however,

the Soviets had no further interest in Zhukov's visiting the United States. (Otto Preston Chaney, Jr., *Zhukov* [Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971], p. 343.)

TO GENERAL CARL SPAATZ¹
Radio No. WAR-45991. *Secret*

August 8, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Personal Eyes Only for Spaatz from Marshall.

A teletype message, WAR 4542 was sent you yesterday by Surles regarding public statements relative to the atomic bomb. You and General LeMay are being widely quoted in papers all over United States on your remarks regarding results of such a bomb on landings in Normandy, to the effect that our present Army is not necessary for the further prosecution of the war in the Pacific and that an invasion will be unnecessary, and that the future of Armies has been decidedly curtailed.² I wish you would refrain from any such comments and see that those about you do the same. However good your intentions you can do incalculable harm back here in the excited state of America and in view of the difficulties I am now having in supporting the Army.³

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-45991])

1. On July 29, 1945, Spaatz had arrived on the island of Guam to assume command of the new U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific, which included the Twentieth Air Force under Major General Curtis LeMay. Spaatz immediately made LeMay his chief of staff.

2. The first combat use of an atomic bomb occurred on August 6 at 9:15 A.M. (Tinian time; 7:15 A.M. August 5 in Washington, D.C.) over Hiroshima by B-29 *Enola Gay* of the 509th Composite Group flying out of Tinian Island in the Marianas. On August 8, after the initial aerial reconnaissance photographs were available detailing the damage, Spaatz and LeMay held a press conference on Guam in which the airmen left no doubt that air forces alone could now defeat Japan. LeMay asserted that if the atomic bomb had been ready in early 1943, there would have been no need for the Normandy invasion. (*New York Times*, August 8, 1945, p. 3.)

3. In his nearly complete third *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War* [Washington: GPO, 1945], Marshall observed: "This Nation's destiny clearly lies in a sound permanent security policy. In the War Department's proposals there are two essentials: (1) Intense scientific research and development; (2) a permanent peacetime citizen army" (p. 6). The key part, in Marshall's view, of the second essential—universal military training—was receiving heavy fire from certain civilian organizations and consequently in Congress, despite his stout defense of the concept. Furthermore, Congress had already adjourned until the autumn without passing a bill the War Department considered important that would give it authority to commission 250 officers in the three lower grades of the Regular Army as a "trial run" for expanding the size of the permanent establishment. (See the *Army and Navy Journal*, July 21, 1945, p. 1420.)

NOTES FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR'S
PRESS CONFERENCE¹

August 8, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

The first reactions to the appearance of the atomic bomb over Hiroshima were to be expected but I am amazed at the rapidity with which conclusions are being formed in this country regarding the effect of such a weapon on our military policy and the present and future strength of the Army.² We have been working for several years towards the production of the bomb and during that time have given lengthy consideration not only to its immediate effect on the Government and the people of Japan but more particularly to its relationship to military requirements for the future; so it is rather surprising, though typically American, to find complete conclusions drawn in a few hours regarding a matter which those immediately responsible have been laboring with for several years and who have not yet arrived at any such definite conclusions as those announced during the past 24 hours.

I will say this at this time, that in my opinion and that of General Marshall and his associates, the bomb, from a military standpoint, is merely another weapon much more powerful than any of its predecessors, but that it is not an easy way out. We think under the special circumstances that now exist in Japan that that Government must decide immediately whether it will surrender or will choose to be extinguished. That special situation, however, does not in our opinion alter the main requirements for military power in the future. If there is any one fact that has been demonstrated time and again in this war it is that to conclude a victory, to prevent the enemy from continuing destructive action against you, a ground Army must move in and take over control of his resources and his power for destruction. The case of the V-bombs is a perfect illustration of this point. Until the Allied armies overran northern France, London remained under the destructive attack of these frightful weapons.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The press conference was cancelled. See note 1, Notes for the Secretary of War's Press Conference, August 9, 1945, p. 262.

2. At a press conference on August 7, Marshall had distributed a one-page not-for-attribution memorandum entitled "Size of the Army" that assumed that Japan would fight on; thus the overall strength of the army would be reduced only to 6,968,000 by June 30, 1946. "Whether this figure can be decreased will depend upon the success of our operations, the Japanese reaction, the action of the Soviets, etc." (Size of the Army, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) The army's peak strength had been reached in May 1945 at 8,291,000. (U.S. Army Service Forces, *Statistical Review, World War II: A Summary of ASF Activities* [Washington: GPO, 1946], p. 57.)

NOTES FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR'S
PRESS CONFERENCE¹

[August 8, 1945]
[Washington, D.C.]

General Surles: Here is another suggested paragraph for the Secretary's press conference:

Regarding the demobilization or the release of high score men in continental United States who are reported in the press or have reported themselves to members of Congress or representatives of the radio and press as not being employed in critical work, of the following should be said:

There are 3,000 posts, cantonments or depots in continental United States, all of which are involved one way or another with the redeployment of troops to the Pacific, many of which are heavily engaged in the demobilization of soldiers or in the movement of supplies to the Army in general and the Pacific theater in particular. Until replacements can be found for these men they must continue to do the work on which they are now engaged for these installations are working under heavier pressure than at any other period in the past two years.

There are only two sources of replacements. One would be men recently inducted into the service who are now being trained as replacements for the long-term in the Pacific and for prospective casualties resulting from disease or battle. To assign these men to installations in the United States would immediately provoke a much more serious situation in the Pacific both as to morale and as to the support of pending operations. The other source, and the one which will be utilized as soon as the men can be made available in continental United States, consists of low score men surplus to the requirements of the European Theater. Shipping for the return of these men to the United States will not be available until two other groups have preceded them—first, those required for operations in the Pacific, that is, according to the redeployment schedule; and second, the high score men in Europe who are entitled in our opinion to return to the United States before the high score men already in the United States are released.

The situation is not at all simple and conclusions should not be drawn from the case of a single individual or small group here or there. It would not be exaggeration to say that if, under the present public pressure, the Army started to release immediately all of the men now on duty in the United States who have sufficient points, the redeployment of troops to end the Pacific War and the release of highest point men only now returning from overseas would suffer critically. For the past year the War Department has exercised great pressure on installations in the United States to replace men who have had no overseas experience with combat veterans who have done their share. Consequently, 78,000 of the troops

in this country handling the vital work of redeployment and processing the highest point men out of the army, have themselves enough points for discharge.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. No press conference was held; see the following document.

NOTES FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR'S
PRESS CONFERENCE¹

August 9, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

The War Department will of course appraise the military situation and the size of the Army in the light of the successful use of the bomb and the new declaration of war.² The possibilities of the bomb have been under consideration for more than a year and the probability of Russia's entry into the war has also been involved in our planning for a considerable period of time. In other words the possibilities of the successful use of the atomic bomb and Russian entry into the war have been given full weight in determining our operational requirements in the Pacific.³

We shall also give heed to any additional factors which may develop from day to day but we shall not do our duty if we plan for the reduction of the Army by even one man below the number which we believe will be needed for the complete defeat of Japan with the least possible loss of American lives.⁴

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall was not aware when he wrote this that the press conference would not occur. Secretary Stimson noted in his diary: "When I reached the office this morning I found that the affirmative news for the press conference was so light that Surles thought we had better call the conference off and simply have me make a direct statement on the effect of the success of the atomic bomb on the future size of the Army." (August 9, 1945, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 52: 64].)

2. Stimson noted in his diary that the news of the Russians' entry into the war with Japan had reached Washington, D.C., the previous day. (Ibid., p. 67.)

3. The secretary of the General Staff noted that Secretary Stimson "does not concur" with the content of this sentence. (Colonel Frank McCarthy Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, August 9, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, SGS, Memos to Chief of Staff].)

4. "We had news this morning of another successful atomic bomb being dropped on Nagasaki," Stimson commented in his diary. "These two heavy blows have fallen in quick succession upon the Japanese and there will be quite a little space before we intend to drop another. During that time I hope something may be done in negotiating a surrender. I have done the best I could to promote that in my talks with the President and with [Secretary of State] Byrnes and I think they are both in full sympathy with the aim." (August 9, 1945, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 52: 67].)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Secret

August 10, 1945
Washington, D.C.

The attached proposal for the immediate relief of our prisoners of war is, in my opinion, of primary importance. We are at work on plans for evacuation by ship and by air.

This matter will undoubtedly have to be coordinated with the British and Chinese. The proposal is written so that they can later name additional places for assembly of their nationals.¹

[Enclosure]

As a condition precedent to a discussion of the proposal of the Japanese government,² the governments of the United States, the British Commonwealth and China require that the Japanese government immediately forthwith and without delay transport the prisoners and other nationals they now hold of the three nations just mentioned and any other nationals of the United Nations to the points hereinafter indicated for immediate release to the representatives of the nations concerned. The Japanese government will facilitate the evacuation of these released prisoners by whatever means the Allied governments concerned find convenient. There will be no cessation of the naval and air attacks on the Japanese Empire and forces elsewhere until the foregoing condition is complied with:

Places designated are:

Keijo — Korea
Dairen — Kwantung
Tsingtao — China
Tokao — Formosa
Canton — China
Fukuoka — Kyushu
Osaka — Honshu
Yokosuka — Honshu
Murovan — Hakkaido

and such additional places as may be designated later by the governments of the United States, Great Britain and China.³

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The memorandum (but not the enclosure) was marked “not used,” presumably because the subject was being handled by the secretaries of war and state, who had received copies of Marshall’s draft proposal.

2. Just after 7:30 A.M. on August 10, U.S. signals intelligence monitors picked up a Japanese transmission in the clear to the governments of Sweden and Switzerland for retransmittal to the U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R., and China governments asserting Japan’s desire for “a speedy termination of hostilities. . . . The Japanese Government are ready to accept the terms enumerated in the joint declaration which was issued at Potsdam on July 26th . . . with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which

prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler.” (*Foreign Relations*, 1945, 6: 627.)

3. On August 11, the four Allies acknowledged receipt of the Japanese note and accepted the stipulation regarding the emperor but added that he would be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. Moreover, “Immediately upon the surrender the Japanese Government shall transport prisoners of war and civilian internees to places of safety, as directed, where they can quickly be placed aboard Allied transports.” (*Ibid.*, pp. 631–32.)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. August 10, 1945
EISENHOWER AND GENERAL JOSEPH T. MCNARNEY [Washington, D.C.]
[Radio No. WAR-47209.] *Secret*

Personal to Eisenhower and McNarney from Marshall. When you are formally notified of the capitulation of Japan we want you immediately to reverse the priorities for movement of organizations and men to the U.S. In general terms first priority must go instanter to men for demobilization, second priority to low score men required as replacements for zone of interior installations in U.S. regarding which detailed instructions will be sent you. We cannot at this time give you a final critical score but in the interest of prompt return of the greatest number of people you should return all with the score of 85 or over, and make plans to return those with a score of 75 or over if necessary to fill available shipping. My thought is that when Japan surrenders the return of personnel from your theaters for discharge will have priority over all but MacArthur’s most urgent requirements and we must all do everything within our power to release personnel just as rapidly as possible. Will you please give this your personal attention and keep me advised.¹

NA/RG 165 (OPD, 370.9, Case 260)

1. “While I find that all necessary orders have been issued,” Eisenhower replied on August 16, “I am placing a very good man on this job [Brigadier General George S. Eyster (U.S.M.A., 1917)] to follow it up personally. We will do our very best.” (*Papers of DDE*, 6: 260–61.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Secret

August 10, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

For your information, instructions have already been issued by the War Department for the curtailment of redeployment, the re-routing of shipping and the expeditious demobilization of long service or high point men, the procedure to commence the moment the capitulation of Japan is

assured. Meanwhile, however, certain changes are being effected which could later be reversed without unfortunate consequences should there be a failure in the negotiations.

Similar preliminary measures are being taken to expedite the arrangements for the cut-backs in production.

As our general planning against such an eventuality was being brought up to date as of September 15th, it is a comparatively simple matter to arrange for the interim procedure until the full formal program is completely under way.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Secret

August 11, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Supplementing the memorandum which I sent you yesterday on preliminary measures in anticipation of Japanese capitulation, ammunition shipments have been stopped both at depots and ports; solidly loaded ammunition ships now at sea have been called back; over 50,000 troops have been added to personnel center staffs for training in anticipation of the larger numbers to be discharged during the coming months; arrangements have been made to release gasoline for immediate civilian use; 144 airdromes have been returned to the Navy or to their civilian owners; telegraphic instructions to all contractors regarding cancellation of contracts are now ready for issue when capitulation is assured; discontinuance of construction projects not required for demobilization purposes (additions to industrial and transportation facilities) has been directed.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR
Top Secret

August 11, 1945
Washington, D.C.

A letter to be dispatched to the Director of Selective Service when the Japanese surrender is accepted has been presented to you. It calls for reduction of inductions under the Selective Service Act from 80,000 a month to 50,000 a month. In my opinion, it is very important that this action be confirmed by the President and given immediate publicity. It is of even more importance that by this means the President give evidence of his intention to support us in continuing inductions on the reduced

scale indicated. Only by this means can we continue the relief of the men who have had long and arduous service. There is much discussion of this subject in the press and in Congressional circles.¹

In view of the above, I suggest the advisability of obtaining the President's approval or at least informal concurrence for your action in dispatching the letter referred to General Hershey.²

G. C. Marshall

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall enclosed a proposed press release justifying continuance of the draft as necessary to supply men for occupation duty and as replacements for those with lengthy wartime service. "Mathematically and morally no other course of action appears acceptable."

2. On the file copy of this memorandum was written "not used," and in Marshall's hand: "Acted on by S/W. G. C. M." President Truman approved the letter to Hershey on August 13, and a slightly modified version was issued over Secretary Stimson's signature the following day. The letter stated that the army desired "the age groups which contain the fewest family men and the fewest industrially skilled experts" and only men below age twenty-six. (Stimson to Hershey, August 14, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Top Secret

August 11, 1945

[Washington, D.C.]

Following are two messages, one from General Spaatz on Guam, Commander of the Strategic Air Forces, and the other just sent by me to General Spaatz. I think they are self-explanatory.

From General Spaatz:

"Weather conditions during the past twenty-four hours influenced me to withhold any large scale operations under conditions which now exist. Not knowing the extent to which area bombing may complicate the situation, am for the present limiting our operations to attacks on military targets visually or under very favorable blind bombing conditions. Unless I hear from you otherwise, will continue this policy until it is determined whether or not Japan offer is acceptable. It is significant that our weather airplane over Tokio today received no antiaircraft fire. This is unusual."

To General Spaatz:

"Reference your message of August 11, you were quoted in the press with the statement that 'The Superforts are not flying today', which has been accepted generally as positive indication that bombing of Japan had been terminated, also that

Halsey's fleet had ceased attacks. This presents very delicate and critical problem to the President. Resumption of bombing would appear to indicate that preliminary negotiations had fallen through, giving rise to a storm of publicity and confusing views. Until I can reach the President and Secretary of War in about an hour do not dispatch any more missions but carry out these instructions in such a manner as absolutely to avoid any news item leaking out from Guam, Saipan or Okinawa. Please make no further press comments of any kind until given release from here."¹

Until I hear from you direct or from the Secretary of War, the temporary stay of bombing by the Strategic Air Forces will continue. No instructions have been sent to General MacArthur whose operations are continuing. I assume that Admiral Halsey's operations are continuing.

Copies of this message are being sent immediately to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The news report was in error; no instructions had been issued to cease military operations. (Telephone conversation of August 13, 9:00 A.M., between Major General John E. Hull [assistant chief of staff for Operations] and Vice Admiral Charles M. Cooke, Jr. [assistant chief of staff for Plans], NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 17, Item 35A].) Admiral William F. Halsey had been commander of the Third Fleet since June 1944.

2. On the cover sheet to the copy of this memorandum that Marshall sent to Secretary Stimson on August 11, he wrote: "Note – 10:40 A.M. The President telephoned me that he approved of action indicated in next to last par.—bombing by strategic air force is to [be] discontinued until he, the President, directs otherwise. I have so advised S/W. G. C. M."

Shortly after the Truman-Marshall telephone conversation, the State Department told the War Department that President Truman wanted the B-29s to fly a leaflet mission over Japan, informing the Japanese people of their government's offer of surrender and the four-power reply. (Pasco Memorandum for the Military Aide to the President [Brigadier General Harry H. Vaughan], August 11, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) The mission was flown on the morning of August 14; five million leaflets were dropped on Japanese cities giving the full texts of the Japanese acceptance of surrender and the U.S. reply. Heretofore, these negotiations had been kept from the Japanese public, and some leaders in Tokyo feared that they would spawn a military coup d'état aimed at preventing surrender. Indeed, sporadic coup attempts were already under way and lasted for two days. (See Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar, *Code-Name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan—and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb* [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995], pp. 279–88.)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
Radio No. WAR-47838. *Top Secret*

August 11, 1945
Washington, D.C.

TOPSEC Eyes Only Marshall to MacArthur.

Negotiations between the Allied Governments on the question of Japanese capitulation has delayed issue by JCS to you and Nimitz of a directive for procedure on capitulation. It is anticipated that shortly you will receive such a directive.¹

The Soviet, British and Chinese Governments have given substantial agreement to the President's proposal that a Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers be designated to enforce the surrender of Japan. This would result in making the authority of the Japanese Emperor to rule the State subject to the Supreme Commander who would take such steps as are necessary to effectuate the surrender terms. The Supreme Commander would be responsible for requiring the Emperor and the Japanese High Command to sign the surrender terms and to issue all required following orders. It is anticipated that a directive of this nature will be distributed shortly.²

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-47838])

1. The twelve-part General Order No. 1 detailed the surrender demands the Allies placed on the Japanese and specified to whom Japanese forces in a particular area would surrender. For example: "I. 1. b. The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within Manchuria, Korea north of 38 degrees north latitude and Karafuto shall surrender to the Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East." (J.C.S. to MacArthur, Radio No. WARX-49961, August 15, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-49961)].)

2. President Truman decided about August 8 that MacArthur would head the occupation forces in Japan (i.e., be Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers [S.C.A.P.]), and this also settled the matter of what officer would preside at the surrender ceremony. The heads of state of Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union endorsed this decision on August 12. On the thirteenth, Truman approved the final wording of the S.C.A.P. directive, and Marshall dispatched it by courier to MacArthur on August 15. (D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur*, 3 vols. [Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970-85], 2: 776; Marshall to MacArthur, August 15, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
Radio No. WAR-47899. *Top Secret*

August 11, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Personal to MacArthur from Marshall.

By direction of the President combat operations of USASTAF have been temporarily suspended. This restriction does not apply to the Navy, or FEAF¹ which, because of the different nature and purpose of their operations, are to continue their air action as planned until such time as directions to cease hostilities are received.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-47899])

1. The Far East Air Forces (FEAF) flew mainly B-24s and B-25s (plus fighter escorts) and were principally committed to tactical targets of value to OLYMPIC, the invasion of

Kyushu planned for November. The B-29s were concentrated in the U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces (USASTAF).

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER
Radio No. WAR-47943. *Top Secret*

August 11, 1945
Washington, D.C.

For Wedemeyer's eyes only from Marshall.

We are in a discussion now regarding deployment of troops into Japan and the return of tired out high score men from the Pacific to the United States. The first requirement involves immediately the diversion of C-54's to a special run from the Philippines to Okinawa and another prospective run into Japan. This diversion of course immediately reduces the evacuation from the Pacific of high score men by the multiple of just that many planes.

What I should like to know from you is how soon you feel we could make a first reduction of hump tonnage in order to release C-54's. I mean by this a reduction prior to the opening of a port;¹ for the situation thereafter of course you already have notification.

I should like an estimate from you as to how much longer the present hump tonnage will be required in order to complete the equipment of the ALFA [*Alpha*] Divisions on the assumption that no further combat operations are required but that of course numerous movements will be involved in order to herd the Japanese Army according to plan.²

NA/RG (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-47943])

1. Wedemeyer estimated that it would require at least thirty days to open the key ports of Shanghai and Canton and a further thirty days to establish adequate distribution from the port areas. (Wedemeyer to Marshall, Radio No. CFB-4461, August 13, 1945, NA/RG 165 [P&O, 336 China, Sec. 1-B-4].)

2. "Current urgent examination," Wedemeyer replied, "indicates that transport aircraft now available in India-Burma and China Theaters will be inadequate to meet requirements for continued movement of essential supplies to China, and concurrently provide timely . . . [lift for] Chinese troops and equipment to critical occupational areas which is urgently desirable" because of Communist intentions to disarm Japanese troops and the possibility that Japanese commanders might be unable to prevent acts of violence by their troops. Wedemeyer did not wish to release any C-54s until the ports were open and adequately running; moreover, Hump operations in support of the Alpha divisions meant that reductions would not be possible for at least sixty to ninety days. (Ibid.)

Chinese "Alpha divisions" (ten thousand men plus a battery of artillery) were organized in early 1945 to be part of the Alpha force, which was to lead the drive to recapture the U.S. air bases in central China lost during the Japanese ICHAGO operation in the spring and summer of 1944. These divisions were to be better organized, paid, supplied, and fed than regular Chinese Army divisions. Alpha force was initially thirty-six divisions but increased to thirty-nine in June 1945. (Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Time Runs Out in CBI*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1959], pp. 151, 165, 232–33, 237.)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER
Radio No. WAR-48661. *Top Secret*

August 12, 1945
Washington, D.C.

TOPSEC for Wedemeyer's Eyes Only from Marshall.

I should like to have your personal views on the following:

It seems to us that there will be a very difficult and critical situation in China following a capitulation because of possible refusal or at least unwillingness of Japanese troops to surrender to the Chinese, feeling that there would be little hope of their obtaining the necessary food and other support from Chinese sources. Under these circumstances might it not be a good procedure for you informally to suggest to the Generalissimo that in his demands on the Japanese forces in China he require them to evacuate certain areas and to concentrate in certain areas, the latter with a view to having present in the harbors American war ships which would, to a certain extent, give assurance to the Japanese that they were not going to be starved or otherwise roughly handled by the Chinese whom they have outraged for the past 8 years. Concentration areas readily permitting a show of United States strength might, for example, be the Tsingtao Peninsula, the vicinity of Shanghai, the vicinity of Canton, and perhaps river ports such as Nanking, etc.

It is anticipated that if the Japanese are hurriedly concentrated in such major ports, the Chinese will probably lack the capability to sustain them. A practical solution might be progressive concentration along the principal lines of communications, due regard being taken as to the location of Japanese depots and any food stocks which might be allocated to their maintenance after surrender. Phased movement thereafter to the major port area might offer the possibility of orderly repatriation. At these port areas, it may be feasible to have U. S. Forces, primarily Naval, present to assist or supervise the final surrender. Also it may be possible and certainly would be highly desirable to concentrate Japanese shipping immediately on convoyed evacuation of Jap troops from China and shipment of rice from Indo-China or Malaysia to ports of Japanese concentrations in China.

A certain advantage from such gradual withdrawal of the Japanese from occupied areas might redound to China in that it would permit of the progressive consolidation of evacuated areas by forces of the Central Government.

The question of shipping for the repatriation of the Japanese is under study. It is estimated that there are about three quarters of a million tons of Japanese shipping which might be made available to return the Japanese from all areas outside the home islands.

While I have referred above essentially to the Japanese Armed Forces in China, it is realized that there are hundreds of thousands of Japanese

civilians there also. These may have to be handled as a separate problem or many of them, including women and children, might become camp followers.

In your discussion with the Generalissimo, no commitments should be made as to the extent of U. S. support from the Pacific in this matter.¹

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Wedemeyer replied that he concurred generally with the idea of gradual concentration of Japanese forces, but complicating matters was the Chinese government's "seriously limited" ability to move its troops into areas the Japanese evacuated. Moreover, Communist troops might oppose by force such movements in order to have the Japanese surrender to them. Wedemeyer said that he would approach Chiang Kai-shek as soon as possible and that he would suggest "that the progressive concentration of Japanese troops be phased with and not started before Central Government troops are in a position to occupy areas evacuated by the Japanese." (Wedemeyer to Marshall, Radio No. CFB-4592, August 14, 1945, NA/RG 165 [P&O, 336 China, Sec. 1-B-4].)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
AND GENERAL CARL SPAATZ

August 13, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Radio No. WARX-48689. *Top Secret*

TOPSEC from Marshall to MacArthur and Spaatz.

Reference WAR 47880 to Spaatz and WAR 47899 to MacArthur concerning very heavy bomber activities,¹ the President directs that we go ahead with everything we've got.²

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-48689])

1. The August 11 message to Spaatz directed that "all strategic air operations of USASTAF will cease at once and any missions which may now be in the air en route to targets will be recalled. This restriction will continue until such time as you may be directed to resume your operations." (NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-47880)].) The message to MacArthur is printed above, pp. 268–69.

2. No word had been received from Japan regarding a surrender by the morning of August 13. This message was sent just after 9:00 A.M., Washington, D.C., time. General Arnold desired a thousand-plane mission, and during the morning of August 14, 828 B-29s (with 186 fighter escorts) bombed Japan. (Craven and Cate, *The Pacific: MATTERHORN to Nagasaki*, pp. 732–33.) Even before all the bombers had returned to their bases, Marshall had sent the following message: "Suspend air operations until further orders repeat air operations only." (Marshall to MacArthur and Spaatz, Radio No. WARX-49346, August 14, 1945 [sent shortly after 3:00 P.M.], NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-49346)].) Truman later wrote that informal word reached the White House of Japan's surrender shortly after 4:00 P.M.; formal word came in at 6:00 P.M.; and the public announcement was made at 7:00 P.M., August 14, 1945. (Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. 1, *Year of Decisions* [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1955], pp. 435–36.)

DRAFT STATEMENT FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR¹

August 13, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Now that hostilities have ceased, the War Department is immediately confronted with three major responsibilities. The first job is to make the victory secure by suitable deployment of our Pacific occupation forces and demilitarizing Japan. The second is to bring home and discharge with all possible speed the men who are no longer required for effective national defense and for the occupational armies in Europe and the Far East and for the normal establishment of the Army. The third is to halt immediately the production of purely war munitions and release facilities for civilian production.

Many of the ships that are now carrying troops and supplies to the Pacific from Europe and from this country will be rerouted to United States ports. Only those carrying men and equipment needed for immediate occupation duty or which are so close to their Pacific destinations that it would be unwise to turn them around will complete their voyages as originally scheduled.

Except for those units which are specifically requested for future shipment by the Commander-in-Chief of Army Forces in the Pacific, General MacArthur, and the Commanding General of the U.S. Forces in the China Theater of Operations, General Wedemeyer, and except for the flow of low-point replacements, the gigantic process of redeployment which started with Germany's surrender will be thrown into reverse.

Air and sea transportation will be utilized to the maximum to return our high score men now overseas to their homes. Immediate action is being taken to enlarge the Separation Centers in this country so they will soon be able to discharge 500,000 men a month.

Our goal is to reduce the Army by 5,000,000 in the next twelve months, but it may take several months longer. More men will have to be moved in less time and over longer distances than ever before. It is a tremendous undertaking.

In order that there may be no delay in starting discharges under a revised point system, we shall continue for the present to release enlisted men under the old adjusted service rating score of 85 and enlisted members of the Women's Army Corps under the old score of 44. For officers the present discharge system will remain unchanged, with preference in discharge to be given to those with the longest and most arduous service.

Within two months arrangements will be completed for putting into effect a revised point system, which will allow troops credit for service after May 12. The aim will be, as in the past, to insure that those who

have had the longest and hardest service receive first consideration for discharge. In addition, all men 38 years of age or older will be automatically eligible for discharge.

Delay in releases on the grounds of military necessity will be limited to a few highly specialized classifications. These classifications embrace a total of about 20,000 men. As conditions permit, some or all of these classifications will be eliminated so that every eligible man may be restored to civilian life.

To guarantee fairness in meeting continuing military requirements, the War Department considers that inductions under the Selective Service system must continue, but at a reduced rate. This will provide new men to replace gradually the present low score men required for occupation forces and other troops overseas in Alaska, Hawaii and the Caribbean. In no other way can these veterans find relief, since the numbers are too large to hope to replace by volunteers.

Selection of units for the occupation forces in the Pacific-China theaters must, of necessity, first be made without regard to whether or not they are Army of the United States (Selective Service), National Guard or Regular Army units.

A complete realignment of personnel in all units in this country and overseas will have to be made on the basis of the new adjusted service rating scores. Only in this way will it be possible to give priority of discharge to those so entitled.

The eagerness with which the men of the Army and their loved ones await their discharge is evident, but even now, if we are to secure the peace, some men who have not yet served a full tour of duty overseas will have to sail to foreign shores to relieve others who have been away a long time. They will go to assignments that involve little or no personal danger, but we would all prefer if they did not have to go at all.

The plans for shutting off the tremendous flow of weapons and equipment that has poured from the factories of America to the war fronts of the world are ready, and will be announced by the Under Secretary of War.

All of us are conscious in this moment of victory of the tremendous debt we owe to the fighting men and at the same time we must have in mind the grim responsibility to make permanent the peace for which so many Americans have given their lives. The next war might destroy the world. It must not come.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Secretary Stimson used this as an attachment to his August 15 statement on army demobilization. (GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO EDWIN C. JOHNSON

August 13, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Senator: I have your letter of July 31 with respect to the promotion of General Kirk, together with the recommendation of the Colorado State Medical Society.¹ Kirk's ability is well known to me in my position as Chief of Staff and also personally as I am a favorable bit of evidence of his surgical skill.²

With your statement that the "situation with respect to the Surgeon General has been intolerable up until a few months ago, etc."³ I do not agree. You characterize the situation as intolerable. I very definitely question the accuracy of this statement and would consider that the discharge of my responsibilities as Chief of Staff would have been a failure if this is the case. There is a wide variety of views in this matter with very few people who are aware of the requirements and necessities and controls to produce a uniform efficiency among the various activities of the Army.

I am glad to have the recommendations of the Colorado State Medical Society and will have them in mind in considering the question of General Kirk's promotion along with that of other major generals similarly situated. I have a high regard for him and great respect for the work that he has done.⁴ Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Senator Johnson of Colorado, the second-ranking Democratic member of the Committee on Military Affairs, had written to send Marshall a letter from the Colorado State Medical Society "urging appropriate recognition" for the army's Medical Department and complaining about the surgeon general's "deplorable" status within the War Department. (Johnson to Marshall, July 31, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected]. The quotations are from Johnson's letter; Marshall returned the Medical Society's letter to the senator.)

2. Norman T. Kirk had operated on Marshall in February 1937 for a thyroid condition. See *Papers of GCM*, 1: 538–39.

3. As a result of the March 1942 army reorganization, the surgeon general—along with many other officials—ceased reporting directly to the U.S. Army chief of staff and was put under the newly created Army Service Forces (A.S.F.). Numerous high-ranking officers had disagreed with the new organization from the beginning. Moreover, whereas the Army Ground Forces took over the functions and authority of the chiefs of Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Coast Artillery, the commanding general of A.S.F. inherited no such unified organization but "simply received command authority over various agencies, each of which retained its separate identity and many of which retained a degree of autonomy"—e.g., the offices of the surgeon general, adjutant general, judge advocate general, and the chief of chaplains. In the case of the Medical Department, its desire to control the procurement and use of personnel, the number and administration of hospitals, the procurement and distribution of medical supplies, and the department's own organizational structure often conflicted with the viewpoints at A.S.F. headquarters. (John D. Millett, *The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1954], pp. 39–40, 95.) In April 1945, all War Department higher commanders had been notified that the surgeon general now could report

directly to Secretary of War Stimson. (Handy Memorandum, April 13, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 020 Surgeon General (1944–45)].)

4. Kirk remained a major general until his retirement in 1947.

TO GENERAL PEDRO AURELIO DE GÓES MONTEIRO

August 13, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear General: It was thoughtful of you to send me by the hand of General Ord¹ an advance copy of the speech made on the occasion of your re-assuming the duties and post of Minister of War.² Your message of greetings, including reference to the recent successful collaboration of our armies in Italy, was also transmitted to me through General Kroner.³

The invaluable aid and the unselfish cooperation of the Brazilian forces in the operations in Italy were of great assistance in expediting the successful termination of the fighting in that region. Their fighting spirit made a genuine contribution to the final victory in Europe.

I am convinced that the future offers greater possibilities for cooperation between the military forces of Brazil and the United States.

With high regard and the hope that you are enjoying the best of health,
Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Major General J. Garesché Ord was chairman of the Joint Brazil–United States Defense Commission in Washington, D.C.

2. The Intelligence Division had sent Marshall an analysis of General Góes Monteiro's August 9 speech; G-2 concluded: "General Góes has had a reputation for military brilliance, and in this speech he appears to have a sound grasp of modern military considerations and of the lessons learned from this war. He seems to have caught a vision of what may be made of the Brazilian Army through continued co-operation with the Army of the United States. . . . Góes appears to be in agreement with U. S. post-war military policy." (Analysis of General Góes Montiero's Speech, undated, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 001 (1944–45)].)

3. Brigadier General Hayes A. Kroner had been military attaché in Brazil since May 1944.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER
Radio No. WAR-49550. *Top Secret*

August 14, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

From Marshall to Wedemeyer for his eyes only.

I have read all of your recent messages including the Generalissimo's plan and your plan for action in China upon the surrender of Japan. Your proposal that we give China first priority over Japan and Korea will not

be acceptable. At the present time it appears that the maximum you can hope to receive in the way of U.S. troops on the China coast for a considerable period of time will be two divisions and it is not clear now whether or not sizeable portions of these divisions can be provided with the necessary shipping in the very near future.¹ You will receive authoritative statements on these matters in a short time from the War Department.

Meanwhile I ask you to consider several other possibilities repeat possibilities. It is possible that a sizeable quantity of Japanese shipping might be concentrated at some point off Japan, taken over by our Navy and escorted to some point on the China coast to effect the rapid evacuation of Japanese troops. This evacuation, say from Canton, might be on a shuttle temporary basis to Formosa which would greatly increase the capability of shipping to remove Japanese troops from the mainland of China. If the evacuation was in the Shanghai region it would probably have to go direct to Japan which involves considerable turnaround time and therefore is delayed accordingly. It might be that certain islands off the Shanghai coast might be utilized by the concentration of Japanese troops providing some supplies could be landed there for their use. This brings up the possibility of sending some Japanese ships to Saigon to load rice to meet the critical situation which will develop as Japanese troops concentrate towards the coast.

U.S. Naval influence will be very remote off Tientsin because ships of more than 18 foot draft cannot cross the bar to get into the river 35 miles from Tientsin. It is for that reason that I made a preliminary suggestion of Tsingtao as a point of contact. Evacuations from Tsingtao might be carried out by Japanese shipping direct to Japan or possibly even to southern Korea in order to shorten the turnaround. From there they would eventually go over to the homeland by ferry.

Please consider all these permutations and combinations which have for their purpose the influence of the presence of the U.S. flag and some gun power despite the small amount of shipping available for this purpose, the evacuation of as much of the interior of China as rapidly as possible by Japanese troops under Japanese control and the further evacuation of troops from China itself by the most effective use of captured shipping.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Chiang Kai-shek had requested a total of five U.S. divisions: two in the Taku-Tientsin-Peking area, two in the Shanghai-Nanking area, and one in the Canton area. (Wedemeyer to Marshall, Radio No. CFB-4317, August 11, 1945, NA/RG 165 [P&O, 336 China, Sec. 1-B-3].)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER August 14, 1945
Radio No. W-49544. *Secret* Washington, D.C.

Personal to Eisenhower from Marshall. Your efforts in getting personnel home for discharge as indicated by S 17273 are appreciated but I do feel that a delay of one month before introducing any sizable numbers of men for demobilization is too long.¹ The difficulties involved in reducing this time are of course tremendous, particularly in view of the rail transportation system in Europe, but can not something be done with truck transportation, for example, on an emergency basis similar to the Red Ball Line which you established last summer?² Even though it might require the return to Germany of some units now at staging areas, the overall results as reflected in public and Congressional attitude toward the Army would make this worth serious consideration. The pressure here is terrific. The demands for termination of the Selective Service increase daily, a wait of a month before the high score men begin to pour into the U.S. will greatly accentuate our difficulties. The War Department stands ready to do all in its power to assist you in this problem.

In another message the War Department is authorizing you to return units and personnel in the pipeline that cannot be diverted.³ I suggest you put someone on this to check it constantly in order that the objective of returning the high score men is not buried in staff reactions to changes which are admittedly difficult but vastly important.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, 370.9, Case 260)

1. Eisenhower's G-3 had sent Radio No. S-17273 on August 13 stating that even after the War Department gave them final instructions, it would take a month before new priorities could be reflected in shipments because those now at staging areas had to be shipped to clear the area and because it would take about thirty days to process and move through the ports the high-score personnel and selected-category units. (*Papers of DDE*, 6: 261.)

2. The Red Ball Express was a truck transport supply system using restricted highways between Saint-Lô in Normandy and eastward (first to Chartres, later to Soissons and Sommesous east of Paris). It ran from August 25 to November 16, 1944. There were several other such truck systems (e.g., White Ball, Green Diamond, Red Lion, etc.) at various times. The opening of rail lines, water routes, and new ports made the various truck systems obsolete. (Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larson, *The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1957], pp. 330–36.)

3. On these instructions, see *Papers of DDE*, 6: 261.

TO WINSTON S. CHURCHILL August 15, 1945
Radio. *Restricted* Washington, D.C.

Personal for Moore¹ from McCarthy. General Marshall desires that General Ismay in London be requested to deliver personally to Mr.

Churchill the following message from General Marshall: "With the termination of hostilities, my thoughts turn to you and the long hard pull up the heights to final triumph of your labors."

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Colonel James B. Moore III was secretary of the General Staff at Eisenhower's European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, headquarters in Frankfurt, Germany.

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEFS OF ALL WAR
DEPARTMENT AND SPECIAL STAFF DIVISIONS¹

August 15, 1945
Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT: War Department Policies for the Period Following V-J Day

1. Since December, 1941, the nation has depended upon the Army and Navy to build up and direct the power to bring us victory and peace. With the capitulation of Japan the nation now looks forward to the demobilization of the Army and its installations as rapidly and efficiently as practicable. In some respects our responsibility is just as heavy as during the critical days of 1942. The same imagination, energy and devotion to duty which characterized the activities of the Army during the past four years must now be turned to the vast task of demobilization.

2. The mission of the War Department during the period immediately following V-J Day is stated as follows:

a. To demobilize the Army and eliminate and curtail the activities of the War Department to the maximum extent and with the greatest rapidity consistent with national commitments for occupational forces.

b. To provide the occupational forces in conquered and liberated areas with sufficient trained personnel, supplies and equipment to assure the proper performance of their missions and to assure their maintenance at standards befitting American soldiers.

c. To make reasonable provisions for fundamental post-war military requirements. Such provisions must not interfere with demobilization and the elimination and curtailment of War Department activities.

3. In the performance of its mission, the War Department will be guided by the following general principles:

a. Every expenditure which is not directly and vitally necessary to the performance of its mission must be eliminated. During the War Congress has been liberal in providing the War Department with funds. A serious obligation is now imposed on the Department to cut expenditures to the minimum. The current requirements must be met to the fullest possible extent with the supplies, equipment and facilities now available.

b. Every member of the Army will be treated as an individual. Primary emphasis will be placed upon the rapid discharge of military personnel in their order of priority as determined by their critical scores. Emphasis will be given to the educational programs and problems concerning personal readjustments to civilian life.

c. All officials will combat natural tendencies to continue activities, demand services and retain personnel, supplies, equipment or facilities which are not clearly necessary to the announced mission of the Army and the War Department. This must be kept in mind in making all decisions.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. Marshall

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. This memorandum was also directed to the commanding generals of U.S. Army Air, Ground, and Service forces.

TO GENERAL JOSEPH T. MCNARNEY
Radio. *Secret*

August 18, 1945
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall for McNarney. G-1 is working on a reply to your letter to me of July 31 regarding theater campaign ribbons to war correspondents, Red Cross, etc.¹ Meanwhile please radio me regarding the last sentence of the second paragraph “so far we have made no etc.”² I cannot understand at all why this should be the case. You certainly had a number of war correspondents who qualified whether they were still in Italy or not. It would appear to me on the surface that there has been a failure in the theater to do what was desired.³

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On the origins of this issue, see Marshall to Smith, March 30, 1945, p. 108.

2. McNarney, commanding general of the U.S. Army’s Mediterranean Theater of Operations, had written that theater ribbon awards to Red Cross workers were rare, and “so far we have made no awards to War Correspondents or other civilians,” in part because of the difficulty of determining when their service had been exceptional. This policy was causing a serious morale problem among the civilians. He recommended that either the ribbon be awarded whenever a civilian had served with the army overseas for six months and had contributed to soldiers’ morale and the successful prosecution of the war, or that the award to civilians be discontinued. (McNarney to Marshall, July 31, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. Marshall soon clarified the standards for ribbon awards to war correspondents and had the Personnel Division work on the problem of Red Cross personnel and other civilians. G-1 recommended—and Marshall approved—discontinuance of awards to Red Cross personnel and liberalization of standards for awards to non-Red Cross civilians. (Captain

Lawrence A. Minnich, Jr., brief for the chief of staff, August 27, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, SGS, Memorandums and Briefs to the Chief of Staff].)

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT CHIEF
OF STAFF, G-1 [HENRY]

August 19, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

The following thought occurred to me, and I wish you would see if it has any practicable application.

We denuded the colleges in order to keep up the strength of the Army and to improve the quality of Infantry non-commissioned leadership.¹ The continuation of the draft at the 50,000 figure with the largest proportion in age groups coming from 18 year olds means that we continue to make it impossible for the small colleges and particularly the military institutions of the college type to get under way under any approximated peacetime conditions.

Meanwhile, the Navy operating on the 17-year old group and giving advance education to this group, which they are now free to project into the 18-year old group, makes it possible for such institutions to function to some degree as in time of peace. This, of course, means inevitably a very favorable attitude toward the Navy and a very hostile attitude toward the Army. Considering the fact that so many college leaders are opposing us as to universal military training, the prospects are not alluring.

I would like you to see when, for example, the men now being drafted must arrive overseas if we are not to have a delay in the return of the veteran soldiers. Transportation is going to be the limiting factor for those returning to the United States. In other words, when will the transportation permit us to bring home men if we have replacements available overseas? In connection with this we may propose a certain under strength for occupation forces in Europe for the time being. For example, a divisional strength of 12,000 might be tolerated for a period without any serious possibilities in connection with the maintenance of our position. Possibly even 11,000 might be the figure for the time being.

What I am getting at is the possibility of permitting the 18-year old men who are now in college and who will be drafted to be continued at college along the line they are engaged in, if it is one suited to our requirements—engineers, communications, medical, etc.

We have, I believe, certain 17 year old men in college. Now if their courses have any connection with Army usage, might we not permit their retention in those courses for a certain period of time? If an announcement to this effect were made immediately, it could be put into effect by the schools for the approaching term.

Please look into this from the various points of view and be prepared to talk to me informally regarding it Monday afternoon.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The virtual dissolution of the Army Specialized Training Program (A.S.T.P.) in February 1944 permitted Army Ground Forces to obtain seventy-three thousand formerly deferred college men. (See *Papers of GCM*, 4: 286–89, 308–11.) The army's official history on enlisted personnel procurement observed that the A.S.T.P. had been "a series of disillusionments" to the trainees. Moreover, "among civilian educators participating in the ASTP the abrupt termination of their efforts, though accepted as a military necessity, was difficult to understand. It seemed arbitrary, after repeated declarations by the War Department of the importance of specialized training, suddenly to snatch away the young men undergoing such training, a select group numbering only 2 percent of the Army, for conversion into infantry privates." A key problem was that "the ground combat arms had been persistently denied a proportionate share of high-intelligence personnel" before 1944, and the expansion of ground fighting in late 1943 "made the consequences fully apparent." (Robert R. Palmer, "The Procurement of Enlisted Personnel: The Problem of Quality," in Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* [Washington: GPO, 1948], pp. 39, 77.)

2. Selective Service System regulations were amended on September 18, 1945, to provide a more liberal policy regarding deferments for high school and college students. In May 1946, Congress prohibited drafting eighteen- and nineteen-year-olds. (U.S. Selective Service System, *Problems of Selective Service*, Special Monograph No. 16, vol. 1 [Washington: GPO, 1952], pp. 153–54.)

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN

August 20, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mr. President: Now that hostilities have terminated, the demobilization of the Army is actively under way, the major military decisions regarding the cut-back of war production have been taken and the post-war military planning is in an advanced state, I feel free to propose my relief as Chief of Staff.

I have been on duty in the War Department continuously for more than seven years, six as Chief of Staff. Aware of the wear and tear of the job, I am certain that it would be advantageous to make a change.

If I may be permitted to propose a successor, I suggest that General Eisenhower is unusually well qualified for the duties of Chief of Staff at this particular time. There are two other factors to be considered with relation to his possible appointment. In his present position the great international prestige he now enjoys, to the advantage of this Government, will certainly be damaged by the difficulties and recriminations inevitable in the complications inherent in his present responsibilities. Also, there is no position other than Chief of Staff of the Army which is suitable to his present rank and prestige.

General McNarney, now Deputy Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces in Italy, is available and thoroughly competent to replace General Eisenhower in Germany.¹ Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall sent a copy of this letter to Eisenhower with a note saying that the president "expressed himself as in complete agreement with me on what I had to say about you and McNarney. He was not at all definite about my relief but asked me how soon I hoped to get away and I said Oh, something like ten days. He remarked that he would be sorry to see me go and would like me to go along a little further and added that he would think the matter over. I rather got the idea that I might hope for relief within the first ten days in September." (Marshall to Eisenhower, August 21, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
[Radio No. WAR-51864.] *Top Secret*

August 20, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Personal to MacArthur from Marshall. In connection with the complicated and difficult political problems which will face you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers it is probable that the British will propose to place with you as Supreme Commander a mission including a Foreign Office man. There will undoubtedly be similar proposals from other nations concerned in the Far East. Please give consideration to the manner in which you would prefer to handle this problem of liaison at your Headquarters, particularly with the Chinese, the Russians and the British.

It is also probable that the President and the State Department will wish to have a political adviser assigned to you. The political advisers from the State Department who have been present with our headquarters in Europe have rendered valuable assistance in relieving the commander of a number of political contacts and problems and in providing him with advice on the current U.S. political policy. These advisers have not acted in any way in an executive capacity but function purely in an advisory capacity.

Please let me have your reactions to the foregoing.¹

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. MacArthur said he "would welcome any advisory groups that the Government desires to place in my Headquarters," provided he could "pass upon their individual acceptability before assignment." Neither did he object to the presence of foreign liaison people, provided they were attached to their country's military groups and that unity of control in Japan under S.C.A.P. was maintained. (MacArthur to Marshall, Radio No. C-35352, August 21, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-IN-20105)].)

An Office of the Political Adviser in Japan, administered by the State Department, was set up in Tokyo at the same time as G.H.Q. S.C.A.P. The office was headed by Foreign Service officer George Atcheson, Jr., who had been in China during the war. He and certain

members of his staff were already being criticised by some in the United States for their alleged sympathy toward the Communist Chinese. MacArthur, however, liked Atcheson and often sought his advice. In April 1946, the office became the Diplomatic Section, G.H.Q. S.C.A.P., directly under MacArthur's authority. (James, *Years of MacArthur*, 3: 48–49.)

TO JOHN J. MCCLOY
Confidential

August 20, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Dear McCloy: I suggest that the Secretary of War send some such message as the following:

Secretary of War to General MacArthur personal.

It seems to me that it would be most appropriate to have General Wainwright present at signing of capitulation.¹ This also appears to be the general view in U.S. as expressed in the press. Please let me have your reaction.²

Faithfully yours,

G. C. Marshall

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Lieutenant General Jonathan M. Wainwright had commanded U.S. forces in the Philippines between March 12 and the surrender to the Japanese on May 7, 1942. He had been freed by a U.S. paratroop team on August 16 from a small camp for high-ranking Allied prisoners one hundred miles east of Mukden in Manchuria. (*New York Times*, August 20, 1945, pp. 1, 4.)

2. Assistant Secretary of War McCloy approved the message and had it sent that same day to MacArthur over Secretary Stimson's signature. (Pasco Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, August 21, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) For more on this issue, see Marshall to Wedemeyer, August 22, 1945, p. 285.

TO MAJOR GENERAL HOMER M. GRONINGER

August 21, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Groninger: I had planned to see you at the Brooklyn Base before your departure for San Francisco.¹ As a matter of fact, I did not know that the change was contemplated until I learnt that you had already reached San Francisco.

I wanted to go over the Brooklyn Base with you and also I wished for the opportunity to tell you personally what a perfect job I think you did. The truth of the matter was that I was so certain of the efficient operation of your installation that I never got around to visiting it, and as a result I

merely paid you the compliment of complete confidence in how you were handling your job.

I am writing this note to make sure that you know that your work in the East was fully appreciated by me, and that in my opinion it was of the highest order of efficiency. I also want you to know that a citation for the immediate award to you of the Distinguished Service Medal is in preparation. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Groninger had commanded the New York Port of Embarkation between November 7, 1940, and June 30, 1945. He took command of the San Francisco Port of Embarkation on July 4.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MCCLOY
Top Secret

August 21, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Reference the withdrawal of Allied troops from Italy, I feel, and General Handy and General Hull concur, that we should go ahead with the withdrawal of troops from Italy down to one division. Also I feel that the determination regarding this division should be considered temporary as it is highly desirable that we evacuate our troops from Italy.¹

I am inclined to feel that we do not cure the situation at all by prolonging the agony and that we would become rather seriously involved the moment we check up on our procedure and thereby proclaim our intention to stabilize that country with American troops. I can understand the Ambassador's feelings, but he and I have differed before, incidentally, over his desire to bar American troops from Rome, shortly after its liberation by their fighting.²

G. C. Marshall

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. McCloy had recently returned from a visit to Italy, where he found Alexander C. Kirk (United States ambassador since December 1944) and most of his associates worried that removing all U.S. troops from Italy would encourage increased political violence from the leftist parties before Ferruccio Parri's recently formed coalition government had a chance to establish itself. McCloy observed that his "inclination is to pull out all but the one division [which already was scheduled to remain because of the recent agreement with Yugoslavia regarding the partition of the department of Venezia Giulia], although it may be risky to do so." (McCloy Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, August 20, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. In April 1944, Kirk had become the U.S. representative on the Allied Advisory Council for Italy, and in September he had become U.S. political adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater. On the social and logistical problems experienced in Rome after its June 1944 liberation, see Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., *Cassino to the Alps*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* (Washington: GPO, 1977), pp. 234–35.

McCloy returned the original of Marshall's memorandum with the handwritten note: "This has been approved in substance by the Committee of Three at its meeting of Aug. 21, 1945." The Committee of Three consisted of the secretaries of the State, War, and Navy departments (or in this case, their designated representatives).

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER
Radio. *Secret*

August 22, 1945
Washington, D.C.

From Marshall to Wedemeyer. General MacArthur radios me "I would be delighted to have General Wainwright and General Percival at signing of capitulation etc."¹ You have probably received a message from him concerning the matter. I informed the British mission here in regard to General Percival and they had no information regarding General Percival.² Please endeavor to get General Wainwright, and General Percival if he shows up, to Manila in time to accompany the party to Tokyo.³

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. This was MacArthur's answer to a message Marshall wrote for Stimson's signature; see Marshall to McCloy, August 20, 1945, p. 283.

2. Lieutenant General Arthur E. Percival, commander of British forces in Singapore at the time of their surrender to Japan (February 15, 1942), had been a prisoner in Manchuria with Wainwright.

3. Wainwright was flown to China's wartime capital at Chungking, location of Wedemeyer's China Theater headquarters, then to Manila (arrived August 30), and to Yokohama (August 31) for the September 2 Japanese surrender ceremony, which Percival also attended. For further developments, see Marshall to Wainwright, August 28, 1945, p. 290.

TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE ARMY¹

August 23, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

To better guarantee the permanence of this peace, I am convinced that it is necessary to build up a strong citizen-army. The world must recognize that we are at all times prepared to defend the peace. Furthermore, we owe it to our country, and to the comrades who have made the great sacrifice, to insure that never again will Americans be drawn into a war unprepared.

Therefore I earnestly hope that you will give careful consideration to the importance of enrolling in one of the civilian components of the Army when you are relieved from active duty, that there may be a solid foundation of veterans for the necessary regeneration of the citizen forces. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. As part of a campaign to induce officers and men to join the Organized Reserve Corps, Marshall's statement was printed as the introduction to a widely disseminated memorandum by Brigadier General Edward W. Smith, the War Department's Executive for Reserve and R.O.T.C. Affairs. In a separate memorandum encouraging officers to join, President Truman signed as "Colonel, Field Artillery Reserve."

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY¹
Secret

August 23, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

The following is a brief summary of our information of the situation in the Pacific:

PARAMACHIRO [*Paramushiro*]:² Surrender has begun.

TOKYO: Arrangements for compliance with surrender terms are completed. Compliance continues throughout Japan.

MANCHURIA: Surrenders continue. According to last information 254,000 or 39% of total Japanese forces in the region exclusive of puppet troops,³ are in the hands of the Russians.

Japanese broadcast of 21 August reports Soviet attacks north of Kalgan and southwest of Jehol taking place.

The Soviets landed airborne forces in Dairen and Port Arthur on the 21st and began disarming Japanese garrisons on that date.

CHINA: Surrender terms delivered and negotiations are continuing. In general the Japanese have agreed to surrender to Central Government forces.

The 116th Division in the Paoching area had not received the Emperor's rescript on the 16th.

On 21 August Wedemeyer stated Japanese had opened rifle and mortar fire on the 16th at Shanhsien. Another cable of same date states that groups of officers of two Japanese divisions in the area had met Chinese officers to arrange surrender negotiations, one meeting on 13 August and another scheduled for 16 August.

LUZON: The pocket in northern Luzon mountains will formally surrender 28 August according to plans made after the conference between Japanese and U. S. officers.

CELEBES: Japanese have stated they will surrender.

MILLE:⁴ Japanese have surrendered to U. S. Naval forces.

SAIGON: Emissaries have departed for Japan and have requested change in schedule due to weather delays.

BURMA-MALAYSIA: Minor hostilities continue but negotiations between Japanese emissaries and Mountbatten are under way.

A complication has arisen out of Mountbatten's desire to continue with a planned landing at Penang⁵ on the 28th and from there sweep

on down the Straits to Singapore. The British Chiefs of Staff have directed him to conform in all respects to General MacArthur's orders.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. This memorandum was also sent to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes.
2. One of the most northern of the Kurile Islands, Paramushiro was a Japanese naval and air base.
3. These were Chinese troops serving under Japanese command or authority.
4. One of the bypassed atolls in the eastern Marshall Islands, Mille (along with Wotje, Jaluit, and Maloelap) was a Japanese air base.
5. An island at the northern end of the Straits of Malacca, Penang was one of the Malay states.

DRAFT OF PROPOSED PRESS RELEASE

August 23, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

An article in a Washington paper this morning indicated that the protests of some 3,000 men in the 29th Division in the European theater had resulted in their being given an earlier date for return to the United States. Such a report, if not based on fact, is merely an encouragement to hundreds of thousands of other soldiers to follow the same procedure which clearly would have a very serious effect on the morale and good order of the army. The actual facts in the case are indicated in the following message dispatched by the Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower and General McNarney on 10 August:¹

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. At this point Marshall quoted his entire message. See above p. 264. The memo printed here was released to the press at 11:30 A.M. with additional comments by the Bureau of Public Relations regarding the return of high-point soldiers and MacArthur's need for manpower. (Memorandum for the Press, August 23, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

TO ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK

August 24, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Betty: I was distressed yesterday to learn that you had called up during my absence from the office and were on your way out of town to be gone for several months. Not distressed that you were going to have a rest in the country with Mrs. Stark, but that I had missed seeing you.¹

From the press notices, I saw that they did you high honor before your departure from England, which is a small portion of what you deserve.²

I hope you are in sound health and can enjoy the relaxation from heavy responsibility. Confidentially, I submitted my request for relief to the President a week ago and asked him informally, in answer to his question, to let me out by the end of this month. I doubt that I get out this quickly but feel reasonably certain that I will be released before the end of September. Arnold is talking about going out but I think plans to remain in office until my successor is in the saddle.³

With affectionate regards to you both, Affectionately,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Stark, former commander of United States Navy Forces in Europe, had arrived in the United States on the *Queen Mary* (along with almost fifteen thousand troops of the Thirtieth Division) on August 21. (*New York Times*, August 22, 1945, p. 14.)

2. On August 13, Stark had been received by the king and queen at Buckingham Palace. His farewell dinner that evening was hosted by the lords of the British Admiralty in the famous painted hall of Greenwich Naval College. (*Ibid.*, August 14, 1945, p. 14.)

3. Arnold and Marshall had discussed retirement during the Potsdam Conference. Arnold offered and Marshall accepted a five-dollar wager that Marshall would still be in office six months after Japan capitulated. Arnold also met with Eisenhower, whom he presumed would be the next army chief of staff, and agreed that Carl Spaatz would succeed Arnold as head of the U.S. Army Air Forces. (Arnold, *Global Mission*, pp. 586–87.)

THE U.S. Army's manpower shortage in late 1944 prompted a call for African-American soldiers in service units in the European theater to volunteer to serve in heretofore white-only Infantry combat units. Twenty-five hundred men were accepted, given Infantry training in early 1945, and organized into fifty-three platoons under a white platoon leader and sergeant. The platoons were used in a total of eleven divisions in the First and Seventh armies.

This experiment with integration was carefully scrutinized in May and June 1945. Trained interviewers from the Research Branch of the Information and Education Division of Eisenhower's theater headquarters visited seven divisions in which the black platoons had served, and 250 white company-grade officers and platoon sergeants were asked what they thought of the blacks' combat performance. In addition, approximately 1,700 white enlisted men received questionnaires asking about their attitudes toward the use of black riflemen. The results, which showed whites more positively inclined toward the black volunteers than had been expected, were issued on July 3, 1945 ("Opinions About Negro Infantry Platoons in White Companies of Seven Divisions").

General Brehon B. Somervell, head of Army Service Forces, thought the report should not be made public, because the experiment provided an inconclusive test of integration; he was also concerned with the political

reaction from segregationist members of Congress and newspaper editors who had heretofore given strong support to the War Department. Omar Bradley and others also urged caution regarding the experiment's implications prior to a future general study of the issue. Assistant Secretary of War McCloy, who headed the War Department's Advisory Committee on Negro Troop Policies, had become dissatisfied with the inefficiency of the army's segregation policy. (On the integration experiment, see Morris J. MacGregor, Jr., *Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940–1965* [Washington: Center of Military History, 1981], pp. 52–57.) He sent Marshall a copy of the July 3 report with the following attached handwritten note:

General Marshall— For years we have been trying to make a military asset out of the negroes. Perhaps this [report] points to the way. I think it should be followed up in spite of Somervilles reaction tho I agree with him we should not publish it as yet. What do you think?

(McCloy to Marshall, [August 23?, 1945], GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Marshall's reply follows. ★

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MCCLOY

August 25, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

I agree that the practicability of integrating Negro elements into white units should be followed up. It is further agreed that the results of the survey of the Information and Education Division should not be released for publication at this time, since the conditions under which the platoons were organized and employed were most unusual.

The Special Planning Division is making an over-all study of postwar utilization of Negro troops. The material being used as the basis for the study was obtained from the several combat theaters. It is estimated that conclusions and recommendations will be completed about 1 October. I recommend the attached report be submitted to Special Planning Division for consideration in connection with the over-all study.¹

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Various reports by the U.S. Army's Air, Ground, and Service forces indicated a general acceptance of the traditional racial status quo (i.e., segregation). On the other hand, commanders generally agreed that black units should be made more efficient. Civilian civil rights spokesmen asserted that segregation was the underlying cause of poor black unit performance. In September, McCloy recommended that the secretary of war turn the matter over to a board of general officers to recommend a revision of the army's policy with regard to African Americans. Late in September, Marshall appointed Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., chairman of the Board of General Officers on Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Post-War Army. The Gillem Board completed its work on November 17

and submitted its rather ambiguous conclusions about future policy on racial integration. The issue would continue to fester for several years. (MacGregor, *Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940–1965*, pp. 138–43, 153–66.)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONATHAN M. WAINWRIGHT August 28, 1945
Radio. *Restricted* Washington, D.C.

Personal for Wainwright from Marshall. Dear Wainwright: I was profoundly moved a few moments ago to receive your first message dated August 28 and I have already repeated the substance of it to Mrs. Wainwright.¹ A more detailed response will follow later. Meanwhile I reaffirm the expressions of my last message to you a few hours before the fall of Corregidor in deepest appreciation of all that you did and have done for the honor of the Army.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall told Mrs. Wainwright about her husband's arrival in Chungking and quoted him as saying: "All members of my party are in good health." (Marshall to Mrs. Wainwright, August 28, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. This was probably Marshall's message of May 5, 1942, that concluded: "You and your devoted followers have become the living symbols of our war aims and the guarantee of victory." See *Papers of GCM*, 3: 182–83. Wainwright replied that "the original copy of that message has been in my personal possession since it came to my hand and it will always be one of my most cherished possessions." (Wainwright to Marshall, Radio No. CFB-6290, August 29, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

Wainwright received a tumultuous welcome in the United States, concluding on September 10 with a parade in Washington, D.C., and a ceremony in the White House Rose Garden at which President Truman awarded him the Medal of Honor, the citation for which Marshall had personally written. A few days previously, the Senate had approved his promotion to full general.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER August 30, 1945
AND GENERAL JOSEPH T. McNARNEY [Washington, D.C.]
[Radio No. WARX-57162.] *Secret*

To Eisenhower and McNarney personal from Marshall. The curtailing of redeployment has left in the U.S. large numbers of men who have too few points for discharge and too many for shipment to the Pacific, which presents an almost impossible public relation situation. We are doing our best to find military jobs here for those who can't be redeployed, but any further shipments to the U.S. of personnel above a score of 45 and below the score for discharge will only serve to make matters worse. If we accu-

multate in the U.S. large numbers of men for whom we have no need, public opinion is almost certain to demand and probably secure the abandonment of the point system for discharge. This would, of course, result in discharging men from sources in the U.S. far ahead of those in the theaters, and would have a most serious effect on morale of troops overseas, particularly in the Pacific.

It is, therefore, necessary to change the requirements expressed in WARX 49576 of 14 August to Eisenhower and WARX 49888 of 15 August to McNarney. We cannot, at this time, foresee any need here for low score personnel. If your present or future flow of personnel forces you to send personnel who are not eligible for discharge, then only men below ASR [Adjusted Service Rating] 45 should be sent. In selecting high score personnel, please arrange them so that the highest scores in your theater come home first and we can adjust the score for discharge accordingly. Casual detachment shipments should be utilized in lieu of unit shipments or attached to major units when this method will facilitate screening, and accelerate the flow.

This answers S 20076 of 28 August. S 20075 of 28 August answered separately.¹

I have no objection to this message being read by the staff officers working on this problem.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, 370.9, Case 305)

1. In S-20076 of August 28, Eisenhower had notified Marshall that redeployment in the European theater should be completed by January 31, 1946. "Over 700,000 individuals, mostly high score soldiers, have been ordered and are now being readied for shipment in September and October under current War Department instructions." (Eisenhower's S-20076 is printed in *Papers of DDE*, 6: 317–18; S-20075 is explained *ibid.*, p. 318 n. 3. On the current instructions, see *ibid.*, pp. 284–85, and Marshall to Eisenhower, August 14, 1945, p. 277.)

Marshall's message, the Eisenhower papers editors note, caused Eisenhower great concern, because sending back the experienced and high-score personnel would lead to an operational breakdown, and halting the return of low-point men would force the theater to violate its orders to fill all the troopship space made available. To complicate matters further, the War Department was preparing to lower the age for automatic discharge from thirty-eight to thirty-five and to reduce the release score from eighty points to seventy-two. (See *Papers of DDE*, 6: 318–19.)

NOTES ON DISCUSSION OF FUTURE
MILITARY POLICY¹
Top Secret

August 31, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have just received for their consideration a proposed "United States Military Policy" prepared by the Joint Staff

Planners in collaboration with the Joint Strategic Survey Committee and the Joint Post War Committee, which after approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be submitted to the Secretaries of War and the Navy with the recommendation that it be furnished to the State Department. A discussion based on this JCS paper, including extracts therefrom, is attached for your use.²

2. In addition to the proposals in the JCS paper above, a discussion of the following points which pertain to the implementation of United States military policy may arise:

a. *Single Department of National Defense* – The necessity for a single department to facilitate economy and coordination is evident. Now, when major reorganizations appear necessary would be the appropriate time to set up a single department.³

b. *It is possible that the size and missions of the Armed Forces will be discussed.* The President has referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the Navy proposal as to size of the permanent Navy asking for the development of a comprehensive plan concerning the armed services for his consideration. Therefore, discussion and action on size, composition and organization should be deferred until the report of the JCS can be made available to the President.

c. The President informed the Chief of Staff that he was strongly in favor of universal military training. He directed that a plan or program of procedure be prepared as a basis for bringing the question most impressively before the country and to the Congress. Work on this is in progress—largely coordinated by Mr. McCloy. On the 23rd of August the attached letter (Appendix II)⁴ was sent to the President containing material recommended for inclusion in a Presidential message to Congress to lead off in the program. The letter recommends the President express himself as favoring universal military training and further recommends that the President state that at a later date he will submit to Congress recommendations for needed legislation for the entire program of a permanent military establishment including universal military training.

d. *Organization of the War Department.* Since the authority for the present organization of the War Department will expire six months after the expiration of the emergency, a board of senior officers is now working to determine the organization which should be put into effect thereafter.⁵

NA/RG 165 (OPD, 334.8, Case 87)

1. This document, covering the three subjects on the proposed agenda for that day's Cabinet meeting, was sent to Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, who was to substitute for vacationing Secretary Stimson.

2. Document J.C.S. 1496/3 was approved by the Joint Chiefs and circulated to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee for comment on October 3. Records of the

lengthy process of writing and approving this document are in NA/RG 165 (P&O, ABC 092 [July 18, 1945]). The attached extracts are not printed here.

3. For further developments on this issue, see Marshall Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 26, 1945, pp. 314–15.

4. Appendix II included Marshall's Memorandum for the President of August 23, 1945; a draft inclusion to the president's proposed September message to Congress; and draft letters to the heads of the chairmen of the Senate and House committees on military affairs asserting that the army could not meet its strength goals for occupation and other duties through volunteers and Selective Service inductions at the current rate. (See NA/RG 165 [OPD, 334.8 TS, Sec. II, Case 87].)

5. On the War Department reorganization effective March 9, 1942, see the editorial note in *Papers of GCM*, 3: 127–29. This reorganization took place under the authority granted to the president by the First War Powers Act of December 17, 1941. (See *U.S. Statutes at Large, 1941–1942*, vol. 55, pt. 1, pp. 838–41, Public Law 354.) Marshall and Deputy Chief of Staff Joseph T. McNarney discovered that this reorganization still left problems with intelligence management, personnel functions, and research and development. Moreover, there were continual difficulties between the functionally organized Army Service Forces headquarters and offices of the chiefs of the traditional technical services. The Organization Branch of the War Department's Special Planning Division had initially worked on the postwar organization of the War Department and the army, but it had been unable to reach a consensus. Consequently, Marshall appointed a Board of Officers on the Reorganization of the War Department under Fourth Army commander Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch (and after Patch's death on November 21, under Lieutenant General William H. Simpson). This board's recommendations were the basis of the "Eisenhower Reorganization" of 1946, which undid many of Marshall's wartime changes. (James E. Hewes, Jr., *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900–1963* [Washington: GPO, 1975], pp. 127–28, 151–62.)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Radio. *Secret*

September 4, 1945
Washington, D.C.

For Eisenhower from Marshall for Eisenhower's eyes only. While I have no indication from the President as to the date he will accept my release as Chief of Staff, I do not think there is a shadow of a doubt regarding your appointment to succeed me. This being the case, it seems to me we are justified in proceeding on that basis; therefore I should like for you to indicate to me any of your people that you now wish to have infiltrated into the present War Department set-up. For example, Frank McCarthy has gone to the State Department. This leaves Colonel Pasco as Secretary of the General Staff. He is desirous of demobilization and is giving experience in the work to Colonel John Bowen of the Regular Army whom Frank McCarthy selected for this purpose, having in mind the desirability of weaving Regular Officers into the organization in time to get and be able to transmit the experience in organization and procedure which has reached its highest state of development. He is 35 years

of age and commanded the 26th Regiment in North Africa before being returned to the United States for hospitalization. He later headed the Mediterranean Section of the Operations Division here and served briefly in charge of the White House Map Room before coming to the Secretariat.¹

Pasco's immediate assistant is [Lieutenant] Colonel [Bradford W.] Davenport, a very able officer and the man who did our business with the White House after Frank McCarthy withdrew from that contact. But Davenport is a lawyer in civil life and wishes to secure his demobilization as soon as practicable, having had almost five years' service.

There are also officers on the General Staff, Assistant Chiefs of Staff, for example, who no doubt would like service overseas and for whom a replacement might be advisable. Handy I imagine would be very happy to drop his heavy burdens but I do not think this would be wise for some time to come. Hull is another.² General Henry has had no overseas service. He is now in the midst of the demobilization statistical complications but no doubt would be very happy to get an overseas assignment, etc., etc.³

I wish you would think this over and let me have the names of any men that you would like to have brought into the machine now or in the near future; particularly that you advise me as to what positions you wish to have held unchanged until you can assume the personal responsibility for replacements.⁴

We have another problem, a question of permanent makes. There are about 10 vacancies for Major Generals and 15 for Brigadiers. Should I fill them or should they be left to you to fill? It is a headache for whoever does it. The problem of a very sensitive Pacific group has to be kept carefully in mind to avoid a postwar Army of strong cliques.⁵

There is also the question of appointments to head Leavenworth, for which Gerow has tentatively been selected; to replace De Witt in the Joint Army Navy Staff College, and to take over a number of important command and executive posts. I should like very much to have your proposals regarding these matters. Please be frank in bringing up any matters of this kind you may happen to think of because my desire is purely to work towards a smooth transition to your satisfaction.⁶

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. McCarthy had resigned as secretary of the General Staff, effective August 21, 1945, and that same day he was appointed assistant secretary of state for administration. He began that job on September 1. (See Marshall Memorandum for General Handy, October 9, 1945, pp. 325–26.) H. Merrill Pasco, in civil life a lawyer in Richmond, Virginia, served as secretary of the General Staff between August 25 and November 11, 1945. Eisenhower replied on September 5 that John W. Bowen (U.S.M.A., 1932) "would be an ideal selection." (*Papers of DDE*, 6: 329.) Bowen took over the job on November 12 and served until May 11, 1948.

2. “I consider it most important that Handy stay for a few months,” Eisenhower replied, “but I will eventually want to do for him and for Hull whatever I can that will most nearly meet their desires.” (Ibid., pp. 328–29.) See the following document for their assignments.

3. Stephen G. Henry had been assistant chief of staff for Personnel since August 1944.

4. Eisenhower noted that he was “handicapped” in making such recommendations “because I do not know how my successor here will feel about their release. The local problem is a very intricate one and I would not want to embarrass the man that takes over.” He did, however, recommend Major General Willard S. Paul as assistant chief of staff for Personnel and Brigadier General Thomas J. Davis (former adjutant general at Eisenhower’s headquarters) as assistant adjutant general. (Ibid., pp. 329, 330.)

5. Marshall should fill the vacancies on the permanent list of general officers (i.e., the “makes”) as soon as possible, Eisenhower thought, because his own personal knowledge of individuals’ capabilities was limited to those who had served in the European or Mediterranean theaters. Beyond that his information was based on “hearsay, old impressions and official records. Someone ought to make these selections who has an identical basis for comparison in all theaters. . . . I am most anxious to maintain a feeling of unification throughout the Army and to avoid at any cost the growth of a European versus a Pacific clique.” (Ibid., p. 329.)

6. Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow was “ideal for the Leavenworth post,” in Eisenhower’s opinion. He suggested that Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, who had been superintendent at the U.S. Military Academy between 1940 and 1942, might replace Lieutenant General John L. De Witt as head of the Army and Navy Staff College. (Ibid., p. 330.)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
[Radio No. WAR-60819.] *Secret*

September 7, 1945
Washington, D.C.

For Eisenhower’s eyes only from Marshall. Re your teletype conference DTG05/1800B September 5.¹

Bowen will be continued as prospective Secretary General Staff. Stack should be valuable due to his intimate knowledge of the War Department and the confidence felt in him.²

I probably will proceed with the permanent nominations as soon as I receive your list, though I much dislike to do this.

Your message and what you said to Handy indicates that you evidently have doubts about McNarney as your successor. I would not wish seemingly to force his assignment on you. Let me have your views.³ Have in mind your choice to succeed Arnold and what becomes of the other senior air fellows.⁴

The eventual internal organization of the War Department has not been determined. The present organization is based on an executive order which automatically terminates six months after the official end of the war.⁵ A War Department board headed by Patch is now engaged on a full time basis in making recommendations for the future organization. JCS

committees are working on the over all composition of the Armed Services pursuant to a recommendation from me and later a directive from the President.⁶ Many questions concerning War Department organization are naturally connected with larger organization. Below are given answers to your specific questions as far as practicable under the existing situation.

It is not my view at present that chiefs of the combat arms should be retained. In any event they should, if retained, be general officers of the line as they can be under present law without thereby limiting the authorized number of brigadiers.

The reactivation of the War College appears to be dependent upon the future of ANSCOL [Army and Navy Staff College]. If we have a Joint War College properly organized and directed neither an Army nor a Navy War College would appear to be necessary. I suggested to Admiral King that the Navy name De Witt's successor and that this be done by October 31st. Vice Admiral Harry W. Hill has been designated. Eichelberger would be an excellent choice as Handy's successor. In connection with the staff you might want to consider the desirability of selecting an air officer as deputy.⁷

Confidentially Somervell will retire simultaneously with my departure. Styer is probably the best man to succeed him. He is, I understand, Somervell's choice. MacArthur could not spare him now. Under present circumstances the best solution would appear to be to have Lutes act. He is very competent. Clay is very able but I don't think you could spare him in Europe.⁸

Gerow will take Leavenworth under present plans.

Paul would be an ideal replacement for Henry if that is indicated. The situation with Congress is so tense over personnel and Henry has been so successful in dealing with the committees that a change now appears inadvisable.

Witsell was selected by the White House as Ulio's successor. He has a fine reputation. He was made a temporary Major General and acting The Adjutant General to cover the time to Ulio's retirement. Davis can be put in as assistant at any time. I understood Davis had had a heart attack and that his physical condition was doubtful.⁹ Handy and Hull will be guided entirely by your wishes and will remain as long as you want them. The question of their replacements can be decided after your return. They both feel that eventually a "New Deal" is called for and in the long run will be best.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See the notes to the previous document.

2. Lieutenant Colonel James Stack had worked for Eisenhower since 1940, when Stack had been a sergeant in the Fifteenth Infantry under Eisenhower's command. Eisenhower had brought Stack into the Operations Division, and he served as Eisenhower's personal representative in the War Department while the general was overseas. (*Papers of DDE*, 6: 28, 90.)

3. On August 22, Eisenhower had given Marshall his ideas on a possible successor to him in Europe. He listed Walter Bedell Smith ("completely acceptable to everyone"), Carl Spaatz, George S. Patton, Jr., and Jacob L. Devers. Not mentioned was Joseph T. McNarney, former deputy chief of staff and, since November 1, 1944, commander of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army. (*Ibid.*, p. 305.) In his September 5 radio to Marshall, Eisenhower wrote that he had given his views on a successor, "but if you can tell me that McNarney is definitely set up for this post, I could hold a confidential conference with him to determine what his desires will be." (*Ibid.*, pp. 329–30.)

In response to Marshall's comment here, Eisenhower wrote on September 8: "In order to get one important point definitely out of the way, I propose that so far as you and I are concerned we definitely fix upon McNarney as my successor." (*Ibid.*, p. 335.)

4. "Frankly," Eisenhower responded, "I favor Spaatz as replacement for Arnold because of Spaatz's clear perception of the necessity for integration of tactical power and because of his instant readiness and ability to cooperate and of his wealth of fine common sense. He has developed immeasurably in this war and in my opinion is the best rounded Air Force officer in the world." In addition, "an Air officer in the position of Deputy [Chief of Staff] would have a splendid effect," especially an airman from the Pacific theater. (*Ibid.*, pp. 335–36.)

5. Executive Order 9082 of February 28, 1942—based on authority specified in the First War Powers Act of December 18, 1941—permitted Marshall to reorganize the War Department in March 1942. (See *Papers of GCM*, 3: 127–29.)

6. See Marshall Notes on Discussion of Future Military Policy, August 31, 1945, pp. 291–93.

7. Hill (U.S.N.A., 1911) took over as head of the Army and Navy Staff College on November 1. This institution was replaced in February 1946 by the new National War College, which Hill also headed. The new institution was intended to prepare professional officers from the State, War, and Navy departments to cope with the mixture of political, economic, and military matters they would meet in their careers. See Marshall's comments to Under Secretary of State Edward Stettinius in mid-1944 on the need for such training in *Papers of GCM*, 4: 519–20.

8. General Brehon B. Somervell, head of Army Service Forces, was relieved of command at the end of 1945; his retirement was effective as of April 30, 1946. His former chief of staff and deputy, Lieutenant General Wilhelm D. Styer, had become commander of army forces in the western Pacific in April 1945. Styer's replacement as deputy was Lieutenant General LeRoy Lutes. Lieutenant General Lucius D. Clay, who was U.S. deputy military governor for Germany, would be "ideal" for the post, Eisenhower thought, "but it would be almost criminal to take him out of his present post at this particular moment." (*Papers of DDE*, 6: 330.) Lutes became head of Army Service Forces on January 1, 1946.

9. Major General Edward F. Witsell (Citadel, 1911) had been director of the Military Personnel Division in The Adjutant General's Office since 1943 and acting adjutant general since July, when James A. Ulio was hospitalized. In mid-October Witsell was appointed The Adjutant General, effective on February 1, 1946. Regarding Brigadier General Thomas J. Davis, Eisenhower replied that while it was true Davis had had "some type of heart attack" a year previously, "the doctors have in several subsequent examinations pronounced him fit." Davis became assistant adjutant general when Witsell assumed office. (*Papers of DDE*, 6: 336.)

DRAFT STATEMENT¹

September 7, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

FACTS CONCERNING DEMOBILIZATION

The problem

Following the surrender of Germany the Army's greatest effort was devoted to the rapid movement of men and materials to the Pacific to bring that war to a prompt conclusion. Consequently men overseas eligible for discharge had to give priority of movement to the men headed for the final operations against Japan—ocean shipping and air transport were the limiting factors. This condition was soon and suddenly reversed upon the capitulation of the Japanese. The demobilization of long service veterans in the fairest, fastest, and most understanding manner is now the governing policy of the War Department. This must be done, however, without lowering the quality of the troops on duty in Europe, in Japan, and the Pacific islands.

The Army is planning to discharge 6,050,000 men and women in the next 10 months.

The complications

Ordinarily the men with highest rank, in other words, the leaders—those in the most responsible positions—are the men with longest service. Therefore the demobilization under the policy now being carried out denudes the troops of the greater part of their leadership which must be replaced by new men. Naturally General MacArthur's troops moving into Japan could not safely undertake their grave responsibilities if not operating under trained leadership. Also, and quite naturally, the men in those organizations who on an average had been overseas longer than those in the European theater, would be deeply resentful of the discharge of men in the United States who had had much less or no service abroad. The War Department could not afford to strike a heavy blow at the morale of the Pacific armies just as they were undertaking a task without precedent in history, securing the surrender in Japan alone of an undefeated, completely equipped Army of two and a half million men.

Another complication which has made the rapid process of demobilization extremely difficult is the fact that the Government requirements for discharge, which are largely in the future interest of the individual, require expert and somewhat time-consuming procedure by a highly trained personnel. Financial papers, exact records of service, physical examinations, X-ray photographs, rights of the individual under the G-I Bill of Rights,² new uniforms, and number of other details, all have to be handled for every individual of the millions of men going through the process of demobilization. The trouble is, that the necessary experts to carry out this process

accurately and rapidly are largely themselves due for discharge and equally impatient with the men they are preparing for discharge. Another example is the Air Transport service, the crews of the planes flying thousands of men across the oceans to the United States. It takes a long time, a minimum of a year, to train an already qualified military combat pilot to operate with the necessary degree of safety, these large trans-ocean transports. Here again we find long-service men anxious for discharge engaged in the business of transporting men home for early discharge and here we have the problem of at least a year required for training of a proper replacement for them. There are many similar complications which react directly against each other. However, the War Department feels assured that it can conduct the demobilization at a rate which will separate from the military forces of over six million men by the end of the next 10 months.

Points

In considering the interests of eight million men it is naturally impossible to find a solution satisfactory to all, equally just to all. The present point system on which discharges are based is the best system the War Department finds it possible to set up on the basis of the greatest good for the greatest number. It was largely determined after a year or more of investigation on the basis of so-called Gallup polls taken in all theaters, where every phase of the matter was considered. It must not be too complicated and it cannot possibly meet everyone's desires. The problem is colossal. The interest of the War Department is solely directed to the rapidity of an orderly demobilization with every consideration that is possible to give the individual when dealing in terms of millions.³

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Marshall's draft was intended to provide information for members of Congress to use in replying to constituent mail on the subject. This version was sent to James R. Shepley, a war correspondent for *Time* magazine whom Marshall had recruited in April and made a captain in the army in order to help write and edit his 1945 biennial report.

2. The Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, popularly known as the GI Bill of Rights, was signed by President Roosevelt on June 22, 1944, following a five-month legislative campaign by supporters, led by the American Legion. The bill provided six benefits: education and training (tuition, books, fees, and a subsistence allowance); loan guarantees for purchasing or building a home, business, or farm; unemployment pay (\$20 per week for up to fifty-two weeks); job-finding assistance; highest priority for building materials used for Veterans Administration hospitals; and a review by the military of dishonorable discharges (persons with such discharges were excluded from benefits). (*U.S. Statutes at Large*, 1944, vol. 58, pt. 1, pp. 284–301, Public Law 346.)

3. Shepley considerably changed Marshall's original, increasing its length by 260 percent in order to add more explanatory information; he also changed the tone to one more popular, if still official-sounding. The typeset final version was a single folded sheet and had an initial press run of fifty thousand copies (roughly one hundred for each member of Congress). Marshall sent each legislator a brief letter enclosing and explaining the statement and telling them where they could get additional copies. (Marshall to the Members of Congress, September 10, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

TO JOAN BRIGHT¹

September 10, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Miss Bright: I have your letter of 24 August and it was very gracious of you to be reminded of me by a rehearing of Beethoven's Seventh. If there is anyone who should come to mind at the thought of those concerts at 43 Ring Strasse and the New Palace, it is you. They were both clear demonstrations of your incomparable knack of laying on a very pleasant do.²

We are all pleased over Frank's appointment, though there was none of my handiwork in it as you suggest. His conspicuous ability spoke for itself. That alone suggested the appointment to his complete surprise.

I hope you enjoyed your holiday and I am sorry that you expect, when you return to Whitehall, to be putting your files in final order. Your generous words are much appreciated. I shall be looking forward to seeing General and Lady Ismay soon in America. I was much surprised by this information.

Sergeant Powder is fine and lending his usual good assistance. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Since 1941 Bright had been responsible for the Special Information Centre in the War Cabinet Offices in London which collected, filed, and disbursed top-secret information to British commanders in chief at home and abroad. Beginning with the Washington Conference of May 1943, she had also been the "administration housekeeper" to the British delegations at various conferences (e.g., Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam). (Joan Bright Astley, *The Inner Circle: A View of War at the Top* [Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971], p. 13.)

2. Bright and the British delegation's administrative section at the Potsdam Conference had been quartered at 43 Ringstrasse in Babelsberg. She noted in her memoirs that on July 24 she, Frank McCarthy, and the Soviet administrators of the area had collaborated in producing "a magnificent concert at the Neues Palast, the 'Sans Souci' palace which had escaped serious damage on the outskirts of Potsdam." Marshall had requested that Tchaikovsky's Sixth Symphony be included on the program. (Ibid., pp. 219–20.) In her letter, she recalled that Beethoven was "the sort of music you had said you wanted to hear." (Bright to Marshall, August 24, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER September 11, 1945
FROM LIEUTENANT GENERAL THOMAS T. HANDY Washington, D.C.
[Radio No. WAR-62610.] *Top Secret*

For Wedemeyer's eyes only from Handy. In General Marshall's discussion with Madame Chiang Kai Shek prior to her departure from the U.S.¹ it is my understanding that he commented on the possibilities in the

field of aviation for China in the post war period not only from the military standpoint but from the civil as well. He emphasized his feeling that China should not attempt to maintain a large peacetime Army or Air Force but that a small, well trained and well equipped Army with adequate means of transportation and a small efficient Air Force would best meet her needs; that the paucity of surface communications in China precludes rapid movement of military forces, therefore proper development of China's transport aviation would be very beneficial not only on the efficiency of Chinese military forces but would provide rapid communications for other purposes. He indicated that we would have a surplus of transport planes once the requirements for occupation and returning personnel to this country had been met; that if Chinese pilots could be trained to handle these planes and arrangements worked out as to their transfer to Chinese agencies it would be of mutual benefit to both United States and China to turn some of these planes over to the Chinese. The whole discussion was of a relatively broad nature and no commitments were made.

General Marshall felt that if a way could be found to furnish China the means of developing air transport the results would be far reaching. Serious doubt exists as to whether the Chinese can be trained as pilots for planes as large as the C-54. It would seem, however, that such could be accomplished in time. The method of transfer of these planes would have to be worked out and would have to be on some basis other than lend lease. In order to get an efficient organization in China the Chinese probably would have to develop an air transport system under military control.

Reply to invitation to visit China will be answered by Chief of Staff later.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Madame Chiang left Washington, D.C., for China on the evening of August 29, 1945, having been in the United States for much of the past year. She had flown to Rio de Janeiro in mid-July 1944 for medical treatment. In mid-September 1944 she entered Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center in New York City reportedly "suffering from nervous exhaustion, insomnia, and chronic urticaria." After leaving the hospital in October 1944, she lived in the Riverdale section of the Bronx. (*New York Times*, August 30, 1945, p. 4; July 14, 1944, p. 1; September 12, 1944, p. 10; October 9, 1944, p. 25.)

TO OVETA CULP HOBBY

September 18, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mrs. Hobby, On my return to Washington yesterday¹ I found your letter with its generous comments regarding my services as Chief of Staff in relation to the Women's Army Corps. I appreciate very much your

expressions of satisfaction and appreciation regarding our official relation during these past critical days of the war.²

I am very sorry that I was unable to attend the dinner in your honor in Houston last week and even more so that where I was in the mountains it was not possible for me to broadcast my feelings regarding your fine services. I had intended to record the statement for use by NBC but was told at the last minute that they would not permit any recorded statement. Therefore the telegram.³

I should have liked so much to have expressed in person my thanks and appreciation of your services, both when you actually surrendered your office here in the War Department and on the occasion of the dinner in Houston. The fact that I was at Potsdam on the first date and in the mountains on the second was most unfortunate and disappointing to me for I had a strong feeling that you deserved much better of me.⁴ Your firm leadership and unselfish purpose were a tremendous factor in the outstanding success of the organization. You made a great sacrifice in your effort which I hope will not prove costly to your future health.

Meanwhile, please accept my thanks and warm regards. Whenever you are in the vicinity of Washington I should like very much to see you. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. General and Mrs. Marshall had spent September 8 to 16 at the summer home of Mr. and Mrs. Joseph E. Davies at Upper Saint Regis Lake in the Adirondack Mountains of upstate New York. (On their 1944 stay, see *Papers of GCM*, 4: 549–50.) Marshall had briefly returned to Washington, D.C., on September 10 for the ceremonies honoring Jonathan M. Wainwright. (See note 2, Marshall to Wainwright, August 28, 1945, p. 290.)

2. Mrs. Hobby had written: "Serving under your leadership was one of the great experiences of my life. I shall ever be grateful to you for the opportunity and the never failing assistance. There is no way for me to express my appreciation as a citizen for your inspired leadership during our great National crisis but it is a comfort to know that the nation as a whole knows and appreciates your very great contribution." (Hobby to Marshall, undated letter received in Marshall's office on September 10, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. Marshall had written that Hobby's "mastery of an exceedingly difficult and complex undertaking commands my admiration." (Marshall to Kern Tips [chairman of the Citizens' Committee, Radio Station KTRC, Houston, Texas], September 13, 1945, *ibid.*)

4. The ceremony marking Colonel Hobby's turning over command of the Women's Army Corps to Colonel Westray Battle Boyce occurred on July 12. Hobby's terminal leave would end and her retirement begin on September 3. (*New York Times*, July 13, 1945, p. 22.)

TO GENERAL MARK W. CLARK
Radio. *Confidential*

September 18, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Clark from Marshall. The Army Navy Joint Staff College,

after completion of the current course in the near future, will be involved in the establishment of the college on an entirely different basis from that which has pertained during the war. Our view is that the college should be organized on a higher War College level.¹

General De Witt is being relieved as Commandant by Vice Admiral Hill of the Navy. This is in compliance with the policy as to retired officers and as to alternation of the position of Commandant. The Deputy Commandant will be an Army officer. It is a key position in which should be placed an officer of keen mentality, organizing ability and school experience. General Gruenther has been highly recommended for this position by both General De Witt and General Devers. It would be a marked advantage to the post war Army and particularly to our post war educational system if Gruenther could be made available. He should be here by 1 November.² Please consider this matter carefully and let me have your views.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See note 7, Marshall to Eisenhower, September 7, 1945, p. 297.

2. Major General Alfred M. Gruenther (U.S.M.A., 1919) was deputy commander of U.S. Forces, Austria. He was a graduate of the Command and General Staff School and the Army War College and had taught at the U.S. Military Academy for eight years between 1927 and 1938. He served as deputy commandant of the National War College between December 1, 1945, and August 21, 1947.

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
FROM HENRY L. STIMSON

September 18, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mr. President: Two or three weeks ago I spoke to you of the importance of properly recognizing the services of General Marshall. He is the outstanding man among the English speaking soldiers of this war, bar none. He has dominated the global strategy of the war in a way that no other general has. By his character and influence he has also dominated the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He has won the complete confidence of the heads of the allied governments, notably Winston Churchill. All have recognized his intellectual power, his selfless integrity, and his inflexible habit of considering only the general interest and never his own.

His mind has guided the grand strategy of our campaigns. He held to the proper line towards Germany's heart when others were seeking diversions. It was his mind and character that carried through the trans-Channel campaign against Germany in spite of constant and powerful attempts to divert and defeat it. Similarly the south of France plan. Similarly his views have controlled the Pacific campaign although there he has been

most modest and careful in recognizing the role of the Navy. His views guided Mr. Roosevelt throughout.

The construction of the American Army has been entirely the fruit of his initiative and supervision. Likewise its training. As a result, we have had an army unparalleled in our history with a high command of supreme and uniform excellence; an army able to go directly from the American training camps and maneuver grounds and successfully meet the best which the Germans could put forward.

With this Army we have won a most difficult dual war with practically no serious setbacks and astonishingly “according to plan”. The estimate of our forces required has been adequate and yet not excessive. For instance, Marshall estimated against the larger estimates of others that eighty-nine American divisions would suffice. On the successful close of the war, all but two of these divisions had been committed to action in the field. His timetables of the successive operations have been accurate and the close of the war has been ultimately achieved far sooner than most of us had anticipated.

Show me any war in history which has produced a general with such a surprisingly perfect record as this greatest and most difficult war of all history. I cannot leave my office without putting on record my view that General Marshall should receive the highest possible American decoration, bar none. The ideally fitting method would be for Congress to vote him a special supreme medal such as they did to General Ulysses Grant. Certainly a DSM would be insufficient. He already has one from the last war.

I have written this hasty sketch of my view of a man with whom I have been in daily contact for five years. Never under all the strain and pressure of those times has he revealed to me a departure in speech or conduct from the uniformly high standard which I have tried to depict.¹ Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Secretary of War Stimson submitted his resignation to the president on September 18; it was to be effective in three days on his seventy-eighth birthday. He handed the statement printed here to the president at the close of the Cabinet meeting that day, and all present were enthusiastic about doing something special for Marshall. Truman agreed that he should recommend a special medal to Congress. (See Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [Diary, 52: 141–42].) Marshall, however, received his second Distinguished Service Medal upon his retirement. (See Marshall Statement upon Receiving the Distinguished Service Medal, November 26, 1945, pp. 366–67.)

At his last press conference on the morning of September 19, about half of Stimson’s farewell statement was praise for Marshall; it concluded: “During the course of a long lifetime, much of it spent in position of public trust, I have had considerable experience with men in government. General Marshall has given me a new gauge of what such service should be. The destiny of America at the most critical time of its national existence has been in the hands of a great and good citizen. Let no man forget it.” (*New York Times*, September 20, 1945, p. 12.)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Top Secret

September 20, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Eisenhower: I am sending you by courier with this letter the draft of a plan for the post-war Army which has had to be prepared as a guide to our planners in their dealings with the Navy planners in the preparation of a report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President. This action has been precipitated by the Navy moving independently to the Congress for a strength of 500,000 men plus 100,000 Marines. The President has referred this to the JCS for a consolidated recommendation to him.¹

I find myself in a most difficult position in this matter due to the fact that I am not to continue in office and therefore will not have the responsibility for the future of the Army during the next three or four years, particularly its initial post-war basis. This special situation finds me at the moment responsible for the recommendations to the JCS and in general disagreement with almost the unanimous opinion of the War Department group responsible for the preparation of the plans I am sending you.

I have tried to avoid tying your hands by some decision of mine as to the future. The present hullabaloo over demobilization with the accusations that the Army is trying to conduct demobilization with a view to the maintenance of a force of 2,500,000 next July, grew in part, I feel, out of the manner of presentation to the Budget and to the Military Committee of the House of the figures involved. I was in flat disagreement with the procedure but felt bound to assure General Handy and General Hull that I would not take action which they felt would commit the War Department to an unwise basis for the future. Now I am up against the problem of a positive recommendation to the President of a course of action with which I am almost in complete disagreement. Also a course of action which I feel will not only ruin the confidence of the Congress in the War Department's wisdom but will defeat Universal Military Training.

Were I to continue as Chief of Staff I would have no hesitancy at all as to how to act but I am greatly embarrassed by reason of my complete disagreement with the Staff in this matter and my feeling that they do not properly evaluate the power and application of Universal Military Training to our military structure nor have they a proper appreciation of the dominant budgetary influence in time of peace. I went through this business in a conspicuous position in 1920 and remained with General Pershing through the successive emasculations of the Army until 1924. I was on the Reorganization Board—the junior member—in June, 1920, with Fox Conner, Campbell King, George Simonds, General Lassiter, and others I have forgotten, and we interviewed the leading officers of the Army in this matter. In other words it is an old story to me which I find now

about to be repeated—the matters to which they attached great importance which received no consideration whatsoever in the final make-up of the Army.²

To me it is tragically bad judgement to approach this conference with the Navy with a proposed strength of almost a million men for the Army, the Navy already conducting a public campaign—under the strong leadership of Mr. Vinson, the Chairman of the Navy Committee—for 600,000 men. The Army proposal, especially when you consider that in addition there would be some 600,000 or 700,000 young men under Universal Military Training, would make the Navy proposal seem very modest. The combination of the two presents, in my opinion, a demand for annual appropriations which is wholly unreasonable in relation to the national budget and which I think is illogical in relation to the state of the world, assuming we have Universal Military Training.

Now my problem is how I can suppress my views so as not to embarrass you. I want you to write me very frankly and at as early a date as you possibly can. I will endeavor to carry out your wishes.³ Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. A discussion of the background to Marshall's letter may be found in *Papers of DDE*, 6: 370–71; see also his comments in Speech to the Maryland Historical Society, June 11, 1945, p. 222. The navy presented its request to the Bureau of the Budget (600,000 enlisted plus 60,000 officers) on June 18. On August 21, President Truman referred the proposal to the J.C.S. for a determination of overall armed forces requirements. On August 29, Marshall appointed a committee to plan for the peacetime army. This committee—headed by Brigadier General William W. Bessell, Jr. (U.S.M.A., 1920), senior army member of the Joint War Plans Committee since April 1943—presented its interim report on September 15; it called for an army of 683,000 enlisted and 95,000 officers. Marshall presented this report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 19. In the letter printed here, Marshall enclosed J.C.S. 1520, a thirty-five-page paper that included projected peacetime navy-marine and army ground and air strengths.

2. See Marshall's comments on the 1920 reorganization in *Papers of GCM*, 1: 196–97. The members of the ten-man board of the General Staff that Marshall mentions are (ranks as of June 1920): Brigadier General Fox Conner, Colonel Campbell King, Major George S. Simonds, and Colonel William Lassiter.

3. Eisenhower replied on September 24 with “a very brief synopsis of my views concerning post-war Army organization”: unity of command in bases outside the United States; universal military training; a small Regular Army (i.e., roughly twenty-five thousand officers and three hundred thousand men for both ground and air forces—excluding temporary occupation forces); the greatest possible utilization of Reserve officers; and the consolidation of various overhead functions (e.g., research and procurement). (*Papers of DDE*, 6: 368–70.)

MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

September 20, 1945 Washington, D.C.

VETERANS and their families had been voicing complaints to the press and members of Congress about the pace and fairness of the army's demobilization. Some people hinted that the perceived slowness was part of an effort to enable the army to retain an excessive peacetime troop strength. Marshall hoped to counter these assertions in an informal morning talk with about 350 members of Congress in the auditorium of the Library of Congress. The following is a summary of a sixty-eight-hundred-word transcript of his extemporaneous remarks that the War Department Bureau of Public Relations prepared and sent to various newspapers.

"All the facilities available in transportation and in personnel trained to handle demobilization have been devoted to release from the Service as rapidly as possible of the largest possible number of men," Marshall began; considerations of army manpower needed for occupation duties would not influence the demobilization rate before late spring of 1946. Several months ago, he noted, the army had been forced by the budgetary timetable to issue a projected troop strength on July 1, 1946, of 2,500,000 (900,000 for the Pacific, 400,000 for Europe, and the balance in training and service organizations). Marshall conceded that these numbers had caused "considerable disturbance" to members of Congress and in the press, but they had been made before the army knew how the Japanese would react to the U.S. occupation. At the time, he reminded the audience, Japan had "an undefeated army of 2,500,000 completely equipped and well-fed men."

Marshall discussed the massive troop and equipment redistribution in the spring and summer of 1945 from Europe to the Pacific that Germany's defeat and the proposed autumn assault on Japan had engendered—seventeen combat divisions plus support and air troops—and the enormity of the construction effort needed to permit this. Some units had to be sent directly from Europe to the Pacific without stopping in the United States for their congressionally mandated thirty-day leave. Many individuals were disturbed by this, but that was necessary and "a hard reality of war."

Combat divisions in Europe had to be reconstituted prior to shipment via the United States to the Pacific, causing a six-week delay in their movement to the embarkation ports. This meant that many high-point men were transported home immediately after V-E Day; but then, as the divisions reached the ports, the long-service men found themselves with a much reduced shipping priority. There were even greater problems in the Philippines, Marshall noted; there troops tended to have had "much longer service—under jungle hardships—than those in the European Theater." There was another problem: "the long-service men were naturally the first sergeants, the leaders of the reconnaissance, the heads of the radar units, the commanders of intelligence teams, the platoon sergeants and corporals—the men that make the wheels go, that make a unit dependable in battle." Screening out such men resulted in "a loss of about 80 per cent of our leadership." Similar losses occurred in units in Europe. This forced the army to delay reducing the point score for demobilization eligibility despite public and troop demands.

The army had spent two years planning for an orderly demobilization, Marshall asserted; but when Japan unexpectedly surrendered, the plans were rendered obsolete.

Shipping priorities were immediately revised to begin a rapid transport of high-score men home. But, he observed, the transportation pipeline from Europe was loaded with low-point men en route to the Pacific. Perhaps worse, the army found itself with fourteen divisions and numerous special units in the United States full of low-point men. If these men were released from service, this might do great harm to the morale of Pacific veterans, who were having to prepare for occupation duty in Japan.

The army had demobilized 450,000 men between May 10 and August 14, Marshall noted; and by the latter date it was releasing personnel at the rate of over 4,000 per day. "Today I think the rate is up to 17,000 a day." Separation facilities—frequently run by experienced, long-service men who were anxious to be discharged and who were being replaced by inexperienced personnel—were now being overwhelmed.

"The process of demobilization is rather intricate," the chief of staff explained. "In the last war men were demobilized so hurriedly that many were given records of service so incomplete they are still being corrected. We are trying to give our men all of the data required for their future relationship with the Government," the Veterans Administration, and their employers. Nevertheless, the army had made great strides in minimizing demobilization paperwork.

"Considerable discussion" had taken place within the War Department as to whether the army was transporting men home as rapidly as possible, Marshall observed. "In the Atlantic returning ships are all full" and numerous vessels shipping supplies to Europe were bringing troops home. The Pacific problem had been slightly different for a while, but ships returning from there to the United States were now full. Soon, he assured the audience, the army would reach the point where it could discharge every person who did not have a useful job—although this would probably lead to complaints of unfairness and hardships from various quarters. He hoped that by late winter the point system would end and all men with two or more years of service would be eligible for discharge.

His mail indicated that Americans desired more certainty, a more definite schedule, regarding demobilization. "To meet that requirement," Marshall announced, "we are going down to a critical score for enlisted men of 70 points on October 1 and to 60 points on November 1." That change would affect 2,000,000 people. He "anticipated that during this month of September, about 450,000 will be released, about 550,000 in October, and thereafter, between 700,000 and 800,000 a month. . . . This rate will be maintained until we reach the point in the spring [of 1946] when we will be forced to determine what forces are to be required for occupation duties, and what men can be brought back for demobilization."

July 1, 1946, was the army's target date for the transition from "the present fluid situation" to one where the size of the peacetime army had become clear. Thereafter, Marshall said, he expected that four hundred thousand men would be needed in Europe, two hundred thousand in Japan and Korea, and some others elsewhere in the Pacific and China. The army was still working out the details of moving back to the United States the "tremendous amount of valuable material" overseas—six million tons in the European theater alone, scattered in numerous camps and depots.

Meanwhile, the army would be happy to assist congressional groups going overseas to investigate the demobilization process. "Any groups that you wish to form, I don't care how large or how diverse the points you wish to visit, will be welcome. . . . At first hand you can judge the efficiency of the demobilization system." (GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Speeches].) ★

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Top Secret

September 22, 1945

[Washington, D.C.]

With reference to the present discussion in the press and by political leaders regarding communications between Governor Dewey and myself in the latter part of September 1944,¹ the following information and attached papers are submitted for your information.

In the latter part of September, 1944, it was reported to me that it was the purpose of the Republican party, in the campaign that was then in progress, to launch a detailed attack on the Administration in connection with the Pearl Harbor incident. In my opinion, with which Admiral King concurred, such a debate would inevitably have disclosed to the Japanese, and possibly to the Germans, the fact that we had succeeded in breaking their machine codes on which we were largely depending at that particular time for information resulting in the destruction of the Japanese navy and other shipping. You will recall that at this particular period the sinkings of Japanese vessels was developing at a very rapid rate and continued to the point where little remained in the China Sea. General MacArthur was then making his final preparations for the invasion of the Philippine Islands and obtaining vital information from this same source. We were also depending on this source for information concerning the German army which was being transmitted by the Japanese Ambassadors in Berlin, Moscow, Stockholm, and Bern.

Under the circumstances it was considered imperative that something be done to prevent the loss of this vital source of information which meant much to this country in the expeditious conduct of the campaign and economy in American lives. It was decided that the only way this could be done was by some method which avoided any political implications, and that method appeared to be a communication direct from me to Governor Dewey with a frank statement of the situation and the assurance that the President and the Cabinet were unaware of my action. To guard against the accidental disclosure of the information given Governor Dewey by letter, he was requested not to read the letter unless he would bind himself to secrecy.

This communication was sent to him by the hand of Colonel Clarke, the officer in charge of Cryptographic Intelligence, who, in civilian clothes, succeeded in unobtrusively gaining an audience with Governor Dewey at Tulsa, Oklahoma. The Governor was unwilling to bind himself to secrecy before reading the entire letter. Therefore another draft of the letter was prepared, which is attached, and Colonel Clarke carried this to the Governor at Albany. Governor

Dewey then talked to me on the telephone, stating that as the representative of the Republican Party in the campaign he could not consider himself as an individual in this matter and that he felt it was necessary that at least one trusted adviser be permitted to read the letter. I agreed to do this and a Mr. Bell was indicated over the phone.

The letter also contained the direction that it be returned after he read it. The Governor took exception to this, stating that he should be protected by having the letter in his secret files. I agreed to this. So far as I was concerned this closed the incident, Governor Dewey reading and keeping the letter. There was no further mention of Pearl Harbor, as I recall, during the campaign.

There is, of course, a very heavy pressure from the press and others for the release of the letter or some statement by me. It is my view that at best only a partial release could be made, as there are certain paragraphs in the basic letter involving British interests which I feel we have no right to disclose. Further, it now appears to me that I should not make any statement, certainly at this time, and especially as I have been unable to communicate with Admiral King over the weekend.²

G. C. Marshall

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The *New York Times*, for example, ran a story about an essay on Pearl Harbor by John Chamberlain to appear in the *Life* magazine issue dated September 24 (pp. 110ff) that called attention to Marshall's letters to Thomas E. Dewey. (*New York Times*, September 21, 1945, p. 4.) On these letters, see *Papers of GCM*, 4: 607–11.

2. President Truman returned the original with the following note at the end: "Dear General: As you know I have the utmost confidence in you & your judgement. I suggest you give both of these—memo and letter to Dewey to the press for tomorrow. It will stop all the demagogues." On September 24, Marshall sent copies of his memorandum printed here and the 1944 Dewey letter to Admiral King and Admiral Leahy, but not to the press.

The issue of Marshall's letters to Dewey was examined at length in December 1945 by the congressional Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Over Marshall's objections, the committee voted to release the letters to the public, and Marshall had to read the two letters into the record on December 7. (See Pearl Harbor Committee Testimony, December 7, 1945, pp. 379–80.) The letters were subsequently widely published in the press. (For example, see *New York Times*, December 8, 1945, p. 5. See also the story on Marshall's objections to publication; *ibid.*, December 16, 1945, sec. 4, p. 10.)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
[Radio No. W-68476.] *Secret*

September 24, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Personal to General Eisenhower from General Marshall. Thanks for your prompt reply regarding post war Army.¹ The following is quoted from an editorial in the *New York Times* [p. 18] this morning: "General

Patton believes that in general, far too much fuss has been made regarding denazification of Germany; that this Nazi thing is just like a Democratic and Republican election fight, and that the best hope for the future lies in showing the German people what grand fellows we are.

General Patton is a fine soldier, etc. but General Patton is now head of the Military Government of Bavaria and what he says on the subject of occupation policy is certain to affect both the attitude of our own troops and the response of the German people. When therefore, General Patton belittles the very purpose for which the war in Europe was fought, namely the denazification of Germany, we do not believe that his remarks should go unchallenged either by his commanding officer General Eisenhower, or by his superiors in Washington.”

Please take action to see that Patton refrains from such comments. I had already received reports from several parties that he was being very indiscreet in his statements.² This particular indiscretion becomes much more important in view of the extreme of trouble we are having in the Pacific and here at home with indiscreet casual comments by senior officers.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See note 3, Marshall to Eisenhower, September 20, 1945, p. 306.

2. The War Department had recently lifted its ban on quotations from general officers by the press. Patton called a press conference at his Third Army headquarters on September 22. Several reporters were particularly interested in the speed of denazification (which Patton was reputed to oppose) and the use of former Nazis in certain roles. Patton lost his temper at what he considered the hostile implications of some of the reporters’ questions. (Martin Blumenson, *The Patton Papers, 1940–1945* [Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974], pp. 761–66.)

“Patton states that he was badly mis-quoted,” Eisenhower replied the next day. He then directed Patton to: (1) read to the press part of a letter on denazification policy Eisenhower had sent to Patton on September 11; (2) submit a report concerning any person in Patton’s occupation area who was in a position of influence and who was suspected of Nazi party affiliation or sympathies; (3) fly to Eisenhower’s headquarters for a meeting. (*Papers of DDE*, 6: 374–76.)

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

September 25, 1945 Washington, D.C.

CLARENCE Cannon, Democrat from Missouri and committee chairman, began by noting that since 1940 the committee had appropriated \$200,000,000,000, “largely on your recommendations; and . . . it has all been well spent.” But doubts concerning appropriations, which had been routinely resolved in the army’s favor during the emergency, would henceforth require a more rigorous proof of need.

He understood and agreed with the committee members’ point of view, Marshall replied, noting that the War Department would return at least \$17,000,000,000 in appropriated money due to postwar cutbacks. He then discussed demobilization and

the size of the army forces the United States would probably need (1,950,000 men as of July 1, 1946, but this included 320,000 who would be demobilized within a few weeks of that date). He urged the committee members to be "very, very wise" concerning "the character of the structure we set up in the way of military power in the future." Without this, congressional generosity would soon cease and the postwar military establishment would "very apt to be more or less completely emasculated shortly thereafter under pressure of public opinion to reduce taxes . . . [and] we may be said to have 'lost the peace.' Whatever the size of the Army, the financial requirements for its maintenance are going to be heavy. If the system is an improvisation, the result of drastic compromises, we will have huge expenses and little resulting benefit."

Marshall commented on demobilization's dependence upon shipping, reduction of facilities in the United States, the army's handing of production (e.g., of tanks and artillery) still in process, the complications introduced by the need to maintain new bases in the Pacific, and the inadvisability of hasty termination of certain activities (e.g., construction and maintenance at various posts). Research on and development of weapons systems was popular at present, he noted, "but I must be frank in stating that the enthusiasm of the moment will be evanescent and it will be very difficult later to maintain a workable continuation of experimentation in scientific research." He concluded his opening statement by praising Congress for entrusting him with a total of \$150,000,000 in contingency funds to use as he saw fit. The money had been "of tremendous value, particularly in the early stages of our military development," and \$119,000,000 of it would be unobligated as of July 1, 1946.

Representative Cannon said that he had been impressed by Marshall's "appreciation of the fact that the military point of view must be tempered by financial considerations, and especially by your charity in realizing that the political implications under which the committee moves may affect the situation." It was not charity but an understanding of democracy, Marshall responded.

Cannon raised the "red hot" demobilization issue, noting the "bitter tenor" of some of the letters about the army's actions that members of Congress were receiving. This led to a discussion of demobilization rates after previous wars and postwar troop strengths. Marshall resisted Cannon's attempts to provide an estimate of the minimum size of occupation forces: "It appears impossible to give even educated guesses as to the future size of the occupation forces. . . . I should certainly not bind my successors with something that I might give you gentlemen today in this offhand manner."

Military production could not be left entirely to army arsenals; industry had to continue its involvement with the military and maintain its expertise or the country would risk a return to the unprepared situation it faced in 1940. The du Pont company, for example, had developed great expertise in powder manufacture by 1917, but after World War I the army gave them no orders, "with the result that in 1940 we had no powder industry worthy of the name."

Marshall favored reducing the number of military posts in the country. The National Guard should be retained, but "without universal military training, [it] would be inadequate to the postwar purpose" of constituting a real army reserve. "The whole point, so far as the continuing peace of the world is concerned, . . . is to impress foreign governments, specifically their military staffs—which means their political leaders with the readily available military power of America. If they know that we are strong, then they will not dare to take liberties."

Democrat congressman Louis Ludlow of Indiana returned the discussion to manpower demobilization; he also asked what effect Marshall thought the atomic bomb

would have on the size of the military establishment. The bomb meant that the United States had to have its armed forces available immediately upon the outbreak of an emergency, the chief of staff responded. “The fundamental requirements of conducting successful war have not changed any more than they were altered by the discovery of gunpowder, the submarine, gas, tanks, or planes. The technique changed but never as much as at first anticipated, and almost invariably with each development the number of men required is increased.”

Before the session ended, Marshall was called upon by other committee members to reiterate his views on the issues of demobilization, surplus property disposal, postwar bases, and army strength and costs. (House Committee on Appropriations, *First Supplemental Surplus Rescission Bill, 1946: Hearings . . . Part 2* [Washington: GPO, 1945], pp. 499–545.) ★

STUDY and debate concerning a unified military department began shortly after World War I but swiftly died in the face of army and navy opposition. The idea was resurrected in 1940 and 1941, and Marshall was a well-known supporter of the concept. Marshall directed that demobilization planning begin in the spring of 1943; the planners needed to know what the postwar military establishment would look like, so the army conducted more studies on unification. The Select Committee of the House of Representatives on Postwar Military Policy held hearings in April and May 1944, but it soon decided that nothing could be done until the war was over. (See *Papers of GCM*, 4: 416–21, 444–45. See also Ray S. Cline and Maurice Matloff, “Development of War Department Views on Unification,” *Military Affairs* 13[Summer 1949]: 65–74.)

On May 9, 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff appointed a four-man (two army, two navy) Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense, under the chairmanship of Admiral James O. Richardson (commander of the U.S. Fleet, 1940–41), which held hearings in Washington, D.C., and in the field for ten months. The committee reported to the J.C.S. on April 11, 1945. With Richardson dissenting, the three-man majority recommended: (1) the creation of a single department of armed forces; (2) three equal services (thus adding an independent Air Force); (3) a single commander of all forces who would be in charge of strategic planning and would direct military operations in the field; (4) a single Services of Supply; (5) a U.S. Chiefs of Staff organization with duties limited to advising the president on military strategy and the budget but without operational authority. The J.C.S. debated unification throughout the summer. (See the proposed organization chart in Alice C. Cole et al., *The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944–1978* [Washington: GPO, 1979], p. 5.)

Admiral Richardson submitted a minority report advising against the concentration of power in a single department and the creation of an inde-

pendent air force. The navy feared that its particular problems and strategic mission might tend to be ignored if it were only one of three military departments. Moreover, the justification for the navy's having its own air and land forces might be questioned. Consequently, in mid-June 1945, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal directed that his friend Ferdinand Eberstadt (investment banker and former chairman of the Army-Navy Munitions Board and vice chairman of the War Production Board) undertake a study on an alternative to the proposed consolidation of the War and Navy departments. Eberstadt completed his report on September 25. (Ibid., p. 6. There is a summary of the unification issue in *Papers of DDE*, 6: 216-17.) ★

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF [September 26, 1945]
Restricted [Washington, D.C.]

1. I am not in agreement with the reasons advanced by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, against acceptance of the recommendations of the majority report of the Special Committee on Reorganization of National Defense that the system of a single department be adopted. In so far as his reasons are expressed by adherence to the minority report by Admiral Richardson, I consider that in general the majority report of the Special Committee covers the points raised by Admiral Richardson.

2. On the matter of the three points in paragraph 3 of Admiral King's paper (JCS 749/22) cited as objections additional to those raised by Admiral Richardson, these have already been covered in substance in both the majority and the minority reports of the Special Committee. In comment thereon, however, I do not agree that it is inadvisable for the President to depend on one man, who, in accordance with the American way of government, would be a civilian secretary with associated civilian under secretaries and assistants, to exercise authority over all the armed forces. I do not agree that the report of the Special Committee implies creation of any organization having the position and powers of that referred to by Admiral King as the Ober Kommando Wehrmacht.¹ Obviously, any necessary departmental staff would be the servant of the civilians exercising authority over the department, subject to the President and Congress. This, however, is a matter of detail which can be worked out later. It does not appear to be an important factor in the consideration of the principle of one department.

3. To the point that results of centralized control of the armed forces compare unfavorably to better all-round results to be expected from

“friendly and intelligent coordination . . . thus providing for balanced consideration of military matters,” in my opinion and experience this coordination has been difficult and incomplete even in war, and will be infinitely more difficult in peace. As a current evidence of the inefficacy of this system and as a strong argument for a single department of national defense is the fact that under the present system, which is similar to the minority proposal, there has been presented to budgetary agencies of the government a plan for a post-war Navy without consideration or coordination with the War Department. Such procedure does not appear to be in the national interest.

4. The basic disagreement within the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization on the most effective form of organization is now apparent and there remains no valid reason for further delay in transmitting to the President the differing views of the Chiefs of Staff and the study of the Special Committee containing the majority and the minority reports on Reorganization of National Defense.

5. It is recommended that the attached memorandum, together with the study of the Special Committee, the differing views of the Chiefs of Staff contained in JCS 749/21 and JCS 749/22, and this paper be presented to the President.²

NA/RG 165 (OPD, 320)

1. The German armed forces high command (*Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* or OKW) was created by Hitler in 1938 as the means through which he would direct the war. The OKW failed to coordinate military views and policies, however, since the individual service commanders had direct access to the Führer, who had great confidence in his own skill as a warlord, and who generally pursued a divide-and-rule managerial philosophy. The OKW was thus left as primarily Hitler’s military mouthpiece.

2. For further developments on this issue, see Marshall Memorandum for General Hull, October 2, 1945, pp. 321–22, and Marshall Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 10, 1945, pp. 327–30.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY¹
Confidential

September 27, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

The Chinese Ambassador saw me this morning in relation to the termination of the operation of the pipeline over the Hump on November 1. He desired that it be continued in operation for another three or four months in order that there would be sufficient fuel oils and gas for the Chinese redeployment requirements in western China.

General Wedemeyer had previously told me that some 1200 or 1400 U.S. soldiers were involved in the operation of the pipeline; that while these men were high point soldiers it probably would not be possible for

them to be transported to the United States for demobilization before February and that if relieved now they would merely accumulate in the pool at Calcutta or Karachi.

I did not commit myself to the Chinese Ambassador. I told him the serious difficulty related to demobilization; that an exception here, meaning along the pipeline, might well lead to drastic action by Congress all over the world to the great embarrassment of the War Department. Therefore we had to be extremely careful in any action that might delay the return of U.S. soldiers for demobilization.

I told the Ambassador that I thought a month or two months at the outside would probably be the limit of possibility in the case and whether or not that could be managed remained to be investigated. I questioned him about the effect of tanker deliveries of gasoline at Haiphong and Canton with relation to the maintenance of Chinese troops accumulating in the vicinity of those places. Of course he had no data, and I was merely putting this possibility into his mind.

Please look into the matter from the viewpoint of demobilization requirements, the amount of fuel that could be stored in Assam in the tank farms, thus releasing all U.S. personnel in that region and yet leaving enough gasoline to feed the pipeline for the desired period, the storage capacity at Kunming from a similar point of view, and in particular, the possibility of tanker deliveries at points on the south China coast other than Shanghai.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. This memorandum was also sent to the Operations Division and Headquarters, Army Service Forces.

2. The headquarters of both the China Theater and the India-Burma Theater were opposed to continuing the operation of the four-inch pipeline, which followed the Ledo Road and a portion of the Burma Road, beyond November 1. On October 5, Marshall notified Ambassador Wei Tao-ming that the U.S. Army would continue to operate the pipeline throughout October but not beyond, because this would cause unacceptable delays in demobilizing the operating personnel. On the twelfth, Marshall wrote Wei that the pipeline would continue "at full discharge rate until 1 November and accumulate as much excess stocks as possible" for the Chinese government's use. On November 2, China Theater Headquarters notified the War Department that an excess over United States needs of 12,922 tons of gasoline, oil, and lubricants had been accumulated in China. (Hull memorandum "Termination of Operation of the Pipeline Over the Hump on 1 November," October 9, 1945; Marshall to Wei Tao-ming, October 12, 1945; and Hull memorandum "Notification to Ambassador Wei of Discontinuance of Operation of India-China Pipeline," November 5, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 091 China 1944-46].)

TO MR. OR MRS. JOSEPH E. DAVIES

September 29, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mr. Davies: I am addressing this note in a rather odd fashion in the effort to have it opened by either you or Mrs. Davies if one or the other only of you is still at camp.¹

I hate very much to bother you but in taking our departure the other day we left behind two canes on the porch of the cottage. One of them is an old stick of no importance but the other, sort of a reddish wood, I have a sentimental attachment for. I do not want to trouble you to have it sent down by mail, but I would appreciate it if in leaving camp you would include it in your baggage and allow me to send over to your Washington house for it.

I always feel very badly about troubling people with my carelessness of this character, particularly after such gracious hospitality.²

It has been quite hot and sticky here in town, disagreeably so. I believe the thermometer reached 90 the other day but the humidity is the trouble.

I am endeavoring to get away today, Saturday, until Sunday night. I have been under extreme pressure in connection with demobilization and in hearings on appropriations—I was before the House Appropriations Committee from 10 A.M. until 5 P.M. on Wednesday and afterwards it took me five hours to correct the testimony.³ Since there is a great deal of pressing daily business, these extras make the burden rather heavy.

With warm regards, and my apologies, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Concerning the Marshalls' visit with Mr. and Mrs. Davies in New York, see note 1, Marshall to Hobby, September 18, 1945, p. 302.

2. Joseph Davies replied that he was sending the canes to Marshall's Fort Myer house. He also observed that he had read the page proofs of Marshall's 1943–45 biennial report "with keenest interest. It is a great document and, if you will pardon me saying so, issued by a great man, whose stature the country now appreciates; posterity will appreciate it still more." (Davies to Marshall, October 2, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. Marshall met with the committee on *Tuesday*, September 25. See the summary of his testimony on pp. 311–13.

TO ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK

September 29, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Betty: I have your note of the 24th.

As yet nothing has come up regarding my appearance before the Con-

gressional Committee.¹ Whenever it does I will let you know the outcome. Also, to date, I have not found a moment in which to go into the matter. As a matter of fact I have never been busier, more closely engaged. The affairs of demobilization, the hearings on the Army appropriation bill—I was before the committee from 10 A.M. until 5 P.M. on Wednesday [*Tuesday*], military government matters, etc., have been very pressing.

I hope to get away sometime today, Saturday, for the weekend, coming back from Leesburg tomorrow night. Hastily and affectionately,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. As soon as the war ended there were calls for a congressional investigation of the events surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The makeup of the ten-man Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack had been announced on September 14, 1945. Hearings were expected to begin in mid-November and to be completed by mid-January 1946. (For background on these hearings, see Gordon W. Prange, with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* [New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1981], chap. 77.)

Stark had written to remind Marshall: "You stated that if you were called by the Committee, you would ask for at least two weeks to prepare yourself. I feel that it would take me about the same length of time to get ready. I would appreciate your letting me know if you do have any discussions with the Committee concerning the time of your appearance, for that might give me some indication of what to expect." (Stark to Marshall, September 24, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) For more information on Marshall's testimony, see the editorial note and the summaries of the hearings, pp. 377–83.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER October 2, 1945
[Radio No. WAR-72298.] *Top Secret* Washington, D.C.

For Eisenhower's eyes only from Marshall. The relief of Patton by Truscott raises the question of a suitable relief for McNarney concerning which your views are requested. As indicated in my 69284 it was contemplated returning Truscott to Italy as a relief for McNarney to wind up that theater as soon as the President had acted in your case. If you do not feel that Truscott should be returned to Italy how about Keyes as McNarney's successor?¹

Since Alexander has left Italy,² McNarney has assumed the duties of the Supreme Commander there, which is satisfactory as an interim measure. I do not feel however that an American should remain indefinitely as the Supreme Commander in the Italian Theater. The political questions involved, particularly as they pertain to the British, the handling of the Poles,³ etc., make it undesirable that we hold the Supreme Command there even though Allied Force Headquarters will break up before the end of the year. From the American military viewpoint it is purely a question

of rolling up the theater and getting out. We have no qualified senior American officers there to relieve McNarney when he leaves.

Field Marshal Wilson indicated to me that the British would like to have McNarney remain on in Italy as Supreme Commander with Lieutenant General Morgan as his deputy. My view is that we should relieve McNarney as soon as possible, possibly returning him to the U.S. temporarily and replacing him with an officer who could become deputy to Morgan or whatever senior British officer the British decide to place in command there. Possibly Smith would like this detail. Would he like the assignment as second in command to a British General?⁴

If you feel that Truscott, Keyes or Smith should not go to Italy do you have any Major General in the theater who could relieve McNarney?⁵

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall and Eisenhower had already agreed that General Joseph T. McNarney would become commanding general U.S. Forces European Theater and military governor of the U.S. zone of Germany as soon as Eisenhower became U.S. Army chief of staff. (See note 3, Marshall to Eisenhower, September 7, 1945, p. 297.)

After the war ended in Europe, Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott applied for combat duty in China, but the war against Japan ended almost as soon as he arrived there. He returned to Italy to prepare his previous headquarters—Fifth Army—for inactivation. In late September, he visited Patton, Eisenhower, and other commanders prior to returning to the United States. On September 25, Eisenhower told Marshall that he was holding Truscott in the area for a few days “pending the outcome of some changes it may be necessary to make.” On the twenty-ninth, Eisenhower cabled Marshall that he tentatively planned “to transfer Patton about October seventh from Third Army to Fifteenth Army Headquarters to take charge of Theater Board.” This board’s main task was compiling a brief military history of the European Theater of Operations. (*Papers of DDE*, 6: 376, 393.)

Effective September 8, Lieutenant General Geoffrey Keyes took command of Seventh Army—i.e., the Western Military District of the U.S. occupation zone in Germany; the Third Army area constituted the Eastern Military District. Eisenhower replied to Marshall’s query on October 3, asserting that “both Keyes and Truscott are occupying jobs here as District Commanders that will be of critical importance for a considerable time.” (*Ibid.*, p. 404.)

2. Sir Harold Alexander, who had been Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, since December 12, 1944, discovered at the Potsdam Conference that King George VI wanted him to be governor-general of Canada. Although this was announced on July 31, 1945, Alexander did not leave his Mediterranean command until the end of September and he did not assume his Canadian duties until April 12, 1946. (Alanbrooke, *War Diaries*, p. 705; *Papers of DDE*, 6: 238.)

3. The Second Polish Corps had been formed in the Soviet Union and the Middle East from Poles who had escaped the Germans. It participated in the Italian campaign and engaged in occupation duties in Italy, where it attracted numerous displaced Poles. Most of its members were bitterly opposed to the accords reached at the Teheran and Yalta conferences that moved Poland’s eastern border and left it in the Soviet sphere of influence. After the war the corps refused to return to a Communist-run Poland. This affair was not resolved until late 1946, when the corps was moved to Great Britain and demobilized. (See Wladyslaw Anders, *An Army in Exile: The Story of the Second Polish Corps* [London: Macmillan and Company, 1949]. Lieutenant General Anders commanded the corps.)

4. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, who had preceded Alexander as Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, was head of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, D.C.

Eisenhower did not want Walter Bedell Smith to go to Italy, because he was presently overseeing a staff reorganization in Europe, and Eisenhower wanted him as a possible replacement for John E. Hull as head of the Operations Division should Hull desire to leave the War Department. Eisenhower agreed that the Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean should be British, and on October 11 it was announced that the post would be held by Lieutenant General Sir William D. Morgan, who had been Alexander's chief of staff. (*Papers of DDE*, 6: 404.)

5. Eisenhower suggested Major General Royal B. Lord (U.S.M.A., 1923)—who since April 1945 had commanded the European theater's Assembly Area Command, which directed redeployment of U.S. forces from the theater—as “eminently qualified to carry out an administrative task of the kind indicated.” Marshall did not think Lord entirely suited and suggested Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway or Major General Edward M. Almond. Eisenhower listed Ridgway as his top choice, and Marshall ordered him to Italy to become Morgan's deputy and commanding general of Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, effective October 11, 1945. (*Ibid.*, pp. 309, 411–12.)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
Radio No. WARX-72310. *Secret*

October 2, 1945
Washington, D.C.

To General MacArthur from General Marshall.

Ultimate composition and organization of occupational forces for Japan, Korea and the Ryukyus is being considered here. WARX 70811 and CAX 52442 illustrate one phase of this problem. Additional suggestions are receiving consideration. One proposal under consideration envisages that the major portion of the occupational force ultimately might be organized along a super military police line with highly mobile tactical units in reserve rather than along the present lines of purely combat organizations. In such an organization, U.S. personnel would be placed in local command staff and other key positions with most subordinate positions held by Japanese for Japan and Ryukyus and by Koreans for Korea. In addition with the establishment of such a police force, it would be necessary that it have the backing of small U.S. combat formations on the order of regimental combat teams located in various strategic areas and capable of rapid movement to threatened points by air or ground. Under this concept, the total of U.S. combat elements might not be greater than the equivalent of one or two divisions.¹

The type of U.S. personnel to be utilized in this proposed integrated military police organization is also being considered. Over-age or limited duty personnel might be satisfactory. Special enlistments in high NCO grade for U.S. personnel to be utilized for this purpose might provide inducement to enable the procurement of sufficient personnel. Commissioned rank might be given to outstanding NCO types as we did for [Philippine] Scouts. Some special legislation might be required.

Methods of effecting the integration of such a force might take one of the following forms:

- A. All officers and NCO's to be U.S., the remainder to be natives.
- B. All officers and NCO's and one squad per military police platoon to be U.S., the remainder to be native.

Variations of the above proposal might consist of replacing native personnel in the integrated organization proposed above by Chinese or Filipino personnel.

Will you consider the foregoing and forward your comments with respect to (1) Japan, (2) Korea and (3) Ryukyus.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM–OUT–72310])

1. A U.S. Infantry division included 15,007 enlisted personnel and 831 officers at this time. (See *Table of Organization and Equipment No. 7*, June 1, 1945.) If various support units were included, the total could nearly double. On September 17, General MacArthur had announced that “within six months the occupational force, unless unforeseen factors arise, will probably number not more than 200,000 men.” If the other Pacific allies participated in the occupation, U.S. troops might only amount to half that figure. As these numbers clashed with Truman administration efforts to get Congress to support an unprecedentedly large peacetime professional army backed by universal military training, they had occasioned a brief controversy. (*Foreign Relations*, 1945, 6: 716; James, *MacArthur*, 3: 18–24.)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HULL
Secret

October 2, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

At the JCS meeting today the two papers, one on a single Department of National Defense¹ and the other on the post-war forces, were discussed at length, particularly the former.

Single Department

Admiral King proposed that time be taken to permit him to submit a brief statement of his views and that the other Chiefs of Staff do the same. Then, with the report of the Board, the whole be transmitted to the President recommending to him, in view of the difference of opinion, the various alternatives—(1) reference of the matter to Congress for investigation, (2) appointment of a board of distinguished civilians to make recommendations, (3) etc. Admiral Leahy read a draft of a lengthy statement in general opposition to the recommendations of the Board. However, most of his contentions were based on details, particularly that of the single commander of the whole forces.

I then made a rather lengthy comment stating my disagreement with various details of the Board's report, notably that of a single commander and I also outlined what I thought was the necessary procedure, that is,

the decision on the fundamental proposition that there should be a single Department and that the development of the single Department be on more or less of an evolutionary basis. Admiral Leahy materially modified his views, Admiral King expressed a different point of view following my explanation, and the final decision was to receive brief statements from each Chief of Staff and send the whole to the President recommending the various alternatives for him. Incidentally, Admiral Leahy in the beginning was opposed to referring the matter to the President.

Post-war Forces

In the Slant 3 document after other proposals by Admiral King, General Arnold and I proposed the omission of sub-paragraph *c* regarding the approach on the basis of a single Department and of the present two-department set-up. Admiral King requested an opportunity to see if the wording of sub-paragraphs *a* and *b* met his views. Presumably the remainder of the affair will be settled by circulation.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. For background on this issue, see the editorial note on pp. 313–15, and the subsequent document.

MEMORANDUM FOR ARMY SERVICE FORCES

October 3, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Please let me have an informal note on the procedure being followed in demobilizing the Post Exchange service. I wish to know specifically what character of service will be continued for occupation forces.

Also let me have an informal statement of the present status of our educational program overseas.

Also let me have a statement of the total number of men in confinement as a result of major court-martial sentences, some idea of the classification of offenses, to what extent sentences have already been revised, and to what extent men have been restored to duty.

Let me have a statement of the progress to date since V-E Day in the demobilization of negro soldiers and the numbers anticipated for October and November.

I should also like to know the present status of motion picture production (get the corresponding data from the Air Corps to include in this statement). Has any thought been given to the possible desirability of releasing the films "Prelude to War" and "The Nazi Strikes" for use in school projectors? I should like in particular General Osborn's view as to this.¹

To what extent must the Military Police organization be continued in force during the process of demobilization? Has any thought been given to the possible desirability of a reserve of Military Police against disorders that may compel federal intervention rather than depending on reserves of ordinary combat organizations?

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. A businessman prior to the mobilization period, Major General Frederick H. Osborn had recently returned to civilian life.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER October 4, 1945
Secret [Washington, D.C.]

Dear Eisenhower: I have approached very reluctantly the business of preparing a list of permanent makes.¹ The Master Board here has furnished me with two papers (1) a list of general officers arranged in order of excellence and (2) an eligible list to comply with the requirements of the law. The latter is a repetition of the first 100 names of the former, less those men already permanent general officers and adding an equivalent number of names below the 100 point on the first list. I could take from these two lists, following strictly the priorities indicated, the 10 men to be proposed for promotion to the grade of major general and about 27 to be given the permanent grade of brigadier general. That, in general, would or will be my procedure but some slight modification I think is indicated.

It seems to me that we should include in our first proposal the names of at least two conspicuous leaders who are not now members of the Regular Army. The inclusion of Doolittle's name involves no complication as he is high on the list. McLain is about 6 counts below the vacancy level for brigadiers.² I am assuming that neither Doolittle nor McLain would desire to remain in the Army but I believe such action on our part would have a very beneficial result and would avoid much later recrimination based on the disappointment of citizen soldiers of general officer rank who were not conspicuously singled out for leadership ability.

Unfortunately, the number of vacancies in the grade of major general lacks the number to cover the leading cases, in my opinion, and it is their possible omission that would inevitably stir up considerable comment. There will be additional vacancies within the next two to five months, mine, Arnold's, Somervell's, etc. If the present legislation is enacted there would be no purpose in terminal leave for two of us, therefore the vacancies would occur quite early, otherwise not.³

At the present moment there are 10 vacancies in the grade of major general and, including those which would be created by the promotion of

permanent brigadiers to the grade of major general—Richardson, Hodges, Devers, Kenney, Spaatz, etc.—amount to 27, on October 31 to 28 and November 30 to 29. I am attaching a tentative list covering these proposed advancements. Those to major general are arranged in order of present rank and those to brigadier are arranged in the order of priority given them by the Master Board. The latter, unfortunately, when considered in order of recommended priority, includes only two members of SWPA.⁴ Please let me have your reaction.⁵ Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. In mid-February 1945, Marshall had notified the heads of all theaters and commands that, in order to prepare for the necessary postwar reductions in grades and assignments for general officers and to avoid the kind of arbitrary and brutal actions taken after World War I, the War Department would attempt to create a system to handle this problem “equitably, sympathetically and with the maximum permissible consideration for the individual concerned.” Each command and theater headquarters was to create a committee of Regular Army generals in the permanent grades to examine in secret the qualifications of general officers for promotion, retention, or reduction in grade. These local boards would send their recommendations to one of four theater boards (European, Southwest Pacific, Pacific Ocean, Mediterranean) which would evaluate and consolidate the lists and forward them to the Master Board, reporting only to Marshall, which would produce a single list. (Marshall to Eisenhower [and sixteen others], February 20, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. James H. Doolittle served in the U.S. Army during the 1920s, but he resigned his commission in 1930 to enter private industry. A member of the Air Corps Reserve, he had been recalled to active duty on July 1, 1940, and held several Air Corps commands during World War II, including—after January 1, 1944—Eighth Air Force. He had been a lieutenant general (temporary) since March 13, 1944. He resigned from the army after the U.S. Senate confirmed his appointment to permanent major general in mid-June 1946.

Raymond S. McLain had been a member of the Oklahoma National Guard since 1912. He had returned to the United States in late May 1945 and on June 6 was promoted to lieutenant general (temporary). His commission as brigadier general in the Regular Army received Senate approval in June 1946. He remained in the army until his 1952 retirement.

3. Legislation had been introduced into Congress aimed at making the five-star rank permanent and for life. See note 4, Marshall to War Department, March 7, 1946, p. 494.

4. The Southwest Pacific Area (S.W.P.A.) had been under General Douglas MacArthur’s command between its inception on April 18, 1942, and Japan’s surrender on September 2. (See the maps in *Papers of GCM*, 3: 723 or 4: 728.)

5. Eisenhower replied on October 12 indicating his “full agreement with the method you used in making your selections for the permanent list.” He noted that he “was somewhat amazed” that Robert C. Richardson, Jr., stood at the top of the major generals list. He also expressed some worry that neither James A. Van Fleet nor Harold R. Bull had made the list of brigadier generals, but he could not determine who on the list deserved to be replaced by them. Eisenhower concluded: “In looking over the whole list, or more particularly, the omissions, I realize more than ever before how difficult the problem is and I regret that I felt it necessary to urge you to take it on. However, I still believe that if any new man should come in and face this issue as one of his first problems he would place himself in an almost impossible situation. I am more than ever indebted, and grateful, to you.” (*Papers of DDE*, 6: 427.)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER October 4, 1945
Radio. *Confidential* Washington, D.C.

Personal for Eisenhower from Marshall. In checking up on the present state of educational activities in the Army at large I find this statement regarding the European Theater: "The establishment of unit schools in ETO has been handicapped by movement of troops within the theater, necessarily occasioned by redeployment and speed of demobilization. It has also suffered from the lack of acceptance of the program by a number of commanders especially in U.S. areas in Germany. As a result the educational program on the unit school level is not yet available to various organizations which should be in a position to use it effectively. Large numbers of unit schools, however, have been established and in many instances have provided excellent examples of effective instruction. Where they have been established such schools have met with warm reception from the men. Conversely, the lack of such schools in units in which the men had been led to expect them has led to many complaints both to Congress and to the War Department."

Please let me have your reaction to this matter, specifically to the statement regarding lack of acceptance of the program by a number of commanders.¹

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Eisenhower had directed that two field surveys be made during August and September regarding the unit schools idea. The initial survey concluded that "some intermediate commanders" were not interested in the program, but the late-September survey found that nearly all commanders backed it. Demobilization and occupation "circumstances and not lack of acceptance of the program by Commanders have handicapped the unit schools during recent months," Eisenhower cabled Marshall on October 11; he also promised "a strong and uniform system of command schools." (*Papers of DDE*, 6: 425–26.)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY
Confidential

October 9, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Subject: Colonel Frank McCarthy.

Attached is a note of mine to G-1 and G-1's reply regarding the possibility of placing Colonel McCarthy on an active duty status for a period equivalent to terminal leave.¹

He is suffering from a return attack of acute bursitis, this time in the opposite shoulder from the one affected last spring. Also he is losing weight and suffering from insomnia, the whole condition due to nervous

exhaustion, in the opinion of the doctors. Mr. Byrnes will undoubtedly accept his resignation in a few days.²

You will recall that Colonel McCarthy's release from active service was at the insistence of the Secretary of State who desired his services there without a day of delay. I feel, under the special circumstances, that if any way can be found to do it we should give him the benefit of a pay status for the period of his terminal leave, which is about the period the doctors prescribe for complete rest. Actually he wishes to sail with General Sexton and loaf about at Sexton's headquarters in Germany.³

Please look at General Berry's statement of the case.⁴ I have talked to Berry over the telephone and we have reached the conclusion that the only way to handle the matter if it is to be done, is to order him to active duty on letter order and place him on temporary duty for four months for the purpose of "rest and recuperation." At the end of that period he is to report in for physical examination for return to inactive status.

What is your reaction to the foregoing?⁵

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall essentially describes these documents in this memorandum.
2. McCarthy resigned effective October 11, 1945.
3. Brigadier General William T. Sexton commanded the Third Division's artillery. Division headquarters was at Bad Wildungen, Germany, about one hundred miles east of Cologne, near Kassel.
4. Brigadier General Robert W. Berry (U.S.M.A., 1924) had been deputy assistant chief of staff for Personnel (G-1) since January 1944.
5. The editors have not found a written response from the deputy chief of staff.

TO EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

October 9, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Ed, Thanks for your letter of September thirtieth. I appreciate very much all the kind things you have to say about me.¹

As matters now stand I hope to be released from my duties by the end of the month. I had thought I could get out by the first of October but the President would not come across.

We are all distressed over Frank McCarthy's dilemma. I see an announcement in the press today that he is to be released on account of sickness and mention of General Clay as a possible successor. However, I think, on the inside, that the Clay business will not materialize.²

I note your comment about the receipt of "some letters from certain people" following my retirement. I shall be very much interested, of course, and I am profoundly grateful to you for your interest and activation.³

Mrs. Marshall heard the other day that Virginia and the boys were coming back;⁴ that you could not get desirable accommodations for them in England. I am sorry that they are to have this disappointment and that you will not have them with you but I shall be delighted to see them back here. I suppose Virginia will spend the winter either in Washington or Richmond in order to facilitate schooling.

I shall be looking for you on your visit in the next few weeks and we must get together for a long discussion. Initially, save me a date for luncheon here at my office and another for Katherine and me to dine you together.

The most encouraging thing we hear from overseas in the present international state of complication relates to your activities and the United Nations Preparatory Commission. They tell me your aggressive and tactful leadership is really leading to something of great importance.

Looking forward to seeing you soon, Affectionately,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Stettinius, who was in London as the U.S. delegate to the United Nations Preparatory Commission, had written that “the action that the Congress will take in honoring you will receive the applause of the whole world. No news that I have received in a long time has made me happier.” (Stettinius to Marshall, September 30, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) Joint Resolutions had been introduced into the Senate on September 19 (S. J. Res. 96) and the House on September 20 (H. J. Res. 243) providing that a Thanks of Congress medal be presented to Marshall. The resolutions were later amended to include Admiral King. A vote in the House on the resolution was blocked by a member who objected that the honor should be postponed until after Marshall’s testimony before the Pearl Harbor investigating committee. H. J. Res. 243 was passed and signed by President Truman on March 22, 1946.

2. Concerning Eisenhower’s opinion of the idea of transferring Lucius D. Clay from his post in Germany, see note 8, Marshall to Eisenhower, September 7, 1945, p. 297.

3. “At the time you become a country gentleman you will receive some letters from certain people following up on the idea that you and I have discussed from time to time. Of course your accepting a few directorships will have to be very carefully chosen from the standpoint of public relations, but when I see you perhaps we can have a word about which ones.” (Stettinius to Marshall, September 30, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

4. Marshall was referring to Stettinius’s wife, Virginia, and their twelve-year-old twin sons, Wallace and Joseph.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Restricted

October 10, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

*REORGANIZATION OF NATIONAL DEFENSE [J.C.S. 749/26]
Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army*

1. I concur emphatically in the basic recommendation of the majority report of the Special Committee on the Reorganization of National

Defense that there be established a single department system of organization for the armed forces with equal and coordinate land, air, and sea components. With certain of the details covered in that report, I am not in accord. However, I am convinced that prior to the settlement of the fundamental principle the discussion of details of the composition and the functions and prerogatives of subdivisions is premature and will only serve to cloud and confuse the primary issue—adoption of the *principle* of a system of organization.

It is for that reason that I proposed on 18 September that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should then recommend to the President the adoption of the principle of a single department system for the armed forces, the details of procedure and organization to be considered later.

2. The importance I attach to the adoption of a single department system for the armed forces and the urgent necessity for an immediate decision is based on the following conception: The maintenance of the future peace of the world will depend in a large measure on the attitude of the United States, its policy as to the international relationships involved, and its ability to back up that policy. The last-mentioned concern relates to the military posture of this government, and that in turn, in my opinion, will depend now and increasingly so through the years on the public and Congressional reaction to the appropriations required to maintain that posture. The maintenance of armed forces by this country is necessarily far more costly than that of any other country in the world. It is, therefore, of especial importance, I believe, to the future peace of the world that whatever we propose for our armed forces be on a sound, business-like basis to secure the most economical set-up compatible with requirements. I am strongly convinced that unless there is a single department for the armed forces within which the difficult and numerous complexities can be ironed out prior to a presentation of requirements to the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress, there can be little hope for the future of maintaining a military posture that the world will respect, and will respond to our peaceful overtures accordingly.

There are, of course, many complications to be resolved in bringing the War and Navy Departments under one directing head. These complications could, in my opinion, never be satisfactorily ironed out in Congress, but I feel sure that an entirely satisfactory solution for a majority of the difficulties can be quickly found under the directing head of a single department. The development, in my opinion, should be on an evolutionary basis. A report to the President and the Congress at stated periods, for example, of the progress made, to be approved by the President or confirmed by the Congress by acquiescence or to be amended or disapproved by appropriate action.

My own experience in resolving difficulties of unity of direction and

of unity of command in this war has been that the problem of the details at first obscured the fundamental principles, but once a favorable decision was reached regarding the latter the minor difficulties could usually be readily resolved. With regard to such details included in the majority report of the Special Committee on the Reorganization of the National Defense, I desire to state now that I am opposed to a single military commander and to a large central general staff. These, however, are merely details and should not be permitted to confuse the consideration of the fundamental principle involved.

3. In considering the proposal for a single department it appears appropriate to face squarely our past experience. There has been a natural tendency in each department, War and Navy, to aim at self-sufficiency in its own military machine. The duplication and waste of the present system have been covered in the majority report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of their Special Committee on the Reorganization of National Defense.

The proposal has been made that we depend on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other joint agencies for the necessary coordination and the elimination of overlapping duplication. There will be a general agreement, I think, that during the past year the coordination and collaboration of the Army and Navy under the impetus of war have reached a level which it would be extremely difficult, I think impossible, to continue in peacetime under any variation of the present organization. Even under the stress of war, agreement has been reached in the Joint Chiefs of Staff at times only by numerous compromises and after long delays, and coordination in materiel and administrative matters has largely been forced by circumstances arising out of the war, and then only incompletely. With the end of the war there is no longer a compelling necessity to reach at least compromise agreements on major matters. There appears no assurance that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could be genuinely effective in peacetime as a coordinating agency, as is evidenced by current events.

The Navy Department proposed on 18 June 1945 to the Bureau of the Budget immediate legislation to authorize a permanent Navy of no less than 660,000 total personnel. Neither the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor the War Department had knowledge of this major proposal, concerned with the national defense, until it was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the President two months later on 21 August for review in relation to the over-all peacetime requirements of the armed forces and for the determination of a comprehensive plan for the consideration of the President. Also, the Congress is now seriously considering similar legislation covering the post-war strength of the Navy and the Marine Corps, on which the War Department was neither consulted nor informed. In other words, on this first important post-war matter of joint concern, lack of departmental coordination is clearly evident. And, what is even more important

to observe, the discussions and recommendations presented to the Congress in support of this legislation lack a basis of coordination with the War Department. Such a procedure inevitably means a confusion of Congressional thought with the consequent difficulty or impossibility of reaching sound conclusions.

During the war time was the compelling factor—not money. In time of peace money will be the dominating factor, and the most difficult obstacle to overcome in the maintenance of a military system that will command the continuing respect of the world. Discordant voices and views regarding the annual appropriations, which appear inevitable under the present system which encourages the diverse views on the part of the personnel under the two departments, will be fatal, I am convinced, to the best interests of the country.¹

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. On the evening of October 13, Major General Arthur R. Wilson (a career officer who had worked since mid-July in the Office of the Chief of Staff on committees on retirement and the National Guard, and who occasionally served as a White House liaison) had an informal meeting with President Truman during which Wilson delivered the text of a draft presidential statement on the unification issue that Marshall and Secretary of War Patterson had approved.

Truman agreed with most of the War Department's proposals and said that in the Senate Committee on Military Affairs hearings on the issue (scheduled to begin October 17) the army should "take off the gloves" and "go in slugging" in presenting its case. Concerning the proposed message, however, the president said that he first had to send a message to Congress supporting universal military training (this was done on October 22). Moreover, he did not wish to alienate members of the House and Senate Naval Affairs committees, who were strongly opposed to unification but whose votes were needed in support of universal military training. Finally, the president hoped that at this Senate hearing the opposition to unification would exhaust itself and make all their points against the bill so that he could have the final rebuttal. (Major General Wilton B. Persons Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, October 14, 1945, and Proposed Message on Unification of The Armed Services, October 13, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

On October 17, the special committee's report, together with separate army and navy reactions to it—as expressed by Marshall and King at the J.C.S. meeting—were forwarded to the president. The following day Marshall testified before the Senate committee on the unification idea. See the summary of his testimony on pp. 331–32.

TO FREDERICK D. PATTERSON

October 16, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Dr. Patterson: I received your telegram of September twenty-ninth withdrawing your suggestion that the participation of negroes in the Army Air Corps could be encouraged and effectively aided by the use of the splendid facilities and relationships developed during the war at Tuskegee Army Air Field.¹

I am sorry that you have found yourself in this embarrassing position but I appreciate your frankness in advising me of the situation. As I anticipated this and so told you at the time of our meeting the other day, I was not surprised at your estimate of the situation.²

Just how we shall meet the situation I cannot say at the moment but it will be very carefully analyzed and I hope a satisfactory arrangement can be effected.

With my thanks again for your frankness and with deep appreciation of the patriotic attitude and wisdom of your course during the war years, believe me Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The president of Tuskegee Institute, Patterson had met with Marshall on the afternoon of September 4 to lobby for stationing reserve units at the Tuskegee field that had trained African-American pilots since late 1941. He subsequently discovered, however, that a significant portion of black flying officers objected strenuously to being based at the racially segregated Alabama facility. Consequently he told Marshall that he withdrew his request. In an October 20 letter, Patterson recalled “the splendid understanding and cooperative relationship which has existed between us during the war effort.” (Patterson to Marshall, September 29 and October 20, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. In 1941 there had been considerable opposition from black leaders to locating air training for African Americans at Tuskegee. (See Papers of GCM, 2: 518–19, 525–26.) In a 1957 interview, Marshall said that in his determination to have most army training camps in the southern United States—because construction of cantonments was cheaper and the climatic conditions for training better—he failed to take into account the impact on blacks from the nonsegregation states of being located in the legally segregated South. “I regard it as one of the most important mistakes I made in the mobilization of the army.” (*Marshall Interviews*, p. 459.)

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS
October 18, 1945 Washington, D.C.

TWO bills had been introduced into the Senate aimed at creating a unified military department: S. 84 by Lister Hill, Democrat from Alabama; S. 1482 by Edwin C. Johnson, Democrat from Colorado. Hearings opened on October 17 with testimony from Secretary of War Patterson. The following morning Marshall had a seventy-five-minute session.

Marshall began by reading a prepared statement of just under fourteen hundred words. Peace, he said, depended on the United States’s ability to command international respect because of its military strength. Such strength could not be maintained under the financial pressures of peacetime unless the military services worked out their differences prior to presenting their budget requests to civilian leaders; otherwise “local service enthusiasms” would result in divisive public debates over technical issues, service missions, and finances. Mere coordination via joint committees was not “an effective substitute for the necessary unified direction.” Moves toward

service unity within the single department should be evolutionary, with progress reports to the president and Congress at stated intervals. Marshall urged congressional leaders not to let the debate over details obscure the fundamental goal of creating a unified military department. "The national security is a single problem, and it cannot be provided for on a piecemeal basis."

The president presided over an extraordinarily complex government machine and needed to consider "a tremendous variety of other interests" than the military's. He had urged President Roosevelt to appoint a chief of staff to the commander in chief, Marshall recalled, "so that he at least would have somebody close to him who would have an over-all view of a very complicated situation." Unity of direction during the war—British-American and U.S. Army-Navy—had been accomplished only gradually and with difficulty.

During the question period, the senators asked a few general questions and Marshall was able to elaborate on certain of his themes. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in his view, should be required to submit to civilian authority an annual estimate of the subsequent year's budgetary requests; beyond this the J.C.S. would be limited in peacetime to recommendations on general policy regarding strategy and military posture. "They would have nothing to do with ordinary administration, they should have no power of direction, they would be purely a recommending agency, . . . so that the Commander in Chief would have the pure professional opinion as to . . . what was thought to be required" militarily. Acceptance would be a matter for the civil heads of the government to determine.

Marshall also assured the senators that there was no peacetime necessity for "what is called a great General Staff"—i.e., an over-all policy staff; rather the unified General Staff should be an operating staff such as an army corps or theater commander would have. A unified military department would solve certain problems easily that had taken months of negotiations during the war. For example, creation of a joint intelligence committee would have been simple and quick in a unified structure, Marshall asserted. Members of Congress had noted instances of duplication of effort that resulted from having multiple independent military departments (e.g., separate army and navy hospitals on the small island of Espiritu Santo). Marshall assured the committee members that what they had observed "is a grain of sand on the seashore" compared with what had taken place elsewhere in the United States and in the Pacific. (Senate Committee on Military Affairs, *Department of Armed Forces [and] Department of Military Security: Hearings* . . . [Washington: GPO, 1945], pp. 49–65.) ★

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL PORTER¹

October 21, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Attached is a statement of mine which has a direct and, I think, an impressive relation to the present emotional move to tear down our military power without regard to the lessons of history and again waste the victory and imperil our future.²

See if you can plant it with some effective individual, preferably a civilian and a woman possibly, to use in urging Universal Military Training.

I am also sending it to General Surles and General Persons to have them try and get it some publicity.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Major General Ray E. Porter, who commanded the Seventy-fifth Infantry Division in Europe during the first half of 1945, had been head of the War Department's Special Planning Division since June 30, 1945.

2. Marshall attached the last two paragraphs of his November 10, 1942, speech to the Academy of Political Science in New York City in which he warned against the American tendency to throw "to the winds whatever scientific approach has been developed in the conduct of war" because of an "extreme distaste for things military" and in order to cut government spending, thereby undermining the country's ability to avoid future conflicts. (*Papers of GCM*, 3: 434–35.)

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING

Top Secret

October 22, 1945

[Washington, D.C.]

SUBJECT: U.S. Military Advisory Group to China¹

Two principles that appear to me to be essential in the establishment of the U.S. Advisory Group in China are:

a. That there be no possibility of differing viewpoints on similar matters being placed before the Generalissimo for resolution.

b. That there be some method to insure that duplication and overlapping of functions be avoided between the various groups in China.

Judging from our past experience and the questions now under discussion, it is obvious that there are important matters on which clear agreement does not exist as to whether they are the sole concern of one service or are of joint concern. These matters include intelligence, communications, and the size and composition of forces. Differences in view between the Army and Navy as to what matters are of joint interest have probably occurred recently more often in China than any other areas of the world.² The amendments in your memorandum of 18 October propose a constitutional framework which I think does not sufficiently guard against the difficulties that are important to avoid.

I suggest that we discuss this matter at the Joint Chiefs of Staff luncheon on Tuesday with a view to making a decision at that time on guidance for the State Department and for commanders in China.³

NA/RG 165 (OPD, ABC 336 China [January 26, 1943], Sec. 1-B)

1. In a letter dated September 10, 1945, Chiang Kai-shek formally requested that the United States establish in China a "military advisory board," with General Wedemeyer as its head, to help China "reorganize her defensive military machine." President Truman replied three days later that the U.S. government was exploring the idea of sending advisers and the "form and extent" of such a mission. (*Foreign Relations*, 1945, 7: 554, 557.)

2. This interservice rivalry is examined in Maochun Yu, *OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War* [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996].)

3. At their October 23 meeting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a memorandum (J.C.S. 1330/10) prepared for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (S.W.N.C.C.) outlining the organization and duties of a proposed 3,880-man Military Advisory Group and the rights or concessions they desired from China to accommodate the operation. (See *Foreign Relations, 1945*, 7: 590–98.) When the State Department's Office of Far Eastern Affairs examined the paper in mid-November, it had doubts about the Military Advisory Group's size and intent, the concessions its presence would require from the Chinese, and the general tenor of the J.C.S. proposal, suggesting that it might appear that the United States was moving toward establishing a "protectorate" over China. In early January 1946, shortly after Marshall began his mediation mission to China, he reduced the proposed Advisory Group to a few hundred people. (Ibid., pp. 614–17, 639–43; Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, 11 vols. [Washington: GPO, 1969–72], 10: 810–11.)

TO WILLIAM R. ARNOLD¹

October 24, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Bishop Arnold: I am writing this to you on the subject of universal military training which, in my judgment, is the number one issue facing the nation at this time with respect to its future security and the peace of the world. I have many reasons for this conviction which I will not labor you with in this letter, but I think you know I would not write this were I not profoundly of the conviction that the success of this program involves the future destiny of the United States.

What prompts this note to you personally is a long letter I once received from Bishop O'Hara, the sole emphasis of which is the question of contraceptives.² This is an important matter and the Bishop has very sound arguments concerning it. But in the final analysis I feel that this can be considered but a detail compared with the imperative necessity of enabling the United States to play a determining part in securing the future peace of the world.

From Bishop O'Hara's letter I have the uncomfortable feeling that such a question, important though it is by itself, and other similar questions, can sway the approach of the members of the Catholic faith in the United States on the subject of universal military training. This can have tragic consequences for the future. So important do I consider this that I would appreciate your frank response as to whether in your opinion it would be desirable for me to discuss this matter, and the general subject of our military posture, with Archbishop Spellman,³ for whom I have a profound respect. Archbishop Spellman has traveled over most of the world visiting our soldiers during the war and, I believe, has seen more of the armed forces in action under wartime conditions than the representa-

tive of any other religious group. Undoubtedly he has a broad background on the world situation, particularly on the current situation with respect to Russia. Therefore, I should be very much interested in his reactions to my own views on the subject of this letter.

I plan to be in New York Monday next, staying with General Frank McCoy at the Lowell Hotel, 28 East 63rd Street.⁴

I was sorry to miss your induction at St. Patrick's. I had a plane ready at 7:00 A.M. that day but was told by two of your brethren at Annapolis the night before that the services would last three hours. This would have made it impossible for me to keep a vital engagement here.⁵ Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Arnold, who had recently retired after thirty-two years as an army chaplain, had been consecrated Titular Bishop of Phocaea and Military Delegate to the Armed Forces on October 11 at St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York City. He replaced John F. O'Hara, who had become Bishop of Buffalo, New York, on May 8.

2. On O'Hara's attitude and letter, see Marshall Memorandum for General Weible, May 20, 1945, pp. 195–96.

3. Francis J. Spellman was military vicar for the United States and archbishop of New York. It was widely rumored that he would be elevated to cardinal in December 1945.

4. Marshall was scheduled to speak at the New York Herald Tribute Forum on Monday evening, October 29. See the text of his remarks on pp. 336–43.

5. Marshall attended the Overseas Writers luncheon at the Statler Hotel in Washington, D.C., on October 11.

TO JOHN C. KUNKEL¹

October 25, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Mr. Kunkel: Mr. William E. Crist, son of General Crist, now in charge of civil government in Japan, has appealed to me to indorse his application for an appointment to West Point. I have an intimate concern in his case because it happens that I secured special permission for his father, then Lieutenant Crist, to return from China with Mrs. Crist so that the expected baby would be born back home in Pennsylvania.² Young William is the result. He is a fine fellow and appears to have inherited the military ideals of his father who is rendering a conspicuous service to the country.³ Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. A Republican member of the House of Representatives since 1939, Kunkel represented the Eighteenth District of Pennsylvania (Harrisburg and vicinity).

2. William E. Crist, Jr., like his father, had been born in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Brigadier General Crist (U.S.M.A., 1920) had been chief of the Government Section, General Headquarters, Tokyo, since August 1945. The Marshalls and Crists had been together in Tientsin, China, between 1924 and 1926.

Concerned that he might be setting a precedent, Marshall had the Personnel Division study the idea of the chief of staff's recommending that a candidate be appointed to the U.S. Military Academy. G-1 concluded that a letter to Congressman Kunkel would not establish a precedent, given Marshall's "long personal acquaintanceship with the boy, as distinguished from your official relationship with his father." (Brigadier General Robert W. Berry Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, October 23, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

3. Young Crist matriculated with the Class of 1950 in July 1946.

SPEECH TO THE NEW YORK HERALD
TRIBUNE FORUM¹

October 29, 1945
New York, New York

The subject of this year's Forum discussion is on the minds of men and women the world over. You who have assembled here and those listening on the radio are all conscious, I am sure, of our great responsibility to the hard-won victory. Americans are more keenly aware today than ever before of the responsibility they bear to the destiny of the nation and its responsibility to the world at large.

So complex is the society of mankind that even those who have thought a great deal about it find themselves at a loss for exact conclusions. I question that there is any one among us who can provide a satisfying answer to even a small number of the searching questions that tax our minds today and sharpen our fears and weigh on our hearts. I certainly cannot provide the answers. There appear to be no short-cuts to a better world. But I do think that if we all make an earnest and devoted effort in a spirit of good faith and of patience and tolerance, somehow or other a formula for the better guidance of mankind may be evolved.

At this moment of history, in a world convulsed by the after effects of the most devastating of all wars, evident signs of moral progress in the human race appear to be lacking. The question can be argued either pessimistically or optimistically; but regardless of whether man in 7,000 years of recorded history has demonstrated social or moral advances, I believe it can be said that throughout the ages men have consistently sought to discover order both in nature and in human relations. This inherent tendency has been called a "feeling for law." There must be an inherent order in this universe; to deny it is to deny God. We admit advances in scientific thought whereby man recognizes and accumulates knowledge of nature and little by little he understands, predicts and manipulates it. The feeling for order, I believe, can be traced in political thought. From the beginning man has established rules of orderly conduct whenever such rules were a prerequisite of survival. First on a family basis, then on a tribal or community basis and later on national levels.

Within the national societies definite rules are laid down whereby man must live. Almost everywhere in the world it is unlawful to commit murder, it is unlawful to rape and to steal. In our complex society it is unlawful to defraud and gain the advantage of other men by conspiracy.

It is not only unlawful in these matters but there are established procedures throughout the world for making the rules stick. Here in New York the constabulary, the police force, the prisons and finally the electric chair, encourage us to play the game according to man-made rules. For centuries man has been seeking, I believe, to extend this inherent order of the cosmos, towards which he strives, to the level of the entire planet. There are two ways in which this has been manifest: we might say one is by way of *cooperation* and the other by way of *operation*. Hitler, whether he knew it or not, sought to establish one kind of order in the world when he precipitated the recent holocaust.

This would be by way of operation. The League of Nations, on the other hand, sought to establish a global order by cooperation. There were many examples of both kinds of effort prior to this century but I cite these two because they are easy to recognize. It would appear that one or the other of these methods will prevail. Time and space have been so shrunk that the world must, I believe, establish definite global rules. Community and national rules no longer suffice. They by themselves are no longer realistic.

Basically then, the question in my opinion is, which one of the two methods is to prevail—global order by cooperation or by operation? Since the United States is one of the senior partners in this world, we have a powerful interest in the formulation of these rules. That is how I would define our responsibility of the victory.

It seems quite clear that the determining factor in whether we have order by cooperation or order by operation will depend on who are the stronger, the operators or the cooperators. That seems to be natural law. The cooperators are, quite logically, usually those people who control their own affairs. For the purpose of simplification let us say the democracies. Democracy certainly is government by cooperation. The operators are the autocracies. Among the democracies the United States has clearly been the strongest. The strength of the cooperators, therefore, at the present moment is tied directly to the strength of the United States. And we and our Allies have recently advanced the structure of the United Nations organization as a vehicle to promote the cooperative idea of global order. Nations which subscribe to this principle, this system, do not propose to establish order by conquering everybody else as Hitler did, nor do they propose to control for their own profit the domestic affairs of the peoples of the earth. What they do propose is a set of rules for global conduct, principally rules against aggression or international violence. They them-

selves are to resort to violence only to enforce these rules, just as does the State of New York, and every other state in this nation, to enforce its rules.

If the vehicle of the United Nations organization is to be effective, it will be because those who advocate it choose to make it so. Those who oppose it certainly will not make it effective, and I personally am convinced that the organization has not even a remote chance of success unless it is nourished by the strength and fiber of the United States. Obviously, if we have no manifest strength, the nourishment of the United Nations organization will be lean.

We are still strong today but we won't be so a few months hence unless we take very positive and definite measures to give some degree of permanence to the strength for which we have just spent so much of human life and money to develop.

We are currently engaged in the demobilization of our wartime forces at the fastest possible rate. That to my mind is precisely as it should be. The machinery that we built to fight this war has been eating into our national resources for years. The sooner we reconvert it to peaceful production and ways of life the more likely is this nation to survive the economic storms that may quite easily follow this great world disturbance.

It is certain, however, that the military establishment cannot hope to insure the safety of the United States very much longer at the present rate of demobilization unless some permanent peacetime program is established and at an early date.

For the moment, in a wide-spread emotional crisis of the American people, demobilization has become, in effect, disintegration, not only of the armed forces but apparently of all conception of world responsibility and what it demands of us. If we are to nourish the infant United Nations organization and thus establish some possibility of a future decent world order, definite measures must be taken immediately to determine at least the basic principles for our post-war military policy. I have never felt so certain of anything in my life.

There has been much discussion about holding what we have fought so desperately to win. What is it that we have fought to win? We fought to prevent Germany and Japan from imposing their kind of order on the world. That certainly was but a negative return for our tremendous investment of blood and money. Did we win anything of a more positive nature? Well, to my mind we did. We won the healthy respect of the peoples of earth and therefore a reasonable chance of negotiating a world order that would fit ideals of decency and justice. Respect, it is true, is an intangible, but consider what it would have meant to us in tangibles had we commanded the military respect of Germany, Italy and Japan in 1939. Recently we demonstrated to the world our capability, I might even say

our invincibility, in the air, on the seas and wherever our armies fought on the ground. Germany and Japan were surprised, actually startled, by our willingness to fight, by our capability in rapidly organizing to fight and by our ability and overwhelming success in the actual business of fighting. Incidentally, they were not the only ones who had their doubts about us in this matter.

On the day of final victory no such doubts existed anywhere in the entire world. Yet need I remind you that respect, like all intangibles, is fleeting, unless we bend our efforts to preserve it.

Just a few months ago the world was completely convinced of the strength and courage of the United States. Now they see us falling back into our familiar peacetime habits. They witness the tremendous enthusiasm with which we mount demobilization and reconversion, but they see as yet no concrete evidence that we are determined to hold what we have won—permanently. Are we already at this early date inviting that same international disrespect that prevailed before this war? Are we throwing away today what a million Americans died or were mutilated to achieve? Are we already shirking the responsibility of the victory?

This business of dissipating the political benefits that a nation may derive from victory is in the American tradition. It is quite understandable in a nation that runs its own affairs, because there is no easy way to get big things done on this earth. The victory was hard won. It will require a great deal of effort and sacrifice to fulfill our responsibilities of that victory, to achieve the future we recently talked about so freely.

We must somehow get it clear in our thinking that the fulfillment of our responsibilities is not some vague mumbo jumbo. It requires positive active effort and sacrifice, and above all it is a continuing process. We cannot do it in one step and then have done with it. Even if the United States now adopts a sound program in its relationships with the rest of the world, the program will be worthless unless we continue to support it year in and year out.

For example, after the last war the Congress enacted the defense act of 1920. It was not the best program we could have found but it was generally sound and would have been a long, forward step had it been implemented through the years. It wasn't. Hardly before the President's signature on the Defense Act had dried the Act was emasculated by an appropriation measure which reduced the strength of the Army from the 297,000 men just authorized to 160,000 men. The following year this appropriation was further cut by 25 percent to a little more than a quarter of the sum recommended by the War Department at the conclusion of World War I. Within a few years Congress had thus completely reversed itself on the policy of maintaining a respectable military posture, not by meeting the issue head-on but by refusing to appropriate the money nec-

essary to carry it out. The Army at home and abroad fell to the woefully inadequate strength of 130,000 men.

It was argued then and it will soon be argued again that the nation's economy could not stand such military expenditures. Is not that absurd if you consider that the country's economy can better stand expenditures for national security than it can stand defeat or even a victory with a consequent debt of more than three hundred billions?

As late as the spring of 1940 when Hitler was about to complete the domination of the continent of Europe, we actually spent about one and three quarter billions on our entire defense establishment, military and naval. It is true that the Congress as France fell actually appropriated more money but the wheels of mobilization were just commencing to turn and it was impossible to realize much on this program in the remaining months of the year.

The year that France fell gate receipts for amusements and sporting events in the United States totalled a billion and a half, nearly as much as our entire outlay for the Army and Navy. We spent five and a half billion more on tobacco and alcoholic products—about three times the sum we devoted to our precarious national security, even in that most critical hour of world history. Do not misunderstand me. I have no quarrel with such expenditures. They are a part of our freedom of life that I myself enjoy. The point is that if we would cheerfully expend seven billion dollars in this manner as civilization crashed down in Europe we should at the very least be willing to accept the expenditures in normal times that are necessary to the peace and the security of our homes and our freedom.

In 1937 when the world was becoming a powder-box, we spent but 1.6 per cent of our national income for our military and naval establishment. In that year of clearly impending disaster the United States spent five billion or 7 per cent of its income for the incidental pleasures I have referred to.

As late as 1937 we might have convinced the Axis gangsters of the complete futility of their preparations by simply matching our "cigarette money"—using the term figuratively—with expenditures on our national security.

Viewed in this light, it would seem that the tragedy of our unwillingness to maintain what Washington called a respectable military posture becomes monstrous.

I sincerely believe that if we had given our security its proper attention the Axis nations would not have started the war. Millions of men and women, Europeans, Asiatics and Americans, who perished in battle by disease, starvation and brutality, in the past five years, might be alive today, had we faced the world in righteous strength instead of careless weakness. The enemy counted on us to go ahead with our pleasures,

ignoring the threat to our lives and our very freedom. We proved them wrong but in the end, it cost us a million casualties and astronomical sums of money to restore our security and rightful position in the world. Had we not had Allies to buy us time, our own efforts, great as they finally were, might easily have been too late.

The War Department has made several recommendations to Congress on how we can best go about maintaining our strength in the future at a cost within our financial means. These recommendations have been questioned, usually by groups looking for an easy way out. I have opposed dogmatism all my life and think for a military man it can be a fatal mental disease, but I must say here tonight with all the emphasis I can command—there is no easy way. The American people will do well to give sober thought to their fateful problem.

In the current emotionalism of the hour we turn for relief from positive action to new theories, new discoveries—the supersonic rocket, of atomic power or explosion. If these remarkable products of our science are merely to turn us from action to inaction on one plea, one theory or another they may well have a more tragic influence on the destiny of the United States than the most pessimistic fear they will have on civilization. I have been considering the military ramifications of atomic explosion for more than two years since my job placed me in the middle of the grim race towards this scientific power. I think I have—if only because of my head start—spent much more time than most Americans, thinking about such bombs and what they will mean to military operations as well as to civilization at large.

I cannot escape the conclusion that the possibilities of atomic explosion make it more imperative than ever before that the United States keep itself militarily strong and use this strength to promote cooperative world order.

No one can foresee unerringly into the future but it is not hard to predict that supersonic atomic rockets will have a profound influence on any war that ever again has to be fought. But, rather than decrease the necessity for our preparation both in manpower and materiel, this terrible new weapon will tremendously increase it.

The present public apathy regarding our military obligations for the future comes as no surprise to me. Three years ago here in New York at a meeting of the Academy of Political Science, just 24 hours after our landing in Africa in the first step towards liberation of Europe, I closed my remarks with this comment, which seems even more appropriate to this day and hour.

“My particular interest at this time in your affairs rests on the fact that after a war a democracy like ours usually throws to the winds whatever scientific approach has been developed in the conduct of the war. This is an historical fact. It is the result of the immediate postwar aversion of the

people to everything military, and of the imperative demand of the taxpayer for relief from the burden imposed by the huge war debt.

“We are in a terrible war and our every interest should be devoted to winning the war in the shortest possible time. However, in view of your interest in the science of government and the intimate relationship that it bears to military requirements, I would ask your very careful consideration of these related military factors in whatever studies you make regarding the readjustments which must follow this war. The theories on the subject will have to be compressed into the realities. The attitude of the taxpayer is human and inevitable. The differing reactions of the people in the center of the country, of those along the coasts, of the people who face the Pacific and the people who face the Atlantic, must be considered. The extreme distaste for things military to which I have already referred and which always follow an exhausting war will have to be taken into account. Then with all of these reactions, how can we so establish ourselves that we will not be doomed to a repetition of the succession of tragedies of the past thirty years? We must take the nations of the world as they are, the human passions and prejudices of peoples as they exist, and find some way to secure for us a free America in a peaceful world.”²

That statement was made three years ago while our troops were still pouring ashore at Casablanca and Algiers. I submit that it represents rather accurately the emotional state of mind of articulate America at this particular moment.

Are we once more to seek the easy way out, to heed only the voice of the minor objector, the critic of so-called militarism, the proponent of the selfish motive? Are we to waste the victory and doom our children's children to more years of horror and destruction?

I beg of you to analyze carefully for yourselves all that is said on this subject against the background of our history, to give critical thought to all proposals and objections, to sift the wheat from the chaff and act—act now before it is too late.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)

1. Marshall's 3,255-word address opened the “1945 Forum on Current Problems of the New York Herald Tribune” discussions on “The Responsibility of Victory.” Mrs. Marshall noted in her memoirs that just before her husband spoke, “Paul Robeson read a poem [by well-known writer Norman Corwin] that made the training and equipping of armies appear to be futile. Robeson delivered the verses with all the power of his magnificent ability. . . . It eloquently advocated peace, but the sense of it, as I recall, was to the effect that we would not outlive another war, that the valor of fighting men would be unemployed and would be replaced by coils of wire and push buttons, that courage would not again be the sacred trust of armies, that such things as armies, drilling, encampments, embarkations, were things of the past—museum pieces—to be placed beside pikes and arrows. This was a perplexing introduction for General Marshall's blunt, logical speech in support of universal military training.” (Katherine Tupper Marshall, *Together: Annals of an Army Wife* [New York: Tupper and Love, 1946], p. 279.)

The speech text was given to the media in advance, and it was published the following day in the *New York Times*, which made Marshall's address page one news. The 8:30 P.M. speech was also carried by the National Broadcasting Company, but at 9:00 Marshall had not finished and a commercial program was scheduled, so the network cut away before the end.

2. These two paragraphs from Marshall's November 10, 1942, speech are printed in *Papers of GCM*, 3: 434–35.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HULL
Secret

October 30, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dr. Evatt had two matters he wished to discuss with me:¹

He was very earnest in expressions of his desire for an early decision regarding the British Commonwealth Force that is proposed for Japan, much regretting the present delay. I explained the objections to the command proposal and I do not think there would be any difficulty in modifying this to meet General MacArthur's desires.

I told him that the matter was in the hands of the State Department and he had already talked to Mr. Byrnes.

It seems to me we have two major considerations in this matter, the extent to which we complicate our situation, particularly as regards the Advisory Control Commission, and the opportunity to reduce the American strength of the command and thus facilitate demobilization to include two-year men.

The other point concerned my Biennial Report. He felt very keenly what he thought was an omission of the listing of 6 Australian divisions in my Order of Battle and drew a contrast between the corresponding Order of Battle in the European Theater. Please take this up with North.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. A doctor of laws and Australia's minister of external affairs since 1941, Herbert V. Evatt had been making a considerable effort to secure for the smaller powers a significant role in the United Nations, Foreign Ministers Council, Italian peace treaty negotiations, and other international efforts. He had spoken briefly following Marshall at the New York Herald Tribune Forum on October 29. He was in Washington, D.C., for the organizing session of the eleven-member Far Eastern Advisory Commission, and he met with Marshall on the afternoon of October 30. (*New York Times*, September 15, 1945, p. 14; October 31, 1945, p. 3; and November 2, 1945, p. 7.)

2. For further developments on this issue, see Marshall to Evatt, November 6, 1945, pp. 349–50. Brigadier General Thomas North had been chief of the Current Group, Operations Division, since June 1942. (Among other things, North's group conducted the daily briefings for the chief of staff.) North was a geography and map expert who had briefly served with Marshall in the Operations Division at American Expeditionary Forces General Headquarters in 1918. He was in charge of maps at General Pershing's A.E.F. headquarters in Washington, D.C., between 1919 and 1920, and accompanied Marshall on his trip to Brazil in 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR FIELD MARSHAL
SIR HENRY WILSON
Secret

October 30, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Wilson: After our conversation today I discussed the question of Mountbatten's command with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection with the withdrawal of the American members of his staff. There is a very definite feeling that U.S. participation in Mountbatten's area should be liquidated as rapidly as possible, in accordance with the policy of this Government.¹ Therefore I think that discussion of the amendment proposed in paragraph 3 of your aide memoire of October 25th would be unfortunate at this particular time.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. For background on the State Department's views on and reports concerning British-Indian relations, see *Foreign Relations, 1945*, 6: 249-54. In mid-November, the U.S. ambassador to Great Britain, John G. Winant, observed that "Reports reaching London indicate that political situation in India is steadily deteriorating and serious disturbances regarded as probable." (*Ibid.*, p. 253.)

2. In mid-June 1945, Marshall had opposed withdrawing U.S. personnel from the Southeast Asia Command and its discontinuance as an Allied command. In late August, however, Lieutenant General Raymond A. Wheeler, commander of U.S. forces in S.E.A.C. and Admiral Mountbatten's deputy, recommended that the United States withdraw as soon as possible, otherwise it would be identified with British actions in India. (Wheeler to Hull, August 27, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 384 CTO, Sec. II, Case 61/3].)

In late October, the J.C.S. proposed that the C.C.S. dispatch a message notifying Mountbatten that United States participation would cease "at the earliest practicable date." In a top secret and personal *aide memoire* for Marshall, Wilson said that the British Chiefs of Staff desired that Mountbatten's authority as an Allied leader not be compromised and asked for Marshall's support in proposing that the message end with: "S.E.A.C. will remain an Allied Theatre for which you are responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff through the British Chiefs of Staff." (Wilson, "U.S. Participation in S.E.A.C.," October 25, 1945, *ibid.*)

TO FRANCIS J. SPELLMAN

October 30, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Archbishop: I wish to express more formally my appreciation of your hospitality yesterday and the opportunity you gave me to discuss the Army point of view regarding our future military policy. I genuinely enjoyed my visit with you and I felt that I personally derived great benefit as well as reassurance from hearing an expression of your views. Thank you very much for your kindness.

Apropos of our conversation I was sorry this morning to note in the Congressional Record that Cardinal Dougherty had chosen to telegraph

Congressman Graham of Pennsylvania to oppose peacetime military training and make known to the conferees his, Cardinal Dougherty's, objection to it.¹

I hope you will let me know when you are next in Washington so that I may have the opportunity of entertaining you here in the Pentagon and continuing our conversations.²

With great respect and warm regard, Faithfully yours,

P.S. I am taking the liberty of sending you a photograph.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Louis E. Graham, Republican from the Twenty-fifth District of Pennsylvania, read the following telegram into the *Congressional Record* (79th Congress, 1st sess., vol. 91, pt. 8, p. 10134) from Dennis Cardinal Dougherty of the Archdiocese of Philadelphia: "Please oppose President Truman's project for peacetime military training and make it known to your conferees my objection to it."

2. Spellman replied that he understood that there was opposition from "very many others" in the church to universal military training. As for himself, "I have the personal policy of not making any statements except on matters involving support of religious, humanitarian and general patriotic causes." (Spellman to Marshall, November 8, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

A few days later, he sent Marshall a statement the church's Administrative Board proposed to make advocating the stimulation of voluntary enlistments, the integration of "enforced training" with "normal school life," and the services' correction of "certain policies and attitudes which have wrought grave moral damage to great numbers of young people in the armed services during the past five years." Marshall responded that: "national security can never be fully provided for by standing armies"; U.M.T. would not interfere with the completion of high school; and Secretary of War Patterson had recently recommended that in the U.M.T. legislation Congress provide for a civilian commission (including representatives of major religious faiths) to determine policies for "the conduct, recreation, and moral and spiritual welfare of the trainees while enrolled" in the system. (Spellman to Marshall, November 13, 1945, and Marshall to Spellman, November 19, 1945, *ibid.*) On this civilian commission, see Marshall Memorandum for General Lutes, November 6, 1945, pp. 352–53.

TO ARTHUR W. PAGE¹

October 30, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Page: Thanks for your note of October twenty-ninth with the interesting inclosures and thanks also for the trouble you are taking to send Mrs. Marshall her cigarette case; she is very normal in this respect and leaves a trail of such impedimenta.

You gave us a delightful day in the country and it was a great satisfaction to me to see you in your own home setting and to have a long period for uninterrupted conversations. Incidentally, I had a most satisfactory talk with the Archbishop [Spellman] and found him vigorous in his feelings regarding the importance of this country taking a strong military

stand, particularly at the present time. He declines to make public pronouncements regarding universal training or other technical methods to obtain the necessary military posture. But there was no doubt whatsoever as to the strength of his feeling regarding the necessity for such.

With warm regard to Mrs. Page and you, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. The Marshalls and the Frank McCoys had spent part of October 28 at the Pages' summer home near Huntington, Long Island. In the 1920s, when Page was a member of the publishing house Doubleday, Page and Company, he and Marshall had worked together on General Pershing's proposed memoirs. Since 1927, Page had been vice president of American Telephone and Telegraph Company. He enclosed two brief memoranda on universal military training—the Catholic church's stake in the defense of freedom and the time lost through peacetime training as opposed to wartime military service—that he had written following his conversations with Marshall. (Page to Marshall, October 29, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

TO JAMES F. BYRNES
Secret

October 31, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mr. Secretary: I am inclosing an aide memoire handed to me personally by Field Marshal Wilson, head of the British Joint Staff Mission here.¹ As I understand the situation the British Foreign Office is in complete agreement with the wishes of the British military to move their Headquarters to Rome. I have talked the matter over with General McNarney who has just arrived, and he states that the British have already acquired and are reserving from other use the necessary quarters for their Headquarters. General McNarney who opposed the move when the Headquarters was large now considers it the sound thing to do, as does General Ridgway who has just assumed command in Italy. General McNarney presents the difficulties of communication and coordination, if the British and U.S. Headquarters are separated, and also the morale problem occasioned by the lack of suitable accommodations for U.S. personnel in Caserta for the coming winter. I do not like to see U.S. soldiers under primitive shelter during the winter season while the soldiers of Allies enjoy the advantages of permanent shelter. Only about a thousand U.S. personnel are involved which seems a small number considering the facilities and population of Rome.

I understand that there are certain objections to this move by the State Department. Before replying to the personal request of the British Chiefs of Staff I would appreciate your view as to whether we cannot agree to accompany the British in a move to Rome.² Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, requested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve moving Allied Forces Headquarters to Rome from its present location at Caserta, an inland town about eighteen miles north of Naples. The British Chiefs of Staff approved, but understood that the U.S. State Department and Italy's prime minister objected; they hoped that Marshall could persuade the State Department to reverse its attitude. (Wilson Aide Memoire, October 29, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. The State Department refused to alter its stance in the matter, primarily because U.S. policy was to encourage the Italian government to accept greater administrative responsibilities, and the presence in Rome of an Allied commander and his staff would "encourage the Italians to continue to lean on Allied assistance, and to an appreciable extent would negate Allied policy." The move to Rome would also "lend color to the frequent allegations that the Italian Government is under Allied tutelage." Moreover, U.S. Ambassador Alexander C. Kirk strongly opposed the move. Marshall informed Wilson that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff could not support the British proposal. Marshall also wrote to Secretary Byrnes to protest the attitude of Ambassador Kirk, who since June 1944 "constantly attempted to avoid the presence of American soldiers in Rome, without giving full consideration to the military factors involved." (Byrnes to Marshall, November 1, 1945, and Marshall Memorandum for Field Marshal Wilson, November 9, 1945, *ibid.*; Marshall to Byrnes, November 12, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 091 Italy]. Regarding the Marshall-Kirk relationship, see Marshall Memorandum for Mr. McCloy, August 21, 1945, pp. 284–85.)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Radio No. WAR-80340. *Secret*

November 1, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Eisenhower from Marshall. OPD has just handed me a proposed message to you regarding decorations for you by Denmark and Norway. I will dispatch the message as written.¹ However, please have this in mind: I think it highly desirable that you appear before the American Legion in Chicago for many reasons.² Incidentally, Tedder will be there which would make a nice grouping of the Supreme Commander and Deputy Supreme Commander but this is merely incidental.³ I don't want you to be exhausted by long back and forth air trips. I am hopeful that your return may be permanent. I expect to see the President in the next three or four days to force a decision regarding me. I am waiting now until the strikes and other political problems abate at least by a few hours.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The message to which Marshall refers cited the State Department's reasons why Eisenhower should visit Copenhagen and Oslo. (Marshall to Eisenhower, WAR-80341, November 1, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-OUT-80341)].) Eisenhower had already told the Norwegians that he could not possibly come to Oslo, and a visit he did schedule to Copenhagen was precluded by a death in the royal family. (*Papers of DDE*, 6: 483, 515.)

2. In early September, the American Legion's national commander informed Eisenhower that the organization wanted to present him its Distinguished Service Medal at its

mid-November convention. Eisenhower had replied on October 27 that he thought it unlikely that he could go to the United States at that time. (Ibid., pp. 333–34.)

3. On October 19, the British government announced that Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Arthur W. Tedder would become Britain's chief of Air Staff, succeeding Lord Portal at the end of 1945. Tedder was to be in the United States for most of November, including making a speech on the need for continued Allied unity at the American Legion convention on November 19.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Radio No. WAR-80436. *Secret*

November 1, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Personal for Eisenhower from Marshall. Since my message WAR 80340 to you this morning I have participated in a lengthy conference between the Secretary of War and myself and the representatives of the civilian group who are endeavoring to carry the ball for us in the matters of Universal Military Training. They are selecting and preparing witnesses for the hearings which begin before the Military Committee of the House on November 2d and also the data to be used by friendly members of the committee in cross-questioning opponents of UMT. They are engaged in launching a series of large gatherings at luncheons, dinners or general meetings in certain large cities, Boston, Chicago, St. Louis, Kansas City, San Francisco, Los Angeles. Your appearance at the Legion convention and that later of the Secretary of War there would be sufficient for that region. I am appearing in Kansas City on the 18th of November.¹ Wainwright is to appear in San Francisco. If you returned for the Legion it would be very important for you to stop for at least a luncheon in Boston to favor John McCormack, Democratic floor leader who pressed to have you there on your last trip, and to offset opposition to UMT by Martin of Massachusetts, Republican floor leader.²

We have got to work at this thing very hard during the next four weeks if we expect to get it through. We have steam up pretty well now but it has to be much increased and we have got to get the women. In making your decision please have the foregoing in mind because the responsibility of the future in the matter will be yours and not mine.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See Marshall's speech to the Salvation Army, November 18, 1945, pp. 357–63.

2. Joseph W. Martin, Jr., had introduced House Resolution 325 on July 17 calling for an immediate agreement by all nations to eliminate compulsory military service. He proposed that while this agreement was pending, congressional action be withheld on any universal military training program. (*New York Times*, July 17, 1945, p. 1. The resolution's text is on p. 11.)

TO JAMES F. BYRNES¹
Top Secret

November 5, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mr. Secretary: Governmental policy which is the present basis for action by the War Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters connected with the use of Allied forces in the occupation of Japan is contained in SWNCC 70/5, approved by you 18 August 1945.² It envisages participation of Allied forces, but not in such numbers as to prevent U.S. control of the implementation of policies regarding enforcement of the surrender terms. Based on this policy the Joint Chiefs of Staff have already accepted in principle British participation in the occupation of Japan and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has already discussed with the Commanding General of the China Theater the provision of a Chinese Army of three divisions for Japan.

It is understood from the remarks of the Secretary of State at the meeting of the Committee of Three on 30 October that there is now some question about the continued validity of the policy in SWNCC 70/5. If this expressed policy is no longer effective, it is requested that the Secretary of State inform the War Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the proposed revisions in this policy so that the proposals and commitments of the War Department for troop strength may be modified accordingly as soon as possible.³ Sincerely yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. This letter was written for Secretary of War Patterson's signature.

2. The text of this document ("National Composition of Forces to Occupy Japan Proper in the Post-Defeat Period") is in *Foreign Relations, 1945*, 6: 603–9. An October 11 report by the Joint Staff Planners of the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested a total occupation force of about two hundred thousand with the British Commonwealth, Soviet Union, and China providing a maximum of thirty thousand each and the balance coming from the United States. (Ibid., pp. 744–45.)

3. At the November 13 meeting of the Committee of Three, Patterson referred to this letter. The brief of the meeting's minutes that Marshall received noted: "Mr. Byrnes stated agreement with Marshal Stalin's position, feeling that entire occupation of Japan should be done by the United States. Mr. Byrnes advised that to bring the British, Chinese and Australians into this occupation without the Russians would further split the world into two camps; however, he felt that Chinese participation only would not so result. It was suggested that through SWNCC the JCS be requested to review this matter." (Brief, November 13, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, SGS, Memos and Briefs to the Chief of Staff]. On Stalin's opinion of occupation policy in Japan, see *Foreign Relations, 1945*, 6: 787–93.)

TO HERBERT V. EVATT

November 6, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Dr. Evatt: The other day you mentioned the unfavorable reaction

which had resulted in the omission from the Pacific Order of Battle, listed in my recent Biennial Report, of the six Australian Divisions.¹ In compiling the order of battle for the various Theaters of Operation *no* divisions were listed other than those of the US Army. In the European and Mediterranean sections mention was made of Allied Army *Groups* and *Armies*, but not of *Corps* or *Divisions* other than American.

In view of the changing command organization in the Pacific it was decided to entitle the list for that area: "Order of Battle US Army Forces in the Pacific (as of 14 August 1945)" and to include only US Army forces. This list therefore omits mention not only of Australian forces but also of the US Marine Amphibious Corps and Divisions.

As I explained the other day, I prepared my report as Chief of Staff of the United States Army. In this light the omissions which you noted are perhaps more readily understandable, but I am very sorry that the decision in this matter should have resulted in a feeling on the part of the Australian troops that their services were not fully appreciated. Quite the contrary is the case. They made a splendid contribution in a magnificent manner. Faithfully yours,

NA/RG 165 (OPD, 319.1 PTO [November 5, 1945], Case 631/1)

1. For previous information on this issue, see Marshall Memorandum for General Hull, October 30, 1945, p. 343.

ARTICLE FOR THE *ARMY AND NAVY JOURNAL*¹

November 6, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

The most lasting monument of the global war brought to a close by Japan's surrender will always be to me the magnificent performance of our citizen-soldier. The men who fought our battles from December 1941 to September 1945 were drawn from every walk of life. Except for members of the National Guard already in Federal service and the comparatively small number of inductees undergoing training when war came, these men had received no preparation for the terrible ordeal into which the nation was plunged by the Pearl Harbor attack. That the average American reacted so remarkably in battle, often rising to the heights of undiluted courage, is a tribute to the basic strength and adaptability of our peoples.

No amount of native courage, however, could have achieved the success won by our troops in battle without thorough training. Individual and team instruction gave our men not only the knowledge of how to perform the multitude of tasks incident to combat in the air or on the ground but the self-confidence to carry them out amidst the confusion and hazards of battle. The efficiency of our field forces was solidly founded on training

doctrines learned in classroom, camp and maneuver area. Throughout the war the training technique was in process of being perfected, not only by Army personnel but by civilian specialists called in to speed up and intensify the process. In our service schools prior to the war and more recently under the stress of war there were developed expeditious methods and techniques in teaching which played an important part in the rapid development of our forces and will, I believe, have a definite effect on the general art of teaching in this country.

An Army today is a complicated structure, and instruction must be provided for a wide variety of jobs. Initially, all men should receive the same basic training. In the early weeks the individual aptitudes and skills would be measured as a basis for a suitable Army assignment. The soldier would then enter into the specialized duties of the branch of the Army to which he had been assigned. The first training phase in his new assignment would be concerned with individual instruction for the specific job he was expected to perform. After he had mastered his own part, he would engage in small-unit training, learning how to work as a member of a team. He would then move on to the next phase in which the small-unit activities would be fitted into the larger machine, later to be combined with the functions of other arms. In the final phase, the unit would participate in extended field exercises under simulated campaign conditions.

The new weapons—atomic explosives, supersonic rockets—and those even more devastating that unquestionably will come in the years immediately ahead make the careful preparatory training of all personnel the more imperative.

The old frontiersman was skilled with the rifle, the tommyhawk and the knife. Self-survival forced him to a state of constant training. The “minute-man” owned and knew his rifle intimately. But what he had of rifle skill and patriotism was frequently canceled by lack of discipline and ability or willingness to operate in a team. The development of artillery introduced a trifle of mathematics into the technique of battle. The telephone, the ground wireless and the machine weapons of the last war further complicated the business of developing a team. Along came the motor vehicle, the mechanized car and tank, introducing an additional technique of immense importance in campaign. Air and antiair equipment vastly complicated the requirements. Radar became a highly specialized factor in the efficiency of air, ground, and naval forces, and while the scientist labored with us, the individual officer or soldier had to be trained to handle elaborate and sensitive equipment. Cooperation between air and ground forces became a highly complicated and sensitive business. And now the atomic age has arrived.

It is clearly the lesson of history that the more complicated the techniques of war the more intensive must be the training. It also seems clear

to me that the more sudden, far reaching and devastating the weapon the greater the necessity for highly trained units ready to react with speed and power.

If Universal Military Training is approved by the people, for the first time in our existence this country will be the real master of its own destiny. Together with an active body of scientific research, a substantial trained civilian reserve behind our permanent establishments will guarantee our security in case of attack by an aggressor state. But, in my opinion, it will do far more than that. It will present to the world an available power that will discourage any plans to upset the peace of the world.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Categorical, Speeches and Writings)

1. A slightly edited version of this essay was published as "Training for Victory and for Peace" in the fourth volume (covering the period December 7, 1944, to December 7, 1945) of the *Army and Navy Journal's* annual magazine-format *United States at War*, pp. 16, 184. Other high-ranking civilian and military leaders also contributed essays.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LUTES

November 6, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Mrs. Robert Woods Bliss, representing the American Women's Voluntary Services, called on me this morning having just returned from a trip to France in the interests of her organization. She toured throughout France, except the Bordeaux region.

Mrs. Bliss is interested in the same proposition as former Ambassador Phillips;¹ that is, furnishing some assistance or measure of relief to the French, particularly in the devastated zones.

The proposed plan is to erect a hut in each small town or village, with a large stove, so that the women can gather there for their sewing or whatever hand-work they may wish to engage in. This would conserve fuel and would promote, which they are very anxious to do, community effort in which the French are reported to be greatly lacking. The funds will have to be raised by the organization in this country and they are already having their difficulties because of the Community Chest or War Fund procedure. However, this last is their problem.

The organization would like to know from the Army what assistance can be rendered in the way of obtaining, for token payments, the necessary huts, the truck transportation for delivering the huts and stoves, and some assistance in the erection of the huts. The question of gasoline was also raised.

I recited some of the difficulties I could foresee in this matter, particularly those relating to delay in demobilization, the possibility of the

scarcity of trucks due to the heavy pressure of demobilization movements both as to men and trucks in France, etc., etc.

Will you have a map made for Mrs. Bliss, dotting in red the villages which the American Army is at least partially responsible for destroying. There will be a complication here in regard to the bombing program prior to the Normandy invasion, but we need not quibble over details.

Will you also give me your reaction to the possibilities in this case and what form of inquiry we should send General Eisenhower.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. William Phillips had been U.S. ambassador to the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, and Italy, and the president's personal representative in India.

2. Marshall told Mrs. Bliss that he had sent a message to the commanding general of the European theater requesting: (1) "his comments concerning the possibility of transferring to your project for a nominal payment such surplus housing and construction items that may become available as a result of the reduction of American forces in Europe"; (2) information regarding damage to small towns and villages in the areas through which U.S. troops had passed. (Marshall to Bliss, November 10, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

STATEMENT FOR SECRETARY OF WAR PATTERSON¹

November 6, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

STATEMENT RESPECTING A CIVILIAN COMMISSION
IN CONNECTION WITH UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING

Since the young men under a system of Universal Military Training would not be a part of the combat Army, involving the War Department's obligation to maintain them in a state of readiness for combat employment, it is recommended.

1. That the Congress provide for a Civilian Commission (or Board) to be appointed by the President. The members of such Commission to be selected from outstanding leaders in civil life in such a manner that the commission would truly represent the public at large.

2. That the Commission be charged with the determination of policies governing the conduct, recreation, and moral and spiritual welfare of the trainees while enrolled in the Universal Military Training system, with the proviso that the armed forces be responsible for the determination and implementation of policies affecting training.

3. That paid civilian representatives of the Civilian Commission be maintained in the War Department, with the headquarters of each

major command, and with each camp where Universal Military Training would be conducted.

4. That in addition to the responsibilities stated above, the Civilian Commission, including its paid civilian representatives as described in paragraph 3, would render advice and counsel to the armed forces to the end that the paramount demands of national security would be harmoniously coordinated with all other interests of the national life.

As a practical matter of administration, it is essential that the armed forces should be responsible for carrying out all policies, including those determined by a Civilian Commission such as described above.

NA/RG 165 (OCS, 353 [November 2, 1945])

1. Patterson told Marshall that in his November 8 testimony before the House Military Affairs Committee "it would be a favorable factor if I could mention in my statement that there should be a civilian board appointed by the President to take part in administration of the program for universal military training. The development of this idea would do something to allay part of the opposition." He desired that Marshall furnish him with "a brief outline of what the functions of such a board should be, stating what phases of the program would be under their supervision." (Patterson Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, November 2, 1945, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 353 (November 2, 1945)].)

DRAFT FOR GENERAL HULL¹

November 10, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Jim: Replying to your letter of November 7, General Marshall tells me you have been incorrectly informed that his attitude in the JCS is that he does not wish to give consideration to the post-war navy or its composition until what he considers to be the more important question is settled—the consolidation of the army and navy.

General Marshall's view of the matter is, that he does not feel that a definite determination of the post-war forces can be made until the character of the peace treaty is known and until it is decided whether or not we have universal military training. Regarding unification of the services, he feels that action on that would facilitate the determination of the appropriate post-war forces.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall prepared this for the head of the Operations Division to respond to Secretary of War Patterson's request for a reply to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal.

TO WILLIAM A. LYDGATE

November 10, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mr. Lydgate: I have your letter of 30 October concerning my remarks at the Herald-Tribune Forum and the findings of the Gallup Poll.¹ I understand the thought which prompted your criticism of my remarks on public apathy but feel that the question involves more than comparison of the numbers who favor or oppose universal military training and adequate military preparedness.

By my comment on “public apathy regarding our military obligations,” I intended no criticism of the thinking of the bulk of American people. My intent was to bring to the attention of those who approve of the soundness of proper military security the fact that passive approval is not sufficient but that active support is necessary to insure that their opinion prevails in practice. I fear that if this apathy persists, the will of the majority of the people of this country is very liable to be flouted.

If the majority does not manifest sufficient interest to promote actively its own views, it can be justly charged with apathy in a matter which has a vital bearing on the future of the nation.

I appreciate your interest in writing to me and hope that my reply will give you a fuller understanding of the reason for my concern.² Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Lydgate was editor of the American Institute of Public Opinion. He wrote that his organization’s Gallup surveys demonstrated that a significant majority of the American people: (1) envisioned maintaining rather large peacetime armed forces; (2) disagreed that the atomic bomb had made the traditional services unnecessary; (3) opposed the hasty disintegration of the present armed forces; (4) believed that the U.S. occupation of Japan would last many years; (5) and favored (60 percent for) universal military training. (Lydgate to Marshall, October 30, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

2. Marshall should not expect activism from the majorities who supported policies he espoused, Lydgate responded; “while people are willing to make the sacrifices involved they see no particular point in shouting about their willingness to be noble or to perform a duty expected of them.” Congressional leaders and others had to be made to understand the silent majority’s positions. He also noted that the latest Gallup survey showed a rise in the percentage favoring the universal military training bill to 75 percent, with 21 percent against and 4 percent without an opinion. (Lydgate to Marshall, November 14, 1945, *ibid.*)

TO HENRY L. STIMSON

November 13, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Colonel: I was very sorry the other day not to see you when I went down to Long Island with Mrs. Marshall and the McCoys to the Page

place,¹ but I was much sorrier to learn that you were threatened, as I understood at the time, with flu. It was not until this morning that I learnt by way of McCloy what a serious time you have been having.

I am greatly distressed but encouraged to learn now that you are decidedly on the mend. I do hope that you will make a rapid convalescence, and also that Mrs. Stimson has kept her strength through this ordeal.

Katherine and I were much disappointed in not seeing you both, as we had counted on this in making the engagement to have lunch with the Pages. As a matter of fact, it was the principal reason for accepting the Page invitation. She is down at Leesburg now in the process of gradually moving our things from Myer to the Leesburg house. Molly is there with the two grandchildren waiting until she can obtain possession of a small shack in Fayetteville, North Carolina. Her husband has just returned from Germany and is stationed at Bragg.

We are counting on moving out of Washington lock, stock and barrel in a very few days, though no mention of this has been made public or is even understood here in the War Department. Eisenhower reached Washington this morning after a day in Boston. He is to appear before the Committees of Congress conducting hearings regarding universal military training and the unification of the War and Navy Departments. He then goes to the Legion meeting at Chicago, and following that will hurry back to Great Britain to accept a degree from the University of Edinburgh on the 23rd of the month and another from Oxford a few days later. General Handy, who met him at the train this morning, said he looked very tired and much in need of rest.

Please be very careful and don't let anything worry you except the possible delay in serving the next meal. Our thoughts and prayers will be with you. Affectionately,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See Marshall to Page, October 30, 1945, pp. 345–46.

TO JOHN J. MCCLOY

November 15, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear McCloy: You and I are completing our active duty with the War Department at about the same time. We served together here for more than five years and in terminating this joint service I wish to express my very real and deep appreciation of the splendid job you have done and in particular the tremendous support and assistance you have been to me. The soundness of your judgment, the long-range view you took in all

important matters and the completely objective and self-effacing manner in which you worked, were great factors in the success of the War Department during those difficult years.

I personally am glad that you will now have an opportunity to look after your own interests but I feel that the Government will suffer a very real loss in your departure from its service at this time.¹

With affectionate regards, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. McCloy's last day in office as assistant secretary of war would be November 24. Thereafter he returned to the New York City business law firm of Cravath, de Gersdorff, Swaine and Wood, with which he had been associated since 1924.

TO CAPTAIN JAMES R. SHEPLEY

November 15, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Captain Shepley: I wish to express to you rather formally my deep personal appreciation of the invaluable service you have rendered me during the past seven months, especially in connection with the preparation of my Biennial Report. I found your estimates of public reactions invariably accurate. You displayed a keen insight into the basic fundamentals involved in the establishment of a sound military policy for this country. You have contributed in an important measure to the present effort of the War Department to bring the public to a realization of the importance of our maintaining a respectable military posture before the world.

Please accept my personal thanks, with my best wishes.¹ Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Marshall presented this letter and a formal citation to Shepley on November 20.

SPEECH TO THE SALVATION ARMY¹

November 18, 1945
Kansas City, Missouri

It has been a matter of regret to me that during the war years I did not find it possible to visit this region. It is only now, as the end of my active service draws to a close, that I have found the opportunity. Almost 40 years ago I arrived here en route to Fort Leavenworth via service in Oklahoma from a tour of duty in the Philippines. I became quite familiar with these surroundings and had many friends in Kansas City, which was to

the young officers at Leavenworth the great center of culture and pleasure towards which we looked for interest and diversion. After the last war I accompanied General Pershing and Marshal Foch to the Legion Convention held here in 1921. On that occasion I recall that Foch questioned me regarding the history of the old Fort whose ruins he noticed at Fort Leavenworth. I explained to him that in the years when this nation's frontiers were being pushed westward by the men and women, whose hardy courage gave us the heritage of modern America, Leavenworth was a frontier outpost; that it was near there that many of the wagon trains organized to face the perils of the continental crossing.

It occurs to me today that in more recent years Leavenworth has provided the leaders who played a determining part in halting the Huns in 1918 and in the liberation of Europe and Asia in 1945. In other words, the land battles of Europe and the Pacific were first won here in the heart of America. MacArthur, Eisenhower, Arnold, Bradley, and a long list of our great commanders, were developed on the heights overlooking the Missouri River at Fort Leavenworth.

I found my opportunity for this visit today largely because of a very real desire to participate in this 80th Anniversary of the Salvation Army and in particular to pay my tribute to Commander Evangeline Booth. To me she has represented a pinnacle of womanhood among those whose contribution to humanity is of supreme importance to this distracted world. Her charm of personality, her intensity of benevolent purpose and her outstanding ability as a leader of people, have marked her apart as one of the great figures of this country and of the world at large.

Some 65 years ago her father landed in New York, the sole representative of this great Army of peace and mercy, with the benevolent purpose and firm determination to invade America, to spread the influence of the Salvation Army the length and breadth of this country. The proportions of his plan seemed beyond the realm of possibility, yet they were completely realized, and today we honor his daughter.

There has always existed among professional soldiers of our Army a special regard for the men and women of the Salvation Army. We understand and greatly admire their standards of loyalty and discipline and their simplicity and selfless devotion to duty. They had a special claim upon the affections of the veterans of the old American Expeditionary Forces and they have much the same claim on the veterans of the great forces we are now in process of demobilizing.

We owe a great debt of gratitude to the members of the Salvation Army for their work during the past terrible years. I say we, meaning the people at large as well as the Army. Their work had a tremendous influence on morale, which is the most vital quality of the individual soldier and of the military unit. There is one quality of greatness that a soldier appreci-

ates perhaps more than any other, that is, the selfless willingness to be of service to others without thought of personal reward or danger. I was particularly conscious of this quality in the service of the Salvation Army during the first World War when I was brought into intimate contact with the individual workers in the field. Colonel Allan here is an old friend of mine from First Division days in the AEF. I saw him at the front and I saw his people, men and women, accept all the hardships and hazards of service in campaign.²

On behalf of the veterans of the old AEF and our great global Armies, I salute and congratulate the Salvation Army on its 80th Anniversary.

* * * * *

Because of the part which the Salvation Army has played in the welfare of the armed forces during war, I think of it as an inseparable part of our efforts to give mankind security and to establish world peace in this new era of atomic power. We enter an age when peace must no longer be considered merely a dream of men. It must somehow be made a lasting reality.

More than ever before this nation must make a solemn and determined effort to secure the peace of the world. Men and women of heart like the valiant souls of the Salvation Army must be vigorous in impressing the inescapable truth that only by true strength, by determined leadership and in confidence that we strive for what is right, can we hope in these troubled times to exert a determining influence on the future stability of the world.

The President and the leaders of our Allied Nations are striving to establish practical methods by which this can be achieved. They have proposed an organization of the United Nations to strive toward this end. They have more recently suggested that these United Nations seek to find some way to make the tremendous factor of atomic power a boon to mankind rather than its destroyer.

The President believes, and I agree with him completely that these united efforts can only be successful, if those who desire most to make them successful insure for themselves a quiet and righteous strength. He has proposed a practical method for us to maintain that strength which we feel is absolutely necessary to nourish the new United Nations organization.

Almost all concede that America courts disaster for herself and for the world if she again falls into a state of disinterested weakness and fails to fulfil her responsibility. But few realize, I feel certain, that the entire allied world looks to us for leadership, for guidance in the practical business of vitalizing the influence, the power, of the United Nations Organization.

Some of our citizens express concern that the specific measure proposed by the President may in some way prejudice the religious or the moral and social strength of the United States. We must first be morally and spiritually sound before we can be militarily strong. But I am certain that if those who question the proposal will consider the facts they must come to realize that such measures as universal military training will strengthen the spiritual and moral fiber of our people rather than weaken it.

To insure that the desires, the will of the people shall dominate in these matters, the Secretary of War has recently recommended to Congress that a permanent civilian commission composed of leaders in spiritual, education and social welfare work be set up with the responsibility to determine the policy in these fields for the direction and guidance of the military authorities.

In time of war military necessity required that the Army establish policies concerning the social and moral welfare of our troops. But in time of peace the situation concerning young men inducted for training only, is quite different. The guidance in such matters presents a problem of tremendous long-range importance to the nation as a whole. I therefore believe that the creation of such a civilian commission composed of leading educators and churchmen of all faiths—Catholic, Protestant and Jewish—and outstanding leaders in the field of social and moral welfare to determine the policies for these phases of our Army training program, would insure that the wishes of the people, the parents, would be fully represented in a determining manner.

I am inclined to think that our principal trouble in reaching a decision in regard to these important matters is the confused state of the public mind which results from the tremendous aftermath of six years of global war—the vast demobilization now in progress, the chaotic state of affairs in most of Europe and Asia that stems from years of unparalleled destruction and death.

We lack at the moment a proper perspective. We see the peaceful countryside of America unscarred by war, and here in the Mississippi Valley in particular, you are most remote from violent scenes of war. We are busily engaged in welcoming home each month a million and a half of our young men returning to their normal civil occupations. We simply cannot comprehend the disruption of governments, and the complete destruction of cities and of homes, that has taken place in the world. We read the discussions in the press and listen to the descriptions and opinions on the radio but these give us only a remote appreciation of the chaotic state of the world beyond the boundaries of continental United States.

In Germany we have a country of destroyed cities and communications, a country whose civil or dictatorial government, which dominated

every phase of German life for many years, was completely swept from power, leaving for the time being virtually a vacuum. We have there a country flooded with hopeless and homeless people from other parts of Europe; a confusion of desires; a confusion of peoples; a situation almost unparalleled in the history of the world.

In complete contrast to the scenes in Germany, we have in Japan a government, headed by the emperor, still in being, and apparently endeavoring to the best of its ability to carry out the directives of General MacArthur. An Army of 2½ million Japanese soldiers undefeated in battle has been demobilized. The Allied prisoners have been rescued and moved out of the country. The leaders responsible for the various war crimes have generally been incarcerated and are awaiting trial. The problem of fuel and food has been carefully surveyed and while exceedingly difficult of solution, it is being handled in a businesslike manner. True, the destruction of cities has been as complete as it was in Germany; but on the other hand the civil government remains in operation, whereas in Germany it has had to be completely reconstructed from the ground up.

In China, torn to ribbons by more than a decade of war and the rapine of the invader, a Japanese Army of a million men is still present in the country. From the press and the radio we form some conclusions regarding the difficult and dangerous situation between the Communist and the Nationalist forces but I doubt if there are any but a few in America who realize the true state of China and how difficult it is to reestablish order and a return to normal ways of life.

In Korea we have an extraordinary situation, ill-judged I am quite certain by most of our people. For more than 40 years that country has been dominated, ruled and administered by the Japanese with the result that the Koreans themselves have now to start from the beginning to learn to direct their own affairs. In the meantime, a comparatively small number of American soldiers are endeavoring to bring order out of chaos, to meet the natural desires of the freed Koreans after their years of bondage, and to handle large numbers of Japanese soldiers and civilians. Various political groups are now struggling for control in Korea, all of recent origin which in most cases can be measured in weeks. The problem is one of magnitude for the military administrators and I personally have been greatly impressed by the manner in which they are carrying out their extraordinarily difficult tasks. Fortunately the evacuation of the Japanese is being rapidly effected across the narrow waters of Tsushima Straits.

Indonesia presents problems of the most complex and perplexing nature. Fortunately for us, American troops are not involved. The transition in Indo-China has been exceedingly troublesome with a number of unfortunate incidents. I am hopeful that the major troubles are a thing of the past.

Formosa is just being taken over, Chinese troops having landed on the north end of the island. They are confronted with a very large problem in disarming some 250,000 Japanese troops.

Small Japanese garrisons throughout the Pacific are being evacuated to their homeland and gradually these islands are being brought under the calm, peaceful control of the Allies. Were it possible in all of these localities to accomplish the immediate evacuation of the Japanese soldiery most of the problems would be much more simple of solution, but the shipping is not yet available.

In the midst of this restive, almost chaotic world to confuse our thinking, we have our immediate local problems that fill the daily headlines—the pressure of demobilization, the settlement of labor disputes, the reconversion of industries and the sharpening of political antagonisms. Is it any wonder that the public mind is in a state of profound confusion?

Yet at no time in our history, I think, has it been more important that the people make a sober, common-sense, survey of the situation and reach an early decision as to our policies with relation to the world and particularly with regard to the future maintenance of peace. The necessity for this is clearly indicated by the very turbulence and confusion of the times and even more by the distracted people of devastated Europe and Asia who all look to us for evidence of a firm determination to give powerful leadership to the purpose of the United Nations Organization to consolidate the victory for the security and stability of the world. They do not view us with suspicion as to our motives. They trust and like our soldiers. They probably have an exaggerated conception of our strength in resources, in our capacity to get things done and in our strength as a nation. As a consequence we have virtually been elected by the acclimation of the harassed and suffering people of the world to the leadership of the greatest and most beneficent movement in world history for the good of mankind.

I do not think the statesman will decide the issue, nor the politician, certainly not – the military leaders. The returning veteran, especially those who will carry through life the scars and mutilations they have suffered in our behalf. Personally I am convinced that the women of America, the wives and mothers of our men will cast the determining vote. They more than any other group have suffered the mental anguish and tragedy of war. The decision will be largely theirs.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)

1. Marshall spoke to a large crowd in Kansas City's Municipal Auditorium. The Bureau of Public Relations had urged him to speak at the Chicago convention of the American Legion on this date, but Marshall elected to speak to the Salvation Army. (Shepley Memorandum for General Marshall, October 22, 1945, and Marshall to John J. Allan, October 25, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

2. John J. Allan was commander of the Salvation Army's Central Territory (eleven states in the north central region). He had been senior chaplain of the Seventy-seventh Division in France during World War I and had also been an army chaplain during World War II.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY
GEORGE C. MARSHALL

November 18, 1945
Washington, D.C.

By direction of the President, General of the Army George C. Marshall, O1616, Chief of Staff, United States Army, is relieved from detail as a member of the General Staff Corps, from assignment to the War Department General Staff and from duty as Chief of Staff, United States Army, effective 18 November 1945. General of the Army Marshall will remain assigned to the Office Chief of Staff.¹

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

Edward F. Witsell
Major General
Acting The Adjutant General

NA/RG 165 (OPD, 201 Marshall, George C.)

1. At his press conference on the afternoon of November 20, President Truman announced that he had accepted Marshall's resignation and that Eisenhower had been appointed acting chief of staff.

FROM THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF¹

November 26, 1945
London, England

On your retirement after six years as Chief of Staff of the United States Army we, your British colleagues in the Combined Chiefs of Staff, send you this message of farewell.

We regret that Field Marshal Sir John Dill and Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, two of your greatest friends and admirers, are not alive today to add their names to ours.²

As architect and builder of the finest and most powerful Army in American history, your name will be honoured among those of the greatest soldiers of your own or any other country.

Throughout your association with us in the higher direction of the armed forces of America and Britain, your unfailing wisdom, high principles and breadth of view have commanded the deepest respect and admiration of us all. Always you have honoured us by your frankness,

charmed us by your courtesy and inspired us by your singleness of purpose and your selfless devotion to our common cause.

Above all would we record our thankfulness to you for the leading part which you have always taken in forging and strengthening the bond of mutual trust and co-operation between the armed forces of our two countries which has contributed so much to final victory and will, we believe, endure to the benefit of civilization in the years to come.

In bidding farewell to you who have earned our personal affection no less than our professional respect, we would address to you a tribute written more than 200 years ago:—

“..... Friend to truth! of soul sincere,
In action faithful, and in honour clear;
Who broke no promise, served no private end,
Who gained no title, and who lost no friend.”³

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson delivered this message on November 26. It was signed by Alanbrooke of Brookeborough, Portal of Hungerford, and Cunningham of Hyndhope.

2. Dill had died on November 4, 1944, and Pound on October 21, 1943.

3. Marshall's friend John McAuley Palmer had ascertained that the omitted words in the first line were “Statesman, yet,” that the lines were from a 1720 poetic epistle from Alexander Pope to Joseph Addison (d. 1719), and that they referred to Addison's friend, James Craggs, Britain's secretary of state. Palmer thought that the British Chiefs of Staff erred in omitting the words. (Palmer to Marshall, December 7, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

FROM LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN E. HULL

November 26, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear General: Now that you are leaving the office of Chief of Staff of the Army I wish to express upon my own behalf and upon the behalf of the officers of the Operations Division our deep and sincere regret that you are leaving that office.

At the same time, I feel that I cannot let the opportunity pass without expressing to you our appreciation for your guidance and loyalty to those of us who have been members of your staff. Loyalty goes both ways, up and down. Loyalty to one's superior is expected and is accepted without question in our service. Loyalty downward is not found in all people. You have demonstrated it to an outstanding degree.

By your method of delegating responsibility, encouraging complete freedom of thought, and placing confidence in your subordinates you have made service under you such as to bring out the very best that the

officers so serving could produce. Although we regret your leaving, we look back on our service under you as an experience of great benefit to us individually and collectively. It has been an honor and privilege to have been associated with you.

I know I speak for all of those in this division in wishing you many years of happiness and I hope that you will still be willing to give us the benefit of your guidance and advice as has been your custom in the past.

J. E. Hull

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Categorical, Resignation Tributes)

CITATION FOR DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL¹ [November 26, 1945]
[Washington, D.C.]

In a war unparalleled in magnitude and in horror, millions of Americans gave their country outstanding service. General of the Army George C. Marshall gave it victory. By the favor of Providence, General Marshall became Chief of Staff of the United States Army on the day that Germany attacked Poland. His was the vision that brought into being the greatest military force in history. Because he was able to make the Allies understand the true potentiality of American greatness in personnel and materiel, he was able to exercise greater influence than any other man on the strategy of victory. It was he who first recognized that victory in a global war would depend on this Nation's capacity to ring the earth with far-flung supply lines, to arm every willing Ally and to overcome the aggressor nations with superior fire power. He was the first to see the technological cunning and consequent greater danger of the Nazi enemy. He was the master proponent of a ground assault across the English Channel into the plains of Western Europe directed by a single Supreme Allied Commander. He insisted on maintaining unrelenting pressure against the Japanese, thereby preventing them from becoming entrenched in their stolen empire and enabling our timely advances across the Pacific. He obtained from Congress the stupendous sums that made possible the atomic bomb, well knowing that failure would be his full responsibility. Statesman and soldier, he had courage, fortitude, and vision, and best of all rare self-effacement. He has been a tower of strength as counsellor of two Commanders in Chief. His standards of character, conduct, and efficiency inspired the entire Army, the Nation and the world. To him, as much as to any individual, the United States owes its future. He takes his place at the head of the great commanders of history.

Harry S. Truman

GCMRL/Research File (Medals, Military)

1. Since Marshall had received the medal in mid-1919 for his World War I efforts, this award was an Oak Leaf Cluster on that medal. The ceremony was held in the central courtyard of the Pentagon Building.

STATEMENT UPON RECEIVING THE
DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL

November 26, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Mr. President: I am profoundly grateful for your citation for the Distinguished Service Medal. I accept it as the agent of those who made it possible for us to stand here today in peace and thanksgiving—the soldiers of the great American Army of this war.

I know, Mr. President, that there is nothing I can say to increase your appreciation and affection for these men. From the moment you became our Commander-in-Chief we have had the utmost support and understanding from you. Your leadership in the final stages of the war made certain that both in Europe and in the Pacific not a moment was lost to bring a swift end to the tragic calamity of this generation.

To you, the men and women of the War Department who served with me during the hard years of this war who labored month after month without regard to hours and without the stimulus of excitement or danger or the opportunity for personal recognition, I need say that you did a tremendous job magnificently. Your work translated the power of America into a great army and deployed and supplied it around the world. I thank you from the heart for your fine partnership and for all that you have done for me to make the task lighter.

To the soldiers of the Army, you still in uniform and you who have already returned to your home, I, as one citizen and one comrade, express my deepest gratitude.

You were the greatest protective force this nation has ever known. In its direct hours you carried the might of America into action. You gave to the United States its rightful prestige among nations. And no one knows better than you that you did not do it alone. You know how tremendous was the contribution of the nation as a whole, of the millions of laboring men and women whose productive efforts supplied your munitions, of the factories of this great nation and the science and management that guided their operation, of the farms, and of the plain citizen who put your needs above his own.

But of all these efforts yours was by far the greatest. You faced death and swallowed fear, endured the agonies of battle and of hearts torn by loneliness and homesickness and starvation for the normal life you loved. Yet you took it—all there was to take anywhere on the battlefronts of the

world. And you had the strength and will to give it back, give back much more than your enemies could take. You know that those who stayed behind were no different than you. Had they been out front and you behind, all would have served just as you did. That is the genius of America; that is the strength of a free people.

Most of you know how different, how fortunate is America compared with the rest of the world. That is something those at home cannot fully appreciate. Today this nation with good faith and sincerity, I am certain, desires to take the lead in the measures necessary to avoid another world catastrophe, such as you have just endured. And the world of suffering people looks to us for such leadership. Their thoughts, however, are not concentrated alone on this problem; they have the more immediate and terribly pressing concerns—where their next mouthful of food will come from, where they will find shelter tonight and where they will find warmth from the cold of winter. Along with the great problem of maintaining the peace we must solve the problem of the pittance of food, of clothing and coal and homes. Neither of these problems can be solved alone. They are directly related, one to the other.

It is to you men and women of this great citizen-army who carried this nation to victory, that we must look for leadership in the critical years ahead. You are young and vigorous and your services as informed citizens will be necessary to the peace and prosperity of the world.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Speeches)

TO GENERAL JOHN J. PERSHING

November 27, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear General: I have just this moment been handed your gracious note of November 23rd. I can't tell you how much I appreciate your writing and how grateful I am for your thoughtful expressions.¹

Katherine and I have been both engaged in moving and also spending most of our time down at Leesburg. We are off again this morning and I soon hope to be able to clear my skirts pretty generally of Washington involvements. Our present plan is to leave for Pinehurst about the 10th, however dates can only be guesses with us at present.²

When I come back to town next week, I hope to get out to see you and Miss May.³ Meanwhile, my thanks again for your thoughtfulness. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Categorical, Resignation Tributes)

1. Pershing had written from his suite at Walter Reed Hospital: "Permit me to extend you a warm welcome to the retired list. It is extremely gratifying to me to note evidences

that your great talents and abilities are now generally recognized and applauded. Surely, your outstanding contributions to the success of the war merits the gratitude of the peoples of all the peace-loving nations of the world. I can add nothing to the deserved tributes your achievements have evoked, but can assure you that your successes have given no one greater personal satisfaction and pride.” (Pershing to Marshall, November 23, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Categorical, Resignation Tributes].)

2. The Marshalls had “a very comfortable place” in Pinehurst, North Carolina. They “planned to spend the winter there, closing the house in Leesburg [Virginia] into which we have already moved our things.” (Marshall to Mrs. Egbert Armstrong, December 1, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Collection.)

3. May was Pershing’s sister.

Inobtrusive Manner

November 27, 1945 – April 12, 1946

I am getting lined up to expedite the formation of the coalition government if that proves necessary, but I am moving in a most inobtrusive manner. If agreement on the military reorganization is reached and genuine progress is made towards implementing the coalition government then I will be ready to propose the resumption or the initiation of discussions in the U.S. regarding financial loans. I am endeavoring to terminate the present higgling over the details of every transaction concerning lend-lease and surplus property, endeavoring to put it on a basis which will not be embarrassing to you politically.

—Telegram to Harry S. Truman
February 4, 1946

The Eastern Shore of Maryland is a beautiful area with many scenic views and historic sites. It is a great place to visit for anyone who enjoys nature and history.

There are many beautiful beaches and parks along the shore. The water is clear and the sun is warm. It is a perfect place to relax and enjoy the outdoors.

There are also many historic sites and museums. You can learn about the history of the area and see some of the old buildings that have been preserved.

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GEORGE and I have had the most hectic fall of his career," Mrs. Marshall wrote to an old friend. "The post-war reconversion seems to be more difficult than the war. . . . I shall be so glad to get to Pinehurst for a little rest." As an easy retirement role for General Marshall, President Truman was considering naming him head of the American Red Cross. (Mrs. Marshall to Mrs. William R. Blanchard, October 23, 1945, GCMRL/K. T. Marshall Papers [Correspondence, 1941–49]. Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* [New York: Viking, 1951], p. 113.) But none of them anticipated that Marshall's retirement would be forestalled by problems in China.

As wartime army chief of staff, Marshall had naturally been cognizant of United States policy toward China, which recognized Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government as sole legitimate sovereign entity in all Chinese territory—now including newly liberated Manchuria and Taiwan. But Japanese military action between 1937 and 1945 had squeezed the center of Nationalist party power out of the cities of coastal China into the distant southwest around the wartime capital of Chungking. Moreover, the sudden end of the war left in China several million Japanese, including several hundred thousand well-armed soldiers, who were directed to maintain civil authority in their areas until they could surrender to the Nationalists. To facilitate the return of Nationalist authority, the United States not only used its air and naval forces to move Nationalist troops into Japanese-held areas but also landed two divisions of U.S. Marines to secure certain ports and rail lines in northern China. The Chinese Communist party also sought to extend its authority and to prevent Nationalist expansion; consequently, a renewal of the Nationalist-Communist civil war appeared certain.

The United States desired a unified China under Chiang's rule, and was willing to continue intervening on Chiang's side to a certain extent, but the authoritarian and corrupt nature of Nationalist rule, and its political and military weaknesses, encouraged a cautious approach by the Truman administration. The United States ambassador in China, Patrick J. Hurley, returned to Washington at his own request in late September. Unhappy with what he perceived as a "wide discrepancy between our announced policies [i.e., democracy, anti-imperialism, and the Atlantic Charter's Four Freedoms] and our conduct of international relations [i.e., bolstering imperialism and Communism]," and incensed at what he considered the professional diplomats' undermining of his and America's policies, he was considering resigning his post. After several weeks of indecision, during which it was publicly stated that he would return to China, he announced his decision to resign at a press conference on November 27 and attacked the State Department and the loyalty of the China specialists in the Foreign Service. (Hurley to Truman, November

26, 1945, U.S. Department of State, *United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944–1949* [Washington: Department of State, 1949], pp. 581–84. [This source is hereafter cited as *China White Paper*.] Regarding Hurley's role and personality, see Russell D. Buhite, *Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy* [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973].)

Hurley's action was "the single topic of discussion" at President Truman's luncheon Cabinet meeting on November 27. According to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, Hurley's

action was a complete surprise to both the President and the Secretary of State, both of whom had the impression that he had agreed to return to China. After lunch, in discussing the question of his possible successor, Clinton Anderson, the Secretary of Agriculture, said he believed the appointment of George Marshall would take the headlines away from Hurley's resignation the following day. I seconded Anderson's suggestion, and it was the general consensus that he would make an able ambassador. (Millis, ed., *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 113.)

After the Cabinet meeting, President Truman called Marshall at his home in Leesburg, Virginia. Truman recounted that "without any preparation I told him: 'General, I want you to go to China for me.' Marshall said only, 'Yes, Mr. President,' and hung up abruptly." The Marshalls had arrived at their retirement home in Leesburg only minutes before the president's call, and the general knew that his wife would not be pleased with his new assignment. He hoped to break the news to her after she had rested, but she heard the story on the radio first. There was, Marshall told Truman two days later, "the devil to pay." (Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, *Years of Trial and Hope* [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1956], pp. 66–67; Katherine Tupper Marshall, *Together: Annals of an Army Wife* [New York: Tupper and Love, 1946], p. 282. For more on Mrs. Marshall's reaction to the China mission, see K. T. Marshall to Frank McCarthy, December 29, 1945, pp. 406–7. ★

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY
DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
Radio.

November 29, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Personal for MacArthur from Marshall. Thanks for your message of the 22d.¹ My retirement was of rather short duration and the outlook does not indicate still waters.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Categorical, Resignation Tributes)

1. Marshall had received a telegram from MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo: "The entire command sends sincere greetings and hopes you will find full contentment in green pastures and by still waters." (MacArthur to Marshall, Radio No. ZA-9315, November 22, 1945, GCMRL/G.C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Categorical, Resignation Tributes].)

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY
Top Secret

November 30, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

General Handy has just informed me that you told him you had been directed by the President to draft a statement of U. S. policy regarding China. For that reason I am sending you the attached paper.¹

The other day the Secretary of State read to me (and to himself for the first time) a draft of a statement of such a policy. It did not appeal to me as sufficiently plain to be understood by the public, it appeared susceptible of serious misunderstanding, and was not sufficiently definite to form the sure base for a directive to Wedemeyer. Therefore I asked him to let me have the carbon to try my hand on it. The attached is the result.²

I have some hesitancy in sending this to you since it came to me direct from Mr. Byrnes as an uncorrected draft, but under the circumstances I have decided to send it to you confidentially.

The rewrite attached represents the combined efforts of General Handy, General Hull, General Craig, and myself, with some consultation with others.³ The endeavor was to couch the policy in such language that the public at home could really understand what we were talking about and what the implications were.⁴ Also, that it would both give the Generalissimo sufficiently definite data on which to calculate the troops available to him, having in mind that Marines would be in certain ports to guarantee their security, and so that it would at the same time be couched in such manner that we could hold him to action in other matters more purely political. Incidentally, it was felt that the statements should be of such a nature that the Chiefs of Staff could really use it as the basis of a new directive to General Wedemeyer, the previous instructions not being satisfactory for this purpose.

I am clear that we must not scatter Marines around China, but on the other hand I feel we must hold them in certain ports to protect our beach-heads. By such action the Generalissimo would be free to remove most of his troops from those ports, feeling secure in regard to them and having these released troops available for the extensive task of taking over rail communications in North China⁵ and releasing the Japanese troops now holding those lines.

I assume that the Communist group will block all progress in negotiations as far as they can, as the delay is to their advantage. The greater the delay the more they benefit by the growing confusion of the situation and the serious results which will follow from the non-evacuation of the Japanese military. Also the longer the delay the less probability of the Generalissimo's being able to establish a decent semblance of control over Manchuria, with the consequent certainty that the Russians will definitely build up such a control.

I suppose we will find ourselves, in this matter, on the horns of a dilemma—on the one side, the reluctance of the Government or the State Department to make so plain and bold a statement; and on the other side, the necessity of saying what we mean so that the people at home and the people in China, and the Russians also, will clearly understand our intentions.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, Memoranda-Messages-Cables)

1. This paper—"U. S. Policy Towards China"—is printed in Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945: Diplomatic Papers*, 9 vols. (Washington: GPO, 1967-69), 7: 749-51.

2. The document given to Marshall by Secretary of State Byrnes (see *Foreign Relations, 1945*, 7: 745-47) was an outline of ideas drafted by John Carter Vincent, director of the State Department's Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Vincent said in 1952: "I was asked on the 28th of November to draw together quickly something on the basis of which Byrnes could talk to General Marshall about what was his general idea of his mission." Vincent noted that there was a "vast difference" between his draft and the War Department's version. (U.S. Senate, *Institute of Pacific Relations: Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary*, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [Washington: GPO, 1952], pt. 6, p. 1714; see also pt. 7, pp. 2197-98.)

3. In August, Chiang Kai-shek and Wedemeyer had requested that the United States land five divisions in the Taku-Tientsin area, Shanghai, and Canton. The War Department replied that only two Marine divisions were ready, and they would arrive piecemeal as shipping became available. Part of the First Marine Division landed at Tientsin's port of Taku on September 30 (China time) and at the all-weather coal port of Chinwangtao (120 miles north) the following day. Sixth Marine Division units began landing at Tsingtao (the most important port city on the south coast of the Shantung peninsula) on October 11. (*New York Times*, September 30, 1945, p. 32; October 4, p. 10; and October 11, p. 3.) By the middle of October, fifty-three thousand Marines and other personnel were ashore. General Wedemeyer considered these forces "inadequate but extremely valuable." (Albert C. Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!* [New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958], p. 348.)

4. The State Department's redraft of "U. S. Policy Towards China" was sent to Marshall on December 8. The War Department Operations Division's response to this was made the same day. (*Foreign Relations, 1945*, 7: 754-57, 758-59.) Regarding the final version dated December 15, see note 1, Marshall Memorandum of Conversation, December 14, 1945, p. 393.

5. North China is approximately the plains between Shanghai and Nanking on the lower Yangtze River and Peiping. The Chinese generally referred to Manchuria as the Northeast. See the map on p. 784 for a political definition of China's regions as of February 1946.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER¹ November 30, 1945
Radio No. WARX-86183. *Top Secret* Washington, D.C.

TOPSEC from WARCOS and CNO. Under consideration by the State Department is a restatement of U.S. policy, which if approved, will result in a new directive to Commanding General, U.S. Forces, China Theater [COMGENCHINA] along the following lines:

The Commanding General, U.S. Forces, China Theater, after coordination with SCAP, will probably be responsible to make necessary arrangements with the Chinese authorities for repatriation of Japanese from the China Theater. The U.S. will furnish assistance in the form of military supplies and advice to the Chinese authorities. The U.S. Marines will probably remain in North China for the time being for the purpose of assisting in the repatriation of Japanese Nationals, military and civil, from that area, the duration of such employment to be subject to future directives from the JCS. It is intended that they would be more or less confined in their employment to holding ports or beachheads.

To effect the above and also to assist the Chinese Central Government in reestablishing control of the liberated areas of North China and Manchuria, the U.S. will furnish transportation for additional Chinese troops. It is emphasized that neither the policy nor the directive given above has yet been approved.

To assist you, 100 Liberty type ships can be made available to COMGENCHINA at the rate of 50 ships per month. If needed, a greater number may be made available.

Your use of these ships depends upon following factors:

1. These Liberty ships are now awaiting discharge in AFPAC² and their time of availability is contingent upon capability to discharge. This requires selection of ships based on cargo utilization or possible sale. Some of these ships are now loaded with supplies that might well be used by Chinese Army. Particularly pertinent in this connection is ammunition requirements of Chinese Forces. Would you desire to have ammunition dumps or depots established at Chingwangtao, Tientsin, Tsingtao, or Shanghai by shipment from Philippines or Okinawa direct and thus avoid long air flights of munitions from Yunnan.³

2. Temporary accommodations for repatriated personnel to be installed by China Theater at ports.

3. COMGENCHINA would be responsible for making necessary arrangements with the Chinese for delivery of personnel to ships.

4. Establishment of a procedure with SCAP for rate of reception and grouping of Japanese to provide for proper port of discharge in Japanese homeland.

5. Possibility of utilizing either Chinese or Japanese crews to replace U.S. crews in toto or in part as conditions warrant.

6. Necessary berthing, servicing, and administrative arrangements for Liberties including minimum arrangements necessary to make into personnel carriers for Japanese type of passenger.

7. Possibility of employing LSTs now in western Pacific crewed by Japanese.

The above factors suggest the need for immediate conference by addressees of this message.

Request comments of all action addressees to JCS.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, TS Message File [CM-OUT-86183])

1. This message was also sent to the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Pacific, Advance, Tokyo (i.e., MacArthur's headquarters) and to the navy's commander in chief, Pacific (Raymond A. Spruance) and for information to the commanders of the Fifth and Seventh fleets (John H. Towers and Daniel E. Barbey).

2. U.S. Army Forces, Pacific (AFPAC), one of General MacArthur's commands, controlled all army resources in the Pacific theater except those of the Southwest Pacific Command and the Alaskan Department.

3. Yunnan province is in southwest China, bordering Indochina and Burma; its capital, Kunming, was the endpoint of the Burma Road and the "Hump" air route, and consequently the major depot for incoming U.S. lend-lease supplies during the war. Kunming is more than twelve hundred air miles from Peiping and Tientsin.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HULL
Confidential

December 1, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Will you have an appropriate officer in your section make a few tactful inquiries of the State Department regarding the handling of the expense accounts, etc., for me.

I suppose I will have to have some officer handle such funds. Once I reach China I imagine it can be done through the Embassy staff but it may be that something will be required en route—I do not know how such affairs function in the State Department.

Confidentially, Mr. Byrnes assures me that he will arrange a special expense account either through State Department funds or the President's special fund or both in order to take care of all of my expenditures on this diplomatic mission. I would not wish the officer you select to announce this to the officials of the State Department.

G. C. M.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 2, Item 9)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN E. HULL

Monday P.M. [December 3,
1945] Washington, D.C.

General Hull: I have talked to Byroade. Unless Bissell has some very sound objections and an excellent candidate—in your opinion—Byroade is my choice. I have told him so and explained the possibility of a reversal of my decision if you felt Bissell had other views with sound reason.

So, put Byroade to work on gathering together the numerous strings—unless B. has objected.¹

See if Shepley can be put on a routine per diem expense account. His pay to come from Time.²

G. C. M.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, Exec. 2, Item 9); H

1. Colonel Henry A. Byroade (U.S.M.A., 1937), at this time acting director of the Operations Division's Asiatic Section, was an engineer who had served in India (1942–43) and China (1943–44) and was not anxious to return to the Far East, but neither did he wish to turn Marshall down. His initial job, Marshall told him, would be “to get [me] to China with the best possible instructions from the President.” (Byroade, interviewed by Forrest C. Pogue, July 22, 1969, p. 2, GCMRL.)

2. Beginning in April 1945, Marshall had had James R. Shepley, a war correspondent for *Time* magazine whose prose and attitude he admired, commissioned a captain and assigned to help him write the *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War* (Washington: GPO, 1945), and to develop public statements relating to postwar military policy. (Marshall had written a flattering farewell to Shepley on November 15, 1945; see GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

THE Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack had begun holding hearings on November 15, 1945. Marshall knew that he would be called to testify, as he had at hearings held by the Roberts Commission (December 1941–January 1942; see *Papers of GCM*, 3: 3–7), the U.S. Army Pearl Harbor Board (July–October 1944), and the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry (July–October 1944). After he was told his testimony date, he would need, he told his friend Admiral Harold Stark, about two weeks to prepare (see Marshall to Stark, September 29, 1945, pp. 317–18). The hearings, which were initially intended to consume approximately two months, were marked by political partisanship and occasionally raucous behavior by committee members (three Democrats and two Republicans from each of the two houses of Congress).

Since the committee began the hearings by focusing on the diplomatic aspects of Japanese-American relations in 1941, the investigation of the military aspects of the Pearl Harbor drama began only on November 29.

By this time, Marshall was deeply involved in preparations for his mission to China. The mission caused Marshall's testimony dates to be changed; as he wrote to the committee's counsel, William D. Mitchell: "I regret that the presentation of my testimony at an earlier date than contemplated in your carefully arranged program should have caused you so much of extra work and difficulty." (Marshall to Mitchell, December 15, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].) The time change also severely restricted the preparation Marshall was able to make for his appearances before the committee.

The committee's questioning also far exceeded Marshall's expectations in time and ascerbic temper. He told Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that he hoped to depart for the Chinese wartime capital of Chungking by December 7—i.e., after but two days of testimony. (Marshall to Wei Tao-ming [the ambassador from China], December 1, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected (China)].) Marshall's ordeal actually lasted seven days: just under twenty-four hours of testimony that filled 407 pages of the printed record. His remarks were front-page news in many newspapers.

Marshall told his authorized biographer in 1956: "Remember that the investigation was intended to crucify Roosevelt not to get me. There was no feeling in the War Department that we had anything to hide." (Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939–1942* [New York: Viking Press, 1966], p. 431.) Marshall's brief time for preparation (two days) and his attempts while testifying to distinguish between what he knew at the time from what he later learned, unwillingness to express certainty of recollection when he was unsure, and frequent assertions that certain facts could best be obtained from the written records or that other persons would be more appropriate witnesses on a particular point lent an air of tentativeness to his testimony. Committee members (particularly Roosevelt administration critics) were demanding detailed recollections and precise analyses of motivations, policies, documents, and activities during the final weeks of 1941.

One thorough student of the Pearl Harbor affair, Gordon Prange, observed: "To this day one can sense the electric tingle of excitement as the crowd in the hearing room awaited Marshall's first appearance" on December 6. "In some respects," Prange wrote, Marshall "was not a good witness. He had a rather rambling style and did not express himself well. He knew that he was not at his best when testifying." Moreover, his press-inflated reputation for having a phenomenal memory may have worked against him. (Gordon W. Prange, with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1981), pp. 687, 689.) ★

PEARL HARBOR COMMITTEE TESTIMONY
December 6–8, 1945 Washington, D.C.

DECEMBER 6

Marshall answered questions for four hours posed by committee general council William D. Mitchell, beginning with some background on his service in the Far East, duties as chief of staff, and his office's general activities and problems during 1940 and 1941. Asked about the relative autonomy of his subordinate field commanders, Marshall said: "My endeavor was to select the ablest people available at the time, have their missions defined, and give them the responsibility for the positions which they occupied." (U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, *Hearings . . .*, pt. 3 [Washington: GPO, 1946], p. 1051. This source is hereafter cited as Pearl Harbor Committee, *Hearings*.)

Marshall rejected the idea that the various military contingency plans developed and the staff conferences held with the British, Canadians, and Dutch either committed or permitted other nations to commit the United States to war. (Ibid., pp. 1052–53, 1057.) There was then a lengthy discussion of the 1940 Hawaiian Department alert and the War Department's efforts to reinforce Hawaii. (Ibid., pp. 1059–83.) By late 1941, Marshall stated, despite materiel shortages, the Hawaiian Department commander (Lieutenant General Walter C. Short) "had sufficient means to have broken up the attack so it could only have done limited harm," provided the army command was alert. At the time, however, Marshall said that he himself was inclined to think that the risks to the Japanese fleet from an attack on Hawaii were too great for them to risk; thus Japan's southward expansion would proceed slowly and conservatively. (Ibid., pp. 1084, 1086.)

The questioning then shifted to President Roosevelt's relations with his army and navy civilian and military chiefs in late November and early December 1941. "From a purely military side Admiral Stark and I together endeavored to put forward the policy of the necessity of taking every measure that we could think of, politically or diplomatically, to carry along the situation in the Pacific without disruption, at least until we had an opportunity to prepare the forces there" (i.e., some time after February 1, 1942). This led to a discussion of the circumstances surrounding the War Plans Division's November 27, 1941, warning message to General Short and the handling of decrypted Japanese messages. (Ibid., pp. 1088–89, 1096–1103.)

December 7

Prior to the day's public session, the committee held an executive meeting (Marshall was briefly present) to discuss the September 1944 letters Marshall had sent to Republican party presidential candidate Thomas E. Dewey asking that Dewey not make a campaign issue of American knowledge of Japan's intentions in early December 1941 as a result of having broken the Japanese high-level diplomatic code ("Purple"). (See *Papers of GCM*, 4: 604–11.) Marshall wished to maintain the secrecy on certain sections of the letters that concerned cryptanalytic methods. A minority argued vigorously for complete release and the committee ultimately agreed. (Two days later the *New York Times* cited an unnamed army source as saying that this revelation had done "incalculable" harm to U.S. intelligence-gathering capabilities, since nations that used encryption systems similar to the German and Japanese would now change them. [*New York Times*, December 9, 1945, sec. 1, p. 32.]

Marshall's four and one-quarter hours of testimony began with a discussion of the Japanese "winds" code message that was to have warned their diplomats of an imminent break in relations with the United States. (This has often been called the "winds execute" or "winds implementing" message. The debate since 1944 has been over whether such a message was ever sent by the Japanese or received by the U.S. and what its receipt would have meant operationally to the United States.) Marshall denied ever having read such a message. Then followed testimony on another famous document: the December 6–7 fourteen-part summary of Japan's position and the subsequent instruction to deliver the message to the State Department at 1:00 P.M. Washington time on December 7. Marshall had read this and consequently sent warning messages to the four Pacific commands. (Pearl Harbor Committee, *Hearings*, pp. 1106–10, 1162.) On the significance and content of these messages, see Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, pp. 360–61, 457–59, 466–67, 474–76, 485–87.) There then ensued a discussion of who in the War Department had the authority to send the Pacific commanders a warning message like that of November 27, defensive preparations in Hawaii, and the idea of unity of command there. (Pearl Harbor Committee, *Hearings*, pp. 1116–24, 1162.)

The committee then took up the Dewey letters and U.S. cryptanalytic work. (*Ibid.*, pp. 1124–39, 1146–48, 1156–58.) Marshall was again questioned about the November 27 warning message, General Short's response, and War Department reaction to the response, which Marshall admitted was inadequate and, as he was in charge, his fault. The former chief of staff also reiterated that the Hawaiian Department should have done a better job against the attack, given the personnel and materiel it had available. (*Ibid.*, pp. 1141–45, 1150.) Marshall was asked where he was on the evening of December 6, 1941; he said that he could not remember precisely (words that would be thrown back at him thereafter): probably he was at home, but certainly not at the White House, as certain conspiracy theorists were asserting. (*Ibid.*, p. 1110.)

December 8

Two members of the Republican party cross-examined Marshall for four and one-half hours; both concentrated particularly on what they considered the War Department's egregious failure to send General Short sufficient information on Japanese intentions gleaned from MAGIC intercepts. Congressman Bertrand W. Gearhart (California) began with questions about the military's attitude toward war with Japan. Marshall explained why the armed services desired to delay a war and the general state of U.S.-Japan relations in late 1941. Questioning then shifted to the fourteen-part Japanese message. Marshall again defended the War Department's behavior and insisted that the General Staff had no reason to believe that Short's command was unprepared. (*Ibid.*, pp. 1166–71, 1176–83.)

Most of the day's questions were asked by Senator Homer Ferguson (Republican of Michigan): who had authority to act in the War Department on the morning of December 7, where was General Marshall that morning, how were MAGIC intercepts handled, what were the Intelligence Division's procedures, and what intelligence exchanges had taken place with the British. (*Ibid.*, pp. 1183–1201.) This was followed by questions and testimony on the omission of reference to cryptanalytic intelligence from the Roberts Commission's 1942 report, the reasons for Marshall's 1944 letters to Thomas Dewey, and the military's efforts to protect the MAGIC source.

One recurring question was why did Marshall refuse to use the scrambler telephone to call Short's headquarters after receiving the final section of the fourteen-part

message on the morning of December 7, 1941. The instrument was not safe for more than ordinary privacy, Marshall insisted; in fact, the Germans had intercepted some of President Roosevelt's scrambled conversations. Besides, he said, even if he had used the telephone, he would have called General MacArthur in Manila first. (Ibid., pp. 1212–14.) Senator Ferguson then switched to probing what he considered a pre-Pearl Harbor U.S.-British-Dutch plan to go to war against Japan. Marshall did not agree that such a "plan" existed, that the military had approved of one, or that it had been implemented. (Ibid., pp. 1218–33.) ★

TO JAMES R. ANGELL¹

December 9, 1945
Washington, D.C.

My dear Doctor Angell: I am sorry that I cannot accept your invitation for the dinner of the English-Speaking Union on December 14th. I expect to be en route to China at that time. Please accept my thanks for the compliment of the invitation.

I am so hurried these days that I am taking the liberty of intruding another matter into this reply, but since it has a rather direct relation to the primary purpose of the English-Speaking Union I think you understand.

Since the death of Field Marshal Sir John Dill and his burial in the Arlington National Cemetery I have been deeply interested, in fact responsible, for a movement to erect a memorial to his war services in making, in my opinion, the greatest individual contribution to British-American understanding and cooperation. In effect, this is literally recognized by the personal citation of President Roosevelt issued the evening of Dill's death and it is further recognized by the unique action of Congress in adopting a joint resolution memorializing Dill's services to our common cause.

My conception was that an appropriate memorial monument at the site of his grave, which was selected by me directly on the main route through Arlington Cemetery to the Amphitheatre and grave of the Unknown Soldier, would attract the attention of all visitors who would find in the President's citation and the resolution of Congress an impressive reminder of the great importance of a generous understanding among the English-speaking people.

We are endeavoring to raise the necessary funds. Mr. Robert Woods Bliss is Chairman of the Committee. He will probably speak to you. I hope you will take the same view of the matter as I do.²

With regret that I cannot attend the dinner and more particularly that I will not have an opportunity to see you personally, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Angell, a retired psychologist and former president of Yale University (1921–37), was president of the New York City-based English-Speaking Union of the United States, whose purpose was “to draw together in the bond of comradeship the English-speaking peoples of the world.” He had written to Marshall on December 6 to invite him and Mrs. Marshall to a dinner at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington to honor the organization’s twenty-fifth anniversary.

2. Concerning Bliss and the Dill statue, see Marshall to Bliss, March 6, 1945, pp. 80–81. Bliss had notified Marshall of the slowness in the accumulation of the Dill Fund. Marshall suggested the creation of a “special committee in New York” of important women “who would hustle around to see personally the people who would be interested in contributing to the fund.” One of the prospective members of such a committee, Mrs. Louis Slade, hoped to interest the English-Speaking Union in the Dill project. (Marshall to Bliss, December 3, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected]. See also the fund-raising letter Marshall wrote for Bliss on December 10, 1945, *ibid.*)

PEARL HARBOR COMMITTEE TESTIMONY
December 10–11, 1945 Washington, D.C.

DECEMBER 10

Senator Ferguson resumed questioning on Monday and dominated the entire four-hour session. During the morning testimony, Senator Ferguson sought evidence that President Roosevelt had committed the United States to war prior to Pearl Harbor. He began by asking Marshall questions about the U.S. chiefs of staff’s meetings with the British concerning the Far East. This led to questions about Marshall’s knowledge of the U.S. fleet’s combat status, the conditions under which the U.S. would go to war with Japan, and President Roosevelt’s order to send three small ships into the South China Sea in early December 1941. (Pearl Harbor Committee, *Hearings*, pp. 1235–41, 1243–52.)

After lunch, Ferguson sought to demonstrate that the military commanders in Washington must have recognized that war was at hand by December 6. He led Marshall through a sentence-by-sentence examination of the various documents relating to the November 27 warnings sent to Hawaii and the Philippines, touching upon the president’s understanding of the need for the warning, the Japanese movements that precipitated the warning, and comparing Marshall’s memory of ideas and events against what Secretary of War Stimson’s diary indicated. The senator suggested—and Marshall rejected—the idea that because the wording differed in the army’s and navy’s separate messages to their commanders in Hawaii, those commanders might have been confused as to what Washington desired them to do. (*Ibid.*, pp. 1269–1305.)

December 11

Marshall testified three hours this day; Senator Ferguson asked the questions for three-quarters of that period. Marshall commented again on various aspects of the November 27 warning message to Lieutenant General Short, the fourteen-part Japanese message of December 6–7, and the handling of MAGIC messages. (*Ibid.*, pp. 1308–12.) Marshall explained once more his whereabouts on the evening of December 6 and the morning of December 7. (*Ibid.*, pp. 1327–28.) Senator Ferguson was particularly interested in why any mention of MAGIC documents had been omitted

from the public portion of the Roberts Commission's 1942 report and why, subsequent to the army's 1944 Pearl Harbor Board Report (which Marshall asserted that he had never read) the War Department had directed that Major Henry C. Clausen and Colonel Carter W. Clarke conduct investigations on the handling of documents relating to Pearl Harbor. (Ibid., pp. 1327–36.)

Congressman Frank B. Keefe (Republican from Wisconsin) used the session's remaining half hour by putting questions to Marshall about various pre-Pearl Harbor military maneuvers and plans, particularly the alert that began in June 1940. ★

TO EUGENE MEYER
Confidential

December 11, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mr. Meyer: Thanks for your letter of yesterday concerning my new job in China. I appreciate the indication that you understand the difficulties.¹

Your suggestion concerning General Order No. 1 is for consideration along with the other very difficult aspects of the Chinese problem which, as you say, is full of pitfalls.² You have no doubt considered other of the intricate points than mentioned in your letter. These include the source of the order, which is the Japanese High Command under the direction of General MacArthur after approval by the nations concerned, including of course the National Government of China. Involved in this problem is the final disposition of the arms and equipment of the Japanese surrender. Then there is also the question of the deportation of the surrendered Japanese for which the National Government has few resources and the dissident elements of China none. The individual Japanese probably will be inclined to surrender to the force most likely to get him home, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration.

Our major preoccupation for the time being, as the Secretary of State has made pretty clear, is the orderly and rapid deportation of both Japanese soldiers and Japanese civilians from China. If the Japanese remain in areas in China and retain their arms they may develop a position wherein, in fact, they would hold the balance of power in certain areas. Alternately, if they are recruited by either faction, the situation would obviously be most unwholesome and would raise the definite question as to whether or not we had achieved the basis for permanent peace in the Far East for which this country sacrificed so much in the Pacific war.

Obviously my first thoughts on the problem should not be made public, particularly before I have had an opportunity to survey the situation in China and discuss matters with the appropriate people. Therefore it would be a very serious matter, a disadvantage for me to have anything credited to me now which might by some chance, because of the unusual

complexity of the problem in China, prejudice my freedom of action in reaching conclusions on the ground or handicap me in the intricate and delicate negotiations which are certain to be required in order to obtain anything like a satisfactory solution. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. The editor and publisher of the *Washington Post* had written: "I think your decision to go to China is an example of public service such as I have rarely encountered. You deserved a rest, yet you are going to a post which will be trying and onerous, and full of pitfalls for your high reputation. It is for this reason that I think I ought to pass on to you an idea for your consideration. Surrender Order No. 1 is our dilemma in China, though the dilemma has been created in part by both the Russians and the Chungking Government not playing the game. I am afraid we shall get more and more bogged down in China unless we ameliorate that order. Is it not possible to amend it? Can we not, on the basis of interim circumstances, fix the areas in Northern China where we will allow the Communists to complete the surrender? I know we have a choice of evils, but this seems the lesser one, and we have as justification the difficulties created by Chiang Kai-shek, not only in respect to the surrender but also in respect of the failure of his negotiations with the Communists." (Meyer to Marshall, December 10, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

2. Prepared by the Operations Division and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then by the Allies, General Order No. 1 was approved by President Truman and sent to General MacArthur on August 15. It was to be issued by Japan's Imperial General Headquarters "by direction of the Emperor" and prescribed to whom the senior Japanese commanders would surrender, listed what information the Japanese would prepare for the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and gave various orders regarding the conduct of military personnel, disposition and materiel, and handling of Allied prisoners of war. Japanese commanders in Manchuria and Korea north of the 38th parallel, were to surrender to Soviet forces; all other Japanese commands in China were to surrender to Chiang Kai-shek's forces. (Marshall to MacArthur, Radio No. WAR-48672, August 12, 1945, and Joint Chiefs of Staff to MacArthur, Radio No. WARX-49961, August 15, 1945, NA/RG 218 [Records of the Chairman, William D. Leahy Papers, Folder 52].)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

December 11, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

NOTES ON A MEETING OF GENERAL MARSHALL
WITH THE PRESIDENT, MR. BYRNES, AND ADMIRAL LEAHY
At 3:30 PM, Tuesday, December 11, 1945

The President took up the question of our policy with China, the announcement he might make, the immediate instructions for the U. S. Chiefs of Staff regarding Wedemeyer's requirements as to shipping, etc.

The President stated that he wished to have a clear and complete understanding among us as to just what was the basis on which I was to operate in China in representing him. Mr. Byrnes outlined the policy of this Government as he understood it and advocated it. In effect he stated

this, that first of all we, that is the Army and Navy, were being authorized to proceed at once with the arrangement of shipping for the transfer of the armies of the Generalissimo to Manchuria and for their logistical support; also for the evacuation of Japanese from China; and finally, though this was to be maintained in a status of secrecy, for the present, for the transfer of the Generalissimo's troops into North China for the purpose, on our part, of releasing the Japanese forces in that area and facilitating their evacuation and deportation to Japan.

Mr. Byrnes stated that the reason for holding secret for the present the preparations for the movement of the Generalissimo's troops into North China was to enable General Marshall to utilize that uncertainty for the purpose of bringing influence to bear both on the Generalissimo and the Communist leaders towards concluding a successful negotiation for the termination of hostilities and the development of a broad unified Chinese government.

The President stated his concurrence with the proposition outlined by Mr. Byrnes and informed General Marshall that he would back him in his, General Marshall's, efforts whatever they might be to bring about the desired result.

General Marshall stated that his understanding then was that he would do his best to influence the Generalissimo to make reasonable concessions in his negotiations with the democratic and communist leaders, holding in abeyance the information that this Government was actually preparing shipping to assist the Generalissimo in moving his troops into North China for the purpose of releasing the Japanese in that region and, incidentally, taking over control of the railroads. That, on the other hand, he, General Marshall, was to utilize the same uncertainty as to the attitude of our Government toward the establishment of the Generalissimo's troops in North China in the effort to bring the Communist leaders to the point of making reasonable concessions in order to bring about desirable political unification. That in the event that the Communist leaders refused to make what, in General Marshall's opinion, were reasonable concessions, he was authorized to back the Generalissimo by assisting in the movement of troops into the region for the U. S. purpose of removing the Japanese.

Finally, General Marshall stated, that if the Generalissimo, in his (General Marshall's) opinion, failed to make reasonable concessions, and this resulted in the breakdown of the efforts to secure a political unification, and the U. S. abandoned continued support of the Generalissimo, there would follow the tragic consequences of a divided China and of a probable Russian reassumption of power in Manchuria, the combined effect of this resulting in the defeat or loss of the major purpose of our war in the Pacific. Under these circumstances, General Marshall inquired whether

or not it was intended for him, in that unfortunate eventuality, to go ahead and assist the Generalissimo in the movement of troops into North China. This would mean that this Government would have to swallow its pride and much of its policy in doing so.

The President and Mr. Byrnes concurred in this view of the matter; that is, that we would have to back the Generalissimo to the extent of assisting him to move troops into North China in order that the evacuation of the Japanese might be completed.

There was some discussion and Mr. Byrnes re-stated the policy of this Government adding specifically that it was not the purpose of the U. S. to send additional troops, divisions—he mentioned, to China, that he was opposed to that and that it would be contrary to the expressions of policy he had made public up to this time. The President agreed with this point of view of the Secretary of State.

The President approved the paper from the State Department containing the draft for a release to the press regarding our policy in China. This draft was in accord with the agreements reached on the previous Sunday morning at the State Department by the Secretary of State, General Marshall, General Hull, the Under Secretary of State and Mr. John Carter Vincent.¹

The President stated that he had given formal approval to the memorandum from the State Department to the War Department stating the immediate terms under which General Wedemeyer and the Army and Navy could proceed for the organization of shipping to transport Chinese and Japanese troops. The President also stated that he had approved the proposals of the previous day, Monday, from the Chiefs of Staff regarding the same matter.²

The Secretary stated that he was having a draft of a letter prepared for the President to General Marshall formally stating these various policies. The draft was not then available.

It was also stated at this meeting, either by the President or the Secretary of State that General Marshall would have the authority in dealing with the Generalissimo to indicate the assistance this government would give in economic, financial, and similar matters.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, Memoranda-Messages-Cables)

1. Lieutenant General John E. Hull's memorandum on the Sunday, December 9, conversation—which covered many of the same subjects as the December 11 meeting with the president—is published in *Foreign Relations, 1945, 7: 761–63*. Concerning the public version of "U. S. Policy Towards China," see note 1, Marshall Memorandum of Conversation, December 14, 1945, pp. 393–94.

2. The State Department's memorandum is in *Foreign Relations, 1945, 7: 760–61*. Concerning the Joint Chiefs of Staff document on the allocation and deployment of shipping to repatriate Japanese and move Chinese forces (J.C.S. 1586), see Joint Chiefs of Staff to CGUSAFCT Shanghai, CINCAFPAC Tokyo, and CINCPAC Pearl Harbor, Radio No. WARX-88411, December 13, 1945, NA/RG 319 (G-3, China Aid Program Files, Binder 25).

PEARL HARBOR COMMITTEE TESTIMONY

December 12–13, 1945 Washington, D.C.

DECEMBER 12

Marshall spent four hours before the committee responding to questions from Representative Keefe. Reporting on the hearings, William S. White observed that Marshall appeared “tired at times and speaking in a voice so low as to be sometimes indistinct.” (*New York Times*, December 13, 1945, p. 1.) At one point, unhappy with Marshall’s inability to recall precise details, Keefe said: “You were Chief of Staff of the United States Army at that time. Whether you have a present recollection of it or not appears problematical.” (Pearl Harbor Committee, *Hearings*, p. 1418.)

Keefe began with questions on the 1940 Hawaiian alert, Marshall’s understanding of the state of relations with Japan, and the War Department’s attempts to reinforce U.S. positions in the Pacific. The Wisconsin congressman desired detailed comments from Marshall on the policies behind and wording of various documents and the content of meetings—subjects which other committee members had previously covered. Marshall at last observed:

May I say also, Mr. Keefe, at the risk of being unduly repetitious, that you gentlemen are bringing up things to me that have been, to a large extent, rubbed out by 4 years of global war. I have not investigated these things to refresh my memory until the past few days, and so I think it is not unduly remarkable that I would not remember the detailed conversations and the frequency of conferences at which one we discussed this, and at which one we discussed that. At the time, of course, I would have had a lively recollection. But there are some rather great events that have intervened. I think I have a fair memory, and I am giving you the best I can under the circumstances. (Ibid., pp. 1406–7.)

Two of the key points in General Short’s defense were: (1) the General Staff, in not sending him information about certain Japanese messages that army and navy cryptanalysts had solved, deprived him of knowledge vital to his command; (2) he had responded properly to the November 27, 1941, warning message sent to the four Pacific commanders, but the General Staff had erred in not noting and thus not correcting the Hawaiian Department’s concentration on defense against sabotage rather than air attack. Keefe, who twice asserted that he was not trying to defend General Short, examined at length the circumstances surrounding the November 27 warning. Given the international situation and Marshall’s knowledge of the state of U.S.-Japan diplomacy, Keefe said, “in the exercise of ordinary care as Chief of Staff ought you not to have proceeded to investigate further and give further orders to General Short when it appeared that he was only alerted against sabotage?” “As I stated earlier,” Marshall replied, “that was my opportunity to intervene and I did not do it.” Keefe appeared to imply that Marshall was mincing words in order to avoid taking responsibility; was not “opportunity . . . synonymous with responsibility.”

Mr. Keefe, I had an immense number of papers going over my desk every day informing me what was happening anywhere in the world. . . . I was responsible for the actions of the General Staff throughout on large matters and on the small matters. I was responsible for those, but I am not a bookkeeping machine and . . . it is an extremely difficult thing for me to take each thing in its turn and give it exactly the attention that it had

merited. Now, in this particular case a very tragic thing occurred, there is no question about that, there is no question in regard to my responsibility as Chief of Staff, I am not attempting to evade that at all, but I do not think it is quite characterized in the manner that you have expressed yourself. (Ibid., pp. 1421–22.)

Given the emphasis for months on the hazard of an aerial or submarine attack in messages to and from Short and the slight emphasis on sabotage, when his “message came in in this way I think everyone that had seen it was misled on what it meant or did not mean and that, I think, accounts for the main portion of the misunderstanding in the case. The fact that it was merely sabotage did not register on anybody’s mind.” Marshall explained what he thought General Short should have done under the November 27 warning. (Ibid., pp. 1424–25.)

Keefe then shifted his inquiry to the handling of MAGIC messages and the information coming in via MAGIC between November 27 and December 7. “Do I understand, General Marshall,” he said, “and is it fair to conclude from your testimony, that you fix responsibility for this disaster upon General Short so far as the Army is concerned?” Marshall, who thought that a lieutenant general in high standing should not need detailed instructions from the General Staff on the running of his command, responded: “I have never made that statement, sir. I feel that General Short was given a command instruction to put his command on the alert against a possible hostile attack by the Japanese. The command was not so alerted.” (Ibid., p. 1434.)

December 13

Marshall’s final day before the committee lasted two and three-quarters hours. Congressman Keefe opened with questions about the 1940 and 1941 alerts. In response to a series of questions from Senator Scott W. Lucas (Democrat from Illinois), Marshall denied that he or any member of the General Staff had any information prior to the morning of December 7 that pointed to a probable attack on Pearl Harbor. The fourteenth part of the well-known Japanese message carried only the implication that something serious was going to happen somewhere in the Pacific. Marshall also denied that he had seen the much-discussed “winds” implementing message that would have warned Japanese diplomats of an imminent break in U.S.-Japan relations. Such a diplomatic break did not mean immediate war anyway, he noted. (Ibid., pp. 1499–1507.)

In response to questions from Congressman Gearhart, Marshall denied that the various MAGIC intercepts either pointed conclusively to an attack on Pearl Harbor or that Short’s not receiving them should have had any impact on the alert status of his command (as this did not in Panama or the Philippines). Senator Ferguson asked questions about the circumstances of Short’s relief and had Marshall repeat his testimony regarding the November 27 warning message and the problem of Short’s reply. (Ibid., pp. 1512–15, 1528–35.) ★

TO WINSTON S. CHURCHILL
Radio No. WAR-88381. *Secret*

December 13, 1945
Washington, D.C.

From General Marshall to Mr. Winant. Please transmit the following to

Mr. Churchill expressing my regret that the pressure of congressional hearings together with arrangements and policies regarding China has made it impossible for me to reply to the Prime Minister's request at an earlier moment.¹ "I testified in connection with the security phase of the use of the telephone to Hawaii and the Philippines and the Panama Canal Zone in the following words:

'I say again I am not at all clear as to what my reasons were regarding the telephone because four years later it is very difficult for me to tell what went on in my mind at the time. I will say this, though, it was in my mind regarding the use of transocean telephone.

'Mr. Roosevelt, the President, had been in the frequent habit of talking to the Prime Minister by telephone. He also used to talk to Mr. Bullitt when he was Ambassador in Paris² and my recollection is that that (meaning the talks with Bullitt) was intercepted by the Germans.

'I had a test made of induction from telephone conversations on the Atlantic cable near Gardner's Island.³ I found that that could be picked up by induction. I talked to the President not once but several times. I also later, after we were in the war, talked with the Prime Minister in an endeavor to have them be more careful in the use of the scrambler.'

I trust my statement will not prove of any embarrassment to you."

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Asked by Senator Homer Ferguson during testimony on December 8 why Marshall did not warn the Hawaiian Department commander by telephone on the morning of December 7, 1941, Marshall explained that the scrambler telephone was not a secure enough medium over which to discuss information acquired from cryptanalysis. (Pearl Harbor Committee, *Hearings*, p. 1213.) The *New York Times* and other news media made this a top story the following day. On December 10, Winston Churchill sent the following message to Marshall through U.S. ambassador in Britain John G. Winant: "I should be very much obliged to you if you would let me know exactly what it is you have said on this subject. Of course the late President and I were both aware from the beginning even before Argentina [i.e., the ARGENTIA conference of August 9–12, 1941] that anything we said on the open cable might be listened into by the enemy. For this reason we always spoke in cryptic terms and about matters which could be of no use to the enemy, and we never on any occasion referred directly or indirectly to military matters on these open lines. It will probably be necessary for me to make a statement on this subject in the future, and I should be very glad to know how the matter stands." (Churchill to Marshall, Radio No. 3001, December 10, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

2. William C. Bullitt had been ambassador to France from August 1936 until July 1940.

3. Gardners Island is at the eastern end of Long Island, New York.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALBERT C.
WEDEMEYER ET AL.¹
[Radio No. WAR-88605.] *Secret*

December 14, 1945
[Washington, D.C.]

Personal from Marshall. Plan to depart Washington 9:00 a.m. local time Saturday [December 15] on C-54 number 9149 en route to Chungking with party of five including Mr. Shepley who is a civilian attache of State Department, Colonel Byroade, Warrant Officer Hickey and two enlisted men.

Itinerary with all times local follows:

Hamilton Field	Arrive 6:00 p.m. Saturday
[San Francisco]	Depart 9:00 p.m. Saturday
Honolulu	Arrive 7:00 a.m. Sunday
	Depart 9:00 p.m. Sunday
Kwajalein	Arrive 7:00 a.m. Tuesday
	Depart 9:00 a.m. Tuesday
Guam	Arrive 3:00 p.m. Tuesday
	Depart 7:00 a.m. Wednesday
Manila	Arrive 3:00 p.m. Wednesday
	Depart 7:00 a.m. Thursday
Chungking or Shanghai	Arrive 1:00 p.m. Thursday

To Richardson: I accept your M15162 Nov 30 for Sunday but would prefer to omit dinner party. To Wedemeyer; you will note that I have not as yet made a decision on my first stop in China. It appears from the viewpoint of protocol that I should proceed direct to Chungking upon entering China. However if you think it permissible for me to stop over at Shanghai before paying first respects to the Generalissimo I may do so. Will you advise me en route on this point. In any event I would like to see you before any detailed discussions with the Generalissimo. I have informed the Generalissimo that I plan to leave Washington on Saturday, 15 December and arrive in China on Thursday, 20 December. I have told him that as a matter of convenience military channels of communication would be used throughout my trip, and I would keep you informed of my daily progress and that you will notify him as to the exact time and place of my arrival. Will you also keep the American Embassy informed. I accept your offer of your former house in Chungking on proviso that it will still be considered your house during your stays in Chungking.² For your information I plan to utilize the office facilities and staff of the Embassy. I have been unable to obtain a properly qualified interpreter here. Your assistance on these problems appreciated.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, 336 China, Item 95/8)

1. This message was sent to the commanding officers of all the commands through which Marshall planned to travel.

2. Wedemeyer had moved his U.S. Forces China Theater headquarters from Chungking to Shanghai between late September and mid-October 1945. On the question of whether Marshall should stay in the former ambassador's quarters in Chungking, Wedemeyer had written: "I recommend that you live in the house that I formerly occupied there. I have a full complement of capable servants and a soldier orderly awaiting your arrival. The Ambassador's House is rather depressing and one must climb many steps to enter." (Wedemeyer to Marshall, Radio No. CFB-16348, December 2, 1945, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Background].)

TO EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

December 14, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Dear Ed: For the past week I have been all day, every day, before a congressional committee and during the few remaining hours I have been engrossed in preparations for my departure for China, which up to the present have of necessity been very superficial. This is the reason you have not heard from me since your transfer from the hospital in New York to your rest area on Pompano Beach.¹ I am so glad that you are down there for I cannot imagine a better place to recover your strength and peace of mind. I wish I could have had an opportunity to see you at least a few moments before my departure but that, of course, is impossible.

Please be very careful during the next few months and not reach out too far, with the inevitable consequences to your own disadvantage and that of the United States. Every senior officer who has gone through somewhat the same experience you have has inevitably pressed me to permit him to resume his work long before he was physically fit to do so. Whenever he succeeded, a breakdown, more serious than the previous one has inevitably resulted. So do not be foolish, and give Virginia complete authority to determine when and on what terms you can resume work. She will know far better than you, though you will never admit it.

I hope to take off tomorrow morning. Katherine hopes to close Leesburg tomorrow and get under way by motor for Pinehurst on Sunday. Molly has a house near Pinehurst at Southern Pines, her husband being on duty at Bragg. Katherine's sister, Allene, will join her at Pinehurst.

With my love to you both, Affectionately,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The U.S. delegate to the United Nations Organization and chairman of the executive committee of the U.N. Preparatory Commission, Stettinius had made a hurried return from the London meetings on October 16 and went to Columbia University's Presbyterian Medical Center for a gallstone operation. At the end of November he left New York City for Florida.

TO CORDELL HULL

December 14, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Hull: I completed my testimony regarding Pearl Harbor yesterday afternoon and have been absorbed since then in endeavoring to prepare for my departure, early tomorrow morning, for China. It had been my hope that I might call on you before my departure.

Since the Pearl Harbor issue was raised in Congress, I have thought it wise not to discuss the matter with any of the individuals concerned. Therefore, until my actual appearance before the committee I had not seen General Gerow except for about ten minutes in the fall of 1944 and then no reference was made to Pearl Harbor. I have never talked to General Short, I had not seen General Miles nor Colonel Bratton and, for the same reason, I thought it advisable that I not discuss the matter with you.¹ I was not only intensely busy during this period, concentrated on the war effort, but it was my desire that when I actually appeared, to give whatever testimony was required of me, that there be no possibility of a claim or assertion being made that I had connived with other leading witnesses to present a story more favorable to me than the facts might justify. For the same reason I never read the report of the Pearl Harbor Board or even of the Roberts Board—I did not think it wise to divert my concentrated attention from the war effort to concerns regarding me personally, and I did not wish to be influenced, possibly subconsciously, in what I recalled regarding the occurrences at the time.

Under these circumstances I hope you will accept my apologies for not paying my respects to you and particularly for not seeing you before my departure for China.²

With great respect, Faithfully yours

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Brigadier General Leonard T. Gerow was acting head of the War Plans Division, Brigadier General Sherman Miles was head of G-2 (Intelligence), and Colonel Rufus S. Bratton was chief of G-2's Far East Section and responsible for handling delivery of MAGIC intercepts.

2. The seventy-four-year-old former secretary of state, who had received the 1945 Nobel Peace Prize in mid-November, had testified before the Pearl Harbor Committee on November 23, 26, and 27.

TO ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET WILLIAM F. HALSEY

December 14, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Dear Halsey: I have been so occupied the past week with congressional hearings and China matters that it was not until yesterday that it registered on me, by something in the press, that you had received your pro-

motion to five-star rank.¹ Please accept my apology for my long delay in tendering my congratulations, which are most sincere and in enthusiastic accord with the action.

As I have indicated to you in my congratulatory messages in the past, at the time of your great naval victories, and as I have commented in public statements, your services as a great fighting leader have been outstanding in this war and will be similarly outstanding in history. I have always admired the way in which you do things, your bearing, your courage and your skill. Please accept the foregoing as evidence of the sincerity of my congratulations. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Halsey had taken the oath as Admiral of the Fleet on December 11, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Top Secret

December 14, 1945

[Washington, D.C.]

*Notes on Meeting with the President
and the Under Secretary of State at
11:30 A.M. Friday, Dec. 14, 1945*

The President handed me a final draft of his letter of instructions together with the enclosures and asked me if these were satisfactory to me.¹ I replied in the affirmative. The President stated that if I desired a directive from him in any other form for me to prepare it and he would sign it, that he wished to back me in every way possible.

I stated that my understanding of one phase of my directive was not in writing but I thought I had a clear understanding of his desires in the matter, which was that in the event that I was unable to secure the necessary action by the Generalissimo, which I thought reasonable and desirable, it would still be necessary for the U.S. government, through me, to continue to back the National Government of the Republic of China—through the Generalissimo within the terms of the announced policy of the U.S. Government.

The President stated that the foregoing was a correct summation of his directions regarding that possible development of the situation.

The Under Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, confirmed this as his understanding of my directions.

The President repeated his assurances that the U.S. Government, that he would back me in my decisions, that he had confidence in my judgment.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Personal China File)

1. The enclosures were a memorandum for the War Department by Secretary of State Byrnes, dated December 9, 1945, and the version of the memorandum "U. S. Policy Towards China" that was to be released to the public. The president's letter and enclosures are printed in *China White Paper*, pp. 605–9.

In his letter, Truman wrote: "Specifically, I desire that you endeavor to persuade the Chinese Government to call a national conference of representatives of the major political elements to bring about the unification of China and, concurrently, to effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in north China. . . . In your conversations with Chiang Kai-shek and other Chinese leaders you are authorized to speak with the utmost frankness. Particularly, you may state, in connection with the Chinese desire for credits, technical assistance in the economic field, and military assistance (I have in mind the proposed U. S. military advisory group which I have approved in principle), that a China disunited and torn by civil strife could not be considered realistically as a proper place for American assistance along the lines enumerated." (Ibid., pp. 605–6.)

The version of "U. S. Policy Towards China" that Marshall took with him is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1945*, 7: 770–73. A conflation showing the differences between the public and private versions of this memorandum is printed in Larry I. Bland, ed., *George C. Marshall's Mediation Mission to China, December 1945–January 1947* (Lexington, Va.: George C. Marshall Foundation, 1998), pp. 551–54. The essential points of this document were that since a united and peaceful China was essential to world stability, the United States desired a cease fire, a conference of all important political elements, and the unification of the various armed forces under a reformed and broadened (but still Kuomintang [Nationalist party] dominated) central government. The United States would continue to give the Chinese government economic and military aid, facilitate the repatriation of the Japanese, and retain its Marine Corps forces in China.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

December 14, 1945

Top Secret

[Washington, D.C.]

*Notes on Meeting with the Under Secretary of State,
Mr. Acheson at 2:30 P.M. Friday, December 14, 1945*

I stated that it was my desire to have some official, preferably of the State Department assigned for the time being the sole duty of energizing and expediting the consideration and handling of all matters pertaining to China involved in the various departments of the government, to be in effect, my personal representative in Washington. This individual also to search for new ways or means of assisting me by government agencies. I outlined the importance, in my opinion, of developing a Chinese coast wise shipping service and a more extensive Chinese air transport service at the earliest possible date. Also the general importance of assistance to the general transportation deficiencies, motor and rail. In the same category of importance I placed the exporting of cotton from the U.S. to China and similar means to meet urgent shortages and expedite the resumption of industries which now lacked raw materials.

The currency issue was also discussed.

I suggested the names of several individuals in the State Department for the position I was proposing. Mr. Acheson suggested two names, Colonel Frank McCarthy (who I felt had not yet sufficiently recovered his health) and a Colonel James Davis, assistant to General Hildring in the

Civil Affairs Branch in the War Department. I immediately contacted General Hildring by phone and he agreed, shortly thereafter, to release Colonel Davis to me and the State Department.¹

Mr. Acheson then called in the heads or acting chiefs of the transportation section, Mr. George P. Baker, the financial, Lend-Lease, and Disposal of Surplus Property Section, Mr. E. G. Collado and the Deputy head of the Far Eastern Section, Mr. James K. Penfield.

In turn these gentlemen outlined the various factors or negotiations involved within their jurisdiction, explaining the various matters to me and answering my questions. On the suggestion of Mr. Collado, it was decided by Mr. Acheson that a letter would be prepared for the President's signature Monday directing the various governmental heads (Treasury, War, Navy, Maritime Commission, Shipping Administration, Export Bank, etc. etc.) that *no negotiations* would be conducted with Chinese officials without a clearance from me, General Marshall, through the State Department.

I was informed that detailed summaries of various pending matters or negotiations would be dispatched to me in China.

The President's directive was delivered to me by messenger at this time.²

Following this meeting, and after learning that Colonel Davis was agreeable to undertaking the task above referred to, I telephoned Mr. Acheson to that effect, and asked him if he thought it desirable for Colonel Davis to function from an office in the State Department. Mr. Acheson replied in the affirmative. I asked if an office, assistants and clerks would be assigned Colonel Davis. Mr. Acheson replied in the affirmative, stating specifically that a representative of the Transportation Section, the Financial or Currency Section, and the Far Eastern Division would be so assigned.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Personal China File)

1. A Cleveland, Ohio, lawyer in civil life prior to the war and at this time head of the Supply and Economics Branch of the Civil Affairs Division, James C. Davis was about to complete his military duties. Marshall convinced him to stay for an additional three months, during which time he would find and train a successor. Davis's job would be to solve his superior's "rear echelon" problems and to facilitate communications. General Hull told Davis that this approach was typical of Marshall's methods. "Throughout the War Department at different times there have been things somewhat smelled up. [Marshall] has picked some man to straighten it out. He has always used that man to cut across command channels or anything else. Of course [the subordinate] always works along with the machinery in existence but he rides herd on it." (Minutes, Conference in General Hull's Office, December 15, 1945, NA/RG 319 [OPD, Top Secret Decimal File, Case 228, China].)

2. On December 18, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson sent President Truman a memorandum enclosing ten letters: "There are attached proposed letters which we have prepared at General Marshall's request addressed to the heads of civilian agencies which may be conducting negotiations of one sort or another with Chinese representatives. These

letters would request such agencies not to continue conversations regarding the extension of American economic or financial aid to China, but to permit all such discussions to be concentrated in General Marshall's mission." (Acheson Memorandum for the President, December 18, 1945, HSTL/H. S. Truman Papers [Official File, 150].)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY HENRY H. ARNOLD

December 15, 1945
Washington, D.C.

Dear Arnold: I am leaving in a few minutes and on calling up your office to say goodbye I learnt that you were out of the city. So this hurried note must serve instead.

In leaving the War Department I wish especially to feel that you are genuinely aware of my appreciation of the tremendous services you rendered the army during the past six years—and me personally. And that I fully realize the complete loyalty and warm support you gave me. It will all be a treasured memory. Affectionately

G. C. M.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Collection; H

IN the brief time he had available between the Pearl Harbor hearings and his arrival in China, General Marshall prepared for the mission in his usual manner: by studying the key War Department staff documents and communications from the theater commander (Wedemeyer), reading books on China supplied by the Library of Congress, and soliciting advice from friends. John J. McCloy wrote: "I feel like giving you the advice that you gave me, 'Don't let them get you down.'" Henry L. Stimson suggested that Marshall keep the mission strictly military ("otherwise you will get into innumerable tangles") and seek to reaffirm the Open Door principle in Manchuria. Furthermore, "remember that the Generalissimo has never honestly backed a thorough union with the Chinese Communists. He could not, for his administration is a mere surface veneer (more or less rotten) over a mass of the Chinese people beneath him." Stimson thought that the Communists' "hold on the people underneath them is sounder than his [Chiang Kai-shek's] hold over his people." (McCloy to Marshall, November 29, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected]; Stimson Memo to General Marshall, November 29, 1945, Yale/H. L. Stimson Papers [General Correspondence].)

In Tientsin between 1924 and 1927, Marshall had experienced the struggles between various "warlord" armies and the early effects in northern China of Chiang and the Nationalists' efforts to unify the country, but

he was in the United States during the Nationalist-dominated “Nanking Decade” (1928–37), during which the Nanking regime stressed national unity, a single state ideology (the Three People’s Principles of the regime’s founder, Sun Yat-sen), and a single party that treated all opposition as treasonous.

In a brief summary for Marshall of the political situation since the Japanese invasion of 1937, James Shepley noted that even before the invasion “Chiang had been moving publicly toward the convocation of a National Assembly to adopt a constitution for China,” but dissidents found unacceptable his control over Assembly delegate selection and the proposed draft constitution (“nothing more than what might charitably be called a constitutional dictatorship”). The debate continued throughout the war. On the last day of 1944, Chiang proposed that the National Assembly be convened during 1945. In January 1945, the Communist party proposed an all-party conference to institute a coalition interim government to run China until the new constitution became operational; however, on March 1 Chiang announced that the Nationalists were unwilling to relinquish power of final decision until a National Assembly convened beginning November 12. The Communists and the Democratic League then refused to participate in the National Assembly. The League, formed in 1944 and having perhaps a hundred thousand members, was the biggest of a large number of coalitions of interest groups and small political parties that sought to represent a “third force” between the Nationalists and Communists.

After Japan’s surrender, the Nationalists and Communists argued over who would receive the surrenders of local Japanese forces in China, and the political and military situation progressively worsened into armed clashes. In October 1945, the Nationalists and Communists announced that they had agreed on membership of the Political Consultative Conference, which was to meet in the wartime capital of Chungking to lay the groundwork for a National Assembly meeting and a draft constitution. “Since your appointment,” Shepley noted for Marshall, “the plans for the Political Consultative Council have proceeded in a more conciliatory manner.” (Shepley Memorandum for General Marshall, December 19, 1945, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, 7: 774–76.)

Chiang Kai-shek was not pleased with the Truman administration’s decision to send Marshall—he would have preferred Patrick Hurley’s return with complete U.S. sanction and assistance for Nationalist efforts to crush the Communists and consolidate power—but he acquiesced rather than cause trouble for himself in Washington. (Sidney H. Chang and Ramon H. Myers, eds., *The Storm Clouds Clear over China: The Memoir of Ch’en Li-fu, 1900–1993* [Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1994], pp. 184–85.) Chinese Communist leaders, however, were

guardedly optimistic, which represented a considerable change from their attitude toward Hurley and the policies he represented. At this time, Mao Tse-tung presumed that Marshall represented the ascendancy of “progressive” forces within the U.S. ruling elite, as formerly represented by Franklin D. Roosevelt. Moreover, American involvement in China could inhibit the outbreak of a full-scale civil war (for which the Communists were as yet unprepared), perhaps assist the Communist party in achieving quasi-legal status and securing foreign assistance, and help to expedite the formation of a coalition government. On the other hand, the Communists recognized that United States policy was basically one of supporting Chiang Kai-shek; consequently, Communist policy was to “neutralize” the United States, i.e., to minimize the level of support the U.S. gave to the Nationalists and the extent of impediments U.S. intervention presented to the Communists. Furthermore, Mao and his associates presumed the Marshall mission was, in part, a result of a Soviet-American agreement aimed at preventing mutual hostilities, and this agreement would be reflected in Communist-Nationalist relations in China. (He Di, “Mao Zedong and the Marshall Mission,” in Bland, ed., *Marshall's Mediation Mission*, pp. 175–80; Zhang Baijia, “Zhou Enlai and the Marshall Mission,” *ibid.*, pp. 201–10.)

A student of the period has summarized the scene in China at the time Marshall arrived:

he entered straight into an extremely volatile political situation—China's political landscape had probably changed more over the previous four months than over the preceding two decades. Japan, which as a foreign power had dominated Chinese politics for a decade and a half, was gone. Chiang Kai-shek's government had taken over the core areas of Central and Eastern China. The Soviet Union occupied Manchuria under the terms of an alliance treaty with the Guomindang [Kuomintang]. Stalin had ordered Mao Zedong to negotiate a peace accord with Chiang Kai-shek. And Mao's forces had fared very badly in their confrontations with the army of the Guomindang government. (Odd Arne Westad, “Could the Chinese Civil War Have Been Avoided? An Exercise in Alternatives,” *ibid.*, p. 501.)

According to Henry A. Byroade, who accompanied Marshall on the trip to China, Marshall and his advisers agreed that the mission's chances of success were slim (Byroade thought perhaps 2 percent), but they were going to work as hard as possible for success. The evening he arrived in Shanghai—December 20, 1945—Marshall met with Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, commanding general of the China theater, and Walter S. Robertson, U.S. chargé d'affaires in Chungking. Wedemeyer,

who favored all-out aid to Chiang and the Nationalists, asserted in his memoirs that Marshall was not in good spirits, and when Wedemeyer said that Marshall would never be able to accomplish his mission, he “reacted angrily” that he could and that he expected Wedemeyer to help. Robertson, who agreed that achieving a Nationalist-Communist political or military coalition was extremely unlikely, did not recall such a confrontation. “General Marshall listened very carefully to what we had to say. . . . How he evaluated what we had to say he didn’t say. He asked questions, we discussed it.” (Byroade, interviewed by Forrest C. Pogue, July 22, 1969, pp. 5, 9, GCMRL; Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!*, p. 363; Robertson, interviewed by Forrest C. Pogue, September 6, 1962, p. 4, GCMRL.) ★

TO DEAN G. ACHESON
Radio No. 400. *Secret*

December 21, 1945
[Shanghai, China]

On arrival in Shanghai I am disturbed by the following:

I find that the President’s statement of policy was preceded by an inept summary of that statement issued by the U.S. Information Service in terms of frequent “musts” that inevitably involves loss of face by the Generalissimo and in effect nullifies and distorts the tactful statement of the case by the President.¹ This summary was immediately put on the radio as a matter of routine and did the harm before the full statement appeared.

Next, I find last night a statement credited to a spokesman of the State Department publicizing the fact that the President has reposed in me the authority to approve or disapprove any movement of Chinese troops into North China, thus taking out of my hands the determination of the best method of utilizing this authority to accomplish the desired result.²

As a consequence of the foregoing I enter on my first discussion with the Generalissimo today under what in my opinion are unnecessary handicaps.

I request that in these critical stages of our negotiations, I be given an opportunity to comment on any future statements, official or semi-official by the Department in Washington which relate to the Chinese situation. I would appreciate also if careful scrutiny be given to the China-directed output of USIS before it leaves Washington.³

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. *New York Times* correspondent Tillman Durdin reported from Chungking on December 17 that the Information Service dispatch described the December 15 statement “U. S. Policy Towards China” as, in Durdin’s words, “a warning and worded its summary in such a way as to give the meaning that United States credits, loans and further military help to

China could be given only if peace and unity were established and a 'fair and effective representation' of non-Kuomintang political elements included in the Government." (*New York Times*, December 18, 1945, p. 2.)

2. The State Department announced on December 18 that General Wedemeyer had received authorization to assist the movement of Nationalist troops to Manchurian ports, but only if Marshall "determines that such a movement is consistent with his negotiations with the Chinese." (*New York Times*, December 19, 1945, p. 2.)

3. Acting Secretary of State Acheson replied that the "slanted summary" of U.S. policy apparently originated in the U.S. Information Service office in Chungking, then headed by Dr. John King Fairbank, a prewar history professor at Harvard University and formerly a member of the Office of Strategic Services in China. "We have urgently ordered a full investigation and expect to take appropriate disciplinary action as soon as facts are reported." Concerning the statement on the movement of Chinese troops: "In future we will, as requested by you, clear with you all statements contemplated for release in Washington which might affect your negotiations or position." (Acheson to Marshall, December 21, 1945, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Division of Chinese Affairs, USIS].)

MEETING WITH CHIANG KAI-SHEK

December 21, 1945, 9:15 P.M. Nanking, China

MARSHALL flew from Shanghai to Nanking on the morning of December 21. That evening there was a meeting that included Marshall, Generalissimo Chiang, Madame Chiang (who did the translating), Wedemeyer, Robertson, and Wang Shih-chieh, China's foreign minister.

The Truman administration and Americans generally were "warmly disposed" toward China, Marshall began, but reluctant to interfere in its internal affairs and to keep troops in the country. Marshall emphasized that the administration's policies depended "in a sense almost entirely upon United States public appreciation of the reasonableness and determination on the part of both sides to reach satisfactory settlement." This public gaze would fall most sternly upon the Nationalist government, but if the Communist party did not make efforts toward compromise, they too would lose sympathy in the United States.

His mission was to listen to all Chinese groups, Marshall stated, but he would not make his personal views known to anyone but the Generalissimo himself. Chiang replied that he understood the U.S. position and hoped that Marshall would speak frankly to him. The Chinese Communist party, Chiang asserted, depended upon the Russians in all matters of broad policy, and he described a number of his recent problems with the Russians in Manchuria. But Stalin suddenly appeared to reverse this unfriendly attitude and requested that Chiang send a representative to Moscow for talks. Marshall recalled that he had had good relations with Stalin during the war but not with his Foreign Ministry; the same applied to his relations with Prime Minister Churchill and the British Foreign Office. "Our own State Department might be considered in a similar manner—they use mysterious language." (*Foreign Relations*, 1945, 7: 794–99. These minutes were written by General Wedemeyer from notes he took.) ★

DRAFT PRESS RELEASE¹

[December 23?, 1945]
[Chungking, China]

News of the death of General Patton comes as a great shock to me.² ~~I had thought he was making~~ I had been told that his condition had shown much improvement.

We had been friends for many years. Since ~~the Meuse~~ his action in the Meuse-Argonne battle of 1918 I had recognized him as a determined and utterly fearless ~~lead~~ battle leader. ~~For this reason~~ This is one of the [reasons] I selected him to lead our troops in the landing at Casa Blanca November 1942. ~~Throughout~~ In the fighting in Africa and in Sicily he was conspicuous for the driving energy and the tactical ~~ab~~ skill with which he ~~dr~~ led his troops. The breakthrough of the 3d Army in Normandy and its dramatic liberation of central France was indicative of ~~General Patton~~ the man who led it. But it was ~~the~~ his counter ~~thrust at~~ attack towards Bastogne and the tremendous thrusts to the Rhine at Coblenz and ~~the~~ south into the center and rear of the Germany armies in the Saar Basin, followed by the ~~qui~~ sudden crossing of the Rhine that ~~mar~~ established General Patton as one of the greatest military leaders in our history.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, General); H

1. The editors have not found the as-released version of this document. The line-throughs indicate Marshall's editing. A note at the end reads: "Given to Press by J. Shepley."

2. On December 9, shortly before noon, the car in which Patton was riding collided with a U.S. Army truck near Mannheim, Germany. Patton was seriously injured and taken to the hospital in Heidelberg, where he died on the evening of December 21. He was buried on December 24 at what was later called the Luxembourg American Cemetery and Memorial at Hamm, a suburb of Luxembourg City, amid soldiers killed during the Battle of the Bulge. (Carlo D'Este, *Patton: A Genius for War* [New York: HarperCollins, 1995], Chap. 47.)

MEETINGS WITH CHOU EN-LAI AND T. V. SOONG
December 23–24, 1945 Chungking, China

CHOU En-lai, a Chinese Communist party intellectual and political leader as well as its best-known negotiator after party chairman Mao Tse-tung, was vice chairman of the Communist party's Central Revolutionary Military Council and chief of military affairs; he held the rank of general. T. V. Soong was an economist, financier, Madame Chiang Kai-shek's brother, and occasionally the Generalissimo's rival for power. He had been acting president and then president of the Executive Yuan (the government's highest executive organ with twelve ministries under its authority) since December 1944 and chairman of the Joint Board of Four Government Banks since July 1945. (Note: hereinafter all meetings take place at Marshall's residence, unless otherwise noted.)

Chou En-lai, December 23, 4:00 P.M.

Marshall explained the purpose of his mission, the reasons for United States interest in China's affairs, and his personal willingness to listen to all sides. It was particularly important, he said, that the Chinese reach some agreement to end the existence of two armies—Nationalist and Communist—and thus two countries in China.

The Communist party agreed with the main points of President Truman's December 15 statement, General Chou said. There should be an immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities while Communist-Nationalist talks were undertaken. Moreover, a coalition government should be created based upon the American style of democracy. Chiang Kai-shek could remain as trustee in such a government, and the Nationalists would remain the senior party. If there were a fully democratic government, all Communist and Nationalist armies could be nationalized. The Communists desired that the up-coming Political Consultative Council prepare a draft constitution and a plan for a coalition government with a National Assembly to adopt the constitution. Chou invited Marshall to submit any questions he had for the Communists to answer. They ended with toasts to understanding, lasting freedom, and the mission's success. (*Foreign Relations, 1945, 7: 800–804.*)

T. V. Soong, December 24, 9:00 A.M.

"At the present time I am here to learn. I have read a good deal and have listened, but I have got to listen to more," Marshall told China's premier. Marshall specifically asked about the Democratic League. There were "only two parties in China that are worth anything," Soong replied: the Nationalists and the Communists. The small political groups comprising the Democratic League—e.g., Youth party and the National Socialist party—were insignificant. One group claiming a membership of six or eight million had tried to see him in Washington, Marshall said. Soong denied that any of the minor parties was that large.

Since Soong had negotiated the recent Sino-Soviet agreement, Marshall asked if he thought that Soviet behavior in Germany, where they had been difficult to deal with and where they declared so many things war booty that "they practically cleaned the place," would be similar in Manchuria. Soong said that the Soviets defined virtually everything in Manchuria as designed by the Japanese for aggression against the U.S.S.R. and thus legitimate war booty, which they were removing.

Soong and Marshall then discussed the distribution and movements of Nationalist and Communist forces in Manchuria, the economic situation in Formosa, China's transportation and supply problems, and materiel recovered from the Japanese. (*Ibid.*, pp. 804–13.) ★

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Top Secret

December 26, 1945
[Chungking, China]

Notes on Conference with the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek at the Country Residence, December 26, 1945¹

Following the Christmas dinner, the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang took me with the American Minister, Mr. Robertson, and the Secre-

tary of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Wang, to the cottage on their country place. There the Generalissimo discussed several matters with me.

He asked my advice on the following:

He said that Stalin had requested him to send a representative to Moscow and he had in mind sending his son. He wanted my advice in the matter. I told him that I thought he should meet Stalin's request, but I thought it imperative that the individual selected be one who would be very direct in his dealings with Stalin or the Russian Staff.

The Generalissimo informed me that the Russians had requested him to place troops in Changchun, the capital of Manchuria, and that he had given directions to fly a division in from Peiping. He asked my opinion regarding this. I told him his decision seemed the proper one.

He made some reference to the Russian attitude in Manchuria and I outlined at considerable length the United States experience with the Russians in Germany which included the question of what constituted "war booty". I pointed out that a number of the actions of the Russians which the Chinese, the Generalissimo and Mr. Soong had talked to me as indicative of Russia's collaboration with the Chinese Communist party and Russia's maneuvers to deny Chinese control of any kind in Manchuria, were identical with the technique Russia had followed in dealings with the United States in other portions of the world. I stated that to me it was very important to determine whether or not the Russian Government was in contact with and was advising the Chinese Communist party for that I regarded it as very important to eliminate from consideration those Russian actions which were common to our procedure in any portion of the world.²

I spoke to the Generalissimo regarding the serious state of affairs as to winter equipment that I had been told applied to his divisions near Kowloon and at Tientsin which were due for transfer to Manchuria; I told him that I had taken up with the War Department the question of locating winter equipment either in Alaska or the United States, or possibly in MacArthur's forces, for issue to these Chinese divisions and I told him that I had not received definite information from the United States on the subject, but had received a preliminary message which indicated the possibility that such equipment in certain amounts could be made available on the coast of China seven weeks after the orders were given in the United States.³

I also told the Generalissimo I was looking into the question of certain supplies in Burma, some 50 million dollars worth, which might be of immediate importance to the rehabilitation of China. He expressed appreciation in these matters and said that he would send two officers to see me. One to explain the situation from the Chinese point of view in Burma, and one to discuss the economic picture in China.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Political Affairs, Conferences Miscellaneous, vol. 1)

1. The Christmas dinner was on December 25; Marshall's notes were written on the twenty-sixth.

2. Marshall asked Secretary of State Byrnes for personal and confidential "assistance in evaluating whether difficulties the Generalissimo reports to me in his relations with Soviet in Manchuria are purely in the pattern of our own similar difficulties in Europe or whether Soviet policy here is deliberately calculated to mitigate against an effective and unified China." (*Foreign Relations, 1945*, 7: 813. As the secretary did not receive it, Marshall sent the message again on January 3, 1946; see Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, 11 vols. [Washington: GPO, 1969–72], 9: 11.) Byrnes replied that while Stalin suspected the United States of intending to remain in China militarily, "he denied aiding Communists in Manchuria and said they had no military strength there and that the National Government had exaggerated the situation." Byrnes thought that the course of Soviet relations in China was in the "same pattern as our relations in Europe"; Stalin "intends living up to his treaty with China and will not intentionally do anything to destroy our efforts for unified China." (*Foreign Relations, 1946*, 9: 17–18.)

3. Marshall had initially cabled the War Department on December 22 requesting a "quick investigation" of U.S. Army winter clothing stockpiles for the estimated 250,000 Nationalist troops in or going to Manchuria. On the twenty-ninth he requested "most expeditious action" on the matter and on January 3 "immediate action." (All three messages [unnumbered, GOLD 4, and GOLD 13] are in NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages].)

MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DEMOCRATIC LEAGUE December 26, 1945, 4:00 P.M. Chungking, China

AS he had in previous meetings with Chiang Kai-shek, Chou En-lai, and T. V. Soong, Marshall began by saying that he was there to "listen to everyone who has a genuine interest in the settlement" of China's problems and to express America's interest in encouraging such a settlement. The League's primary wish, according to its spokesman (not identified in the conference notes), was an end to the civil war and a reduction and modernization of the nation's military forces. The present armies—the Nationalists had two million troops and the Communists a million troops and two million guerrilla fighters, the spokesman asserted—were useful only for fighting a civil war, not for national defense.

A woman delegate asked Marshall what he meant by democratic government. Marshall admitted that there were numerous definitions of democracy, but "the fundamental requirements of democracy are free speech and freedom of peaceable assembly and a governmental structure that permits a genuine will of the people to be given effect." (While describing the peculiar problems of democracy, Marshall reminded his visitors that he was speaking "off the record," since he never intended to enter into that kind of discussion.) Implementation, not principles, was the problem in China, Marshall said; "half the difficulty is lack of understanding and lack of confidence" in opponents.

Responding to a question from Marshall, the League's spokesman said that the Political Consultative Conference's success depended upon the Nationalist government (more than the Communists) to stop the civil war, start reorganizing the government, make a coalition government, and nationalize the army. The meeting ended

with a lengthy discussion of elections and the problems of holding them in a country such as China. (*Foreign Relations*, 1945, 7: 816–24.) ★

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN¹
Radio No. GOLD 7. *Top Secret*

December 29, 1945
[Chungking, China]

My Dear Mr. President: I have no definite opinion or progress to report, the following being merely an outline of my activities since arriving in China. I have requested delivery of this message directly by hand of officer in order to avoid possibility of a leak which might greatly embarrass if not hazard the success of my mission.

In the first place, I have not repeat not up to the present time made any statement of my views but have sought at great length the views of all principal parties concerned. In my latest interviews I have somewhat by implication indicated certain necessities which might enhance the prospects of successful compromises in the Chinese negotiations.

I talked at length with Generalissimo at Nanking and again Xmas Day at Chungking. He had little to say regarding Communists and much to say regarding Russians. Incidentally, I think I brought him to realize that many of the embarrassments in Manchuria were not peculiar to that problem but common to Russian procedure everywhere, citing examples.

To date he has been most friendly and I have endeavored to avoid posture of cracking the whip. Our frank talks must come later, probably within the next few days.

I have had lengthy interviews with all parties, generally from 9 A.M. until 4 or 5 P.M., including lunch—Communists, Democratic League, Youth Movement [Chinese Youth party], T. V. Soong, various Central Government officials, specialists from our Embassy, correspondents, Americans in employ of Chinese Government. All agree to leadership of Generalissimo and to high-sounding principles or desires for a more democratic government, a coalition government, a reorganized and completely nationalized army. But the practical procedure to secure these ends, especially as to the nationalization of army and selection of senior provincial officials are almost completely lacking. This I have plainly and emphatically indicated in my repeated questioning and blunt statements. I think I have made this point glaringly clear to all and they now appear to be struggling towards a more realistic point of view. I now have my own ideas of how to proceed in some of these matters, mainly nationalization of army, but have not yet thought the moment had arrived to state them.

A long interview this afternoon with Government leaders rather precipitated matters. As a result the three governmental principals involved

in the Political Consultative Council meetings which it is hoped will find a basis for termination of hostilities and first steps toward coalition agreements, are to meet me tomorrow, Sunday. The Political Consultative Council has not held its first meetings, but the principal Kuomintang and Communist members met Thursday evening and the latter proposed terms for cessation of hostilities. There was another meeting scheduled for this evening at which I was told the Government would be rather uncompromising. However, apparently as a result of discussions with me today the meeting was postponed and the appointment made with me for tomorrow. I will see Generalissimo the following day, Monday.

I think I have laid the necessary basis for my more formal and intimate entry into the discussions and hope to make some progress from now on.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Report to the President)

1. In this message and henceforth, Marshall addressed his reports to the president and the secretary of state or, as Byrnes was often out of Washington, D.C., at meetings, the acting secretary (usually Under Secretary Dean G. Acheson).

TO FRANK MCCARTHY
FROM KATHERINE T. MARSHALL

[December 29, 1945]
Pinehurst, North Carolina

Dear Frank— Your yellow roses really made this Xmas more like my past ones than anything that happened. How sweet and how thoughtful of you— for my heart was truly sad. This assignment to China was a bitter blow. If General Marshall could have had even a few weeks rest and have had you and Srgt [*Sergeant*] Powder with him I would not have had such fears about his going. I know you were more than ready to make the sacrifice but it was one he could not run the risk of accepting. You have always been perfectly selfless in your loyalty to him and therefore someone else had to think of your good. It would have been madness for you to face that trip and a Chinese winter. When I saw his plane take off without anyone to be close to him— whom he had known and depended on— I felt I could not stand it. A new Sect [*secretary*]*—* new orderly new cook. I know just how he felt too— but neither of us could speak of it for it was too close to our hearts.

I give a sickly smile when people say how the country loves and admires my husband. That last week— testifying from 9 until 5 every day— with the luncheon hours spent with the President and Sect. Burnes [*Byrnes*] trying to get some idea of what must be done on this mission— then dumped into his lap to write the whole policy— after he got home at night— I shall never forget that week and I shall never forget how this country showed its love and admiration. This sounds bitter. Well, I am bit-

ter. The President should never have asked this of him and in such a way he could not refuse. This is a long way from yellow roses– but I have kept silent so long I had to get it out to someone and it will be safe with you. His trip was fairly comfortable and now my daily prayer is that he can bring some sort of unity out of chaos [and] come home. What are your plans? and how is your health? I do so hope that 1946 will bring you both health and happiness. Affectionately,

Katherine Marshall

GCMRL/F. McCarthy Papers (Additions); H

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 11. *Top Secret*

January 1, 1946
[Chungking, China]

A rather critical conference with a Central Governmental group on Saturday afternoon precipitated a conference late Sunday night December 30th with the three governmental leaders in the People's Consultative Council including Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang.¹ There was outlined the prospective Central Government's rather uncompromising position in reply to Communists' proposals for cessation of hostilities. For the first time I gave what might have been termed an opinion though I voiced it as a mere suggestion of the moment. In consequence the leaders held a meeting Monday morning, finally consulting with the Generalissimo. Doctor Wang then came to see me at 4:30 PM, 25 miles out of city at Generalissimo's country place. He stated that as a result of my suggestions they would present following proposal to Communists members of the PCC at 5:30 PM.² Quote in briefed form:

1. Immediate cessation of hostilities.
2. Appointment of Central Government and Communist representatives, one each, to consult with me in proposing terms and methods of enforcing and maintaining the armistice, restoration of rail communications, and initiation of surrender and removal of Japanese troops in disputed districts.
3. Appointment by PCC of a commission to visit disputed areas and determine facts and make recommendations. End of proposal.

The first two points only are concerned with immediate future. I have my staff developing plans for an executive combined agency or headquarters to carry out on the ground a possible directive to be agreed upon by the representatives with me.³ An elaborate command-control-communication set up will be required. I have already drawn upon Wedemeyer for some personnel and will have to secure more from him and especially of motors, radio materiel, etc. This group will have to control for the time

being railroad reconstruction and operation, organization of railroad police to remove troops from such service, and troop movements incidental to Japanese surrenders and repatriation. Working members of group or headquarters will be under U.S. executive, in effect a Chief of Staff, with staff officers and communication operatives from Central Government and Communist armies, coordinated in each activity or mission by Americans. I purpose establishing my immediate assistant and military attache Colonel Byroade as this executive.⁴ He is now planning organization, duties and equipment of group. I plan to appoint the American Minister, Mr. Robertson, as chairman of the control group or headquarters to balance the contentions, claims and views of the two hostile representatives.

I am quite certain that no other method will give genuine effect to the cessation of hostilities, reopening of rail lines, acceptance of Jap surrenders and repatriation of Japanese. There must be an impartial source of direction and authority on the ground. The directive for guidance of this group will be drawn up here by me and the two hostile representatives, to receive joint approval of Generalissimo and Mao Tse-tung. Thereafter to be issued formally by Generalissimo. No American troop units are involved in present plans or envisaged for future developments.

The foregoing as to proposed combined group or headquarters is at present merely my proposition to bring forward at meeting proposed by Central Government and not yet accepted by Communists.

Tonight Communist representative [Chou En-lai] spent several hours with me and I frankly outlined my conception of necessary procedure.⁵ He apparently agreed throughout, at least he understands my point of view. He has not yet heard from Mao Tse-tung on question of acceptance of Central Government proposal. I was left with impression that he was favorably disposed.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. The editors have not found minutes of or notes on these conferences.
2. This document is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 3.
3. See *ibid.*, pp. 6–8.

4. To replace Byroade as Marshall mission chief of staff, Wedemeyer sent Colonel J. Hart Caughey (U.S.M.A., 1935) to Chungking on January 1. Caughey had been on Wedemeyer's China Theater staff since mid-November 1944. He would remain with Marshall throughout the mission and came to idolize his boss. Caughey wrote to his wife the day after he arrived at Marshall's headquarters: "I've never seen or been in the presence of a man like Gen. Marshall. He's calm, persuasive and infectious. His most noble attribute being his complete selflessness." A few weeks later he observed: "I can't get over the profoundness of this guy Marshall. He is really something. I try to present ideas now and then and no sooner than I do he leaves me so far out in the cold that I shudder. He's about ten jumps further ahead than everybody else I have ever had the pleasure of watching operate. I use the word 'watch' advisedly, because that's about all that I find myself in a position to do—just watch. He has got his finger on things particularly China, and what makes China tick. Even old TV Soong, who is notorious for being able to melt foreigners down, wilts

before the General. What ever gave the President the idea that maybe Marshall would be a good man to send to China, I don't know but he couldn't have made a better choice." (Caughey to Betty B. Caughey, January 2 and 19[?], 1946, GCMRL/J. H. Caughey Papers.)

5. Marshall's files in NA/RG 59 contain no minutes or notes on this meeting, but there is a Chinese summary of Chou En-lai's side of the conversation in *Zhou Enlai 1946 nian tanpan wenxuan* (Selected documents from Zhou Enlai's 1946 negotiations) (Beijing: Zhonggong wenxian chubanshe, 1996).

MEETING WITH CHOU EN-LAI

January 3, 1946, 3:30 P.M. Chungking, China

THE Communist party welcomed Marshall's participation in matters concerning the cease-fire, surrender of Japanese forces, and the reopening of communications, Chou asserted. He then gave Marshall a Communist draft directive on a cease-fire. (See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 10.) The Communists envisioned that a headquarters in Peiping, which Marshall was working to establish, would continue after the recently established and temporary Committee of Three (i.e., Chou En-lai, Marshall, and General Chang Chun, governor of Szechwan province and a close associate of Chiang Kai-shek) was replaced by China's Political Consultative Conference after the two sides had signed the various agreements.

Marshall gave Chou the draft memo (which had been prepared for Chiang Kai-shek) of his ideas on achieving a cessation of hostilities. (The key paragraphs of Marshall's staff-drafted directive for the cease fire read: "a. All hostilities will cease immediately. b. All movements of forces within China proper and Manchuria will cease with the exception of movements of forces of the National Government of the Republic of China into and in Manchuria for the purpose of re-establishing Chinese sovereignty. There also may be the purely local movements necessary for supply, administration and housekeeping. c. Destruction and interference with lines of communications will cease and you will clear at once blocks placed against movement along land lines of communications. d. For the time being all units will maintain their present positions." [Ibid., p. 6.] Chou and Marshall agreed that their two proposals were similar. They then discussed the organization and location of the Executive Headquarters' subsidiary field headquarters. As the meeting ended, Marshall suggested to Chou, who had an appointment to meet with Nationalist representatives, that the two sides agree not to issue press releases until a formal agreement had been reached and a joint communiqué agreed upon. "This is not a political consultation which you murder with the press sometimes if you can. This is a military matter for the peace of China, rather for the cessation of hostilities and it would be most unfortunate if the negotiation was disrupted by some outside press business." (Ibid., pp. 11–17. The original typed heading on these notes stated that the meeting occurred at 3:30 P.M. on December 4, 1945; someone subsequently wrote "4 Jan 46" over this date. Evidence in Marshall's January 1 letter to President Truman and the notes on the January 5 conference with Chou indicate that this meeting probably took place on January 3.) ★

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN E. HULL
Radio No. GOLD 20. *Secret*

January 5, 1946
[Chungking, China]

Personal to Hull info Wedemeyer from Marshall. I note in Wedemeyer's CFB-19018, copy to you, that he has requested shipment of 7.92 ammunition from India and has placed request for requirements of other calibers with the War Department.¹ There have been many messages on this subject. Before I left Washington I sent radio to Wedemeyer suggesting possibility of sending ammunition from Okinawa or Philippines to China coast mentioning Chinwangtao, etc. There must be no further delay. There should be no complication regarding lend lease on this as ammunition to fit weapons we have supplied is part and parcel of equipment—or the same as the button on a uniform.

Has the ammunition requested been shipped? If not, why not?²

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. In a lengthy January 4, 1946, message to Byroade, Wedemeyer stated that the Chinese had accumulated thirty thousand tons of lend-lease ammunition in western and southwestern China (i.e., at the end of the "Hump" air routes and the terminus of the Burma Road), but they had no effective method of transporting it to their armies, which were now concentrated in East and North China. Wedemeyer said that he had requested the shipment from the India-Burma Theater to Shanghai of 7.92-mm rifle ammunition and other supplies, but he needed a revision of instructions from the War Department in order "to continue to furnish the Chinese additional military supplies and provide logistical support." (Wedemeyer to Byroade, Radio No. CFBX-19018, January 4, 1946, NA/RG 332 [Headquarters U.S. Forces China Theater, Wedemeyer Files, Outgoing Radios].)

2. A January 9 memorandum to General Wedemeyer stated that the India-Burma Theater had seven thousand tons of 7.92-mm ammunition and forty-eight hundred tons of other supplies for the Chinese army ready to ship to Shanghai as soon as the War Department approved. (Colonel Carl R. Dutton Memorandum for General Wedemeyer, January 9, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Wedemeyer File]. Marshall initialed the file copy of this document, indicating that he had read it.)

MEETINGS WITH CHOU EN-LAI AND CHANG CHUN
January 5–6, 1946 Chungking, China

CHOU En-lai, January 5, 4:30 P.M.

General Chou described his January 3 meeting with Chiang Kai-shek's representatives. Mention of Manchuria should be omitted in the proposed cease-fire agreement and the problems there settled separately, he said, lest it complicate Chinese-American-Soviet relations. Marshall expressed concern that the agreement not be rigid in excluding all troop movements in China, and he suggested that the minutes of the meeting where the cease-fire was agreed to carefully note what both sides understood the agreements to mean in addition to what the wording stipulated.

Marshall warned that premature, uncoordinated, and possibly differing, public communications by the two sides about the cease-fire might make his job of mediating impossible and could “easily be fatal to the negotiations.” Furthermore, “it is a long distance down to the troops and they have very strong feelings” about the conflict and the high-level agreements on a cease-fire; “therefore it is very important to the success of our procedure that this matter be very carefully handled.” For example, he did not want the two sides to spend weeks exchanging conditions and writing letters. Marshall also desired the immediate establishment and manning of the Executive Headquarters in Peiping and its traveling Nationalist-American-Communist truce-inspection teams. He offered the use of his personal aircraft to facilitate the Communist representatives’ arrival at Executive Headquarters. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 20–25.)

Chang Chun, January 6, 4:30 P.M.

Governor Chang explained some of Chiang Kai-shek’s reservations about Marshall’s draft cease-fire proposal concerning the cessation of troop movements throughout China. (See *ibid.*, p. 6.) Chiang recommended that this be amended to permit troop movements south of the Yangtze River, prohibit the movement to the north of troops presently south of the Yangtze, and prohibit troop movements north of the Yangtze (both sides agreed that the exception to this would be the movement of government troops into Manchuria to reestablish Chinese sovereignty).

Marshall recapitulated the conversation he had had with Chou En-lai the previous day. The two men then discussed the Communists’ desire to have Manchuria excluded from the cease-fire agreement and the Nationalists’ request that Jehol province (north of Peiping) be included in Manchuria. Marshall thought that the Communists were opposed to including Jehol, and they discussed possible alternative ideas or wordings that the Generalissimo might consider as a compromise—for example, adding a phrase that permitted government troops to enter and reestablish sovereignty in Manchuria and “such other specific areas as are now occupied by Soviet troops in North China.” Governor Chang said that he would see Chiang Kai-shek about this and also mentioned the Generalissimo’s desire to add a paragraph in the cease-fire draft about the disposition and reorganization of Chinese troops. Marshall did not think that this was a good move, since it might encourage the Communists to add more paragraphs and might confuse the public and the troops that had to implement the cease-fire orders.

Marshall and Chang ended their conference with a lengthy discussion about the creation, location, and structure of the Executive Headquarters. (*Ibid.*, pp. 26–39.) ★

MEETINGS OF THE CONFERENCE OF THREE January 7–8, 1946 Chungking, China

JANUARY 7, 10:00 A.M.

At Marshall’s suggestion, the committee agreed that the official records of the meetings would be kept in English and that the two Chinese delegations would make their own translations. They then agreed that their meetings would be called the Conference of Three. (“Committee of Three” soon became the more generally used term.)

Governor Chang Chun and General Chou En-lai stated that their respective sides agreed “in principle” on three main points of the cessation of hostilities orders (i.e., cease-fire throughout China, halt of significant troop movements except in Manchuria, and the restoration of communications), so they undertook to define precisely what these points meant. Manchuria, as usual, was the key point of contention. The Nationalists desired that the government’s right, through agreement with the Soviet Union, to move troops anywhere in Manchuria be included in the cease-fire agreement. In addition, the government asserted that two strategic cities—Chihfeng in Jehol province and Tolun in Chahar province—also be specifically excluded from the prohibition against troop movements in the cease-fire agreement, because both were occupied by Soviet troops and the Sino-Soviet agreement permitted Chinese government troops to occupy any Chinese city held by the Soviets. Chang was unwilling to agree to Chou En-lai’s suggestion that all troop movements in North China and Manchuria be subject to “consultation” with the Soviets and the Chinese Communists. Chou En-lai said that not only was his information that Chihfeng and Tolun were under Chinese Communist and not Soviet control, but he also knew nothing about any Sino-Soviet agreements relating to Jehol and Chahar provinces.

Marshall decided to call a temporary halt to this line of argument. Instead he had the negotiators examine the wording of a paper proposing the actual language to be used by each side in notifying its troops of the termination of hostilities. He received from the two representatives a series of acceptances to sentences and paragraphs in this paper, ending with notification to troop commanders that “An Executive Headquarters will be established immediately in Peiping for the purpose of carrying out the agreements for cessation of hostilities,” and that this organization would issue “instructions and orders unanimously agreed upon by the three Commissioners.” (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 43–59.)

According to an unofficial history of the Executive Headquarters:

Late at night on the 6th of January 1946, a small number of selected officers of the United States Army were called together at headquarters, China Theater, in Shanghai for a “Top Secret” conference. At this conference it was first made known that there was to be established an Executive Headquarters. The size and location were still unknown. The organization and make-up were yet to be decided. The manner in which the Executive Headquarters should function was not determined except that there was to be a small central headquarters with a small number of field teams composed of Chinese and American members who would actually enforce the truce in the field. To this small group of officers was assigned the mission of determining the organization and set-up of the Executive Headquarters, the method of its functioning, and its supply, administration, and logistics.

(*History of the Executive Headquarters, January 1946–February 1947, Peiping, China* [Peiping: (Peiping Headquarters Group), March 6, 1947], p. 1.) A copy of this unofficial history is in GCMRL/Small Manuscripts Collection (John M. Ferguson). The official history is “Historical Record of the Executive Headquarters Peiping Headquarters Group, Peiping, China,” NA/RG 407 (Operations Reports, History—Peiping Executive Headquarters). A set of “History and Record Series Data Cards, Peiping Headquarters Group, Peiping, China (Including—The Executive Headquarters), 1946–1947,” is in NA/RG 338 (China-Burma-India Theater, U.S. Branch of Executive Headquarters).

January 8, 10:00 A.M.

Most of this meeting was spent considering paragraph “b” (forbidding troop movements, with certain exceptions) of the cease-fire order. General Chang desired that this paragraph be amended to specify four exceptions. Chou and Chang continued to differ on the current and future status of Chihfeng and Tolun (the Nationalist insisting that the cities were the central government’s by agreement with the Soviets, the Communist denying this and insisting that the Communist Eighth Route Army was already in residence).

Marshall eventually got the Chinese to agree that the definition of what constituted allowable government troop movements for reorganization south of the Yangtze be put into the agreed minutes (like the understanding on Manchuria) rather than into the cease-fire order. After further debate and clarification of positions, the Chinese agreed on the following wording for paragraph b: “Except in certain specific cases, all movements of forces in China will cease. There also may be the movements necessary for demobilization, redistribution, supply, administration and local security.” The meeting ended with each side restating its position regarding Chihfeng and Tolun. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 59–75.)

January 8, 4:30 P.M.

The meeting began with discussion of the precise wording of the Manchurian exception to the no-troop-movements part of the cease-fire order (i.e., paragraph *b*). After some wording changes, Chou En-lai said that he was satisfied, but that he needed to consult with Mao Tse-tung and his advisers in Yen-an. The question of an understanding regarding the use by Nationalist troops of the railroads to move into Manchuria was left unresolved.

The committee members again took up the question of control of Chihfeng and Tolun; General Chou requested a copy of the Chinese-Soviet agreement on troop dispositions in Manchuria that the Nationalists asserted gave them the right to occupy those strategic cities. (This agreement—dated October 31, 1945—is *ibid.*, p. 98.) Marshall, hoping to avoid a lengthy delay over this difficult issue, sought to include a restriction on Nationalist troop movements into Jehol and Chahar provinces “pending further agreements.”

The committee members then discussed the authority and operations of and security for Executive Headquarters and the wording of this matter in the cease-fire order. After a lengthy discussion, the committee members reached agreement on this and adjourned. (*Ibid.*, pp. 76–98.) The U.S. draft that was the basis for this discussion is *ibid.*, pp. 6–8. ★

TO DEAN G. ACHESON
Radio No. GOLD 26. Secret

January 8, 1946
[Chungking, China]

Reference WAR-91636 from Davis and your number 28 January 4, 8 PM:¹ Robertson is due if current negotiations are successful to be chairman of three man commission in Peking² administering details of cessation of hostilities, reopening of communications, etc.³ I have arranged to take

over personally direct general supervision of Embassy during his absence.

His prestige in vital job in Peking would be seriously damaged by change of status therefore I desire to continue him as Minister for present.

Due to the lack of experienced China service personnel other than Smyth⁴ I desire that he be held here for at least six weeks after arrival of Butterworth. I hope that two months or less from now Robertson's special job will have been completed. Thereafter I imagine your arrangements for permanent set up of Embassy can be conveniently put into effect without prejudice to my mission.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. In a radio message to Acheson on January 4 concerning various mission personnel needs, Marshall noted that the press in China was reporting that the State Department had appointed W. Walton Butterworth, Jr., a career Foreign Service officer, as Marshall's financial and economic adviser. Marshall said he was already receiving such advice from members of the embassy's Economic Division and preferred that Butterworth be assigned to the embassy to supplement their services rather than to his mission. Acheson replied that same day that the press reports were incorrect; that Butterworth was to be assigned as counselor of embassy with the personal rank of minister; that when Butterworth was appointed the department did not know that Robertson had agreed to stay in China; and that the department and Butterworth would be happy to do whatever Marshall desired. (Marshall to Acheson, Radio No. 28, January 4, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Political Affairs, Messages Out—Embassy]; Acheson to Marshall, Radio No. 28, January 4, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, Personnel I].) On Butterworth's arrival and role, see note 3, Marshall to Acheson, July 5, 1946, p. 622.

2. The capital of China between 1421 and 1928 and after 1949 was called *Peking*, meaning "northern capital" (*Beijing* in pinyin transliteration). During the period of Nationalist dominance (1928–49), when China's capital was at Nanking ("southern capital"), the former capital was called *Peiping* ("northern peace"). The Japanese, during their 1937–45 occupation, used *Peking*. During Marshall's mission, he and other Americans often used *Peking*.

3. Walter S. Robertson had been a banker in Richmond, Virginia, prior to being designated head of the U.S. lend-lease mission in Australia (1943–44). He subsequently became an economic adviser to the State Department, and in April 1945 he was appointed an Auxiliary Foreign Service Officer and made economic counselor (with the personal rank of minister) to the U.S. Embassy in China. After Ambassador Hurley left Chungking in September 1945, Robertson became chargé d'affaires and (since Marshall had the personal rank of ambassador but was a presidential agent not the U.S. ambassador to China) remained so until a new ambassador was appointed in July 1946. Robertson had volunteered for wartime duty only, and even before Hurley departed he had sought to resign. When Marshall arrived in December 1945, Robertson told him that he wanted to return to Virginia, but Marshall would not hear of it, saying that he too had been drafted from Virginia for China duty. He offered to arrange for Robertson's wife and children to come to China; they arrived in late February 1946. (Robertson interview, GCMRL/Pogue Oral History Collection [#107].)

4. Robert L. Smyth—an Old China Hand along with John Paton Davies, Jr., John Stewart Service, John Carter Vincent, and a few others—had been born of American parents in Foochow, China, in 1894. He joined the Foreign Service in 1920 and had served most of his career in China. Since 1945 he had been counselor of embassy in Chungking.

MEETINGS OF THE CONFERENCE OF THREE

January 9–10, 1946 Chungking, China

JANUARY 9, 5:00 P.M.

This meeting's only accomplishment was to demonstrate a seemingly unbridgable gap between Nationalist and Communist views regarding control of Jehol and Chahar provinces. Chang Chun reiterated his government's view that a Sino-Soviet agreement authorized government troops to occupy Chihfeng and Tolun, but he stated that a political settlement for the region south of those cities might come later.

Chou En-lai asserted that the cease-fire should be implemented immediately and the political problems settled afterwards. Moreover, the Sino-Soviet agreement applied only to Manchuria, and Jehol and Chahar were not part of Manchuria. He suggested further that the Nationalists might use this agreement as a precedent to occupy more of those provinces than the two cities or even other areas of China not then under their control.

Seeing that negotiations were stalemated, Marshall halted the proceedings before tensions could mount beyond control: "It seems too bad to me that we have so nearly reached complete agreement on a large number of difficult problems and then at the end we reach a complete impasse." He convinced both sides to hold a meeting the next day, following the opening session of the long-delayed Political Consultative Conference. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 98–104.)

January 10, 8:15 A.M.

Marshall hurriedly called this special session after holding a meeting with Chiang Kai-shek the previous evening at which the Generalissimo agreed to a cease-fire without reference to the status of Jehol and Chahar provinces. (There are no notes or minutes on this 10:00 P.M. meeting in the Marshall mission files.)

Marshall began the discussion by getting the two sides to agree on the final wording of the cease-fire agreement and the "understandings" that would be set down in a secret agreed memorandum. (See *ibid.*, pp. 125–26.) Chou En-lai and Chang Chun agreed that the cease-fire should begin shortly before noon that day, although both sides expected that it would take several days for the order to take effect everywhere. Both Chou and Chang praised Marshall for his efforts. At the end of the meeting, Marshall observed, according to the minutes: "It is my hope that the good faith that will be built up under the terms of this cessation of hostilities order as it is being carried out by this practical headquarters in the field will result in a development of confidence in the good faith of all parties so that it will not be as difficult as it would now appear to reach a solution." (*Ibid.*, pp. 105–16.)

January 10, 3:10 P.M.

The conferees began by signing copies of the cease-fire for a group of press photographers. (See photo #38 following p. 544.) After this, they discussed aspects of Executive Headquarters operations and signed a memorandum specifying each side's initial manpower contributions. (See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 128–29.) Chou En-lai suggested, and Chang Chung agreed, that the headquarters send a delegation to investigate and report on conditions in Jehol and Chahar provinces. The meeting ended following Marshall's praise of the Chinese conferees' cooperation and their thanks to him for the negotiations' success. (*Ibid.*, pp. 119–25.) ★

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 30. *Top Secret*

January 10, 1946
[Chungking, China]

Dear Mr. President: Conferences or negotiations between representatives of the National Government and the Communist Party with me had reached a point two days ago where the wording of the order terminating hostilities and the exact terms of the detailed instructions creating an Executive Headquarters of three commissioners with a complete staff for implementing the armistice, reopening and repairing communications, creating a railroad police organization, and proceeding with the surrender and evacuation of Japanese soldiers, had been formally agreed upon. There negotiations hung on the insistence of the National Government to continue its troop movement into provinces of Jehol and Chahar to occupy important rail points of Chihfeng and Tolun in accordance with the outline of the plan of the National Government to take over from the Soviet forces in accordance with the latter's plan of withdrawal through four phases, all to have been executed last November. A delay to January 3 was requested by National Government of [the] Soviets and a further delay to February 1 was later requested the line through Chieh-feng and Tolun to have been vacated by Soviets on January 15.

It is not known whether or not Soviet troops are still in those two places. The Communists claim that their troops have already occupied those places.

Negotiations continued here at a stalemate up to meeting yesterday evening which I terminated to avoid further rather bitter discussions.

At ten last night I saw the Generalissimo and secured his agreement to drop all reference in armistice arrangements to situation in Jehol and Chahar, which means that National Government troop movements cease in those provinces leaving that issue to later political negotiations. I suggested and Generalissimo agreed for him to make announcement of hostilities at opening of Political Consultative Council at ten this morning, to be followed at 11:30 by press release of terms of cessation order, including provisos regarding certain troop movements which will be permitted. This release to be by the Government and the Communist Party representatives.

At eight this morning a meeting of the three conferees was held and has just been completed with regard to numerous minor details to permit Generalissimo to make his announcement of cessation of hostilities at opening of Consultative Council meeting at ten this morning.

I will start Colonel Byroade with first echelon of field headquarters to Peking immediately to be followed in about 48 hours by the three commissioners to head the headquarters, traveling in my plane. I have designated our chargé here, the American Minister Walter S. Robertson as the U.S. commissioner, who will be invited to act as chairman.¹

New subject: Last night the Generalissimo expressed the desire for me to participate directly in conference of an already agreed upon committee of three military officials to develop the plan for the nationalization or reorganization of the armies of China. Today at the meeting both representatives, National Government and Communist, expressed the same desire. I agreed to participate.² This will be the hardest problem of all and it is fundamentally basic to all other considerations, political and economic.

What I may be able to do indirectly to facilitate political agreements for coalition government is quite uncertain and must remain to be determined.

I am having the exact terms of the order, instructions and provisos regarding cessation of hostilities sent direct to State Department. I am sending this through War Department channels and by hand to you in order to avoid possibility of a disastrous leak regarding this most confidential description of what has actually happened.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. The agreement to establish Executive Headquarters in Peiping stipulated that it was to be governed by three commissioners (one each from the government, Chinese Communist party, and the United States) with the authority to negotiate among themselves. The U.S. commissioner was to act as chairman, but unanimous consent was required for the organization to take action. Each commissioner was to have a staff initially stipulated as 170 persons for the government and the Communists and 125 for the United States. The three commissioners arrived in Peiping on January 13.

Each delegation maintained independent signal communications. All orders, directives, and instructions were to be issued in the name of the president of China through the Operations Section, headed by Byroade. The Operations Section was authorized to dispatch truce teams and establish headquarters substations at trouble spots and to report on these activities in the field. The section was to write a daily activity report ("Trusum"), which the three commissioners would convey to their chiefs.

Personnel assigned to Executive Headquarters were billeted in hotels in Peiping but had their offices at the Peiping Union Medical College, where Executive Headquarters was formally opened on January 14. Its first major effort was to send U.S. Marine Corps planes to drop leaflets announcing the cease-fire agreement to various trouble spots. ("Historical Record of the Executive Headquarters," NA/RG 407 [Operations Reports, History—Peiping Executive Headquarters], pp. 6–23.)

2. The next day, Marshall told Truman: "On rereading message I fear I may have given impression that a formal proposal had been made to me to serve on committee of 3 military officials to develop the plan for nationalization of armies of China. Such was not the case. Only informal expressions of sentiments on the subject occurred." (Marshall to Truman, Radio No. GOLD 35, January 11, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages].)

TO MRS. JOHN B. WILSON

January 11, 1946
Chungking, China

Dear Rose: I was happy to receive your note of the 20th but very sorry

to learn of the anxiety you had suffered regarding the baby. Fortunately that appears to be past history.¹

I left for China hurriedly with only a minimum of preparation possible. Congressional hearings took up almost all of my days, but for hurried visits to the White House or the State Department during lunch recesses.

Since around here I have naturally been intensely busy every hour from 9 to 5 or sometimes midnight. There is small prospect of a let up for some time to come.

I long for personal freedom and my own home and simple pleasures. My shooting trips were all arranged for the winter along with horseback rides on the lovely Pinehurst trails and a month in Florida at a luxurious cottage that had been placed at my disposal. But, here I am.

I am sorry about the god-father delays, but if you still want me to serve I will be honored to do so.²

With my love, and warmest regards to John. Affectionately,

G. C. M.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Collection (Rose Page Wilson)

1. Marshall's goddaughter had written shortly after Marshall departed for China: "I would have written you before you left but Page has been terribly sick with pneumonia. He is OK now but I was scared stiff and naturally, up most nights and busy all day." (Wilson to Marshall, December 20, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [China Mission, General].)

2. Wilson had written: "I guess you forgot all about [Page's] Christening when this China business broke. I started to write you before Thanksgiving but I thought you'd write to me if you could have gotten here and I didn't see any point in bothering you. Anyhow, if you are still agreeable to being his God-Father, I intend to wait until you get back home." (Ibid.)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Radio No. GOLD 44. *Top Secret, Eyes Only*

[January 13, 1946]

[Chungking, China]

The following outlines my conception of possible and desirable developments out here: Early initiation of organization of Military Advisory Group on small scale based on President's war powers, without waiting for formal congressional action.¹ Wedemeyer to organize and head group during initial period continuing as head of theater to its demobilization, but released as Chief of Staff to Generalissimo.²

An officer of high rank to report here to me immediately to familiarize himself with situation in preparation for duty as U.S. representative on board or group actually carrying out reorganization and redeployment of Chinese armies. Whether or not such a representative will be desired remains to be seen but I think it will be impossible to carry out any such

program without the guarantee provided by the presence of an impartial U.S. official. To prepare in time for this possibility I think either Simpson or Hull should be started out here without announcement of their prospective assignment.³

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. On the origins of the Military Advisory Group, see Marshall Memorandum for Admiral King, October 22, 1945, pp. 333–34.

2. In comments at the end of Wedemeyer's January 21 letter answering State Department criticisms of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's plans for the Military Advisory Group, Marshall stated: "I have come to the conclusion that Wedemeyer should not be burdened with this duty [i.e., head of the Military Advisory Group] and, also, that for the present he should continue as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo." (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 815.)

3. Eisenhower replied that neither Hull nor Simpson could be sent to China immediately, so he suggested one of three former European theater corps commanders: Geoffrey Keyes, Walton H. Walker, or Alvan C. Gillem, Jr. (Eisenhower to Marshall, January 16, 1946, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 17, Item 36].) Marshall selected Lieutenant General Gillem, who was then in Washington, D.C., as a member of the Stilwell Board on postwar equipment. He arrived in Chungking on February 17.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER [January 13, 1946]
Radio No. GOLD 45. *Secret* [Chungking, China]

Urgently necessary for me to have the information you possess regarding possible plans for reorganization of Chinese armies. Madame tells me that the Generalissimo understood you to have agreed or recommended that in view of struggle with Communists no further demobilization of National Army divisions should take place. Is this correct? If not, how many did repeat did you feel could safely and profitably be demobilized? Does fact of armistice alter your views.¹ I have to move into this problem immediately. Send papers by next plane² but radio at least briefly your views.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Wedemeyer replied on January 14 that he "did not agree or recommend that in view of struggle with Communists no further demobilization of National Army divisions should take place." The Chinese army could and should be reduced to approximately fifty divisions. He did not want the morale or movement plans of those armies that the U.S. had trained and equipped disrupted, however, so he sent a memorandum to Chiang Kai-shek recommending that Chiang's order demobilizing the New Sixth Army be rescinded. Wedemeyer admitted that his memorandum might have caused Chiang to misinterpret his intent. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 189.)

2. Wedemeyer sent a lengthy staff-prepared memorandum on "the feasibility of integrating Chinese Nationalist and Chinese Communist armies." Integration ought to be done, the memorandum concluded, but—given the disparities between the Nationalists and Communists in training, equipment, language, organization, and political beliefs—initially only

at the army group level and not at army or division levels. Integrated army group commands should be divided equally between Nationalists and Communists. Army group commanders would report to the Supreme Field Commander, who would have an integrated staff. The Nationalists had approximately 3,140,000 men in ninety-two armies (thirteen of them armed and trained by the United States) of about three divisions each. The Communist party was thought to have two armies totaling approximately 1,200,000 men in the Field Forces and an unknown number in the Guerrilla Army and the People's Militia. (Ibid., pp. 178–88.)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Radio No. GOLD 46. *Top Secret, Eyes Only*

[January 14?, 1946]

[Chungking, China]

Could monitoring service focus on Yen-an, Kalgan and Peiping?¹ Evaluated ULTRA would help.² MacArthur also queried.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. A week later, Marshall expressed disappointment with the intelligence he was receiving as being of little value and too late to aid him in the daily negotiations. He told Bissell: "What I would appreciate are frequent evaluations of world matters as they effect China, Manchuria in particular." To Army Chief of Staff Eisenhower, he wrote: "I need immediate radio Top Secret code reports if I am to be benefitted in my work in this manner." (Marshall to Bissell [GOLD 93], and Marshall to Eisenhower [GOLD 94], January 22, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages].)

2. Byroade and Shepley arranged to have an ULTRA clerk (or Special Security Officer)—First Lieutenant A. Fairfield Dana, a prewar New York City lawyer—come from MacArthur's Tokyo headquarters to Chungking with his special Sigaba machine that could decrypt and encrypt the high-level code that was used for transmitting intelligence gathered by the United States and Great Britain from reading messages encrypted by machines similar to those used by the Germans and Japanese that had been "broken" by the Allies during World War II.

Dana arrived on February 1 and remained until June 26. During this period, in addition to passing on to Marshall world "diplomatic traffic" regarding China received via ULTRA, Dana conducted an intense effort to read communications between Chou En-lai's headquarters and Mao Tse-tung's headquarters in Yen-an. This effort failed because the Communists may have been using a "one-time pad" for encrypting messages rather than a sophisticated machine system. The U.S. seems to have had better luck with the Nationalists' codes. Marshall was soon made aware of the differences between what Chiang Kai-shek told him and the Generalissimo's instructions to Nationalist commanders in the field. (A. Fairfield Dana, interviewed by Larry I. Bland, September 29, 1983, and Dana to Bland, January 27, 1984, GCMRL/A. F. Dana Papers; James R. Shepley, interviewed by Forrest C. Pogue, July 15, 1957, GCMRL/Pogue Oral History Collection [#173N].)

MEETINGS WITH CHANG CHUN AND CHOU EN-LAI

January 14, 1946 Chungking, China

CHANG Chun, 1:30 P.M.

General Chang reported on the Communists' continued fighting and a consequent exchange of accusatory messages with Chou En-lai. Marshall said that he would pass Chang's information to Executive Headquarters and direct them to send truce teams to investigate. Marshall then signed two agreements: (1) instructions to Executive Headquarters to dispatch representatives to Jehol and Chahar to report on conditions there; (2) recommendations to Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung that a Military Sub-Committee of the Committee of Three be convened immediately in order to develop a plan for reorganizing China's armed forces. These documents were immediately taken to Chou En-lai for his signature, returned to Marshall's house for Chang's signature, and dispatched. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 345–47.)

Chou En-lai, 8:30 P.M.

As Chang had done earlier, Chou opened the meeting with a series of charges of truce violations by the opposition. Marshall said that he would inform Executive Headquarters and take the matters up with government representatives. Marshall told Chou that Chiang Kai-shek had assured him that hostilities would cease and the government would be embarrassed if Nationalist troops did not obey the cease-fire order. Marshall hoped that reports of heavy fighting were exaggerated, but he would "use his every influence to insure that actions in the field are in conformance with the agreements." The reason he had insisted that Executive Headquarters be established as rapidly as possible with sufficient manpower, Marshall said, was so it could smooth over low-level difficulties that were bound to appear.

The Communist party would not interpret the taking of Chihfeng by Nationalist troops as a low-level action, Chou said, and he suggested that Executive Headquarters either send representatives to Chihfeng and Chengteh or observe the actions from the air and drop cease-fire leaflets. After the meeting, Marshall reported Chou's allegations and suggestion to Byroade in Peiping (see the following document) and in a memorandum to General Shang Chen, Chiang Kai-shek's personal chief of staff. (*Ibid.*, pp. 347–49.) ★

TO COLONEL HENRY A. BYROADE AND
WALTER S. ROBERTSON
Radio No. GOLD 49. *Secret*

[January 14, 1946]
[Chungking, China]

For Byroade. Information here, stated as being from reliable source, indicates presence in Chihfeng of approximately 10,000 local peasants, laborers and farmers organized by Chinese Communists into a military force. A certain Japanese by name Tanaka is responsible for training this force. Armament this force is supplied by Soviets including 20,000 rifles, 150 heavy machine guns and 25 field pieces. Same source indicates pres-

ence of Soviet troops in Chihfeng which exercise command over previously referred to local force.

New subject: Ho P'ang-chi commands puppet force at Hsuchowfu. Indications are that Communists are agitating these forces and Central Government is fearful that these forces may be integrated with the forces of the Communists.

New subject: Linch'eng and Tsaochuang 20 miles due east of Linch'eng and location of important coal mine, both towns on Tientsin-Pukow railroad and both in Shantung province are reported as containing Nationalist troops surrounded by Communists. Air drop to these troops is only means of communications, except wireless, since rails and road are blocked by Communists. Central Government is anxious that these blocks be reduced.

These matters are for your information and investigation by your field teams without revealing National Government representatives as source.¹

For Robertson: I have just gotten agreement here for two sides to refrain from press accusations of failure to observe armistice conditions such as occurred yesterday. If possible you three commissioners should reach similar agreement.

New subject: Chang, Chou and I signed today formal instructions to commissioners to send investigating group of three immediately to report on existing conditions Jehol and Chahar in accordance with minutes of meeting last week.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. The information on Communist military activities was provided the previous day by General Chang Chun. (See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 345-46.) Marshall sent GOLD 50 the same day listing the charges Chou En-lai had made about Nationalist attacks in various places.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER January 15, 1946
Radio No. GOLD 52. *Secret* [Chungking, China]

Refer your CFB-20060:¹ I am proposing to Generalissimo immediate issue of public order for demilitarization of a certain number of divisions during next six months, stating rather precisely the schedule. Also indicating that further demilitarization and demobilization will follow.

How many divisions might be nominated for next six months? Rush reply.²

Further reference your 20060: Please give me a concise statement of matter reference Six Army incident and including your general view on demobilization that I can quote to Generalissimo.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. See note 2, Marshall to Wedemeyer, January 13, 1946, pp. 419–20.

2. Wedemeyer replied the next day that he envisioned demobilizing sixty divisions by July 1, sixty more before the end of 1946, and fifty-five additional by July 1, 1947. This would reduce the Chinese National Army to seventy-five divisions, the nucleus of which would be the thirty-nine divisions trained and equipped by the United States. After mid-1947, there would be a “progressive orderly demobilization” of Nationalist and Communist divisions until the Chinese National Army reached five first-line U.S.-style divisions (which were at least twice the size of Chinese divisions), five more in training, and forty reserve divisions. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 190–91.)

MEETING WITH SHANG CHEN

January 16, 1946, 2:00 P.M. Chungking, China

GENERAL Shang noted that the Nationalists were particularly interested in opening three rail lines in North and Northeast China, and Marshall said he would inform Executive Headquarters to take action. Marshall gave the general a memorandum from Chou En-lai describing continuing Nationalist hostilities in various places, suggesting that it would take “peremptory orders on the highest level” to stop the fighting. “General Marshall stated that he had been turning over in his mind the advisability of putting Marines in troubled areas to implement cessation of hostilities.” (NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Political Affairs, Conferences Miscellaneous, vol. 1].) ★

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 60. *Top Secret*

[January 16, 1946]
[Chungking, China]

Dear Mr. President: Since issuance of orders for cessation of hostilities strenuous and immediate efforts have been made to build up Executive Headquarters in Peiping of some 125 officers and 300 men, with radios, planes, jeeps, trucks, etc. to enforce and coordinate execution of order and get started on reconstruction of communications, organization of railroad military guards and evacuation of Japanese. Difficulty of assembling quota of Communist officers has been main stumbling block with poor radio communications to their scattered commanders. Meanwhile commanders on the ground have pushed ahead in many instances to get every advantage of final positions. Severe fighting has resulted. Both sides appeal to me. I think I have the situation in hand now, with improved condition in Peking Executive Headquarters and additional and peremptory instructions I have gotten each side to issue from Chungking. Also I have now gotten agreements to refrain from press comments. The distances are great, the areas tremendous and the communications miserable or com-

pletely lacking. We are using 15 Marine planes today dropping leaflet instructions in all troubled areas. Chinese planes insufficient for this purpose. I hope that by tomorrow peace will really reign over China.

Another subject: For nationalization of all Chinese armies a Committee of Three was tentatively agreed upon last fall but a meeting could not be obtained. My committee for cessation of hostilities signed an urgent recommendation to Generalissimo and Communist leader to convene committee.¹ It will probably meet within the next few days. Generalissimo proposes me as advisor of committee. I think Communist will probably accept me, but I will know shortly. This is the most difficult problem of all and the great fundamental requirement for a peaceful China. I have not repeat not yet disclosed my views on a method to accomplish this objective and will not repeat not until I see how far the two sides can succeed in getting together.

Another subject: For present public negotiations or debates regarding procedure to form a coalition government seem to be proceeding with fair prospect of successful agreement and implementation. I am holding aloof on this so far until an impasse appears to be reached.

There are hundreds of details involved in these matters all delicate and of great importance but details nevertheless. I am trying to treat them and handle them accordingly.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. On the order convening the "Military Sub-Committee," see *Foreign Relations, 1946*, 9: 188-89.

DRAFT STATEMENT

January 18, 1946
[Chungking, China]

GENERAL MARSHALL'S STATEMENT REGARDING THE CHINESE AIR FORCE¹

General Marshall agreed to concur with General Wedemeyers recent proposal for a Chinese air force, provided it was made clear that the proviso that the organization should start with the creation of the carrier groups, drawing on existing personnel for this purpose. That completion of carrier group program should be followed by repairs to damage done combat squadrons of fighter bombers and reconnaissance planes. By that time General Marshall feels that it will be apparent to all from a financial as well as strategical point of view that the maintenance of the medium and heavy bomber units will be inadvisable.²

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Originals); H

1. Brigadier General Russell E. Randall of the Air Force Liaison Mission to China was informed that Marshall's statement was "for reference in case you are queried on this subject by the Generalissimo or other Chinese officials." (Caughey Memorandum for General Randall, January 18, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, Chinese Air Force].) Regarding Marshall's previous ideas on the possible creation of a Chinese Air Force, see Handy to Wedemeyer, September 11, 1945, pp. 300–301.

2. The War Department received Wedemeyer's first plan for creating a Chinese Air Force in August 1945. By late October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had a paper (1330/9) on the subject. In December, Headquarters, Army Air Forces, China Theater sent in a plan, and the J.C.S. requested Wedemeyer's comments on it. (M.S.J. [Colonel Max S. Johnson, chief, Strategy Section, Operations Division] Memorandum for Colonel Roberts, January 9, 1946, Subject: Proposed Chinese Air Force, NA/RG 319 [OPD, ABC 336 China (January 26, 1942)].)

Marshall's statement resulted from Wedemeyer's memorandum to him that was to be the basis of the theater commander's reply to the War Department. Wedemeyer recommended that the War Department approve a program to create four fighter/bomber groups, two troop carrier groups, one medium bomb group, one heavy bomb group, and one photo reconnaissance squadron. Priority was to be given to the troop carrier groups. (Wedemeyer Memorandum to General Marshall, January 9, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Wedemeyer File].) For more on U.S. plans for training and equipping the Chinese Air Force, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 767–86.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER January 18, 1946
Radio No. GOLD 73. *Secret* [Chungking, China]

Reports of continued Communist hostile activity on the part of the Communist New Fourth Army in Shantung continue to reach us. Since Byroade is short on personnel, particularly Communists, and since the area of these particular hostilities is Shantung and Anhwei Provinces, I propose to dispatch a balanced team from Shanghai to Suchow [Hsüchou] in an effort to cause hostilities to cease. I am therefore bringing with me tomorrow to Shanghai one Communist and one Nationalist representative which I hope can depart from Shanghai for Suchow together with an American representative for this purpose as soon as possible.¹

Could you designate an appropriate American representative to accompany this team which will report to General Ku Chu Tung, Commander Suchow Pacification Area and also arrange for appropriate aircraft and weather check? Would like the team to depart Sunday.

General Chou En-lai is sending a message to General Chen Yie [Yi], Commander Communist New Fourth Army, instructing that he designate a representative to report to the commander of the Nationalist Ninety-seventh Army at Lincheng, southern Shantung province, for safe conduct to Suchow to assist in, and expedite, continued negotiations.

General Shang Chen is sending a message to the commander of the Nationalist Ninety-seventh Army and to the commander Suchow Pacification Area regarding the reporting, and safe conduct, of the Communist representative referred to above.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. On Marshall's January 19–21 visit to Shanghai, see Marshall to Truman, January 23, 1946, pp. 427–28.

TO WALTER S. ROBERTSON
Radio No. GOLD 86. *Secret*

January 21, 1946
[Chungking, China]

I am concerned over reaction of American press men in Shanghai over announcement that Executive Headquarters had no authority to act in Manchuria. What was the basis for that announcement. Who do the commissioners assume will act to settle any sporadic or serious fighting or differences between Chinese factions in Manchuria.¹

Do not disclose this statement or questions to other commissioners.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Robertson replied that in response to questions at a January 18 press conference in Peiping, all three commissioners (Robertson, General Cheng Kai-ming [Nationalist], and General Yeh Chien-ying [Communist]) had stated that Manchuria was not included within the scope of Executive Headquarters operations. This was the result of impressions they had all received from conversations in Chungking, Robertson said, and he asked that the situation be clarified. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 372.)

Marshall wrote to Chang Chun and Chou En-lai recommending that Executive Headquarters send a truce team to investigate conflicts around Yingkow, a Manchurian coastal town about half way between Mukden and Port Arthur. Chiang Kai-shek, however, "suggested that we wait until the Soviet troops have withdrawn before a team is dispatched." (The January 24 message to Chang Chun is *ibid.*, pp. 375–76. The quote is from a sentence Marshall edited out of a draft memorandum for Chou En-lai, January 27, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Originals].)

MEETINGS WITH SHANG CHEN AND CHANG CHIH-CHUNG

January 21 and 23, 1946 Chungking, China

SHANG Chen, January 21, 10:00 A.M.

Chiang Kai-shek had sent General Shang, his personal chief of staff, to tell Marshall the Generalissimo's views on the current political situation and to ask Marshall to visit him the following evening to discuss developments at the Political Consultative Conference. (There are no minutes of such a meeting in the mission files.) Marshall indicated that he was still awaiting notice from the Military Sub-Committee

regarding his future role. He also ascertained from General Shang that the Soviets in Manchuria were participating in hostilities against Nationalist forces there. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 138.)

Chang Chih-chung, January 23, 10:00 A.M.

A close friend of Chiang Kai-shek and on good terms with Chou En-lai, General Chang had recently been designated, along with Chang Chun, government representative on the Military Sub-Committee. Chang began the meeting with some background on his relations with Chou En-lai since 1924, the Communists' military demands on the government at four political conferences since 1937, and the development of the Chinese National Army since 1937. Marshall asked about the government's military demobilization program and sought to clarify General Wedemeyer's recommendations on the subject. (See Marshall to Wedemeyer, January 13, 1946, pp. 419–20.) The four key problems to be solved during the military reorganization, Marshall said, were to: (1) organize a "real" National Army under the national government; (2) develop some means whereby the Communists could give up their separate military power; (3) create a military establishment sufficient for internal and external security without bankrupting the country; and (4) establish the army as the servant of the government not the instrument of any political leader. (*Ibid.*, pp. 194–96.) ★

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 98. *Top Secret*

January 23, 1946
[Chungking, China]

Dear Mr. President: The following are the developments since my last message dated January 16: My time was largely consumed last week in furthering special actions to suppress fighting in isolated regions, which finally culminated in my taking in my plane with me National and Communist officers to Shanghai, securing and instructing American officers there to head two field teams or groups, procuring radio equipment and operating personnel, also planes, and starting these two teams off last Sunday one due north to Suchow [Hsüchou] and one north of Hankow to Kwangshan. The Peking headquarters was unable to reach these two trouble spots due to bad weather and great distance. Reports now indicate that the general situation is getting well under control, and that the three commissioners in Peking headed by our man Robertson are working in commendable harmony and sufficient three man teams have been organized and gotten into the field. Bad weather at first hampered all movements, assembly of staff and dispatch of teams.

My short time in Shanghai Saturday evening to Monday morning was also devoted to numerous demobilization and reorganizational details with General Wedemeyer; also agreements with Admiral Cooke commanding Seventh Fleet involved in handling Chinese troops to Manchuria and

repatriating Japanese.¹ I went over UNRRA situation with Kizer² and heard views of leading American business men in Shanghai.

Another subject: Here in Chungking I have moved quietly and very carefully since completion of "cease firing" mediation meetings to avoid criticism of barging into position of dictating. Formal request for me to act as advisor in three man group to determine on the nationalization of Chinese military forces had not been forthcoming, though the Generalissimo in writing had expressed such a desire to the Chinese two members of the original mediation group.³ Chou En-lai, Communist, had indicated his willingness to accept my services but had not addressed me formally. Today the Government member sent me a formal request for my services and I am told that the Communist member had been prodded to do the same.⁴ Meanwhile the Government member of the Military Nationalization Committee called on me and stated the case from the Government side and I have provided him with a lengthy written presentation of my draft of the necessary instructions to be promulgated by the Government after agreement by the two sides. He will discuss this with me tomorrow and he hopes to bring about a meeting with General Chou, the Communist, and me the following day.

On my return from Shanghai the Generalissimo sent me that evening, Monday, a representative to convey his view of the situation regarding agreements to be reached, political as well as military,⁵ and requested me to see him Tuesday at 11 AM. I did so. He first discussed the procedure regarding the nationalization of the army which I have outlined above: He favored delaying meetings until completion of political discussions but accepted my suggestion that there should be no repeat no delay.

He then turned to the political situation, the progress of the work of the Political Consultative Conference now in session which is to reach agreements on the formation of a coalition government and the question of representatives to the Constitutional Convention on May 5. This conference was to have terminated its session today but he stated its committees had failed to reach agreements regarding very important points. He asked me if I would be willing to see the Communists and endeavor to persuade them to make the necessary concessions. I replied that informally I would be quite willing to do my best to bring about a solution, but that I myself was completely confused by the debates and that no one had as yet produced a definite program or proposed action in writing; that I must be better informed before taking any personal action, both regarding the Government's proposals and the Communist proposals and by proposals I did not mean speeches. I meant written documents. In anticipation of some such situation, since the debates and exchanges of written stipulations or generalities seem to have made little head way in settling the "cease firing" problem in the past, and in the present struggles, I had prepared an extremely

brief act to be promulgated by the Government, setting up an interim coalition government reposing in the Generalissimo power of control as President of all China rather than as at present as head of the Kuomintang Party, over the non-Communist held portion of China, and including a brief Bill of Rights and a provision for the drafting of a constitution for submission to the Convention in May.⁶ This provided a definite basis for discussion and incidentally furnished at least one example of specifically how to go about the establishment of an interim coalition government preliminary to the formation of a constitutional government. The Generalissimo studied my paper over night and discussed it with me for two hours this afternoon. Part he did not understand but does now. Part he thought it dangerous to concede to the Communists, etc., etc. The bulk of the document he agreed with. It did not change the governmental structure except on the highest level, but did set up a Bill of Rights. I characterized it as a dose of American medicine, to his amusement. Incidentally, he is much concerned to have the fact of my having submitted such a plan kept now and for the future completely secret. Therefore, please destroy the record of this radio, for a leak in the press would be disastrous to my mission.

The Generalissimo gave me several lengthy Government proposals to study and I am to meet him again tomorrow to see just what definite proposals he will actually make to the Communists and to what degree I would be willing informally to press them to accept. I have decided that even if I am formally requested, as has now been intimated in the China press, to act as a mediator in the political struggle regarding the formation of a coalition government, I will decline to accept. But I will personally or unofficially do my best to secure the necessary concessions by both sides in order to reach an agreement.

I have told the Generalissimo that two factors in my opinion make it imperative for him to find an agreement with the Communists for a unified government and army at an early date. First, that in the present situation China is very vulnerable to low level Russian infiltration methods to the strengthening of the Communist regime and the progressive weakening of the National Government's position in Northwest China and Manchuria reference Russia, and secondly, that it is apparent that United States military and naval forces can not be continued for long in China. He is much disturbed by Russian actions the past week involving sporadic firing on Chinese troops, failure to evacuate localities and in some instances increasing local garrisons and heavy pressure to secure Chinese agreement to Russian joint participation in the operation of certain heavy industries.⁷

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Vice Admiral Charles M. Cooke, Jr., had spent most of World War II as navy assistant chief of staff for plans. In December 1945 he was assigned to command Seventh Fleet, which included East Asian waters under its purview.

2. Benjamin H. Kizer, a sixty-eight-year-old lawyer from Spokane, Washington, had been director of the China Office of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration since October 1944. The U.N.R.R.A. was providing civilian relief, mainly in areas formerly occupied by the Japanese.

3. Chiang Kai-shek Memorandum for Marshall, January 16, 1946, *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 191.

4. Chang Chun to Marshall, January 22, 1946, and Chou En-lai to Marshall, January 23, 1946, *ibid.*, pp. 192, 193–94.

5. See Minutes of Meeting between General Marshall and General Shang Chen, January 21, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 138, and summary above, pp. 426–27.

6. See Charter for the Interim Government of the Republic of China, *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 139–41.

7. Under Secretary of State Acheson told the president: “After reading General Marshall’s very fine telegram . . . I am prompted to suggest that you may wish to send him a brief telegram expressing your approval of the General’s work.” President Truman presumably used Acheson’s draft as the basis of his message to Marshall, which said, in part: “I wish to tell you that my confidence in your judgment and ability is again being amply justified by the manner in which you are handling this mission.” (Acheson Memorandum for the President, January 25, 1946, HSTL/H. S. Truman Papers [Official File 840]; Truman to Marshall, January 25, 1946, *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 380.)

MEETINGS WITH CHANG CHUN AND CHANG CHIH-CHUNG January 24–25, 1946 Chungking, China

CHANG Chun, January 24, 11:00 A.M.

General Chang briefed Marshall on the current situation around Chihfeng. The Nationalists favored sending a truce team to investigate; a telephone message from Chou En-lai, however, requested that Executive Headquarters take no action. Marshall showed Chang his proposal to send a truce team to Yingkow. (See note 1, Marshall to Robertson, January 21, 1946, p. 426.)

The Political Consultative Conference was not making satisfactory progress, General Chang noted, but it had organized five subcommittees to work on various problems. He commented on the military-related programs various political groups had proposed. After hearing Chang’s exposition, Marshall concluded that three months did not appear to be a realistic time to plan and execute a military reorganization. He repeated for Chang what he had told General Chang Chih-chung the previous day regarding his general concepts on reorganization. (See p. 427.) Change would of necessity be gradual, Marshall said. Because of Communist fears, the first six months of reorganization would be the most difficult. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 374–75, 196–98.)

Chang Chih-chung, January 25, 11:00 A.M.

Having previously received from Marshall a draft military reorganization plan, Chang discussed various elements of it. He was particularly concerned with the proposed 2:1 Nationalist-Communist ratio of divisions, which he said was beyond previous Communist demands of 6:1, and with the idea of giving the Communists a role in regions where they were presently weak. Chang agreed with certain parts of the draft proposal and questioned the advisability of others. (Numerous draft plans are in

NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, Demobilization]. A version from mid-February is in *Foreign Relations, 1946*, 9: 215–19.) Marshall stated that he would have a new draft prepared for review. (Ibid., pp. 199–201.)

Chang Chun, January 25, 3:00 P.M.

General Chang informed Marshall of the state of negotiations in the Political Consultative Conference's various subcommittees. Some progress was being made toward drafting a new constitution, he noted. (Ibid., pp. 144–46.) ★

TO BRIGADIER GENERAL HENRY A. BYROADE¹
Radio No. GOLD 111. *Confidential*

January 26, 1946
[Chungking, China]

Are you giving our United States officers with teams any expense money? I think they should be amply provided for and if your CN equivalent of [\$]4,000 gold is not sufficient let me know and I will secure additional allotment.² Further, if answer to first sentence above is in the negative then notify officers by radio of amount being allotted so that they can proceed to substitute personal funds accordingly.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. A War Department order of February 1 promoted Byroade to brigadier general effective January 17.

2. Marshall told Wedemeyer that he had "discovered that Executive Headquarters US leaders of teams in the field had no expense money." Byroade replied to GOLD 111 that he had disbursed to each of the American truce team leaders the equivalent in Chinese National Government dollars [CN\$] of U.S.\$133 and that this had used up three-fourths of his fund reserves. Marshall asked Wedemeyer to send Byroade "immediately CN equivalent of [U.S.\$]6,000 gold." (Marshall to Wedemeyer, Radio No. GOLD 125, January 30, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages].) The open market CN\$:U.S.\$ exchange rate in Shanghai at this time was above 1400:1; see *Foreign Relations, 1946*, 10: 928–29.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN E. HULL
Radio No. GOLD 112. *Secret*

January 27, 1946
[Chungking, China]

Wedemeyer is pressing War Department for communication personnel.¹ This is of first importance to effective functioning of Peking Executive Headquarters over critical areas. We have within past 36 hours doubled the number of Chinese and American officers to provide the balanced teams urgently required in the field. Without signal communications the teams are more or less impotent. Later I hope I can work this same headquarters into control position overseeing reorganization and

nationalization of Chinese military forces, regular and Communist. Help Wedemeyer all and as fast as you can.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Wedemeyer had written to Marshall: "We are trying to anticipate your requirements in connection with the Executive Headquarters. At present we are very short of communications personnel and have sent radios screaming to the States. It would be helpful if you could mention the urgency and importance of signal communications personnel in the Theater at this crucial time and request favorable consideration on China Theater requests." (Wedemeyer to Marshall, January 24, 1946, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [China Mission, General].)

TO WALTER S. ROBERTSON
Radio No. GOLD 121. *Top Secret*

January 29, 1946
[Chungking, China]

I have had several difficult and lengthy interviews with Generalissimo reference Chihfeng situation and probable procedures of team and commissioners in handling the matter. He assures me that National troops will not be sent into Chihfeng by his direct orders. Your DOVE 109 leaves us in confusion as to why your team did not attempt to contact the plane of 26th with radio equipment. Was there an interpreter with plane?

The situation in Chihfeng is so serious in its possibility of establishing unfortunate precedents as well as possibly disrupting the armistice that Colonel Tourtillott in my opinion should be given the prestige of the presence of immediate United States assistance of rank. Possibly Byroade should go if he can get back without too much of delay. The issue there is critical in its effect everywhere and must be handled accordingly.¹

Another subject: I noted today your report of January 27 to State Department.² Please do not make any reports to Washington reference the work, situation or your duties in Executive Headquarters. I am carefully refraining from giving Washington such details to avoid destructive leaks in the press. Besides, this business of Executive Headquarters is an establishment under Committee of Three and not under the Embassy. Your channel is to me direct and probably for my eye only.³ Press releases are matter for unanimous agreement of commissioners and are not referred to in foregoing.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. On January 27, Marshall responded (GOLD 115) to a message from Robertson (DOVE 96) regarding the situation around Chihfeng and observed that the report by the head of Truce Team 2, Colonel Raymond R. Tourtillott, "sounds somewhat hysterical." Message DOVE 109 from Peiping in response to GOLD 115 "was inadequate in that it did not give full story concerning plane carrying radio supplies [for the Truce Team] which had to return without making delivery." This problem was solved the following day, and Tourtillott reported on January 30: "Situation now satisfactory. No immediate danger of con-

flict now seen.” Robertson thus thought that Brigadier General Byroade should not be sent to Chihfeng. (Marshall to Robertson, January 27, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages]; Robertson to Marshall, January 30, 1946, *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 389–91.)

2. Marshall is probably referring to two reports Robertson made on January 25; see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 377–80, 391.

3. Marshall followed this with instructions to Byroade to cease submitting Truce Team Summary Reports (Trusums) to Washington and to mark copies going to China Theater headquarters as being only for Wedemeyer and his immediate staff. All consular officials were informed that their political reports were not to go directly to the State Department but were to be routed through the embassy in Chungking. (Marshall to Robertson, Radio No. GOLD 131, January 31, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages].) For more on this issue, see his comments to the War Department in Marshall to Bissell, January 31, 1946, p. 435. Marshall informed the State Department of his actions on February 5. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 394.)

TO SALLY G. CHAMBERLIN

January 29, 1946
Chungking, China

Dear Sally: I am inclosing the autographed cards you request.

I wrote you a longhand note the other day and I can't think of anything else that has come up since then that I have to say to you, except possibly in regard to the Leesburg house and Powder. Is he in Washington still? Has he checked up on the condition of the house? Is there any later information about the delivery of the car?¹

Katherine tells me she is working on her data and I am going to suggest to her that she get a stenographer of some sort in Pinehurst to turn out for her triple-spaced material, and then after reworking that possibly send that up to you for retyping and a little checking. You may hear from her in regard to this.²

Harriman and his party have been here since Sunday afternoon and are leaving in the morning. We are staying down in the country at the Generalissimo's place, though I have had to come up to town each day because of my governmental conferences.³ Faithfully yours,

G. C. M.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. The editors have not found Marshall's longhand note to the woman who ran his office in the War Department and handled many of his and Mrs. Marshall's personal and business affairs. Chamberlin replied that Sergeant James W. Powder, now retired from the army, had checked the Marshalls' Leesburg, Virginia, house before setting off for Florida. She also reported that the steel strike continued to delay delivery of the Marshalls' new Oldsmobile. (Chamberlin to Marshall, February 1, 1946, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [China Mission, General].)

2. As her husband had frequently made clear his disinterest in writing a memoir or cooperating with a biography of himself, Mrs. Marshall concluded, after her husband departed for his China mission, "that I could perform neither a greater service nor pass the

long months more interestingly than by putting into an informal narrative the material I had collected since our marriage in 1930." (K. T. Marshall, *Together*, Foreword.) She thus began dictating a rough draft into a recording machine at their winter cottage in Pinehurst, North Carolina. General Marshall thought that his wife was merely annotating and updating her scrapbooks and did not yet know that she was working on a publishable memoir.

3. W. Averell Harriman, U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union since October 1943, was going to Washington, D.C., to report to President Truman and to resign his post. He left Moscow on January 24, 1946, and flew through the Persian Gulf, India, and the wartime "Hump" route into southern China, arriving in Chungking on Sunday, January 27. While there, he talked with Chiang Kai-shek about Sino-Soviet relations in Manchuria, particularly economic problems. Harriman's messages to the State Department regarding the meetings are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1946*, 10: 1100-1104. Regarding the China visit and his view of Marshall's mission, see W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, *Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946* (New York: Random House, 1975), pp. 537-42.

TO MRS. HARRY L. HOPKINS
Radio No. WCL-42543

January 30, 1946
[Chungking, China]

General Marshall asks that the following message be forwarded to you:¹

"Dear Louise: You have had a great sorrow and I have lost a great friend for whom I had a deep affection and the utmost admiration.² He was a heroic and unique figure of the war. He rendered a service to his country which will never even vaguely be appreciated.

"I deplore the fact that I did not see him before I left home. I shall never forget him or the great services he rendered. Signed George Marshall."

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Marshall's original message had been sent (in the clear but marked "Above all Else") to the Office of the Chief of Staff for retransmittal by the War Department.

2. Hopkins died in a New York City hospital on January 29 at age fifty-five. Marshall released the following statement to the press. "I am greatly distressed by the news of the death of Harry Hopkins. I had a warm affection for him as a friend and as a strong support in critical moments of the war. To me he was one of the most courageous and self-sacrificing figures of the war, the least appreciated and the most misunderstood." (GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [China Mission, General].)

MEETING WITH CHANG CHIH-CHUNG
January 31, 1946, 2:00 P.M. Chungking, China

GENERAL Chang explained the changes that Chiang Kai-shek desired in the draft military reorganization plan that Marshall had proposed. Chiang thought that the number of divisions allowed to the Communists should be changed back to twenty from fifteen "in order to avoid embarrassment to General Marshall"; the government

could then propose fifteen, and, if the Communists objected, compromise. Marshall said that the Communists had already indicated that they would accept a 6:1 ratio of Nationalist to Communist divisions (e.g., 90:15).

Generalissimo Chiang also objected to having nine government armies in Manchuria, and Marshall and Chang agreed that the American proposal would show five. (A Chinese government “army” was approximately the equivalent of an American corps—i.e., three divisions plus support and certain nondivisional units. A Chinese division was nominally fourteen thousand men.) Marshall also suggested that Chang see the Generalissimo about sending a Chinese force to Japan for occupation duty. The Generalissimo had some suggestions regarding the wording in some of the proposal’s sections. Marshall ended the discussion by pointing out the difference between the Western and Eastern civil-military traditions and urged the Chinese government “to accept the Western ideas in order to develop a nationalized, non-political armed force.” (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 201–2.) ★

TO MAJOR GENERAL CLAYTON L. BISSELL
Radio No. GOLD 132. *Secret*

January 31, 1946
[Chungking, China]

Reference your secret review of Far East 14 January page six in regarding truce negotiations appears statement regarding concessions obtained by Communists.¹ I would prefer that such deductions be excluded from published resumes, however secret, during the progress of my negotiations. Their purpose would presumably be to assist me or advise the President and Secretary of State but I am the accurate source of information in these particular instances and I am the one to inform the Washington authorities to such extent as I think it safe to do so at the time having in mind the frequent leaks and the disastrous effect they might make here on the delicate business in which I am engaged.² I suppose the review statement was based on press reports, but it is necessarily given the impress of a War Department conclusion when appearing in the review.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Marshall presumed that Bissell was still assistant chief of staff for intelligence, but he had left that office effective January 25.

2. For Marshall’s other attempts to contain political reporting from China, see Marshall to Robertson, January 29, 1946, pp. 432–33.

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 133. *Top Secret*

January 31, 1946
[Chungking, China]

Dear Mister President: I greatly appreciated the generous expressions of approval and confidence in your radio of January 25, White House

405.¹ As yet I have not found an appropriate occasion to take advantage of your permission to quote its contents to Generalissimo and Communist leader.

Since my last radio of January 23, I have been formally invited by both parties to act as advisor on reorganization of armies of China. The Communist member of committee is General Chou [En-lai], pronounced Joe, who is also their leader in all political debates and agreements. He has been so busy with latter duties that he could not meet on army problems. But I proceeded to draft a complete reorganization of Chinese military forces with prohibitions and stipulations familiar to our democratic system, adapted to China and to the menace of Chinese war lords and the uncertainties of provincial officials. After several meetings with National Government committee member and with Generalissimo I got agreement on plan and approval of procedure to be followed in negotiation with General Chou.

Meanwhile I have had long discussions with Generalissimo on political program and his views on good faith of Communist leaders. This last I will leave to Harriman to report on orally as he heard enough to understand the situation.² General Chou flew to Yen-an to get approval of party for his proposed commitments. He was to return Monday but weather delayed him until yesterday, Wednesday evening late. He telephoned at 7:30 this morning to see me at 9. There follows a report of that interview.

General Chou stated that the Communist Central Executive Committee confirmed his negotiations in PCC; that they believed the broadening of the government could well have gone farther but that they were generally satisfied with the agreements because they opened the door to the democratization of China. He stated Mao Tse-tung had instructed him to inform the Generalissimo personally that the Communist party was now prepared to cooperate in his government both during the interim period and under the constitution. Chou also said that the Communist party believed in principle in socialism but for the present they regarded socialism as an impractical system for China under present conditions and that they therefore subscribed to the introduction of a political system patterned after the United States; that by this he meant that prosperity and peace of China could only be promoted by the introduction of the American political system, science, and industrialization, and of agrarian reform in a program of free individual enterprise. He stated that Mao had directed him to inform me that the Communist party was satisfied with the fairness of my attitude and that they were ready to cooperate with the purposes of the U.S. government. (Whether or not he was implying that his party would cooperate with us rather than with Russia was differently interpreted by my staff who listened to the conference. Chou did say, referring to a rumor that Mao was planning to go to Moscow, that at the

mention of this Mao laughed and said he had no such intention and on the contrary would like very much to go to the U.S. where he believed he would be able to learn much.)³

General Chou continued, that in view of the agreement of the PCC regarding the reorganization of government which gave the minority parties sufficient voice to block certain possible governmental actions, Chou wished to inform me that the Communist party would not use this power to obstruct any measure of the government which would be within the intent of the PCC agreements. He stated that they were much pleased regarding the cessation of hostilities procedure.

General Chou informed me that it had finally been agreed that the PCC would adopt resolutions implementing the agreements regarding reorganization of the government, nationalization of the army, and the drafting and adoption of the constitution. The meeting, which a government representative has just informed me may complete the work will convene in ten minutes. In general, it has been agreed that the organic law of the [re]public will be amended to abolish the Supreme National Defense Council and to clothe the Council of State with what amounts to full legislative powers. In this reorganization the Government will no longer be responsible to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. The Council of State will have a membership of 40 of which 20 will be Kuomintang, 14 Nationalist [*Communist*] and Democratic League, and 6 members of the Youth Party and non-partisans. A definite parliamentary procedure is provided for. In general, it follows the voting pattern of the United Nations Assembly. Bills may be introduced either by the President or on the motion of any three members of the Council. Nominations to the Council by the several political parties must be sanctioned by the President, and if he disapproves a name, a new nomination must be made. Nominations to the Council of no party affiliation are to be made by the President and approved by the Council.

The President's veto may be over ridden by a 3/5ths majority. A reorganization of the Government also provides for a reorganization of the Executive Yuan in which the heads of the 14 ministries and members of the Executive Yuan will be known as Ministries of State and there will be additional members without portfolio. It will be a coalition cabinet with minority party representation in the ministries. Appointments to the Yuans must be confirmed by the Council of State as must the exercise of the emergency powers retained by the President.

A "common program" is to be adopted as an interim charter for the reorganized government guaranteeing civil rights and pledging the government to a constitutional, elective democracy.

The new draft constitution is to be written by a special commission of the Political Consultative Council. It will be composed of 25 members

representing all parties and non-partisans and 10 drafting experts. The committee will submit a new draft of the constitution to the National Assembly, whose membership will be broadened to give minority representation.

The agreement regarding nationalization of the army provides for the integration of the present National Military Council and the present War Ministry in a new Ministry of National Defense in the Executive Yuan, and calls for demobilization, complete separation of the military from the political and civil into a truly national army and the integration of the National and Communist armies. The details are to be worked out by the Military Sub-Committee, which I have been asked to advise, and have accepted.

After General Chou's departure the government military representative saw me for a final conference on army nationalization.⁴ The last hesitations of the Generalissimo were ironed out and the following procedure agreed upon: I had told General Chou that the government had informed me of the general terms of their proposals and that I had my own views. He plans to talk this over with me tomorrow if PCC conference duties permit. Then I will resumé his agreements, objections and proposals to the government representative and see to what extent my plan should be modified. Then a formal meeting will be arranged for and the two Chinese members will exchange views. After this first meeting I will make such modifications in my plan as seem to be indicated and will then send it to the Government and the Communist representatives on the committee prior to the second meeting. The negotiations will then be on in full force, but with my written text as the firm basis for discussions. I will of course advise you as soon as the outcome is evident. This issue is the most difficult and critical of all, therefore the foregoing detailed exposition of planned procedure.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. See note 7, Marshall to Truman, January 23, 1946, p. 430.

2. See note 3, Marshall to Chamberlin, January 25, 1946, p. 434.

3. The minutes of Chou En-lai's meeting with Marshall at 10:00 A.M. record Chou as stating that: "Chairman Mao was satisfied with the cease firing arrangements and that the PCC opens the door 'narrowly' to peace; that General Marshall's attitude and method of fair dealing renders him [Mao] willing to cooperate with the United States externally as well as locally and that Chinese democracy should closely follow the American way; that the long range objective is socialism for China but that the conditions do not now exist for socialism; that American democracy for China should also include development of American science, agricultural reform, industrial revolution, and free enterprise in order to create a strong China; that Chairman Mao laughed heartily over the rumor of his trip to Russia and stated that he would rather go to U.S." (Minutes of Meeting between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai, January 31, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Political Affairs, Conferences Miscellaneous, vol. 1].) A Chinese summary of this conference is

in *Zhou Enlai 1946 nian tanpan wenxuan*, pp. 92–93. In addition, see Marshall's message enclosing a translation of Chou's initial remarks and a letter from Chairman Mao in *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 151–52.

4. See Meeting with Chang Chih-chung, January 31, 1946, pp. 434–35.

MEETINGS WITH CHOU EN-LAI
February 1 and 4, 1946 Chungking, China

FEBRUARY 1, 2:00 P.M.

Marshall explained his ideas on Chinese military reorganization, beginning with a lecture on the Anglo-American tradition in civil-military affairs since the early 1600s and emphasizing that army commanders should not hold political positions. There needed to be checks on commanders' power, he said. For example, the heads of the eight service areas into which China would be divided under Marshall's plan would wield great economic power; therefore, personnel in these commands should serve for a limited time and the officers should be prohibited from commanding troops, controlling military conscription, or holding civil offices.

China's peacetime army should consist of a number of three-division "armies" whose commanders would report directly to the Ministry of War. Some armies would contain two Nationalist and one Communist divisions under a Nationalist commander; some armies—mainly in North China and Manchuria—would consist of two Communist and one Nationalist divisions under a Communist commander. Marshall hoped that after the cessation of hostilities in China, a highly trained, well-equipped, politically integrated Chinese army might participate in the occupation of Japan. Two big problems in reorganizing China's armed forces, Marshall thought, were demobilizing and reequipping troops. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 202–4.)

February 4, 3:00 P.M.

The Political Consultative Conference had adopted a resolution calling for a two-stage reorganization (see the resolution's section IV—"Practical methods for the reorganization of the army"—in *China White Paper*, pp. 618–19). General Chou stated: first, reorganization into ninety Nationalist and twenty Communist divisions; second, reduction in six months of the entire army to fifty or sixty divisions. Marshall was dubious about two points: (1) quick demobilization and reorganization (at least a year was needed to "permit a business-like development"); (2) postponing political integration until the second stage. Chou En-lai agreed with Marshall that "demobilization and integration should be worked out together." Marshall believed that the Military Sub-Committee should: (1) reach agreement on a general plan for moving, deactivating, and integrating divisions and get it approved by Generalissimo Chiang and Chairman Mao; (2) establish an agency (e.g., Executive Headquarters) to carry out the plan; (3) work out agreed-upon specific details for implementation by Executive Headquarters. National government military regions, provincial headquarters, and "pacification" headquarters would be abolished. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 204–6.) ★

TO W. AVERELL HARRIMAN¹
Radio No. GOLD 144. *Top Secret*

February 4, 1946
[Chungking, China]

Dear Harriman: Most confidentially, since our late evening talk with G[eneralissimo Chiang Kai-shek] and his frank statement of feelings he seems to have gained considerably in confidence of good faith of other parties as a result of events, meetings and discussions of past few days. I think he is headed into implementation without too serious reservations and if I am successful in formal negotiations starting tomorrow Monday most doubts will be cleared away. This is for you only and merely to guide you in your reports of conversations out here.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Marshall instructed the War Department to deliver this message to Harriman "immediately on his landing in Washington and certainly before he sees the President or Sec-State."

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER
Radio No. GOLD 147. *Secret*

February 4, 1946
[Chungking, China]

Negotiation for demobilization, integration and reorganization of Chinese armies are taking shape to the point where the preparation of detailed plans and schedules should be gotten underway immediately on a tentative basis.

I therefore wish to assemble the group of three or four officers as quickly as possible here at Chungking. Perhaps some of the officers with the Chungking Liaison Group would be excellent for this purpose. If, in addition, you could spare him for a brief period Caraway would be a strong man to organize the work of the new section and get them started on their planning, that is if Maddocks has returned.¹ I wish to have the officers doing this, at least a portion of them, transferred as soon as their detailed plan is agreed upon by the two parties, to the Executive Headquarters at Pekin[g] to form a new or additional section, say G-5, to that staff to do the staff work required for direction in the field of the supervision of demobilization-reorganization procedure.² The Executive Headquarters is to be charged with this duty I feel rather sure.

Please let me have your reaction.³

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Brigadier General Paul W. Caraway (U.S.M.A., 1929) had been a member of the China Theater staff since late 1944. At this time, he was concurrently serving as deputy chief of staff, Headquarters, U.S. Forces, China Theater, and commanding general, U.S. Army Liaison Group, Chungking. Major General Ray T. Maddocks, who had had various assignments in the Far East since late 1943, was chief of staff, U.S. Forces, China Theater.

2. The “G” designations, used by the U.S. Army General Staff for certain functional subdivisions, were not used at Executive Headquarters. On May 20, the tripartite Army Reorganization Section (later Group) was formally activated at Executive Headquarters to implement the February 25 agreement on Chinese military integration and reorganization.

3. Wedemeyer replied by offering the names of three colonels who would be available “immediately” because the military staff in Chungking was to be reduced. Wedemeyer thought that Caraway could help Marshall, but also “serve as my direct liaison and representative with the Generalissimo.” (Wedemeyer to Marshall, February 8, 1946, NA/RG 332 [Headquarters U.S. Forces China Theater, Wedemeyer Subject Files, Radio File].) Marshall asked Wedemeyer to “expedite” the officers’ assignments. “I am getting days behind on the work of this group and it is urgently important.” (Marshall to Wedemeyer, Radio No. GOLD 193, February 14?, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Originals].)

DRAFT STATEMENT

[February 4?, 1946]
[Chungking, China]

Statement on Surplus Property, Lend-Lease, etc.¹

There are many items pending between China and the United States for which a financial settlement must be arranged sooner or later. The U.S. owes China for CN dollar advances to the U.S. Army and Navy in 1945 and presumably 1946. This is an item on the debit side.² There are many more items on the credit side of the U.S. ledger.

Details are not the important considerations at the present time. But there is one general principle which I think must be establish[ed] as quickly as possible. This principle is that the Chinese Government should immediately agree to offset Chinese financial obligations on account of lend-lease and the purchase of surplus property against U.S. Army and Navy financial obligations to China, and thus permit the rapid transfer to China of vitally need materiel before it is otherwise disposed of.³

I don’t know what the total of China’s obligations to us and of our obligations to China will come to. No one knows at present. But we can be reasonably sure that China’s obligations to the U.S. will far exceed our obligations to China. It would therefore appear to the American public and the Congress highly unreasonable to expect the U.S. to make a settlement in which it would end up by paying China cash for our smaller debt to you and settling your much larger debt to us on credit. Such a procedure would be politically impossible for President Truman to carry out.

On the other hand there is everything to be said in favor of the offsetting principle. It is sound common sense and accords with normal financial practice. What is more, I am certain that it accords with China’s self-interest.

She would more speedily acquire a large amount of vitally needed supplies from our stocks of surplus property, transfer of which is being held up by higgling over the terms of payment. I particularly have in mind the Calcutta trucks and the dockyard equipment, both of which China urgently needs.⁴ And soon we will have to deal with the ships, machines, electrical equipment, etc., which China may wish to acquire from our Pacific surplus property stockpile.

It would facilitate the cleaning up of the lend-lease slate. I am told that it would help, not harm, China's foreign exchange position. For China would have to pay out much less cash and would be able to get better terms of payment with the acceptance of this principle in the overall settlement than if there were protracted negotiations in which each single item were treated separately and independently. And China would most probably end up by having more real wealth in the form of road and river transportation, machinery, etc., to show for it.

The principle is no less desirable from the U.S. point of view. Without it the President could not defend any financial settlement with China to the Congress and the people. People in the United States and consequently the members of Congress are now aggressively economy-minded in complete contrast to their attitude throughout the war. They would ask many searching and embarrassing questions.

They would demand to know why we should be paying *cash* to China for goods and services received during the war of the very same kind that were rendered to us everywhere else among the allies as reciprocal aid when we were selling large lots of valuable material to China *after* the war on very long term credits. They would also ask what we had done about all the lend-lease we had given and were giving to China.

I seriously doubt whether we could put such a deal over. I know that it would place Mr. Truman in a most embarrassing political position, though his real desire is to lend assistance to China in every way possible. He wants to proceed on a generous basis and to do this he must not be exposed to the inevitable and bitter repercussions and political recriminations that would follow the policy now insisted upon by China.

But suppose for the sake of argument that we could proceed in that manner. The net result would be that it would seriously prejudice China's economic and political prestige in the United States. It would make the American people that much less willing to help China in the future. And it would make it just that much harder for the American Government to lend China the help it genuinely desires to give.

Therefore, it seems clear to me, that from every point of view, whether of China's short or long-range economic interest, as well as of the broad considerations of future Sino-American relations, China has everything

to gain by accepting the principle of offsets to the Chinese financial obligations referred to.

The surplus property administrators are pressing for action to clear up their responsibilities and unless action is promptly taken, rather than long drawn out negotiations, the material desired and so badly needed by China will go elsewhere.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Originals)

1. The copy-text for this document is a typed, triple-spaced, edited draft. The editors have neither found a final version nor ascertained that Marshall ever gave this statement to anyone. Documents on U.S.-China financial arrangements between the end of the war and early February 1946 are in *Foreign Relations, 1945*, 7: 1125–1205, and *Foreign Relations, 1946*, 10: 911–34.

2. On February 13, Marshall asked the Treasury Department for an “extremely tentative and absolutely secret” estimate of the total amount needed to settle U.S. Army and Navy debts in China. Treasury replied on the twentieth that the amount was in the range of \$125,000,000 to \$150,000,000. (*Foreign Relations, 1946*, 10: 938, 947.)

3. As early as mid-August 1945, then-Ambassador Patrick Hurley reported, with “great reluctance,” his disappointment with Chinese government financial expert T. V. Soong’s demanding attitude concerning U.S.-China financial negotiations. In mid-October, the United States proposed that an agreement be reached with China on “offsets”—crediting the sale price of surplus U.S. property in China (i.e., mainly lend-lease supplies not yet signed over to China) against the money advanced by the Chinese government to cover U.S. Army expenses in that country. By November 28, when Marshall’s mission was beginning, U.S. negotiators were complaining that the value that Soong placed on the surplus U.S. property was too low. In mid-December, Marshall had all negotiations between the U.S. and China put on hold in order that they not compromise his own mission or that they serve as potential bargaining chips. (*Foreign Relations, 1945*, 7: 1125–28, 1168–69, 1177–78, 1183, 1187, 1193.)

In a lengthy message dated January 17, the State Department told Marshall that the U.S. “wishes to inaugurate discussion with the Chinese leading to settlement” of the various outstanding financial matters, although the timing was left to Marshall. He replied on the twenty-fifth that “it appears better not to institute negotiations at present,” and asked if the department thought such an over-all settlement should “await initiation of discussions on further loans to China.” It was clear, Marshall thought, “that Soong is doing his best to avoid acceptance of the offsetting principle.” The State Department told Marshall on February 4 that it did not believe that the settlement of surplus property, lend-lease, and other such matters “should await initiation of negotiations for further credits.” (*Foreign Relations, 1946*, 10: 912–19, 924–26, 933–34.)

4. When the war ended, the United States had accumulated thirty-five thousand tons of matériel (80 percent in the form of fifty-seven hundred three-ton Dodge trucks in crates plus tires and spare parts) at the Calcutta end of the India-China lend-lease pipeline. The sale of these had not been negotiated. In addition, the Chinese navy had requested authority to purchase on credit \$5,000,000 worth of surplus machinery and supplies for use in the Kiangnan dockyard in Shanghai where U.S. vessels were repaired. (*Ibid.*, pp. 916–17, 1064, 1071.)

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 148. *Top Secret*

February 4, 1946
[Chungking, China]

My Dear Mr. President: Affairs are progressing rather favorably. The Political Consultative Conference did their job well and included enough of the details of the interim Constitution I had most confidentially given the Generalissimo to provide a fairly definite basis for a democratic coalition government. The approach to the constitutional convention appears sound.

As to the nationalization of the armies, demobilization—integration—and reorganization, I have secured the Generalissimo's agreement to my proposals and two days ago outlined them to General Chou En-lai, the Communist leader. This afternoon he, Chou, spent two hours with me asking questions and then gave a general indication that he would go through with my plan, though I cannot be certain of this until a formal meeting is held tomorrow or next day. He is discussing the plan this evening with his opposite of the National Government. Apparently the prospects are favorable for a solution to this most difficult of all the problems.

I am getting lined up to expedite the formation of the coalition government if that proves necessary, but I am moving in a most inobtrusive manner. If agreement on the military reorganization is reached and genuine progress is made towards implementing the coalition government then I will be ready to propose the resumption or the initiation of discussions in the U.S. regarding financial loans. I am endeavoring to terminate the present higgling over the details of every transaction concerning lend-lease and surplus property, endeavoring to put it on a basis which will not be embarrassing to you politically.

I am collecting a small special staff to work out the details—schedules, instructions, procedure, etc.—concerned with the demobilization, integration and redeployment of the armies. When this is done and agreed to these U.S. officers will be transferred to the Executive Headquarters in Peking to form a new section of that staff which, as a whole, will be charged with the execution of the new military program. Also, as soon as the main details are settled here, Chou En-lai, Governor Chang Chun and I, the original Committee of Three, will tour the important points, meet the principal army commanders and staff officers and the three of us explain the plans and endeavor by our united presence to expedite the development of a cooperative and understanding procedure on the part of subordinate officials of both factions.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

TO DEAN G. ACHESON

February 5, 1946
[Chungking, China]

My dear Acheson: Your note of January 15th with the attractive book on “John Mix Stanley and his Indian Paintings” arrived.¹ Already I have read the book and taken a first look at the prints. It pleased me very much to have you remember in this way our brief conversation on the subject last December, and I am delighted to have the book. Thank you very much.

Thanks also for your most cordial expressions of approval regarding the progress of affairs out here. What ever my success, it has depended in a large measure on the unqualified attitude of the Department and the President in giving me backing and authority. Things today,² about an hour ago as a matter of fact, give some indication that the Nationalization of the Army—integration and demobilization—will not be too difficult. Chou En-lai spent two hours with me this afternoon and for the first time expressed himself in regard to my proposals. I will have a much better idea of prospects after a meeting tomorrow, but I do not now see any heavy storm clouds on the horizon.

With my thanks again for the book. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, General)

1. The editors have not found Acheson’s note. Stanley (1814–72) was a well-known nineteenth-century painter who specialized in painting the native peoples of the American West. Many of his works were destroyed in an 1865 fire at the Smithsonian Institution. The forty-eight-page pamphlet Acheson sent was William V. Kienitz, *John Mix Stanley and His Indian Paintings* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1942).

2. The original draft and Marshall’s appointments calendar suggest that this letter was written on February 4.

MEETING WITH CHANG CHIH-CHUNG
February 5, 1946, 10:00 A.M. Chungking, China

GENERAL Chang reported the results of his two talks with Chou En-lai concerning various aspects of Marshall’s proposed demobilization-reorganization plan. The meetings did not illuminate any irreconcilable positions between the Nationalists and Communists. The two leaders disagreed on the political roles suitable for active members of the armed forces. Chang noted that five of the twenty-five members of the Kuomintang Executive Committee, which met every two weeks to discuss party matters, were high-ranking army officers who were also members of the Supreme National Defense Council; the Communist party was similarly organized, he said. A complete severing of party relationships for military officers would probably be unacceptable at present, Marshall suspected, and he suggested a compromise: “Any officer of the army while on active duty will not be permitted to hold any position in a political party, nor will he be permitted to accept membership in any committee of a

political party." Marshall then outlined his plan for handling the military reorganization "in an orderly and business-like manner." (See his comments of February 4 to Chou En-lai, p. 439. *Foreign Relations, 1946*, 9: 209–11.) ★

TO WALTER S. ROBERTSON
Radio No. GOLD 158

February 7, 1946
[Chungking, China]

Please transmit the following to US leaders of teams now in the field by individual name in each case: "All reports indicate that you are doing a splendid job under extraordinarily difficult conditions and that you have displayed an unusually generous and sincere spirit of cooperation. The work you are doing is of vast importance to China and I want you to know personally that I am deeply grateful for your complete support of our efforts."

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

MEETING WITH CHANG CHIH-CHUNG AND CHOU EN-LAI
February 9, 1946, 10:10 A.M. Chungking, China

GENERAL Byroade had been conducting discussions with Chang and Chou and had reached a general agreement on the wording of three draft documents regarding the restoration of communications in China: an order to Nationalist and Communist military commanders in North and Central China to assist in restoration efforts (document "A"); a memorandum to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek requesting that the government provide some technical staff to assist in railroad reconstruction (document "B"); and a memorandum of principles adopted regarding railroad reconstruction (document "C"). (The final versions of these are in *Foreign Relations, 1946*, 9: 422–25.)

They began the discussion with document "C." Chang and Chou agreed that the agreement applied to the period until the creation of a coalition government and to the eight railroad lines in the area north of the Yangtze River and south of Manchuria. The political and military aspects of railroad operation and construction (including the sending out of field teams to settle disputes) would be handled by a Railway Control Section to be established at Executive Headquarters. Document "C" was approved.

Document "A"—which directed local commanders to remove all blockages and military works along communications lines, to prevent interference with civilian travel, and to facilitate the work of repair personnel—was quickly approved with only minor amendments, as was document "B." Chou En-lai then raised the issues of absorption of Communist railroad personnel by the reorganized Ministry of Communications and that ministry's decision-making capacity. The three discussed the extent to which they needed to become involved, for the determination of principles or the

sake of efficiency, in decisions and policies that would normally be handled by lower-level leaders (e.g., at Executive Headquarters). They then modified the paragraph in document “C” that dealt with train guards and administrative control and operating personnel so that it was clear that such personnel would be under the direct control of the Ministry of Communications, which itself would be under the general supervision of Executive Headquarters. The meeting ended with a general agreement of the importance of cooperation in the reopening of communications. (Ibid., pp. 398–422.) ★

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 170. *Top Secret*

February 9, 1946
[Chungking, China]

Dear Mr. President: The Chinese Foreign Minister, Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, called on me last night to inform me of the increasing critical developments in Manchuria. He reported that he had called in the Russian Ambassador, [Appolon Alexandrovich] Petrov, several days before to inquire of him why Soviet Forces had not completed their withdrawal from Manchuria by February 1, in accordance with the Sino-Soviet Treaty and subsequent corollary agreements between the two governments. Petrov replied that he would have to consult Moscow and would then report to the Chinese on the status of the Soviet withdrawal. (Petrov had not reported by the time Dr. Wang called on me last night.) Dr. Wang then commented to Petrov that Soviet authorities in Manchuria had “informally” suggested to the Chinese authorities that the Soviet withdrawal could be expedited by Chinese agreement to Russia’s demands for economic concessions, which she claims as Japanese war booty. These economic concessions or “war booty”, as the Soviets call them, involve 50 per cent Soviet ownership, or participation, in virtually every phase of Manchurian economy. They include joint ownership of natural resource developments, such as coal mines and hydro-electric systems, future air transport systems and virtually every important industrial establishment in the country. It is quite clear that the Soviet is demanding tremendous economic concessions in Manchuria for the present and the future rather than anything that could reasonably be called “war booty”. Dr. Wang informed Petrov that the Chinese Government could not meet such Soviet demands and that, in any event, could not negotiate a settlement of legitimate war booty until Soviet troops had withdrawn.¹ He recalled that the Chinese Government had already made major concessions in the Sino-Soviet Treaty and could pay no additional price for Manchuria under threat. Dr. Wang said the Chinese Government now has several courses of action in mind. In brief they are:

1. Seek to effect a reasonable settlement with the Soviets on part ownership or [of] industrial establishments in Manchuria which were bona fide Japanese properties as a recognition of Soviet claims for war booty. This settlement would be by informal understanding prior to Soviet withdrawal and negotiated formally after withdrawal.

2. Propose to the Soviets that the entire issue be put to the Far Eastern Commission as Molotov had suggested to Dr. Wang in the first meeting of Foreign Ministers at London. Wang believes that Molotov may have made the proposal as an empty gesture since at the time the U.S. refused to agree to the principle of a Far Eastern Control Commission.²

He then asked for my views on what might be done. I first asked him what he thought the U.S. might do to assist China in this matter and he had no specific proposals. I then told him I thought first of all China must proceed with her projected unification at the fastest possible pace so as to eliminate her present vulnerability to Soviet undercover attack, which exists so long as there remains a separate Communist government and a separate Communist army in China. Secondly, I told him that I believed he should make no commitment formal or informal with the Soviet which would recognize her claims that war booty consisted of the kind of economic concessions she is demanding. I suggested that if a settlement seemed possible on the type of concessions that were implicit in the Sino-Soviet Treaty, such limited concessions might be made. I told Wang it was my belief that time was running against the Soviet, since the longer her troops remain in Manchuria the more clearly she becomes a deliberate treaty violator in the eyes of the world. I suggested further that this psychological weapon could be sharpened by the entrance of American and Allied correspondents into Manchuria.

Doctor Wang said he concurred completely in my point that a speedy execution of the unification was essential. He agreed with me that time was running against the Soviet and said that the idea of turning the spotlight of publicity on Manchuria was already under consideration.

Harriman has already probably told you the Generalissimo is deeply concerned over the steadily increasing dilemma his officials and his troops find themselves in Manchuria. He is opposed to combined teams of the Executive Headquarters going into Manchuria because he fears the Russians would demand representation on such teams, since Russian troops are usually present if not directly involved in the troublesome incidents. It was reported to him that when his small National force entered Yingkow in Manchuria it was attacked by some 400 Russian soldiers with armored vehicles and heavy weapons along with an overwhelming Com-

munist force. I have been unable to check on the accuracy of this report as he declines to agree to the dispatch of a team to Yingkow.

I have reported this situation to you in detail because I feel that it not only involves me in matters beyond my mission but is perhaps more dangerous to world accord than any other present issue. It is clear to me that the survival of much of what has been accomplished in China this past month will depend to an important degree on an early disposition of the festering situation in Manchuria. I also believe that our government must shortly do more for China in this matter than give advice. Just what action might be taken with reasonable hope of success I do not know, but the following thoughts occur to me:

1. First of all China must speed up on her unification-nationalization of her armies, actual development of the projected coalition government and restoration of communications.

2. We must clear our hands out here as quickly as possible in order to avoid the inevitable Russian recriminations similar to those today regarding the British troops in Greece. I mean by this, we must terminate the "China Theater of Operations" and in its place quickly develop the Military Advisory Group. (Wedemeyer on my urging is actually but unofficially organizing this group in Nanking). Also, in this connection, we must move all of the Marines out of China but some reconnaissance and transport aviation and some housekeeping and local guard units. The timing of this last move requires a critical decision. I have been having it planned for some time but there is still a grave question in my mind as to the effect on both the Kuomintang and the Communist groups. I am not prepared to advise this action now, but I hope I will be ready to do so in another month. Meanwhile I have agreed to considerable reductions in Marine strength.³

3. China should announce her intention to send troops into Japan. Generalissimo was previously forced to state his inability to do this, but under present and prospective circumstances I think he will make the offer shortly, on my suggestion, the movement to be initiated about May 1st.

4. China would now be ready to carry the Manchuria issue to the Far Eastern Commission, with definite evidence of unification, with the embarrassment of the presence of American combat troops removed, and with her status dignified by the fact of her troops having joined the Allied Occupation Forces in Japan.

Another subject: Negotiations regarding nationalization of Chinese armies progressed well at first but have been delayed by necessity of Chou En-lai having his views confirmed by Yen-an. Also, he is so deeply

engaged with initial discussions for actual formation of National Council, etc., that he has been prevented from proceeding rapidly with military conferences. Incidentally, he and the National Government representative were in conference with me for three hours and a half this morning straightening out serious differences which had continued ten days in Peking over problem of control of railroad operations in Communist territory. An agreement was reached.⁴

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Sino-Soviet negotiations in Changchun concerning the disposition of former industries in Manchuria that were owned or partially owned by the Japanese had been suspended by the Chinese government because the Soviet Union had failed to withdraw its armed forces from the region. In late March, the Soviets informed the Chinese government that their forces would be completely withdrawn by the end of April and that they were willing to negotiate in Chungking on matters of economic collaboration. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 1121.)

2. The Far Eastern Commission had been established on December 27, 1945, when, with China's concurrence, the foreign ministers of the U.S., U.K., and the U.S.S.R., meeting in Moscow, issued a communiqué establishing the commission's "Terms of Reference." The new organization replaced the recently established Far Eastern Advisory Commission, of which the U.S.S.R. was not a member. The commission was supposed to "formulate the policies, principles, and standards" of Japan's surrender obligations and, at any member's request, to review any directive issued by General MacArthur's headquarters (S.C.A.P.). The eleven-nation commission's first meeting was not held until February 26, 1946. The Soviets would have preferred that there be an Allied Control Council for Japan that would permit them to have veto power over S.C.A.P.'s decisions, but the United States would not agree to this. (*Activities of the Far Eastern Commission: Report by the Secretary General, February 26, 1946-July 10, 1947* [Washington: GPO, 1947], pp. 1-4; George H. Blakeslee, *The Far Eastern Commission: A Study in International Cooperation: 1945 to 1952* [Washington: GPO, 1953], pp. 1-18.)

President Truman replied on February 13 that the only practicable help the commission could offer regarding Manchuria was, possibly, on reparations. Otherwise, the commission was to limit itself to Japanese concerns rather than to Far Eastern problems in general. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 434-35.)

3. "Current developments in connection with the presence of British troops in Indonesia and Greece, to which you refer, increase my anxiety to get American armed forces out of China just as soon as they are no longer essential to implement our policy in China," President Truman replied. (*Ibid.*)

4. See Meeting with Chang Chih-chung and Chou En-lai, February 9, 1946, pp. 446-47.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
Radio No. 260. *Secret*

February 10, 1946
[Chungking, China]

Reference DEPTTEL 152 January 25, 7 p. m. regarding despatch of Adler or Cassidy [*Caseday*] on Special Mission to Bangkok: Cassidy is working with General Hodge in Korea and I suppose but do not know that at

the moment his presence there is important.¹ For me at present stage of negotiations in China Adler's daily presence is indispensable as I am now moving into the details of finance, offsets and other negotiations on surplus property transfers, shipping etc. He would be leaving here at the time I need him most.

I hesitate to press General Hodge from here to release Cassidy, as I have no knowledge of his situation and Hodge, because of past relationship, would be at least embarrassed if he did not yield to my request. I therefore recommend that General Hodge be approached from Washington if no other solution can be found.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Political Affairs, Messages In—Embassy)

1. Solomon Adler and Lauren W. Caseday were the Treasury Department's representative and assistant representative in China. Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, who had served on the General Staff under Marshall, 1938–41, had commanded the Twenty-fourth Corps in the Luzon and Okinawa campaigns. On September 8, 1945, he and the leading elements of the corps arrived in Korea; there he commanded the United States Forces in Korea.

INFORMAL MEETING OF THE MILITARY SUB-COMMITTEE
February 11, 1946, 12:30 P.M. Chungking, China

MARSHALL began by asking that Chou En-lai and Chang Chih-chung discuss the results of their meetings. The Chinese leaders agreed that both Nationalist and Communist armies would be reorganized, but disagreed on the number of Communist divisions to be retained during the twelve-month initial stage. They agreed with Marshall's concept of three-division armies reporting directly to the Ministry of War, that there should be no Communist units in South China, that the Communists could keep surrendered Japanese arms pending a settlement, that all "puppet" troops (i.e., Chinese units allied with the Japanese) should be demobilized rather than recruited by either side, that local and irregular forces should not be considered part of the army, and that the reorganized and unified army would need an adequate personnel system.

Marshall said that Chang and Chou needed to agree soon on certain general principles, and they should agree within the next two days on the number of divisions each side would retain during the initial phase. He had arranged for a team of planners to come to Chungking to work with Chinese officials on specific details of the demobilization and integration. Marshall hoped that military integration could begin during the third month after beginning demobilization. Chou En-lai thought this would be difficult to achieve, but he would consult Communist party headquarters in Yen-an on the matter. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 211–15.) ★

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER
Radio No. GOLD 184. *Secret*

February 12, 1946
[Chungking, China]

I am now at this moment in conference with Dr. T. V. Soong. He brings up this point in connection with prospective food shortages in China: the urgent necessity of repatriating Japanese from Kwantung province where a food shortage threatens and also from Hainan Island and from Formosa where similar shortages are in prospect. We have to balance the military threat of their presence in Northern China against food shortage problem just referred to. Please talk this over with Admiral Cooke and let me hear from you as soon as possible.¹ I favor meeting Dr. Soong's request so far as possible.

Another subject: Inform General Johnson surplus property administrator² that Doctor Soong has agreed to the offset principle on transaction but not including special basis of settlement for Kiangnan Dock affair on which all parties now apparently agree. This agreement of Doctor Soong will settle the Calcutta stockpile including the trucks.³

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. The editors have not found a reply by Wedemeyer, who was in Chungking February 15-16 and may have commented orally.

2. Executive Order 9630 of September 27, 1945, terminated the Foreign Economic Administration and transferred to the State Department the disposition of surplus property owned by the U.S. but located in foreign areas. The department established the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commission, whose field commissioner for China and Eastern Areas was Brigadier General Bernhard A. Johnson.

3. On the dock and the trucks, see note 4, Draft Statement, February 4, 1946, p. 443.

TO DEAN G. ACHESON

February 13, 1946
Chungking, China

My dear Acheson: I am sending James R. Shepley home tomorrow because he has already exceeded the leave that Mr. Luce of "Time" gave him at my request, and I do not wish to prejudice his career.¹ Also, he has developed a rather bad sinus and this is one of the worst places in the world for that affliction.²

Shepley has done a remarkably fine job out here, making a very important contribution to whatever success I have had. He has not only handled the press people astutely but more particularly he has participated in all the negotiations, lent me valuable assistance in drafting documents, and has carried out numerous preliminary negotiations with various principals to save me from committing myself too early in the procedure.

As the Government's reward for his work has been the modest per diem of four dollars and even that was denied him the first ten days he assisted me in Washington, I wish him to have some official recognition of his services beyond that I might give him in a personal letter. Therefore, would you be good enough to propose to Mr. Byrnes that he give Shepley a letter of appreciation or commendation with some such paragraph as the following:

"I wish to thank you for the important personal contribution you made to the success of the mission General Marshall has been charged by the President in carrying out in China. It has been reported to the State Department that in the handling of the press in Chungking, in the preparation of material for the various negotiations and in the way of participation in those negotiations, you have been most helpful. The State Department wishes to acknowledge your services and to express regret that it has become necessary for you to return to your normal occupation. With my personal thanks."

I will appreciate very much your kind offices. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, General)

1. See Marshall to Hull, December 3, 1945, p. 377.

2. Chungking, the commercial center of China's Red Basin in Szechwan province, had a mild but cloudy and moist climate during the winter. A local saying about the winter asserted that "the dogs bark at the sun even as they do at strangers." (George Babcock Cressey, *China's Geographic Foundations: A Survey of the Land and Its People* [New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1934], p. 314.)

TO WALTER G. ANDREWS

February 14, 1946
Chungking, China

Dear Ham: Your letter of February 1st has just reached me. Thanks a lot for the news and especially for your thoughtfulness in writing.¹

I have been kept very busy out here, one conference after another from ten in the morning often until five or six in the evening—a wide variety of people, subjects and certainly of points of view. Also, there are long and extremely delicate negotiations regarding the unification of the army, reconstruction and operation of the railroads, coal mines, etc. in Communist areas, finance, surplus property transactions, naval and air equipment and organization and, of course, all with a background of political complications or efforts. I would like to boil this business all down to the simple proposition of negotiations with Katherine over where we plant the shrubs and flowers, shall it be cabbages or cauliflower, who gets the car

this morning and what are we doing this evening. God willing, I will be back to that life before long for the first time in almost seven years.

Please give my regards to those who still remember me—favorably—on your committee. And with my thanks for your letter, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, General)

1. A longtime congressional supporter of Marshall, Andrews was the ranking Republican on the House Military Affairs Committee. His letter praised Marshall for “the good news from China” and expressed the hope that the general would soon be able to return home. He commented on various events in Washington, D.C., particularly the “furor and hysteria” over the demobilization of troops. (Andrews to Marshall, February 1, 1946, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [China Mission, General].)

MEETINGS WITH CHOU EN-LAI AND CHANG CHIH-CHUNG
February 14–16, 18, 1946 Chungking, China

CHOU En-lai, February 14, 3:00 P.M.

Prior to going to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s town house for the first formal meeting of the Military Sub-Committee, Chou En-lai came to Marshall’s house to inform him of Communist party headquarters’ response to various proposals on reorganization and integration. Yen-an desired that the Communist party retain twenty divisions compared to the Nationalists’ ninety during the twelve-month initial stage of demobilization; during the six-month second stage the ratio would be 10:50. Yen-an was not opposed to military integration occurring during the initial phase, but thought it better to do this during the second phase. They were also concerned about the allocation of supplies by the proposed Service Area directors, stipulating garrison areas for the new armies, and the management of military police and railroad guards. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 220.)

Military Sub-Committee, February 14, 4:00 P.M., Generalissimo’s Aide’s Office

Marshall began by asking for comments on the latest draft of “Basis of Reorganization of Communist Military Forces and Their Consolidation with the National Army of China.” (The draft from which the subcommittee members were working is *ibid.*, pp. 215–19.) Chang Chih-chung and Chou En-lai began with a discussion about the Chinese translation of the official English version. The subcommittee then began considering the plan’s articles in sequence. The first two articles (“Command” and “Employment”) were approved with minor changes. Article III (“Organization”) concerned the distribution of divisions by party and the organization and duties of the eight Service Areas into which China was to be divided. After considerable discussion, the Chinese accepted the proposal that, at the end of twelve months, the ratio of divisions would be ninety Nationalist to eighteen Communist. Marshall then explained at considerable length the importance and function of service areas in British, French, and American military organizations. “Now we are attending classes,” General Chang said. “General Marshall is our teacher.” With a few reservations, the Chinese leaders accepted the rest of Article III and the three-hour meeting ended. (*Ibid.*, pp. 220–22.)

Chang Chih-chung, February 15, 10:00 A.M.

Marshall asked Chang to discuss some items that might come up in the afternoon Military Sub-Committee meeting. He thought that the Communists would ask for more than the four army commands the Nationalists were offering and also for a Service Area command; he thought that the Nationalists should find some way of making an agreeable compromise. Regarding the Nationalist-Communist division ratio, Marshall suggested that General Chang could use the support troop authorization (15 percent of the total) as a bargaining point. He still did not have a solution to the question of Military Police, Marshall said. (Ibid., pp. 222–23.)

Chou En-lai, February 15, 2:00 P.M.

General Chou asked for the meeting in order to discuss problems relative to Military Police organizations. There would be such organizations within the armies but they would have no authority over civil matters, Marshall said. How the gendarmes (which he likened to American state police) were to be regulated he did not yet know. Chou En-lai expressed concern with the eighteen regiments of railroad guards that were being organized and trained by Major General Tai Li, head of the Nationalist secret police (i.e., the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics of the National Commission of Military Affairs). Marshall said that he was aware of Tai's activities, that he was opposed to one individual being in command of this force, and that some restrictions would have to be imposed on the units' use. (Ibid., pp. 223–24.)

Military Sub-Committee, February 15, 3:30 P.M., Generalissimo's Aide's Office

Article IV ("Demobilization") was the starting point for this session. Chang and Chou agreed on the 90:18 division ratio and that the two sides would have prepared, within three weeks of the promulgation of the agreement, lists of the units to be retained on active duty and within six weeks lists of organizations to be demobilized. Marshall then made a lengthy statement on Executive Headquarters's role in handling the details of transferring arms and equipment from demobilizing to retained units and its need for power to act. Chang and Chou both quickly agreed. "I guess you are afraid I will make another speech," Marshall said, and moved to the plan's next paragraph.

Consideration of the fourth section of Article IV (stipulating that between the twelfth and eighteenth months after the promulgation of the agreement the total number of divisions in China would be further reduced to sixty, of which ten would be Communist) immediately recalled the divisive issues of power distribution, so after each side commented, Marshall suggested that further discussion on this be delayed until the following day.

The conferees proceeded to Article V ("Deployment"), which described how the sixty divisions remaining after the first year would have been integrated into thirty-six armies and where these armies would be deployed. Chou En-lai objected that the Communists had repeatedly insisted that such integration take place in a second stage beginning after the first twelve months in order that the units could be trained and mentally prepared for integration. Marshall said that attempting a true fusion of divisions into a true National Army, as opposed to a mere integration of divisions into armies, could probably not be accomplished in the short time the Political Consultative Conference delegates had hoped; contrariwise, he thought, delaying integration for eighteen months was politically unwise. He suggested that the next day's discussion consider beginning the process in six months. (Ibid., pp. 224–35.)

Military Sub-Committee, February 16, 3:00 P.M., Generalissimo's Aide's Office

"The class is now in session," General Chang Chih-chung said, and the group again took up Article V ("Deployment") of the draft demobilization-reorganization agreement for the new Chinese army. The Chinese negotiators vigorously restated their positions from the previous meeting. The government, Chang Chih-chung explained, preferred to begin integration after four or six months and work toward fusion of the armies in which there would be no distinction between Communist and Nationalist units. Chou En-lai reiterated that during the first twelve months following promulgation of the agreement only demobilization would occur; during the succeeding six months further demobilization and integration of armies would occur. "I must admit," Marshall interjected, "that today I have a very much better impression of the difficulties involved in integration that I had two months ago. I think I recognize more than has been said here in regard to the difficulties of reorganizing and developing the training of the units of the Communist armies, and equipment to bring them on a parity with the divisions already equipped and carefully trained of the National armies." Key points to weigh, Marshall said, were "the hazards of the delay in initiating integration with the hazards of a long continued period following the development of the coalition government and during a constitutional reorganization of large forces totally separate in effect, in control." The inevitable Nationalist-Communist disputes in the interim period were bound to affect military morale. Marshall proposed a compromise: integration would begin at the level of the army group (i.e., one three-Communist-division army and one three-Nationalist-division army) with a new army group formed each month beginning in the seventh month; after the twelfth month, integration would begin at the army level. General Chang said that he would accept this if General Chou did. Chou En-lai said that he would consider it and report to party headquarters in Yen-an.

The negotiators then moved to Article VI concerning the militia, which was not to exceed fifteen thousand in any one province and was to be limited to light arms. "Militia" was the wrong concept, the Chinese agreed; the "Peace Preservation Corps"—professional soldiers under provincial authority—was what should be considered in this article. Marshall was worried by some of the suggested wording changes that seemed to him to permit unlimited use of this force by local officials. "In a military force in a democracy there is always a limit, there are certain qualifications." General Chang accepted the article, as did General Chou, although he reserved the right to discuss further the issue of military police.

Article VII concerned six points of somewhat lesser importance (i.e., the role of Executive Headquarters, uniforms, personnel system, secret police, political affiliations, and puppet and irregular troops). The negotiators agreed on several points, but soon decided that the meeting had run long enough and adjourned. (*Ibid.*, pp. 235–47.)

Military Sub-Committee, February 18, 3:30 P.M., Generalissimo's Aide's Office

The Communists were suspicious of the militarized police forces: the twenty-plus regiments of Military Police and the proposed eighteen regiments of railroad guards. After demobilization and reorganization, Chou En-lai argued, they could be concentrated as an independent force of division size or larger. The Military Police, Chang Chih-chung argued, were at half strength, widely disbursed, usually in squad-sized units, and lightly armed. The conferees agreed to discuss this later and to move on.

The Chinese agreed to omit the section of Article VII prohibiting army officers from holding membership in a political party. Puppet and irregular troops were to be disbanded and disarmed “as soon as practicable,” and the Chinese agreed that the meeting’s minutes would show agreement between them that restrictions should be worked out that would prevent these units from switching from side to side. (“They are very amphibious,” General Chang said.)

There were some wording changes in the final article of the agreement (VIII: “General”), and it was accepted. To save time, Marshall said, he had a team of American staff officers already at work on detailed plans to implement the agreement; this group would prepare a tentative outline of issues to discuss with Chinese forces staff officers. As the meeting ended, Marshall asked if Chou En-lai would remain for a few minutes. (Ibid., pp. 248–58.)

Chou En-lai, February 18, 8:00 P.M.

Marshall outlined “his ideas with respect to assisting the Communists in giving selected officers and non-commissioned officers basic training prior to integration of the armies.” This brief (about four weeks) training would cover only basic principles and “was an expedient in order to overcome the Communist objection to a more hasty integration.” Chou En-lai seemed to agree that this idea had merit. Marshall said that his mission would probably terminate in August or September; in the meantime, he would make a trip to Washington, D.C., to handle loan and surplus property issues. He could arrange to have General Wedemeyer made the U.S. ambassador to China.

Concerning the up-coming trip by the Committee of Three, Marshall said that he did not wish to “precipitate a new crisis” by making an “untimely visit” to Manchuria. Chou En-lai asserted that the Chinese Communists were anxious to have Executive Headquarters teams in Manchuria “to settle the question in order to facilitate the taking over of Manchuria by the government.” Chou did not think that the Russians would object and “he could not understand why the Nationalists did not want to go in.” (Ibid., pp. 258–59.) ★

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER
Secret, His Eyes Only

February 18, 1946
Chungking, China

Dear Wedemeyer: In my talk to you regarding the return of Miles¹ I failed to mention another very pertinent factor. At the recent meeting here of the Committee of Three to resolve the twelve-day stalemate at Executive Headquarters over the opening up of railway communications, I found that the principal difficulty lay in the fear of the action of the party we had in mind.² I should have mentioned this to you at the time because it should have a very positive influence on your conversations with Cooke.

I cannot go forward with the matter of resolving these various complicated situations like the one above referred to and like those that I have been engaged in for the past week and very acutely this afternoon with the injection of a Navy personality who adds fuel and flames to the fire.

Please try to make this very clear to Cooke. It is a most serious matter. Far more so than I realized when I was talking to him [Cooke] during his visit here because it has now reached the proportion of almost blocking me in matters of tremendous significance to China, while the Navy side of the issue might well be considered entirely negligible in its importance. I am mentioning no names for evident reasons. Faithfully yours,

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Wedemeyer File)

1. Commodore Milton E. Miles (U.S.N.A., 1922) had been head of Naval Group, China (1942–45) and the Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.) in China (1942–43), and American head of the Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Organization (S.A.C.O.), 1944–45. He was a friend and supporter of Major General Tai Li. Miles's relations with the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Army in China in general and with General Wedemeyer in particular had been poor. He had returned to the United States at the end of September 1945 suffering from a nervous breakdown. He was not reassigned to duty involving China until 1947. (Milton E. Miles, *A Different Kind of War: The Little-Known Story of the Combined Guerrilla Forces Created in China by the U.S. Navy and the Chinese During World War II* [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967], pp. 547–64, 566.)

2. Tai Li is clearly meant. At his February 15 meeting with Marshall and the February 18 Military Sub-Committee meeting, Chou En-lai had expressed his concern with the railroad police force that Tai Li was creating under his personal command. Ruthless and extremely loyal to Chiang Kai-shek, Tai Li had built a large and efficient intelligence network throughout China by the end of the 1930s. Nationalist party critics and enemies had good reason to fear him, and Americans in China often called him China's equivalent of Nazi Germany's Heinrich Himmler. (On Tai and Miles, see Maochun Yu, *OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War* [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996], particularly pp. 31, 46, 285 n. 2.)

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 205. *Top Secret*

February 19, 1946
[Chungking, China]

My dear Mr. President: Regarding the unification of Chinese armies, after numerous individual conferences with General Chang Chih-chung and with General Chou En-lai there have followed four formal conferences, one just concluded this evening.¹ I can now repeat now report that an agreement has been reached on practically all of the critical issues of my plan for the demobilization, reorganization and integration of the military forces. I am hopeful that a full committee agreement will be reached within the next few days and that the formal approval can be secured from the Generalissimo and Mao Tse-tung. When this is done I will endeavor to have a joint press release issued outlining in full the fundamental principles agreed upon.

There will then remain for preparation, and approval on a joint basis, the numerous details involved in the demobilization of some 250 divisions, the reduction of the total military forces to 60 divisions, the actual

integration of Communist and National Army forces, the set up of an entirely new and a democratic system of command and control in time of peace, in divorcing military commanders and armies from control over the civil population. The Executive Headquarters, now in action in Peking, will be the agency utilized to carry out these measures. The details also will have to be formally approved. They will then be sent to the Executive Headquarters in Peking for execution.

I have assembled a small very special staff of American officers from Shanghai and Chungking who are working on these detailed plans. It is a most difficult and intricate staff job, in many respects without precedents for guidance. When the approved procedure is sent to Peking, I will transfer this small staff there as an additional section of the Executive Headquarters. Incidentally, that headquarters is the first step beyond our Chungking Committee of Three in obtaining a homogeneous military establishment. Its purpose when first proposed by me was neither understood or appreciated by the Chinese. However, having quickly demonstrated by operation that it provided the only method practical for terminating the actual fighting over a tremendous area with all the bitterness and feuds and misunderstandings of such a fratricidal struggle, it is now being recognized as the logical medium for carrying through to completion all plans and procedures for the unification of the military forces. The framework of the staff consists of Americans and the operating procedure is directed by Brigadier General Byroade as executive. Once the combined policy has been agreed upon the 21 teams of three representatives each sent into the field give effect to the policies and are gradually in one respect and rapidly from another point of view, bringing the opposing military forces and the general populace to an understanding of the beneficent purpose of the Executive Headquarters. The reception of the American officer on each of these teams by the civilian communities is one of tumultuous acclaim and almost overwhelming expressions of gratitude. He seems to represent their one hope for the return of peace and security. We have only had one really disagreeable incident and that developed out of a starved people clamoring for supplies then available in the railroad yards, and also clamoring for justice against puppet officials who they accused of murder, brutality and rapine. The incident was well handled, I believe, by our representative and the situation has now been regularized.

As soon as the detailed plans have been agreed upon here in Chungking I plan to start on a trip through the troubled areas in company with the Communist, Chou En-lai and the National Government representative, General Chang Chih-chung. We are to visit Executive Headquarters and are to meet the principal army leaders in various localities so that they may have a demonstration in our appearance of the cooperation and reorgani-

zation we represent, also, so that their leaders accompanying me can explain to their people direct the why and wherefore of most of our decisions. I hope this procedure will promote confidence and a better spirit of understanding, although I suppose there will be some rough moments since most of the high rankers are not only bitter partisans but will be losing their jobs in the process of the reorganization we are proposing.

I am sending Chou En-lai to Communist headquarters at Yen-an this morning by American plane to reach a decision regarding final issue remaining in debate on unification of armies.

The Generalissimo has been away a week first endeavoring to bring the members of his party around to a full acceptance of the PCC resolutions. He is now in Nanking endeavoring to line up his generals to accept the terms for the unification of the armies. He is in an extremely difficult position struggling with the ultra conservative and determined wing of each group, many if not most of whom will lose position and income all or in part by the changes proposed. I hope for the successful outcome of his efforts and especially hope that I will not be compelled to move in more or less in the open to intervene in this phase of the matter. The conservatives political and military are naturally rather bitter towards me. I have avoided public statements in order not to give them an opening.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Apparently Marshall wrote the first draft of this message on the evening of February 18.

TO JAMES F. BYRNES
Radio No. GOLD 212. *Secret*

February 19, 1946
[Chungking, China]

Reference your desire to reestablish U.S. Consulate officers in Dairen, Mukden and Harbin, Manchuria and the Chinese Government reply that in view of present conditions it would not be practicable at this time to give such permission,¹ I informed Foreign Office today that I thought it desirable for U.S. to go ahead and reestablish Consulate offices at Dairen and Mukden, unless Chinese objected. I thought that this would either force the Russians into the open if they chose to object or would give us the advantage of lookouts in those localities whose mere presence would embarrass the Russians in taking any raw measures. The Foreign Office replies that the Chinese Government has no objections to U.S. Consular officers returning to Dairen and Mukden, but as Chinese are not in control at those places they could not guarantee safety. At Mukden there is a Chinese appointed mayor but he has not yet taken over administration as

Russians are still in control and Russian troops present. At Dairen Chinese have nothing.

I am sending our Consulate officials to Dairen and Mukden. They may be refused entry or permission to establish their Consulates but if so there can no longer continue any doubt on the part of the world as to the Russian intention.²

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. In late January, at the State Department's direction, U.S. Counselor of Embassy Robert L. Smyth asked China's Foreign Ministry to permit the United States to reopen its consular offices in Harbin, Mukden, and Dairen. The initial Chinese response on January 30 was positive, but on February 16 the Foreign Ministry said that "it would not be practicable for the time being." (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 1130–33.)

2. Documents concerning the problems of opening U.S. consulates in Harbin and Dairen are *ibid.*, pp. 1130–1200.

TO JAMES R. SHEPLEY
Radio No. GOLD 218. *Top Secret*

February 20, 1946
[Chungking, China]

I have spoken to Wedemeyer regarding ambassadorship to China. He will accept this position if he is asked. I may in the near future, recommend Wedemeyer to the President. I understand that Mr. Byrnes questioned him on this point last October. Also, Generalissimo expressed desire for appointment. Use your judgment regarding discussion of the matter with President and Byrnes.¹

Another subject: I have been meeting almost every day with General Chang Chih-chung and General Chou En-lai on the reorganization of the Chinese armies. We have made excellent progress and apparently there remain but two points to be resolved. Chang generally accepts initiation of integration in the latter half of first stage but presses for fusion of personnel in second stage—i.e. last six months of eighteen month period. The Communists on the other hand desire to delay army integration until after the first stage of twelve months in order to, I am now inclined to believe, more for purpose of permitting them to reorganize into a respectable divisional appearance more than for purpose of maintaining a sufficiently large separate force until they have achieved their purpose in organization of constitutional government. I introduced a compromise proposal in order to get on with the integration. That proposal follows. "During the first twelve months there shall be organized three army groups each consisting of one National and one Communist army. Each army shall consist of three divisions. The schedule for establishing these army groups shall be as follows: one army group shall be organized during the seventh month; another the eighth month; and another the ninth month.

"During the following six months these three army groups shall be reorganized, creating four separate armies each consisting of one National and two Communist divisions and two separate armies each consisting of two National and one Communist divisions; an additional Communist division being added for this purpose. Thereafter, the organization of army groups shall be terminated." General Chou En-lai states that he personally favors this proposal but cannot proceed any further without approval from Yen-an. I sent him to Yen-an on 19 February in order to make personal representations to Chairman Mao. We are awaiting his return today before proceeding. Chang really did not oppose a delay of a year in initiating integration. I did though, because I thought it dangerous to permit the passage of so much time without any positive action of integration. My plan incidentally only concerns the ten Communist divisions which are to be in existence at the end of eighteen months.

The second point at issue is the question of military and railway police. Fear of Tai Li animates Chou in this matter. Tai Li is now organizing 18 regiments of railroad police of which he is the C in C.²

Chou wants to start on inspection trip as soon as possible and guesses we will be clear to start in about eight days. He wants to go to the same places in North China we had in mind, but also includes Yen-an, Hankow, Nanking, Canton and Mukden.

I asked WARCOS to give you a copy of my radio to the President of 19 February 1946 (GOLD 205).³

Another subject for Colonel Bowen:⁴ Please telephone the following to President's secretary Mr. [Matthew J.] Connelly: "General Marshall requests me to ask you to arrange for a half hour conference with the President for James Shepley who accompanied the General to Chungking as an attache of the State Department and took a leading part in the negotiations. He is returning home at conclusion of his leave of absence from Time magazine and can bring the President up to date on the situation and the future problems and difficulties."

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. According to Marshall's appointments diary, he met with Wedemeyer on February 15 and 16. On his return to Shanghai, Wedemeyer wrote to Marshall about their discussion about his and Marshall's future plans. "You indicated that you felt the following schedule might be accomplished if I accepted the position of Ambassador upon your relief which you stated would probably occur next Fall: (1) You would go to the States in March and return to China about the first of April. (2) I would return to the States the first week in April for a scheduled operation on my sinus. (3) If the deactivation of the Theater were progressing according to our presently projected plans, in all probability I would not return to China Theater but would be given some temporary duty until such time as my appointment to the Ambassador's post became effective perhaps early Fall. . . . (4) If you were appointed Secretary of State, I would be continued in role of Ambassador to China for approximately one year and then would be assigned to post in the State Department. . . . If the President appoints me Ambassador to China I will accept but I hope that in so doing

that I will ultimately be assigned to the State Department to assist you, the Secretary of State, or be returned to the Army as an active military man." (Wedemeyer to Marshall, February 17, 1946, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [China Mission, General].)

Concerning suggestions in 1945 that Wedemeyer become ambassador, see *Wedemeyer Reports!*, pp. 358, 364. The president describes his problems with Secretary of State Byrnes and his desire to appoint Marshall as secretary in Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. 1, *Year of Decisions* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1955), pp. 546–52.

2. Regarding Major General Tai Li, see note 2, Marshall to Wedemeyer, February 18, 1946, p. 458.

3. See Marshall to Truman, February 19, 1946, pp. 458–60.

4. In mid-November 1945, at army chief of staff designate Dwight Eisenhower's request, Marshall had appointed Colonel John W. Bowen (U.S.M.A., 1932) secretary of the General Staff.

MEETINGS WITH CHANG CHIH-CHUNG AND CHOU EN-LAI February 20–21, 1946 Chungking, China

CHANG Chih-chung, February 20, 5:00 P.M.

Marshall told the Nationalist member of the Military Sub-Committee that Chou En-lai had "enthusiastically" received the idea of creating a preintegration elementary training school for Communist troops. Marshall then asked General Chang's opinions on the timing and manner of military integration, the details regarding the new army group organization, and the upcoming Committee of Three trip to northern China.

Chou En-lai was anxious to have the Committee of Three go to Manchuria, but Marshall was reluctant to go "since he did not want to give the Russians a new opportunity for conjecture and possible propaganda lines that might be injurious" to his mission. At least one truce team ought to be sent to Yinkow in Manchuria, as Chou had suggested; Marshall thought that this indicated that Chou needed Executive Headquarters help in handling some of the local Communists. The demobilization and integration plan should not include having a Communist army in Manchuria, Marshall said. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 262–63.)

Chou En-lai, February 21, 10:00 A.M.

General Chou had returned the previous day from a visit to Yen-an, and he announced that Chairman Mao had accepted, in principle, Marshall's two-stage integration proposal. Mao also indicated "enthusiastic acceptance" of Marshall's idea of establishing a transitional training school for Communist officers and men. The Communists' best men would attend. Concerning Manchuria, Chairman Mao had concluded that the Committee of Three should visit, the cease-fire order was applicable there, and army reorganization should also take place there. With regard to Marshall's planned visit to Washington in March, Mao hoped that Marshall would not go until China's constitutional reform and army reorganization had become "reasonably stabilized." Marshall said that he would only be gone four or five weeks in order to handle urgent economic issues regarding China. (*Ibid.*, pp. 263–64.)

Military Sub-Committee, February 21, 4:00 P.M., Generalissimo's Aide's Office

Marshall began the discussion with Article V, which dealt with troop integration and deployment. Chou En-lai noted that Marshall's initial proposal concerning the

beginning twelve-month stage included some Communist troops in Manchuria, but his most recent one did not; he asked that the Communists have one of the armies to be formed in the area, and General Chang agreed. The committee then discussed the precise demarcation of the five regions into which China was to be divided for purposes of demobilization and integration and the number of armies and army groups and their Communist-Nationalist composition in each region during the initial phase. (See the map on p. 784.) Article V was accepted.

Having jumped this hurdle, the committee members agreed to minor modifications to various other articles. On the problem of military and railroad police, Marshall suggested that Chang and Chou settle this between themselves. The American minutes record that "there was a long animated discussion in Chinese at this point not translated," after which the Chinese representatives announced that they had agreed to have General Chou and Nationalist representatives settle this separately. The meeting ended with Chang and Chou debating the agreement's title and its implications. (*Ibid.*, pp. 265–77.) ★

TO WALTER S. ROBERTSON

February 21, 1946
Chungking, China

My dear Robertson: I hope in a week or ten days to pay you and Executive Headquarters a visit—with the other members of the Committee of Three—as Byroade has no doubt told you. We will only be in Peking briefly, long enough, however, to talk things over. But I wish now, most confidentially, to give you some idea of the tentative plans for the immediate future.

I am planning on making a quick trip home shortly after my return to Chungking from the inspection trip. The timing will depend on the starting date for the trip and its length, somewhat on the state of affairs in Manchuria, and on the progress the five special planners I have assembled here have made regarding the detailed schedules and instructions for carrying out the demobilization, the integration of armies and their general reorganization. Once approved, Executive Headquarters is to have this job of remaking the armies of China, and will be so employed at least until the end of the calendar year.

I have brought Lieut. General Gillem out to take the lead in this work.¹ He first must familiarize himself with people and conditions and at the same time must supervise the staff work here in developing the plans. Then he will be ready to move on to Executive Headquarters and relieve you. You, I think, should be here during my absence, which will be about four or five weeks. (I am going to make the reports and assist in setting the stage for the Chinese loan, as well as reach general understandings regarding Lend-Lease, FLC [Foreign Liquidation Commission] and sim-

ilar matters.) Wedemeyer will remain on his job until I return and then he will go home for an operation. I, confidentially, do not expect to stay here beyond August, and that is a great deal longer than I anticipated. We can talk over in Peking your plans or desires. Butterworth has not arrived and is not due, I believe, for some time.² And he must get some familiarity with the place before taking over, I suppose.

You are, no doubt, in a seventh heaven with your family about you in the interesting surroundings of Peking.³ I think I will bring Mrs. Marshall back with me, though I will decide that later on.

Meanwhile, with my congratulations on the fine work you are doing, and thanks for your letter, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, General)

1. See Marshall to Eisenhower, January 13, 1946, pp. 418–19.
2. See note 1, Marshall to Acheson, January 8, 1946, p. 414.
3. See note 2, *ibid.*, p. 414.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR February 22, 1946
Radio No. GOLD 226. *Secret* [Chungking, China]

Serious difficulty is being encountered regarding the amalgamation of the Communists and National Army Forces in China due to the fact that while a portion of the National Army divisions which are to be continued have been equipped and trained by Americans, the Communist organizations on the other hand have little or no divisional organization, having operated more or less in a guerrilla fashion, poorly equipped and have had little or no military schooling. The integration of the divisions into corps or armies presents to the Communists a serious embarrassment unless there is a delay of such length that it, in my opinion, may prejudice the whole program. Agreement has been reached on practically every phase of the problem of amalgamation except as to the actual date when integration of the divisions into army corps is initiated, which is a critical political factor in the formation of a coalition and representative government.

To solve this last problem, we are undertaking to organize hurriedly within the Communist area an elementary school for infantry and artillery officers and for division and corps staff officers and their commanders. The courses will only be three months in duration, but it is of great importance to get the first courses started without delay. The limitation is the lack of American personnel in China. The Executive Headquarters in Peiping with its numerous field teams has exhausted our resources in personnel.

Would it be practicable for you to let Wedemeyer have on a temporary duty and volunteer basis about 60 young American officers in the grades

of lieutenant, captain, and possibly major, and 60 American non-commissioned officers grade immaterial from Japan, Okinawa or the Philippines to lend invaluable assistance in getting this business started. If the number of officers is too large would you consider increasing the number of NCOs? If you could see your way clear to let us have these people for a minimum of four months in China, the proportion should be as follows: officers, approximately 70 per cent infantry, 25 per cent artillery, and 5 per cent young graduates from the Leavenworth special wartime course. Enlisted men, the proportion should be 60 per cent instructors, infantry weapons, 20 per cent instructors, light field artillery, and 20 per cent clerks and draftsmen. If agreeable to you a portion of this personnel could be offered the possibility of selection for later permanent assignment to the Military Advisory Group on a volunteer basis. The Military Advisory Group will operate from Nanking in assisting the Chinese in the conduct of their schools and in the training of their armies.

I am trying to get some people from the States but that is a long drawn out and involved process under present conditions at home and I cannot delay the organization of the schools. The time for their opening is dictated by the situation here.¹

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. MacArthur replied that his personnel shortage in Japan was bad and getting worse; it was not physically practicable to honor Marshall's request, otherwise he would be only too glad to help. (MacArthur to Marshall, cited in Caghey to Marshall, Radio No. GOLD 273, March 3, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages].)

TO FRANK MCCARTHY

February 22, 1946
Chungking, China

Dear Frank: Katherine sent me a letter of yours to Sally which gave me your address and some knowledge of your present situation.¹ I am very glad that you are so pleasantly situated and occupied. However, I fear a little the proximity of so many dizzy blondes and animated brunettes. Pardon the liberty of the warning, but please remember that bachelors of your age with a wide experience in meeting attractive women very frequently end up by falling for the poorest bet of all. I have seen this happen time after time, and have never evolved a logical explanation of the procedure—except that good swimmers frequently drown, they are too certain of themselves.

Some one, Shepley, I believe, remarked the other day that you were a confirmed bachelor, and would never marry. I would be very sorry if he

is proven right. A wife is a very necessary part of the balance of life in a man. His judgment and efficiency will always lack, otherwise. I seem to be off on an orgy of preaching for some reason.

I started Shepley home last week. His time was up on his leave, but I hated to see him go, for he was a great assistance to me during critical periods of my negotiations.

I hope to complete the negotiations for the nationalization of the armies this afternoon. Then, if the Gimo approves the committee agreement—he had previously approved the outline of my plan—the “deed is done”. He has been away for ten days and returns day after tomorrow.

I next go on an inspection tour to Peking to see the Executive Headquarters which does all the business, and then to a number of isolated points where the Communists and Nationalists have been engaged. We will meet all the principal field commanders and explain the next steps—demobilization, reorganization and integration. I will be accompanied by the other members of the Committee—Communist Chou En-lai and Nationalist Chang Chih Chung.

Most confidentially, I then plan to make a quick trip home to be gone about four or five weeks in all. In Washington I will work on loans, surplus property, shipping, etc.

I hope to bring Mrs. M. back with me for the remaining months of my stay—until about August or September. I am going to try and have Wedemeyer made Ambassador to take my place. He will go home immediately on my return here to have a sinus operation and a rest until the early fall.

I have forced so many compromises on both sides that I am in the awkward position of being obligated by pressure from both sides to stay on and maintain a balance between the mistrusts of the two parties in their attempt to make a coalition government work.

I have lost most of the people I brought out. Byroade is Executive of the headquarters in Peking and I gave him my Master Sgt, who took Powder’s place. Shepley has gone home, which only leave me WO [Warrant Officer] Hickey of O.P.D.—now a first lieutenant, and Sgt. Wing I had at Ft Myer as cook.² Write and tell me how you are making out. Faithfully
yrs.

G. C. M.

GCMRL/F. McCarthy Papers (Correspondence, 1946–49); H

1. McCarthy had written to Sally Chamberlin to tell her of his new job address (Motion Picture Association of America in Hollywood, California) and some of his adventures in Los Angeles. (McCarthy to Chamberlin, February 1, 1946, GCMRL/F. McCarthy Papers [Correspondence, 1946–49].) After his health caused him to resign from the State Department in October 1945, McCarthy had undergone ten weeks of hospitalization and treatment for “anemia, low blood pressure, and a shoulder ailment called Bursitis.” (McCarthy to Byron Price, January 1, 1946, *ibid.*) When he learned that Marshall was going to China, McCarthy volunteered his services: “I would gladly, even eagerly, forego any other future

possibility if I could be of assistance to you." Marshall replied that he would like to have him, but it would "be doing you a very bad service to shorten your convalescence." (C. G. Heitzeberg Memorandum for General Marshall, November 28, 1945, quoting telephone messages, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) McCarthy had become assistant to the Motion Picture Association's president on February 1.

2. Richard G. Hickey had been a chief warrant officer until January 1946. He served as Marshall's secretary and attended many of the negotiating sessions. Sergeant Richard C. Wing, a Chinese American with relatives in the Canton region, was Marshall's cook and orderly.

MEETING OF THE MILITARY SUB-COMMITTEE

February 22, 1946, 4:00 P.M., Generalissimo's Aide's Office Chungking, China

THIS semester seems to have come to an end in the class," General Chang Chih-chung joked. "I hope so," teacher Marshall responded. The first issue discussed was possible public perceptions of various wordings of the agreement's formal title. The Chinese finally agreed that it should be: "Basis for Military Reorganization and for the Integration of Communist Army into the National Forces." The conferees then took up the problem of the proper intent and meaning in Chinese of the somewhat vague American term "service area." They discussed additional wording changes intended to facilitate clarity.

Marshall then moved them into a discussion of the press release on the agreement. He was reluctant to have his name on this document because of possible public relations problems; for example, the press in the U.S. would probably play up Marshall's name and not mention Chang and Chou, which might lead to resentment in China. Chang and Chou were not deterred, so Marshall agreed to sign last as an adviser. This settled, the conferees worked out various changes in the document's wording. (The text of this press release is in *China White Paper*, p. 622.)

Chou En-lai had the authority to sign the demobilization-integration agreement for the Communists, but General Chang Chih-chung first needed to confer with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 278-89.) ★

TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Radio No. GOLD 231. *Top Secret*

February 23, 1946
[Chungking, China]

General Wedemeyer will shortly propose inactivation of China Theater May 1st. Matters thereafter can be readily handled on a temporary basis by MAG [Military Advisory Group] and Seventh Fleet. I regard this action as very important to my mission as demobilization and integration procedure of Chinese armed forces carries Executive Headquarters action into Manchuria.¹ In the same connection, I am hopeful that I may be jus-

tified in proposing start of withdrawal of all of marines except transport air, housekeeping and small guard details, at an early date, possibly April 1st.² Growing Manchurian crisis with its inevitable effect on Kuomintang distrust of Communist purposes or good faith complicates my problem and position in this matter.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. On February 25 President Truman issued a directive establishing a joint army-navy Military Advisory Group for China with a maximum strength of one thousand persons. The president ordered the State Department to conduct the negotiations with the Chinese concerning the MAG. (Truman Directive, February 25, 1946, NA/RG 319 [P&O, 091 China, Item 5].) On March 26 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved document J.C.S. 1330/21, which stated that the China Theater would become inactive on May 1. (Memo for the Record, April 1, 1946, NA/RG 319 [P&O, 384 TS, Sec. 1, Case 9, Item 15].)

2. The rate of Marine withdrawal slowed during the spring and summer; there were still twenty-two thousand in China in late September. See Marshall to Under Secretary of State, September 25, 1946, p. 692.

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 233. *Top Secret*

February 23, 1946
[Chungking, China]

Dear Mr. President: Yesterday afternoon the committee on demobilization, reorganization and integration reached a final agreement on all points, carefully checked the phrasing and translation and agreed on the form for the press release. Mao Tse-tung has given Chou En-lai authority for final approval but absence of Generalissimo for past ten days leaves his representative, General Chang Chih-chung, without similar authority. Generalissimo had previously approved my draft but there have been some changes, none I think compromising his position. He returns today or tomorrow and unless his state of mind over the Manchurian issue upsets his previous views and willingness to compromise there should be no trouble in securing approval.

Another subject. James Shepley who accompanied me to China in status of State Department attache and acted as my assistant in all negotiations, frequently dealing direct for me with various principals, is returning home on expiration of leave given him by Time Corporation. He arrives in Washington Monday the twenty-fifth and can give you a complete picture of the complicated situation and various influences and of my views.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER February 23, 1946
Radio No. GOLD 236. *Top Secret* [Chungking, China]

In announcing movements to Manchuria the expression “with General Marshall approval” was used. Please have BPR [Bureau of Public Relations] omit such references. It complicates my business re Russia as well as affording CC critics¹ a chance to arouse resentment against supposed assumptions of command in China by me.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. John F. Melby, second secretary of embassy in Chungking since November 1945, observed in his memoirs: “The CC clique is the best known and most notorious faction in the Kuomintang. The basic philosophy of its leaders, the Ch’en brothers [Kuo-fu and Li-fu], is a kind of Chinese Fascism which has great appeal for the Generalissimo, who has never displayed any understanding of economics beyond Confucian feudalism. The brothers are adamant in their opposition to any agreement with the Communists. Force is the only answer. They can usually count on the support of a group of generals whose sole objective is to protect their looting of military funds. It is a formidable combination and, skilled politician that he is, the Generalissimo does not dare ignore their wishes too much. . . . It is this coalition which is meant whenever anyone in China refers to ‘reactionary elements in the Kuomintang.’” (John F. Melby, *The Mandate of Heaven: Record of a Civil War; China, 1945–49* [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968], p. 132.) According to Ch’en Li-fu, the younger but better known of the brothers, the Communists invented the pejorative “CC clique” in order to paint their vigorous and longtime enemies as reactionaries. See *The Storm Clouds Clear over China: The Memoir of Ch’en Li-fu, 1900–1993*, ed. Sidney H. Chang and Ramon H. Myers (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1994), p. 193.

OFF-THE-RECORD STATEMENT TO EDITORS¹

February 23, 1946
Chungking, China

. . . I am taking a step which I imagine is very unusual to China and particularly for a person in my position—very much as I found it necessary to do a number of times during the war in the United States. About a week ago, or 10 days ago, I thought I might ask you to come in because I feared there would be a great deal of feeling in the press on the various matters that are involved in the accomplishment of coalition government, but it appeared to me that all the press reviews I saw were in such a restrained nature that any comments by me were inappropriate, but now I feel from the events of the last few days we have arrived at a very serious situation—so serious that I thought I was justified in asking you to come in for an informal conference. I feel great reluctance to injecting myself into a purely Chinese situation. However, I have become involved in it by invitation and I am now at a very critical moment in the matter of negotiations. So I cannot escape a feeling of at least some responsibility for

the effect of what has happened. If everything I have been concerned with since I arrived out here is going to be wrecked then I think I have a very definite interest in what has happened out here. This matter was brought to a head, in my opinion, by the recent demonstration at the Executive Headquarters in Peking. That actually threatened the continued existence of that Headquarters.² If I have any correct understanding of the situation, that is one of the most important institutions in China today for the good of China—to the good of the Chinese people. If that one agency we have set up which has within its structure the ability to compromise and negotiate the various complicated situations all over North China—if that one agency is going to be torn down, then we are right back where we started when I came out here last December.

I know the character of the demonstrations as it was given publicly, but I don't accept that. I am certain that there is an ulterior motive behind this which the people involved in it are largely ignorant of, the same for the students. There is some ulterior motive in it—I cannot be convinced otherwise. Now we are just on the verge of completing a successful negotiation for the demobilization, the reorganization and the integration of the armies of China which, I believe, has been regarded as almost an insoluble problem. Now there is no question that at least some, if not all, these demonstrations have a very definite purpose beyond that which appears on the surface. Now I am certain the students quite have a perfectly justified motive, but I am not so certain that the gathering has not been inspired as a cover for rough performances by other agencies. . . .

Now when the radical groups of either side start to tear down the Executive Headquarters that is the destruction of the only practical means I see for implementing the tremendous things that have to be done to bring about a cessation of the chaotic conditions that now exist. Now I have been sent on a diplomatic mission, but I am not at all a diplomat. I only know how to deal with facts as facts in the plainest of English. I have been astonished at the unexpected ease with which we have been able to negotiate so many difficult things—the attitude here upon both sides trying to reach an acceptable solution. . . .

I have now found a situation, as I have already said, which threatens the success of our negotiations. I can think of no other way of trying to save the situation than by turning very frankly to you gentlemen of the editorial press. I ask you to understand that I am very reluctant to step out, as it were, in dealings with the situation, which is purely Chinese, but I am hopeful that through the influence of your editorials and the attitude of your papers that you can halt, or at least moderate, this present highly emotional wave that is being used for other purposes that are not at all emotional. Now some of your papers represent various interests but I am only talking about China now, I am not talking about any interests other

than China. I would like to try to analyze the situation as I see it right now and its possibilities for China.

If this Executive Headquarters is wrecked in Peiping then I see no other way, and no one has shown me any other way, of carrying out to the field the negotiations which we have now completed. If the rough character of these demonstrations go much further, you risk the loss of public opinion of America and I would like to explain to you what I think that means.

Now at least for those radicals that are probably opposed to what I am doing, it would probably terminate my mission. When you terminate my mission, you terminate a great many other things, which I don't quite see which you are going to make good for yourselves. If you are not already aware, please understand that there is a very large group in the United States who are opposed to practically anything outside of the United States and all they need is a good argument to force the Government's hands to terminate a great deal of its activities overseas. The American people and the American government do not want any soldiers out here at all. They want them home just as quickly as they can get them home. This same group are opposed to the foreign loans and opposed to almost everything that goes beyond the United States. It is a return to the old isolationism. The arguments of such a group are greatly enlarged by the assertions of other countries that the United States is endeavoring to obtain special interests in China. That has no foundation whatever in fact. It is quite the contrary. The whole effort on the part of the United States has been to help at a great expense to the United States and a great effort on the part of the United States and in spite of political difficulties in the United States.

I am going to ask Captain Eng³ to read you a press report of yesterday which refers to the accusations from outside which are really to assist in breaking down what we are trying to do to help China.

An Article in todays Daily Worker "Manchuria has long been on the tip of the tong[ue] to most American military men in China. One prominent General, in the very thick of recent headlines is known to be quite hysterical about the importance of Manchuria. Over the hard whisky glasses, he will tell anyone who is willing to listen that the United States must fight the Soviet Union within two years, and the plans for Manchuria are ideal for this noble purpose. . . . One thing is certain: though the Soviet Union recognizes Manchuria as Chinese soil, Americans should not expect the USSR to stand by idly while American generals openly talk of war on the Manchurian plains, and American officers lead Kuomintang divisions, and American big business moves to pick up the pieces of Japans empire."

Now I am not concerned about such a press statement in China, but I am much concerned about the effect of such a statement in the United States. There are many of that kind coming in now and there will be a great many more. It is all propaganda, of course. This refers to me personally. The danger is on public opinion in the United States. The danger, as I see it, to the interests of China is what happens out here if the tremendous effort the United States is now making is hindered or abolished. I am not concerned about what the public in the United States will feel at the end or in Great Britain for that matter because I can make a statement and they will all believe me, but I must not make any statement because it would destroy all my possibilities in the way of mediation out here. It seems to me that the next three months are a crisis in the history of China. I can see nothing else than a completely chaotic condition if there is a breakdown in carrying out what has been agreed to. I can certainly say that if radical elements in either side are successful in breaking down the progress thus far made, this will terminate the interests of the United States. It would seem to me that that would be utterly tragic at the present time. For example, I have had all the surplus shipping all over the world frozen, while we could select the portion that could be used to the best advantage here in China. The American navy now is supporting the troops in Manchuria with its shipping. It is moving them there and it is supplying them there. They have no basis of existence without it. We are trying to make available and we are endeavoring to assist you in obtaining crews to restore your coast-wise shipping and your river shipping as quickly as possible. We are making a tremendous effort to try to get the railroad and other equipment to restore your communications, telephones, telegraphs—everything of that nature. The United States is trying to do that. So it seems to me utterly tragic to see this thing torn down just at the moment when we are reaching a final agreement on the most difficult part of it here, that is, the integration of the Army, the demobilization of the Armies and the establishment of a normal basis for the military forces in China. I repeat again that I am not implying that students have gathered for an evil purpose—have not gathered for a evil purpose. I am asserting that those gatherings are being made use of for an evil purpose by others with an ulterior motive. I am not implying that the poor people who gathered at Executive Headquarters and ran all over the building at Executive Headquarters in Peiping did of themselves handle themselves in an evil purpose—they did not. That was an organized demonstration for another purpose of which they themselves were ignorant. I have a wealth of information from a number of sources, so I am pretty certain of what I am talking about. I am intensely concerned to try to render every assistance I can to help the people of China and I am talking mostly about the poor people of China. I am very definitely not talking about the man who may lose

his job, by some of the changes that are in prospect—I am not talking about him. I cannot sit silent and see such men do a terrible harm at the present critical situation. I felt utterly powerless to do anything to help the situation until I thought possibly by talking very frankly with you gentlemen to see if you could do it for me. The most powerful thing in the world is a free press. A democracy without a free press is a joke. I hope you can agree with me and see your way clear to do something in your papers to try to help this present situation before it reaches a final crisis. I have been talking as we say in the United States, “off the record”. I am trusting to your confidence to not quote me because that will give a great offense particularly to those that are looking for an opening such as that. I have [been] sitting through all these almost endless negotiations and have been struggling with the various small crises that we have had in the gradual growth of the Executive Headquarters and the exercise of its power over a great deal of Northern China, and I therefore wanted you to have the picture at least as I see it, whether I am right or whether I am wrong, in the hope that it might influence you to some action that might be helpful. Here is a group with all of your various interests. I am hopeful that you can do what we have done around the table—take action for China alone. We succeeded in stopping the fighting in negotiations in this room and we have had endless negotiations here about the reorganization and demobilization of the armies—again in this room. It would be a very wonderful thing to me and I think a wonderful thing to China if this meeting here today might bring forth a unified effort that would save this situation before it leads to a disaster. I repeat again for the third time that I am very reluctant to inject myself into this particular Chinese situation as now cited, but it seemed unavoidable because I could not sit silent and see this crisis develop. I am speaking purely for China. . . .

I wish you to be perfectly clear on one point. I am not asking you to support me. I am asking you to support these successful negotiations. I am nothing in this. But your PCC resolution, your cessation of hostilities and now next your reorganization of the army; those are three very great things in the interest of China. Governor Chang Chun, General Chou En-lai, General Chang Chih Chung and myself are just implements. It is the agreements that I ask that be supported. What I am asking is for your resistance to those that tear down what has been done for an ulterior motive that we are all aware of. This is the mission, I think, of a free press. . . .

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, Correspondents)

1. Thirteen Chinese editors and two members of the U.S. Embassy staff were present. Omitted portions of the document include Marshall's introductory remarks on the meeting's timing, two brief breaks while late-arrivals entered, and some praise by attendees for Marshall's efforts and Marshall's response to these at the meeting's end.

2. On February 20, “a noisy mob of 500 or more” twice invaded Executive Headquarters offices at Peiping Union Medical College and insisted upon seeing the Communist commissioner, General Yeh Chien-ying, in order to demand means to return to their homes in the outlying districts of Hopei province, “restoration of communications, cessation of Communist grain levies and other protests directed toward Communist administration in the outlying areas. Apparently no effort was made by [Nationalist] civil or military authorities to prevent entry of the mob into the corridors of the building.” The Communists subsequently “stated their reluctance to do business on the premises.” (Byroade and Robertson to Marshall, February 21, 1946, *Foreign Relations, 1946*, 9: 438–39.)

John F. Melby commented in his memoirs that by mid-February the “rioting and disorders [in Chungking] are beginning to get on Marshall’s nerves, and he is sharp about it, as he begins to suspect that he has something by the tail that is bigger than any one person. Nothing he does or says to anyone stops the violence, and this exasperates him.” On February 22, the day before Marshall’s meeting with the Chinese editors, there had been a lengthy anti-Russian get-out-of-Manchuria protest demonstration in Chungking involving over ten thousand university students. “Some nosing around,” Melby noted, “produced the fact that it had been organized by the CC clique, with a large part of the crowd participating only under the threat of having their food rations cut off for two weeks.” Following the student protest, a “CC police” mob broke into Communist headquarters, sacked the Communist newspaper’s office, and then attacked the offices of liberal newspapers. (Melby, *Mandate of Heaven*, pp. 90, 93.)

3. Of Chinese-American ancestry, Captain Ernest K. H. Eng was one of Marshall’s aides and interpreters.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALTER BEDELL SMITH [February 24, 1946]
Radio No. GOLD 237 [Chungking, China]

Congratulations on your appointment which is a splendid choice.¹ I am sorry you are to have such a heavy job with no opportunity for rest but I know of no one who could give a better performance.²

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Originals); H

1. President Truman had decided that Smith would succeed Averell Harriman as ambassador to the Soviet Union. He announced this on February 14, the day Harriman arrived in Washington and his resignation was accepted. In order for Smith to retain his military status, however, Congress had to pass special legislation; consequently, Smith was not formally appointed until March 22.

2. Smith replied: “I would have much preferred a quiet assignment but you have set the example of devotion to duty and the rest of us must follow you and do the best we can.” (Smith to Marshall, Radio No. WCL-49838, February 26, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, Messages In].)

TO COLONEL JAMES C. DAVIS
Radio No. GOLD 242. *Confidential*

February 24, 1946
[Chungking, China]

Are there any Quonsett huts surplus or which might quickly be declared surplus in Pacific? Same are urgently needed in providing shelter for government headquarters being transferred to Nanking in May. Material prices are so exorbitant, as well as limited, that rebuilding with limited local supplies only would further intensify inflation. Insofar as such huts can be gotten on boats in Pacific being sold by FLC [Foreign Liquidation Commission] to China, so much the better.¹

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Two months later, Marshall reported that an exhaustive search of South Pacific facilities had located only fourteen hundred huts, many of them in poor condition. Since neither the army nor the navy could provide personnel to dismantle and ship the huts, the Chinese government proposed to organize work battalions to do the job. Marshall suggested that a Chinese team first be sent to make a survey of the huts' condition. (Marshall Memorandum for Doctor T. V. Soong, OSE 8, May 3, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Originals].) Condition and labor problems ultimately precluded hut procurement by the Chinese.

Several times hereafter, Marshall unsuccessfully sought to acquire Quonsett huts for various uses: for example to house the U.S. Military Advisory Group in Nanking. (Marshall to Styer, Radio No. GOLD 1316, August 15, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages].)

MEETINGS WITH CHOU EN-LAI AND CHANG CHIH-CHUNG
February 25, 1946 Chungking, China

CHOU En-lai, Noon

Marshall said that by the following day he would have a schedule for the Committee of Three's trip to North China. Policies were needed that explicitly covered Manchuria, Chou suggested, in order to "avoid subsequent misunderstanding." Marshall agreed, reiterating his views on the importance of Communist cooperation with Executive Headquarters as a way of reassuring the government of Communist good faith. Marshall was critical, however, of recent Communist-inspired demonstrations at Executive Headquarters and a February 14 Central Committee press release about Communist strength in Manchuria. The latter had encouraged widespread disapproval of and attacks on Communist policy in the Nationalist and independent press. (See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 448–49.) Chou assured Marshall of Communist continued good faith and suggested that various Nationalist party cliques were plotting to disrupt the agreements. (Ibid., pp. 441–42.)

Military Sub-Committee, 4:00 P.M., Generalissimo's Aide's Office

The meeting had been called in order that the members could sign the reorganization-integration agreement. The three signed the official English-language copies in

private; they then went to the public meeting and signed the Chinese-language copies. Chang Chih-chung and Chou En-lai both praised the agreement and General Marshall for his assistance. "This agreement, I think," Marshall said in conclusion, "represents the great hope of China. I can only trust that its pages will not be soiled by a small group of irreconcilables who for a separate purpose would defeat the Chinese people in their overwhelming desire for peace and prosperity." (Ibid., pp. 291–95.) ★

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 251. *Top Secret*

February 26, 1946
[Chungking, China]

Dear Mr. President: Yesterday, Monday, at 4 PM a ceremony was made of the formal signing of the agreement for the demobilization and integration of the armies of China. There were speeches by the Government and Communist representatives each emphasizing the great importance of the agreement and of the occasion, including most generous references to me. However, I felt it necessary in my brief comments to make a direct reference to the destructive efforts of certain cliques composed of men who will lose power, position, and income as a result of the modernization of the Government. I felt it necessary to put those responsible for the recent disorderly occurrences here in Chungking and at Peking and other points on notice that I understood the character and purpose of their efforts.

The Generalissimo discussed matters with me last night until midnight and again this morning at nine o'clock. (1) He wishes to delay the announcement of Chinese troops taking part in the occupation of Japan until the successful conclusion of the meeting of the Kuomintang Central Committee, presumably between March 10th and 15th. (2) He wishes to delay sending combined teams into Manchuria until I return from a trip to be referred to later. (3) He requested me to shorten my trip in order that I would be in Chungking during the latter half of the meeting of the Central Committee, that is from May [March] 5th to 10th so that he could consult with me regarding the drafting of the constitution in particular and also in case the meeting developed precariously. He also wished Chou En-lai to be here at the same time.

The meeting of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang Party starts March 1st and is for the purpose of formally indorsing the recent resolution of the Political Consultative Conference. By this action, if it is taken, the Central Committee vacates its present power of governmental rule over China. The action of this committee would be the acid test of whether or not the Government is to proceed in good faith towards the establishment of a genuine democratic coalition.



Principal famine areas in 1946.

I am scheduled to start on an inspection trip Thursday in company with my committee associates, General Chang and General Chou, to visit Executive Headquarters in Peking and in turn the critical points in North China. We will meet and talk to the principal military leaders, endeavor to compose their difficulties and will explain to them the agreed upon procedure of demobilization and unification. We will also visit Communist Headquarters at Yen-an.

Chou En-lai wants us to visit Mukden and Changchun. I will not agree to go to Mukden if the Russians are in control there, because I feel certain that they would attribute to my appearance there every implication but the real purpose, which might create a situation more embarrassing than helpful.

I will return to Chungking March 5th to be on hand for the Central Committee meeting and to advance certain plans preliminary to the demobilization program.

About March 12th I think I should return to Washington for a short visit as there are a number of aspects of the situation I would wish to dis-

cuss with you and the Secretary of State, but I am particularly anxious to go directly into the details of certain matters regarding transfer of surplus property and shipping and with regard to loans. Also I wish to make a personal presentation of the situation here regarding UNRRA and famine conditions.¹ I should be back in China in time to balance differences that are bound to rise over the major adjustments that will then be getting under way, political as well as military.

If you approve of the foregoing I suggest that as soon as I indicate to you a definite time for my departure that you formally recall me to Washington, announcing that action at a press conference indicating the general purpose of my visit and that I am to return again to China.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Concerning the famine situation, see Marshall Memorandum for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, March 26, 1946, p. 515.

MEETINGS OF THE MILITARY SUB-COMMITTEE

February 26–27, 1946, Generalissimo's Aide's Office Chungking, China

FEBRUARY 26, 4:00 P.M.

The conferees first discussed plans for their trip to North China, and then they began a paragraph-by-paragraph examination of the draft directive to Executive Headquarters explaining its role in implementing the reorganization-integration agreement. (This draft by Marshall's staff is in *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 300–302.) They agreed to create a tripartite "Control Group" at Executive Headquarters to plan for and supervise the agreement's implementation.

The disposition of captured Japanese equipment entailed considerable discussion; Marshall ultimately agreed with the Chinese that no explicit instructions on the matter should be given to Executive Headquarters, which would thus be free to make its own temporary arrangements. The draft proposed (paragraph 7) that the divisions to be retained by each side be notified and assembled in their general areas, but General Chang observed that both the government and the Communists would be better off integrating (or amalgamating) their respective divisions prior to demobilization rather than trying to name sixty specific existing divisions to be retained in toto. Marshall thought it unwise to modify the recently signed demobilization agreement so soon, so the conferees agreed that the meeting minutes would reflect their agreement that each side carry out some divisional amalgamation prior to demobilization. Executive Headquarters, Marshall emphasized, was not going to tell the Chinese which divisions to amalgamate or retain, but it did need to know the designation of the divisions to be retained at the end of twelve and then eighteen months under the agreement. Chou and Chang agreed. The three then discussed division size and organization.

The tenth and final paragraph was a list of "detailed logistic and administrative plans for personnel to be demobilized" that Executive Headquarters was to prepare. One of these was the Demobilized Manpower Commission, which Marshall said was important for the Chinese to have and was similar in operation to the U.S. Veterans Bureau. General Kuo Chi-chiao, deputy chief of the Chinese General Staff, then out-

lined the government's plans to employ demobilized personnel, particularly officers. (Ibid., pp. 302–17.)

February 27, 10:00 A.M.

The discussion resumed with General Kuo presenting the War Ministry's suggested revisions of section 10. Marshall thought that some matters Kuo had included should not be undertaken by Executive Headquarters but by government agencies. He suggested that Brigadier General Paul W. Caraway study General Kuo's suggestions and that in the meantime they omit references to the specific areas regarding demobilization for which Executive Headquarters was to plan. The Chinese agreed that the modified directive was acceptable. (The final version of this document, dated March 16, 1946, is in *China White Paper*, pp. 626–27.)

Marshall then had Generals Chang and Chou examine three draft letters to Chiang Kai-shek: "Organization of Service Areas," "The Peace Preservation Corps," and "Formation of Demobilized Manpower Commission." Chou and Chang quickly approved the first but postponed the second and third pending further study. Marshall suggested that the government and the Communists designate one or more officers to work with the small American planners' committee he had established under General Caraway. The committee's job would be to see that the language and content of the army integration instructions were understandable and in accordance with Chinese military procedures before implementation of the directives was handed over to Executive Headquarters. "You are accepting the proposition of westernizing your armies according to our democratic system and at the same time undertaking a vast demobilization," Marshall said, "so I think it is very important to give the most careful consideration to an effort to solve this problem with as little variance to Chinese methods and traditions as possible." Marshall described his "education" during World War I in the problems of inter-allied understanding when a complete failure of French and American railroad engineers to understand one another's techniques and ideas delayed a battle for five days.

Both Generals Chang and Chou agreed that Chinese officers had much to learn from the Americans and expressed their appreciation for Marshall's attitude. The meeting concluded with a discussion of the forthcoming North China trip and how to handle possible press questions with regard to the cease-fire order's applicability to Manchuria, which was still being considered. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 317–26.) ★

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM JAMES R. SHEPLEY
Top Secret

February 28, 1946
Washington, D.C.

In accordance with your instructions I have prepared the following written report on General Marshall's negotiations in China.¹

When General Marshall arrived in China to carry out your directive it was necessary for him to make an exact estimate of an extremely complex military and political situation. It was essential that he accurately gauge:

1. The military capabilities of the opposing armies of the National Government and of the Communist Party.

2. The degree of willingness of the controlling leaders of the Communist and Kuomintang (Government) Parties to resolve their differences by political means and end the civil war then in progress.

3. The effect of your statement of American policy with regard to China.²

4. The Soviet objectives with regard to China and the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the U.S.S.R.

Immediately upon his arrival in China on December 20, General Marshall conferred with General Wedemeyer and the Chiefs of all his Staff sections. He then proceeded to Nanking where he met the Generalissimo and had his first official discussions with him, at the Generalissimo's request, the night of his arrival.

From Nanking General Marshall went to Chungking where for 10 days he made himself available to all who desired to see him. In this period he heard representatives of all major factions in the country.

General Marshall's initial estimates of the unknown factors stated above (which throughout his mission have remained largely unchanged) were:

1. That neither the National nor the Communist Armies had the capability to bring about a military decision with their own resources, and accordingly, without the intervention of foreign powers, a stalemate was likely to result and produce a China divided between at least two independent governments and possibly three.

2. That both the National Government and the Communist Party were willing to negotiate so long as they could win their own objectives by political means, and that both sides were filled with such a deep-seated distrust of the good faith of the other that no concrete results were likely ever to result from such negotiations if the Chinese factions were left to themselves.

3. That your statement had an extremely healthy effect throughout China. It had clearly opened the way for American assistance in bringing about a peaceful settlement.

4. That the Soviet objectives in China and the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the U.S.S.R. were extremely obscure but, insofar as they could be judged, made it all the more imperative that the Chinese factions reach a political settlement.

In addition to his deepseated distrust of the Chinese Communists the Generalissimo was extremely fearful of his and their relationships with Russia. His first statements to General Marshall were in this vein and he

repeated them on almost every occasion. It seemed at first that his views might be colored by the thought that he might thus be able to press the United States into supporting the Central Government in the liquidation of the Communists. However, with the more recent developments of Russian failure to leave Manchuria on the agreed date of February 1 and their heavy demands for economic concessions, he seemed to have more justifiable grounds for his grave concern.

General Marshall concluded that so long as there remained in existence an independent Communist Government and independent Communist Army, China was highly vulnerable to undercover Soviet infiltration, which could result in the Communists overthrowing the Generalissimo by force of arms. It was his opinion that the Communist forces which lay across the throat of the strategic areas of North China and controlled the vital north-south railways, could not be liquidated by National forces without full-scale American intervention both in the movement of Chinese forces with American equipment and the use of American personnel, possibly even combat forces.

Since this was utterly out of the question the Generalissimo would be left unable to eliminate Communist Armies, which, with their backs to Soviet Siberia, could easily be supplied and equipped and led under cover by the Soviets.

The only hope of maintaining a sovereign China appeared to lie in a political settlement which would present a unified nation to the world and force any other power that might be intent upon creating a puppet China to do so by overt aggression.

The Generalissimo clearly was not, and will not be for many years, in any position to defend himself against armed Soviet aggression. His only hope and sovereign China's only hope in the event the Soviets should make hostile moves was to place China in the position of a victim of open aggression and hope for the same world support that was drawn to the victims of German and Japanese aggression.

General Marshall proceeded to attempt to carry out your instructions, to strive for a cessation of hostilities in China, a coalition government in which all factions might participate in the government, and the integration of autonomous armies into the national armies of the Republic.

Each step along the way was extremely laborious and required extremes of tact and patience and diplomacy. The Chinese were able to agree to almost anything in general and almost nothing in specific; and even when they were able to agree on specific terms they had not the slightest conception of how to put agreements into operation.

Basically, General Marshall was able to convince the Generalissimo that it was imperative to him to get an agreement which would put an end to the independent Communist Government and Army, and that this

would require concession on his part. General Marshall was able also to convince the Generalissimo that without such an agreement it was politically impossible for the American Government to make available the aid to China which she needs so critically. Essentially, this was the way in which the Government was brought to make the necessary concessions which produced the agreement, but it was far less simple than this mere statement. The Generalissimo was continually unable to relate his general logic to the day by day incidents that occurred in the negotiations with the Communists.

The cessation of hostilities, for example, was brought about only after General Marshall went to the Generalissimo late at night and prevailed upon him to discontinue efforts to take over the provinces of Jehol and Chahar. The Generalissimo was determined to move into these two provinces, both before and after the truce, to gain only a minor advantage, and continued to fail to perceive that he was risking everything. In this course he was urged continually by his generals and the Kuomintang irrecconcilables who were not and never have been in sympathy with, nor understood the vital necessity for the agreement. These “diehard” elements of the Kuomintang present one of the Generalissimo’s most serious problems at this time. It is likely that the Generalissimo can handle them, but before the progress in China that is now promised becomes certain, there will undoubtedly be many tense moments precipitated by the “diehards”.

The political agreements in the Political Consultative Assembly were effected only after General Marshall prepared a complete draft charter for a coalition Government, which specifically stated the method in which it would be brought about and guaranteed the freedoms on which the minority elements in China were so insistent. This was done in the utmost secrecy by General Marshall so as to preserve “face” for the Generalissimo and must remain secret at the risk of nullifying all that has been accomplished so far.

The agreement on the consolidation of the armies and the demobilization was accomplished through the preparation of concrete and specific schedules by competent American staff officers borrowed from General Wedemeyer. The Chinese themselves seemed to have no idea about how to proceed.

It is this inability of the Chinese to carry out even the things they agree to in good faith that is so critical in the present and in the future situation. The Executive Headquarters which General Marshall created to carry out the cessation of hostilities on the ground is one of the most essential operations now going on in China. It would be utterly hopeless to expect the Chinese to carry out their present agreements without the most detailed and exact kind of American assistance. Because of its success in bringing about the truce, the Executive Headquarters is already a powerful instru-

ment in the unification of China. So long as it is supported by this Government with highly competent personnel its chances of doing an unprecedented job of combining two armies, both of which have been fighting for years and neither of which has been defeated, remain from even to good. Without American assistance and "know how" there is no chance. This same principle is true of all that is going forward in China at this moment. Without the most liberal kind of American aid and the best expert personnel we can provide, the chances of the new coalition Government to succeed are dismal.

The Chinese Government must have in the next few years generous quantities of American money, American machinery and equipment and personnel, and American guidance, or it is almost certainly foredoomed to collapse.

If the efforts to make this coalition Government effective should fail we can reasonably expect that China will revert to political and economic chaos and break up into many small autonomous war-lord-dominated areas, which would be easy prey for the Soviet if it is her intent to make a puppet of China and a great temptation for the Soviet if that is not her present intent.

At the same time General Marshall feels strongly that this American assistance must be made available to China with the utmost of efficiency and skill. Since it will be necessary for us to prop up the Chinese militarily, economically, financially, and politically for some time, there will be unquestionably many different groups of American experts and advisers and missions and individuals loose in the country. It will be chaotic if these groups are not placed under a single authority and coordinated toward a single objective, which must be the policy fixed by the President for our relations with China. This will require that all American groups and missions in China be placed under the direct control of the Ambassador. At the same time the effort must be coordinated carefully in Washington, just as the office established by General Marshall under Colonel Davis has been doing thus far.

The man who is made Ambassador to China must necessarily be of the highest type. He must, General Marshall believes, have a certain amount of prestige in the world at large and in this country and must at the same time have no record of prejudice or advocacy which would irritate either the Chinese nationalists or the Chinese communists. He must be a man competent to control and administer all of the various groups and missions which we will send to China and he must be a man who will receive his orders from the President and carry them out faithfully.

General Marshall has been searching for some time for a name to suggest to you for this appointment. General Wedemeyer seems to meet the many-sided requirements for the job.

His own plans are now fairly definite, as he radioed you this week.³ He hopes, with your approval, to leave China about the 12th of March in order to consult with you personally and return soon enough to keep the preliminary moves of the Army consolidation and governmental consolidation well on the track. He is desirous, with your approval, of completing his mission by no later than mid-summer and feels that it would be highly beneficial if the appointment of the Ambassador could be made in time for him to help the new man on his way.

General Marshall feels that no international situation which involves this country is more important than that which will exist for the next 18 months in China. He feels that it is imperative that China receive all the assistance from this country that is necessary to start her toward conversion into an effective, peaceful, democratic, modern nation. It is of equal importance that the United States give its assistance with careful regard for Chinese “face”. Several “leaks” in Washington which created the impression in China that General Marshall was to conduct high-handed negotiations threatened for a time to damage the great effect of your well-phrased statement of policy. Dr. Soong, for example, was exceedingly hard to work with on this account for nearly two months, and put General Marshall to considerable effort to get on a basis of understanding with him.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, Memoranda-Messages-Cables)

1. Marshall had arranged to have Shepley visit President Truman. (See Marshall to Truman, February 23, 1946, p. 469.) Shepley saw Truman on February 27, but “the President was harassed by an appointment jam and an upcoming cabinet meeting,” and he directed Shepley to distill his remarks in a memorandum. Shepley summarized his memorandum in a February 28 message to Marshall, part of which is in *Foreign Relations, 1946*, 9: 446–47.

2. See “U. S. Policy Towards China,” December 15, 1945, *Foreign Relations, 1945*, 7: 770–73.

3. See Marshall to Truman, February 26, 1946, pp. 478–79.

WITH significant progress seemingly being made toward solving the key military problems of cessation of hostilities and military reorganization and integration, Marshall desired that the Committee of Three visit Executive Headquarters in Peiping and various trouble spots in northern China where Truce Teams were active; Chou En-lai convinced him to include Communist headquarters in Yen-an. The visits would allow the Committee of Three to impress upon local military and political leaders American-Nationalist-Communist solidarity, explain in detail the meaning and importance of the various agreements, and reinforce the importance of the tripartite Executive Headquarters and its Truce Teams as local mediators. The schedule called for the group to visit and receive briefings at Peiping (February 28), Kalgan and Chining (March 1), Tsi-

nan and Hsuchow (March 2), Hsinhsiang and Taiyuan (March 3), Kueisui and Yen-an (March 4), and Hankow (March 5).


Flying in Marshall's C-54 transport plane, Chou En-lai, Chang Chih-chung, Marshall, and thirteen aides and assistants departed on the morning of February 28. After the hectic weeks of meetings and negotiations in Chungking, Embassy Second Secretary John F. Melby observed: "There is a nice dopey lull today because Marshall took off early for Peiping." (Melby, *Mandate of Heaven*, p. 96.) At 1:00 P.M. their thousand-mile trip ended at Peiping's West Field, which was operated by the U.S. Marine Corps Twenty-fifth Air Group. They were met by a large delegation of local Chinese military leaders and members of the Executive Headquarters staff. At 4:00 P.M. the visitors were briefed on the military situation in North China (see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 453-62). After this, Generals Chang and Chou offered some brief remarks to the headquarters staff. Marshall took the opportunity to speak at length. ★

REMARKS AT GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

February [28], 1946
[Peiping, China]

*Remarks by General Marshall at meeting of the Committee of Three
with commissioners and officers of Executive Headquarters*

As a member of the Committee of Three responsible for creation of this Executive Headquarters, I wish to express my thanks to the commissioners personally and to all the members of the staff for the splendid manner in which you have carried out your difficult duties up to the present time. Your task was extraordinarily difficult; you had to organize yourselves and become acquainted with each other at the very moment it was most necessary that you bring to bear your influence and direction to terminate hostilities. The tremendous area of country involved and the general lack of communications have added much to the difficulty of your mission. I wish, particularly, to express my personal thanks to the members of the field teams who have really had the hardest and most important task of all. It is not so very difficult to reach a general agreement on a policy gathered around a table at Chungking, or Washington, or London perhaps. The real test is in carrying that policy into successful execution, which the little teams of three men from this headquarters have succeeded in doing. They have individually and as a small group made an inestimable contribution to the peace and future prosperity of Eastern Asia.



The Committee of Three's Visit to North China.

What I wish particularly to say to you is this. Your headquarters, I think, is somewhat unique in the world's history. Two warring factions with the assistance of a neutral agency have actually formed a large and highly efficient administrative and executive headquarters, whose agencies reach over great distances and into remote regions. Your headquarters is rapidly becoming a unified group operating with remarkable efficiency. The continued development of this unity of purpose and this efficiency of execution is becoming of greater and greater importance to China and that means to the world because the peace and prosperity of China is of outstanding importance to the world at large.

You are soon to be given an additional task. One even more important and more difficult than that of terminating hostilities. In Chungking an agreement has been reached for the unification of the armies of China and

for the demobilization of most of the troops. Extraordinary to report, it was not very difficult to reach an agreement on this problem which many feared was almost insoluble by peaceful means, but such an agreement has been reached and it will become, at an early date, the mission of this headquarters and its field teams to transmit the orders and supervise the execution of the demobilization and reorganization involved.

I am confident that with the experience you already have had and with the daily increase of your regard and respect for each other and your spirit of cooperation that this exceedingly important and complicated task will be carried out with high spirit for the good of the Chinese people and for the prosperity and dignity of China.

Many individuals will be called upon to make what may seem to them at this time, great personal sacrifices. Some must sacrifice but I think the majority will profit greatly. The prosperity of China is directly dependent upon your execution of this new mission. The prosperity of China will mean the prosperity and happiness of all Chinese. The tremendous resources of China, the industry of its people, the demand of the world for its products all should combine to free the people from their present distress and lift China to its rightful position among the nations of the world.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Originals)

MEETING WITH MAO TSE-TUNG
March 4, 1946 Yen-an, China

CHAIRMAN Mao thanked Marshall for his efforts in China and promised that the Communist party would abide by the terms of the agreements they had signed. Marshall said that he was gratified by this spirit and praised Chou En-lai's cooperation. He had noticed on both sides signs of considerable reluctance to proceed and evident distrust. Obstructionist cliques were to be expected but definitely not tolerated. He was encouraged by pledges of cooperation he had received from local leaders during the Committee of Three trip. Stability and unification were needed to justify U.S. economic aid to China, which was essential.

They then discussed the applicability of the cessation of hostilities agreement to Manchuria and the possibility of dispatching Executive Headquarters Field Teams there. The time had come, Marshall said, when political differences had to be set aside for future discussion, the interests of the individual had to yield to that of the majority, and all efforts had to be directed to the good of China and its people. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 501-2.) ★

TO JAMES R. SHEPLEY
Radio No. GOLD 281. *Top Secret*

March 6, 1946
[Chungking, China]

Returned few hours ago from trip through North China and to border of Inner Mongolia, some three thousand miles. I found your message of March 1st. Many thanks. Am contacting Soong regarding Beal and Reston.¹

Took commissioners with me on travels. I found our presence was urgently needed and had most happy results. We saw principal leaders, talked with extreme frankness and terminated almost all of the complications some of which were threatening. Sieges or encirclements productive of starvation and animated by presence of puppet troops were abolished. Resistance to opening of communication work was terminated. All commanders were brought to an understanding of the much more important things before us. They without exception assure me in most emphatic terms that they would comply with complete loyalty and energetically to the terms of all agreements, they would put aside their differences and bitter feelings during this critical period. I had completely frank conversations with the old warlord present Governor at Taiyuan² and Mao Tse-tung at Yen-an. If reiteration after reiteration of intention to cooperate in every way means anything, I think we are on the way to immediate clearing up of conditions throughout North China. We arrived just in time I think and the results I believe will be highly beneficial. I believe Chou had to deal pretty strongly with some of his people and Chang much the same.

I plan to send the President a wire tonight reporting on my trip and the situation and as directed by him notifying him that I wish his message of recall to be sent immediately and his statement given to the press that I was being brought home to report on various details and would return to China. I will probably leave here no repeat no later than the twelfth and will probably fly straight through without spending any time en route. I will bring nobody home with me except Sergeant Wing and will drop him on the West Coast for a visit home.³

I hope you get another opportunity to talk to the President. I received your message regarding the Secretary of State business.⁴ I am beginning to think that maybe that would be my only way of escape from this burden.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Marshall thought that the Chinese government should consider the American press's reaction to certain of its policies. He had protested to officials about "the harm they were causing, but Marshall felt cautionary advice would be more effective if the government heard it from someone independent of his mission. The Chinese, he concluded, needed an adviser familiar with both U. S. Government thinking and American public opinion. Accordingly he suggested that they hire an American adviser for this purpose. The Chinese

government promptly agreed but since it was his idea they asked him to find a suitable candidate." (John Robinson Beal, *Marshall in China* [New York: Doubleday and Company, 1970], p. 4.) T. V. Soong rejected the first three candidates suggested by General Wedemeyer, so Marshall asked Shepley to present some others. (Marshall to Shepley, Radio No. GOLD 240, February 24, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages].) In his March 1 message, Shepley nominated John R. Beal, Washington news editor for *Time* magazine, and Scott B. Reston of the *New York Times*. (Shepley to Marshall, March 1, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Reports to the President].) For further developments, see Marshall to Soong, March 18, 1946, p. 509.

2. General Yen Hsi-shan had been governor of Shansi province, whose capital was Taiyuan, between 1912 and 1927 and again since 1943. In 1930, he had fought a major separatist war against Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists.

3. Wing's home was in Hanford, California.

4. Shepley had told Marshall about a March 4 story by Constantine Brown at the top of the first page of the *Washington Star* asserting that Marshall was to become secretary of state because the president was displeased with James Byrnes's negotiations at the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference. Shepley thought the story was "a calculated attempt to embarrass the secretary irregardless of the fact that it embarrasses you at the same time." (Shepley to Marshall, Radio No. WAR-99329, March 5, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, Messages In].)

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 282. *Top Secret*

March 6, 1946
[Chungking, China]

Dear Mr. President: I returned today from about a three thousand mile flight through North China to the borders of Inner Mongolia taking with me my two associates on the committee for the cessation of hostilities and the committee for the demobilization and reorganization of the army, also the three Commissioners from Executive Headquarters at Peking. We saw almost all the principal commanders in the field. We found a number of difficulties which could have soon become dangerous situations. All of these I think have been straightened out and a general understanding promoted throughout the region. There was every indication that affairs would clear up quickly and communications be reopened and normal life for the poor civilians actually gotten under way. A number of the field commanders were feeling deeply over local matters and we were able to lift them to an appreciation of the much larger issues at stake. They all promised complete cooperation. I had a long talk with Mao Tze-tung at Yen-an and I was frank to an extreme.¹ He showed no resentment and gave me every assurance of cooperation. My reception everywhere was enthusiastic and in cities tumultuous.

I think we are now ready to start on the demobilization and reorganization. Shortage of American officers to be present as the middle men at the scene of these various procedures is my greatest difficulty at this

time. The presence of an American in such circumstances will be mandatory for some time to come. The officers we have had on these little teams of three men² scattered about at isolated posts in China have performed an amazing task. A single American with a Communist and Government representative on his committee and with communications almost non-existent will have to dominate a region larger than Pennsylvania and bring factions who have been at war for eighteen years to a peaceful understanding and communications restored. Airplanes have made the work possible, but what has been done in the field has been really astounding in its magnitude and importance considering the small number of Americans who have made the task possible of realization. Our men have been splendid and are performing a great service for China and for American prestige. I will take this officer shortage up with the War Department on my return.

I request that you send a message recalling me home on receipt of this radio and that announcement be made to the press accordingly as suggested in my previous message (GOLD 251).³ I am planning to leave here between the tenth and twelfth and to fly straight through without overnight stop.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. See the summary of this March 4 meeting on p. 488.
2. Truce or field teams were led by three officers (usually colonels), but typically they also included two or three dozen others: interpreters, assistants, radio operators, drivers, cooks, and guards.
3. GOLD 251 is Marshall to Truman, February 26, 1946, pp. 477–79. The official March 7 recall message (received by Marshall late on March 8) is in *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 511.

TO WAR DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
Radio No. GOLD 285. *Top Secret*

March 7, 1946
[Chungking, China]

In reply to message from President AmEmbassy 352 February 26 [27], my early departure from China and other circumstances make it inadvisable in my opinion for me to undertake negotiations for contract regarding MAG.¹ I propose the following, that General Gillem now here who is eventually to be the head of the group and who in the interim will be representing me during my absence and will shortly take over the position of American Commissioner with Executive Headquarters, to supervise the carrying out of the demobilization and reorganization of the Chinese armies, be designated to initiate negotiations with Chinese Government officials immediately but on an informal basis determining their probable

acquiescence or otherwise to the general terms indicated in JCS 1330 series.² Gillem would then communicate this to the official in the State Department designated to finalize the negotiations. A direct liaison between these two individuals should facilitate an early completion of these negotiations.

Another subject: For General Handy. Inform VMI Board that Middleton is outstanding but I am certain is unavailable. Allen and Gruenther are very able but I am uncertain as to local Lexington reaction as to their sharp efficiency. MacLyan and Persons are unknown to me unless it is our congressional Persons. Ruffner I have just met and merely have a knowledge of high opinions expressed regarding him.³

Another subject: For Bowen pass following to Admiral Byrd. Thanks for your message and more thanks for the part I know you played in the operation.⁴ Another subject: For Hull. I will shortly return and will wish to talk to you and Paul immediately regarding officer situation in China in view of demobilization and reorganization program. Meanwhile please have someone look into this possibility: Gillem tells me that a number of the old type officers were pressing him for a job. I imagine that the War Department is finding difficulty in placing men of this type as it always did in my day. Now out here we have exactly the place for the older officers with the rank of lieutenant colonel and colonel, jobs where age is equally important as rank. Practically every phase of the elaborate agreements reached require the presence of an American officer at the place of execution, otherwise the projects fall apart in the midst of dissensions developed through 18 years of fighting. My expression "at the place" refers to areas in many cases as extensive as Pennsylvania or New York state minus their communications. The American officer stands between the Communist and the Government representative and is not only the adjudicator and source of confidence in the integrity of the procedure but he is the individual who deals directly with the various Chinese high commanders in the region. Those on the twenty-three teams now in the field have done an amazing job but it has been heartbreaking in the circumstances because of the tremendous areas involved and the multitude of crises with only one individual and a jeep to conduct the battle. Strange to say these older American officers who were carrying out the job have entered into it enthusiastically and have given a splendid performance living under conditions of considerable hardship in remote regions. Their recompense has been that individually they have in effect dominated the great areas and have been welcomed by the inhabitants in tumultuous receptions in various communities and looked up to as the hope for common people. We need as many of this type as we can possibly get and we need them immediately for a year's service.

Another subject: I found it necessary to propose the establishment of an elementary school for Communist company officers and for battalion, regimental and division commanders and principle staff officers. A three months course for the juniors to prepare them to carry out the reorganization of their troops into divisions without any intention of teaching them field tactics merely instructing them in the organization of companies and battalions and the higher staffs, the method of functioning, the principle weapons and their care and some elementary knowledge of their use. This has been necessary in order to secure the early integration of Communist armies with National armies otherwise the prospective loss of face by the completely unorganized swarms of Communist soldiers made integration impossible before the lapse of at least a year. I tried to borrow on a short term basis 60 young officers from MacArthur but he wires me that he is 27 percent short and can do nothing for me.⁵ For much of this work sergeants would suffice. I expect to utilize MAG to the limit and that institution will be charged with the conduct of the school. Wedemeyer is here today and he and I are endeavoring to see what he can leave behind in the closing out of China Theater to help in this project. With the growing Manchurian crisis this business of integration is of dominant importance to the United States (no localitis involved)⁶ and a very serious effort will have to be made to expedite the integration to enable China to present a solid front to the Russian infiltration.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. President Truman's message stated that he had officially directed that a Military Advisory Group [MAG] to China be established and that the State Department conduct the necessary negotiations. Secretary of State Byrnes had asked that Marshall conduct the negotiations. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 823.)

2. The original 1945 Joint Chiefs of Staff paper 1330 on China Theater issues had evolved into a whole series as sections of the original document were modified. By the time Marshall left for China, the series included: J.C.S. 1330/7, "U.S. Military Responsibility in Training and Equipment of Chinese Armed Forces"; J.C.S. 1330/8, "Directive for Inactivation of China Theater"; and J.C.S. 1330/11, "U.S. Military Advisory Group to China."

3. Thomas T. Handy, a 1914 graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, had written that their alma mater's Board of Visitors wanted Marshall's views on several candidates for superintendent to replace Major General Charles E. Kilbourne—V.M.I.'s superintendent since 1937 who was planning to retire at the end of the current school year. (Handy to Marshall, Radio No. WAR-98513, February 27, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, Messages In].) Marshall himself had consented to become a member of the V.M.I. Board of Visitors as soon as this was permitted by a law then under consideration by the Virginia General Assembly.

The persons mentioned are: Lieutenant General Troy H. Middleton, former Eighth Corps commander; Major General Leven C. Allen, former Twelfth Army Group chief of staff; Major General Alfred M. Gruenther, former chief of staff of Fifteenth Army Group, had recently become deputy commandant of the National War College; "MacLyan" is perhaps Lieutenant General Raymond S. McLain, former Nineteenth Corps commander and

then U.S. Army assistant chief of information; Major General Wilton B. Persons had been chief of the Office of the Chief of Staff's Legislative and Liaison Division since 1942; Major General Clark L. Ruffner (V.M.I., 1924) had been chief of staff of U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

4. Rear Admiral Richard E. Byrd had written: "Five Star bill passed House today unanimously. Congratulations. Everything agreeable." (Byrd to Marshall, February 28, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, Messages In].)

Since the inception of the drive to legislate a five-star rank (General of the Army, Admiral of the Fleet), the famous polar explorer had been one of the U.S. Navy's chief proponents. Originally a temporary wartime measure, the rank was made permanent for the eight men who held it (Marshall, MacArthur, Eisenhower, Arnold, Leahy, King, Nimitz, and Halsey [Bradley was added later]) by legislation approved by President Truman on March 23, 1946. At his March 28 press conference, "the President said the action creates an elder statesmen's organization of national defense wherein wartime leadership will be available in peacetime on a consultative basis." The rank was for life and included wartime salary and benefits. (*New York Times*, March 29, 1946, pp. 1, 13.)

5. See Marshall to MacArthur, February 22, 1946, pp. 465-66.

6. *Localitis* was Marshall's word for the tendency of a commander to think that *his* most important problems or concerns were or ought to be those of higher command or the nation. Marshall learned the dangers of such thinking during World War I. (See *George C. Marshall Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue*, 3d ed. [Lexington, Va.: George C. Marshall Foundation, 1996], p. 211; George C. Marshall, *Memoirs of My Services in the World War* [Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976], pp. 120-21.) The people who had worked with Marshall knew that a suggestion by him that *localitis* might be infecting a command was a serious criticism; see Eisenhower's reaction in February 1944 to such a charge in *Papers of GCM*, 4: 271-72.

TO JAMES F. BYRNES
Radio No. GOLD 286. *Top Secret*

March 7, 1946
[Chungking, China]

Dear Mr. Secretary: General Wedemeyer informs me that the evacuation and repatriation of Japanese is now proceeding at a rapid rate from China proper and that shipping now involved in this procedure will be gradually liberated starting April 15th unless Japanese personnel from Manchuria reaches the ports ready for embarkation.

The Japanese soldiers of Manchuria are in the hands of the Russians. Japanese civilians are scattered about in the country but we have no data regarding them except in the few places occupied by Chinese troops.

What procedure should be followed? (a) I might write directly and somewhat informally to the Russian Ambassador here stating the shipping situation and requesting him to ascertain whether or not the Russian Government wished to turn over the Japanese soldiers at Dairen or other port or elsewhere for shipment home and making much the same inquiry regarding Japanese civilians or (b) the State Department make the inquiry.

The point is that unless we receive early advice this shipping will be lost to the movement.¹

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Byrnes replied that he thought option (a) was better. He also noted that the Soviets had told him in December that the Japanese troops in Manchuria had been disarmed and moved to Soviet territory. With regard to Japanese civilians, the secretary of state agreed that it was a good idea for the U.S. to offer the shipping, but he did not wish to “make an issue of the matter at this time should the Soviets prove reluctant to accept the offer.” (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 890.)

TO BRIGADIER GENERAL HENRY A. BYROADE
Radio No. GOLD 291. *Confidential*

March 8, 1946
[Chungking, China]

Prior to my departure at Hankow I intended to again take up with you the question of taking better care of the members of your headquarters serving in the field. However, I finally decided not to harass you further at that time. I feel strongly about this and desire that you immediately designate an officer or preferably a good non-commissioned officer whose duty it is to see that these people receive constant attention. This is mandatory if we are to hope for successful operations and continued high morale. You know how I feel about elaborate planning and long delays. I want action along simple lines so that every plane carries something, not merely *The Stars and Stripes*.

Another subject: In connection with the foregoing reference to “every plane” I was not favorably impressed by the fact that the staff officer in charge of teams had not himself made any trips into the field prior to my inspection.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

MEETING OF THE MILITARY SUB-COMMITTEE

March 9, 1946, 3:00 P.M., Generalissimo's Aide's Office Chungking, China

CHOU En-lai requested the meeting in order to discuss the status of Communist divisions surrounded near Hankow (Hupeh province) and Canton (Kwangtung province). Chou reported on Communist-Nationalist talks regarding the withdrawal, in part due to food shortages, by rail of some forty thousand Communist troops north of Hankow and the demobilization of another twenty thousand. The government opposed the move because the Communists had to pass through hundreds of miles of Nationalist troops (they were surrounded by nine government armies) and because

there were food and transportation shortages. The government preferred to try to feed the Communists in place; Chou objected that this would not solve the reorganization problems. Marshall expressed concern that field commanders might object to various other impending movements and demobilizations under the military reorganization plan to which the two sides had already agreed. Generals Chang and Chou agreed that they would meet to discuss Hupeh province's food problems and would postpone for two weeks consideration of the troop movement issue.

The conferees then considered the two or three thousand Communist troops surrounded in south China's Kwangtung province, where the government's local commander had asserted that the cease-fire order did not apply. All three agreed that the local commander was wrong in his interpretation of the cease-fire agreement, and Marshall said that he would inquire of Admiral Cooke as to whether the U.S. Navy might evacuate the Communist units.

The committee concluded the session with a discussion of problems relating to reopening the railroads. Marshall wrote instructions to Executive Headquarters directing its Railway Control Section to confer with the Ministry of Communications regarding creation of a unified administration for all railroads and the inclusion of Communist personnel in repair efforts. There was a brief discussion of the directive's wording, but Marshall had to leave for a meeting with Chiang Kai-shek before the text could be agreed upon. The conferees decided to meet again on March 11. (*Foreign Relations, 1946, 9: 516-28.*) ★

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER
Radio No. GOLD 306. *Secret*

March 9, 1946
[Chungking, China]

We have a dangerous spot in vicinity of Canton, about 3000 Communists driven into hiding by Government troops under Chang Fa-kuei who declares them bandits.¹ The proposal is to remove Communists by water to Chefoo. Please query Cooke as to availability of LST or other vessels for such evacuation at an early date. I would suggest that a small port distant from Canton be selected for assembly, medical examination and preparation, etc. General Chou has man in Chungking who knows present hide outs of Communist personnel.²

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Chang Fa-kuei had been commanding general of Second Regional Command since 1945 and a member of the Kuomintang Central Supervisory Committee since 1931.

2. General Chang raised numerous issues that delayed the evacuation, but it was finally made between June 26 and July 6 by three U.S. Navy LSTs that moved 2,081 soldiers, 419 women and children, and some supplies. Another 781 Communist troops were demobilized and left behind. (See NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Political Affairs, Canton Communists] and *Foreign Relations, 1946, 9: 614-711 passim.*)

DRAFT INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXECUTIVE
HEADQUARTERS¹

[March 9, 1946]
[Chungking, China]

Basis for entry of field teams into Manchuria

1. The teams should accompany government troops, keeping clear of places still under Russian occupation
2. They should proceed to points of conflict or close contact between government and Communist troops and bring about a cessation of fighting and the necessary readjustments to avoid future trouble
3. The government troops are authorized to occupy any places necessary to the reestablishment of the sovereignty of China and are to exclusively occupy a strip 30 kilometers wide either side of the two railroads mention in the Sino-Soviet treaty.²
4. The Communist troops will evacuate any places to be occupied by the government troops for the reestablishment of sovereignty, communities, coal mines, utilities, etc.
5. The Communist troops will not be permitted to move in and occupy places evacuated by Russian troops.³

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Originals); H

1. This document—handwritten by Marshall, presumably on the evening of March 9 when he met with Chiang Kai-shek at the latter's country estate outside Chungking—was approved in principle by the Generalissimo. The next day, according to a memorandum by Marshall, Chiang said that he was “loath to have any representative from Executive Headquarters in Manchuria for the reason that he assumed Communist desire for such representation was based on the idea that the Russians would demand and secure equal representation along with American officers,” and the Russians would make every effort to favor the Communists. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 528–29.)

2. This treaty had been signed in Moscow on August 14, 1945; see *China White Paper*, pp. 585–87. One of the treaty's numerous accompanying agreements concerned the creation of the joint Sino-Soviet “Chinese Changchun Railway” by combining the Chinese Eastern and the South Manchurian railways. *Ibid.*, p. 593.

3. When he returned to the U.S. Embassy on March 10, Marshall had a triple-spaced modified version typed, which was his usual way of preparing a document for further revisions. The chief differences between his handwritten version and the one he gave to Chou En-lai and Chang Chih-chung were: (1) the addition of a new paragraph 1 asserting that “the mission of the teams will pertain solely to military matters”; (2) the addition of “they should visit Communist commanders and headquarters” to paragraph 2 (renumbered to be paragraph 3); and combining paragraphs 4 and 5 into a new paragraph 5. The draft used for consideration by the Military Sub-Committee is in *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 543.

TO APPOLON ALEXANDROVICH PETROV¹

March 9, 1946
Chungking, China

My dear Mr. Ambassador: General Wedemeyer, and Admiral Cooke

(Commander of American Navy in Far East) inform me that the evacuation and repatriation to Japan of Japanese military and civilian personnel from China is now proceeding so rapidly (about ten thousand individuals a day) that shipping now involved in this procedure will be gradually liberated commencing April 15th next.

I would appreciate your ascertaining for me the view of your government regarding the evacuation of Japanese military and civilian personnel in Manchuria. If personnel of this character can be made available at Manchurian ports commencing April 15th, the excess shipping referred to above can be devoted to the repatriation of these people in steadily increasing numbers as the evacuation from China approaches completion.

Your early advice will be appreciated as the orders for the shipping concerned must be issued well in advance, either for its demobilization or for the repatriation referred to.² Faithfully yours,

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Political Affairs, Manchuria)

1. The Soviet ambassador to China, Petrov was suspicious of Marshall's role and successes. His reports to Stalin were increasingly negative, asserting that Marshall's real objectives were to secure a U.S. foothold in Manchuria and to buy time in order to build up Nationalist forces. Not only had Marshall played "the ugly role of Chiang Kai-shek's herald," Petrov reported, but he had allied himself with "reactionary Republicans and Democrats [in the U.S.], with strong support of the Army and Navy." (Quoted in Westad, "Could the Chinese Civil War Have Been Avoided?" in Bland, ed., *Marshall's Mediation Mission*, p. 512.)

2. On April 27, Marshall reminded Petrov that he had yet to receive a reply to his letter. According to the Chinese army, he said, there were about eight hundred thousand Japanese in the area between Darien and Mukden, and the U.S. wanted to send a repatriation team to Dairen "to coordinate movements of the Japanese." On May 14, Marshall wrote to Walter Bedell Smith, U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, to have him prod the Soviet Foreign Ministry. "I doubt if you can help but it might be that you could dispel any idea of a deep diplomatic plot in my action and get them to treat it as it is: as purely business to utilize shipping without delays. As to Japanese military prisoners, they could merely remain silent as to that." (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 892-93.)

Petrov responded on July 4 that Soviet military authorities proposed to deliver the Japanese to U.S. ships at Darien and other Manchurian ports; the details of the operation were to be worked out with MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo. By the end of 1946, over one million Japanese had been repatriated from Manchuria: 17,361 military personnel and 993,476 civilians. (*Ibid.*, pp. 906, 910.)

TO WALTER S. ROBERTSON AND BRIGADIER
GENERAL HENRY A. BYROADE
Secret, Eyes Only

[March 10?, 1946]
[Chungking, China]

Instructions are being sent to cover the dispatch of field teams into Manchuria. These instructions are self-explanatory. I desire that great care be taken in the selection of the U.S. membership of the teams and that the American officer be given these secret instructions.

“In the event that a Russian demand is made for representation with the team during its transaction of business, the American member will acquiesce with casual politeness, not consulting the Russian as to detailed procedure, but merely informing him of when a meeting is to be held or a visit is to be made by either party. The representative from the Central Government will make no comment whatever. It is hoped that the American can carry the ball without discussion. Should the Russian object to the procedure or the decisions in such a manner as to create an issue, the American should make certain that that issue is clearly defined, and if it is important and there is not, in his opinion, reasonable justification for the Russian attitude, the matter will be reported to the Executive Headquarters and in turn to the Committee of Three for consideration on this level.”

I am leaving tomorrow for the United States and General Gillem will represent me on the Committee during my absence.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Originals)

TO COLONEL JAMES C. DAVIS
Radio No. GOLD 311. *Secret*

March 10, 1946
[Chungking, China]

Rumblings here from both American and Chinese sides indicate that Ralph Olmstead is not the man for UNRRA Director of Operations in China, the post which he now holds.¹ Aside from Olmstead's reported arbitrary and confusing administrative procedure, there is the additional complication that his opposite in CNRRA is reported to be an incompetent.² It has been suggested that Mr. Franklin Ray, Director of UNRRA's office for the Far East with full powers to take necessary organizational measures should proceed here immediately to investigate. Please investigate this matter quietly with the object of informing me upon arrival exactly what I should do in Washington.³

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Ralph W. Olmstead was a lawyer who had spent World War II in a number of U.S. government food and commodity positions. A lieutenant colonel, he had been sent to the China Theater by Army Service Forces in 1945 to survey the food situation. In November 1945 he joined the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in China. Marshall had asked Wedemeyer to comment on Olmstead's abilities. Wedemeyer replied that he had not been favorably impressed: “I think he is able talker and not repeat not able doer.” (Wedemeyer to Marshall, Radio No. CFB-22101, February 2, 1946, NA/RG 332 [Headquarters U.S. Forces China Theater, Wedemeyer Subject Files, Eyes Alone and Personal Radio File, Item 1486].)

2. The government of China created a special agency in January 1945—the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (C.N.R.R.A.)—to negotiate with U.N.R.R.A. and to administer and coordinate relief and rehabilitation operations in China. The Basic Agreement between the two organizations was signed in Chungking on November 13, 1945. In the early months of operations, according to the U.N.R.R.A.'s official history, relations between C.N.R.R.A. and the China Office of U.N.R.R.A. were "marred by disagreements, inefficiency, and considerable friction." The C.N.R.R.A. organization could not "keep pace with the rapid piling up of U.N.R.R.A. supplies in the ports, with the result that the U.N.R.R.A. China Office began, in February and March 1946, to assume increasing functions in direct distribution" of supplies in China. (George Woodbridge et al., *UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration*, 2 vols. [New York: Columbia University Press, 1950], 2: 374, 376, 381.)

3. J. Franklin Ray, Jr., soon became acting director of the China Office in Shanghai, although Olmstead did not turn in his resignation until June 1. To the China Office's dismay, Olmstead became a personal adviser to T. V. Soong; he asserted that Ray was *persona non grata* with Soong. (Lowell W. Rooks to State Department, June 1, 1946, and Monnett B. Davis to State Department, Radio No. 1047, June 12, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Division of Chinese Affairs, UNRRA].)

MEETINGS WITH CHOU EN-LAI AND CHANG CHIH-CHUNG March 11, 1946 Chungking, China

CHOU En-lai

According to the minutes kept by the Communist delegation, Chou did nearly all the talking. He began with an analysis of Marshall's draft of an agreement to send field teams into Manchuria. (See Draft Instructions for Executive Headquarters, March 9, 1946, p. 497.) Chou was opposed to paragraph No. 1, which directed the teams to confine their activities "solely to military matters." "I am of the opinion that the big problem lies in the separation of military and political aspects of the matter," Chou said. "This makes it difficult for us to accept, and particularly difficult in convincing our armed forces in the Northeast." The recent withdrawal of Soviet troops from south Manchuria and Chiang Kai-shek's acquiescence to having field teams in the region meant that a Nationalist-Communist political-military settlement could be achieved.

In response to Marshall's question the previous day about the relationship between the Chinese Communist party and the Soviet Union, Chou admitted that while there were "some similarities in theoretical aspects," the two nations were "definitely" separate. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 535–38. John Melby noted in his memoir that on March 9 "We had a rough session on Manchuria with Marshall this morning. He is furious about the Russian looting; and he is irritated that the Communists, although not defending the Russian actions, remain silent about them. He has insisted all along that the Communists are just that ideologically, but that they are without ties to Moscow. Now he is not so sure they are not playing the Russian game, and he is in a mood to demand categorical assurances that no ties exist [he says he believes the American Communists have such ties] or he will wash his hands of them." [Melby, *Mandate of Heaven*, p. 98.]

Committee of Three Meeting, 3:00 P.M., Generalissimo's Aide's Office

Chou En-lai began by reiterating a number of the points he had made to Marshall that morning about the proposed instructions to Executive Headquarters. He thought that the Committee of Three needed to decide what places government troops were to take over and the procedure for accomplishing this and to have the field teams sent out at once. He recommended another Committee of Three trip to Manchuria. General Chang thought that the Committee of Three did not have a mandate to discuss civil and political affairs, although he supported sending the truce teams into Manchuria to “clarify the situation” (i.e., stop hostilities), after which political questions could “easily be solved.” Both Chou and Chang restated their positions and agreed with Marshall’s suggestion that further consideration be postponed for a few days. “I think it is very important to get the teams up there” (i.e., into southern Manchuria) immediately, Marshall asserted. The problem was left for the committee to settle during Marshall’s absence in the United States. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 543–53.) ★

WHAT Marshall termed a “heavy cold,” caught a few days prior to his departure for Washington, “was not improved by the trip.” (Marshall to Winston S. Churchill, June 18, 1946, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [China Mission, General]; Marshall to Cordell Hull, March 20, 1946, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].) The four-day ordeal (over fifty-eight hours in the air in his bed-equipped C-54) was broken only by brief stops. After Tokyo, where he had lunch with General and Mrs. MacArthur, he flew on to Wake Island, Hickam Field (Honolulu, Hawaii), and Long Beach, California.

In Los Angeles, Frank McCarthy arranged a dinner for Marshall at Frank Capra’s home. The conversation there concerned the impact of films on public opinion. Recalling the success of the “Why We Fight” series and other wartime Hollywood films, McCarthy noted that Marshall

indicated his strong feeling that the motion picture could be used to tremendous advantage in the democratization of China. He has stated his belief that he could raise money from Chinese sources, possibly with U. S. philanthropic assistance, for the production of a number of helpful films, most of which would be documentary shorts—one to explain the Supreme Court, another the Congress, a third the relationship of the States to the Federal Union, etc. Perhaps there would also be films of feature length. Towards the end of the series, practical steps in the application of our principles to the Chinese structure would be shown. General Marshall has asked Mr. Capra to advise him as to how the production of these films, using the highest Hollywood professional standards, could best be achieved.

Frank Capra later wrote to Marshall that he and McCarthy were proposing to create a nonprofit, independent production company to make the films, but the idea never developed beyond the conceptual stage. (Memorandum for Mr. [Eric] Johnston and Mr. [Donald] Nelson, no date, by McCarthy but to be signed by film producers Frank Capra, Robert Riskin, and David O. Selznick, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [China Mission, General]; Capra to Marshall, April 4, 1946, *ibid.*)

Reaching the Washington, D.C., airport at mid-morning on March 15, Marshall was met by a large group that included Mrs. Marshall, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower. That afternoon he met with Secretary of State James Byrnes, and the two of them went to the White House where Marshall reported on his mission. The subsequent four weeks Marshall would soon describe as “the busiest, most closely engaged period of my experience, not even excepting wartime.” (Marshall to Churchill, June 18, 1946, *ibid.*) ★

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT¹

March 13, 1946

En Route Tokyo to Wake Island

Subject: Oral Statements of Views of Chinese Central Government
And Communist Party Reference Situation as of 10 March
1946, in Personal Conversations with General Marshall.

There are attached a statement by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and another by General Chou En-lai made to me in my final conversations with these two officials just prior to my departure from Chungking for the United States. I dictated my recollection of the Generalissimo's statement and had Chou En-Lai's Secretary-Interpreter write up his notes of Chou's oral statement.²

In reading these papers it should be borne in mind that they represent views expressed during a most critical situation in Manchuria and in the heat of a political struggle within the governing Central Committee of the Kuomintang Party—a Committee which *rules* China and whose officials and subordinates down the line hold their position of power and personal income by virtue of that Committee's rule, now due to be abdicated to a coalition government.

Another fact bears on the interpretation of these statements. So far *no measures have been taken* to suppress the fighting and the struggle for favorable position in Manchuria. It has required two months and a personal visit by me to bring all the Central Government and Communist leaders in the field into line in accordance with the terms of the Cease Firing agreement—halt of all movements, restoration of communications and evacuation of Japanese. Lack of communications makes it very difficult not only to reach leaders, but especially to reach the commanders of brigades, regiments and independent or guerilla groups.

In Manchuria the situation as to communications and leadership is far more difficult than in North China. The Communist forces are large—about 300,000, but little more than loosely organized bands. It has been all but impossible for the Yen-an headquarters to reach the leaders. On the Central Government side the leaders have been free to place their own interpretation on orders or agreements—complicated by the Government public announcement that the Executive Headquarters had no jurisdiction in Manchuria. This was an unjustified statement, as the agreement of January 10th for Cease Firing included Manchuria.

Now, on the night of my departure from Chungking, I succeeded in getting an agreement for the immediate entry of field teams from Executive Headquarters into Manchuria. I was notified the same evening that the American Consul was amicably received in Dairen. The Consul for Mukden is en route by rail, which the Russian troops have evacuated.

I will make no predictions at this writing—enroute Tokio to Wake Island, delaying such report until the further developments of the situation become known to me on my arrival in Washington.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Return to China File)

1. Marshall wrote on another copy of the memorandum: “Read to the President and copy delivered to Sec. of State.” (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 541.)

2. Marshall’s memorandum of his conversation with Chiang Kai-shek noted the Generalissimo’s concern about Communist intentions and dependability as a negotiating partner. Chiang hoped that any U.S. loans to China would come without announced conditions. A positive outcome of the Manchurian situation for China, Chiang asserted, depended upon the United States taking a strong stand towards the Soviet Union. Marshall observed that Chiang was “using his great influence to bring the recalcitrant leaders of the Kuomintang Central Committee into line” on the issues of cease-fire, demobilization, and reorganization. (*Ibid.*, pp. 528–29.)

Chou En-lai’s lengthy March 10 statement insisted that the Communists had been quite reasonable and blamed the Manchurian problems on the Nationalists. The Soviets, and subsequently the Nationalists, Chou said, had mainly occupied the larger cities on rail lines, and the Communists had simply moved into the vacuum in the countryside and organized the people there. He blamed “irreconcilable elements” within the Nationalist party, who were “reluctant to give up the power of one-party dictatorship,” for the recent civil disturbances and propaganda attacks, to which the Communists had been forced to reply. (*Ibid.*, pp. 529–35.)

PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT¹

March 16, 1946
Washington, D.C.

General G. Marshall, holding his first press conference today since his return yesterday from three month mission in China as President Truman's personal representative, told of progress being made in uniting that country, and of importance of its unity to the world.

"If the world wants peace", he said, "China's effort must succeed, and that success will depend largely on other nations."

General Marshall revealed that he will be going back to China soon.

General Marshall authorized direct quotation of the following statement made at the beginning of his press conference:

"The Chinese people are engaged in an effort which I think should command the cooperation of the entire world. It is an effort almost without precedent. Their leaders are making daily progress towards the settlement by peaceful discussion of deep-seated and bitter conflicts over the past twenty years.

"They are succeeding in terminating the hostilities of the past twenty years. They have reached agreements and are now engaged in the business of demobilizing vast military forces and unifying, and integrating the remaining forces into a national army. They have agreed to the basic principles for the achievement in China of political and economic advances which were centuries coming to western democracies.

"If we are to have peace, if the world wants peace, there are compelling reasons why China's present effort must succeed and its success will depend in a large measure on action of other nations. If China is ignored or if there is scheming to thwart the development of unity and present aspirations, why of course, their efforts inevitably will fail.

"The United States, I think, at the present time is best able to render material assistance to China. I feel quite certain of the sympathetic interest of the U.S. people in China, but I am not quite so certain as to their understanding or the understanding of their political leaders of the vital importance to the United States of the success of the present Chinese efforts towards unity and economic stability if we are to have the continued peace we hope for in the Pacific.

"Incidentally, I do not believe any nation can find justification for suspicion as to our motives in China. We are asking for no special preferences of any kind whatsoever regarding economic or similar matters. We are placing no price on our friendship. I must say, though that we have a vital interest in a stable government in China and I am using the word 'vital' in its accurate sense.

"The next few months are of tremendous importance to the Chinese people and, I think, to the future peace of the world. I am now using that term

in its longer sense, that is, through the years. Stable governments in Asia are of great importance to us not to mention what they mean to the people who have suffered to a degree which the Chinese have during the past decade.

“I have met on every hand the most generous reception, the most remarkable reception, I might say, and it seemed to me a very understanding cooperation towards whatever efforts I might be making. The situation of course has been most complicated throughout my brief stay in China, first by the disturbed conditions in this country,² in the army in the Pacific,³ and then later by the critical state of affairs in Manchuria.

“Despite these difficulties I think tremendous progress has been made.

“I would like to have you understand something of an organization that has been established in Peiping which we call Executive Headquarters. That is the most important instrument we have in China at the present time. Agreements are all very well but unless you have a means for carrying them out, particularly when they are intended to resolve bitter differences of large groups of people, you must have some means of implementing those agreements.

“So we have in Peiping a headquarters consisting of three commissioners, the Chairman of which is an American, the other two members representing the Government and the Communist party, and then we have an American Chief of Staff and under him is a group of about 250 officers. The core of the organization is American with the representatives of the National Government on one side and the Communists on the other, and they are brought together with this framework of an American staff. They are represented out in the field throughout the critical portions of China by little teams of three men, one American, one Governmental representative and one Communist representative, and the force and effect of these agreements and the detailed orders to carry them into effect are in that way carried upon the group at the scene of the trouble, whether it is fighting, whether it is restoration of communications, whether it is relieving the encirclement of a city, the evacuation of Japanese, or, as is now coming up, the demobilization, reorganization, and integration of the armed forces in China.

“We would have gotten nowhere without that headquarters. It is absolutely essential in every step of the way in connection with these agreements which have application to the military situation which of course includes communications.

“Now the last evening I was in China, up to ten minutes before my departure, we were reaching agreements regarding sending those teams into Manchuria. We reached a general agreement and they had certain details to work out after my departure. They should be on their way now.

“It is of great importance that they get there as soon as possible. You must understand that it is exceedingly difficult with the best intentions in

the world to transmit orders where there are very limited radio communications and almost no highway communications over these great forces [that] are not well-knit organized units. I found it necessary to make a trip of about 3,500 miles to the principal region where there was still trouble. I was accompanied by the Government representative and part of his staff, and the Communist representative with part of his staff.

"I found in the case of the latter, they hadn't seen some of the leaders, for two years and had very limited communications with them from time to time. We were able to resolve almost every difficulty once we got the people together. It was very remarkable how quickly we could straighten out what seemingly were impossible conditions and which had their tragic effect on the Chinese people. A single conference of a few hours in an afternoon would raise the encirclement of what amounted to ten or twenty besieged cities where people were starving. It only took that long to straighten out but until we arrived nothing could be done.

"Now in Manchuria they have no representative of the Executive Headquarters there up to this time. The situation has been very fluid, troops moving here and there and of course all sorts of minor clashes occurring. There is no doubt whatever in my mind in many instances, particularly on the communist side, that they are almost unaware of the agreement we have reached, therefore, it is most important that we have these teams appear in that country as quickly as possible.

"I would like to say the American officers in these small groups are rendering a very remarkable service not only under the difficult conditions of the task but under extremely difficult conditions of life. I repeat again that without the headquarters of the nature that we have established in Peiping with its representatives, it would be literally impossible to carry out any of these agreements, even with the best intentions of the world at the top.

"I saw General MacArthur in Japan and talked over with him the representation of Chinese troops in the army of occupation. He was very happy to have them and I think you will shortly read of an announcement by the Generalissimo to that effect."

NA/RG 407 (Operations Reports, History—Peiping Executive Headquarters, Appendix 5)

1. On March 20, Executive Headquarters sent copies in English and Chinese to all field team personnel.

2. The news in the United States during Marshall's mission had heretofore been dominated by labor-management problems. Despite Truman administration efforts after the war's end, the number, size, and duration of strikes increased rapidly. Marshall had hardly arrived in China when the auto industry strike (targeting the General Motors Corporation) began; this 113-day strike was finally settled during Marshall's trip to Washington. Meanwhile, there had been a pattern-setting steel strike and wage agreement. By the time Marshall reached the U.S. capital, the rate of inflation was beginning to rise rapidly, and there were many indications that labor-management disputes would escalate.

3. The pace of manpower demobilization proceeded more rapidly than anticipated after the war's end, and by late 1945, President Truman and the army's planners were increasingly worried that the ground and air forces would fall below the July 1, 1946, target of 1,550,000. On January 4, 1946, the War Department issued a press release noting that nearly 5,000,000 people had been separated from the service, but that this pace had to slow down. "If all shipping now available were used to the maximum, all men overseas who will become eligible for return could be brought back in three months, but such a program would cripple the Army in carrying out its occupational duties and those incident to closing out various supply and other installations overseas. . . . There will be about 1,553,000 men to be shipped home over a period of six months rather than three months." (John C. Sparrow, *History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army* [Washington: GPO, 1951], pp. 320–21.)

This announcement, combined with a number of other factors—including a well-publicized press statement by Secretary of War Robert Patterson during his tour of Pacific bases that seemed to imply that he did not know how demobilization was going—led to two days of large-scale soldiers' protest meetings in Manila on January 6 and 7 and soon thereafter in other cities, including London, Paris, and Shanghai. (Ibid., pp. 164–67.)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALVAN C. GILLEM, JR.
Radio No. WAR-80896. *Secret*

March 16, 1946
Washington, D.C.

Personal to Gillem from General Marshall. Have received your GOLD 320, 334 and 335. Announcement to press referred to in 320 was OK by me.¹

Reference 335: Inform Smyth there is no objection to completing consular personnel in Dairen and Mukden.²

Do not commit yourself to any agreement to extend school course for Communists beyond three month period and character of course I outlined. That would be a fatal mistake.³

Reference 335 Yu Ta-wei, I think amalgamation of our scheme with War Minister's scheme of Service Area organizations is a practical procedure.⁴

I am seeing Generals Hull, Paul, and Vandenberg this morning on the general situation particularly with reference to personnel and will let you know the results later.⁵ Please send me messages every day or two outlining the developments, political as well as military but not lengthy political resume, merely whether or not a breach of faith on PCC commitments is threatened.

I secured General MacArthur's agreement to a reinforced division of fifteen thousand men into Japan in June and radioed Wedemeyer from Tokyo to that effect requesting an announcement by Gimo and indicating language for announcement. I have wired Wedemeyer to know why no announcement has been made.⁶ This is unfortunate in regard to the effect here and my meeting with the press this morning and negotiations of following three days.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, Memoranda-Messages-Cables)

1. Gillem's GOLD 320 reported on news articles in the March 12 Nationalist and Communist papers in Chungking—obviously released by Chang Chih-chung and Chou En-lai without Marshall's concurrence—noting that the Military Sub-Committee had agreed to include Manchuria under Executive Headquarters jurisdiction and to dispatch field teams into the region. (Gillem to Richardson for Marshall, March 12, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages].)

2. Preliminary arrangements had been made with the Soviets to reestablish U.S. consular representation in Dairen. See *Foreign Relations, 1946*, 10: 1153–1200.

3. Chou En-lai had presented Gillem a memorandum on March 14 suggesting a six-month officer training course that was larger and more sophisticated than the two three-month courses Marshall had proposed. (Gillem to Marshall, Radio No. GOLD 335, March 15, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages].)

4. General Yu Ta-wei, vice minister of war, met with Gillem to discuss modifying the service area organizations his government was establishing to coincide with American ideas regarding the eight service areas into which the nation was to be divided. (Ibid.)

5. Lieutenant General John E. Hull was chief of operations (O.P.D.), Major General Willard S. Paul was chief of personnel (G-1), and Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg was chief of intelligence (G-2).

6. Wedemeyer replied that he had “promptly relayed” Marshall's message to Chiang Kai-shek. (Wedemeyer to Marshall, Radio No. CFB-25905, March 18, 1946, NA/RG 332 [Headquarters U.S. Forces China Theater, Wedemeyer Subject Files].) Occasional but ultimately fruitless discussions of the occupation forces issue continued for several months.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALVAN C. GILLEM, JR.
Radio No. WAR-80978. *Secret*

March 18, 1946
Washington, D.C.

Acknowledging your GOLD 339, please express my appreciation to the Generalissimo for his message which I have just transmitted to the President and the Secretary of State.¹ You may also tell him that I have been in conference with the President and the Secretary and also with the Import-Export Bank head, the Under Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Clayton, regarding Chinese matters.² I am to have an interview Wednesday with the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems and should then be able to clear the way for early negotiations regarding all matters financial and materiel relating to China.³

New subject: If you have not gotten an agreement regarding teams in Manchuria having in view the fact that the [Nationalist] Sixth Army has taken over Mukden, I do not think it wise for you to delay your trip to Mukden any longer. It is urgently necessary to get someone on the ground quickly and if there is to be a prolonged bickering over the matter you had best precipitate the matter by going yourself with Chou En-lai and with or without General Chang. Further delay may be fatal.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, Memoranda-Messages-Cables)

1. In GOLD 339, Gillem said that four conferences on the status of field teams for Manchuria had failed to settle the issue, but he was still optimistic. Chiang Kai-shek had requested that Gillem forward a message to Marshall expressing his optimism about the likely outcome of the current Nationalist Party Central Committee meetings regarding Manchuria and asking that Marshall “not worry about the anxieties I expressed to you before you left Chungking.” (Gillem to Marshall, March 17, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages].)

2. William McChesney Martin, Jr., had been president of the Export-Import Bank of Washington since February 1946. Dean G. Acheson was under secretary of state, and William L. Clayton had been assistant secretary of state for economic affairs since December 1944.

3. Under the Bretton Woods Agreement Act (59 Stat. 512), the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems was created in the Department of the Treasury on July 31, 1945, as a policy coordinating group.

To T. V. SOONG
Radio No. WAR-80983. *Secret*

March 18, 1946
Washington, D.C.

Personal to Gillem from Marshall. Please pass the following to Doctor T. V. Soong: “I propose John R. Beal, Washington news editor of Time magazine, as best available man to act as advisor to the Chinese government on foreign press and political relations. He has been a very able and distinguished Washington correspondent for the past fifteen years. He knows the United States Congress intimately and also the ramifications of government departments and influences. He is prepared to consider the job favorably on the basis of one year’s sabbatical leave from Time magazine. If you consider him favorably please radio me the terms you propose and I will have Shepley discuss details with him.”¹

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, Memoranda-Messages-Cables)

1. Beal was surprised when James R. Shepley suggested the assignment to him, as he had no expertise in East Asian affairs. “Your mission,” Shepley replied, “will be to keep the Chinese out of trouble with the United States.” (See note 1, Marshall to Shepley, March 6, 1946, pp. 489–90.) Although he was familiar with some of the common American perceptions of the Nationalists and the Communists in China, Beal recalled being surprised to hear his State Department briefer assert that “T. V. Soong is the greatest crook in the world.” Given the importance and worrisome vagueness of his assignment, Beal decided to keep a journal, the edited version of which was published in 1970 as *Marshall in China*. Marshall told Beal to get to China as quickly as possible, and he arrived in Shanghai on April 28. (Beal, *Marshall in China*, pp. 4–6.)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALVAN C. GILLEM, JR.
Radio No. WAR-81547. *Top Secret*

March 21, 1946
Washington, D.C.

Personal to Gillem from Marshall. Have just read your GOLD 344.¹ You will have to force an agreement quickly regarding entry of teams into Manchuria. Remember I worded those stipulations, hurriedly dictating them after a conversation with the Generalissimo. It seems to me that you could get a concession from each side sufficient to permit entry of teams. You will have to force the issue. We cannot delay any longer. If there is to be further delay over the teams I feel you yourself must go to Mukden. I am not in agreement with the opinion of Byroade and you that the Committee of Three loses face in the matter. Face will be lost if the fighting develops more seriously in Manchuria and spreads south into Jehol. That will be the serious consideration, not face.²

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, Memoranda-Messages-Cables)

1. On March 23, Gillem reported that Chang Chih-chung and Chou En-lai had held three meetings. Chou had received U.S. air transportation to Yen-an to obtain instructions on the field teams issue. Chiang Kai-shek told Gillem that he was greatly concerned over the failure of the Communists to agree to send the teams into Manchuria. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 590.)

2. Gillem replied on March 23 that negotiations continued to be delayed by Chou En-lai's visit to Yen-an. Gillem had contacted Chang Chih-chung, who indicated that the Chinese government was willing to make concessions in order to get an agreement from the Communists to send truce teams into Manchuria. (*Ibid.*, pp. 593-94.) Colonel J. Hart Caughey, who had gone to Yen-an to talk to Chou, told Gillem on March 23 that Chou's trip had been provoked by the lack of agreement or action concerning evacuating the Communist forces surrounded near Canton and north of Hankow. Chou promised to return to Chungking if he could secure agreement from the government on certain modifications to the instructions to Executive Headquarters regarding field teams. (*Ibid.*, pp. 596-97.) Chou returned to Chungking on March 25, and the instructions agreement was signed the following day. (See *ibid.*, pp. 603, 605.)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER
Radio No. WAR-81632. *Secret*

March 22, 1946
Washington, D.C.

Personal to Wedemeyer from Marshall. A Navy decision has just been made here to the following general effect: An increase in CINCPAC's post-war establishment of 20 LST and 30 LSM on basis that 10 LST's and 15 LSM's must be deactivated by 1 September and 10 LST's and 15 LSM's by 1 March 1947.¹ These craft will be crewed by 100 percent Navy personnel amounting to 170 officers and 1650 men.

Admiral Towers talked to me about this in Honolulu and again this morning over the phone in Washington where he now is.² Towers states that the increase was to enable Cooke to meet the military requirements of troop movements and supply for Chinese armies and was not provided for UNRRA work. I stated that the UNRRA delivery of supplies up the Yangtze had decided military implications as the non-availability of food and rail materiel for reopening of communications, and so forth, in light of famine conditions and existing Communist-National Government troop deployments could too easily lead to renewed and uncontrollable fighting. Therefore I thought it quite possible that we would accept certain delays of troop movements in order to reopen immediately the movement of supplies up the river. He acquiesced to the utilization of Cooke's increased shipping for this purpose.

Please discuss this with Cooke and see if you can get UNRRA stuff going up to Hankow as soon as possible, and if any specialists can be borrowed from LST's or LSM's to run some fuel oil up to the storage tanks near Chungking.³

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, Memoranda-Messages-Cables)

1. The U.S. Navy's shallow-draft landing vessels varied considerably in structure, equipment, and purpose. Those longer than two hundred feet were designated landing ships; those under that size were landing craft. The primary military function of an LST (landing ship, tank) was to carry vehicles; the smaller LSM (landing ship, medium) was designed to supply the beach after the landing had been effected.

2. John H. Towers, a naval airman and planner, had been promoted to admiral in November 1945 and given command of the Pacific Fleet and the Pacific Ocean Areas.

3. On March 28, Marshall repeated his request that personnel from LSTs and LSMs be temporarily assigned to small boats to make fuel-oil runs up the Yangtze River. "Navigation between Hankow and Chungking is literally at a standstill because of both lack of vessels and particularly lack of fuel oil in the storage tanks near Chungking. . . . It appears to me of great importance to facilitate the navigation of the upper reaches of the Yangtze." (Marshall to Commanding General U.S. Forces China Theater [Wedemeyer], March 28, 1946, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [China Mission, Memoranda-Messages-Cables].)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HULL
FROM COLONEL LAWRENCE J. LINCOLN¹
Top Secret

March 22, 1946
Washington, D.C.

1. Attached hereto are views expressed by General Marshall in a conference with Asiatic Section and Colonel Davis on Friday, 22nd March. Some of the points covered were not as clearly stated as the attached notes might indicate. The conference lasted over an hour during which General Marshall did practically all of the talking.

2. The following action is being taken pertinent to the points raised by General Marshall:

a. Radio to China to clarify total requirements under the reoccupation [*reorganization*] program and the training equipment program.

b. Radio to China in attempt to get a phased requirement in terms of divisions of the Peace Time Army Program.

c. Radio to CINCAFPAC instructing him to retain the 10 Division sets in Japan pending clarification of their disposition.²

d. Radio to CHINA, CINCAFPAC, etc. for information clearing up certain loose ends pertinent to the above subjects, as to nomenclature, etc.

e. Radio to China giving War Department views on MAG organization.

NOTE: All the above radios have been prepared or are in process of preparation.

f. G-4 has agreed to brief General Marshall on the surplus property picture with particular attention to the 10 Divisions in Japan. Actually, it doesn't appear that G-4 can give a definite answer to the question in General Marshall's mind as to whether the 10 Division sets are needed to meet U.S. Army requirements.

g. The JWPC [Joint War Plans Committee] are writing a paper on the inactivation of China Theater. Presumably, this will contain a proposed directive governing the set up in the post-inactivation period. Asiatic Section will convey the pertinent views of Gen. Marshall to the JWPC.

I. General Comments on Organization after Inactivation –

1. On inactivation of China Theater—give a very general directive about the U.S. Army organization in China. The relationships, etc. must be worked out on the ground. A C.G. [commanding general] of all the U.S. Army forces in China seemed OK.

2. MAG [Military Advisory Group] must be somewhat operational for about 18 months. (See Part II for details on MAG operations).

3. All U.S. activities vis a vis the Chinese Government in China will funnel through the Ambassador.

4. He didn't favor Peiping for any overall administrative control (He was quite definite that MAG should do it). He said some logistical-administrative agency would be necessary in Shanghai.

II. Part II—Comments on MAG. –

1. Present staff in Nanking working on MAG matters are involved in

a self-consuming operation and producing nothing. Their ideas are far too elaborate.

2. He violently disapproved of China's suggested MAG organization as being too complex and over-staffed. He wants workers—not brass hats!

3. He violently objects to inflated rank as proposed by ASF [Army Service Forces] (3 stars to start with and two later on for head of group is OK)

4. The titles of the various sections should be such as to connote their advisory duties rather than the conventional terms (G-1, G-2, etc.) now used.

5. Except for schools the MAG's big job won't start for two years or more. (This relates to China Theater's scheme of 40 Divisions (inactive), 10 (active) and any other major reorganization of Chinese Army.)

III. Equipment for Chinese Units.

1. National Units shouldn't need much equipment to take care of their initial requirements under the integration and reorganization plan which reduces them to 50 divisions.

2. The Communists will need enough to give them "face". The artillery now arranged for (11 Batteries) will be sufficient initially. The Infantry now arranged for (11 Battalions—ALPHA) will probably be insufficient. They must be given this several weeks before integrating with the Central Government Forces.

3. As regards the 10 divisions (U.S.) of equipment now in Japan, can it be sold to China as surplus or can it be delivered prior to 30 June under Lend-Lease?³ He was doubtful of the political acceptability of the latter. He was quite definite in his desire to have all or part of this available for the Communists unless it cut across U.S. Army requirements.

L. J. L.

NA/RG 165 (OPD, 384, Sec. I, Case 14)

1. Lincoln (U.S.M.A., 1933) was head of the Operations Division's Asiatic Section.

2. A "division set" was the equipment needed to outfit a division under the T/O&E (Table of Organization and Equipment).

3. The legal authority to transfer material under the Lend-Lease Act would cease as of June 30, 1946, unless a purchase agreement had been negotiated with the recipient nation. At this time, there were efforts in Congress to pass legislation granting the government authority to transfer equipment for the peacetime Chinese Army program. (Operations Division to CINCAFPAC, Radio No. WARX-84657, April 16, 1946, NA/RG 165 [OCS, CCS, 452 China, Sec. 6].)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE¹

March 26, 1946
[Washington, D.C.]

The following is a proposed announcement by you, if this proves necessary relative to American forces in China.² It is the result of a compromise between certain Naval complications in the theater and Army proposals. I hope it will prove satisfactory.

"The so-called China theater of operations will be inactivated on May 1 next. As a result, the only United States Forces, other than Naval, remaining in China will consist of those required to dispose of surplus U. S. property, to complete assistance to the Chinese Government in the repatriation of the Japanese and in the movement of Chinese armies and equipment, and to participate in the operation of Executive Headquarters in Peiping which was established by the President's Special Envoy, General Marshall to implement the agreements he reached with the representatives of the Chinese Government and the Communist Party to terminate hostilities, restore communications, and effect demobilization and reorganization of the armies.

"In anticipation of this inactivation the U. S. Army Forces have already been reduced by 60,000, that is by 90 per cent, and there are now no army combat units, either air or ground, remaining in China.

["]The Marine forces in China have already been reduced from about 53,000 to 34,000. The reduction in strength will be continued throughout the spring."³

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, Memoranda-Messages-Cables)

1. On Marshall's copy, this title was followed by "To reach him in New York without delay." Marshall cleared this memorandum with Army Chief of Staff Eisenhower and the concluding paragraph on the Marines with Admiral Nimitz, who had been chief of naval operations since December 1945. Marshall noted on the file copy: "Signed copy sent to Under Secretary of State 1215 PM 3/26/46 G. C. M."

2. Secretary of State Byrnes had said in late February that he wished to announce the deactivation of the China Theater in order to counter Soviet and Chinese propaganda about the presence of American troops. Wedemeyer thought that mid-summer would be a good termination time, but Marshall told him that May 1 should be the target date. On March 24, Marshall asked Wedemeyer to draft a statement for Byrnes's possible use; when the draft was received, Marshall edited it into the document printed here. (*Foreign Relations, 1946*, 10: 849-50, 855-58.)

3. Secretary Byrnes did not issue the proposed statement. On April 1 General Wedemeyer announced that the China Theater would cease to exist at the end of the month, although three to four thousand U.S. Army personnel were to remain in China in various capacities. (*Ibid.*, pp. 860-61; *New York Times*, April 2, 1946, p. 2.)

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT
CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2 [VANDENBERG]

March 26, 1946
[Washington, D.C.]

The Chinese are endeavoring to make an effective presentation to the headquarters of UNRRA for an increase of their allotment of funds in order to meet the famine situation which is now rapidly developing. I am greatly interested because it involves an explosive possibility.

For example, in one region north and slightly east of Hankow there is a communist army of 40,000 surrounded by a nationalist army of 120,000 and the two are located in the center of a famine district. Meanwhile, we have had little or no success in moving supplies available in Shanghai up the Yangtze. Fortunately now I have gotten some naval delays in demobilization which will permit shipments until Chinese crews are available for surplus shipping being turned over to China.

I wish to help out in this matter because I think the situation in China is not only highly explosive in its present nature and might quite easily blow up all I have accomplished up to the present time, but I think it is much more important to the interests of the United States than somewhat similar situations in other portions of the world—though famine is famine wherever it occurs.

If you still have some of the talent in G-2 that formerly prepared for me the graphic charts which presented matters in such an illuminating manner, will you have them look over the attached memorandum from the Chinese Embassy and see if they can prepare a chart or two to help in the presentation of this problem to UNRRA.¹

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, Memoranda-Messages-Cables)

1. The first shipload of U.N.R.R.A. supplies from the United States had arrived in Shanghai in November 1945, and shipments during the first half of 1946 piled up in that city's warehouses and on docks. Reporter Henry R. Lieberman noted in early June: "Despite the influx of UNRRA supplies, the flow has not been sufficient to alter the goods and food shortages much, according to Chinese officials. Of the 375,000 tons that have arrived it is estimated that only 10 per cent of the supplies has reached the people who are in need." (*New York Times*, June 5, 1946, p. 12.) The editors have not found the Chinese embassy's memorandum.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALVAN C. GILLEM, JR.
Radio No. WAR-82259. *Secret*

March 27, 1946
Washington, D.C.

I have had a list of about 110 colonels, lieutenant colonels and a few majors approved for China service with Executive Headquarters. They have been selected from efficiency reports. A number of them have volunteered but there has not been time to secure voluntary action from the

entire list. They have not delayed here to screen these people, that can be done in Peiping. I think from this list it should be possible to obtain the services of sufficient men to oversee the demobilization and reorganization of armies or possibly to provide additional Manchurian team leaders. These men have been leaving at a rate of 6 a day by air from Hamilton Field,¹ some will go by water.

I have also arranged for a number of junior officers, approximately 100 company grade officers and 25 first three grade enlisted men, to be sent out. Officers will all go on one vessel departing on or about 2 April. This should help you meet the present dilemma in personnel.

I am trying to rush the provision of equipment both for the Communist school and for at least a skeleton outfit for the important ten Communist divisions. This has to be managed if possible within lend lease provisions which means the materiel should reach China prior to June 30 if it is at all possible to arrange. The extension of lend lease beyond June 30 is a critical political problem. Once the materiel is in China the situation is considerably improved.

I am glad to see the teams are at last going into Manchuria. Let me have an estimate of the present political jam between the Kuomintang and Communists.² That cannot be allowed to brew up to an explosion. Something positive will have to be done.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, Memoranda-Messages-Cables)

1. Hamilton Field was twenty-five miles north of San Francisco, California.

2. The chief cause of the "political jam," Gillem responded, was the strategic situation in Manchuria, where "the Communists are definitely the aggressors." Communist strength there on V-J Day had been approximately thirty to forty thousand, but it had since grown to three hundred thousand, notwithstanding the cease-fire agreement's stipulation that only government forces should move into or within Manchuria. Chou En-lai was pressing Gillem and Executive Headquarters to resist further Nationalist troop movements into the area, but he had recently approved using U.S. resources to move two additional Nationalist armies to Manchuria. (*Foreign Relations, 1946, 9: 716-17.*)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER
Radio No. WAR-82585. *Top Secret*

March 29, 1946
Washington, D.C.

Re your CFB-26620. In principle I am in agreement with Admiral Cooke's proposal. I think there is justice or rather logic in his point of view.¹ I will not express myself to JCS until I get clearance from you.

I am delighted to see that you are due to leave for home on April 4. Incidentally, I have been going through a continuous series of meetings with a number of agencies, sometimes two meetings with a single agency. All regarding the matters, ships and crews, and general subject of new

loan. It has been a hard battle but I think I have won all over to quite generous terms on all counts considering the political reactions or fears here, the past financial difficulties in dealing with Chinese government, etc. Secretary Vinson heads the dominant committee NAC [National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems] and [William McChesney] Martin heads the directors of Exim Bank.² I have also talked off record to large number of press,³ and am due before both Foreign Relation committees of Congress Monday and Wednesday and overseas press Thursday.⁴ I have had to talk at length to cabinet members. All in all I think I have sold China.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, Memoranda-Messages-Cables)

1. Wedemeyer forwarded to Marshall a message from Cooke that the admiral proposed be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a joint proposal from himself and Wedemeyer regarding the command situation following the China Theater's inactivation. Cooke, Wedemeyer noted, "stated with some emphasis that Navy forces are under the command of MacArthur in the Pacific and under McNarney in the European Area and that it was logical for the Navy to have the China area command" under the J.C.S. The Marines would continue in their current functions and not be replaced, as Marshall desired, by effective Chinese troops. All operational liaison with the Chinese government would be conducted by a liaison committee under navy control and independent of the army-dominated Military Advisory Group. (Wedemeyer to Marshall, Radio No. CFB-26620, March 26, 1946, NA/RG 332 [Headquarters U.S. Forces China Theater, Wedemeyer Subject Files, Eyes Only Misc., Book IV].)

2. The Export-Import Bank had extended a credit of \$500,000,000 to be spent on specific projects until June 30, 1947, Marshall informed Chiang Kai-shek in a March 28 message, but "Congress has not appropriated the \$1,250,000,000 for foreign loans which had been requested by the Exim Bank and that there is no prospect of such an appropriation in the near future. Therefore, if there is to be any immediacy in the action toward China it will have to be based on funds now available." He had had better luck in blocking efforts to include the cost of surplus property as charges against future loans to China. From his discussions with the National Advisory Council, Marshall thought that "negotiations could be started almost immediately with a very favorable probability of securing a credit of \$500,000,000." (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 970–71.)

3. Marshall delivered an off-the-record speech at the National Press Club on March 28. Congressman Sol Bloom, chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, wrote to say that the speech "was the finest I have heard in years. It was a pleasure to have had the opportunity of listening to you, and everyone had the nicest things to say about your speech." (Bloom to Marshall, March 28, 1946, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

4. Marshall's April 1 and 3 congressional testimonies were in Executive Session.

TO OMER L. DENTON

April 1, 1946
Washington, D.C.

Dear Denton: I have your answer to my wire and shall expect the truck at Leesburg on Tuesday. There is not a good truck load but too much and

of too awkward shapes for us to get packed for freight or express during our present rush in preparation for my return to China.¹

In all probability much that Mrs. Marshall is sending you will not be appropriate for your purpose. Don't trouble to include it and don't trouble to return it, just box it up and put it in the cellar. There are other items of possible interest, but I can't find time to get at them now. I will send them later after my return from China. In due time I shall turn over my decorations for the same purpose. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Denton (V.M.I., 1924) was the secretary of the Virginia Military Institute Foundation in Lexington, Virginia. He had written to Mrs. Marshall asking "for anything that you could send us, such as war relics, etc.," that could be put in the Institute's museum. Mrs. Marshall made arrangements for V.M.I. to send a truck to Dodona Manor in Leesburg. Because of the congressional hearings he had to attend on April 1, Marshall had sent a telegram changing to April 2 the date of the truck's arrival. (Denton to Mrs. Marshall, March 22 and 27, 1946, and Marshall to Denton, March 30, 1946, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) This was the beginning of the collection that later was housed in the George C. Marshall Foundation's museum, library, and archive.

To T. V. SOONG
Radio No. WAR-83057. *Top Secret*

April 3, 1946
Washington, D.C.

From General Marshall to General Gillem, his Eyes Only. This message is reply to CFB-27205, dated 2 April 1946, from Wedemeyer.¹ Please pass following to Doctor T. V. Soong: "General Wedemeyer has conveyed to me your views with respect to use of part of Eximbank loan for expenditures for labor and buildings in China and for the purchase of consumer items of raw materials. In my negotiations with US Government financial representatives, I had already stressed the points which you raised. There is a firm feeling at all financial levels in the United States Government that under the statute creating the Export-Import Bank, it should not extend credit for the purchase of consumer's goods except in unusual circumstances such as were present in the cotton loan to China.² Moreover, it is felt that so far as use of Eximbank funds is concerned, these should not be utilized for the payment of China domestic costs such as local labor and supplies. I feel certain that to insist upon the elasticities which you suggest would jeopardize the integrity of the entire loan and reopen proposals to charge against it Maritime Commission credits and credits for the purchase of surplus material, which as I advised the Generalissimo, I believe have been successfully though with difficulty repulsed.³ I anticipate that the Department of State and the Eximbank will open formal negotiations with respect to the loan with the Chinese Government's

representatives within the next day or two.”⁴ As I assume Wedemeyer has left China a copy of this message will be shown to him here.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, Memoranda-Messages-Cables)

1. See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 972.
2. On the \$19,000,000 U.N.R.R.A. raw cotton purchase and exchange for cotton yarn, see Woodbridge et al., *UNRRA*, 2: 398.
3. See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 970–71.
4. Soong replied on April 5 that Chiang Kai-shek had asked for Marshall’s backing in making the wording of the Export-Import Bank loan “elastic” enough either to “provide cash for domestic expenditures in China,” or to permit purchases of Chinese domestic goods or raw materials. On April 9 Marshall reiterated his objections. See *ibid.*, pp. 973–75.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALVAN C. GILLEM, JR.
Radio No. WAR-83515. *Secret*

April 5, 1946
Washington, D.C.

Personal to Gillem from General Marshall. Please pass the following to the Generalissimo: “I now plan to leave Washington for return to China on April 11, 12, or 13 depending on success in clearing up last issues. The proposals in your message transmitted to me yesterday by Doctor Soong will be taken up by me personally Monday and Tuesday preliminary to direct negotiations by your representative.”¹

I have had lengthy hearings by the Foreign Relations committees of both House and Senate and I am assured of strong support for China. I have met with a large number of governmental groups and I think I am assured of support by them. Certainly they have, I think, a much better understanding of the necessities. I talked yesterday with the overseas correspondents and have had lengthy interviews with the principal State Department correspondents and the entire list of Washington correspondents. Altogether I believe that when Chinese issues are raised here they will receive understanding, consideration, and support.

I had a discussion yesterday evening with Ambassador Wei and Doctor Tsiang regarding UNRRA affairs and the rice issue in particular.² I hope to be able to be of help in that matter next week.” Another subject: Gillem please inform Governor Chang Chun that I saw his daughter Mrs. Lew yesterday afternoon.³ She was looking very well and sends her affectionate greetings.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, Memoranda-Messages-Cables)

1. See note 4 of the previous document.
2. Wei Tao-ming had been ambassador to the United States since 1942. T’ing-fu (T. F.) Tsiang had been director general of the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration since its establishment in January 1945 as a special Chinese government agency

to conduct negotiations and relationships with U.N.R.R.A. and to administer and coordinate relief and rehabilitation operations in China.

3. Chang Chun's daughter was married to Daniel Yu-t'ang Lew [Liu], who had served as Carsun Chang's English-language assistant at the U.N. Conference in San Francisco in 1945.

PEARL HARBOR COMMITTEE TESTIMONY

April 9, 1946 Washington, D.C.

MARSHALL was called before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack for the eighth time, interrupting testimony by former Chief of Naval Operations Harold R. Stark, because, as Senator Alben W. Barkley, the committee's chairman, told his colleagues: "General Marshall advises me that he is extremely anxious to return to China. . . . He is getting daily requests to return immediately." (Pearl Harbor Committee, *Hearings*, pt. 11, p. 5174.)

The committee counsel's questions were brief, merely having Marshall reiterate that he was at home on the night of December 6, 1941, went riding the next morning, and knew nothing of the fourteen-part Japanese message prior to about 10:30 A.M. on December 7. Most of the rest of the session was taken up by questions from and Marshall's answers to three members of the Republican party: Senator Owen Brewster (Maine), Senator Homer Ferguson (Michigan), and Representative Frank B. Keefe (Wisconsin).

Senator Brewster sought to get from Marshall an "estimate of whether the Japanese attack might be logically expected." Consequently, he asked about Marshall's knowledge of the war around Moscow in December 1941 and its possible impact on Japanese planning, the exchange of information between Great Britain and the United States, the state of Japanese-American relations, and Japanese decision-makers' psychology in late 1941. The Japanese, with some reason, had misjudged U.S. fighting capabilities in late 1941, Marshall said, and then he repeated his December 1945 estimation that the Hawaiian installations were "reasonably well equipped" and "the commanders had been alerted. . . . In our opinion, that [Hawaii] was the one place that had enough within itself to put up a reasonable defense." (*Ibid.*, pp. 5186–87.)

Senator Ferguson asked if President Roosevelt had sought to maneuver Japan "into a position where they would be compelled to fire the first shot." Marshall denied this; the discussions in the autumn of 1941, he said, were about what procedures to follow "so we would not find ourselves in a dangerous position where we had to do something initiating a fight. . . . That was the general opinion, that they [the Japanese] were going to attack, definitely, in the Southwest Pacific." The senator then returned to the importance and impact of the December 6–7 Japanese fourteen-part message—particularly the president's "offhand" (Marshall's word) comment "this means war"—so Marshall again described his actions regarding the message on the morning of December 7. (*Ibid.*, pp. 5188–89, 5190–91.)

Mr. Keefe of Wisconsin was interested in determining whether Roosevelt's military advisors had met at the White House on the evening of December 6. Marshall was "absolutely certain" that he was not there. Marshall took this occasion to correct an impression that he had given in previous testimony that he was uncertain where he

was on the evening of December 6: "I am certain I was at home." (Ibid., p. 5194.) Unlike his December testimony, newspaper accounts of this session were generally not front-page news. ★

TO GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK
Radio. *Secret*

April 11, 1946
Washington, D.C.

I am leaving for China tomorrow, Friday the 12th, and should arrive the eighteenth weather permitting. I have just this moment completed an hour's conference with Wedemeyer and am due to see the President at 12:30 and to lunch with Mr. Byrnes, Secretary of State. I hope that this will close up all of the various interests I have been working on since my return.

Yesterday I had a conference with American representatives of the Combined Food Board governing allocations all over the world.¹ Also important UNRRA officials. Later I had an hour and a half with Mr. La Guardia the new head of UNRRA regarding supplies, especially rice for China.²

Another subject: I am greatly disturbed by the unfavorable political effect here of the character of the present press reports from China.³ Anything you can do to temper your press at this time will be of great importance here in the matter of the loan.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, Memoranda-Messages-Cables)

1. The Combined Food Board (Canada, Great Britain, United States) was established on June 9, 1942, to formulate plans relating to food resources utilization for the Allied war effort. Because of the critical food situation, it was continued after V-J Day. The board was dissolved on June 30, 1946.

2. Fiorello H. La Guardia had ended his twelve years as mayor of New York City at the end of 1945. On April 1, 1946, he became director general of U.N.R.R.A.

3. An example of this was Tillman Durdin's April 9 story from Chungking (headlined "Deadlock in China More Embittered"): "Smouldering Kuomintang antagonisms against the Communists burst into rejoinders [in the press] of flaming resentment against yesterday's personal attack on President Chiang Kai-shek by the Yen'an *Emancipation Daily News*." He also cited a pro-Nationalist *World Daily News* declaration that, in Durdin's words, "the Communists want to start the civil war up again so as to prevent an American loan to China and thus utilize the impoverishment and resultant chaos in China as an aid to the seizure of power." (*New York Times*, April 10, 1946, p. 4.)

TO ELBERT D. THOMAS

April 12, 1946
[Washington, D.C.]

My dear Senator: I had hoped to be able to discuss with you personally the importance to my mission in China of the Military Missions Bill (S1847) and the companion House measure (HR5433).¹ The necessity for my return to China requires that I furnish you my views by letter.

The integration of the armed forces presently maintained by the Nationalist Government and the Communist Party in China and their reduction to an appropriate peace-time size is essential to the attainment of the peace, unity, and stability in China which are so necessary to the security of the United States. I believe that the prompt provision to China of the Military Advisory Group of American Army and Navy personnel, which the Generalissimo has requested, is vital to the success of the program.

As a temporary expedient I have been able to provide some assistance by the use of some American personnel now in China. However, the longer term help necessary to enable China to carry out its program can be provided only under the authority of the type contemplated in HR5433 and S1847.

It is most desirable that we be able to formalize our arrangements to provide this assistance to the Chinese at the earliest possible date. To this end any practicable way in which consideration of the enabling legislation by the Congress may be expedited will be most helpful.

I am sending a similar letter to Mr. May.² Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected

1. Thomas—a Utah Democrat, chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, and a member of the Foreign Relations Committee—was a former professor of political science who had written, among other things, *Chinese Political Thought* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1927). On February 18, he had introduced S. 1847, a bill providing for the detail of military and naval missions to foreign governments. (*Congressional Record*, 79th Cong., 2d sess., vol. 92, pt. 1, pp. 1383; pt. 3, p. 3832.) The chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs, Andrew Jackson May, Democrat from Kentucky, introduced H.R. 5433 on February 8. (*Ibid.*, pt. 1, p. 1191.)

2. See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 827. The bills were reported out of their respective committees but never passed.

In the Middle

April 13–August 31, 1946

Out here I have sat in the middle for many months and listened to an outpouring of suspicions and beliefs of the representatives of each side regarding the other. I find that in most instances neither side properly, or even casually, evaluates the fears or suspicions of the other and their effect on the action taken or the attitude in negotiations. When I emphasize this state of affairs neither side treats it as of much importance, but as a matter of fact from my middle position it has appeared to me of the most vital importance because misunderstandings are a fruitful cause of unhappy situations or events.

—Marshall to Bernard M. Baruch
August 21, 1946

PRESSURE on General Marshall to return to China to salvage the agreements previously reached and to prevent the complete collapse of ongoing negotiations and an all-out civil war increased the longer he remained in Washington. From Executive Headquarters in Peiping, Walter Robertson radioed on April 6: “It is my carefully considered opinion that the situation is so serious and is deteriorating so rapidly that your immediate return to China is necessary.” (Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, 11 vols. [Washington: GPO, 1969–72], 9: 735–36.) By April 8, Marshall had established an itinerary for his return to China.

In mid-February, Madame Chiang Kai-shek had invited Mrs. Marshall—who was then at the Marshalls’ cottage in Pinehurst, North Carolina, working on her memoirs—to return to China with her husband. The couple departed Washington, D.C., at 10:00 P.M. on April 12 for Long Beach Army Air Base in California. They spent the day in Hollywood with Frank McCarthy, including a luncheon with motion picture director Frank Capra. That evening they departed for Honolulu, where they spent another day prior to a night crossing to Wake Island, then on to Tokyo. The evening of April 16–17 the Marshalls were guests of General and Mrs. Douglas MacArthur in what Mrs. Marshall thought was “the most beautiful American Embassy I have seen.” The following day (April 17) they flew to Peiping where they remained overnight. Mrs. Marshall toured the Forbidden City, which she wrote was “indescribable in its magnificence and beauty.”

On the morning of April 18, the Marshalls left Peiping for Chungking. “The flight over China was the most unforgettable sight I have ever seen,” Mrs. Marshall observed.

Every inch of this huge country cultivated—range after range of mountains even on top of these where a flat space was—were squares of winter wheat or rice paddy. Mud villages. When I asked how they got out, the answer was they don’t get out—but have been there for hundreds of years. The great Yellow river sprawling through the mountain gorges with mud flats as far as you could see on either side.

She was less enthusiastic about life on the ground in Chungking. “We arrived during a heat wave 100 [degrees Fahrenheit] humidity 90[%]—Mr. Robertson told me in Peeking that in Chungking during the summer you awoke fearing that you would not die—instead of that you would.” As a result of the war, the city’s population was perhaps fifteen times its pre-war level. “The dust heat s[t]ench are beyond description.” Inflation was rampant and there was little for a foreigner to purchase, she discovered. Moreover, foreigners, particularly women, attracted considerable atten-

tion if they traveled about the city, “so you just do not go out.” The Marshalls’ quarters were an office building where heavy curtains were drawn across all the windows in an attempt to keep out the heat and dust. (K. T. Marshall to Sally G. Chamberlin, April 24, 1946, GCMRL/K. T. Marshall Papers.) Mrs. Marshall would not have to endure Chungking for long, because the government—and consequently nearly all the foreigners—was in the process of moving back to the prewar capital of Nanking. ★

TO WALTER S. ROBERTSON
Radio No. GOLD 534. *Secret*

April 20, 1946
[Chungking, China]

Your DOVE 1974 received.¹ At the moment I see no practical way of timely intervention in Changchun situation.² A Communist attack on Nationalists established in Bank compound in Changchun was reported to me the evening I arrived here, including statement that Russian plane had dive bombed Bank compound. The latter statement, judging by telephonic report referred to in your message was evidently in error. I can only trust that there are other exaggerations in reports though it is plainly evident that the situation is very critical. I am requesting General Chou En-lai to take such action as practical through Communist channels to secure the safety of Major Rigg and the five correspondents and to advise me of their situations.³

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Robertson reported that the Nationalist commander in Manchuria told Executive Headquarters that the Communists had taken nearly all of Changchun and that they had Soviet air and tank assistance. “There appears to be no way to aid in evacuation of Americans from Chang Chun. Last messages of Chinese Air Force from Chang Chun feared for their safety. This may be true due to reported intensity of conflict. The fact that they may possibly be seeing too much also makes us uneasy.” (Robertson to Marshall, Radio No. DOVE 1974, April 19, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, Messages In].)

2. Changchun, a city of approximately 750,000, had been the Japanese capital of Manchukuo, their puppet state that included all of Manchuria and part of North China. In mid-November 1945, the Nationalist government had sent liaison officials to the city, then occupied by Soviet troops. Communist forces arrayed around the city had delayed the arrival of Nationalist Army units, but by the time the Soviets withdrew on April 14, the Chinese government had about four thousand regular army troops plus local levies in the city, and the government’s First Army was pushing northwest up the railroad from Mukden. The Communist New Fourth Army opened an offensive on April 14 to capture Changchun and soon drove the government defenders into the inner city. By the evening of April 20, the Communists had conquered the city. Correspondent Tillman Durdin reported from Chungking: “Communist headquarters here reflects a cocky, confident attitude over the situation in Manchuria. One spokesman indicated that the Communists considered the truce agreement there no longer valid and said that control of Manchuria would be settled by force.” (*New York Times*, April 20, 1946, p. 1.)

3. Trapped with Nationalist troops in the Central Bank Building and adjacent fortified structures were U.S. military attaché Major Robert B. Rigg and Sergeant Clay Pond, who had flown an observation plane to Changchun on April 13, and reporters Charlotte Ebener (International News Service), Henry R. Lieberman (*New York Times*), Tom Masterson (Associated Press), Reynolds Packard (United Press), and George Weller (*Chicago Daily News*). (*New York Times*, April 16, 1946, pp. 1–2.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERALISSIMO

April 20, 1946
[Chungking, China]

Your Excellency: There has been brought to my attention your views regarding the supplying of certain equipment for the school to be organized at Kalgan for the preparation of Communist divisions for integration, and the eventual distribution of this equipment among the 10 Communist *divisions* selected for integration into armies during the final six months of the program.

There are two special considerations involved in this matter. First, the origin of the school and second, the procurement of equipment from the United States,

The school had its origin in a suggestion made by me to General Chou En-lai:¹ In the negotiations for the integration of the armies, the Communists steadily maintained that the earliest moment for actual integration would be at the end of the first 12 months. This was unacceptable, in my opinion, because too many changes might occur in the period of a year and I regarded it as very important that the earliest possible start be made to bring Communist troops under a unified command. I had first proposed that the actual integration into *armies* should commence in the 4th month. However, as I gradually learned of the character of the Communist troops—their lack of formal organization, lack of trained staff and lack of normal equipment—I came to the conclusion that a possible explanation of the reluctance of the Communists to undertake integration earlier than 12 months was due to their appreciation of the difficulties to present a division at an earlier date in a state of organization and appearance that would not involve serious loss of face. I therefore experimented by suggesting to General Chou En-lai that it might be possible to arrange for an elementary school for some company officers and higher commanders and their staffs at some point within the Communist zone of occupation, in which a short course would be given by American officers to prepare the Communist officers concerned to effect the formal organization of their troops into regiments and divisions that could at least march and parade in a presentable manner. It was stated that tactical training for

field operations was not the purpose of such a school and could not be undertaken.

General Chou En-lai flew to Yen-an the morning following the suggestion and came back with approval for the proposal and, what was more important, the agreement to start the integration in the 7th month instead of the 13th month. The proposal was discussed in the negotiations of the Military Sub-Committee, of which I was the advisor, and received formal approval, I thought, at that time.²

It was plainly evident to me that without such assistance the Communists themselves could not get together their people in an acceptable state of organization in the month specified—the 7th—for the initiation of integration. At the same time I thought it was of high importance that the integration begin at that time and not be delayed.

Such a school requires certain equipment, otherwise it is without purpose, therefore, the urgent necessity for procurement of such equipment in time to get the school promptly started. There follows a statement of the complications and considerations involved in that procurement.

Unless the necessary materiel for such a school is landed in China prior to June 30th, next, there is no hope, I think, of bringing the transaction under lend-lease and it therefore would not only be a complicated procedure but very expensive. I, therefore, while in Washington, made a special effort to arrange for the shipment of the equipment from Japan, the deficit being made up from the United States, all to be landed in Shanghai prior to June 30th. Some 600 tons has already arrived. Now I find your instructions which would terminate that procedure. This would also definitely terminate the implementation of the agreements for the reorganization and integration of the armies and this, of course, would be a very serious matter.

I am submitting this statement in writing in order that you may have a general understanding of the situation prior to a personal discussion I would like to have with you in regard to the matter.³

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Political Affairs, Chiang Kai-shek)

1. See the summary of Marshall's meeting with Chou En-lai on February 18, 1946, p. 457.

2. See the summary of Marshall's meeting with Chou En-lai on February 21, 1946, and Marshall to MacArthur, February 22, 1946, pp. 463, 465–66.

3. Tillman Durdin reported that, upon his return to Chungking, Marshall "plunged immediately into a series of conferences" that culminated with an April 19 evening meeting with Chiang Kai-shek. The next day, General and Mrs. Marshall went to the Chiangs' suburban home for the evening and part of the next day. (*New York Times*, April 20, 1946, pp. 1, and April 21, 1946, p. 26.)

TO WALTER S. ROBERTSON
Radio No. GOLD 537. *Restricted*

April 21, 1946
[Chungking, China]

General [Alphonse] Juin Chief of Staff of French Army is visiting Peiping Sunday evening, Monday and possibly Tuesday.¹ He is a fine fellow, an old friend of mine, an outstanding commander of a French Corps in the American Fifth Army in Italy. Please make a courtesy call and offer him the opportunity to visit Executive Headquarters.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. The French government had announced that Juin's visit was made in order to adjust French affairs in China. (*New York Times*, March 8, 1946, p. 11.)

MEETINGS WITH GENERALS YU TA-WEI,
CHOU EN-LAI, AND HSU YUNG-CHANG
April 22–23, 1946 Chungking, China

Y*U Ta-wei, April 22, 2:00 P.M.*

General Yu, vice minister of war, paid an unofficial visit and learned first-hand of Marshall's frustrations with how the military situation had deteriorated while he was out of the country. "A great part of these difficulties could have been avoided by the National Government," which had delayed the sending of Executive Headquarters field teams to Manchuria, insisted that the cease-fire agreement did not apply to those provinces, and had sent in troops. "I do not know who the Generalissimo's advisors are but whoever they may be, they are very poor ones," Marshall said. The government had advanced toward Chihfeng contrary to the original agreement and had failed to abide by the agreement to evacuate the Communist forces near Canton.

Concerning the present state of affairs in China, "no one has offered any alternative except a great war and you can not support a great war." The United States would not support the government in such a war. Moreover, the Generalissimo's recent speeches had "murdered" Marshall's efforts to get a large loan for China. "The Kuomintang had a good chance to have peace in Manchuria but it did not utilize this chance. The Communists are taking advantage of their positions and are becoming stronger every day. The Government has gotten into a bad spot and I have to figure a way out." (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 788–90.)

Chou En-lai, April 23, 10:00 A.M.

To correct the inflated figures the Communists were using, Marshall informed Chou that by June 1 the U.S. Navy would have transported 228,000 government troops into Manchuria. Chou admitted that there was a race to occupy the vacuum in Manchuria left by the Soviets' withdrawal and that this made it more difficult to discuss troop redistributions. He reminded Marshall that the Communists had urged the government to move into Manchuria, but the Nationalists had instead attacked the Communists in Jehol province. The Communist party did not intend to monopolize Manchuria but instead desired international cooperation. His ability to negotiate, Chou said, was diminishing due to the current situation in Manchuria. Now the gov-

ernment insisted on taking Changchun by force and then negotiating; the Communists thought the fighting should cease immediately and then negotiations begin. Moreover, the previously agreed ratio of one Communist to fourteen Nationalist divisions in Manchuria was no longer appropriate. Having just completed drafting a proposal for an immediate cease fire (see *ibid.*, pp. 792–93), Marshall handed Chou a copy. (*Ibid.*, pp. 790–92.)

Hsu Yung-chang, April 23, 2:30 P.M.

General Hsu—a former army commander, provincial governor, and government minister—had recently been appointed the government’s representative on the Committee of Three, and General Marshall wished to describe to Hsu the situation as he saw it. Since the Nationalist government had allowed itself to get into “a dangerous position, compromises are necessary.” The two sides were “poles apart and refuse to alter their course through a fear that the other party would obtain a favorable position,” and “the fear is at its worst on the Nationalist side.” The government had adopted an adamant attitude toward numerous minor matters that Marshall listed (see his comments to General Yu above), gained little from this, and “lost a lot.” Now that circumstances were changing, the Communists were becoming bolder. Marshall thought that the national government showed poor judgment in seeking unilateral control of Manchuria.

At the end of the meeting, Marshall handed Hsu a copy of the draft cease-fire document. It called for Committee of Three approval of occupation zones and of further government troop movements into Manchuria. Ultimately Chiang Kai-shek did not accept Marshall’s draft; he proposed one of his own, which the Communists then rejected. (*Ibid.*, pp. 793–95.) ★

TO COLONEL MARSHALL S. CARTER¹
Radio No. GOLD 566. *Confidential*

April 24, 1946
[Chungking, China]

Referring to your WAR-85268² I would like very much to have General Eisenhower pay me a visit and meet the Generalissimo and Madame. Please encourage him to do so. You may use this message for this purpose. On 7 May China will be in the throes of critical readjustment since the National Assembly convenes on the 5th. General Eisenhower will find both the Generalissimo and myself in Nanking.

I would also like to see Mr. Pauley again, however suggest that he leave all but himself and one or two others in Shanghai since accommodations at Nanking are extremely limited, and will be taxed by two thousand or more delegates at that time.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Carter (U.S.M.A., 1931) had spent much of World War II in the War Department’s Operations Division. Between July 1945 and January 1946, he served as assistant chief of staff for civil-military relations at China Theater Headquarters. In March he replaced Colonel James C. Davis as head of Marshall’s Washington, D.C., office.

2. Carter said that Eisenhower was leaving Washington, D.C., on April 28 for a Pacific

tour and could visit China about May 7. He also noted that Edwin W. Pauley, who had been the president's personal representative on reparations matters since April 1945, would soon lead a group of about seventeen persons on an inspection trip to Korea and Manchuria. (Carter to Marshall, Radio No. WAR-85268, April 22, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, Messages In].)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HSU YUNG-CHANG

April 26, 1946
[Chungking, China]

On inquiry of General Chou En-lai as to when he would be available in Nanking for negotiations I learned that his movement plans were somewhat indefinite because of the probable non-availability of quarters in Nanking for about ten days and the fact that he has not been advised by the government as to when transportation would be made available. I am interested in view of the serious situation in Manchuria and the continued impasse in negotiations. It would be impracticable for me as a member of the Committee of Three to perform any useful service if General Chou is in Chungking and the Generalissimo and other members of the Committee are in Nanking.

I have offered to help out with some air transport and I think I can manage to transport the minimum number of people required by General Chou for his immediate assistance and his communications—about 50 persons and 1,500 pounds of baggage. But I am powerless to render any assistance regarding accommodations in Nanking.

I hope something can be done to permit the early establishment of General Chou and his principal people in Nanking.¹ A delay can be very serious in its consequences.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Political Affairs, Government Member)

1. At a meeting with Marshall the following day (see the summary below), Chou En-lai indicated that he thought that the housing problem would soon be solved. (*Foreign Relations, 1946*, 9: 798.) General Hsu replied that office space for the Communist delegation had been secured and three motor vehicles assigned to assist in the Chungking-Nanking move. (Hsu Memorandum No. T [35] 32, April 29, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Political Affairs, Government Member].)

MEETING WITH CHOU EN-LAI

April 27, 1946, 10:30 A.M. Chungking, China

THE Democratic League had submitted some proposals aimed at stabilizing the Manchurian situation, but neither the Communists nor the government were prepared to accept them, preferring their own ideas. Control of the railroads was the main

problem, Chou asserted. Military and political questions were being confused, Marshall suggested; when the political situation was resolved, the military confusion would subside. Marshall said that he had been searching for a quick solution to the Manchurian problem during his entire mission, but this was hard to accomplish amid mistrust and fundamental differences.

The situation in Manchuria was continually getting worse, according to Chou; the government wanted to fight and then talk, whereas the Communists wanted to stop fighting and then talk. Marshall was meeting with Chiang Kai-shek that evening, so he asked Chou if he had any proposals to make regarding troop dispositions. Chou outlined four points for immediate action (separate the armies, cease troop movements, solve the communications problems, and dispatch truce teams to points of close troop contact and along the main rail lines), and four additional points to be discussed after agreement on the first four items. Marshall stressed the importance of providing explicit instructions for the truce teams, such as specifying that Communist and Nationalist units be separated by twenty miles. Marshall noted some of the complications that were likely to arise in implementing any agreements and suggested that if Chou had any definite proposals, they could meet again the next morning. Nationalist secret police organizations stationed along the railroads were one of his main concerns, Chou said, suggesting that this would complicate Executive Headquarters's attempts to cooperate in settling the railroad problem. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 797–800.) ★

TO WAR DEPARTMENT, OFFICE
OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
Radio No. GOLD 598. *Restricted*

April 28, 1946
[Chungking, China]

For the purpose of official War and State Department records I will probably need a specially qualified officer or civilian, with small staff to go over my now voluminous files to establish at least the ground work for a detailed report. The situation is and has been so complicated, the negotiations so frequent and lengthy and recriminations will be so inevitable that a carefully prepared paper will undoubtedly be necessary. Have you any suggestions?¹

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Marshall Carter replied that the War Department suggested two names, and the State Department suggested Philip D. Sprouse—who was then a second secretary of embassy assigned to Executive Headquarters—as eminently qualified, well-informed on China, and a good writer. (Carter to Marshall, Radio No. WAR-86444, May 2, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, Messages In].) Marshall responded: “Believe he [Sprouse] is the type I need. I shall think about this further before acting.” (Marshall to Carter, Radio No. GOLD 645, May 5, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages].)

DRAFT MEMORANDUM

[April 28, 1946]
[Chungking, China]

We, the Committee of Three, have reached the following agreement regarding the Manchurian situation, with the approval of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Chairman Mao Tse-tung:

a. The terms of the Cease Fire agreement of 10 January 1946 apply to Manchuria except as specifically modified hereinafter.

b. Orders will immediately be issued by the National Government and the headquarters of the Communist forces to their military commanders in Manchuria to bring to an end all fighting and firing within twenty-four hours of the signing of this agreement.

c. The troops now in hostile contact will withdraw each 30 li¹ in rear of their positions at the time of receipt of these instructions.

d. All troop movements will cease except:

(1) As provided in c above, and

(2) As are involved in the sea movement of the 60th and 93rd Armies, or

(3) Are agreed upon by the Committee of Three for the purpose of facilitating supply, shelter or control.

e. The railways included in the Sino-Soviet treaty will immediately resume operation under the present direction.

f. A commission consisting of the following individuals will proceed at once to Manchuria:²

Chang Kia-ngau³ Chairman

General Chou En-lai

Mo Te-hui⁴

This commission will investigate the situation and conditions in Manchuria and will submit recommendations to the National Government regarding the following matters:

(1) Redisposition of the military forces.

(2) Restoration of communications.

(3) Organization of the present political and economic councils and the political organization and administration of provincial governments and cities.

In its recommendations the commission will consider interim measures to reestablish peace and an early return to normal conditions, as well as measures for a permanent establishment of domestic affairs. It is authorized, in its discretion, to submit its recommendations piecemeal while reaching an agreement on all matters concerned.⁵

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, Agreements)

1. A *li* is one-half kilometer or 0.31 miles; thus thirty li was just under ten miles.

2. Marshall had held meetings on April 25, 26, and 28, with two leaders of the Democratic League—Carsun Chang and Lo Lung-chi—and he incorporated the League's proposal into his memorandum. (On the Democratic League, see the editorial note on p. 397.)

3. A banker and former minister of railways (1935–37) and communications (1937–43), Chang Kia-ngau was Carsun Chang's brother. Between late 1945 and the end of April 1946, he was head of the government's Northeast Economic Commission; he conducted negotiations with the Soviet Union regarding the joint management of Manchuria's industrial economy. He believed that Marshall's January 10 truce and the subsequent arrival of truce teams had served to legitimize the Communist forces in Manchuria and to encourage Soviet actions favorable to the Chinese Communists. (*Last Chance in Manchuria: The Diary of Chang Kia-ngau*, ed. Donald G. Gillin and Ramon H. Myers [Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1989], pp. 27–29.)

4. Mo, a former president of the Chinese Eastern Railway, had been a member of the presidium of the People's Political Council since 1942.

5. Marshall wrote on the file copy of this draft: "Submitted to Gimo but not accepted. Par. f submitted as proposal of Democratic League, which had been checked by them with Chou En-lai. G. C. M."

MEETING WITH CHOU EN-LAI

April 29, 1946, 10:30 A.M. Chungking, China

CHOU announced that he was inclined to accept the Democratic League's proposal for a post-cease-fire joint commission to Manchuria. (See *f* in the previous document.) After meeting with Chiang Kai-shek the afternoon and evening of April 28, Marshall said, the Generalissimo had rejected the proposal as incompatible with Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria, which implied governmental control that was impossible without possession of the city of Changchun. Continued Communist opposition to this, Marshall said, had no foundation in any agreement. The government's position was that the Communists must cede Changchun to government occupation, after which there could be a cessation of hostilities; thereafter, the Committee of Three would consider the various Manchurian military and political issues. Marshall noted that Chou En-lai had made a similar proposal while he, Marshall, was out of the country. Moreover, Chiang Kai-shek had, in effect, compromised by agreeing to negotiate a settlement of matters in Manchuria north of Changchun.

He regretted having to do it, Marshall told Chou, but recent events had forced him to prepare the following statement:

I have done the best I can in an effort to negotiate this critical situation. The matter, with this statement, virtually passes out of my hands. I do not see anything more I can do in the way of mediation and I think it best this be understood. I've exhausted my resources in an effort to compromise the various positions and views and I cannot see how I could gain any more by further discussion of this particular issue with the Generalissimo. As I told you, before, my position is greatly changed because in all previous agreements I was continually confronted by the statement of the Government that whatever agreement I brought about would not be carried out by the Communists. At the present time my position in endeavoring to persuade various lines of action by the Government have been

heavily compromised by the Communist action in Manchuria. I repeat again, I am intimately familiar with your résumé of actions of the Government not in accordance with agreements. For instance: the Canton situation; the question of jurisdiction of Executive Headquarters in Manchuria; the action by Government troops in fighting in Manchuria without recourse to the presence of teams to stop fighting. But the fact remains I've exhausted my resources and I have tried to give you the basis of what I think could be a Government agreement.

The Generalissimo's attitude regarding Changchun had been the cause of the difficulties, Chou En-lai responded. He would not recognize Communist forces, calling them bandits; he used military force when he failed at negotiations; and he made concessions only when forced to do so. Chiang's positions were really no different than those of the "irreconcilables and renovationists" to which Marshall so frequently referred. Chou noted that he had said on numerous occasions that the government could have the railroads, but instead the Nationalists chose to fight the Communists. An easy conquest of Changchun would only tempt the government to drive toward Harbin. Besides, things had changed in Manchuria. The original problem was to replace the Japanese and Soviets in Manchuria with Chinese authority, but Japanese and Soviet forces were no longer the issue. Since the Communists had occupied some places, the former basic considerations regarding establishing Chinese sovereignty were no longer applicable. The Communists did not wish to monopolize Manchuria but only to assist, as part of the new National Government, in administering it.

Marshall observed that his difficulty throughout his mission had been each side's lack of confidence in the other. He repeated his assertion that Chiang Kai-shek had made a great concession to the Communists on future negotiations regarding Manchuria and again stated that he had exhausted his means and was moving his headquarters to the new government center at Nanking the following day. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 802–5.) ★

TO WALTER S. ROBERTSON AND BRIGADIER
GENERAL HENRY A. BYROADE
Radio No. GOLD 613. *Top Secret, Eyes Only*

April 30, 1946
[Chungking, China]

It may be that fighting in Manchuria will be suddenly settled by Communist evacuation of Changchun and Nationalist occupation, but truce would not be signed until foregoing has been effected. All to be followed by negotiation by Committee of Three for future troop dispositions in Manchuria and political reorganization. If such agreement is concluded difficulty will be to actually stop fighting and readjust troops locally to facilitate evacuation and avoid clashes during readjustment and thereafter while negotiations are in progress.

Probable procedure will be as follows: An oral agreement preliminary to initiation of evacuation orders, will be given field commands to cease advances, attacks and pursuits. Formal agreement will include provision

that Executive Headquarters will establish an advance headquarters in Changchun to precede actual signing of agreement and to be clothed with authority to supervise manner of evacuation and occupation, and all troop dispositions in general vicinity of Changchun. General Byroade with his three chiefs of staff to form basis of advance headquarters, reinforced by a number of carefully selected field teams. Byroade to have authority to make final decisions when chiefs of staff fail of agreement. It might be that General Gillem might be selected for Byroade's job but I think not.

Probability of general agreement is questionable but it is important to formulate most confidentially plans for carrying out procedure indicated with minimum of delay, but without knowledge of either faction. Acknowledge.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

COMPETING with the great military and political issues for Marshall's attention were dozens of smaller problems. Some of these about this time include the Brazilian ambassador's desire to purchase a jeep, T. V. Soong's request that a token shipment of rice be made to Hankow for its potential psychological effect on the local population of this famine-plagued region, a medical missionary's daughter's need for cash to purchase passage to the United States, and Claire Chennault's involvement in a projected airline to move urgent U.N.R.R.A. supplies in China. The following document concerns one of these "small" problems. ★

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL CHOU EN-LAI
OSE 6

May 2, 1946
Nanking, China

Dear General Chou: Madame Carla Elena, Provincial Vicar of the Franciscan Missionaries of Mary, appeals to me for assistance in securing the evacuation from Chefoo of about thirty-two sisters of the order. Seven are French, Belgian, Italian, English and Canadian, who are elderly women and some sick. The remaining twenty-five are Chinese.

There are no Americans involved in this request. Will it be possible to arrange for the evacuation of these women if I can find a vessel for the purpose?¹

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, OSE Letters)

1. Marshall was able to find a ship. A June 29 memorandum to him from Chou En-lai stated: "Regarding the repatriation of 32 Catholic nuns in Chefoo on board the U.S.S. George and the survey of seacoast to look for a landing, I already cabled General Chen Yi

[commander, Communist New Fourth Army, Shantung province] asking him to render every possible assistance.” (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 711.)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL THOMAS T. HANDY
Radio No. GOLD 30

May 2, 1946
[Nanking, China]

We are having something of a motor car crisis out here in connection with transfer of government to Nanking. Cars at Chungking were not only worn out (I had three breakdowns in one day and finally accepted one of Generalissimo’s pre-war cars) but transfer involves three or four weeks of rough road travel to get cars to Nanking. I found Embassy on my arrival here with one Ford borrowed from Chinese and not running, correspondents trying to buy bicycles, another pre-war car of Generalissimo’s loaned to me. Cadillac sent out via Burma lacks transmission.

In view of demobilization in U.S. can you find three Cadillacs and send them out here for me and Gillem and Embassy.¹ I am getting five light sedans from Styer.² He has no medium or heavy cars.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. The automobiles arrived in Nanking on August 11. (Caughey to Carter, Radio No. GOLD 1308, August 13, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages].)

2. Lieutenant General Wilhelm D. Styer had been commanding general of U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific (i.e., mainly the Philippines), since June 1945.

TO JOAN BRIGHT

May 4, 1946
Nanking, China

My dear Joan: Your letter of April 18th reached me in Nanking—where I arrived day before yesterday from Chungking in record time. I appreciated very much your writing and was greatly interested in the news you had to tell me.¹ I have not yet seen General de Wiart. I probably will in a very few days and will thank him then for his services as a King’s Messenger.²

We transferred from Chungking to Nanking day before yesterday and we have gotten settled here in a very comfortable house.³ You have your troubles there and we certainly have them here as General de Wiart probably told you. I have not yet found an opportunity to relax. I think I have been busier here in China and during my four weeks in the United States than at any time during the war—which seems a rather remarkable statement, but I think an accurate one.

Mrs. Marshall returned with me which is a great help to me as it makes my moments here of possible relaxation very pleasant.

I was sorry not to be available at the phone when you called up Leesburg. Particularly sorry that I did not get to see you when you passed through Washington.

I spent part of a day with Frank in Hollywood en route from China and en route back to China, which was very pleasant. I had to see Frank Capra, the great moving picture director, who did the various films for me during the war, because I am again deep in the film business to facilitate my work here.

Frank McCarthy looks well and is delighted with his job. However, most confidentially, he had a terrible experience two weeks before my arrival. Leaving one of the principal hotels in Los Angeles after dinner one night he took a taxi and the doorman put a sailor and a civilian in the taxi with him—which is the custom. Frank was busy with his own thoughts and paid no attention to them, endeavoring to read the headlines in the paper by flashing streetlights. The taxi turned up a dark street, stopped and a door was opened by the sailor and the first Frank realized that anything was wrong, they propelled him out of the car almost on his face. Thinking he was dealing with a drunken sailor he reacted accordingly and as the sailor got out, Frank floored him, but a second later the civilian—a heavy-weight—landed on Frank from behind and knocked him out. They beat him up, blacked both his eyes, knocked out two front teeth, tore a tendon in his side, sat on his chest, and robbed him. He made a quick recovery and his morale appears to be undamaged.


Please give my warm regards to General Ismay, and with the same to you. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, General)

1. Bright had written from her London office, to which she had just returned following five months away at a series of conferences in Bermuda and a visit to Washington, D.C., and Richmond, Virginia. She commented on people she had met, her disapproval of Ralph Ingersoll's *Top Secret* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946), and aspects of life in England. (Bright to Marshall, April 18, 1946, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [China Mission, General].)

2. Lieutenant General Adrian Carton de Wiart had been special British military representative in China since 1943; his job was to facilitate exchanges of views between China and Britain. De Wiart had delivered Bright's letter to Marshall, who had him to dinner on May 6.

3. Regarding the shift of the Chinese government capital, Embassy Second Secretary John F. Melby noted: "With a great heave, the diplomatic corps was pulled out of Chungking yesterday [April 23] and dropped into the walled city of Nanking. . . . The remaining brass from Chungking, including Marshall, arrived over the airfield [on April 28], as did General de Gaulle. Fourteen layers of planes were stacked up in blinding weather to be talked in and down one at a time. As luck would have it, de Gaulle was high in the air and hence low on the list to land. This annoyed his self-appropriated sense of priority and he peremptorily and repeatedly demanded of the hapless lieutenant in the control tower that



Nanking in 1946—showing some major roads and the twenty-mile-long fourteenth-century city wall, which had been largely destroyed as a result of the city's being taken by assault in 1853 and 1937. The city was China's national capital between 1928 and its capture by the Japanese in November 1937. Nanking remained China's legal capital when the Nationalist government moved to the wartime capital of Chungking. The government officially returned on May 6, 1946.

all others be sent away until he had landed. Finally, an exasperated Marshall broke in: 'General de Gaulle, this is General Marshall. The lieutenant is in absolute command of this field. You will do exactly as he tells you. This is the last I want to hear from you.' The ensuing silence was impressive." (John F. Melby, *The Mandate of Heaven: Record of a Civil War; China, 1945–49* [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968], pp. 113–14.)

MEETINGS WITH CHOU EN-LAI AND HSU YUNG-CHANG

May 4, 1946 Nanking, China

CHOU En-lai, 10:00 A.M.

This meeting was held primarily to discuss Chou's April 29 memorandum to Marshall on the situation in Honan province. For some months, approximately nine government armies had surrounded a sixty-thousand-man Communist force in the mountains about one hundred miles north of Hankow. Chou's memorandum warned that in early May the government intended to try to annihilate the Communist force, and that if such an offensive were launched "it will be viewed by the Chinese Communist Party as the signal given by the Nationalist forces for unleashing a nation-wide civil war." (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 648.)

Marshall assured Chou that he had sent Chiang Kai-shek a copy of the April 29 memorandum and that he intended to talk to the Generalissimo about it. He was attempting "to locate the trouble area so that the representatives can go there immediately." Marshall wanted Chou to go to the region, and he would arrange to send General Byroade and to locate "some responsible Kuomintang representative there with whom General Chou could deal."

The Communists did not want war in either Manchuria or China proper, Chou assured Marshall. Moreover, hostility by low-ranking Communists toward Americans resulted from their perception that the U.S. supported the Nationalists. General Chou thanked Marshall for his efforts at facilitating the Communist delegation's move from Chungking to Nanking and help in locating a house in the city. (*Ibid.*, pp. 650-53.)

Hsu Yung-chang, 8:15 P.M.

Hsu, the newest member of the Committee of Three, denied Chou's accusations about an imminent government attack north of Hankow. Both Chou and Marshall desired that General Hsu go to the area with Chou.

Marshall discussed the Manchurian situation and how Nationalist and Communist misperceptions and fears had aggravated the difficult problems there. With regard to control of Changchun, Marshall suggested that perhaps the Communists could evacuate the city but the government refrain from moving in its forces; meanwhile, Executive Headquarters could establish an advance echelon there to establish peace. (*Ibid.*, pp. 813-14.) ★

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 651. *Top Secret*

May 6, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mister President: I have delayed in sending this report in the hope that I would have reached an agreement on Manchuria ere this. The following describes the situation on my arrival and the developments to date.

I found a complete break between the Government and the Communists on the Manchurian question with hostilities increasing in intensity and threatening to spread south into China proper. In my opinion the situation grew from the following circumstances: The Communists became

fearful of the good faith of the Government party in carrying out the Political Consultative Conference written agreements for the formation of a bona fide coalition interim government and the drafting of a constitution to be submitted to the constitutional convention scheduled for May 5th. This Communist doubt was stimulated by the anti-Communist demonstrations which at times resulted in physical attacks on Communist meetings, newspaper office and individuals. In Manchuria the situation was aggravated by the prolonged unwillingness of the Government to send field teams from Executive Headquarters into that region to suppress sporadic fighting. At the same time the conditions under which the Government had to proceed to reoccupy Manchuria were made exceedingly difficult because of the fact that transportation of their troops by rail to occupy points as evacuated by the Russians was denied them while the Communists appeared free to move in themselves. Also, they apparently gained access to Japanese military equipment and stores, including medium artillery and tanks, which steadily strengthened their military power while the Government military position grew weaker due to the great distances over which its small force of troops had to advance in proceeding northward.

The Communist matched their doubts or fears as to the good faith with which the Government political leaders would carry out the Political Consultative Conference agreements by insisting on some representation in the local government in Manchuria which has been turned over to National appointees from Central and South China.

On the purely military side, the Government generals evidently felt that they had far more military power of action than was actually the case and I think influenced the Generalissimo accordingly. They then precipitated themselves into a seriously weak and dangerous military position of which the Communist were fully aware and seized the advantage accordingly. Changchun was taken from a small National garrison which had been flown in and at the same time and to date the northern advance of the Government forces was successfully blocked to the south of Changchun.

I have endeavored since my arrival to bring about a cessation of fighting and negotiate the disputed points in Manchuria. The Communists have clearly broken the plain terms of the cease firing agreement of January 10 last regarding the freedom of action to be accorded the Government in the establishment of sovereignty in Manchuria. On the other hand the Government itself, up to the time of my return to the States, did not proceed in strict accordance with the terms of the agreement in that it did not admit teams to control the sporadic and I think unnecessary fighting during the northern advance of Government armies, which fighting finally developed into successful Communist opposition. The Commu-

nists had joined with me in my proposal to send teams into Manchuria. The Generalissimo stated to me his opposition was based on the fact that the presence of an American officer might cause the Soviet Government to demand equal representation. It was not until the day of my departure for the United States on March 11th that he finally agreed to the entry of the teams but numerous conditions were stipulated which finally brought about the breakdown of this agreement, and when the teams were finally cleared for entry into Manchuria on March 27, their directives were not sufficiently broad to enable them to bring about a cessation of the fighting, which meanwhile developed into a dangerous situation for the Government forces.

In addition to the foregoing there has been a justified complaint by the Communist that the Government commander at Canton has not observed the terms of the cease firing agreement and the Supreme Headquarters of the Government armies at Nanking failed to carry out the specific stipulation of the January 10th agreement to report all movements of Nationalist troops to Executive Headquarters in Peiping. There have, of course, been a number of minor infractions of the agreement by subordinate commanders on both sides.

On my return I found the irreconcilable members of the Government party were firmly in the saddle and the Generalissimo took the position that the Communists were in league with the Soviet Government and could not be relied upon to keep any agreements. In other words, he meant that my efforts in the past to bring about agreements were based on a faulty conception as to the dependability of the Communist representatives.

The Communist in turn had been stirred by the fighting in Manchuria to direct their propaganda against the United States transporting any more troops to Manchuria or ammunition, or the use of troops armed with U S equipment (issued during the war against Japan) against the Communists or the granting of any loans to China. The impasse was complete except that the Communist were willing to submit the future military dispositions and local political reorganizations to negotiations if fighting would be terminated. The Generalissimo declined such compromises on the grounds that the agreement of January 10 clearly gave National troops the right to proceed anywhere in Manchuria necessary to establish sovereignty and took the stand that negotiations regarding political matters would only be considered after sovereignty had been established along the railroad mentioned in the Sino-Soviet Treaty, but was militarily powerless to enforce his demands. A proposal was made by me in keeping, I thought, at the time with the view of the Generalissimo that he could not, and would not, advance further north. But I found the next evening that he had again in mind the use of military power to seize Changchun and overpower the Communist forces in that region. In this conception he was

intensely interested in the transportation of two additional armies to Manchuria. One army had just completed its transit by sea to Manchuria in our shipping and another was partially en route. I have permitted the movement of the latter to continue but I declined to authorize the movement of the two additional armies, first, because I could not then tell, and still am in doubt, as to the capability of our Seventh Fleet to move the armies in view of demobilization conditions in June and the complications involved in the change of date for CROSSROADS, the atomic tests in the Central Pacific¹—also the urgent necessity to move UNRRA food up the Yangtze River towards Hankow, and secondly, because I would not authorize such a movement—the two additional armies—without taking the question to my Government as it amounts in effect to supporting under the existing circumstances, a civil war. He is greatly concerned over the possibility that his supply communications with Manchuria might be cut off by the withdrawal of Seventh Fleet support and that the provision of munitions might likewise be cut off. I have not expressed myself on this point, but it is my conviction that it would be most unfair for our Government to leave, as it were, his troops now in Manchuria completely in the lurch as the Chinese Government for some months to come will not possess sufficient transportation to maintain their armies in the north. Of course the Communist are appealing or demanding that we do cut off the Government armies.

Meanwhile, the Generalissimo finally came to the point five days ago of proposing the same conditions for the Manchurian settlement that the Communists had actually proposed about six weeks earlier, except that the Communist now hold Changchun, which they did not then. He demands that they evacuate Changchun and permit the National troops to occupy it, thereafter matters to be negotiated both as to military dispositions and political reorganizations.

The successful Communist generals in the Changchun region, jubilant over seizing the place, well armed with Japanese equipment and in a very strong strategical position are now, I feel sure, dominating the negotiations of their representatives. They do not accept such an arrangement and Chou En-lai urges me to withdraw shipping support to force the Generalissimo's hand. The Generalissimo's political advisors or backers, and I think his military leaders also, urge a policy of force which they are not capable of carrying out even with our logistical support and presence of Marines in North China ports of Tsingtao, Tientsin and up railroad towards the port of Chinwangtao from which the important coal is shipped south.

In brief, we are now at an impasse with the Generalissimo insistent on his demand for the evacuation of Changchun and his occupation of the city and the Communist refusal, possessing as they do the power to hold

the place. I had hoped to break the dead lock day before yesterday, but was not successful. The outlook is not promising and the only alternative to a compromise arrangement is, in my opinion, utter chaos in North China to which the fighting will inevitably spread. I have been laboring the past two weeks, and particularly the past two days to hold the peace in North China and have had to take many measures to meet the critical issues as they arise. All are related in Manchuria and North China to the fear on the side of the Communists that the stalwarts of the Government party do not mean to go through with a genuine coalition government, and the fear on the part of the Government of Soviet Russian influence or assistance, with the successful Communist military operations in Manchuria strongly influencing all Communist party action.

I am in the midst of the problem. At this moment I submit no recommendations. I am merely submitting a too long delayed report of the situation. I am going ahead in the hope that I can resolve the difficulties without troubling you and while I am taking many diplomatic liberties I am trying to do so in a manner that will keep the skirts of the U S Government clear and leave charges of errors of judgment to my account.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. The test over an anchored fleet of seventy-three surplus ships at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands had been publicly discussed since January. It occurred on July 1.

MEETINGS WITH CHEN CHENG AND YU TA-WEI
May 7-8, 1946 Nanking, China

Chen Cheng, May 7, 3:30 P.M.

General Chen, China's minister of war since November 1944, met with Marshall to discuss army reorganization problems. His greatest difficulty, Chen said, was what to do about the present thirty thousand discharged and still unemployed professional army officers and the potential surplus of three hundred thousand at the end of the reorganization process. Reduction of the 1,180,000-employee National Military Council raised similar problems. Chen said he favored a U.S.-style organization for the council that separated military from political control and planning from execution.

The key was the separation of the military from the political, Marshall asserted. Moreover, the army's 70 percent share of the government's budget "was exorbitant to the point of inviting financial chaos." Demobilized personnel, Marshall suggested, should be retrained by the nation's colleges and schools, which would also help the school system. Some existing civilian organization should handle the personnel problem not another new army organization. Marshall was opposed to using military personnel to perform civilian jobs, such as handling river and rail freight. Not only would this not assist in demobilizing the army, it "would tend to involve the army in big business which must be avoided since this would be the first step toward involving it in politics." (*Foreign Relations, 1946, 9: 339-40.*)



(32) "Some China to Mend," drawn by Edwin Marcus and printed in the New York Times, December 2, 1945, sec. 4, p. 9.



(33) General Marshall and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes leave Blair House in Washington, D.C., following their December 11, 1945, afternoon meeting with President Truman to discuss U.S. policy toward China.

(34) General Marshall bids farewell to U.S. Army Chief of Staff Dwight D. Eisenhower as he leaves Washington, D.C., on December 15, 1945, for his trip to China. Ambassador Wei Tao-ming and Admiral Harold R. Stark are also present.





(35) Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek greets Marshall at Nanking airport on December 21, 1945. The following day Marshall departed for Chungking.

(36) Marshall talks with Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Commanding General, U.S. Forces, China Theater, at Chungking in January 1946.





(37) Communist Party member of the Committee of Three, General Chou En-lai (left), meets with Kuomintang member General Chang Chun in Nanking to sign a cease-fire treaty on January 10, 1946.

(38) Chinese Nationalist General Chang Chun (left) and Communist General Chou En-lai (right) sign a truce on January 10, 1946, as General Marshall (middle) watches.





(39) During the first stop on the Committee of Three's inspection trip, the group dines at Kalgan on March 1, 1946. Kuomintang General Chang Chih-chung sits at General Marshall's right.

(40) In Taiyuan on March 3, Marshall is presented with a samurai sword by Kuomintang General Yen His-shan. On Marshall's right is Walter S. Robertson, U.S. Chargé d'Affaires and Commissioner at Executive Headquarters.





(41) General Marshall taking a review of the Communist Party Honor Guard upon his arrival in the CCP capital of Yen-an on March 4, 1946. Left to right: General Chou En-lai, Marshall, and General Chu Teh, commander in chief of Communist military forces.

(42) During the Committee of Three's tour, General Marshall reviews the Communist Honor Guard at Yen-an on March 4. Left to right: Chairman Mao Tse-tung, General Chou En-lai, Marshall, General Chang Chih-chung, and General Chu Teh.





43) Chairman Mao Tse-tung welcomes General Marshall to a reception for the Committee of Three in the Communist Military Headquarters at Yen-an on March 4, 1946. Nationalist General Chang Chih-chung is standing in the background.

(44) General Marshall offers a toast to the future success of the peace efforts in China during a dinner hosted by Chairman Mao on March 4.

(45) Chairman Mao and General Marshall watch a film during the Committee of Three's trip to Yen-an on March 4-5. Madame Mao is seated on the front row to the right.





(46) General Marshall and Chairman Mao Tse-tung have a final discussion prior to Marshall's departure from Yen-an on March 5, 1946. Captain E. K. H. Eng is interpreting.

(47) Madame Mao (Chiang Ch'ing) sees General Marshall and his party off at the airfield in Yen-an on March 5.



TIME

THE WEEKLY NEWSMAGAZINE



GENERAL MARSHALL

"We must not waste the victory."

(48) General Marshall's temporary return to Washington on March 14, 1946, inspired Henry Luce's flagship journal to publish a laudatory essay on the general's "visible touch of greatness" resulting from his accomplishments in just three months. "He found a nation of 450 million war-sick people on the verge of civil war; he had left it not at peace, but in truce and hope. For his part in that rescue the Chinese could—and warmly did—thank him. The U.S. and world could thank George Marshall for an even more important service. For the first time in a major post-war issue, the power, prestige and principles of U.S. democracy had been brought to bear in constructive, positive fashion." Under a photo of Marshall, the caption read: "Democracy, after all, is an exportable commodity" (p. 28).


George C. Marshall Foundation, Lexington, Virginia



(49) "There Must Be A Way Out." This cartoon in an April 1946 issue of the New York Times implies that the fog of war is making Marshall's mediation efforts increasingly difficult and, perhaps, ultimately impossible.

(50) Marshall's successor as U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Dwight D. Eisenhower, visits Nanking on May 9, 1946, on his way from the Philippines to South Korea. He is shown here with General Marshall, Madame Chiang, and the Generalissimo.





(51) W. Walton Butterworth, minister-counselor of embassy, is standing behind Chiang Kai-shek and George C. Marshall at Kuling in July 1946 at the time John Leighton Stuart (left) presented his credentials as ambassador.



(52) Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem (left) and Colonel J. Hart Caughey stand on the front steps of House 28 (General Marshall's quarters) in Chungking, China, on April 10, 1946. Major Bosey Berger and Captain Samuel N. Karrick, Jr., stand in the back.



(53) General Marshall presents the Distinguished Service Medal to Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade on September 25, 1946, at Nanking.



(54) Colonel Marshall S. Carter ran Marshall's liaison office in the State Department between April 1946 and January 1947. He is shown here in China during his 1945 assignment as assistant G-5 (Civil Affairs) of the China Theater.



(55) Ch'en Li-fu is pictured while minister of education in 1944. With his brother, Ch'en Kuo-fu, he led the so-called CC clique, which Marshall considered a major obstacle to his mission's success.



(56) Vice Admiral Charles M. "Savvy" Cooke, Jr., in December 1945 took command of Seventh Fleet, which had responsibilities similar to that of the prewar Asiatic Fleet.



(57) General Marshall presents Walter S. Robertson with the Medal for Merit on October 12, 1946, in Nanking.



(58) General Marshall and Vice Admiral Stuart S. Murray relax during a picket boat trip on the Yangtze River.

(59) Marshall and T. V. Soong deplane at Chiuchiang's grass airstrip, slightly less than two hours by air up the Yangtze River from Nanking. From here it was a fourteen-mile auto trip to the foot of Lushan, the mountain on top of which Kuling, the summer capital, was perched. The trip from the airstrip to Kuling took at least four hours.





(60) Katherine Marshall sits in her chair at Kuling. General Marshall wrote on the back of the photograph: "K has 6 chair coolies. I have 8 for my 190 lbs."

(61) At Kuling, General Marshall studies the new tactical situation resulting from Madame Chiang's Chinese checkers move.





(62) George and Katherine Marshall walk along the Fort De Russy seawall in Honolulu, Hawaii, on January 9, 1947. Marshall had sent his wife there in early December 1946 for her health. After leaving China on January 8, he stayed with her for ten days prior to their return to the United States, where he would assume the duties of secretary of state.

Yu Ta-wei, May 8, 3:00 P.M.

Chiang Kai-shek was worried that Chou En-lai had asked Marshall to reenter the peace negotiations regarding Manchuria. Chiang did not desire that General Marshall should do so and had sent General Yu to ascertain Marshall's position. Marshall said that Chou had "merely requested that he use his influence to solve the problem." Marshall took the opportunity, however, to state that if Chiang was stalling in order to afford his forces "time to attack Changchun, then the Generalissimo's action was ill-advised and definitely in the wrong. . . . [A]n attack on Changchun was a great hazard in that its success or failure would preclude further negotiation for peace."

The Generalissimo, Yu stated, wanted to know Marshall's views on the conditions for peace in Manchuria. Marshall professed ignorance of the political aspects of the Manchurian situation, but from the military point of view the best scheme would be to allow Communist occupation west and north of Harbin. The Communists would probably not concur, Marshall admitted, as they would very likely desire territory adjacent to their positions in Jehol and Chahar provinces, including Changchun. General Yu believed that it was important for the government to place small, symbolic forces in critical Manchurian cities and along the railroads north and east of Changchun. This would be a serious mistake, Marshall said; the Nationalists should concentrate in southern Manchuria where they could maintain logistical support for their forces.

The Generalissimo would have to concede to the Communists some political appointments in Manchuria. Marshall then outlined his ideas—previously given to General Hsu Yung-chang (see above, p. 540)—on defusing the Changchun situation by getting the Communists out and Executive Headquarters in. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 820–22.) ★

TO COLONEL MARSHALL S. CARTER
Radio No. GOLD 664. *Confidential*

May 9, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Our Embassy and Consulate people are having strenuous time in China in managing a decent standard of living. Consumer goods are seldom available at all and when available are so exorbitant in price as to preclude purchase. Basic foodstuffs sell at prohibitive prices. Rents for suitable quarters are beyond capacity to pay. Furthermore the Embassy and Consulate are not organized in a manner to maintain themselves in view of recent withdrawal of Army support, particularly as to commissary and post exchange supplies and motor transportation. Many are now finding themselves in dire straits.

I am informed that War Department regulations were the basis upon which Army support was withdrawn. What steps can I take to secure extension of privileges, which the Army is, and will continue to be, in a position to render here in China? It is extremely important for Americans in governmental service in China not only to be clothed in a dignity befit-

ting their position which is not now possible under fantastic condition of inflation but in a manner to support high morale and pride in the service they are rendering.

I am aware of budget considerations and necessity for other departments to bear their legitimate expenses but this is virtually a theater of war with all Americans fighting on one team and the numbers involved are small.¹

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Originals)

1. The editors have not found Colonel Carter's response to this message. In mid-May, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson told Marshall: "You may rest assured that we shall do everything in our power to place Shanghai and other China posts on an adequate footing as quickly as possible." The department would authorize salary increases for Chinese employees and the establishment of a commissary. (Acheson to Marshall, Radio No. 127, May 14, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Political Affairs, Messages In—Embassy].) The following week Marshall instructed Carter to "thank Handy, Hull et cetera for generous action regarding support of State Department personnel in China." (Marshall to Carter, Radio No. GOLD 737, May 22, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages].)

THE idea that George Marshall would some day become secretary of state had probably been raised at least as early as January 1946. In mid-February, Marshall and Wedemeyer discussed it briefly in connection with the idea of Wedemeyer's becoming ambassador to China. Wedemeyer told Marshall that he hoped "that I will ultimately be assigned to the State Department to assist you, the Secretary of State." (See note 1, Marshall to Shepley, February 20, 1946, pp. 462–63.) President Truman later wrote in his memoirs—referring to some time in the first half of 1946—that he wanted Marshall to replace James Byrnes as secretary of state and that Byrnes knew this and had agreed to resign whenever Truman designated his successor. (Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. 1, *Year of Decisions* [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1955], p. 552.)

Before Army Chief of Staff Dwight D. Eisenhower left Washington, D.C., on April 28 for a lengthy tour of army installations in the Pacific, President Truman directed him to stop in Nanking and ask Marshall to become secretary of state. Eisenhower arrived in Nanking on May 9, met with Marshall and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and stayed the night before flying on to Tokyo. ★

MEMORANDUM FOR MY FILE

February 12, 1948
Washington, D.C.

The attached is the code arranged by me with Eisenhower on his visit to Nanking in May (?) or June (?) 1946. He brought to me Mr. Truman's request that I accept the position of Secretary of State about July 1, 1946, as Mr. Byrnes would have to quit due to heart ailment.

My reply, via Eisenhower, was yes, but I could not—to be fair—leave China before September 1946 as it appeared that an agreement was about to be reached between Government and Communists and if effected I must remain a few months to see it well under way. I suggested that I be nominated and confirmed, but that I be permitted to delay acceptance until departure.

The code was set up to permit Eisenhower to notify me of the President's approval or disapproval of my proposal without any other individual being aware of what we were communicating about.¹

Eisenhower sent me, by this code, word that the President approved.² I heard nothing further of the matter until January 1947.³

G. C. Marshall

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. The four-word code was: "Pinehurst" = Secretary of State; "Agent" = James Byrnes; "Courier" = President Truman (at the time he wrote this memorandum, Marshall recalled the word for president as being "Owner"); "Agreement" = Confirmation.

2. A radio message from Eisenhower dated June 4 said: "I sent you a letter on the Pinehurst proposition. Courier was more than pleased to have my report and believes that if the conditions he anticipates should actually arise the suggested timing and sequence of steps can be arranged without difficulty." In a letter dated May 28, Eisenhower said that he had explained "your position in detail. He [Truman] expressed great satisfaction, saying 'This gives me a wonderful ace in the hole because I have been terribly worried.' He seemed to be of the opinion that, provided the matter should finally come to a head, he could arrange for the appointment and confirmation, leaving formal swearing in for a later date." (*The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, ed. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., et al., 21 vols. [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970–2001], 7: 1102–3, 1085.)

3. In a 1954 letter to Washington *Evening Star* columnist Constantine Brown, Marshall wrote: "Nothing further happened, and I was not nominated. I made no inquiries and, as the Fall of the year came without action, I assumed that the matter had been dropped. . . . I received no written or cabled mention of my possible appointment as Secretary of State until January 1947." (Marshall to Brown, November 17, 1954, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Retirement, Chronological].)

MEETING WITH YU TA-WEI
May 10, 1946 Nanking, China

GENERAL Marshall began the meeting by giving General Yu a list of ammunition that the United States had delivered or would soon deliver to the government's

forces in Manchuria. He also related what he had heard about the Communist occupation of Changchun from two American correspondents who had recently returned from that city.

Yu's visit was occasioned by Marshall's promise the previous day to provide Chiang Kai-shek with written comments on the Manchurian problem. Marshall read a draft of the military portion of his statement; the political portion needed further revision, he indicated, but it would be ready by the afternoon. General Yu explained that the government did not desire to occupy Manchuria in force, but it did wish to post the major portion of its troops at Harbin, with one battalion deployed along the Harbin-Manchouli railroad. "General Marshall stated that he still did not concur with this proposal since the position of the forces would be precarious," as they would be surrounded by Communist troops. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 823-24.) ★

MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERALISSIMO
OSE 27

May 10, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Subject: Possible Basis for Agreement Regarding Manchurian Issues.

General Yu Ta Wei requested me to reduce to writing suggestions of mine for a possible basis of reaching an agreement to put a stop to the fighting in Manchuria. I lack the necessary foundation of knowledge to base with any assurance suggestions regarding the political aspects of the problem. I am better informed, of course, as to the military considerations. With regard to the entire problem, I am taking into consideration the possibilities for agreement on the part of the Communist Party though I have made no proposal to them since April 23d¹ other than to transmit the proposition stated by your Excellency just prior to our departure from Chungking. In other words, whatever in the following discussion I suggest as a possible basis of compromise in order to reach an agreement for terminating the fighting has not been suggested to General Chou En-lai by me.

Military Considerations

In my opinion, the deployment of the Government forces in Manchuria should not be determined on the basis of an effective resistance to possible offensive action by the Soviet Government. Sufficient Government forces and supplies cannot be maintained in Manchuria adequate to a substantial defense of that nature. Therefore, the decision as to the disposition of the Government forces should, in the first place, I would think, be based on the Government's uncertainty as to future action of the Communist Party and the possible reactions of the Soviet Government in connection therewith. The deployment should also be based on the facilities for supply and maintenance.

These two considerations would seem to indicate the concentration of National troop strength in the southern portion of Manchuria, with the major concentrations in the vicinity of Mukden and to the northward of Hulutao.

Another consideration is the probability of Communists insistence on a reconsideration of the final military strengths in Manchuria to increase their present agreed upon proportion of one Communist division to 14 National Army divisions. Just what their demand might be I do not know, but my guess would be that they will insist on one army [i.e., three divisions]. If that proved to be the case, the National Government might raise its total by one division which would make the comparison 5 Government armies to 1 Communist.

If this adjustment were to be acceptable, then the next consideration would be the final disposition of these forces and it is in regard to this matter that my lack of basic knowledge regarding the political significance of the areas and other factors makes it difficult for me to formulate a proposal. Off-hand it would seem that the Government should hold its forces to the south of Changchun and might well accept the Communist army (as a future part of the National army) to be disposed in the area to the west of Harbin and toward Manchouli. General Yu Ta Wei has insisted that one National army should be distributed between Changchun and Manchouli as a sort of symbolic recognition of the power of the Central Government. I think such a disposition not only would be seriously weak, even from a symbolic standpoint, but that it would probably block negotiations, and even if agreed upon, would be a future source of constant disturbance. I am inclined to think that the Government would do better to accept a Communist army in principle as a portion of the Government forces and agree to locate it in this region.

With regard to the dispositions along the railroad there are three factors, it seems to me, that must be considered. First is the Sino-Soviet treaty provisions which the Central Government is intensely interested, from an international viewpoint, in strictly carrying out. The second is the fact that the Soviet military in Manchuria have, at least by negative action, made it exceedingly difficult for the Central Government to carry out its responsibilities under that treaty. And the third is the question as to whether or not that particular treaty relationship regarding the railroad is of such overwhelming importance that a calamitous civil war must be accepted rather than to compromise the execution of the agreement, or that it is of such importance that rather than compromise the treaty agreement the Central Government would surrender any possibility of influence over the greater part of Manchuria.

In the present troop situation, I am of the opinion that should a northern advance of the National army on Changchun be carried out, before a

possible basis of agreement is reached regarding the cessation of hostilities, there would remain small prospect of reaching any agreement, except by the destruction of the Communist military forces in Manchuria, which I do not think is within the power of the Government. Incidentally, if such an advance should be undertaken and it should be repulsed, then the Government's position would, in my opinion, be so seriously compromised that little could be done towards a peaceful solution without an unacceptable sacrifice of prestige on the part of the Government.

I have not been informed as to whether or not the Communist Party would accept the proposal of your Excellency for them to evacuate Changchun and agree to the occupation of that place by troops of the Central Government before any agreement for the cessation of hostilities would be signed and before any negotiations regarding future military dispositions and political reorganizations would be entered into. It is my impression that the Communists will not agree to the immediate occupation of Changchun by the troops of the National Government. I do not know whether or not they would agree to the evacuation of Changchun by their forces, but it is my hope that they might be prevailed upon to agree to that phase of your Excellency's proposal and could be induced to accept some compromise arrangement regarding the actual occupation of Changchun. If that proved to be the case, it is my suggestion that the issue be met by the proposal to have an advance headquarters of the Executive Headquarters, established in Changchun to control that city during the period of negotiations with the authority to organize Peace Preservation troops and to take such other measures as might be necessary to facilitate the operation of the railroad and restore local conditions to a normal basis. It might be that an agreement could be found for the eventual occupation of Changchun by National forces, say in three months after reaching an agreement in the negotiations.

Your Excellency has stated that you would not entertain any compromise regarding the proposal of conditions that I communicated to General Chou En-lai in your name, however, it seems to me that if an agreement cannot be secured in a very few days to that proposal, it is greatly to the interest of the Central Government to attempt to find some acceptable basis of compromise because I feel that time is definitely working against the Central Government and in favor of the Communists. And also I feel extremely concerned about the situation in North China which is trembling on the verge of a serious break which would inevitably involve a general civil war.

Political Negotiations

I have already referred to my uncertainty regarding these matters and therefore submit my suggestions with considerable hesitation. I am

informed by American members of the press who were in Changchun and had lengthy interviews with Communist leaders, that the military, political and propaganda headquarters in Manchuria have been established in that city and that elections of some character have been held to select governors for eight of the nine provinces. From conversations which have already taken place between the representatives of the Democratic League and myself and between General Chou En-lai and myself, it would appear that the reorganization of the Political Council and the Economic Council in Manchuria would facilitate all other negotiations. What apparently is desired is the removal of the Council from military domination and representation on the Council of both Communists and residents of Manchuria. I assume that domination of the Council by the Government would be acceptable provided that there was reasonable representation of the other groups.

The Communists have definitely stated their insistence on having the local governments which have been elected, presumably under their supervision continued in force until the negotiations have determined the future political arrangements in Manchuria. I suppose they would probably endeavor to maintain at least a portion of these local governments under the final arrangements, but I also suppose that they will make a point of insisting on some representation in the matter of provincial governors. Here, specifically, I am without the necessary knowledge to submit suggestions with any assurance of their soundness, but reasoning from a map, the possibility occurred to me that the compromise in these matters might be related to the region in which Communist military forces were to be disposed, that is, to the provinces of Nunchang, Hsingan, Liao-pei, and Hei lung chiang. Such a concentration of Communist influence might well be considered highly undesirable, but this undesirability would have to be weighed against the possible effects of a scattering of Communist influence throughout the region and, what apparently you regard as inevitable, contact with the Soviet influence along the border. In view of the present establishment of Communist control in almost all portions of Manchuria from Changchun north, I fear they will be inclined to drive a hard bargain, but that is the problem to be faced unless the larger part of Manchuria is to be completely abandoned—which also involves, I think, a complete disruption in North China.

General Comments

With regard to all of the foregoing, we are confronted with a definite and serious weakness in the Government's military position and a strategic military advantage of the Communist forces. We are also confronted with the profound desire of the Chinese people for peace and a similar desire on the part of the people of the world. In the circumstances, I do

not agree with General Yu Ta-wei that the psychological effect of a certain compromise on the part of the Central Government to achieve peace would be ruinous to the prestige of the Government. On the contrary. I feel, that if it becomes necessary, such a compromise as I proposed for the utilization of the Executive Headquarters—not merely a team—in Changchun would be unmistakable evidence to the world that your Excellency was making every effort to promote peace, particularly in utilizing an agency that was created solely for that purpose.

In connection with the immediate arrangements for the cessation of hostilities there remains the question of whether or not the Soviet Government would oppose the American participation. There have been no indications that I know of that they were antagonistic to the entry of our teams and I think the necessity for the presence of American mediation is so evident that the risk of Soviet resentment or insistence on representation should be accepted.

Finally, I would submit this thought, some compromise must be achieved, and that quickly, or China is faced with a chaotic situation, militarily, financially and otherwise economically.²

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, OSE Letters)

1. See the summary of Marshall's meeting with Chou En-lai on April 23, 1946, pp. 529–30.

2. Marshall met with Chiang Kai-shek on May 12 to discuss this memorandum. In his record of the meeting, Marshall noted that Chiang had, in general, “voiced agreement” on the memorandum’s military aspects, but insisted that the Communists not occupy Harbin. As to negotiations, the Generalissimo asked Marshall not to discuss a Manchurian settlement with Chou En-lai until the Communist representative came forward with a proposal. Marshall said that he was deeply concerned over the critical status of affairs in North China and thus was opposed to delays. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 840–41.)

MEETINGS WITH CHOU HSIEN-CHUNG AND YU TA-WEI May 10–11, 1946 Nanking, China

CHOU Hsien-chung, May 10, 2:30 P.M.

Professor Chou, a representative of the Chinese Youth Party and editor of a daily newspaper in Chengtu, the capital of Szechwan province, talked to Marshall about what could be done to break the political stalemate. The current “extremely tragic” situation was “largely due to the fear and mistrust of each side toward the other,” Marshall said; “the main obstacle to an agreement was the lack of appreciation on either side of the fears of the other party.” Marshall suggested that the minority groups “form one single independent and neutral political party” that would fully support his mediation efforts. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 829–30.)

Yu Ta-wei, May 11, 9:45 A.M.

Marshall handed General Yu his memorandum “Possible Basis for Agreement

Regarding Manchurian Issues” (see above, pp. 548–52). Yu again raised the issue of government occupation of Changchun, followed by the stationing of symbolic forces along the Changchun-Harbin-Manchouli railroad. “Symbolism matters little if the area is dominated by the Communists,” Marshall replied. “It is a matter of weighing the symbolic gesture against the actual power.” Time was on the Communists’ side. The Nationalists might have to withdraw partially from Manchuria and face a civil war in North China. Radicals and militarists were in power within the Communist party, Marshall thought, and Chou En-lai “has lost a great deal of his power to negotiate thus making it problematical whether we can restore the balance we had on 1 March.” Nationalist-Communist maneuvering against one another had to be stopped at once or not at all, which would render Executive Headquarters ineffective.

Chiang Kai-shek had repeatedly stated his determination not to agree to anything that did not provide for the government’s occupation of Changchun, Marshall noted. “The Generalissimo’s feeling is shared by many other Chinese,” Yu said, and outlined the likely distribution of government armies in Manchuria after the Communists agreed to evacuate Changchun. The Communists would never accept this, Marshall insisted, adding that he “would not be a party to the negotiations as chairman, knowing that there was no basis for agreement.” The symbolic force dispositions would not demonstrate the government’s power and were certain to invite trouble. He was considering asking Chou En-lai to go to Yen-an and Manchuria, where he could familiarize himself with the dangers of the situation, Marshall said. He hoped that this might “convince the Communists—who are too keenly aware of their favorable military situation in Manchuria—that their immediate gains may well lead to their eventual loss.” (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 830–32.) ★

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE OR
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
Radio No. GOLD 679. *Top Secret*

May 11, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Please delay until further receipt of notice from me Wedemeyer’s nomination.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, Memoranda-Messages-Cables)

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 681. *Top Secret*

May 12, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Most confidentially, Generalissimo informed me today that early last week Attache Russian Embassy here requested him to have his son, who speaks Russian and made special trip to Moscow last winter,¹ call on Russian Ambassador. Son was in Peiping, so Generalissimo proposed to send Secretary Foreign Affairs. Russians said no, repeat no, that the mat-

ter was secret and personal. Son was then brought from Peiping and saw Russian Ambassador Thursday last. He was told that Stalin desired Generalissimo to go to Moscow immediately on completion of meeting now in progress in Paris.² Generalissimo replied that the situation in China was so serious that he could not leave China at this time.

He said that he had not told me of the affair until he had given his answer as he did not wish to run the risk of embarrassing me.

I replied that, speaking purely personally and without any guidance from my Government, I wished to say that our interest was for peace in China, for a united China; that as for Manchuria we of course wished to see Dairen a genuine free port and American business to have access to Manchuria in common with others, but that peace was our great purpose. We would have no suspicions whatever as to his motives and no resentment regarding such a conference with Stalin. That, as a matter of fact, if Stalin should propose the good offices of the Soviet Government to bring the Chinese Communist in Manchuria to a reasonable agreement with Chinese Central Government provided no U. S. officers were utilized in adjustments or negotiation of Manchurian difficulties I personally would favor his agreement with Soviets. We were working for peace and not special privileges, and I for one would welcome a helpful, repeat helpful intercession by Soviets to compose Manchurian crisis.”³

Note for Colonel Bowen: The secrecy of this must be guarded with every precaution. There must be no slip.⁴

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, Memoranda-Messages-Cables)

1. Chiang Kai-shek's thirty-six-year-old eldest son (by his first wife), Major General Chiang Ching-kuo, had met with Stalin on December 30, 1945, and January 3, 1946. As special commissioner of foreign affairs in Peiping, he dealt with the Soviet Union regarding Manchurian affairs.

2. The first part of the second session of the Council of Foreign Ministers (i.e., of France, U.K., U.S., and the U.S.S.R.) met from April 25 to May 16; see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 2: 88–440.

3. President Truman replied the following day that he and Acting Secretary of State Acheson approved of Marshall's reply to the Generalissimo. (Ibid., 9: 846–47.)

4. Like nearly all of Marshall's radio messages from China to President Truman, this passed through War Department Office of the Chief of Staff channels where it would be handled on an eyes-only basis by Secretary of the General Staff Colonel John W. Bowen.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER
Radio No. GOLD 682. *Top Secret*

May 13, 1946
[Nanking, China]

I received your letter May 4th.¹ Reference your return China, make decision yourself on basis of health and recuperative rest alone which were my sole reasons for counseling delay of several months.

Timberman goes to Executive Headquarters at present time where he is needed. Attacheship is later consideration. Other colonel vacancy will be retained.²

Reference Cadillacs Handy is sending three new ones out to arrive in July.

House is luxuriously comfortable.³

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Wedemeyer had written that his sinus operation had been a complete success and that he was in excellent health. He urged Marshall to permit him to return to China as soon as possible. "If I delay too long I may jeopardize the position of confidence and complete responsibility that the Generalissimo has conferred and thereby weaken the contribution that I might make toward attaining the objectives of our government." (Wedemeyer to Marshall, May 4, 1946, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [China Mission, General].)

2. As presumptive ambassador, Wedemeyer was concerned that the embassy's Military Attaché Section was being staffed without his participation. He wrote that he understood that Marshall had selected Brigadier General Thomas S. Timberman to be the military attaché and that one of the section's two colonel's positions had been filled. He asked that the second remain vacant "for future consideration." (Ibid.) Timberman, who had held a number of posts in the Southeast Asia Command between February 1944 and March 1946, had recently arrived in Peiping to become director of operations and commander of the U.S. forces at Executive Headquarters.

3. Wedemeyer expressed his regret that the automobile he had ordered to Nanking for Marshall's use had not functioned well and his hope that Marshall was enjoying "the lovely house which the Generalissimo had set aside for us in Nanking." In commenting on events in Washington, Wedemeyer noted that "there is plenty of evidence that the Navy wants to retain large forces both sea and land in the Asiatic area" and desired that their senior officer in the region be in command there. He also expressed his dismay over the political considerations that were delaying passage of the military unification bill. "My experiences in Washington, political and military, would indicate definitely and more strongly than ever that you should take the post as Secretary of State, and when the time comes for the nomination of a Presidential candidate, you should accept same. We need leadership of the calibre you and you alone are capable of giving during this critical period in our country's history. Your abject humility in approaching problems disarms the opposition and your experience in coping with problems both national and international would do something constructive toward bringing about clear-cut solutions of problems." (Ibid.)

TO ARTHUR H. SULZBERGER
Radio No. GOLD 684. *Confidential*

May 13, 1946
[Nanking, China]

It would be very helpful to me in the present grave situation in China to have the services of Tillman Durdin for the next month or two months. Would you be agreeable to loaning him to me on a leave status at full pay? I am not thinking of press relations but of advice and direct assistance in connection with daily negotiations now in progress. I discussed the matter with Durdin this morning and he is agreeable to the arrangement if it meets your approval. He is now at Nanking and will await your reaction here.¹

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Sulzberger, publisher of the *New York Times*, replied that he would comply with Marshall's request, "but must impose two (2) months as a maximum limit, hoping that the period will be considerably shorter." (Bowen to Marshall, Radio No. WAR-87934, May 14, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, Messages In].)

MEETINGS WITH CHOU EN-LAI
May 13–14, 1946 Nanking, China

MAY 13, 3:30 P.M.

General Chou desired to discuss the escalating military problems in North China—where, he asserted, "the Kuomintang was trying its utmost to stir up trouble and eventual civil war and lay the blame on the Communists"—and the proper locations to which Executive Headquarters truce (or field) teams should be sent. Chou and General Byroade had met the previous day to examine the truce team issue. Byroade had drafted a directive from the Committee of Three asserting the right of freedom of movement for field teams and permitting the American member to decide where to go if the Communist and Nationalist members disagreed. Chou had countered with a more complicated six-point draft that specified, among other things, penalties for truce violations. (On the Chou-Byroade meeting and the two documents, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 833–40.)

Chou's six-point proposal was "too complicated to be carried out," Marshall told him, and he urged the Communist leader to sign Byroade's draft directive. He was particularly concerned about recent reports that indicated "complete opposition of the Communist members toward any common sense action" by the field teams. The growing mutual suspicion and distrust between Communist and Nationalist team members was "causing the situation to become almost hopeless."

Marshall also raised the Manchurian issue, stating that he "had exhausted his resources in dealing with the Generalissimo," who was "convinced that the intention of the Communists in Manchuria was totally different from the original [cease-fire] agreement." Marshall reiterated his idea of a Communist withdrawal from Changchun, a Nationalist forces halt in place, and the establishment in the city of an advance echelon of Executive Headquarters.

Responding to Communist criticism of the U.S. troop presence and his own role in the negotiations, Marshall insisted that he was trying to get American forces "out of China as quickly as he could," and if his impartiality was in doubt, "we should terminate his role of mediator." Marshall did not wish to be "placed in the position of mediator where a stalemate was in prospect." Chou thought that the North China situation should be prevented from worsening and then solved as "a beginning point in solving the Manchurian problem." He did not want Marshall to resign. "Radicals on both sides"—higher echelon Nationalists and lower echelon Communists—were the ones blocking progress in Marshall's opinion. (*Ibid.*, pp. 843–46.)

May 14, 3:30 P.M.

With regard to General Byroade's draft directive, Chou insisted that truce team unanimity be retained and that the American chairman not be the final authority in making decisions regarding investigations. Marshall obtained Chou's agreement to

wording specifying that in the case of continued team member disagreement, the American member would report to the commissioners at Executive Headquarters, who would either reach a unanimous decision within twenty-four hours or refer the matter to the Committee of Three. Chou then signed the modified Committee of Three directive. (Ibid., pp. 847–48.) ★

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS May 16, 1946
OSE 40 Nanking, China

My dear Dr. Wang: I have been informed that there are in China certain Japanese technicians whose services would be profitable to the Government if retained. According to the figures that were handed to me, there are in the Peking area approximately 5,000; in the Tientsin area, approximately 5,000; in the Tsingtao area, approximately 6,000; and between 1,500 and 3,000 in the vicinity of Taiyuan.

Your Government appears to desire retention of certain Japanese technicians. Please advise me as to the desires of the Government in this matter, so that firm plans can be made regarding the shipping involved.¹

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, OSE Letters)

1. Foreign Minister Wang replied on June 5 “that in order to ensure the uninterrupted operation of certain enterprises such as factories, mines and communications,” the Chinese government wished to retain (in areas outside of Manchuria and Formosa) the services of twelve thousand Japanese technicians. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 895.) In a June 6 memorandum for Marshall, Chou En-lai charged that in Shansi province (whose capital was Taiyuan) the government had disguised as technicians seven thousand Japanese troops who were actually being used to garrison various localities; he demanded that all Japanese in China be repatriated quickly. (Ibid., 9: 991–92.)

MEETINGS WITH CHOU EN-LAI AND CHANG NAI-TEH
AND CHEN PING-HSIEH
May 17, 1946 Nanking, China

CHOU En-lai, 10:00 A.M.

General Chou began by accusing Chiang Kai-shek’s government of preparing a five-army attack on Communist forces in North Kiangsu (i.e., that part of the province north of the Yangtze River). He suggested that the Committee of Three send a special fact-finding delegation to the area that day. Marshall had Colonel Caughy investigate the possibility of a quick trip by air. (Caughy reported back later in the meeting, and Chou and Marshall decided that a trip was not possible until the field team in the area reported on the situation.)

He had conveyed to Communist party headquarters Marshall’s ideas regarding the situation around Changchun (see p. 556), Chou reported; he then offered some ideas of his own on settling the Manchurian problems. Marshall elaborated on his ideas regard-

ing what Executive Headquarters should do in Changchun and on the military agreements that would have to be reached in the negotiations after an impartial government had been installed in the city. With regard to the political aspects of the problem, Marshall admitted his own "ignorance as to the points of view in the matter."

In the course of the discussion, Marshall three times reiterated his determination not to involve himself in trying to mediate matters on which neither side intended to compromise. As it was, Marshall said, he had been told that the controlling members of the Kuomintang (he was not certain exactly who they were) believed that his past advice to the government had been proven wrong and that his subsequent advice should not be followed. He wished to limit the Committee of Three to problems concerning North China, but he would be "glad" to discuss Manchuria with Chou "because the Communist Party has taken the aggressive role [there] and are in a position of bringing to a halt the Central Government's efforts."

General Chou expressed sympathy with Marshall's problems with the Nationalists and said that he would try to "correct the propaganda situation" from the Communist side. Chou then reported in some detail on government planning regarding finances and Manchurian fighting. "Each side consulted its own fears and then estimated the other man's intentions," Marshall observed, and sometimes each thought that what the other "may do" was what it "will do." "The difficulty is to separate the wheat from the chaff." Marshall asserted that his "only hope was in scattering enough Americans around to see, so I can keep the ship trim, that is about all." (*Foreign Relations, 1946*, 9: 849–61.)

Chang Nai-teh and Chen Ping-hsieh, 2:30 P.M.

The two representatives of the Chinese Youth party—a large, pro-democracy party that was part of the Democratic League—asked Marshall if he thought that his mission had any hope of success. Marshall did not answer this question, stating instead that it would be a great help to him if the minority political parties organized themselves to help his efforts, for example, by trying "to influence newspaper editors and individual Kuomintang and Communist party members toward a more tolerant point of view." No one in China really understood the meaning and working of a two-party system, Marshall said. Neither the Nationalists nor the Communists could destroy the other militarily, but between them they could destroy China. (*Ibid.*, pp. 861–62.) ★

TO THOMAS B. McCABE¹
Radio No. GOLD 712. *Secret*

May 18, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear McCabe: Yesterday I had a long conference with your Mister Howard and General Johnson. Howard's 10 page letter to me of May 14 was basis of discussion. Copy of this letter is en route to you by hand of Wendell Endicott who is due Washington in a few days.² Crux of proposition of Howard is price of 30 percent of cost less scrap, vessels, aircraft and fixed installations provided China takes all such surplus in the Western Pacific except UNRRA and Philippine quotas.

One necessary condition precedent to agreement is availability of sufficient U. S. credit to enable China to complete overall purchase, and the other condition is necessity to securement of agreement of other governments where material is now stored and inadequate labor is available to permit Chinese to land labor to carry out task of guarding, sorting, packing and loading items. This would involve Australia for New Guinea, Bismarcks, Solomons, et cetera, French, possibly New Zealand and Great Britain.

Availability of credit will depend on total price. At present unexpended U. S. dollar equivalent of yuan debit owed China will now probably total 80,000,000. Credit already granted is 150,000,000 and extendable to 250,000,000, making total of 330,000,000.

At a sale price of 30 percent of cost, necessary credit would be from 370 to 500,000,000.

At 25 percent of cost would require a credit of from 300 to 420,000,000. (All figures approximate)

I understand that the average price of previous sales has been 37 percent of cost. Howard expresses willingness to go down to 30 percent of cost for China. This to me is too high for these reasons:

We have far more than merely a financial interest in the transaction. Our position if not our future security in Pacific is involved. The Chinese economic crisis and inflation present a threat to our desires and hopes. Such considerations were not involved to any material extent in case of other countries. Furthermore in most other cases I believe surplus property was on the ground of country making purchase. China will have to import practically all of her purchase over long ocean distances and at considerable expense from her limited cash resources.

I think 25 percent would be the maximum we would be logically justified in charging unless we plan to charge higher prices for war surpluses and then offset the procedure by loaning more money than we plan to do. Incidentally I do not understand that there is any competition for this overall purchase.

Howard feels that Foreign Liquidation Commission should be cleared to negotiate with definite assurances as to U. S. credits available which he hopes will permit cleanup of surplus property in Pacific.

We have the problem out here of deciding whether or not China can absorb purchase of entire lot, and how long a period will be involved in importation and distribution, and the effect on American business interests. Howard thinks last mentioned would profit if given opportunity with Chinese in marketing items. Also deal would promote demand for spare parts and replacements.

Another subject for Carter:³ Please give copy of this to proper official in State Department and any one else you think advisable. Howard

plans to talk to McCabe by telephone from Manila tomorrow Sunday evening—your Saturday. So get this to McCabe as quickly as possible.⁴

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. A banker, executive in the wood pulp and paper industry, and member of the Commerce Department's Business Advisory Council since 1940, McCabe had served as Army-Navy Liquidation Commissioner in 1945. In September of that year, he became a special assistant to the secretary of state and the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner. On the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commission, see note 2, Marshall to Wedemeyer, February 12, 1946, p. 452.

2. H. Wendell Endicott was McCabe's deputy. Brigadier General Bernhard A. Johnson was in charge of the commission's China and Eastern Area office in Manila. John K. Howard—central field commissioner, Pacific and China—was one of Johnson's assistants.

3. The message was addressed to Colonel Marshall Carter for delivery to McCabe.

4. McCabe replied on May 20 that he was "very much impressed with your reasoning and am sympathetic to your views." Colonel Marshall Carter told Marshall on May 23 that McCabe had concurred in the idea of 25 percent of original price as a maximum. On June 16, Marshall informed McCabe that the Foreign Liquidation Commission field personnel had negotiated an agreement with T. V. Soong for a 22 percent price and, since most of the material being considered was in the Philippines, asked McCabe to obtain Philippine agreement for Chinese and U.S. Army and Navy officials to enter the Philippines (which would become a sovereign nation on July 4, 1946) to make preparations for the surplus property's removal. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 1039–41. The agreement reached with the Chinese in mid-June is *ibid.*, 1041–43.) For further developments on the surplus in the Philippines, see Marshall to McNutt, July 5, 1946, pp. 619–20.

TO JAMES V. FORRESTAL¹
Radio No. GOLD 714. *Secret*

May 19, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Admiral Cooke tells me he has received a citation for Tai Li to be presented posthumously by him shortly.² This will seriously prejudice my efforts by virtually egging on the Communist propaganda against American support of National Government in present conflict. Importance of naval recognition of Tai Li's assistance in SACO matter I think is of negligible importance compared with settlement of present crisis.³ Cannot this matter be delayed?⁴

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. The routing instructions to Colonel Marshall Carter stated: "Please see Secretary Navy personally immediately and give him the following orally, repeat orally."

2. Tai Li, the Nationalist government's spymaster and one of the men most feared by its enemies, had been killed in an air crash that many regarded as suspicious in origin near Nanking on March 17. Since 1942, Tai had had close relations with representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence. In early 1946, U.S. Navy representatives in China had begun pressing the Navy Department to support Tai's being named chief of the Chinese navy. (Maochun Yu, *OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War* [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996], pp. 253–54.)

3. In late 1942, Tai Li "decided to impose a legal obligation on the U.S. government to

regulate Sino-U.S. intelligence operations and stop any future unauthorized OSS secret intelligence efforts in China.” He proposed an agreement creating a Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Organization (S.A.C.O.). When the proposal was taken up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in February 1943, Admiral King was supportive, but Marshall opposed those sections of the draft that sought to control and regulate U.S. intelligence efforts in China and that consequently undermined unity of command under General Stilwell. But when asked to comment on the draft agreement, Stilwell agreed to give up control of intelligence to S.A.C.O. (which was to be headed by Tai Li and to have Navy Commander Milton Miles subordinate to him as the U.S. head). The S.A.C.O. agreement was signed in China on July 4, 1943. Neither the O.S.S. nor U.S. Army intelligence were ever completely subordinated to S.A.C.O. On October 11, 1945, S.A.C.O. was formally dissolved as a result of the dissolution of the O.S.S. (Ibid., pp. 94–100, 252.)

4. According to Miles, Marshall prevented both him and Admiral Cooke, who had a Legion of Merit for Tai, from attending Tai’s funeral and that Cooke was “resentful” of this. Miles attended Tai’s burial in Nanking in 1947. (Milton E. Miles, *A Different Kind of War: The Little-Known Story of the Combined Guerrilla Forces Created in China by the U.S. Navy and the Chinese During World War II* [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967], pp. 579, 581–82.) On Miles and Tai Li, see Marshall to Wedemeyer, February 18, 1946, pp. 457–58.

PRESS RELEASE

May 20, 1946
[Nanking, China]

General Marshall is daily engaged in discussions with representatives of the Chinese political parties and others concerning the restoration of peace in Manchuria. He is deeply concerned over the critical situation in North China and is endeavoring by every means within his power to avoid the spread of the fighting in Manchuria to this region. The present publicity or propaganda campaigns conducted by both sides naturally inflames feelings and increases the possibility of some hot-head precipitating a general conflagration. This reckless propaganda of hate and suspicion seriously aggravates the present serious situation and can lead to results that would be disastrous for the people of China.

Operations of truce teams has been made especially difficult by the spreading of the propaganda among the officers and soldiers of both sides and it is on the success of these teams that China must largely depend for the effort at least to localize, if not suppress, conflict. The American members of the teams are coping with conditions that involve, not only hardship, but the risk of their lives in a determined and impartial effort to better the situation.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, General)

MEETING WITH CHOU EN-LAI
May 21, 1946, 10:40 A.M. Nanking, China

GENERAL Chou said that he agreed with Marshall's May 20 press release and had sent a copy to Communist party headquarters in Yenai. Marshall replied that he was reluctant to interfere in such a domestic situation but felt that it was necessary; moreover, the propaganda campaigns were discrediting both sides in the United States. Chou suggested that he might meet the new government minister of information to see if something could be worked out.

Marshall and Chou then discussed the issues raised in three letters dated May 19 Marshall had received from Chou concerning truce team problems and specific areas of fighting. There were several instances in which the Communists were at fault in thwarting the truce teams' operation, Marshall asserted, and he asked that General Chou "take some positive action to get his people [in the Chihfeng and Chengte regions of Jehol province] under control." He was also unhappy with two instances of the Communists blocking the movement of U.N.R.R.A. supplies to starving people. Chou explained the Communists' viewpoint on these issues and said that he would investigate further.

They briefly discussed the Changchun situation. Chou assured Marshall that, after the truce, the demobilization and reorganization would be carried out as previously agreed. The Communists now wished to have five divisions in Manchuria rather than the one stipulated in the original proposal. Marshall stated that the central government would doubtless demand a corresponding increase. He was opposed to a net increase in troops in Manchuria, but supposed that a change in the ratio of Nationalist to Communist armies from 14:1 to 5:1 might be possible.

General Marshall said he would not permit himself to become involved in the negotiations unless he thought there was a fair prospect of reaching an agreement. Once he had a pretty definite idea of the Communist side of the picture, he could do some investigating to find out what the possibilities of the Government's considerations of his views would be. General Marshall would follow the same procedure he had in the past. He would start with the side that was in the strong position at the moment. It was crucial that rapid action be taken to settle the troop strength and disposition problems. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 868-79.) ★

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 740. *Top Secret*

May 22, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mister President: As the military situation in North China reaches a critical state trembling on the verge of open general war and the fighting in Manchuria continues, a point has been reached in negotiations that indicates probability of an agreement for termination of hostilities with a reasonable basis for military and political compromises in Manchuria. The time factor is critical as an open rupture in North China would probably fatally defeat the possibility of reaching agreement. The following is

the situation and I must ask you and Mister Byrnes to guard this recital against all possibility of a leak, which would wreck any prospects I now have for terminating the present conflict.

On my departure from Chungking for Nanking I, in effect, withdrew as a mediator in the Manchuria problem as having exhausted my resources and found myself in a position where National Government leaders, because of Communist attack on Changchun, felt my advice regarding cooperation with Communists had proved unworkable and Communists were attacking me for assistance they charged U. S. was giving National Government. I said I could no longer through my actions place the U. S. Government in the position of being charged with responsibility for another stalemate and consequent resumption of hostilities, that a firm basis of compromise would have to be found and that appeared quite improbable in view of the determined, rather implacable attitude of the two parties concerned. I therefore confined my activities to efforts to control the situation in North China and prevent a general outbreak there.

In discussions with the Generalissimo I found he would recede from his determination to have his army occupy Changchun and would accept the suggestion that an advanced section of Executive Headquarters, on withdrawal of Communists, take over the management of Changchun while negotiations were completed for the reorganization of the military and political governments in Manchuria. I also found that he would concede certain points in connection with this political and military reorganization. These discussions were a lengthy process.¹

Next, General Chou En-lai wished to resume discussions regarding a possible Manchurian settlement. In effect, I declined but explained again why I had withdrawn, at the same time outlining all the factors I would have to be fully informed on to permit me to reconsider my position. He transmitted my outline to Yen-an and they in turn discussed the terms with Manchurian leaders. All this being by radio over highly controversial matters in the midst of fighting, was also a lengthy process. He has returned with certain definite proposals which are not too seriously out of line with the Generalissimo's present attitude. Chou En-lai comes again today to discuss details, on the assumption that if I consider the Communist position not too extreme I will undertake again formally to mediate.

The most critical factor at the moment is not the distance apart of the two parties, but is the rapid development of a crisis which may overtake and wreck negotiations beyond hope of repair. Added to this is the secret intention of the Generalissimo to fly to Mukden tomorrow because, he stated to me most confidentially, he feared his military leaders there were heading into an attack on Changchun which both he and I think would fatally terminate all hope of an agreement. While he is gone negotiations will be largely at a standstill and time presses seriously. I am trying to

arrange a basis for terminating the fighting while he is actually in Mukden, but this will be very difficult of arrangement as I cannot press definitely for Communist declarations regarding several critical political points without indicating some response from Government side. But I will try to find a method. Both are reluctant to state their terms, awaiting for a commitment by the other side. I am working against time, otherwise I would be quite hopeful. As it is, success depends on the developments in the field more than on the problems of negotiation. Hence my press release of day before yesterday was in an effort to moderate the vitriolic campaign of propaganda now in progress. I did this in the face of a probable hostile reaction to my interference in a purely Chinese problem as would of course be charged by certain people. But something had to be done to moderate the inflammatory press and radio charges and counter charges and I appeared to be the only person who would do it.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. See Marshall's notes on a May 22 meeting with Chiang Kai-shek in *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 880–81.

MEETINGS WITH WANG SHIH-CHIEH AND CHOU EN-LAI
May 23 and 25, 1946 Nanking, China

WANG Shih-chieh, May 23, 5:00 P.M.

Foreign Minister Wang urged Marshall to “triple his efforts” to secure a Nationalist-Communist military agreement. They then discussed the Manchurian situation, and Wang said that both he and the Generalissimo agreed that it would be a bad idea for the government to assault Changchun. Wang thought the Nationalists should accept the Communist party into a coalition government. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 883.)

Chou En-lai, May 23, 6:00 P.M.

Marshall summarized his conversation with Wang Shih-chieh and noted that the foreign minister agreed with them on the deleterious effects of the propaganda campaigns in the press and that both sides should take determined action to control it.

Chou said that he had asked for the meeting because he desired Marshall's opinion on whether Chiang Kai-shek's departure for Mukden indicated the Generalissimo's intention of settling the Manchurian problem by force. Marshall would not comment on his ideas about Chiang's trip but did note that he had met with the Generalissimo the previous evening and outlined the possible basis of an agreement (excluding the political reorganization issue). Chiang was not antagonistic regarding Changchun or the military problems, Marshall thought. Marshall then delineated three points that Chiang had said were conditions precedent to any general agreement: (1) Communist efforts to facilitate the restoration of communications; (2) specified dates for carrying out the demobilization and reorganization plan; (3) Communist-Nation-

alist impasses on routine truce team operations were to be decided by the American member. As a result of his meetings with Chiang, Marshall said, he suspected that the Generalissimo was seriously considering Marshall's ideas about a possible basis for quick agreement on Manchuria.

Chou proposed that a field team be sent to Changchun. Marshall replied that he might send a message to Chiang to say that General Chou had proposed this as a preliminary step toward the termination of hostilities and that he (Marshall) proposed instead the establishment of an advance section of Executive Headquarters and that each side issue orders to cease advances, attacks, and pursuits. Marshall asked Chou if the Communists would accept his Changchun arrangement (i.e., Communist evacuation, cessation of Nationalist advances, and the establishment of the advance section). Chou said that he would work on this and on the Generalissimo's three points. "Small things must not be allowed to block" progress, Marshall concluded, but "the possibility of bringing about a termination of the present terrible situation lay within grasp." (Ibid., pp. 884–90.)

Chou En-Lai, May 25, 10:45 A.M.

Marshall had received no messages from Chiang Kai-shek, he told General Chou. The Communist leader said that he had information that the Nationalist commanders in Manchuria were still talking about capturing Changchun and now pressing Chiang to seek a Communist evacuation of Harbin and the main rail lines, which would cause Communist field commanders to launch further attacks. Three or four weeks ago, Marshall observed, he feared that successful Communist generals would insist upon conditions for negotiations that the Nationalists found unacceptable; now he was troubled that the reverse would happen. Concessions had to be made quickly by both sides, because further delay in reaching a settlement encouraged the growth of mutual suspicions about the enemy's probable intentions.

Pending further communications from the Generalissimo, Marshall again brought up the three points that Chiang had raised. They had a lengthy discussion about how to reopen communications and to end the rumor-mongering and propaganda campaigns in the press. Chou noted that in North China "both sides were now resorting more and more to dangerous retaliatory measures," which, if continued, would lead to large-scale fighting. Chou ended the meeting by saying that he would "make further efforts to improve the relations between the Communist officers and the American officers" on the truce teams. (Ibid., pp. 893–900.) ★

TO COLONEL MARSHALL S. CARTER
Radio No. GOLD 767. *Restricted*

May 25, 1946
[Nanking, China]

General Yu Ta-wei is now conferring with Gillem's people regarding ammunition requirements for Chinese forces. Ammunition acquired through requisition will constitute a strategic reserve. Basis of requisition is six months supply for 39 Alpha divisions.¹ I approve in principle this basis. When compiled requisition will be submitted to Chinese Supply Commission Washington for submission to War Department. Opposition

to granting requisition may arise due to its projected use in Manchuria, however the Chinese now have a reserve of 100 days of supply which would presumably cover such fighting as may continue in Manchuria short of an outbreak into a general civil war. The U. S. cannot well afford to cut off completely logistical support and thus virtually disarm forces armed with U. S. equipment. Chinese would be responsible for transporting ammunition. As I see it this would be a matter of outright purchase.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Regarding the Alpha divisions, see Marshall to Wedemeyer, August 11, 1945, p. 269.

TO CHIANG KAI-SHEK

[May 26, 1946]
[Nanking, China]

Very Secret from General Marshall to Consul Clubb Mukden for his Eye Only.¹

This is the first of a series of messages I will probably have to send to you for personal delivery to the Generalissimo.

“Your Excellency:

I received your statement of terms of 24 May by letter of Madame Chiang at noon today Sunday.² Have had three hour conference with Chou En-lai.³ He is to give me a statement this evening of agreements, and commitments on certain details which are involved in your statement of general terms. His difficulty is inability to commit himself on details regarding matter of procedure of government in taking over sovereignty and extent of authority proposed for American officers referred to in your paragraph four (c).⁴

Meanwhile I make these recommendations and observations:

(a) General Chou and I propose that an advance section of Executive Headquarters be moved into Changchun immediately and get established there.

(b) I urge that you immediately issue orders terminating advances, attacks and pursuits by government troops within twenty-four hours of the time of issuing your order, publicly announcing such action and stating that you do this in furtherance of your desire to terminate hostilities and settle matters by the peaceful method of negotiations. I feel that to continue to press your present military advantage will invite a repetition of the unfortunate results of the early National Government experience in Manchuria and the result of the more recent belligerent attitude of the Communist leaders at Changchun. Besides, to do otherwise at this moment would be contrary to your recent proposal to the Communists.

(c) Question. Is it your intention to give American Commissioner at Peiping complete authority to make decision on all matters over which opposing commissioners are in disagreement. This certainly would facilitate matters but I feel that it is too all inclusive in effect to place American and consequently American Government in position of deciding a number of major matters that would shortly become involved. How about restricting this final decision by Americans to specific matters such as where, when and how teams should proceed, who they should see and decisions covering local situation. Also final decision by Americans at Changchun regarding all immediate arrangements and matters in Manchuria pertaining to termination of hostilities. Also decision at Executive Headquarters regarding matters referred to Commissioners by teams or team chairman, and in matters pertaining to restoration of communications. In all of this, decisions regarding political matters would be excluded unless specifically stipulated by later agreement.⁵

(d) Reference statement in letter regarding my willingness to guarantee good faith of Communists please explain the meaning you place of [on] the term guarantee.⁶

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Political Affairs, Chiang Kai-shek)

1. O. Edmund Clubb, one of the Old China Hands and an expert in the language, had served in numerous posts in the country since 1929. In 1946 he was U.S. consul general in Mukden. His 1932 report "Communism in China" was the first detailed study of the Chinese Communist movement by an American, although it was not available outside the State Department until it was published by Columbia University Press in 1968.

2. This document (see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 891–92) stated that government troops had begun to enter Changchun and that "a fair and permanent" understanding with the Communists should be based upon their adherence to the three agreements already signed (i.e., cease-fire, army demobilization and reorganization, and restoration of communications). In his fourth paragraph ("Method of Procedure"), Chiang made three points:

- a. The Communists should not obstruct or impede the Central Government in the taking over the sovereignty of Manchuria as provided in the [August 14, 1945] Sino-Soviet Pact.
- b. The Communists should not interfere with or obstruct the Central Government's efforts to repair railroads in all parts of China for the resumption of traffic. Only in this way can the Communists demonstrate their sincerity to live up to their pledged word.
- c. In the carrying out of the three agreements . . . the American officers of the Executive Headquarters or Teams have the determining voice and authority both in the execution and interpretation of views held in divergence by the Government and Communist representatives.

3. See the summary of the meeting with Chou En-lai on May 23, 1946, pp. 564–65.

4. Marshall sent Chou En-lai a copy of Madame Chiang's letter. Chou responded (see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 903–4) that the agreements already signed should be implemented without delay. Responding to Chiang's fourth paragraph, Chou wrote that: (a) it was not clear what was meant by "taking over sovereignty" in Manchuria; (b) railroad repair work should be "immediately expedited" and that he would begin talks with the government's minister of communications (Yu Ta-wei); and (c) he would "further exert" his efforts to get Communist headquarters to agree to have the American representative on

field teams be given "determining power over the procedure of conducting investigations."

5. In his May 28 reply (see *ibid.*, pp. 907–8), the Generalissimo agreed that the American member's "authority should be confined to specific matters. However, all executive matters relating to the restoration of railroad and other communications must be included in the scope of such authorities."

6. Having listed the things that the Communists needed to do, Madame Chiang's May 24 letter (*ibid.*, p. 891) had included the sentence: "Whether the Communists would agree to the above, and whether the American representative would be willing to guarantee the good faith of the Communists." Chiang's May 28 response to Marshall's message said that by "guarantee" he meant that "in regard to all the agreements you have participated in signing . . . you will set time limits for the putting into effect of such agreements and will assume the responsibility of supervision over the strict observance of such agreements on the part of the Communists, so as to avoid any further delays."

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 776. *Secret*

May 26, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mr. President: Since my message of May 22d GOLD 740 and Generalissimo's departure for Mukden, I have had continuous conferences with Chou En-lai. This noon I received letter from Generalissimo formally stating conditions he demanded for restoration of peace. In brief he demands execution of agreements for cessation of hostilities of January 10th which specifically relates to freedom of action of Government in taking over sovereignty in Manchuria, and agreement of February 25 for military demobilization and reorganization. He placed first importance on Communist demonstration of good faith by permitting Government agencies to restore communications in northern China, and stipulated that in Executive Headquarters and teams, American member should cast deciding vote or make decisions in case of Communist-Central Government disagreement on action or interpretations of agreements. He also made a peculiar statement of query if I could guarantee Communist good faith in carrying out agreements. Chou En-lai discussed letter with me but was not in position to commit himself on certain points. He will give me a partial statement of agreements late tonight for transmission to Generalissimo at Mukden. Meanwhile, I have dispatched a message to Generalissimo requesting explanatory details regarding his general statements, proposing immediate movement of a section of Executive Headquarters to Changchun, and urging him to issue an order immediately directing cessation of attacks, pursuits or advances while details of truce are being arranged. I urged him to avoid painful results of previous Government error in forging ahead in Manchuria without granting permission for presence of teams to prevent unnecessary skirmishing and more recent similar unfortunate results of attitude of belligerent Communist generals at Changchun. I also requested him to explain the meaning he gave to his use of the word "guarantee" in refer-

ence to me. I will keep you advised from now on more closely on progress of events. I think any statement at this time would be premature.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

TO JOHN CARTER VINCENT
Radio No. GOLD 788. *Secret*

May 29, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Regarding your radio statement that military truce of January 10 does not apply to Manchuria,¹ it does and always did in my opinion, despite Central Government implications to the contrary some time back. Misunderstanding partially arose due to the fact that no arrangement was made immediately after the agreement for truce teams to operate in Manchuria, as there was little trouble there in comparison with situation in North China, and there had been no Central Government–Communist disagreement or reluctance over negotiations, and also the presence of Russians presented a delicate problem because of American team captains. This did not mean, however, that cease fire should not be observed there in connection with the provision that Government troops were to be free to move into and within Manchuria for the purpose of establishing Chinese sovereignty.

On January 24 I addressed in writing to the Generalissimo and Chou En-lai, a recommendation that truce teams be immediately dispatched to Manchuria. Chou agreed, and later on frequently urged such action. The Generalissimo declined to approve, stating a fear that the Russians would demand equal representation along with Americans.²

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. On May 25, the NBC radio series “Our Foreign Policy” broadcast a three-man discussion on “Our Policy in China” featuring Vincent (director of the State Department’s Office of Far Eastern Affairs) and two members of the House of Representatives: pro-Chiang Kai-shek Walter H. Judd (Republican from Minnesota) and anti-Chiang Hugh DeLacy (Democrat from Washington).

2. Vincent replied on June 7 that he had deleted the statement on Manchuria from the script the day prior to the broadcast, but this was too late to enable NBC to alter the version released to the public. (Carter to Marshall, Radio No. WAR-90515, June 7, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Vincent Files, Marshall and Stuart].)

MEETINGS WITH CARSUN CHANG AND CHOU EN-LAI
May 29–30, 1946 Nanking, China

CARSUN Chang, May 29, 5:00 P.M.

Nationalist-Communist suspicion continued to escalate and the North China situation was increasingly critical, Marshall said. He urged the minority political

groups, like Chang's Democratic League and the Chinese Youth party, to "get together for the interim period to render some useful and important service" as middle men to convince a few key members and editors of the two major parties to "moderate their feelings."

Marshall discussed Chiang Kai-shek's conditions for a Manchurian agreement. Marshall was particularly concerned to place limits on the heavy responsibilities Chiang was proposing to delegate to the American member at Executive Headquarters for deciding Nationalist-Communist impasses. In the past, the inability of the Chinese members of truce teams and at Executive Headquarters to agree had damaged the headquarters and discredited the Americans, Marshall noted. "He further stated that he personally was criticized and attacked by people from all sides. Even in the U. S., a movement was now under way charging him of supporting the Communist Party." Marshall told Chang of his unwillingness to participate in negotiations that had no reasonable chance of success.

Carsun Chang thought that the Communists' suspicion was "due to their feeling of insecurity." The Communists, he suspected, would not object to government forces occupying Harbin and Tsitsihar, but hostilities had to cease before negotiations could begin; consequently, it would be best if government forces ceased their northern advance. Chang hoped that the Political Consultative Conference would meet again and determine Manchuria's political status. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 912-14.)

Chou En-lai, May 30, 6:00 P.M.

Marshall began with a discussion of Chiang Kai-shek's "not a very definite response" of May 28 to a letter from Marshall. (See Marshall to Chiang, May 26, 1946, pp. 566-68.) He read most of the Generalissimo's letter to General Chou. He also noted that T. V. Soong had had a lengthy meeting with Chiang and subsequently with Marshall. Taking his talk with Soong and Chiang's letter as a basis, Marshall had drafted a possible agreement for discussion of the American representatives' role at Executive Headquarters, in Changchun, and on the field teams. (See *ibid.*, pp. 914-15.)

General Chou explained Communist party headquarters's response to Chiang's May 24 letter, observing that Chiang had said nothing about stopping government forces' attacks following their capture of Changchun. The Communists expected that the government would now demand control of Harbin, Kirin, and other places, and "under such circumstances the hostilities could not be stopped by negotiations." The Generalissimo's actions and letters appeared to Chou to indicate that the government would continue fighting under the pretext of reimposing Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria and reopening communications. The government's failure to reach a propaganda truce agreement with the Communists and its recent suppression of the Communist press in Peiping were, in Chou's mind, further examples of government hostility. Chiang seemed to "put up details as conditions precedent to a truce," when the cease-fire agreement was the "condition precedent to the other agreements." Chou said that he and party headquarters felt they had been deceived by all the previous talks and that "the Generalissimo's purpose was to order a total war." Since the January 10 cease-fire agreement, the government had moved 106 Nationalist divisions, taken over large territories from the Communists, and erected many fortifications. He asked Marshall for his evaluation of the present situation.

Marshall explained his efforts recently, noting that "he had talked a great deal to General Chou and very little to the Generalissimo because he first had to determine

whether or not there was any probability of his being able to make any real contribution as a mediator.” He could not adequately respond to Chou’s inquiry until he had talked with Chiang Kai-shek. He also observed that the Communists’ “launching a full fledged attack on Changchun had almost destroyed his powers of negotiations with the Government.” Marshall agreed with Chou “that the prospect of terminating hostilities at the present movement would appear to be rather gloomy, but he was not a pessimist and he didn’t quit in the middle of a fight.” He hoped that talks between himself and the Generalissimo would improve the situation.

General Chou asserted that while he recognized Marshall’s good intentions, Communist officers in the field did not always understand the situation and could only see what was actually happening—such as U.S. military assistance to the Nationalists. Marshall disagreed with the Communist view that the Generalissimo’s insistence on the importance of reopening communications was merely a ploy to continue the war. He thought that an agreement by the Communists not to interfere with railroad reconstruction might be “a basis for reaching an immediate decision regarding hostilities.” (Ibid., pp. 915–26.) ★

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. T. V. SOONG
OSE 103

May 31, 1946
Nanking, China

Dear Dr. Soong: With reference to my request to you of May 29th, to transmit a message to the Generalissimo,¹ I have just received a radio from Mr. Robertson that the Generalissimo requested him to advise me that the Generalissimo plans to remain in Peiping for two or three days before returning to Nanking.

Will you please be kind enough to transmit the following message from me to the Generalissimo:

“Your Excellency:

Mr. Robertson has just advised me at your request that you would remain in Peiping two or three days. I have not received a reply to my message to you of May 29th. I must therefore repeat that under the circumstances of the continued advance of the Government troops in Manchuria my services in mediation are becoming not only increasingly difficult, but a point is being reached where the integrity of my position is open to serious question. I therefore request you again to issue immediately an order terminating advances, attacks or pursuits by Government troops, and also that you authorize the immediate departure of an advance section of Executive Headquarters to Changchun.”²

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, OSE Letters)

1. This message said: "The continued advances of the Government troops in Manchuria in the absence of any action by you to terminate the fighting other than the terms you dictated via Madame Chiang's letter of May 24, are making my services as a possible mediator extremely difficult and may soon make them virtually impossible." (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 912.)

2. Marshall sent a similar message to Walter S. Robertson, U.S. commissioner at Executive Headquarters, with instructions to deliver it to the Generalissimo, "preferably through Madame Chiang." (*Ibid.*, p. 926.)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER
Radio No. GOLD 807. *Top Secret, Eyes Only*

June 1, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Reference your message 29th,¹ action in your case has been delayed in hopes earlier peaceful settlement here would have been accomplished before announcement, for several reasons, effect of suggestion of my withdrawal on CC clique and Communists both, weakening of my influence on Gimo in view of his insistence on my long stay here, your inclusion with me in Communist propaganda against U. S. assistance to Government armies in present fighting. I had hoped to have fighting terminated several weeks ago but matter still drags with Government military now pressing their temporary advantage to the limit.

Problem of congressional adjournment had not occurred to me but will have to be taken into account immediately. I have a hope to precipitate initiation of settlement within next 48 hours. If not successful we will have to go ahead with your affair.²

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Wedemeyer did not know that Marshall had asked that his nomination as ambassador to China be delayed (see Marshall to the Secretary of State, May 11, 1946, p. 553), and Marshall apparently did not know that Wedemeyer had not been told (see Carter to Marshall, June 3, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Miscellaneous Files, Wedemeyer]). In his May 29 message, Wedemeyer said that he wanted his status clarified as "I tentatively plan to leave Washington between June 10 and 15 for China. . . . In as much as legislation is involved and the adjournment of busy congress is scheduled for early summer some action is clearly repeat clearly indicated." (Wedemeyer to Marshall, May 29, 1946, *ibid.*)

2. Secretary of State Byrnes had not been informed of Marshall's desires regarding Wedemeyer's nomination, and on June 12 he met with the general and offered him the job. Wedemeyer asked him to clear this with Marshall—to which Byrnes agreed. Wedemeyer told the secretary that if Marshall "could not accomplish amicable arrangements between the opposing factions, I know of no one who could do so." Moreover, Wedemeyer said, his experiences in China had taught him that "an American could foresee the goal to be attained and also the methods by which the various forces involved could be integrated or coordinated. However, the devious ways of the Chinese would invariably interfere with the attainment of goals; sometimes there were malicious and intentional circumventions; sometimes there were simple stupidities and incompetencies involved." (Wedemeyer to Marshall, June 13, 1946, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [China Mission, General].)

MEETINGS WITH LO LUNG-CHI AND CHOU EN-LAI

June 1 and 3, 1946 Nanking, China

Lo Lung-chi, June 1, 10:00 A.M.

Marshall informed Dr. Lo, secretary general of the Democratic League, of the state of the Manchurian negotiations: Chiang Kai-shek's insistence upon assurances that the Communists would not delay carrying out the agreements and his proposal that the U.S. representatives on truce teams be given the deciding vote on where to go and what to investigate in the event of Communist-Nationalist disagreement. He was reluctant to accept this proposal, Marshall said, because it placed a "grave responsibility and heavy burden" on the U.S. representatives. Nevertheless, unless this was done, "there was very little hope of reaching any agreement." General Chou was reluctant to accept this proposal, however, given the bitterly anti-U.S. feeling of Communist party soldiers. "General Marshall reiterated that the situation at present is extremely dangerous due to the conditions in North China and the possibility of the Nationalists' Generals overplaying their military power in Manchuria, just as the Communist Generals have recently done." If the fighting could be stopped immediately, "this would have an important psychological effect on all." Allowing the American team members to have the deciding vote would allow the teams to move freely and to stop troop movements that did not conform to the signed agreements, which would help to reduce the fear and suspicion each side had of the other. Marshall suggested that a few teams might be formed consisting of an American and a member from the antigovernment Democratic League and the progovernment Chinese Youth party.

If the Americans were given the final authority, would this permit the Manchurian problem to be settled, Dr. Lo asked. In the past, Marshall replied, Nationalist-Communist deadlocks had undermined the Committee of Three agreements. But, he emphasized, Americans would not have the deciding vote on all disagreements, only on issues of communications restoration and reports from field teams. He could not guarantee the cessation of hostilities if the Communists accepted this proposal.

Dr. Lo described the Communists' feelings toward Americans as a result of U.S. assistance to Chiang's forces. The U.S. should not continue to supply the government if a civil war broke out, he said, and this should be made clear to the government. "Marshall reserved his comment in view of his position as Ambassador." He noted, however, that U.S. aid to China was diminishing. Lo twice said that should the Generalissimo agree to an immediate cease fire, the Communists would agree to it. "Marshall stated that he would [try to] persuade the Generalissimo to cease advances, attacks, and pursuits." (*Foreign Relations, 1946, 9: 927–30.*)

Chou En-lai, June 3, 10:45 A.M.

Chou began by detailing some of the Communists' suspicions of recent government activities. He wished to talk to General Marshall "not only as a negotiator, but also as a friend," and to tell him "frankly of his thoughts and of the points which he does not fully understand." First, it appeared to the Communists that the United States government was simultaneously conducting two China policies: the cooperative "bright side" represented by Marshall; and the "gloomy side" demonstrated by various U.S. military and supply efforts on the Nationalists' behalf that, "if viewed objectively," tended to encourage the Nationalists to wage civil war.

Since his December 1945 arrival, Marshall said, he had received no instructions "of any kind whatsoever" from the U.S. government, had made no recommendations

to it, and had communicated but infrequently with it. He told General Chou what he had previously told Dr. Lo: most U.S. aid and involvement with the Chinese military had been the result of wartime agreements to facilitate operations against the Japanese, and the U.S. could not have been expected in 1944 to forbid the government of an ally to use the aid in some potential future civil war. He then detailed his and the U.S. government's position on shipping, the Marines in China, the navy's activities in the western Pacific, the Military Advisory Group's role, U.N.R.R.A. supply deliveries, and retired General Claire Chennault's right of free speech. He defended the sincerity of American intentions in China and noted its forthcoming grant of freedom to the Philippines. Marshall assured General Chou that "his best efforts would go toward terminating the fighting quickly."

Chou replied that he could understand the wartime decisions, but why did the U.S. in recent months appear to be so powerless with respect to the Chinese government when the Nationalists did not subscribe to American policy—for example, in desiring a coalition government. It seemed to the Communists, Chou said, that since Marshall had returned to China in April, Marshall's "working method seemed to be different"—easier on the government than in the early days of the mission. When he returned, Marshall responded, the Manchurian situation had gotten out of hand and precluded U.S. aid for such things as the Kalgan training school for the Communists. Marshall asked for more information on the Communists' problems with U.N.R.R.A. aid so that he might take action.

The situation in Manchuria in April had forced the Communists to occupy Changchun, which Chou admitted had caused problems for General Marshall. Nevertheless, the fighting in Manchuria was the main cause of problems, and the main cause of the fighting was the government's perception that it was in an advantageous position militarily. The Communists wanted the fighting stopped in Manchuria, but the government was determined to "occupy all the large cities and the communication lines under the pretext of taking over sovereignty." In the past, Chou noted, Chiang Kai-shek had asserted that after the capture of Changchun, the government would order an immediate cease fire, but recently Chiang had issued messages that his forces should occupy all the large cities and rail lines. Chou believed that the Nationalists were trying to make Marshall's mission fail and involve the U.S. in the civil war—neither of which the Communists desired. "Any Government in China without the participation of the Chinese Communist Party could not be called a democratic government," Chou asserted. "It has never occurred to the Communist Party to set up a government in China without the Kuomintang."

General Chou then took up the question of the U.S. member having the deciding vote on the truce teams—which he clearly thought was a bad idea. Marshall admitted that while the U.S. member's decisive authority would be limited, he understood the Communists' fears; uniformity and fairness of team operations would have to be overseen by an autonomous inspection service. Chou suspected that the Generalissimo's suggestion of U.S. final authority was "a very sharp maneuver" that would enable the Nationalists "to conceive all kinds of ways to deceive the Americans and lead them into a trap" that placed them in opposition to the Communists. Chou did not flatly oppose the U.S. final authority idea, but insisted that the key problem was to stop the fighting, after which cooperation in various matters could develop. He would await the Generalissimo's return to Nanking that day and see if the government presented any new ideas before going to Yen-an for discussions. (Ibid., pp. 950–73.) ★

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER
AND VICE ADMIRAL CHARLES M. COOKE, JR.
Radio No. GOLD 826. *Confidential*

June 4, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Propaganda agencies the world over are building up the thought that naval vessels are extensively engaged in supporting Government troops engaged in civil strife. I understand that there is no American shipping (except for Chinese manned SCALS) now engaged in supporting Nationalist forces in Manchuria or engaged in movement of Nationalist troops between places within China.¹

From the standpoint of my present negotiations it is important to maintain this position with regard to U. S. naval shipping. Except for the Communist movement from Mirs Bay area and UNRRA shipments on Yangtze, are there any plans afoot to utilize American flag ships to assist the military forces of either side?²

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. On December 11, 1945, President Truman approved a Joint Chiefs of Staff plan to place under the control of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in China (COMGENCHINA, i.e., Wedemeyer's headquarters) some war surplus Liberty ships—initially twenty-five but quickly reduced to ten. These ships were soon placed under the control of a new staff agency called Shipping Control Authority Liberty Ships (SCALS). Pending purchase by the Chinese government, the ships were being operated by the Chinese National Shipping Administration with Chinese crews under a contract with and flying the flag of the U.S. Maritime Commission. (Lieutenant Colonel James I. Muir, Jr., Memorandum for Colonel Carter, June 13, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Division of Chinese Affairs, Shipping].)

2. During a June 3 morning meeting with Chou En-lai, Marshall said that he had just received a message from Admiral Cooke's headquarters asserting that no U.S. Navy ships were carrying government troops or supplies to Manchuria or along the coast. Moreover, Seventh Fleet had but ten LSTs: two were being held to pick up Communists at Mirs Bay near Kowloon; eight were hauling U.N.R.R.A. supplies on the Yangtze River. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 958.) For Marshall's further comments on these ten ships, see Marshall to Carter, June 16, 1946, pp. 594–95.

Cooke confirmed Marshall's understanding, adding that the U.S. Navy was also moving Nationalist Army vehicles from Hankow to Nanking and Shanghai. (Cooke to Marshall, June 8, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, Messages In].)

TO J. C. UPTON¹

June 5, 1946
Nanking, China

My dear Mr. Upton:² Your letter of May 10th has just reached me in Nanking, China. While I appreciate the great compliment you pay General Marshall by your proposal, it would be useless for me to transmit any

such proposition to him. I can assure you that he has no intention of ever entering into politics, and there is no possibility of his ever changing his mind.

With my thanks for your courtesy, and apologies for my long delay in acknowledging your letter, Sincerely

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, General)

1. Upton, a resident of Greenville, South Carolina, had written to Mrs. Marshall that he had "contacted many [of] our present leaders, every one to a man heartily agrees with my proposal to draft the General as next democratic Nominee. . . . The movement has progressed to the point where we deem it advisable to inform the General of our intentions." (Upton to K. T. Marshall, May 10, 1946, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [China Mission, General].)

2. Marshall wrote this letter for Mrs. Marshall's signature.

TO WILLIAM M. TUCK¹

June 5, 1946
Nanking, China

My dear Governor: I am highly honored by the action of the General Assembly of Virginia, and the offer of appointment to the Board of Visitors of the Virginia Military Institute. Needless to say, I am more than glad to accept this honor, although my return to the United States (and the possibility of any active participation in the duties of the Board) is a matter for conjecture only.

I, too, recall very pleasantly our meeting at the Governors' Conference in 1943, and hope it will prove to be the first of many. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Tuck had taken office as governor of Virginia in January 1946. He wrote that the 1946 session of the General Assembly had passed an act increasing the membership of the Virginia Military Institute's Board of Visitors from twelve to thirteen. The bill "was passed with the understanding that this appointment would be offered to you." The term of the appointment was four years. (Tuck to Marshall, May 16, 1946, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 828. *Top Secret*

June 5, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mr. President: Since my message of May 26 GOLD 776, following has transpired, on May 28 Generalissimo sent me from Mukden a letter received the thirtieth largely repeating terms dictated in previous letter of May 24 but agreeing to my qualifications regarding power of decision of

Americans, also stating that as to the method of recovering sovereignty in Manchuria Government could not abandon the taking over administration of any area but might agree to send forward, after military advances had ceased, only administrative officials and such military and police force as would be absolutely necessary for the maintenance of local order and communications. Also he explained use of word guarantee in reference to me as meaning that in regard to all agreements in which I have participated in signing that I would set time limits for the putting into effect of such agreements and would assume the responsibility of supervision over the strict observance of such agreements on the part of the Communists. Incidentally, in what follows I have made no reference to this matter of guarantee in my negotiations with Generalissimo.

Not having received the foregoing letter on the twenty-ninth I had Doctor T. V. Soong transmit the following message from me to the Generalissimo in Mukden. "The continued advances of the Government troops in Manchuria in the absence of any action by you to terminate the fighting other than the terms you dictated via Madame Chiang's letter of May 24, are making my services as a possible mediator extremely difficult and may soon make them virtually impossible."

No reply to the foregoing message having been received on May 31 I had the following message dispatched to Generalissimo in Peking where he had just arrived. "Your Excellency: Mr. Robertson has just advised me at your request that you would remain in Peiping two or three days. I have not received a reply to my message to you of May 29th. I must therefore repeat that under the circumstances of the continued advance of the Government troops in Manchuria my services in mediation are becoming not only increasingly difficult, but a point is being reached where the integrity of my position is open to serious question. I therefore request you again to issue immediately an order terminating advances, attacks or pursuits by Government troops, and also that you authorize the immediate departure of an advance section of Executive Headquarters to Changchun."

This message was sent direct by me to our American Commissioner of Executive Headquarters in Peking Walter Robertson and also through Doctor T. V. Soong. Incidentally it developed that my previous message of May 29th had missed the Generalissimo in Mukden and was therefore long delayed in delivery.

Robertson on June 1st sent me the following from Generalissimo. "I have just received your telegram sent through Mister Robertson. I surmise that you have received my message of 28 May sent through Doctor Soong. You may rest assured that in all my decisions I have kept in mind the difficulty of your position and am doing everything in my power to facilitate and assure the success of your work. I shall be returning

Nanking tomorrow or Monday when I shall tell you in person the Manchurian situation as I saw it. I am ready to agree to your proposal to send an advance party of the Executive Headquarters to Changchun for preliminary work in the event of my not being able immediately to issue orders to Government troops to terminate advances and so forth."

During the foregoing period I had continued lengthy conferences with Chou En-lai Communist representative including one from 10 AM until 4 PM. Also lengthy meetings with Doctor Soong, representatives of Democratic League, Young China Party, a representative committee from 500 delegates to National Assembly and many others.

Generalissimo returned day before yesterday evening and I had a three hour conference with him yesterday morning. The following developed:

A. A misunderstanding on his part caused by a mistranslation had blocked the immediate establishment of an advanced section of Executive Headquarters in Changchun. I immediately directed its establishment.

B. The Generalissimo agreed to issue an order to his armies in Manchuria to cease advances, attacks or pursuits (in other words, aggressive action) for a period of ten days to afford the Communist an opportunity to prove their sincerity by completing negotiations with the Government during that period on the following points.

1. Detailed arrangements to govern a complete termination of hostilities in Manchuria,
2. Definite detailed arrangements, with time limits, for the complete resumption of communications in North China,
3. A basis for carrying out without further delay the agreement of February 25 for reorganization of armies.

He first stipulated one week in which to complete these negotiations, but I insisted that would be impossible. He finally agreed to a period of ten days. He stated to me, most confidentially, that this would be his final effort at doing business with the Communists, that the present indeterminate situation with communications blocked, coal barely obtainable in sufficient quantities, cities starving could not be endured economically or otherwise, that all out war would be preferable.

I saw Chou En-lai yesterday afternoon, first having sent him a memorandum of the Generalissimo's terms. Chou immediately asked for an extension of the 10 days to one month but finally reduced his request to 15 days which in my opinion is not unreasonable as there are many complicated plans to be agreed to and he must fly to Yen-an at least once and to Manchuria for conferences. Doctor Soong called later and discussed details regarding communications in which he is vitally interested. I

already had an American Army engineer, who heads the communications reestablishment activity of Executive Headquarters¹ in conference yesterday with the Minister of Communications.

I will see Generalissimo early this afternoon regarding extension of time to 15 days.

The following factors have been involved most in the foregoing: The prolonged absence of Generalissimo created a serious doubt in the minds of Communist leaders regarding impartiality of my attitude, accentuated by a lively propaganda against U. S. support of Government armies, etc. The Generalissimo's insistence at the same time that American officers should be given the deciding vote in all cases of Communist-Government representative disagreements, added to these suspicions and the delicacy of my position. I can ride through these difficulties I think.

For your information, but I hope not repeat not for press release, our naval vessels or other American flag shipping are no longer engaged in transporting either Chinese Government troops or military supplies, this work now being carried out by Liberty ships with Chinese crews under special flag until sale negotiations are completed and by Chinese-manned LSTs in process of turnover to Chinese Navy. We may give some help to the transport of a Chinese division to Japan.² I want no press release on this because I do not wish to tie my hands or to appear to be pushed into a defensive attitude of explanation. Furthermore, the Communist leaders know the facts and are surprised and somewhat apologetic.

Question regarding American powers of final decision has been left to direct negotiation between Government and Communists without reference to me.

Finally, as matters now stand solution awaits Generalissimo's agreement or refusal to extend time to 15 days and Chou En-lai's obtaining commitments or instructions from Yen-an. I will advise you tonight or tomorrow of progress.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Colonel Donald C. Hill (U.S.M.A., 1924) was chairman of the Communications Group at Executive Headquarters.

2. See Marshall to Gillem, March 16, 1946, pp. 507–8.

MEETING WITH T. V. SOONG

June 5, 1946, 5:30 P.M. Nanking, China

DOCTOR Soong reported that at his meeting that morning with the Generalissimo, Chiang had "insisted on a complete and definite arrangement" with the Communists within the proposed ten-day truce period. The Communists, Marshall noted,

were distrustful of the government's secret police and its refusal to remove fortifications it had built along the rail lines. Moreover, he observed, "he was extremely concerned over the fact that trivial matters in the past had blocked much needed developments in China's economic structure. The small things seemed to mount and mount, thus overcoming any definite results toward necessary reconstruction."

Soong pointed out various recent Communist provocations. Marshall discussed the negotiations over the press releases regarding the truce, saying that "the Communists were objecting to the 10 day time limit and he felt they were not unreasonable in their contention." Dr. Soong admitted that each side was suspicious of the other; consequently, "it might be preferable to seek a peaceful solution by giving the Communists certain areas of China which would then be their domain." (*Foreign Relations, 1946, 9: 979-81.*) ★

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 832. *Top Secret*

June 6, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mr. President: Generalissimo and Communists are issuing orders at noon today Thursday June 6 halting advances, attacks or pursuits by their Manchurian forces for a 15 day period commencing at noon tomorrow June 7th,¹ during which period complete agreements must be reached regarding the three points mentioned in my message of June 5 GOLD 828. That is, arrangements for the complete termination of hostilities in Manchuria, complete resumption of communications in China and execution without delay of agreement of February 25 for reorganization of armed forces.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Marshall had drafted a press release to be issued by the Committee of Three announcing the truce agreement, but Chiang Kai-shek did not desire a joint statement. (*Foreign Relations, 1946, 9: 982.*)

MEETING WITH CHOU EN-LAI
June 6, 1946, 8:00 P.M. Nanking, China

GENERAL Chou asked Marshall for his "views on the overall situation" in light of recent developments. Marshall outlined what he thought were "general measures that would have the most influence towards securing a permanent peace." First, he had to fight suspicions and misconceptions by both sides. The Nationalists believed that: (1) the Communists would not carry out agreements but merely used them to cause delays; (2) "in dealing with the Communist Party, they were confronting Soviet Russia." For their part, the Communists were inordinately suspicious of any government proposal and troop movement and thereby encouraged Nationalists' suspicions.

Marshall thought that the Communists should stop disrupting communications, facilitate the production and distribution of coal, stop repressive measures in the cities

they controlled, and cease attacks on government forces in Manchuria. He desired that the Committee of Three give “immediate agreement” to establishing Executive Headquarters’s Advance Section in Changchun. The key problem in Manchuria, Chou said, was deciding local administrative control, but the Generalissimo refused to address that issue. Marshall suggested that during his forthcoming trip “Chou become well informed at Yen-an as to just what lengths he could go in negotiations.”

Marshall raised the issue of Nationalist-Communist strength ratios in Manchuria; the Generalissimo was insisting on a definite time schedule for settling this question rather than the general terms of the February 25 agreement. Lack of data on Communist force dispositions made an agreement difficult, and he asked Chou “to think of a solution when he went to Yen-an.”

General Chou raised the question of reopening communications and Communist participation in the administration of the railways. “General Marshall thought the main thing was to get started promptly,” for the Communists to confine themselves to seeking specific safeguards against government “misuse of the railroads,” and for the two sides to avoid getting bogged down in trading small points. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 985-91.) ★

TO BRIGADIER GENERAL HENRY A. BYROADE
Radio No. GOLD 843. *Confidential*

June 7, 1946
[Nanking, China]

It is my thought and desire that you should proceed to get firmly established in Changchun particularly as to communications and reserve of transportation.¹ Probably little can be done by your headquarters towards composing crises or hostilities during 15 day period which commences today. But you might be called upon to arbitrate or act in some particular situation.

Meanwhile I suggest that you endeavor to survey situation in Manchuria and actually to establish a few detached posts with American officer and communications at prospective focal points, Harbin if permitted, Kirin, Anshan, etc., so that you will be ready and capable to carry out rather elaborate or complicated cease firing terms without delay. If my influence is needed in this matter let me know.

Also, I want you immediately to give your best thought to method of readjustment for matters in Manchuria during first 30 day period. Chou En-lai leaves for Yen-an this morning and probably will go to Manchuria after returning here. Also, will probably then meet with me in Peiping and I will want you there at that time with your detailed proposals.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Byroade replied on June 9 (not received by Marshall until June 12) that the “American branch Advanced Section of Executive Headquarters at Changchun is now ready to function and receive the representatives of the National Government and Communist Branch.” (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 1007.)

MEETINGS WITH P.C.C. DELEGATES, HSU YUNG-CHANG,
AND CHOU EN-LAI

June 8–10, 1946 Nanking, China

P*OLITICAL Consultative Conference Delegates, June 8, 4:15 P.M.*

Eight delegates, representing independents, the Chinese Youth party, and the Democratic League, came to express their gratitude to Marshall for his efforts to arrange the present fifteen-day truce (which all agreed was not enough time) and to talk about what might be accomplished during it and how they could help. One suggestion was that a three-man committee elected from the P.C.C. should consult on the political aspects of issues with the Committee of Three.

Marshall said that he had no objection to such a committee, but political issues were “outside his jurisdiction.” He explained how the Committee of Three operated and how it was different from a P.C.C. committee. He urged speed in arriving at small agreements that built confidence on both sides. In discussing the problems of realizing democracy in China, he mentioned his idea of creating special films to educate the masses. (See the editorial note on pp. 501–2.) “General Marshall then suggested that all the independent groups should combine to exercise their influence on a few important individuals on each side as well as important editors to convince them that there must be more moderation in order that a solution other than a devastating war might be reached.” (*Foreign Relations, 1946, 9: 995–97.*)

Hsu Yung-chang, June 9, 4:00 P.M.

The government’s representative on the Committee of Three, General Hsu had called on Marshall to deliver a message from the government commander in Manchuria, General Tu Li-ming, protesting a Communist attack southeast of Harbin launched after the truce began. Marshall promised to send a message to Chou En-lai urging him to obtain orders stopping the action. Marshall objected to a statement by General Tu that if the Communists continued attacking government troops, he would order a resumption of attack and pursuit. Marshall said that “General Tu needed to be calmed down” so that he “would not again upset everything in Manchuria.”

General Hsu suggested—and Marshall agreed—that the two parties’ troops be assigned certain territories in which they would be responsible for communications restoration. Marshall discussed the United States system of parallel federal and state governments in a two-party system as a possible model for power-sharing on a territorial basis.

In Manchuria, General Marshall said, getting the troops “untangled” was crucial and difficult, and the politics of control “could easily wreck all military proposals.” In the political context, Marshall described his June 8 meeting with the PCC delegates. He urged General Hsu to “use his influence” with the Generalissimo “to find some compromise on the political side” with the Communists in Manchuria, otherwise the fifteen-day truce “would come to an unfortunate end.” General Hsu thought that General Tu’s reaction to local Communist actions was “over-sensitive”; Marshall thought Tu “pugnacious.”

Marshall suggested that General Hsu begin working on proposals to be made to the Communists, but not to wait until all the government’s ideas were fully developed before talking them over with Marshall’s staff and beginning talks with the Communists. “The best way to proceed was to continue discussions on difficult points but always have something else that they [the Committee of Three] could complete” in

order to keep the process moving. He also thought it would be useful if Hsu and Chou would initiate exploratory talks on various issues.

General Hsu raised the issue of United States representatives having the deciding vote on the truce teams and at Executive Headquarters; he thought that nothing would be accomplished without it. Chou En-lai had consistently opposed the idea, Marshall replied. (Ibid., pp. 998–1006.)

Chou En-lai, June 10, 10:10 A.M.

Chou recognized that mutual confidence between the government and the Communists had been destroyed and that one way of restoring it was to “approach detailed problems one by one and then go on to another,” using Marshall as a mediator. He reminded Marshall of his comment at their June 3 meeting (see p. 573 above) that the Communists suspected that United States policy toward China was simultaneously progovernment and promediation. “Communists now feel that the United States rather favored the Kuomintang,” and while Marshall himself was working for peace, U.S. support of the government encouraged the Nationalists to wage a civil war. Yen-an thus concluded that “regardless of the concessions Gen. Marshall would make for the sake of peace, the Kuomintang would never feel satisfied” until they, in the name of reestablishing sovereignty and reopening communications, had driven the Communists into a corner in Manchuria and forced them into the rural areas in China proper. “The next effort would be to suppress Communists in the rural areas.”

There was no reason, Chou continued, for the Communists to participate in the Nationalist-dominated People’s Consultative Conference, National Assembly, or government, since “under the present rule of the Kuomintang, it is impossible to obtain a true peace and democracy. The Communist Party feels that the only way out is to resist any attack from the Kuomintang.” Despite the government’s provocations, Chou said, the Communist party “would give a new trial to cooperation.” Marshall’s efforts were still needed for this work, but there also needed to be some U.S.-Communist party cooperation in communications restoration and army reorganization. Direct Communist-Nationalist contacts without Marshall’s mediation would not work.

Unfortunately, Marshall responded, there were “some military leaders who look to a settlement only by military means,” but he had acted vigorously to quiet outbreaks caused by both sides. Nationalist leaders Marshall had talked to recently were “seriously considering the most practical approach to a final solution politically,” but the fighting had to stop for moderation to succeed. He had perhaps been harder on the government for its military transgressions than on the Communists, and “a considerable portion” of the Nationalist party was bitterly opposed to his role. Marshall hoped “that there were a sufficient number of individuals on each side to take a long view of the situation and to suppress their own personal feelings of resentment.” The Communist party, Chou said, taking a long view of the situation, thought that Marshall was working for peace in China, and they hoped that he “would stay in China for a long time.”

Chou said, and Marshall agreed, that it would be a good idea for the two sides to deal with the communications problem first and then move on to the more difficult cessation of hostilities and military reorganization issues. They discussed railroad reconstruction, and Marshall said that it was also important to reopen the highways as soon as possible. Concerning the cessation of hostilities, Marshall was more optimistic than Chou; they should keep the terms of the agreement as simple as possible and leave the details of execution to the Executive Headquarters group in Changchun

and its local network of field teams. A similar incremental approach should be used for the more difficult to achieve agreement on force readjustments in Manchuria over the next six months. Beginning with the communications problem, each side had to concede some things quickly in order to develop confidence between them on the more difficult matters to be settled later. General Chou concurred. (Ibid., pp. 1008–20.) ★

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT OF
THE EXECUTIVE YUAN
OSE 147

June 10, 1946
Nanking, China

My dear Doctor Soong: It has been reported to me that within the past two weeks UNRRA supplies duly allocated by CNRRA to Communist areas have been prevented by Nationalist authorities from moving into those areas in at least two specific instances. Without going into details, the first such instance was at Yangchow in northern Kiangsu and the second was at Tsing-tao. In both cases, the orders under which local commanders acted are ascribed to General Cheng Kai-ming.¹

Furthermore, a check of mine with Mr. Ray indicates that UNRRA supplies for the areas dominated by the Communists amount to nine tenths of one percent of the entire UNRRA shipments into China.²

I would appreciate your comments on the foregoing.³ Such a condition would not be supported by the American contributors to UNRRA.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, OSE Letters)

1. Lieutenant General Cheng was the government's commissioner at Executive Headquarters.

2. J. Franklin Ray, Jr., was acting director of the U.N.R.R.A.'s China Office in Shanghai. Chou En-lai had protested to Marshall at their June 3 meeting that the Communists were getting only 0.6 percent of U.N.R.R.A. aid to China. In a July 12 letter to U.N.R.R.A. Director General Fiorello H. La Guardia, Chou said that the percentage was 0.67 despite the Communists' controlling all or part of nineteen provinces with a population of 140,000,000. (*Foreign Relations, 1946*, 9: 953; Chou to La Guardia, July 12, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Division of Chinese Affairs, UNRRA].)

3. The editors have not found a written reply from Soong. On June 13, Ray met with Soong, who mentioned Marshall's "representations . . . concerning Chinese military interference movements UNRRA supplies into Communist areas and disclaimed personal knowledge UNRRA distribution operations." Ray said that this statement could not be reconciled with Soong's previous assertions to La Guardia that he was personally participating in improving the distribution system. (Ray to State Department, June 15, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Division of Chinese Affairs, UNRRA].)

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL THOMAS T. HANDY
AND COLONEL MARSHALL S. CARTER
Radio No. GOLD 860. *Secret*

June 10, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Carter recommends I clarify War Department impression of my views concerning reorganization of Army Forces in China reurad WAR-90670.¹ I do not want any Army commander between me and my Executive Headquarters which has a purely Chinese mission. It is also politically desirable to avoid the connotation of “U. S. Army Forces, China”.

What is needed is something simple akin to a post commander and station complement setup for each of the two main divisions, Executive Headquarters and MAG. Gillem’s original proposal provided this. A temporary Shanghai area command under Nanking HQ Command would complete roll-up activities by 30 September. Gillem’s staff tells me that this arrangement will effect a savings of from 4[00] to 500 men plus a considerable amount of money.

Unified control is a sound principle, but it definitely has no application, from point of view of a military commander, to Executive Headquarters which is only one-third American and operates as my ambassadorial medium for implementing Chinese party agreements. Unified control is now really vested in me for important decisions or policy. However, I must not exercise command in the liberal [*literal*] sense of the word. Therefore the desirability of the two autonomous command arrangement.²

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. In WAR-90670, Carter had written: “War Department is under the impression that it is politically and diplomatically embarrassing to you to have a CG, USAF China, and that accomplishment of your mission will be more difficult unless the US Forces are reorganized into two or more autonomous commands, all reporting directly to the War Department. It was War Department understanding that you especially desired unified control, not only of Army, but of practically all U.S. activities in China.” The War Department thought that, for administrative and logistical matters, there should be a single army commander in China, but it was most important that General Marshall’s desires be met. (Carter to Marshall, Radio No. WAR-90670, June 8, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Reorganization—U.S. Forces China].)

2. The War Department General Staff was still a bit hazy regarding Marshall’s command-structure ideas, desiring that one or the other of the two commands that would replace the present China Theater command (i.e., Peiping Headquarters Group and Nanking Headquarters Command) be responsible for its own administration and partially of the other’s. Marshall insisted upon complete autonomy, since the Peiping group “must concentrate on the activities of the executive Hqs. To have that group administer the Nanking Hqs Cmd, which renders advice to the Nationalist Government only (since a coalition govt has not yet been formed) would present embarrassments that might adversely effect the desired neutral position of the United States in executive Hqs.” (Marshall to Handy, Radio No. GOLD 929, June 18, 1946, *ibid.*) Marshall’s ideas were implemented on July 1.

TO COLONEL MARSHALL S. CARTER
Radio No. GOLD 865. *Top Secret*

June 10, 1946
[Nanking, China]

I think you should know reasons behind recent heavy Communist propaganda attack against U. S. and me personally. Extended absence of Generalissimo in Mukden and Peiping while his armies hastened their advances in Manchuria, this occurring just as I had brought the two sides to the verge of an agreement, enraged Communists and what was much more serious aroused a deep suspicion in their minds that I was favoring the Government side and was a party to the delay caused by the Generalissimo's prolonged absence while his armies capitalized their success to the south of Changchun. Incidentally, use of my plane added to Communist belief but he used plane on my urging for safety reason and because Madame Chiang was ill yet he insisted on her accompanying him.

To add fat to the fire Generalissimo then made demand for agreement that the Americans on teams, at Executive Headquarters and finally for me on Committee of Three have authority to make final decision in case of all disagreements. To offset approval this proposition might gain from American public the Communist concentrated propaganda attack resulted, but it was hatched before the 15 day proposition had been broached. The Communists are now inclined to accept me on old terms of confidence but much harm has been done. Incidentally I would have to be very careful of Soviet reactions against U. S. Government if I were given power of decision on highest level which though military would necessarily involve the final word regarding some of the most delicate questions concerning the reorganization of local and provincial government in Manchuria.

I would not risk this information through normal radio or office channels but I pass it to you for limited use as seems best in your judgment. It might be well to tip Shipley off, though this is questionable. However, you are on the ground and you know the reactions: State Department, press and radio, and maybe political.

Chou is back from Yen-an and negotiations are proceeding initially in favorable manner.

Another subject: Convey my congratulations to the Chief Justice. Tell him I will miss his influence on NAC.¹ Notify Baruch that I am writing him a letter regarding Atomic questions he asked.² Take occasion to remark to Dean Acheson and Vincent that I am deeply sensible of the complete backing they are giving me in every way, small Embassy or consulate business, funds, etc., etc. This is a hell of a problem but we will lick it yet, pessimists to the contrary notwithstanding.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Former congressman and court of appeals judge Fred M. Vinson had been secretary of the treasury since July 23, 1945, and also chairman of the National Advisory Council on

International Monetary and Financial Problems. On June 6, President Truman nominated him to be chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court; he took the oath of office on June 24.

2. In early April, the Senate had given its approval to Bernard M. Baruch's nomination to be the U.S. member of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. In a May 24 letter to Marshall, Baruch noted that "a national policy has to be developed to cover that subject [atomic energy] and, generally, other instrumentalities of war." On his letter and Marshall's reply, see Marshall to Baruch, August 21, 1946, pp. 660–62.

TO WALTER S. ROBERTSON
Radio No. GOLD 866. *Top Secret*

June 11, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Please contact Doctor Leighton Stuart of Yenching University¹ and see if he would be willing to come to Nanking for a week or ten days, to assist me quietly by influencing certain Chinese officials of his acquaintance to a more moderate or tolerant point of view during current negotiations. I am requesting such services of several others, Frank Price, Doctor Wu Yi-fang of Ginling College, General Li of Army Medical Corps. W. P. Mills suggested Dr. Stuart's name.² I would provide transportation. Arrival here would have to be during next five days.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. China-born son of Presbyterian missionaries, the seventy-year-old Stuart had spent most of his life in China. He was a well-known scholar, able administrator, and successful fund-raiser, which led to his appointment in 1919 as president of Yenching University in the northwestern suburbs of Peking. After Pearl Harbor, the Japanese placed him under house arrest. Following the war, he reestablished the school and had recently returned from an extended fund-raising trip to the United States. (Kenneth W. Rea and John C. Brewer, eds., *The Forgotten Ambassador: The Reports of John Leighton Stuart, 1946-1949* [Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981], pp. xix–xx.) While in Nanking for a conference, he had called on Marshall on May 17.

2. Dr. Frank W. Price, a Presbyterian missionary and editor, was an organizer of rural religious and social programs, an adviser to China's delegation to the United Nations conference in 1945, an adviser to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, and a personal friend of Generalissimo and Madame Chiang. He had met with Marshall on May 13. In a May 18 letter, Price recommended that Marshall see "that wonderfully wise woman, Miss Wu Yi-fang, President of Ginling College for Women at Nanking—who was the one woman on the Chinese delegation at [the U.N. conference in] San Francisco." (Price to Marshall, December 21, 1945, and May 18, 1946, GCMRL/F. W. Price Papers.) Marshall had met with Dr. Wu on May 29.

On June 8, Marshall had had lunch with Dr. W. P. Mills, the leader of the U.S. missionaries in Nanking; Mills had also called on Marshall on the afternoon of June 11. Major General Li Chen-pien (C. P. Lee) was director of the Serum Institute of the Chinese Ministry of War.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

June 11, 1946
Nanking, China

My dear Eisenhower: I received your confidential letter of May 28th regarding my Pinehurst affairs. Thank you for attending to the matter for me.¹

I gave Mrs. Marshall your message of concern regarding her reported illness.² The facts are these, amusing and a commentary on the virulence of the present propaganda warfare: She merely made a week end trip to Shanghai with Madame Chiang, but some of the die-hard government political boys in their assaults on me to weaken my influence and clear the way for a war of extermination, which they are incapable of carrying through without our assistance, built up a press attack that Katherine and I had fallen out and she had left Nanking in a huff. Then I had gone to Shanghai to bring her back, but she immediately went into the hospital. They left her there, I returning empty handed.³ She was never sick, never saw a hospital, and returned here with me and Madame Chiang. The part that greatly amused us but outraged Katherine was the description, "Mrs. Marshall, though over sixty, still demands her diversions. Throughout the war General Marshall had to take her to the movies and other diversions. Since he came to China he has been too busy, so she left him, etc. etc."

I will give your message to the Generalissimo and Madame.⁴ She has been suffering badly from neuritis or whatever her trouble is since the Mukden trip. They all got sick there from bad water. Incidentally, life is pretty hard on all our officers in the field because of the scarcity and danger of the food and the bad water, especially with no beer, wine or soft drinks to resort to. Tea is the only "out" and that not always safe. Sleeping accommodations are terrible in these war-torn communities with germs thick and no doctors, troops or facilities to help them get established. It is a pretty rough and thankless business. Two have had interpreters killed alongside of them, one has been slightly wounded, and we had two people wounded in one of our planes going into Changchun day before yesterday. I don't know yet whether or not they were Americans. The morale of these older officers of ours is high and they deserve much praise and credit.

I am now in the midst of continuous conferences, usually all day long—very tiring and trying, but the issue is vital. My people here in the office in my house are simply swamped with work and back to the old time 10 to 14 hour war day.⁵

The President seems to be having a hard time with domestic crises, not to mention foreign affairs—a thankless job.

With my affectionate regards to you and Handy, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, General)

1. “Pinehurst” was the code word for “secretary of state” that Marshall had given to Eisenhower during the latter’s May 9 visit. See Marshall Memorandum for My File, February 12, 1948, p. 547.

2. Eisenhower had written: “I heard a rumor upon my return to the United States that Mrs. Marshall had suffered a temporary illness.” (*Papers of DDE*, 7: 1085.)

3. Mrs. Marshall had visited Shanghai May 12 to 16. General Marshall was there May 15 and 16.

4. “Please take advantage of any available opportunity” to extend his thanks to Generalissimo and Madame Chiang, Eisenhower wrote, “for the delightful luncheon they gave me.” (*Ibid.*)

5. On June 13, Mrs. Marshall wrote to their secretary at the Pentagon, Sally G. Chamberlin: “Gen M. is working day & night to bring some kind of accord during these 14 days of truce. Some times I feel neither party really want peace[.] They are so bitter that they want to fight it out no matter what it does to China or these poor people. . . . He looks thin to me & very tired.” A day or two later, Mrs. Marshall contracted bacillary dysentery. Her husband, she noted in a June 17 letter to Chamberlin, was “still struggling manfully” with the negotiations. (Larry I. Bland, ed., *George C. Marshall’s Mediation Mission to China, December 1945–January 1947* [Lexington, Va.: George C. Marshall Foundation, 1998], pp. 576–77.)

MEETING WITH CHOU EN-LAI

June 12, 1946, 10:10 A.M. Nanking, China

MARSHALL reported that the Communists had launched numerous attacks after the June 6 truce agreement had taken effect. When he met with the government’s representative on the Committee of Three (Hsu Yung-chang) the previous day, the reports of fighting and bridge and railroad destruction “had all but stopped him from any prospect of success in conducting negotiations,” particularly his efforts to modify the government’s proposed terms.

General Chou responded with a discussion of government provocations that had caused the Communists to retaliate. He had talked with Yu Ta-wei and Hsu Yung-chang about these problems, Chou said, and had requested that Yen-an order the Communist New Fourth Army to stop all fighting; he expected similar action from the government. He and Yu Ta-wei were working on an arrangement to halt conflicts along the three key railroads through the main combat areas. Some of the fighting might be the result of poor communications with the central authority, but hostilities in Manchuria should be stopped, the advance section of Executive Headquarters in Changchun should begin operations, and field teams should be dispatched to fighting areas.

“General Marshall said he would do his best to influence the Government against retaliations, but he asked General Chou particularly to give an order to all of his people to stop destruction of railways and all other destructions unless they are absolutely forced to do so by circumstances, and by forced he meant that there was no other way out of the situation. He said he could not believe that the Communist Party got anywhere by destructions. The evil results generally fell on the people and brought little

return except by way of retaliation." The reported destruction "was entirely self defense," Chou replied; government forces undertook their destruction in rural areas, where it was not highly publicized.

They then discussed other truce issues (e.g., problems at Tsingtao) and ideas for separating and redeploying the two sides' troops. (*Foreign Relations, 1946*, 9: 1025–33.) ★

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 884. *Top Secret*

June 13, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mr. President: Since promulgation of orders to cease aggressive actions and stipulation of three specified matters to be settled within 15 days, my negotiations have been constant. Chou En-lai has consulted the Communist governing group in Yen-an and returned to discussions with me. Of the three things to be settled agreements have about been completed regarding communications. Little trouble is anticipated in reaching agreements on the detailed arrangements for formally terminating hostilities in Manchuria. The great difficulties to be resolved relate to demobilization, reorganization and particularly to the redistribution of forces especially in Manchuria and Shantung province. My problems of the past few days have also related to the sporadic but violent fighting in various localities, mostly in North China, which could not be halted on short notice and many of the actions were evidently planned and ordered ten or more days ago. However, I think we have secured a reasonable pause. Admiral Cooke left here this afternoon for Tsingtao with a Communist official bearing a letter from Chou En-lai to the Communist leader in Shantung.

The recent rather virulent Communist propaganda or attacks against U S and my alleged support of the National Government in the recent fighting was due to two reasons, a continuation of an effort to arouse U. S. opposition to any military representation out here, and to offset in America the effect of the Generalissimo's proposal to give American officers the deciding vote in case of disagreements. The fact that just as we were on the eve of reaching an agreement, the Generalissimo remained absent in Mukden and Peiping for a considerable period while his armies exploited their successful action south of Changchun, aroused great suspicion against his good faith and particularly against the impartiality of my attitude. I think the latter has now been dissipated but a great deal of harm was done.

This message is merely to keep you advised of the situation and of what progress has been made.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERALISSIMO
OSE 168

June 13, 1946
Nanking, China

Your Excellency: General Yu Ta-wei tells me that you desire that I present to you, in written form, my present suggestions regarding the redistribution of troops in Manchuria, so far as the Communist forces and various provinces are concerned.

At the present time I have no idea of just what the Communist proposals in this matter will be, although I should have this within twenty-four hours. In the meantime I can only proceed on conjecture as to what conditions might meet their demands that at the same time would be reasonably acceptable to the National Government.

The initial proposal of your military staff which relegated the Communist forces to the mountainous, sparsely populated province of Shinhei Lung Kiang [new Heilungchiang] and along the course of an uncompleted railway immediately to the west, I am certain would not be accepted by the Communists. You had referred to the province Ho Kiang as a possible compromise, with the Communist agreement to withdraw from Jehol as a necessary stipulation. You also mentioned their possible demand for including the province Hsing-An, in which event you had not decided on what compromise they must agree to in North China.¹

Following my conversation with you and an examination of the map I came to the conclusion that the three provinces mentioned were so mountainous and apparently devoid of resources other possibly than timber, that a Communist commitment to deployment in these areas would be rather unlikely. I therefore suggested to General Yu that Ho Kiang province be ignored and that we consider the possibility of including Nunchiang as the third province, stipulating the evacuation of Jehol and Chahar. General Yu desired to include in the stipulation a Communist commitment to the National occupation of Chefoo and Wei hai wei and the reinforcement of Tsingtao.

The province of Nun Chiang would not, in my opinion, be too serious a concession for the National Government. The railroad net through Tsitsihar could be cut in any event if the Communists were in the provinces to the northwest and north, and the railroad from Hailar south would fall within the government province of Hao Peh [Liaopei]. It therefore appears to me that if the Communists can be prevailed upon to concentrate their troops in the northwest, the old province, consisting of Hsin Hei Lung Kiang, Hsing-An and Nan Kiang [Nunkiang], would be the desirable area.

In order to secure the necessary concessions in Shantung it might prove to be necessary to relax on the requirements stipulating the withdrawal of Communist forces from Chahar.

General Yu informs me that it is desired that the Communist divisions be included in two integrated armies, which would mean three National divisions north and west of Sung Kiang province. To my mind this is not only too many troops for that thinly populated region, but also involves an over extension on the part of the National forces. Also, there is the consideration that some time will be required before an integration on the army level of divisions can be effected, while what is immediately wanted is a disposition that will not present an undue hazard to the National Government. I am therefore of the opinion that at least for the first six months and possibly for the first year, a purely Communist army will prove a more practical arrangement and one which can be more easily adjusted to circumstances and the terrain.

General Yu informs me that if the Communist Divisions are not integrated it would be necessary to stipulate that no Communist troops would occupy any of the cities or towns along the railroad. I think this presents two undesirable conditions; on the one hand it would be far more irritating, in my opinion, than it would be important for the interests of the National Government, and on the other hand, judging from the map, it would appear that there are very few localities in which the troops could be quartered, other than along the railroad. I understand that the climate of north Manchuria is very severe in the winter season, therefore a disposal of troops in isolated places would be objectionable from a number of points of view. General Yu stated that National Military Police should be employed along the railroad. I think that some arrangement other than this should be considered because it would inevitably lead to trouble as there would be no immediate support for these isolated men, which could lead, I think, to trouble in some incidents. It seems to me, that since the power to interrupt the railroad would rest with the military forces in the general vicinity it would be much better to charge the guarding of the railroad in such areas to that military force, at least so far as prevention of sabotage by banditry was concerned.

As I before stated, I have no indication at the present time of the Communist proposal as to the future disposal of their troops in Manchuria. General Byroade feels that in view of their present concentration to the east of Kirin, that it is possible that they will desire to maintain a concentration near the Korean border to the southeast of Lafa. That region I believe is rich in resources. Whether or not any such proposal is to be made remains to be seen. If it were made, it might be considered on the basis of an integrated army between Changchun and the Korean border immediately to the east, with a single Communist division near the border. The remaining two Communist divisions could then be disposed within an integrated army in the northwest, one division in southern Hsin Hei Lung Kiang and one in southwest Hsing-An, with the National divi-

sion in Nun-chiang and the Communist commander of the integrated forces in Tsitsihar. But such an arrangement does seem rather improbable of agreement.

In considering all these matters, I think it is most important that stipulations be avoided which will cause great difficulty of acceptance or prove merely irritating to the negotiations, unless a really important advantage is to be obtained. The main purpose of negotiations would seem to be the attainment of peace under conditions which will not present a hazard to the National Government and also will not involve conditions which might give rise to local incidents that would develop into serious consequences. Faithfully yours,

Note: I find that the present design of provinces in Manchuria present exceptional difficulties with relation to the military adjustments.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, OSE Letters)

1. From the Chinese point of view, the Northeast was made up of three of the country's twenty-eight provinces: Kirin, Liaoning, and Heilungkiang. In their colony of Manchukuo, the Japanese had redrawn the boundaries of these three to make nine provinces. During the period of Marshall's mission, Americans continued to use the Japanese boundaries; thus Hsingan, Heilungkiang, and Hokiang were the three most northern provinces. See the map on p. 786.

MEETING WITH CHOU EN-LAI

June 14, 1946, 11:00 A.M. Nanking, China

MARSHALL expressed his concern to General Chou that *both* sides in Peiping were urging General Byroade not to establish an Executive Headquarters advance section in Changchun. Chou replied that neither side trusted the other, the fifteen-day armistice was only a temporary respite before larger hostilities, and the government had not carried out the March 27 cease-fire agreement. Chou then approved the proposed Committee of Three message directing Executive Headquarters to deploy eight field teams in Manchuria and permit them to be controlled from the advance section in Changchun, and stating that the committee would work out a detailed arrangement for termination of hostilities by noon June 22. (This memorandum was approved by the government and sent on June 15; see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 1058–59.)

They discussed the problems encountered in the negotiations regarding reopening communications, particularly concerning the character of railroad guard units in Communist areas. Marshall then raised the question of the redistribution of troops in Manchuria. Chou desired a reconsideration of the troop ratio to reflect increased Communist strength, and he thought that, pending a final agreement, the two sides should continue to occupy the areas they currently held—which, he noted, left the government in an advantageous position, since it held the key industrial and agricultural areas. The “unavoidable relationship between the political consideration and the military distribution,” Marshall noted, had made it difficult for him to prepare pro-

posals, as "he was carefully avoiding all political complications." Chou suggested four formulas on Manchurian political and administrative matters. Marshall did not comment on the formulas, but noted that he had only raised the question of political considerations because doubts about the political reorganization would hold back solution of the military redistribution, which he desired to achieve quickly. (Ibid., pp. 1047-56.) ★

TO COLONEL MARSHALL S. CARTER
Radio No. GOLD 915. *Secret*

June 16, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Reurad WAR-91312,¹ my desire is to relieve U. S. Government of embarrassment in controlling those ships now with complete Chinese personnel. Only this morning I had to countermand the orders of the Gimo to troops en route from Canton to Shanghai to proceed on to Tsingtao and reenforce the Chinese National garrison there in connection with the current fighting in Shantung province.² Furthermore these vessels are handling army supplies to Manchuria which procedure is under constant Communist propaganda attack as American shipping, though not flying U. S. flag. The date of June 20th has great significance as it anticipates the close of the present partial truce at noon on June 22nd and the possibility of the failure to reach the necessary agreements to finally terminate hostilities, in which event a general civil war would probably develop.

Do your very best to get these ten vessels under Chinese flag at the earliest possible moment.³

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. On June 13, Marshall had directed Colonel Carter to see if the Maritime Commission's contract on the ten Liberty ships (SCALS) could be "readjusted quickly to release ships to Chinese. . . . I want to get SCALS under Chinese flag as quickly as possible." Carter replied the next day that Dr. S. C. Wang, the head of the Chinese Supply Commission in Washington, had just telephoned to say that he had received a message "directing him to do everything possible to have the ships transferred to Chinese Flag by 20 June. This date has no significance with respect to the Lend-Lease Act or Ship Sales Act, or any other economic considerations of which I am aware." Under the Ship Sales Act, the earliest the ships could be transferred to the Chinese was July 23. (*Foreign Relations, 1946, 10: 795.*)

2. On June 15, Marshall sent a message to Admiral Cooke stating that the China Merchant Steam Navigation Company, which operated the ten Liberty ships for the Chinese government, had received orders from the government to use four of the ships to transport the Fifty-fourth Army from the Canton area to Tsingtao and to request U.S. assistance. Marshall said that he had advised Executive Headquarters "that the operation of the 4 SCALS involved in this movement would be confined to the scheduled move from Canton to Shanghai." (Marshall Memorandum for Captain Kenny [for Cooke], Radio No. GOLD 912, June 15, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages].)

Three days later, Marshall told Walter Robertson, U.S. commissioner at Executive

Headquarters, that he had been informed that the Fifty-fourth Army was moving to Tsingtao and the Seventy-third Army to Tsinan. “These movements could not have come at a worse time insofar as my negotiations are concerned. It will probably take the best efforts of several good Field Teams to keep this situation from getting out of hand.” (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 1083.)

3. Carter replied on June 17 that the president had approved the transfer of the vessels under the Lend-Lease Act, “subject to an agreement by the Chinese to purchase them at the earliest possible moment permitted under the Ship Sales Act.” This would permit the Chinese to reflag the vessels immediately, although title would not pass to them until the actual sale in July. Marshall wrote to Carter on June 29 that this action was acceptable, but formal sale should take place “as soon as possible to avoid any possible repercussions coming about through United States retention of title during this intervening period. Even the loan of a United States ship though flying a Chinese flag is subject to challenge as constituting support for one side against another.” On July 12, the Chinese Supply Commission placed the \$5,500,000 sale price in escrow with the U.S. Maritime Commission and signed an agreement transferring the “use and possession” of the ten ships to the Chinese government. (*Ibid.*, 9: 796, 798, 800.)

MEETINGS WITH CHOU EN-LAI AND OTHERS June 17–18, 1946 Nanking, China

CHOU En-lai, June 17, 10:00 A.M.

On June 13, Marshall sent the two other members of the Committee of Three (Chou and Hsu) a draft proposal he had prepared on terminating hostilities in Manchuria. (See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 1044–45.) Marshall proposed “wiping the slate clean” by going back to the January 10 cease-fire agreement and modifying it to take care of the situation as of the June 7 truce. Chou thought that the part of the January 10 agreement permitting the government to reassert Chinese sovereignty was no longer effective, since Soviet troops had left Manchuria; the draft agreement should note this lest the government claim the right “to go everywhere under the pretext of restoring sovereignty.” The mere evacuation of Russian troops, Marshall noted, did not determine the sovereignty question, “because Communists were definitely not taking over control for the Central Government during the past few months.” He hoped to get a special separate agreement that would stop the fighting and cover troop redistribution in Manchuria, thereby making the sovereignty issue moot.

They then discussed the distance contending troops would withdraw from one another and the time on June 7 to which troop dispositions would be restored. Chou reiterated Communist opposition to permitting the U.S. representative of the advance section or truce teams to make decisions if the Chinese members were deadlocked.

Concerning the proposed military reorganization, Marshall said that each side was keeping him too much in the dark about its essential demands on the other side. Thus he found it difficult to mediate. The Communists were willing to make concessions to reach agreement, Chou said, but before making proposals “they wanted first to see what the Government’s proposal would be and then to negotiate.” He also pointed out a number of proposals and concessions the Communists had made toward reaching a Manchurian settlement.

Later that day, Marshall's assistant sent to Chou for comment copies of three government papers regarding troop readjustments in North China, an amendment to the February 25 agreement on military reorganization in Manchuria, and a proposed agreement on the restoration of communications. The Communists were to evacuate Jehol and Chahar provinces and government forces were to occupy the ports of Chefoo and Weihaiwei and reinforce Tsingtao in Shantung province and Tientsin in Hopeh province. In Manchuria, the government was to occupy Harbin and various other cities then held by the Communists. (Ibid., pp. 1065–74.)

Lo Lung-chi and Carsun Chang, June 17, 5:30 P.M.

The Democratic League leaders came to discuss the issue of giving the U.S. member on field teams the power of final decision and the Communist attitude regarding this. Marshall desired that American officers on field teams and at Executive Headquarters have only limited authority concerning where teams would go and who they would be able to see—not final authority on all issues, as the government desired and the Communists feared. Lo and Chang thought that the Communist party was willing to grant final authority to American team members. It would help a great deal, Marshall concluded, if the Democratic League would facilitate a quick settlement of the authority issue. (Ibid., pp. 1079–81.)

Yu Ta-wei, June 18, 9:15 A.M.

General Yu informed Marshall that his previous evening's meeting with Chou En-lai had been unsatisfactory and that Chou "had become 'wild' and acted in a disgraceful manner." Their discussions on communications problems and troop dispositions had been fruitless. On the question of allowing the American representative to have the decisive vote, Chou asked: "What would happen if I suggested that a Russian have the decisive vote?"

Marshall desired to know if General Yu thought there were any grounds for an agreement on Manchuria; the general thought not, and said that the Generalissimo desired Marshall's reaction to the Yu-Chou meeting. Marshall "replied that he knew the Generalissimo's terms were too harsh. What concerned him at the moment was what concessions could be made by the Generalissimo." He also thought that the government's belief that a settlement required the Communists to be concentrated in specific areas would "evoke the natural fear on the part of the Communists of being concentrated in an area to facilitate ultimate destruction." The Generalissimo was willing to grant the Communists more generous areas, Yu said, and asked Marshall to have his staff prepare a solution. (Ibid., pp. 1082–83.)

Chou En-lai, June 18, 11:15 A.M.

The scope of the government's demands were surprising, Chou stated, and it left him feeling "rather embittered." The proposals would have to be transmitted to Yen-an. Chou defended Communist military actions in Manchuria and Shantung, maintaining that the government's forces had been even more aggressive. Communist evacuation of Chahar and Jehol could not be considered, he asserted, and against the government's demands, the Communists could make similar demands—e.g., government evacuation of Peiping, Tientsin, and Tsingtao. The government, while making no assurances on political matters, demanded concessions from the Communists on military reorganization, troop movements, and communications far beyond the January and February agreements. Chou did agree to Marshall's suggestion that he fly in Marshall's plane to Yen-an for consultations. (Ibid., pp. 1083–90.)

Hsu Yung-chang and Yu Ta-wei, June 18, 4:40 P.M.

General Yu detailed the government's ideas about areas in North China and Manchuria where Communist troops should be concentrated. Marshall asked how many Communist troops were in Jehol and Chahar and what portion of those troops were natives of the area. Fifty thousand in each province and somewhere between a third and half, Yu replied. Marshall feared that an enforced evacuation of Jehol and Chahar would create an explosive situation and the concentration of so many Communists in North China would present a threat to both sides' interests. He also thought that it would be a mistake for the government to present its entire plan to the Communists at one time; it should begin with the Manchurian agreement, with which Chou was already largely in agreement, and then the Chahar-Jehol and Shantung problems. Marshall particularly did not want General Yu to show General Chou the map depicting the government's ideas on Communist concentration areas: "if you show him the restricted areas you will have war in China."

They talked about the issue of American-member decision-making authority, and Marshall described his meeting with Carsun Chang and Lo Lung-chi. General Yu ended with a discussion of the communications-restoration agreement negotiations. (Ibid., pp. 1091–99.) ★

TO COLONEL MARSHALL S. CARTER
Radio No. GOLD 927. *Secret*

June 18, 1946
[Nanking, China]

I sent you a personal statement in my GOLD 926 to be used at your discretion.¹ In supplement to that, the following may prove useful to you as private lobbying material:

1. Congressional approval of the bill is important whatever the outcome of peace efforts in China. American military assistance would be invaluable in cementing Communist-Government army reorganization and integration if peace efforts are successful. If they are not, the hands of the President and his advisors are free to go through with the program of assistance to the Central Government alone or not as final determination of policy dictated.

2. Despite propaganda recriminations on both sides and the appearance of irreconcilable enmity, there are still prospects of an ultimate agreement for peace and unity in China. These prospects certainly would be dimmer by a refusal to enact this legislation.

3. Expenditures under the program would be small in comparison with the tremendous benefits that would be obtained in the direction of a stable China and of Chinese forces founded on a basis of cooperation with Americans and the use of American equipment.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. On June 12, a draft bill to provide military assistance to China had been sent from the State Department to the Senate (S. 2337) and House of Representatives (H.R. 6795).

The total requested appropriation of just over \$100,000,000 was for: (1) supporting a Chinese division as part of the occupation force in Japan; (2) training for the Chinese Air Force; (3) military aid for the four months following the July 1, 1946, termination of lend-lease authority; (4) the cost of U.S. Navy supplies on the vessels transferred to China prior to June 30, 1946; and (5) the Kalgan Communist training school. (See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 747–50.)

Marshall sent a “personal statement” to Colonel Marshall Carter for use—“if desirable”—in supporting the aid bill: “The purpose of the bill . . . is to support the American program for creating a stable and friendly China. . . . I believe that the passage of the bill by Congress would facilitate the efforts now being made to promote peace and unity between warring factions in China. The President under the terms of the bill would have the authority to proceed at his discretion in accordance with the situation, towards the establishment by the Chinese of unified National Defense Forces. The assistance to Chinese ground forces authorized in the bill would be carried out in accordance with the program of reorganization and integration of National Government and Chinese Communist armies as agreed upon by Government and Communist representatives and the Military Advisory Group. Without passage of the bill the President and myself would lack authorization to carry through a phase of American policy toward China which appears vital to the success of our announced policy. American assistance as contemplated under the bill to supplement the efforts of the Chinese themselves, would serve to create in China ground, air and naval forces modern in character and of sufficient strength and effectiveness to contribute materially to stability in the Far East.” (Marshall to Carter, Radio No. GOLD 925, June 18, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages].)

Marshall’s statement was included in the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s June 28 report on the bill to the whole House (Report No. 2361, 77th Cong., 2d sess.). For further developments on this bill, see Marshall to Carter, July 22, 1946, pp. 632–33.

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 934. *Top Secret*

June 19 [18]¹, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mr. President: Negotiations have proceeded very slowly due to reluctance of either side to commit themselves one in advance of the other regarding reorganization and particularly redistribution of troops. Fighting in Shantung Province proved to be a very disturbing factor, causing increased bitterness and unwillingness to make concessions. Finally Saturday noon last [June 15] the Generalissimo indicated definitely to me the nature of his demands and had me put them into formal shape for presentation to General Chou En-lai. The latter had made no definite propositions and had only given me a few general statements.

After the formal papers had been drawn up it required the better part of Sunday to translate them into Chinese for detailed consideration by the Generalissimo. It was not until 7 o’clock Monday evening [June 17] that he gave me his formal approval. I immediately sent the papers to General Chou En-lai that evening.² Again a delay of translating was involved. Chou saw me at 11 o’clock this, Tuesday, morning. He had had but little

time after translation to consider the proposals but sufficient to find them, in his opinion, entirely too demanding to admit of acceptance by the Communists. I prevailed upon him to meet late this afternoon the two principal officials representing the Government in the negotiations. Meanwhile, I saw the Generalissimo at 6 o'clock this evening and told him that there was no chance, in my opinion, of the Communists accepting his terms without considerable moderation.

I had suggested to Chou En-lai that he take my plane and fly to Yen-an this afternoon or early tomorrow morning to consult with his principals. He accepted for tomorrow morning but late tonight sent me word that nothing had occurred in the conference this evening with National officials to justify a visit to Yen-an, therefore he would not go tomorrow. One of the two Government officials called on me later and said that no meeting of views had been obtained and that General Chou had resented bitterly the Government insistence that Americans on field teams and the American Commissioner at Executive Headquarters be given the deciding vote in a number of matters in case of disagreements.

The principal stumbling block presented by the Government proposals does not appear to be in regard to readjustments in Manchuria but more resentment was aroused by certain Government stipulations concerning North China, wherein it is demanding the immediate evacuation by the Communists of the provinces of Chahar north west of Peiping and Jehol north and north east of that city; also the Government demand that National troops immediately take over Chefoo and Weihaiwei on the northern coast of Shantung Province. Incidentally the Government had announced this morning that it was in the process of sending an army of three divisions to Tsingtao and another to Tsinanfu, both in Shantung Province, because of the recent Communist offensive operations in that province.

At the present moment we have reached an impasse. Whether or not I can prevail upon the Generalissimo to make concessions sufficient to find Communist acceptance of the general proposition remains to be seen, and whether or not I can get from the Communists a commitment to definite proposals on their part is also uncertain.³ The situation is extremely critical and has not been helped throughout by the belief, freely expressed, by some of the Government military officials and some politicians that only a policy of force will satisfy the situation, and that the Communists can be quickly crushed.⁴ I consider the last view a gross underestimate of the possibilities, as a long and terrible conflict would be unavoidable, I am sure. Also, the Soviet Government would probably intervene openly or under cover.⁵ All of my views have been stated to the Generalissimo. I rather think today's evidence of the reception of his demands may induce him to moderate them considerably, though I will probably find my

efforts opposed by certain military officials. There remain but three and a half days of the truce period. If I develop the possibility of significant Government moderations of the original proposals and a Communist favorable reaction I think I can have the truce period extended a few days without the hazard of fatal disruptions in the field. You will be kept advised.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. The copy in the GOLD Messages file is dated June 19, which is when it was dispatched. At the top of Marshall's handwritten original, the file clerk wrote "18 June 1946." At the end of the message on the GOLD Messages file copy is: "Note: Foregoing msg written night of eighteenth and should be so dated."

2. See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 1075-79.

3. Communist leaders agreed that a turning point was at hand. On June 18, Chou En-lai informed the Party Central Committee in Yenan that while Marshall's and Chiang Kai-shek's views were not entirely congruent, he doubted Marshall's ability to control Chiang. Whether or not Marshall supported Chiang or sought to control him, it would be difficult to prevent the outbreak of full-scale civil war, in Chou's opinion. "We must reassess the role of the United States and of Marshall."

The following day (June 19), Mao Tse-tung sent the following telegram to the leaders of all the "liberated" areas: "Judging from recent events, Chiang Kai-shek is preparing for large-scale war, and it will be difficult to stop him. Once fighting starts up, I estimate that if after about six months we have scored a big victory, then it will be possible to negotiate peace. If we fight to a draw, peace may also be possible. If Chiang scores a big victory, however, it will not be possible to negotiate peace. Therefore, our army must repulse Chiang Kai-shek's attack in order to secure a peaceful future." (Quoted by He Di, "Mao Zedong and the Marshall Mission," in Bland, ed., *George C. Marshall's Mediation Mission to China*, p. 195.)

4. Embassy Second Secretary John F. Melby had talked with Chen Li-fu on June 12. Chen asserted that negotiating with the Communists was "futile since what they say today they will deny tomorrow. . . . He does not however believe there will be civil war since the Communists are bluffing and can be destroyed with very little difficulty." (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 1045-46.)

5. The chief of the Press Section at the Soviet Embassy, Eugene Vinogradov, had invited U.S. Embassy Second Secretary Raymond P. Ludden to dinner on June 13 and asserted that: The Marshall mission had failed and there was no hope of a permanent Nationalist-Communist settlement; the Soviet government assumed that all U.S. actions in the Far East were aimed offensively at the U.S.S.R.; the Soviet Union might find it "necessary actively to intervene in China if the present unsatisfactory situation continues." Ludden thought this was the first time the Soviets had expressed the possibility of Soviet intervention to any member of the U.S. Embassy staff. (*Ibid.*, pp. 1046-47.)

MEETINGS WITH YU TA-WEI AND JOHN LEIGHTON STUART June 20, 1946 Nanking, China

Y*U Ta-wei, 9:30 A.M.*

Marshall asked General Yu what he thought would be an appropriate extension of the present fifteen-day truce; one day, Yu replied. Marshall thought this was unrealistic and probably based on the government's assumption that the U.S. would support a civil war in China. "General Marshall stated emphatically that 'it would not'";

furthermore, in the event of a civil war, the Marines and the Seventh Fleet probably would be withdrawn from China and all U.S. economic and military assistance probably would be cut off.

With regard to the Americans having the final decision on field teams and at Executive Headquarters, Yu suggested that the government would accept wording that permitted a majority, rather than unanimous, vote. The Communists were unlikely to accept this, Marshall responded; moreover, the government would probably have to modify certain of its stipulations regarding North China, Manchuria, and communications (see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 1075–81) if there were to be further discussions with the Communists. The current truce should be extended by at least five days. (Ibid., pp. 1105–6.)

John Leighton Stuart, Frank W. Price, and W. P. Mills, 11:00 A.M.

The missionary group had talked with Chou En-lai, and Dr. Stuart with Chiang Kai-shek, the previous day, and they desired to tell Marshall what had occurred. Chou had said that the Communists desired an unconditional cessation of hostilities; the government was being unreasonable with regard to Manchurian and North China arrangements; and the two sides should jointly control the railways. He also saw dangers from both a U.S. withdrawal and Soviet influence. American guidance and technical assistance would be welcome in reorganizing the army, Chou said; however, American final authority in making decisions would impinge upon Chinese sovereignty.

In his long, frank conversation in Chinese with the Generalissimo, Stuart said, Chiang admitted that there were many problems in China, but the government was making reforms. The Communists were the chief offenders, breakers of agreements, and obstacles to economic recovery; they did not really want to cooperate with the government. Stuart told Chiang that the people were losing confidence in the government and that he was overestimating his personal popularity. Chiang failed to see economic problems clearly, in Stuart's opinion. Price and Stuart thought that the Generalissimo would meet Chou half way if the Communist leader (preferably accompanied by General Marshall) would go to Chiang with a fresh, cooperative approach. Dr. Stuart said that Chiang was willing to abide by Marshall's decisions, for example on railway control, and Chou had also agreed. "You don't mean that," Marshall responded. "He [Chou] has not agreed to my having the power of decision—he has resented it." Stuart thought that it did not matter whether Chou agreed in principle with Marshall's judgments so long as Chou could say to the Generalissimo that it was his decision that concessions first be made on the method by which railways would be controlled. (Ibid., pp. 1106–10.) ★

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 947. *Top Secret*

June 20, 1946
[Nanking, China]

I have arranged that Generalissimo issue an order to his troops continuing suspension of all aggressive action, that is, advances, attacks and pursuits, until noon of June 30th for the purpose of permitting further time to negotiate the matters referred to in his original 15 day suspension

order, which would otherwise terminate Saturday June 22 noon.

Also, there appears fair prospect for some Government concessions on original stipulation regarding North China. I had Chou En-lai here from three to five this afternoon and spent five to seven with Generalissimo.¹ Tomorrow, Friday, I see Generalissimo at 9 o'clock in morning and Chou En-lai at 11. There is a wide gap to be closed but I now think that I have some chance of success.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. There were no minutes or memorandums concerning either meeting in the mission files.

MEETINGS WITH CHOU EN-LAI AND THE COMMITTEE OF THREE
June 21–23, 1946 Nanking, China

CHOU En-lai, June 21, 12:05 P.M.

Marshall had met with Chiang Kai-shek the previous evening and this morning. He sought to get the current truce (which was scheduled to end June 22) extended and to modify the government's demand that the Communists evacuate Jehol and Chahar provinces and the cities of Chefoo and Weihaiwei, which the Communists would not accept. Marshall believed that he had achieved "a better basis . . . for negotiating details with General Chou." He was seeking "a middle course" between the two sides' "strong stands," Marshall said, and showed Chou a map of North China on which he had indicated areas (with the Communist areas somewhat enlarged from those the government had stipulated) in which both sides' troops would concentrate by October 1 for the first phase of demobilization.

Chou said that he was unwilling to discuss troop dispositions in North China alone; it had to be for all of China. Moreover, he was not interested in discussing mere modifications of a unilateral government proposal. The government's plan sought to get the Communists away from the rail lines and big cities where Chiang's forces could wipe them out any time he chose. He could not consider the government's plan, even as Marshall had modified it. Chou insisted that the Committee of Three immediately decide to get the fighting stopped, issue an order to that effect, and direct that the American members of field teams had the power to decide what investigations were to be made in order to execute the order. Once the fighting ceased, the Committee of Three would work out a plan for the restoration of communications, the demobilization of the entire country, and the reorganization of the government. Army reorganization, the key problem, should be carried out in separate Communist and government areas with training undertaken by American officers, "since we all trust the Americans." After the forces were separately reorganized, they could be brought together for integration.

Marshall agreed with General Chou as to the need for immediate consideration of exact terms for cessation of hostilities and the restoration of communications, "but I am also of the opinion that we will have to have a pretty precise understanding as to

what the Communists' demands will be in connection with redistribution of troops in North China." Both sides were to have submitted lists of troops in March and April; the government had done so, the Communists had not. With those lists, a combined staff could have made a proposal—or at least identified differences—regarding redistribution of troops in North China, and the issue might not now be such a divisive one.

The meeting was interrupted by a telephone call to Marshall from Chiang Kai-shek, who agreed to extend the current truce until June 30. Marshall then appealed to General Chou to do nothing "to wreck this last possibility of reaching a preliminary agreement on the military considerations." For his part, Marshall said, "I will use my very best efforts to persuade the Generalissimo to make the announcement or definite commitments regarding the PCC and certain other matters in connection with the political reorganization of the government." He hoped that basic agreements on the military and purely political matters could be announced and put into effect simultaneously. (*Foreign Relations, 1946*, 9: 1115–23.)

Chou En-lai, June 21, 5:10 P.M.

The Communists had presumed that discussions of troop dispositions in China proper would take place only after the Manchurian matter had been settled, Chou said, and thus they could not now consider the Generalissimo's proposals on the subject. With regard to American decision-making authority, the government seemed confused and was now talking about field-team decisions by majority vote, which they knew the Communists did not accept. The Communists desired to have an immediate agreement on repairing the railroads, Chou said, but the Nationalist government's recent actions on the Yellow River dike repair operation suggested that it would not accept. Finally, the Generalissimo sought to force the Communists to make military commitments without any government assurances on political matters.

Marshall responded that the Committee of Three should meet at once and take up the order for the cessation of hostilities and then the agreement for restoration of communications. General Chou should make definite proposals regarding redistribution of troops. Chou and Marshall discussed Committee of Three meeting arrangements. Marshall then described what he saw as each side's fears about the other's negotiating stance. "Now I am going to talk just as frankly to the Government representatives in this final effort to see if we can't get at least a little bit away from these deep and deadly suspicions which makes agreements over the simplest matters almost impossible." Chou defended the Communists' negotiating procedures and criticized the government's. The idea that the Soviet Union was influencing Chinese Communist policies was "entirely groundless. The truth is that more and more, in North China, we are seeking cooperation with the United States."

Marshall thought that both sides adopted positions that evidenced short memories regarding their own attitudes and positions on events. With regard to public charges from both sides that he was prejudiced, Marshall said: "I do not belong to the Kuomintang Party and I do not belong to the Communist Party, and I don't enjoy my job. I am merely doing the best I can." Chou appreciated and was grateful for Marshall's efforts, but to outsiders, the government's legal status and big-city industrial point of view was understandable; this made it easy for Westerners to view the Communists, representing the point of view of villagers, as being illegal in actions and demands. United States military assistance to the government, in the past and being planned,

encouraged certain Nationalist generals in their conviction of continued aid by the U.S. Part of the problem on the military assistance issue, Marshall replied, was the long time it took a democracy to act. Assistance programs begun in late 1944 and 1945 (e.g., aid to Chinese air and naval forces) were just now being felt. He had been pressing for faster movement on American support for the Communist training center at Kalgan, but such programs “are things which you cannot stop and start . . . like turning off water at a faucet.” (Ibid., pp. 1125–33.)

Committee of Three, June 22, 11:00 A.M.

Marshall initiated a discussion of each of the eight paragraphs in his June 13 draft proposal on “Termination of Hostilities in Manchuria” (see *ibid.*, pp. 1044–45). Chou En-lai and Hsu Yung-chang could not agree on how far the troops in the field should withdraw from one another—five or ten miles (fifteen or thirty li)—so the committee moved on to consider the official time after which troop movements were to cease (June 7, noon). Disagreement over who was to decide the troop locations at the cease-fire time caused consideration of this to be postponed. With regard to the American member’s authority to break deadlocks on the field teams and at Executive Headquarters and its advance section, Chou detailed his ideas for negotiating a separate agreement to cover this. General Hsu agreed to negotiate this issue separately.

After a lengthy exchange between Chou and Hsu over the agreements to be reached, Marshall finally said: “Gentlemen, I hardly know what to say. There is so much sparring going on here, to use an American expression, that I am having considerable difficulty in following matters.” Marshall thought that the committee had “arrived at what appears to me to be a very practical place to consider General Chou’s proposal to draw up a separate document giving specific terms in relation to decisions regarding teams and Executive Headquarters.” Regarding General Hsu’s objection to the imprecision in the sentence on troop withdrawal distances, Marshall insisted that local circumstances necessitated this. (Ibid., pp. 1139–51.)

Committee of Three, June 23, 10:35 A.M.

The meeting began with a presentation by Vice Minister of War Yu Ta-wei of the government’s position paper on restoration of communications. Colonel Donald C. Hill, chairman of the Communications Group at Executive Headquarters, had, after consultation with both sides, prepared a draft agreement on the subject, and following General Chou’s overview of the Communist party’s positions, Marshall proposed that they examine Hill’s draft paragraph by paragraph. Chou, however, insisted that General Yu’s paper had confused the issue. Marshall threatened to adjourn the meeting unless they agreed on a specific paper to discuss: “I find a discussion without a definite paper is endless and usually arrives nowhere.” General Yu agreed that Colonel Hill’s paper would be the one considered.

The Chinese agreed that reconstruction and the “free and unrestricted interchange of goods, foodstuffs, and ideas” and civilian travelers should begin without delay. Both sides also agreed that the removal of fortifications along the railways was a good idea, but there was considerable discussion of specifics such as bridges, culverts, the distance fortifications should be from stations, and who could work for the railways. They agreed to consider communications at the next meeting. (Ibid., pp. 1153–68.) ★

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 967. *Top Secret*

June 23, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mr. President: Negotiations since yesterday morning have been proceeding by formal meetings of the Committee of Three lengthily and painfully but we are making progress. These meetings are preceded and followed by personal meetings of mine with various principals. Communists have made important concessions in granting the deciding vote to the Americans on teams and at the Executive Headquarters regarding matters pertaining to the cessation of hostilities procedure, interpretation of agreements and their execution. These do not pertain to highest level, that is the Committee of Three, but I think that there is a possibility that Communists will accept the majority vote decision on interpretation of agreements. I have declined to commit myself further regarding Committee of Three as I do not think US Government should bear the heavy responsibility through my actions in regard to matters of great importance beyond interpretation of agreements, which means the manner or direction of their implementation. On lower level, that is at Executive Headquarters and with teams, I think it alright for Americans to be committed to a majority vote policy regarding specific matters.

It is very difficult to predict rate of progress and eventual outcome because of effect of heavy sporadic fighting, carelessly expressed desire of some important Government leaders to settle issues by force, unfortunate propaganda, mutual accentuated suspicion and distrust, etc. etc. However, all this seems to be normal to any settlement in China.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF THREE
June 24, 1946, 10:35 A.M. Nanking, China

MARSHALL resumed discussion of the key fifth paragraph of Colonel Hill's draft agreement on communications restoration (see the final version in *Foreign Relations, 1946*, 9: 1187–88): the elimination of fortifications along the railways. Disagreement quickly evidenced itself, so he switched to consideration of the sixth paragraph (railway personnel). The issue of determining personnel qualifications raised serious problems, and Marshall thought that the American member of field teams or Executive Headquarters Communications Group should have the deciding vote in case the Chinese deadlocked. Chou En-lai agreed to this, but thought that personnel issues should be handled in a separate agreement. A great deal of discussion but little progress ensued, so Marshall called a recess in the formal proceedings, after which he stated: "That was a constructive 10 minutes." The Chinese then agreed that qualified Communists would be employed on the railroads' restored sections and

would be included as personnel of the Ministry of Communications "in accordance with a plan to be determined." Finally, a draft of the entire paragraph was agreed upon and shortly thereafter the entire document.

Marshall then directed the discussion to "Directive for the Termination of Hostilities in Manchuria" (see the final version, *ibid.*, pp. 1186–87). The Chinese agreed that the troop withdrawal distance would be twenty li (6.2 miles). They then took up consideration of General Chou's "Stipulations for the Resolution of Certain Disagreements Among the Field and Communication Teams, and Executive Headquarters in Changchun and in Peiping" (see *ibid.*, p. 1189). With little difficulty, Marshall led the committee through the paragraphs in sequence, and the document was approved. (*Ibid.*, pp. 1169–86.) ★

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 995. *Top Secret*

June 26, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mr. President: The negotiations have reached a point where the detailed instructions to govern a cessation of hostilities have been agreed to, also the instructions for the reopening of communications. Further, an important agreement has been completed granting certain authorities to American officers on teams and at Executive Headquarters which should greatly facilitate the control of situations by Executive Headquarters in the future. We are now engaged in the far more difficult matter of the redistribution and reduction of troops in Manchuria and North and Central China. The Manchurian phase seems to be the least difficult of the three to compose. The Communists submitted their detailed proposals this morning and I am at this moment engaged with General Chou in a discussion of the proposals.¹ I write while he is making his statements in Chinese or listening to the translation of mine.

The Communist proposals are far apart from the Government demands and there remain but a few days in which to achieve a compromise solution. The situation is further complicated by the freely expressed desire of some to settle the issue by force, by mass meetings in Shanghai carefully organized to stir up anti-American feeling related to current congressional consideration of lend-lease matters in particular.²

I realize the circumstances which have caused the initiation of new measures in Congress for aid to China at this time but these moves, coming at the most critical stage in my negotiations, are causing difficulty and embarrassment. The Communists profess to regard recent measures and official statements in Washington as proving their contention that American economic and military support to the Kuomintang Government will continue to be given irrespective of whether the Government offers the Communists a fair and reasonable basis for settlement of military and

political differences. The Communists maintain new legislation intended to aid China is reinforcing the Government's tendency to deal with the Communists by force and thus is contributing to all-out civil war. They relate the proposed congressional action to active support of the Government military power in the immediate future and not many months hence as would be the case. I think it is a fact that some diehard Kuomintang elements in inner Government councils are utilizing recent American measures as a basis for pressing the Generalissimo to push forward with a campaign of extermination against the Communists. At the same time these and other Kuomintang extremists appear to be joining in anti-American agitation on the grounds that American economic pressure is causing American imports to displace Chinese products, bankrupt Chinese industrialists and prevent Chinese recovery. These Kuomintang groups also are antagonistic to the restraint exercised by myself and other Americans on the Government with regard to an anti-Communist military campaign, and are even using the Communist line against American intervention in pursuance of their aim to free the Government from any American impediment to drastic anti-Communist action. The agitation and propaganda resulting from the activity of the different factions is being manifested in mass demonstrations, press campaigns and mob actions such as the incident at the Nanking Railway Station on the night of June 24 [23].³ It would be helpful if government spokesmen in Washington seized a favorable occasion to explain the aims and development of American measures for aid to China.⁴ The recent moves are but steps in the complete implementation of a long agreed program for helping the Chinese nation as a whole to rid itself of the Japanese. These moves include steps to implement the agreement reached in Chungking, February 25 last, for reorganization and unification of the armed forces of China. They are intended to cement rather than destroy unity, and were planned for a single National Army made up of both Communist and Central Government troops. All of the steps concerned involve a lengthy procedure of negotiation, agreements, legislative action and lastly decisions by yourself in accordance with the existing situation. These steps consume many months, more than a year in this case and if interrupted could not be quickly, if ever, resumed. It could be pointed out that measures to provide economic aid to China in the form of supplies and credits are an impartial American effort to contribute to a solution of the acute economic crisis in the country and prevent a complete economic breakdown. It could be stressed that it is the American hope that economic assistance be carried out in China through the medium of a government of all factions, including the Communists, and that the American Government feels that a few measures of economic assistance could not be held in abeyance despite the failure, so far, of Chinese groups to come together in a unified

government, without danger of an economic collapse which would spell a great tragedy for the common people of China.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Chou's memorandum of June 25 with two annexes is in *Foreign Relations, 1946*, 9: 1195–1201. The Communist party proposed to change the ratio of Nationalist:Communist divisions in the February 25 agreement on demobilization and reorganization (see *ibid.*, pp. 295–300) from 90:18 to 90:20 at the end of the initial twelve-month period and from 50:10 to 50:13 at the end of eighteen months. The Communists would add strength in Manchuria and North China.

2. Labor unrest and public demonstrations had been common in Shanghai since Marshall had been in China, in part because of the city's postwar economic problems and the fact that the U.S. presence in China was most obvious there. United States aid to China usually passed through the city's grossly overcrowded port, and nearly all of it went to the Nationalists; consequently, many in Shanghai considered that the U.S., far from being an impartial mediator, was backing the government against the various reformers and the Communists. In May, a coalition of groups formed the Shanghai Federation of People's Organizations, which was much more critical of the government than of the Communists. On June 23, the federation carried out a lengthy demonstration involving between fifty and one hundred thousand people who demanded peace and democracy and criticized the United States. See Mark F. Wilkinson, "A Shanghai Perspective on the Marshall Mission," in Bland, ed., *George C. Marshall's Mediation Mission to China*, pp. 327–55; on the demonstration, see pp. 343–45.

3. One aspect of the June 23 Shanghai demonstrations was the departure for Nanking of an eight-person peace delegation (six men and two women, including leaders of two student groups, a former vice minister of education, several businessmen, a college professor, and a Y.M.C.A. worker). When the delegation arrived at the Nanking train station, they were attacked by a mob of "gangsters" and "beaten mercilessly." (Henry R. Lieberman in the *New York Times*, June 24, 1946, p. 9.) Chou En-lai informed Marshall of the attack around 9:00 P.M., by which time the attack had been going on for almost two hours. Marshall immediately called Yu Ta-wei, the government representative on the Committee of Three, who assured Marshall that peace would be restored and the delegates taken care of, but the issue was not settled for several more hours. The Nationalist government's American public relations consultant, John R. Beal, noted in his diary for June 29 that when he talked with Marshall just before the general was to meet with Chiang Kai-shek, Marshall "waxed indignant over the station riot, suggesting that I tell the Gimo no one in America will believe the government is not implicated because of the long abstention from interference by the police." (John Robinson Beal, *Marshall in China* [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1970], p. 95.) Marshall later said that he had told Madame Chiang that the five-hour riot had been "a most terrible thing," and he asked her to go to the hospital to visit the injured—which she reluctantly agreed to do. Marshall was not pleased when the Generalissimo said that he would have someone look into the incident. "What you are saying," Marshall replied, "is that your army is completely impotent and I can't swallow that at all. His foot just went a wiggling, as it did when he was angry or upset. The people were just coming to talk to him. I don't think they were communists. His people were doing a terrible thing. It got so I was constantly being appealed to by women whose families were being attacked." (*George C. Marshall Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue*, 3d ed. [Lexington, Va.: George C. Marshall Foundation, 1996], p. 575.)

4. Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson issued a statement on June 28. See *Department of State Bulletin*, July 7, 1946, p. 34.

MEETINGS WITH CHOU EN-LAI AND CHIANG KAI-SHEK

June 26–27, 1946 Nanking, China

CHOU En-lai, June 26, 2:00 P.M.

Marshall doubted that the government—which had already indicated that it would accept a 5:1 ratio of Nationalist-Communist divisions in Manchuria—would agree to General Chou's latest proposal (see *Foreign Relations, 1946*, 9: 1198–99) to have five Communist divisions in Manchuria, nor was it likely to accept the proposed Communist dispositions in north Kiangsu province near Nanking. General Chou defended the Communist proposals on military reorganization as being closer to Marshall's and the P.C.C.'s ideas, unlike the government's proposals. Moreover, the Communists did not intend to abandon any place they currently held to government troops. Chou explained how reasonable Communist proposals were, particularly in Shantung province, but the government was being unreasonable in demanding that they evacuate Jehol province. The Communist party was "prepared to make military concessions in order to get the Government to concede political matters so that the goal of democratization of politics and nationalization of armies will be achieved." Chiang Kai-shek, Chou asserted, desired that the troop disposition issue be solved first so that government troops could occupy a larger area; then the government would fear no one.

He could understand the Communists' fears about the government's military operations, Marshall said, but given the Communists' post-cease-fire operations in Shantung and elsewhere, there were reasonable fears in the government about the Communists' attempts to influence political discussions through military action. There was "little time for maneuvering," Marshall said, and it was "quite evident that further delays or extensions of negotiations are not practicable because of the growing unrest and the constant threat of disturbances and vicious propaganda." He was "rather at a loss" as to what to do next. "I find the two sides so far apart and so firm in their purpose, that I do not know what to say or do." The key issue was military reorganization—and resulting troop dispositions—Chou replied, but the Communist party could not compromise the rights and interests of the peasants to solve this. Chou suggested some approaches to getting the talks moving again, and Marshall responded: "I will see what I can do with them." (*Ibid.*, pp. 1203–15.)

Chiang Kai-shek, June 27, 9:30 A.M., Generalissimo's Office

The Generalissimo outlined what he considered the Communists' policies of delaying and obstructing implementation of the February 25 military demobilization and reorganization agreement. He asked Marshall to point out to General Chou that he (Chiang) knew of no instance where the inhabitants of a region occupied by the government had fled to a region controlled by the Communists, whereas over five million people had fled from Communist-controlled regions. Chiang suggested that Americans might control the movements of Communist and government forces into and out of areas. Furthermore, the government would be willing to accept Communist officials temporarily in Heilungkiang, Hsingan, Nunkiang, and Chahar provinces pending a final political reorganization.

Marshall observed that "the discussions and action of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang has conveyed to the public a grave doubt as to the intention of the Government in carrying out the agreements of the PCC." Moreover, staged violent demonstrations against the Communists and the Soviets, in addition to actions by the Communists, "militated against the implementation of the agreements." Marshall sug-

gested that the recent round of demonstrations appeared to be "a deliberate effort to interrupt the negotiations," and he could not conduct negotiations under such circumstances. The Generalissimo assured Marshall that there would be no further outbreaks of rioting. With regard to the critical points in the current negotiations, Marshall said, the government's present terms regarding Communist evacuation of north Kiangsu and Jehol provinces and the Manchurian rail center of Harbin were unacceptable to the Communists and some basis for compromise had to be found. (Ibid., pp. 1215-18.)

Chou En-lai, June 27, 1:30 P.M.

Marshall relayed the substance of Chiang Kai-shek's initial comments on the notes of the June 26 Marshall-Chou meeting. Chou En-lai then rebutted the Generalissimo's specific charges against the Communists, blaming the Nationalists for the problems. At some length, he explained the seeming imbalance in refugee flow; landlords' hostility to Communist reforms was one contributing factor, Chou asserted. Holding proper elections would show what the people desired in the way of personnel and policies. The Communists were definitely unwilling to accept the government's demands on north Kiangsu, Shantung, the Tsinan-Tsingtao railway, and certain other areas. However, the Communists might concentrate their troops and leave most of north Kiangsu and the railroad unoccupied, so long as the government did not try to move in troops.

Marshall repeated his assertion that he was at a loss as to how to proceed. "I find that in both my discussions with the Generalissimo and with General Chou, about the time a new idea forms in my mind as to possible compromise, some further statement obliterates that as a possibility." At Marshall's request, Chou elaborated on his non-garrisoning suggestion. (Ibid., pp. 1218-28.) ★

MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERALISSIMO
OSE 241

June 28, 1946
Nanking, China

Your Excellency: In compliance with your request of yesterday, I am submitting my views on the present status of negotiations between the Government and the Communist Party regarding the detailed reorganization and redistribution of troops under the agreement of February 25th last. As you know, during the past several days I have endeavored, with all the means at my disposal, to seek out possible points of compromise to lessen the present serious differences in the proposals or stands of the National Government and the Communist Party. Following my meeting with you yesterday morning, I discussed with General Chou the various issues from 1:30 to 4:00 yesterday afternoon and again at 6:30 in the evening.

At the present time I find the Government demands and the Communist position irreconcilable regarding the following aspects of the situation; the total evacuation of Kiangsu by the Communists, their evacuation

of Chengteh and the Communist insistence that the local governments in whatever areas might be vacated by the Communists should not be interfered with until the formal reorganization of the Government had been established. . . .¹

I have not discussed with General Chou the possibilities of effecting compromises if certain provincial appointments were assured the Communists, but I am inclined to the belief that they are far more deeply interested in an early meeting of the PCC and the initiation of formal discussions regarding the drafting of the constitution. You stated the other day that you would not consider any political discussions for three or four months following the successful conclusion of the military agreements. It is my belief that such a delay would almost inevitably have disrupting consequences. While from your point of view the delay would be for the purpose of testing the good intentions of the Communists, it would actually result, in all probability, through rather normal reactions to the present tense political state of China, in a renewal of hostilities.

It seems apparent to me that a formal detailed amendment with the necessary annexes, to the agreement of February 25th for the reorganization of the armies cannot be produced before noon of June 30th. In the meetings I have presided over in the Committee of Three it is frequently the case that the discussion of a single sentence will absorb an hour or more of time. I do not believe the unsettled differences now involved could be resolved in the final form as to the exact wording in less than a week, possible 10 days. At the same time I do not think a prolongation of the truce period beyond June 30th could be carried out without a complete breakdown in the situation. Therefore I propose that a special agreement be prepared which will cover a settlement for the critical areas in enough detail to protect the interests of the Government sufficiently to permit instructions to be issued for the cessation of hostilities on June 30th.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, OSE Letters)

1. Just over 60 percent of the memorandum is omitted here. In that section, Marshall describes the problems facing negotiators in Antung and Sungkiang provinces in Manchuria; Jehol, Chahar, and Shantung provinces and several key railways in North China; and Kiangsu province in Central China. (See *Foreign Relations, 1946*, 9: 1328–30.)

MEETINGS WITH CHOU EN-LAI AND CHIANG KAI-SHEK
June 28–29, 1946 Nanking, China

CHOU En-lai, June 28, 3:30 P.M.

Marshall told Chou of his two-hour meeting with Chiang Kai-shek that morning and of his idea to have the Chinese sign a temporary agreement that would allow negotiations to continue after the current cease-fire ended on June 30. Chou agreed

that the negotiations should continue, but he had just received word from Yen-an that government forces had launched an all-out attack on June 26 aimed at annihilating the Communist force of sixty thousand north of Hankow. Meanwhile, the Communists would continue to adhere to their pledge not to attack Tsinan (the provincial capital of Shantung) and Tatung (in north Shansi). Marshall told Chou of his various proposals for evacuations to the Generalissimo and his reactions to them. Chou thought that Chiang's responses indicated that he rejected the principle that government troops should not occupy places the Communists evacuated during the army reorganization.

Marshall handed Chou a "Preliminary Agreement to Govern the Amendment and Execution of the Army Reorganization Plan of February 25, 1946" (see *Foreign Relations, 1946*, 9: 1240–42). Chou read the draft and commented on the various paragraphs. Chou desired to add a statement that when the Communists "vacated" (he objected to the word "evacuated") an area, government troops would not move in and the established civil government and (Communist) peace preservation corps would be preserved. The Communists feared, he said, that if they evacuated all the rail lines and highways, their areas would be so cut up that government forces could easily surround and annihilate them. Chou also objected to many of the specific locations the agreement proposed for Communist forces. Marshall said that an agreement was needed by noon on June 29 if orders were to reach field commanders. A stalemate in endeavoring to reach a formal agreement "would mean another resumption of retaliations, gradually developing into open civil war." Consequently, highly detailed understandings could not be agreed upon rapidly. Chou promised a reply (see *ibid.*, pp. 1242–43) by the following morning. (*Ibid.*, pp. 1231–40.)

Chiang Kai-shek, June 29, 11:30 A.M., Generalissimo's Office

The Generalissimo refused to modify his demands on the Communists for the redistribution of troops. Marshall replied that he "was left with no basis for further negotiations." Chiang said that he could agree to nothing that did not guarantee that there would be no future difficulties with the Communists. His negotiations had already been made difficult, Marshall said, by statements of Nationalist leaders who opposed negotiations and were determined to solve the problem by fighting, and if this was actually attempted, "the Government of China would be judged by the world, and certainly by American public opinion, as having unnecessarily plunged the country into chaos by implacable demands and the evident desire to pursue a policy of military settlement." Chiang regretted that the negotiations had failed and showed Marshall a draft press release on the subject that expressed the hope that Marshall would continue his mediation efforts. "I expressed thanks for the complimentary references," Marshall replied, "but stated that I much preferred no such reference to me be made and that I would decline to be an umpire on a battlefield." (*Ibid.*, pp. 1248–49.)

Chou En-lai, June 29, 3:30 P.M.

Marshall reported on his three and a quarter hour meeting with the Generalissimo and the reasons Chiang had given for some of his positions. Marshall and Chou then went over in detail Marshall's draft—and Chiang's and Chou's responses to it—looking for points of potential government-Communist agreement. They found few. Chou was at particular pains to rebut the government's charge that refugee flow indicated dissatisfaction with Communist rule. Chou praised Marshall's mediation efforts, expressed the hope that Marshall would yet find a way out of the present situation,

and noted that he had proposed various concessions to the government because of the trust he had in Marshall's mediation.

Marshall said that he had done his best to produce an acceptable compromise, but that recent aggressive Communist actions in Shantung and Shansi provinces had undermined his efforts to persuade the government to alter its position. Having listened to the Generalissimo and General Chou, he could "find no basis for optimism in the present tragic dilemma." (Ibid., pp. 1250–62.) ★

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 1022. *Top Secret*

June 29, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mr. President: At nine tonight Saturday with the so called truce terminating at noon tomorrow, negotiations have reached a stalemate. A representative of Generalissimo is to see me at ten and I am apparently to see Generalissimo early tomorrow. But when we parted at three PM today there was so serious a difference between Government demands and Communist willingness to make further concessions that a final breakdown appeared inevitable. I saw Chou En-lai from 3:30 to 6:30 and got the possibility of a few minor concessions but no more. He is communicating with Yen-an and I will see him tomorrow A.M. but there appears to be little prospect of important adjustments.

The principal disputed points concern the extent to which Kiangsu province will be evacuated by the Communists and the Government demand for evacuation of Chengteh capital of Jehol Province. Also Communist insistence that local governments and militia established by them in regions they had agreed to evacuate will be continued until political reorganization of the Government is effected. There are a number of other details as to rapidity of evacuation, clearance of certain railroad lines, etc. which are in disagreement but these are minor matters in my opinion.

Communists are urgently demanding issuance of formal cessation of hostilities order, the terms of which have been agreed upon, but Generalissimo insists that a complete signed agreement on schedules for distribution of troops and their accurate locations must first be concluded. I have informed Generalissimo that in my opinion an extension of the present form of partial truce would probably result in violent military ruptures due to tense and explosive situation, the bitterness of commanders in the field, and the strong desire of Government military leaders to settle matters by force for which the plans of the Government are complete and pretty well known to Communists.

I will radio you tomorrow the moment I complete my interview with the Generalissimo.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 1028. *Top Secret*

June 30, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mr. President: I saw Generalissimo for lengthy conference this morning in which exceedingly frank and lengthy statements were made by both of us, I principally reflecting on the plainly evident and tremendous pressure of military leaders (who also occupy powerful political positions) to pursue without delay a policy of force for which all plans have been made.¹ However drastically they reduce their application to Communist territorial holdings and territory occupied by Communist troops or eliminate local Communist governmental set ups of long standing, the Generalissimo laid great emphasis on the necessity of arrangements which would safeguard the Government against the uncertainties of agreements with the Communists or future hostile threats or actions by them to influence political negotiations.² I had been endeavoring to have a small group of civil representatives of high position or reputation convened immediately to undertake the solution of the exceedingly complicated problem involved with regard to the local civil governments of the regions to be evacuated by the Communist troops and to which thousands of refugees would be immediately returning. With regard to the previous unwillingness to accept such a proposition I stated that the procedure contemplated by the Government officials would in effect be washing their hands of any idea of democratic procedures and deliberately following the dictates of Army officials as did Japan to her ruination.

The Generalissimo finally announced that he had already issued instructions continuing in effect his orders against aggressive offensive action by his troops. He accepted my proposal that he have a personal interview with Chou En-lai tomorrow and that he would discuss with his people the appointment of a special group of six, the three from the Government to include my suggestion of Doctor Wang, Minister of Foreign Affairs and General Chen Cheng, Chief of Staff. General Chou En-lai would head the Communist representatives. If he decided on this procedure he agreed to propose it himself to General Chou. The latter incidentally had formulated such a proposal the preceding day at my suggestion.

I just completed a meeting with Chou En-lai who is preparing for his meeting with the Generalissimo. The latter issued a statement to the press this afternoon of which I was shown a draft. I have not yet seen the statement actually issued so I do not know to what extent my rather extensive alterations were accepted.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Information he had gleaned from the newspapers, Marshall had told the Generalissimo, "indicated plainly that the Government was washing its hands of any democratic procedure and was pursuing a dictatorial policy of military force. I further stated that the

comparison would be inevitable of the army leaders' procedure in this case with that of the army dictatorship in the case of Japan, which led to the destruction of that nation." (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 1263–64.)

2. A few hours after this message was dispatched, Marshall sent another message (GOLD 1029) asking that this sentence be replaced with: "The Generalissimo laid great emphasis on the necessity for harsh measures or demands to safeguard the Government against the uncertainties of agreements with the Communists and also against future hostile threats or actions by them to influence political negotiations." (*Ibid.*, p. 1272.)

TO DEAN G. ACHESON¹

Radio No. GOLD 1032. *Top Secret*

July 2, 1946

[Nanking, China]

Dear Acheson: No repeat no negotiations yesterday Monday, Generalissimo probably discussing with his people basis for his meeting with Chou En-lai at ten this morning. Whether or not suggestion that a small high level group meet immediately to attempt a political solution to problem of local government I have not yet been informed. Local public opinion among inner Kuomintang bureaucracy is that Generalissimo's press release of Sunday was merely a sop to me and for purpose of placing Government in better position before public and probably preliminary to launching a military campaign.² I am so closely engaged and so close to the trees that I may lack perspective. Therefore I would appreciate your and Vincent's frank and quite informal reactions to present developments and the imperative issues that might soon and suddenly arise.³

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Acheson was acting secretary of state. Secretary James Byrnes was in Paris at a conference of foreign ministers working on peace treaties with European states formerly allied with Germany.

2. Marshall commented in his notes on the June 29 meeting with the Generalissimo that Chiang had "produced a draft of a statement referring to me which evidently was to be released to the press. It expressed regrets over the failure of the negotiations. It said that, even so, the Government hoped I would continue my efforts at mediation." (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 1249.)

3. John Carter Vincent replied on July 4 (over Acheson's signature) that Marshall's idea of a high-level group to discuss a political solution was "thoroughly sound." He believed that Chiang Kai-shek did not want war but feared the consequences of a peaceful settlement, and "under pressure of expediency" he might choose war, as some of his "fire-eating political and military advisors" desired. Since the Communists were militarily over-extended, the government might be successful in conquering territory in the opening phase of an all-out war, but this would not eliminate the Communists as a social and political force, or even as a military force, and maintenance of its new conquests would be "ruinously expensive." Vincent thought that if the current military situation resulted in a stalemate without civil war, the U.S. could maintain contact with both groups but reduce its mediation attempts. On the other hand, if all-out civil war erupted, the U.S. might continue to maintain relations with Chiang Kai-shek's government but end material support and withdraw most of its remaining military forces from China. In either eventuality, it

would be important for the U.S. to obtain an agreement to a "hands off policy" from the Soviet Union. "If an agreement cannot be reached and Soviet support of the Communists becomes a factor, we should make a complete assessment of all phases of the situation to determine whether there is a real threat to our national security and vital interests." (Ibid., pp. 1295-97.)

TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Radio No. GOLD 1040. *Top Secret*

July 2, 1946
[Nanking, China]

SWNCC 291/1 reached me at most critical time of my current tour in China, right at the eleventh hour of my negotiations when I and my small staff were in the fourth week of continuous pressure without respite. I have not the time now to give this paper on "Security Implications in Manchurian Situation" the consideration it merits.¹

At first glance, conclusions appear basically sound. There is considerable attention devoted to Manchuria. We should probably encourage China in an effort to locate the center of gravity of its industry further south. Manchurian resources should be tapped to a maximum but the area is very vulnerable strategically. It would be better if possible to avoid a heavy concentration of industrial strength there.

Page 13, paragraph 4 (d), in the middle sentence regarding the Soviet trained leaders it might be added "and to improve the harsh conditions under which the peasantry lives".² However, from past experience it would seem that the most drastic measures would be necessary to influence the controlling clique of Kuomintang leaders sufficiently to effect the large scale reforms which are necessary.

On page 15, paragraph 4, (g) apparently overlooks the opportunity to make use of facilities and technical ability provided by the United Nations Economic and Social Council in addition to Japanese technicians.³ Also it appears that the power of the loan to China has already been overplayed. While the Chinese want it for the long term pull, a popular view of some National Government officials is to plan on going ahead without it.

On page 16, paragraph 4, (k) makes the statement that the position of the United States vis-a-vis China and Manchuria is exceptionally strong, etc.⁴ This is not as valid today as it was prior to Yalta agreement. This agreement legalized Soviet position in Manchuria and thus weakened ours.⁵ It made it difficult for United States to continue its historic policy of insisting upon territorial and administrative integrity of China.

Last but not least, the outbreak of a general civil war in China might well require a reorientation of our policy toward China. Since what this paper states is repetition of what is already well established fact, I sug-

gest the paper be submitted to the President “to note” instead of “to approve”.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. This report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee’s Subcommittee on the Far East recommended that “this paper be transmitted urgently by the State Department to General Marshall for comment, including his opinion on the advisability of requesting Presidential approval of the paper, prior to final consideration by SWNCC.” (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 933–45; quote on p. 937.)

2. Section 4 (“Conclusions”) included eleven lettered paragraphs (*a* through *k*) which were primarily concerned with: (1) perceived Soviet efforts to create a puppet state in Manchuria “integrated into the Russian economy,” which “would prove a grave threat to the United States as well as to China”; (2) ways of helping China to preclude this eventuality. Paragraph *d* discussed how the Chinese government could “win the allegiance and support of all Chinese groups”: encourage middle-of-the-road groups to convince the government to create a multiparty representative government. The sentence at whose end Marshall would append his comment reads: “It is felt that communism is in opposition to the basic Chinese way of life and that the present Communist party in China has won a following, not because of real devotion of the people to Communist doctrines emanating from Moscow, but rather because of the ability of Soviet-trained leaders to exploit popular opposition to the reactionary and oppressive one-party rule of the Kuomintang.” (*Ibid.*, p. 935.)

3. Paragraph 4*f* enumerated ten reforms China’s government needed to implement. Paragraph 4*g* listed six ways the United States could assist China financially, provided a reform program was adopted. (*Ibid.*, p. 936.)

4. The sentence Marshall cites concluded: “for the United States will be continuing its historic policy of insisting upon the territorial and administrative integrity of China, upon non-interference in China’s internal affairs, and upon the equal opportunity of all nations in China’s commerce and economic development.” (*Ibid.*, p. 937.)

5. The trilateral “Agreement Regarding Entry of the Soviet Union into the War Against Japan,” signed on February 11, 1945, at Yalta gave the U.S.S.R. “preeminent interest” in the port of Dairen, the lease of Port Arthur as a Soviet naval base, and joint Sino-Soviet operation of two key Manchurian railroads serving those ports. These agreements were made without Chiang Kai-shek’s knowledge, but his government was obligated to legitimize them in a Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship signed August 14, 1945. (Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta 1945* (Washington: GPO, 1955), p. 984; *China White Paper*, pp. 585–96.)

TO J. KING HOYT, JR.¹

July 2, 1946
Nanking, China

My dear Hoyt: Thank you for your gracious letter of June 10th, which has just reached me here in Nanking, and for the kind thought of me which prompted its writing.

I am duly impressed by the honor I share with General MacArthur in having Harvard University break its 300-year tradition of not conferring honorary degrees in absentia and am deeply appreciative. I also appreciate your intention to attend the actual presentation of the degree and certainly hope you will be able to do so.²

My days here are overcrowded and the ultimate success of my mission still rests in the lap of the Gods.

With kind regards and best wishes, Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. A graduate of Harvard University who had attended the school's June 6 commencement, Hoyt had served as an assistant chief of plans (G-3) with the First Division during World War I.

2. Harvard President James Bryant Conant had notified Marshall in April that he had been selected (along with Henry H. Arnold, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur, Chester W. Nimitz, and Alexander A. Vandegrift) to receive the honorary Doctor of Laws degree at the June commencement. Marshall replied: "I regret my inability to be present. . . . There is no objection on my part to your announcing that the degree had been voted me. I shall be honored to receive the degree at Cambridge in the not too distant future I hope, in a special ceremony as you suggest." (Marshall to Conant, Radio No. GOLD 532, April 20, 1946, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [China Mission, General].) On the June 6 ceremonies, see *New York Times*, June 7, 1946, p. 40.

MEETING WITH CHOU EN-LAI
July 3, 1946, 10:30 A.M. Nanking, China

GENERAL Chou described his meeting with Chiang Kai-shek on the morning of July 2. Chiang assigned Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh and two others the job of negotiating with Chou a settlement of the problem of four key areas occupied by Communist troops that were of paramount importance to the government (e.g., north Kiangsu province, the city of Chengteh, the Tsingtao-Tsinan railroad, and Antung province). After the north Kiangsu problem was settled, the Generalissimo thought, the two sides might continue discussions on civil administration issues.

Chou En-lai then described the subsequent meeting with Wang Shih-chieh and his associates, indicating that little new was accomplished and reiterating his conviction that the government was preparing for a massive assault on the Communists. Marshall said that he thought Chou's assessment of the government's attitude was wrong and that many things that were happening were merely retaliation by the government against Communist provocations occurring between June 9 and 14. Indeed, Marshall said that he was encouraged by what Chou had described as the government's positions and attitudes, because these appeared to be less rigid than had been indicated to Marshall and than those favored by some government officials. Marshall said that it was "urgently important" for Chou to reach a settlement with the government on civil administration and the refugee problems; then the key military problems could be settled and a cease-fire implemented. Chou was not as sanguine as Marshall regarding a settlement of the troop distribution and occupation areas issue, but he would continue his discussions with the government representatives on July 4. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 1283-93.) ★

TO PAUL V. McNUTT¹

July 5, 1946

Radio No. GOLD 1052. *Confidential, Eyes Only*

[Nanking, China]

Dear McNutt: FLC is about to consummate a contract for the transfer of surplus property in the Pacific area to China.² I understand you have some objection against selling surpluses in the Philippines to China and against Chinese labor coming into the Philippines to pack and prepare surpluses for outloading because of the local unemployment problem.

There could be no question in my mind but that the interests of the Philippine people must come first, but it would appear that under the proposed contract the interests of the Philippine Government under the Tidings Act will be fully protected. The contract, as I understand it, will not adversely affect Philippine purchases of surplus property up to the \$100,000,000 limit allocated by the Tidings Act.³

China is desperately in need of every kind of rehabilitation and reconstruction equipment. The transportation situation is tragic. It is seriously impeding, almost completely preventing, her post war recovery and has constituted a major contributing factor to the current difficulties and confusion preventing progress in securing a political settlement in China.

Various moves taken by our government have been steps in the complete implementation of a long agreed program for helping the Chinese nation. The proposed surplus property contract is an essential part of this program.

I fully realize that the question of using Chinese labor presents a number of complex angles. The problem from the Chinese point of view is the conservation of their limited foreign exchange assets which they need for purchases of urgently required materiel and for the rehabilitation of their currency. They can pay Chinese laborers in their own currency after they return home and they can also arrange to support them for the duration of their stay in the Philippine Islands. Further I believe they count on using demobilized or demilitarized Army units who would be remaining on the Government payroll in any event until arrangements could be made or the economic life is resuscitated to find them employment.

Should the Chinese not be permitted to use their own laborers, we will certainly be pressed to loan them additional funds to cover the additional US dollar costs of employing non Chinese labor. While such a request would be justified in view of the Chinese foreign exchange position, you can appreciate it would be difficult for us to justify it to Congress.

I would appreciate your good offices in this matter.⁴ Faithfully yours,

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Formerly U.S. high commissioner for the Commonwealth of the Philippines (1937–39, 1945–46), McNutt had become the first U.S. ambassador to the newly independent Republic of the Philippines on July 4.

2. On the Foreign Liquidation Commission's agreements for the sale of U.S. surplus in the Pacific region to China, see *Foreign Relations, 1946*, 10: 1041-42.

3. On November 19, 1945, Senator Millard E. Tydings had introduced the Philippine rehabilitation act into Congress (S. 1610). It passed and was signed by the president on April 30, 1946.

4. By the end of August, the United States had decided that the Philippines should negotiate the purchase of the surplus there and none was to go to China. However, the U.S. began negotiations with China that would allow that government to purchase some \$500,000,000 (original cost) in U.S. property located at other Pacific sites at 22 percent of cost. (Ibid., pp. 1055-56.)

TO DEAN G. ACHESON
Radio No. GOLD 1053. *Top Secret*

July 5, 1946
[Nanking, China]

I am requesting War Department to delay Wedemeyer's departure for China.¹

The following situation exists. The Generalissimo had long talk on 2 July with Chou En-lai and arranged for meetings between Chou and two Communist associates and the Minister of Foreign Affairs with two Nationalist associates who were the Chief of Staff and Shao Li-tze.² This meeting was designed to find a solution for problem of local governments in regions to be evacuated by Communists and regarding the degree of their evacuation from Kiangsu. Two meetings have taken place but I have not yet received a report on yesterday's, Thursday's, meeting. The first meeting was largely a statement of views and exploratory as to extent of differences and reasons therefore. Meanwhile some dangerous fighting has been going on in Shantung Province involving expulsion of Communists from places forceably occupied by them since June 7th and involving action to free completely the Tsingtao-Tsinan-fu railroad.

I find that the recent publicity regarding Wedemeyer's return, accentuated by a casual remark by the Chinese Minister of Information that I could not remain here indefinitely, made I am sure without any intention of implying my early departure, has created a situation inimical to my negotiation. The Communists are greatly disturbed and aroused. Therefore I feel that Wedemeyer's nomination as ambassador should be indefinitely postponed.

Further, I feel that in the present circumstances I need assistance in the person of an ambassador who would immediately create on both sides a feeling of greater confidence in the negotiations. But one name occurs to me that would in any way serve my purpose at this time. I propose that Doctor Leighton Stuart, the President of Yenching University in Peiping, be nominated, assuming that the Generalissimo would find him acceptable.

I have brought Doctor Stuart twice to Nanking to advise with me, and to influence, the Generalissimo and other leaders of the Kuomintang, also to sound out the views of Government and Communists alike. I called on him because by common report of all informed people in China, American as well as Chinese, he occupies a unique position as the most highly respected foreigner, one whose standards of integrity and actions through the 50 years of his life out here have been a model of the best of the western world. Communists and Nationalists alike trust and admire him. The recent celebration of his 70th birthday in Peiping was made a great occasion. He is selfless and has only the interests of China and America at heart. I would not expect him to participate formally in my negotiations or to carry the responsibility for the major portion of the routine business of the embassy. Butterworth is exceptionally qualified to do this.³ But I would want Doctor Stuart in a high position so that I could capitalize on his influence with the various political leaders, almost all of whom he knows intimately. During the political negotiations he would be particularly helpful and it is his present urgent recommendations to the Generalissimo and Government officials to raise the present negotiations from the level of military disputes to the higher political level for securing a genuine start towards a democratic government.⁴

I would not have in mind his serving longer than nine months. In the tragic event of open civil war, I would assume that for the time being at any rate, you would prefer to leave matters in the hands of a chargé Butterworth, recalling him, the ambassador, presumably for consultation.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. On July 2, Eisenhower had radioed Marshall: "Recent press reports from Shanghai, repeated here, relative to General Wedemeyer's impending return to China imply your early return to the United States. In the belief that this may be embarrassing to you in your present negotiations I am prepared to relieve Wedemeyer of assignment to China and re-assign him to the Continental US, without in any way prejudicing future plans. Wedemeyer concurs. Please advise." (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 1277.) Marshall replied on July 5 with an "Eyes Only" message to Eisenhower: "Please delay Wedemeyer's departure from U.S. until I advise later. I am considering a drastic alteration of previous plans." (Radio No. GOLD 1051, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages].) Eisenhower replied that "Wedemeyer will not go to China in any capacity until so directed by you." (Eisenhower to Marshall, Radio No. WAR-93581, July 6, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Wedemeyer File].)

Wedemeyer's subsequent attitude toward this affair ("the outrageous appeasement of the Chinese Communists") and toward Marshall, who "was primarily a military man who had little knowledge of the complexities of the world conflict [with communism] and no conception of the skill with which the Communists pervert great and noble aspirations for social justice into support of their own diabolic purposes," and who "was physically and mentally too worn out to appraise the situation correctly," is in *Wedemeyer Reports!* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958), pp. 366–70.

2. See Chou En-lai's remarks in *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 1286. Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh's associates were Minister of War Chen Cheng and Shao Li-tze, a member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee since 1926 and for the past three

years the secretary-general of both the People's Political Council and the Commission for the Inauguration of Constitutional Government.

3. W. Walton Butterworth, Jr., a Rhodes Scholar and specialist in economic and financial affairs, had arrived in Nanking on May 19 from his previous posting in Spain, where he had been since 1942. As counselor, he was in charge of the Embassy's daily operations. John F. Melby commented after meeting him: "I am rather impressed with him so far; he is hard-headed, intelligent, a good listener, and I think will be a good influence around here." (Melby to Lillian Hellman, May 23, 1946, HSTL/J. F. Melby Papers.)

Butterworth had been sent to China with the personal rank of minister, but Marshall did not want this announced as it might undermine Walter Robertson's prestige as minister and head of Executive Headquarters. (See Marshall to Acheson, January 8, 1946, p. 414.) Once it had been announced that John Leighton Stuart would be ambassador, Marshall no longer had objections to the announcement of Butterworth's ministerial status, and this was made on July 18.

4. Marshall's interest in Stuart, widely acknowledged by Chinese leaders to be well informed about and to have a sophisticated understanding of China, resulted from criticisms from a number of Nationalist party members that Marshall had neither. See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 564.

Acheson replied on July 6 that Marshall's idea "has my complete support." On the eighth, Marshall notified Acheson that the Chinese government had approved of Stuart as ambassador and the nomination should "proceed without delay." (Ibid., pp. 1307, 1316-17.) The Senate confirmed Stuart's appointment effective July 11.

Melby asserted that Stuart's appointment had "produced an atmosphere of unmitigated gloom around the Embassy. The gent is seventy, a professional missionary, has been in China forty years, is a close friend of the Gimo, very pro-KMT, and will probably run his own show his own way. I assume it means Marshall will soon give up and go home and we will continue to dilly-dally along, without taking any very definite line of policy on anything. Most disturbing is that he [Stuart] apparently is sold on the line that the KMT lip-service to democracy means something. Anyway, he speaks Chinese and knows a great deal about the country. That is something." (Melby to Lillian Hellman, July 10, 1946, HSTL/J. F. Melby Papers.)

MEETINGS WITH CHOU EN-LAI AND YU TA-WEI July 5, 1946 Nanking, China

CHOU En-lai, 5:45 P.M.

Chou complained that the government's recent public announcement that the National Assembly would be convened on November 12 (Sun Yat-sen's birthday) constituted "a bomb shell to the Communist Party," because both sides had previously agreed that the assembly would not meet until all outstanding political and military issues had been settled. The Communist party had refrained from calling an assembly of people's delegates from the Communist liberated areas, Chou noted, because they desired unity and cooperation for the whole country. Now the government was "threatening the Communists to come to terms before a certain date or the Government would go ahead unilaterally." Chou then explained the results of his meeting with government representatives led by Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh.

He was "a little afraid," Marshall responded, that the Communists' insistence that local governments not be changed in those areas that the party's troops vacated would

make a general agreement on troop dispositions “rather impossible,” as Chiang Kai-shek had insisted that the government would “not accept that procedure.” He hoped that some temporary measure on reorganizing the government—precisely what he did not know—would pave the way for a formal settlement of outstanding issues. He emphasized the need “to clear the air of conflict and permit political discussions with a reasonable chance of success.” It was extremely important, Marshall asserted, that the fighting stop and agreement reached on his “Preliminary Agreement to Govern the Amendment and Execution of the Army Reorganization Plan of February 25, 1946.” (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 1299–1305.)

Yu Ta-wei, 6:30 P.M.

The Generalissimo had sent him, Yu said, to tell Marshall that the Communists had taken, by force and without justification, cities in both Shantung and Shansi provinces, and that if they did not stop such actions he would break off negotiations with them. The Communists had reported to him similar instances where the government had attacked, Marshall replied; both sides conducted “outrageous and stupid” retaliatory military actions. Each sides’ military commanders were anxious to demonstrate military power in order to force political concessions by the other. It was crucial that the conference he had arranged between the two sides (aimed at resolving civil administration matters with respect to areas vacated by the Communists) solve that problem, because it was blocking Committee of Three action on other issues. Marshall promised to “take up the grievances of each side with the other side.” (*Ibid.*, pp. 1305–7.) ★

TO SALLY G. CHAMBERLIN

July 6, 1946
Nanking, China

Dear Sally: . . .¹ These are busy days—critical negotiations all day every day, four senators and five Congressmen for lunch tomorrow, within an hour of them the Secretary [of the Navy] and six others, next day the Postmaster General and Asst. Sec. Air, the following day a deputation from the Agricultural Department—and negotiations just the same, delimited by luncheon and dinner parties by me. Some day I will really retire!

Thanks for all you are doing for me and Katherine. Faithfully yours—
G. C. Marshall

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General); H

1. The omitted half of the letter concerned various banking transactions that Chamberlin was handling for the Marshalls.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER
Radio No. GOLD 1065. *Top Secret*

July 7, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Some form of China SSU organization after 30 September is desirable for essential intelligence coverage,¹ and its continuation under limited control and full logistic support of Seventh Fleet may be necessary. However realistic steps should be taken to reconstitute it as an undercover agency if possible, particularly if we are to avoid Chinese Government's right to press for a similar unit in United States or avoid Soviet right to establish similar unit in China. At present, SSU in China lacks cover as counter espionage agency and is of definite value only as an intelligence unit.²

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. The postwar successor to the O.S.S. (Office of Strategic Services) was the S.S.U. (Strategic Services Unit). In November 1945, the China branch established itself at General Wedemeyer's China Theater headquarters in Shanghai. Soon after Marshall arrived in China, Chou En-lai protested against S.S.U. intelligence gathering in North China and Manchuria. Marshall received conflicting advice from Americans in China as to whether the S.S.U. should withdraw. Marshall finally encouraged Wedemeyer to end S.S.U. operations in North China, but Wedemeyer took no immediate action. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War Department did not want S.S.U. out of China, and the Operations Division appealed directly to Marshall during his March-April visit to Washington. Marshall finally agreed to leave the decision to Wedemeyer, who desired that the unit should remain in action. Nevertheless, Marshall did not wish to have an open association with S.S.U. lest all sides in China be displeased. (Yu, *OSS in China*, pp. 252-54.)

While the China Theater was officially inactive as of May 1, 1946, the headquarters continued in operation until July 1. After that date, the S.S.U. reported directly to its Washington, D.C., headquarters but received logistical and liaison support from two different U.S. Army residual commands in China (the Peiping Headquarters Group and the Army Advisory Group in Nanking). S.S.U. leaders in China desired that the Seventh Fleet assume command over their organization. Marshall finally agreed and sent the message printed here.

2. At the end of July, the S.S.U. office in Shanghai notified its Washington, D.C., headquarters that "General Marshall desires that Seventh Fleet assume control and support of S.S.U. China as soon as practicable in order to disassociate officers in the military advisory and executive groups from connection with an intelligence agency." (Ibid., p. 261.) Seventh Fleet control began on September 30, and SSU China became External Survey Group (later "Detachment") 44 and its Washington headquarters the Central Intelligence Group. (Seventh Fleet to War Department, September 29, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, ESD 44].)

MEETINGS WITH CHOU EN-LAI, YU TA-WEI, AND OTHERS
July 8, 9, and 11, 1946 Nanking, China

CHOU En-lai, July 8, 4:00 P.M.

Little had been accomplished in the past week by his meetings on the local civil government question, Chou said, but perhaps the two sides had gained a better

understanding of the other's views. That was a hopeful development, Marshall thought, and perhaps in the long run that was the most important factor. Nevertheless, he was concerned with the increasingly serious situation north of Hankow and around Tatung, which might lead to a complete rupture in relations. Chou explained the Communists' views on those problems and the situation in Hopeh province. Marshall said he would send a U.S. aircraft to bring to Nanking the senior U.S. members of two truce teams and a government and Communist representative from the region north of Hankow.

Chou then discussed the government's attacks along the main railroad in Shantung province. Marshall reminded him that the Communists' "wholly inexcusable" attacks there in mid-June had forced him to use his influence with the government to the limit to try to halt the fighting, and there was little further he could do. Chou then described the deadlock and termination of negotiations regarding north Kiangsu province. "It would seem," Marshall responded, "the situation is back in my lap." Chou thought that the only hope for a quick solution was to refer the problem (i.e., local civil administration after the Communists departed an area) to the Committee of Three. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 1317–23.)

Yu Ta-wei, July 8, 6:00 P.M.

Marshall and Yu discussed the status of the negotiations with Chou En-lai. The Nationalist-Communist conference discussed too many subjects, in Marshall's opinion; it should have concentrated on the key issue of civil administration in areas vacated by Communist forces. The Communists were obviously at fault, General Yu asserted; moreover, as Marshall was a friend of the Chinese people and government, he should not want the government "to end up in an unfavorable position," and "if the Communists continue, they must take the consequences." Marshall agreed that the Communists had provoked the fighting in Shantung province, but he also pointed out military problems where the Communists were not the instigators. A solution was still feasible, Marshall insisted, but it appeared that China was on the verge of a civil war. (*Ibid.*, pp. 1324–26.)

Tseng Chi, July 9, 10:00 A.M.

A representative of the Chinese Youth party, Tseng asserted that the Communists had to make more military concessions and the government more political concessions. The delays heretofore in implementing agreements had weakened the government and strengthened the Communists, whose claim to be supported by and to represent the people was "purely propaganda." The Nationalists represented the upper and the Communists the lower classes, Tseng said, while the Chinese Youth party represented the majority in the middle classes. Consequently, he thought that Marshall should pay more attention to his group. Marshall asked him to comment on "the commonly expressed belief that the Democratic League was a tool of the Communist Party and the Young China Party was a tool of Kuomintang." The former might be true, Tseng replied, but the latter were certainly not, citing instances where his party disagreed openly with Kuomintang proposals. (*Ibid.*, pp. 1329–31.)

Wang Shih-chieh, Shao Li-tze, and Chen Cheng, July 9, 3:00 P.M., Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The members of the government committee, who had met three times with Chou En-lai, explained to Marshall why the government's negotiating positions on Com-

munist troop evacuations and subsequent local administration were reasonable. The Generalissimo, they said, agreed that negotiations should continue.

A temporary arrangement that would settle the local administration issue was crucial, Marshall responded; given that, the fighting could be stopped with cease-fire orders. Contrary to the government's belief, he insisted, the Communists were "intensely anxious" to achieve these goals. However, the Communists suspected that the government intended to abandon the People's Consultative Conference, so Marshall suggested that the P.C.C. or its Steering Committee be scheduled to meet at some definite time soon to discuss the local government issue. Foreign Minister Wang explained why this was not a good idea. (Ibid., pp. 1331–35.)

Yu Ta-wei, July 11, 9:00 A.M.

The Communists were "attacking everywhere" in Honan, Kiangsu, and Shantung provinces, the vice minister of war said, showing Marshall a map. The "situation appeared critical," Marshall agreed, and the immediate solution lay in the government committee's meetings with Chou En-lai solving the local administration issue. Marshall suggested a sort of court of appeal made up of an American civilian, and a representative from the government and the Communists to rule on the equitable distribution of property and to prevent the violation of agreements reached for control of the civil administration. Yu was dubious, stating that the Communist party wanted power, and if it received such additional power it would tend to wage a greater civil war. If that were the case, Marshall replied, the government "might as well go to complete civil war today." Marshall said he suspected that the Generalissimo had only agreed to the government committee's meetings with Chou in order to please him (Marshall), but had simultaneously instructed the government conferees "to assume an unbending attitude." Marshall also believed that a way could be found to involve the P.C.C. in solving the civil administration issue. (Ibid., pp. 1338–40.)

Chou En-lai, July 11, 10:30 A.M.

Marshall began by discussing his efforts to get truce team leaders and Chinese representatives to Nanking from the fighting area north of Hankow. From the Americans he received the impression that both sides were at fault in the conflict there, and Marshall directed the two teams' redispositions to try to regain contact with Communist forces leaders. Chou said he "almost entirely" agreed with Marshall, and delivered a lengthy discourse on the Communist viewpoint. Chou described the failure of his meetings with Foreign Minister Wang's committee. Marshall commented on the fighting in various locations.

On July 7, the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist party had issued a manifesto that, while not attacking Marshall personally, vigorously denounced the "reactionary cliques" in the United States and their partners in China (i.e., the Nationalists) for seeking "to transform China into a colonial settlement for American imperialism" and endeavoring "to convert our country into a corpse-filled hell." The manifesto demanded an immediate cease-fire, reconvening of the P.C.C., weeding out of "fascists," an end to U.S. aid to the government, and the withdrawal of all U.S. forces. (See *ibid.*, pp. 1310–16.) "In my opinion this was pure propaganda," Marshall asserted, and it came "at the same time as propaganda releases from Moscow, along the same line." Moreover, since he had received no instructions from the U.S. government since coming to China in December 1945, "then I am the 'reac-

tionary party.' . . . Nobody else can be charged with this but me, personally." Furthermore, "this bitter, anti-American attack deliberately leads to violent reactions against my officers and Americans generally," and he gave Chou some examples. "It is useless to expect that I can serve any useful purpose towards terminating hostilities with this type of propaganda being carried on. In all probability it was the opinion of those who drafted this paper that it would produce a helpful result in the United States. If a 'helpful result' means a precipitation of a chaotic condition in China, then probably they are correct. But the responsibility for the chaotic condition will be very clearly placed by any more of that procedure." Marshall assured Chou En-lai, however, that he would continue seeking a solution and consider the episode "water over the dam." Chou agreed. (Ibid., pp. 1340–48.) ★

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 1100. *Top Secret*

July 11, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mr. President: Since my last message there have been a series of meetings between the Government group headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chou En-lai and associates. Meetings were unproductive and ceased last Saturday. I succeeded in having them renewed but the meetings still are unproductive. A final effort of this group to find a solution will be made tomorrow.

The issue to be decided before the Government is willing to issue the already agreed upon instructions for formal complete termination of hostilities is the question of local governments in regions from which the Communist have agreed to evacuate their military forces. The problem primarily involves (a) the handling of land taken from landlords, now refugees, some one to eight years ago and redistributed to peasants, (b) the immediate treatment to be accorded to returning refugees, and (c) the character of the local militia to be maintained. The military phases have been pretty well settled. It is the related civil problems that now has me blocked.

I conferred with Government member of Committee of Three this morning, also for two hours with Chou En-lai. This evening I spent an hour and a half with Generalissimo. Here is his present attitude: When efforts to reach agreements are completely blocked it is well to wait awhile and usually a solution will be found. He assured me that his leaders in Manchuria would not resume aggressive fighting, that "he had them well in hand". He felt that fighting in China would be isolated and sporadic and would not lead to general civil war. I had stated that a continuation of the present situation appeared impossible, that general fighting would surely develop and that I would soon have to call in American officers from the field. If such a procedure as he outlined is workable it is

purely Chinese. But I suppose I will have to accept the possibilities and do my best to keep things in balance. Incidentally, in this precarious situation Doctor Leighton Stuart's services would be of great assistance to me here in Nanking but I hesitate to bring him here from Peiping until his status is assured. Therefore I would be exceedingly thankful for early Senate action to confirm him. Every hour counts.¹ I do appreciate your acceptance of my proposal for his appointment.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. By the time Marshall's message was sent, the Senate had confirmed Stuart's appointment. See note 4, Marshall to Acheson, July 5, 1946, p. 622.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER July 14, 1946
Radio No. GOLD 1116. *Secret* [Nanking, China]

At the present time I cannot say when my negotiations might be completed in China or when I might return to the United States. My tenure of office in China is not indefinite and I wish to return to the States before the middle of September.

Whether or not it would be desirable politically for General Wedemeyer to replace me at that time cannot now be predicted. Another question is the desire of the Generalissimo with regard to Wedemeyer's services as his Chief of Staff. I have not discussed Wedemeyer at all with the Generalissimo. I doubt the advisability of having a United States Chief of Staff in view of Communists' present anti-American campaign. Please discuss situation with Wedemeyer and get his views for me. Incidentally, I do not need his assurances that he will willingly and cheerfully do anything I think might be helpful. I know that to be a fact.

I suggest that you give him such choice as possible for a home assignment but I would prefer that no announcement be made for several weeks so as to avoid if possible insinuations that he has been sacrificed to Communist pressure. I anticipate that he need not return here, but cannot state this conclusively at this time.¹

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. After reading Marshall's message, Wedemeyer told Deputy Chief of Staff Thomas Handy: "I do not think that I should be returned to China in any capacity in the immediate or distant future unless U.S. policy is modified radically. In other words, if the United States elected to support the Central Government unqualifiedly and refused to recognize the Communists or any other political group within China and announced that the settlement of internal affairs in China were the sovereign rights and complete responsibility of the recognized government of China and that the United States would not interfere or brook interference on the part of any other Nation." (Wedemeyer to Handy, July 15, 1946, NA/RG 165 [OCS, 091 China (July 15, 1946)].) Handy, replying for Eisenhower, said that

Wedemeyer “feels that he should not be employed in any capacity in China under existing conditions,” that there should no longer be an American chief of staff to the Generalissimo, and that as Generalissimo and Madame Chiang had written to Wedemeyer asking when he would return to China, Wedemeyer would tell them that he would not be returning. (Handy to Marshall, Radio No. WARX-94527, July 15, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Wedemeyer File].)

TO COLONEL MARSHALL S. CARTER
Radio No. GOLD 1121. *Confidential*

July 16, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Please advise State Department to proceed with appointment of Butterworth to ministerial rank.¹ Another subject: Please transmit following to Sulzberger New York Times: “Tilman Durdin’s time expires today and he returns to his regular duties.² He has been of invaluable assistance to me during a most difficult period as an advisor and in many other ways. I am deeply grateful to you for your understanding and generosity in placing his knowledge of China and Chinese at my disposal. He is a fine character and a level-headed fellow and made a definite and important contribution to our efforts to bring peace to China.” Another subject: You might suggest a note from Acheson to Sulzberger expressing appreciation, but not stating at my request.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. On July 18, the Department of State announced that W. Walton Butterworth, Jr., had been given the personal rank of minister.

2. Regarding his request for correspondent Durdin’s services, see Marshall to Sulzberger, May 13, 1946, pp. 555–56.

MEETINGS WITH YU TA-WEI AND CHOU EN-LAI
July 16–18, 1946 Nanking, China

Y*U Ta-wei, July 16, 10:30 A.M.*

Communist troops were attacking in force some seventy-five miles east of Nanking in Kiangsu province, Yu reported; he thought they might be attempting to wipe out crack government troops north of the Yangtze River. Marshall thought that Yu’s fears flew in the face of the seeming belief by a majority of government officials that the government could liquidate Communist forces in China in three to six months; moreover, there were other possible explanations for the Communists’ actions, such as strikes in retaliation or to preempt government attacks.

Yu began an analysis of the government’s position, but Marshall stopped him. What General Yu was discussing was a justification for the government’s military procedure; what he, Marshall, had in mind was an estimate of Communist intentions. When he talked with T. V. Soong the previous day, Marshall said, Soong indicated that

his previous estimate that China had the economic strength to stand six months of war was erroneous. Indeed, Marshall asserted, "as early as December 1945, China was faced with an economic situation the like of which no other nation ever survived." The Generalissimo seemed to think that delaying negotiations would help the government, but Marshall suspected that this would most likely result in civil war. Chiang's military commanders were "leading him into a situation that will develop beyond control"; when that happened, "these same military commanders will be calling for assistance [from the U.S.] which will be unobtainable." (*Foreign Relations, 1946*, 9: 1360-62.)

Chou En-lai, July 16, 6:00 P.M.

Chou described his trip to Shanghai—in Marshall's plane—to discuss U.N.R.R.A. aid and reconstruction matters. Meanwhile, he asserted, government attacks had intensified in nearby Kiangsu province. Marshall read from two notes he had received that day from the government concerning Communist attacks. Chou disputed the government's assertions. The present situation "cannot continue without developing into general fighting," Marshall said; "we should make an extraordinary effort to find some solution to the civil government dilemma," so that a cease-fire order could be issued.

As a step toward clearing away the local administration roadblock, Marshall asked Chou to consider the possibility that the Communists agree that in Kiangsu any *hsien* (county) they controlled prior to Japan's surrender would continue under their administration, but in those areas they occupied after Japan's surrender they would not resist government control of local administration. Moreover, perhaps some temporary agreement could be reached regarding the Communists' "land adjustments" in the latter counties. "If we don't find some solution in the next four or five days it will be too late." (*Ibid.*, pp. 1363-69.)

Yu Ta-wei, July 17, 9:30 A.M.

General Yu reported on the Communist attack in Kiangsu province, which had produced heavy casualties. The government had no assurance that the Communists would not attack in other places, he said, and "it would appear that the Communists must accept all consequences." Marshall asserted that "a continuance of that attitude would inevitably lead to civil war." He repeated his proposal made the previous day to Chou En-lai (which originally had been made to Marshall by Foreign Minister Wang Shieh-chieh), that the civil administration of *hsiens* should reflect the status quo as of V-J Day.

Besides a lull in negotiations, Marshall stated, "Executive Headquarters appeared to be out of business." Nevertheless, he was "willing to make a last desperate effort" to reach an agreement. Marshall then read extracts from a letter (a copy of which had come from a confidential, non-Chinese source) that purported to be a report from a high government official to army chief of staff General Chen Cheng recommending that the government prepare plans to exterminate the Communists while continuing the peace negotiations.

General Yu stated that he wished to withdraw from participation in the Committee of Three, as he could no longer influence the Generalissimo or other government military authorities. A week previously, Yu said, he had assured Chiang that the Communists would not attack in Kiangsu province, and shortly thereafter they launched a major offensive. (*Ibid.*, pp. 1369-71.)

Chou En-lai, July 17, 10:45 A.M.

They began with a discussion of the problems of diverting the Yellow River into its prewar bed. Chou noted that two important leaders of the Democratic League had been assassinated in Kunming (see note 2, Marshall to Truman, July 22, 1946, p. 634), and the Communists believed that the government's secret police were about to launch similar attacks elsewhere. Marshall said he shared Chou's shock and horror at the deeds and the U.S. Embassy was vigorously protesting to the government and endeavoring to prevent future episodes.

Regarding Marshall's proposed solution to the local administration issue, Chou En-lai said that he did "not find it wise to bring up this subject" to Communist leaders, given their bitter experience with the government since V-J Day. Moreover, since the Communist evacuation of Changchun, the military formula Marshall advocated had been "almost completely acceptable" to the Communists but not to the Generalissimo, who sought to use force and intimidation to force further concessions from the Communists, who preferred to resist attack rather than capitulate. Marshall noted that each side had asserted that they attacked in order to forestall the other side's planned assault—"each side accuses the other of exactly the same thing." (Ibid., pp. 1371–78.)

Yu Ta-wei, July 18, 11:30 A.M.

The main reason for the meeting, Marshall said, was to show General Yu an alleged government order (sent to him by Chou En-lai) for a general attack in Kiangsu beginning July 15. If true, this was another embarrassment to the government, which had heretofore insisted that the Communists had attacked first. Marshall also brought up the assassinations in Kunming and indicated that he had received a list of people to be murdered and the name of their assassin. "Negotiations could not be conducted in an atmosphere of this nature," he said. (Ibid., pp. 1283–84. ★

TO SALLY G. CHAMBERLIN
FROM KATHERINE TUPPER MARSHALL

July 21, 1946
Kuling, China¹

Dear Sally Gen M. came up from Nanking on Thursday [July 18] and leaves tomorrow Monday. He brought a pouch full of papers magazines & letters. I hate to see him go back into that inferno— but he hopes to get up again this week— He has conferences here with the Generalissimo & Nanking with the Communist— He never says die and maby he will wear the Chinese down instead of their doing him in— Cooling is beautiful beyond description. Cool mountain air & water— No smells dust or filth— A lovely house to our selves. All the Staff in one next door— Mme [Madame Chiang Kai-shek] & the Generalissimo across a quaint bridge over a mountain stream 100 yards away— She has luncheon with me or I with her each day. Fine swimming pool and such magnificent scenery that makes Switzerland look mild. The stone steps coming up are six miles

long. One range after another towering to the sky— & mountain chairs with 12 coolies wait on the lawn all day to take us where ever we wish. Each evening at six— Mme & Generallissimo G & I have gone for picnic suppers to one of the peaks— when we got there a hot supper served— wicker chairs & table set— All sent up ahead— We look like the crusaders winding up the mountains with 6 chair bearers dressed in royal blue carrying each chair— The chairs have white fringed tops & cushions & running ahead and in rear are 25 guards in the Generallissimos house uniform. Its a great sight & looks like a scene out of Arabian Knights. I am running out of Calox tooth powder and invisable hair pins. If possible please get me a dark blue slack suit size 16— It should have a jacket & I want a good one— Never mind the price— Wool or rayon. I need it badly here. I am beginning to feel like a different person— Affectionately

K. T. M.

GCMRL/K. T. Marshall Papers (Correspondence, 1941–49); H

1. Mrs. Marshall had moved to the Chiangs' summer retreat on July 14.

TO COLONEL MARSHALL S. CARTER
Radio No. GOLD 1164. *Secret*

July 22, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Reference your WAR-94906 July 19 and GOLD 1139 regarding Chinese legislation.¹ My present view follows: In the present state of my efforts to influence China governmental course of action and the determined stand and plans of political reactionaries, civil and military, I do not wish to urge the passage of the legislation. Yet I do not want it withdrawn. I think it might help me if State Department put it forward and Congress declined or failed to act on it. The consequences out here of delays in receiving equipment, etc. would be negligible compared to the importance of possible favorable influence on these people of the refusal of Congress to act at this time.

Please quickly check my proposition with Acheson or Mr. Byrnes and inform me accordingly.²

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Carter told Marshall that the China aid bill had been reported out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was likely to follow suit. Carter noted, however, that opposition to the bill in Congress would doubtless "cause a resurgence of press comment," which Marshall had previously told President Truman caused "difficulty and embarrassment" in his negotiations. (Carter to Marshall, Radio No. WAR-94626, July 16, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, Carter Correspondence]. Regarding the publicity problem, see Marshall to Truman, June 26, 1946, pp. 606–7.) Marshall replied: "Bill should not be delayed due to publicity. We will ride that one out." (Marshall to Carter, Radio No. GOLD 1139, July 18, 1946, NA/RG

59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages].)

Carter notified Marshall on July 18 that the State Department had put China aid on a list of six high-priority bills that it desired that Congress pass before its proposed July 27 adjournment. Opposition was growing in Congress to military cooperation bills in general, Carter noted, and no U.S. supplies or equipment could be transferred to the Chinese government except under authority of the aid bill, which would probably not pass without “a strong personal appeal” by Marshall to congressional leaders. Carter recommended that Marshall send such an appeal to the president, secretary of state, and six key members of Congress. (Carter to Marshall, Radio No. WAR-94906, July 18, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, Carter Correspondence].)

2. Carter replied on July 23 that Secretary of State Byrnes had expressed “his complete concurrence” with Marshall’s ideas. If the bill did come up for consideration, it would probably be defeated, Carter wrote; thus it should be allowed “to die quietly.” Marshall concurred. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 754–55.) Regarding Chinese purchases of materiel, see Marshall to Carter, July 26, 1946, pp. 636–37.

MEETING WITH JOHN LEIGHTON STUART
July 22, 1946, 4:00 P.M. Nanking, China

STUART wanted to tell Marshall about the contents of a government announcement that probably would soon appear in the newspapers and that the press would probably conclude was the result of Marshall’s recent visit with the Generalissimo at Kuling: (1) all agreements made prior to June 30 were to be carried out (e.g., cease-fire, military reorganization); (2) the government would make greater efforts to settle differences (particularly with the Communists) by political rather than military means; (3) the settlement of scattered conflicts would receive detailed consideration; (4) the government would explain fully what the convening of the National Assembly on November 12 is intended to accomplish; (5) other parties besides the Nationalists were to be included in the government.

Marshall said that he was glad to hear the news and that probably his meetings with Chiang Kai-shek had had some effect. He outlined for the ambassador his actions on the China aid bill, and he expressed the hope that Congress’s defeat or refusal to act on the bill “might have a sobering effect upon some aggressive leaders in China.” Stuart agreed and stated that he was “quite optimistic about the most recent trend of events.” (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 1393–94.) ★

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 1165. *Top Secret*

July 22, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mr. President: I took Doctor Stuart to the mountain so-called capitol Kuling Thursday afternoon to present his credentials and to talk to Generalissimo.¹ After dinner that night the Generalissimo precipitated a discussion of situation, to which I felt forced to reply with considerable frankness considering the fact that the [Chinese] Chief of Protocol and

two Embassy secretaries, [W. Walton] Butterworth and [Robert L.] Smyth, were present. I differed with him as to dangers of present fighting, I feeling that it was heading directly into uncontrollable civil war. I also differed as to his feeling that entire responsibility rested with the Communist, and I was emphatic regarding the effect on world opinion of the assassinations of peaceful Democratic League professors at Kunming, particularly as rumor regarding an organization of a terroristic intimidation of liberals pointed directly at one of the most conspicuous Kuomintang leaders.²

Doctor Stuart had a long talk with Generalissimo the following day and another talk the next morning before his return to Nanking.³ He was also able to exert some additional influence through the fact that the Generalissimo's secretary was a former student of his, Stuart's.

Since his return to Nanking Saturday he has seen a number of influential people, notably Chen Li-fu, the political leader of the Government party, and the man most opposed to my efforts: He sees T. V. Soong tonight and also Chou En-lai, who returned this evening from the UNRRA Yellow River project where I sent him in an American plane.

Heavy fighting has been going on not a great distance from Nanking, to north of Yangtze River.⁴ Communist report successes. I will get Government reports tonight. Will see Chou En-lai tomorrow. The situation is critical but through Doctor Stuart's great help we may be able to bring about an end to this confused and tragic mess and pass into the acknowledged great difficulties of political negotiations but without violence and the danger of complete chaos.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. John R. Beal commented in his diary about a meeting he had had with Marshall on July 18: "Marshall was plainly annoyed with the Gimo for leaving for Kuling. His departure stopped the negotiations cold, and Marshall interpreted it as an attempt to do just that and to force the Communists into coming to terms." Marshall thought that the key remaining problem, the military settlement, was 80 or 90 percent solved, but the opposing armies were "straining to get at each other." With negotiations suspended, the straining was "very strong and threatens to become really widespread civil war." (Beal, *Marshall in China*, pp. 122-23.)

2. On July 11 Li Kung-pu was assassinated and on July 15 Wen I-to. (See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 1373-74, 1380-83.) The U.S. Military Attaché's Office weekly report observed: "Daylight shooting in Kunming of two liberal professors has aroused storm of protest even in Kuomintang press but latter denies KMT complicity in murders. . . . Reports from reliable sources indicate many liberals throughout country genuinely alarmed for their safety." (Military Attaché to War Department, Radio No. 24149, July 23, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Incoming Cables].)

Ambassador Stuart told the State Department on July 17 that the Chinese government insisted that the Communists had done the killings in order to embarrass it. Government Committee of Three member Hsu Yung-chang wrote to Marshall on July 19 that the attack order Chou had given Marshall was a typical Communist fake created to cover up their own offensive plans. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 1383, 1386.)

3. In reporting to the State Department on these meetings, Stuart observed: "It was

transparently clear in our conversation that he [Chiang Kai-shek] has the greatest admiration for General Marshall and even something in the nature of personal affection for him. Outspoken as General Marshall has been in his comments, often unfavorable, this has increased rather than weakened the respect of President Chiang and his desire for a continuation of the relationship.” (Ibid., pp. 1388–93; quote p. 1392.)

4. John F. Melby reported on July 23: “Apparently, the Communists have just finished administering a pasting to their opponents at Nantung across the Yangtze from Shanghai. That is getting close [to Nanking]. The other night I could hear the artillery fire across the river from the top of my hill. Ceasefire or no ceasefire, reports of sporadic fighting all over the country have become so persistent and numerous during the last three weeks that there must be a great deal to them, even if any one story bears little measurable relationship to the truth.” (Melby, *Mandate of Heaven*, p. 140.)

MEETING WITH YU TA-WEI
July 22, 1946 Nanking, China

MARSHALL summarized his July 20 meeting with the Generalissimo in Kuling. He then asked the vice minister of war to describe the present military situation. Events were unfolding as he had expected, Marshall said, but he was surprised that the Communists had not used their strength in Jehol province to attack the vital rail connections between North China and Manchuria. He was more depressed every day, General Yu stated; Communist local commanders appeared to be getting out of hand. He asked Marshall whether he thought the country would have a general civil war, “to which General Marshall replied that it already had.” Marshall also thought it probable that the Soviet Union would openly vie for control of Manchuria while operating “on a *sub rosa* basis” in the rest of China. Public opinion in the United States, he thought, “would probably be to pull out completely.” (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 1395–97.) ★

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER July 24, 1946
Nanking, China

Dear Wedemeyer: I have just read your letter of July 8th regarding your interview with Dean Acheson, etc.¹ I should have written a note to you ere this and submit my apologies. I requested Acheson specifically to read to you my radio recommending Stuart’s appointment which gave my reasons in sufficient detail for you to understand. I am sorry he did not do so and I inclose a copy for your eye only.² Stuart has been of immediate and I think great assistance to me in a most intricate, difficult and critical situation. He has already relieved me of a great burden of conferences regarding the political factors which are now blocking my efforts and about which I am least informed. Knowing intimately all of the leading figures, particularly the CC clique, the G’imo and the top Communists

and Democratic Leaguers and speaking Chinese, he covers a great deal of ground in short order. I am hopeful of the results.

I am so sorry you have been subjected to press hounding, and that you became involved in expenditures for a civilian outfit.

I hope Admiral Leahy's recommendation that the President write a note to the G'imo regarding the Chief of Staff will be carried out.³

I am also very sorry that the sudden change of plans has militated against your change [*chance*] for a desirable U.S. post.⁴ Altogether you have been made to suffer far too much by my actions and I regret it very much.

Each day out here is a little more difficult than the last one, but we are still in the ring and hopeful. Faithfully yours,

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Wedemeyer File)

1. Wedemeyer's letter was dated July 12, but he began it: "On July 8th Under Secretary of State Acheson [*sic*] summoned me to his office." Acheson told him that Dr. Stuart was to be appointed ambassador. Wedemeyer told Marshall that he had already acquired the required special ambassador's clothes "with difficulty and at some expense." After Stuart's appointment was announced, "I was pestered by newspaper men." (Wedemeyer to Marshall, July 12, 1946, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [China Mission, General].)

2. See Marshall to Acheson, July 5, 1946, pp. 620-22.

3. Since the end of the war, Wedemeyer had written, Chiang Kai-shek had been urging him to stay in China, "making various attractive offers. He particularly desired that I head up the Military Advisory Group and remain as his Chief of Staff." Wedemeyer was initially reluctant, but in March 1946, he accepted the post on a one-year basis, and just prior to his return to the United States in April, he had assured the Generalissimo "that I was coming back to China." Wedemeyer believed that now that he was not to return, the Chinese might feel "that I am not trustworthy." Admiral Leahy had sent for him and discussed the China situation "and expressed belief that the President should write a note to the Generalissimo explaining that the conditions that caused President Roosevelt to appoint an American as Chief of Staff [to the Generalissimo] no longer existed." (Wedemeyer to Marshall, July 12, 1946, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [China Mission, General].) Marshall transmitted messages to Chiang Kai-shek from Wedemeyer and President Truman on July 24. See OSE 331 and 332, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Wedemeyer File].)

4. In September 1946, Wedemeyer was given command of Second Army, which had its headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland.

TO COLONEL MARSHALL S. CARTER
Radio No. GOLD 1181. *Secret*

July 26, 1946
[Nanking, China]

There is no objection that I see for the Chinese to purchase equipment and ammunition in the United States providing it is stipulated that delivery on undelivered items, whether paid for or not, can be withheld by the United States should that course appear to be in the best interests of the United States. Your WAR-95249 refers.¹ In this connection I asked General Gillem very recently to add a similar proviso in a message he was

sending to the War Department concerning additional equipment and 7.92 ammunition for the Chinese. While I am uncertain that this proviso is completely feasible I feel that this course would be best as far as my negotiations are concerned and also would be in the best interest of the United States. Even if the suggestion is not feasible an embargo could be established should United States policy be changed or modified.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Carter's July 23 telegram stated that the Chinese Supply Commission was "attempting to purchase through War Assets Administration approximately 150,000,000 rounds of 7.92 mm. surplus rifle ammunition" in addition to other military items. Carter desired that Marshall "verify my assumption that until the situation clears, shipment of military end-use items to China obtained from any source should continue to be deferred." (*Foreign Relations, 1946*, 10: 753–54.) For further developments, see Marshall to Carter, August 2, 1946, p. 642.

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 1210. *Top Secret*

July 30, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Since my message to you of July 22d, I remained in Nanking four days waiting for delayed return of General Chou En-lai from Shanghai where he had been negotiating matters with UNRRA and CNRRA regarding Yellow River project. During this period the fighting had increased in intensity and in the number of contacts. The Nationalists blamed the Communists for starting fighting in the Kiangsu and Tatung regions while the Communists blamed the Nationalists in Kiangsu, Shantung and Hopei. The facts were hard to determine and the data confusing. Meanwhile the assassination of two college professors of the Democratic League in Kunming and the close surveillance of similar individuals in Shanghai by secret police agents created great excitement and caused the feeling among liberals that terroristic methods were being employed to suppress any spoken or printed opposition to the Government. On Chou En-lai's return to Nanking, I conferred with him to see if I could find any new basis for conciliatory action and found him strongly condemning what he claimed was the deliberate policy of the Government to stand clear of successful negotiations while pursuing an aggressive military policy to secure every possible advantage over the Communists before entering into political negotiations.

Leaving our new ambassador Doctor Stuart in Nanking to confer with Chou En-lai on a possible basis for initiating a coalition government, I proceeded to the summer capital at Kuling to see the Generalissimo. Doctor Stuart followed a day later and we arranged for him to analyze personally the entire situation for the Generalissimo, that is, the tragedy

impending, the overwhelming desire of the people of China for peace and their rapidly growing disapproval of the methods of the Kuomintang Party, the turn of public opinion in the United States, especially following the assassinations and the statement of Madame Sun Yat-sen,¹ and the threatened loss of prestige by the Generalissimo. An immediate and drastic step was to be proposed for actual measures to start a coalition government. Since Stuart speaks Chinese fluently and there would be no necessity for the presence of a third party and since he has long been a friend and an admirer of the Generalissimo and is universally conceded to comprehend the peculiarities and conditions of things Chinese, it was thought best for him alone to prepare the way by a very frank statement as indicated before I again participated. Unfortunately immediately after his arrival in Kuling he was stricken by a severe case of dysentery and confined to his bed where he still is. I delayed any action for two days thinking he was about to make a full recovery but when he tried to meet an appointment with the Generalissimo last night he proved to be too weak. I sent to Nanking for American doctors and they arrived this morning at Kuling, pronounced the trouble dysentery—the Chinese doctor had been treating him for malaria—and reported that he should be well on the way to recovery tomorrow.

Under the circumstances I had a long and very frank talk with the Generalissimo today covering most of the ground Stuart was to cover and while no definite result was achieved he was brought to a better understanding of at least the American point of view. Stuart will go into details with him tomorrow Wednesday or Thursday and will either report back to me here at Nanking where I just arrived or I will take Chou En-lai back with me to Kuling.

I can only repeat myself as to the situation. It is extremely critical and what I most fear is the spread of the fighting into the province of Jehol, northeast of Peiping, and then inevitably into Manchuria which we have so far managed to keep quiet. The Generalissimo's attitude is that of counseling us to be patient, quoting a Chinese proverb to the effect that when the fruit is ripe it will drop into your hands and referring to the Chinese traditional method of dealing severely with an opponent at first and then tempering the action with kindness. My view and that of Dr. Stuart is that his method is leading directly into uncontrollable civil war and that the seeds of distrust and violence now being sown will make later political settlements impossible.

On top of this situation comes today a report of an attack by Communists on a Marine convoy near Peiping with loss of three American lives and a number of wounded.² I will see Chou En-lai tomorrow and hear what he has to say regarding this incident. It is undoubtedly the result of violent Communist propaganda against so-called American military sup-

port of the National Government and the present confusion of military action all over North China. I suppose it will precipitate a strong demand for the withdrawal of Marines. As a matter of fact I notified the Navy three weeks ago to plan for Marine withdrawal initially to start from Tsingtao and informed Commander of Seventh Fleet Wednesday last to proceed with withdrawal as soon as transport and arrangements could be made. This step was taken by me as Government had reinforced its Tsingtao garrison sufficiently to protect the port. This has not yet been done at Tienstin. No press release on commencement of Marine withdrawal will be made until the dates are settled.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Madame Sun, widow of the Chinese republican leader and sister of Madame Chiang Kai-shek and T. V. Soong, issued a statement in Shanghai on July 22 denouncing the “reactionaries” who were inflaming a war they could not win but which they hoped would incite war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. that would allow them to crush the Chinese Communists. The American people, she said, “must be told that the presence of United States armed forces on Chinese soil is not strengthening peace and order among the Chinese people. They must be warned that loans should be given only to a reorganized and truly representative Government. They must be told that if America makes it plain she will not supply munitions or military equipment there will be no spreading Chinese war.” (*New York Times*, July 23, 1946, pp. 1, 5.)

2. On July 29, a regularly scheduled supply convoy of twenty-three vehicles, guarded by forty-three Marines, was attacked shortly after noon on the Tientsin-Peiping road at the village of Anping, about thirty-five miles southeast of Peiping. The convoy commander and two enlisted men were killed (another died later of wounds) and an officer and eleven enlisted men were wounded in the four-hour affair. While the area was loosely controlled by the Communists, it could not immediately be demonstrated that they had been the attackers, and some people asserted that an armed guerrilla band searching for loot might have been responsible. (*Ibid.*, July 31, 1946, p. 6; “Report of Field Team 25 on An Ping Conflict of 29 July 1946,” NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Anping Incident].)

MEETING WITH YU TA-WEI

July 31, 1946, 6:45 P.M. Nanking, China

GENERAL Yu asked what had been the results of General Marshall’s July 26–30 visit with the Generalissimo at Kuling. “Practically none,” Marshall replied. Ambassador Stuart had become ill with dysentery, which delayed things, but it seemed to Marshall that Chiang Kai-shek “was somewhat resentful of Dr. Stuart’s appointment as ambassador because he referred to him several times as being merely a college professor.” Marshall said that he had had Stuart appointed because whenever he (Marshall) broached political subjects Chinese “politicos always seemed to go way back into history to start educating him,” which would not be necessary with Stuart, who “knows more about China and has more China in his head than almost anyone in China.”

The next time he went to Kuling, Marshall said, “he would have to go into the seriousness of the present situation very decidedly with the Generalissimo.” The infor-

mation he was receiving from the War Department on U.S. media and public opinion indicated a "tremendous change in the U.S. attitude towards China," particularly a loss in Chiang's prestige. "That is sheer tragedy. The Generalissimo represents perhaps the greatest capital of China. Now he is being stripped. His advisors give him such prejudiced advice that the situation seems hopeless."

Military considerations were no longer the key problem, Marshall asserted; a high-level political settlement had to take place quickly. The Generalissimo's keeping "under surveillance almost every individual who had a liberal thought in China" and suppressing the press was damaging the government in American eyes, "yet he does not realize that." (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 1422–26.) ★

TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT, OFFICE
OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
Radio No. GOLD 1218. *Secret*

August 1, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Gillem¹ informs me that no action has been taken on the proposed transfer of the Director of Intelligence, China Service Command, to the Military Attache Office.² I would appreciate early action.

In this connection the China Service Command continues to issue Intelsums and Sitsums³ which are additional to information being reported by SSU, Embassy, Seventh Fleet, by the Naval Attache and by the Military Attache systems. The China Service Command no longer is involved in any considerations regarding combat operations. Therefore its own service Intelsums and Sitsums no longer are necessary and add to the mass and repetitions of these documents in China. The reports and proposed amplification of the Military Attache reports as well as SSU reports should fulfill War Department requirements for intelligence on China and I therefore desire to terminate China Service Command reports.⁴

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Lieutenant General Alvan Gillem had replaced Wedemeyer as commanding general, U.S. Forces, China Theater. When the theater was terminated on May 1, 1946, he commanded its successor, U.S. Army Forces, China, and its successor (after July 1, 1946), China Service Command. All of these organizations had their headquarters in Shanghai.

2. On May 10, Gillem had suggested to the War Department (and noted Marshall's concurrence) that intelligence in China be centralized under the Military Attache's Office in Nanking. (Gillem to War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, Radio No. CFB-01440, May 10, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Reporting].)

3. Headquarters of battalion size and above made summary reports of intelligence gathered (intelsums) and its command's tactical or administrative situation (sitsums).

4. For further developments, see Marshall to Eisenhower, August 2, 1946, pp. 642–43.

TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL, CHINA
SERVICE COMMAND [Gillem]
Radio No. GOLD 1220. *Secret*

August 1, 1946
[Nanking, China]

It is my desire that military and intelligence activities in Manchuria, other than activities of the Executive Headquarters, be coordinated by the Consul General in Mukden [O. Edmund Clubb].

A similar directive is being sent to the Embassy, the Military Attache and to the Director of SSU in China.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

MEETING WITH CHOU EN-LAI
August 1, 1946, 4:00 P.M. Nanking, China

GENERAL Chou explained the Communists' views regarding military clashes in Hupeh, Kiangsu, Shantung, Shansi, and Antung provinces: they represented the unfolding of the government's plan to annihilate the Communists. The Anping incident, Chou asserted, was caused by U.S. Marines entering, without permission, Communist liberated areas in the company of Nationalist troops. Such incidents were the result of certain elements in the government seeking to entangle the Marines in Chinese affairs. He suggested ways the government could end the civil war; if all were rejected, the Communists would attack elsewhere and unleash a propaganda offensive.

Marshall rejected the conclusions regarding the Anping incident issued by the Communists' New China News Agency that General Chou handed him, saying that it differed almost completely with the reports he had received from the local Marine commander and from Admiral Cooke. When he and Dr. Stuart sought to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to order a cessation of hostilities and to arrange a high-level political reorganization of the government, Chiang invariably replied that the fighting resulted from Communist aggression. And while Marshall did not accept this argument, the "vicious" Communist campaign against the United States and him personally and various other Communist provocations, such as the Anping incident, were undermining his efforts with the Generalissimo, despite the fact that his and Chou's interest in ending the civil war were "almost identical" at present. "If we are to save this situation, it must be done by the immediate initiation of some form of coalition government."

Chou and Marshall then discussed the Marines' role in China and various recent confrontations involving Marines and Communists. Chou said that he wanted an Executive Headquarters team to investigate the Anping incident. Marshall agreed and sent a message to Peiping to that effect. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 1427–37.) ★

TO COLONEL MARSHALL S. CARTER
Radio No. GOLD 1226. *Secret*

August 2, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Suggested proviso in your WAR-96049 concerning delivery of equipment and ammunition to the Chinese Army appears possibly too rigid to be included in contracts.¹ Your general idea appears correct and might be reworded so as to leave our statesmen more freedom in determining future policy. Suggest possible rewording to read, "It is the desire of the United States Government that these munitions be destined for an integrated and representative National Army under a coalition government. It is to be understood by the Chinese Government that if at the time for delivery, it appears to be in the best interests of the United States, this contract can be terminated unilaterally by the United States subject to such financial adjustments as may be subsequently negotiated."²

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. For the previous communication on this subject, see Marshall to Carter, July 26, 1946, pp. 636–37. Carter's WAR-96049 suggested the following proviso: "In making these arrangements, the Chinese government assures the U.S. government that the equipment is destined for an integrated and representative national army under a reasonable coalition government, and understands fully that if such is not the case at the time of delivery, or if it appears to be in the best interest of the U S, arrangements will be terminated unilaterally by the U. S. subject to such financial adjustments as may be subsequently negotiated." (Carter to Marshall, Radio No. WAR-90649, July 31, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, Carter Correspondence].)

2. For further developments, see Marshall to Carter, August 11, 1946, pp. 652–53.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Radio No. GOLD 1228. *Secret*

August 2, 1946
[Nanking, China]

With reference to my GOLD 1220¹ I have found two situations out here unsatisfactory. First, there have been too many separate agencies reporting on China which is bound to create confusion, may easily lead to unfortunate leaks and requires too much of my time to examine to see if erroneous impressions may be given. Therefore I thought Gillem's G-2 business should be transferred with necessary personnel to Military Attache's Department here, particularly as Gillem has no combat command and is solely engaged in liquidating his command and in logistical matters. The Seventh Fleet intelligence, military and naval attache intelligence, Embassy intelligence and SSU intelligence, supplemented by consular intelligence presents a heavy dose of intelligence at best without the product of Gillem's [China Service Command] organization.

Secondly, and more important, I found a situation in Mukden almost

exactly comparable with the deplorable situation that festered in Moscow prior to Harriman's and Dean's arrival out there,² with which Handy is familiar. The military attache was antagonistic to the SSU senior, his side was accused of being pro-Soviet while the SSU was accused of being pro-Kuomintang. Both were criticising each other and declining to pool or cooperate. Also there was necessarily present the American member of the Executive Headquarters team that might happen to be in Mukden at the time. The American Consul General, a very fine fellow, was sitting in the middle of this unfortunate American muddle in the center of the most delicate region in the world, possibly, at this moment. As I have said, it almost exactly duplicates the mess in Moscow that defeated us for almost three years.³ I therefore directed that all United States intelligence agencies in Manchuria be coordinated by the Consul General. I anticipate that there may be objection from Vandenberg's new agency, but while I recognize its independency from one point of view, I cannot accept its independence unless it goes completely under cover which will take time and the introduction of new personnel. I also anticipate some disagreement from your G-2, but again I cannot accept the responsibility for action out here with such fumbling and almost public muddling as inevitably goes on under divided control.

I am giving you the above as a basis for preventing Washington action antagonistic to my purpose.⁴

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. See Marshall to Commanding General, China Service Command, August 1, 1946, p. 640. Copies of the message had been sent to Colonel Marshall Carter and the secretary of the General Staff.

2. On the staff problems at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in 1943 prior to the arrival of W. Averell Harriman as the new ambassador and Major General John R. Deane as head of the newly created military mission, see Marshall Memorandum to General Styer, September 22, 1943, *Papers of GCM*, 4: 134–35.

3. Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg had become director of the Central Intelligence Group in June 1946. The group had been initiated in February 1946 "as a cooperative interdepartmental activity . . . [to] furnish strategic and national policy intelligence to the President" and various departments and agencies. (Michael Warner, ed., *CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman* [Washington: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1994], p. 35.)

4. Marshall was notified on August 5: "War Department approved transfer of personnel and activities of Director of Intelligence China Service Command to Office of Military Attache, transfer to be completed not later than 20 August." On August 8, Deputy Chief of Staff Thomas T. Handy told his former boss: "G-2 of War Department will carry out the letter and spirit of your desires. Vandenberg is away but your directive was discussed by [Major General Lauris] Norstad [director of the Plans and Operations Division] with Vandenberg's executive who gave assurances that no antagonistic action would result. Colonel Carter discussed same question with Acheson, Acting Secretary of State, who supports your action completely." (Colonel J. Hart Caughey to Marshall, Radio No. GOLD 1256, August 5, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages]; Handy to Marshall, Radio No. WAR-96854, August 8, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Reporting].)

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 1229. *Top Secret*

August 2, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mister President: Reference the Communist attack of 29 July on a Marine detachment or convoy near Peiping,¹ the Navy Department has received the Marine report of the incident. Meanwhile at the personal request of Chou En-lai, as well as the Generalissimo, a fact finding team of selected individuals from Executive Headquarters has been sent out to make a report and to determine responsibility. I delayed such action until the Marine investigation had been completed, and the Communists made a personal request for such action because of the almost inevitable charge that the Government representative in the investigating team would automatically side with the American member. I stated this reason to Chou En-lai.

Doctor Stuart in Kuling has so far recovered his health as to have had a long conference with the Generalissimo in which he secured a tentative agreement to the appointment of a group of Government and Communist representatives to sit with Doctor Stuart as chairman, to determine an immediate method for initiating a reorganization of the Government. This committee will point toward establishing an effective State Council concurrently with a cessation of hostilities.² The Generalissimo utilized the Communist-Marine Corps incident as a reason for delaying decision but has agreed to discuss the entire matter with me and Doctor Stuart in Kuling where I go tomorrow afternoon. I had a long talk along this same line with T. V. Soong this morning and he is also leaving for Kuling tomorrow.³ He is strongly opposed to the actions, terroristic in my opinion, of Chen Li-fu, the political leader of the Kuomintang and the virtual successor of Tai Li, former head of all secret police or plain-clothesmen operations in China. Soong is urging immediate steps to establish a more democratic form of government, but where he may or may not differ from Stuart and I, is regarding the urgent necessity in our opinion for creating the State Council of 40 members, which in effect would give a form of genuine legislative action for control or guidance of the existing government. I think I have convinced Soong of the necessity for such action.

I had a lengthy session with Chou En-lai yesterday, Thursday, and another scheduled for tomorrow Saturday morning. I leave for Kuling at one o'clock.

Admiral Cooke, Seventh Fleet, and I have been in personal conference over Marine Corps-Communist incident. He is at Kuling so will see him again tomorrow. Meanwhile, I should receive information from Executive Headquarters which should guide us as to appropriate action in the case.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. See note 2, Marshall to Truman, July 30, 1946, p. 639.

2. In January 1946, the Political Consultative Conference had adopted resolutions expanding the State Council to forty members and designating it “the supreme organ of the Government in charge of national affairs” pending the convocation of the National Assembly. Members included the heads of the government’s five branches and were to be appointed by President Chiang Kai-shek. (Chinese Ministry of Information, *China Handbook, 1937–1945, 1946 Supplement* [New York: Macmillan Company, 1947], p. 744.)

On August 1, Stuart proposed that an informal special committee of five members (hence subsequently referred to as the Five-Man Committee)—consisting of two Nationalist and two Communist representatives with Stuart as chairman—be established to organize the State Council. For a summary of the efforts to convene the committee, see *China White Paper*, pp. 174–88.

3. Regarding her husband’s Kuling visit, Mrs. Marshall wrote: “I think if negotiations this week end do not bare fruit—The jig is up— Gen M is making his death struggle.” She expected to return to the United States in September. (K. T. Marshall to Sally G. Chamberlin, August 2, 1946, GCMRL/K. T. Marshall Papers [Correspondence, 1941–49].)

MEETING WITH CHOU EN-LAI

August 3, 1946, 11:00 A.M. Nanking, China

MARSHALL handed Chou a copy of the U.S. report on the Anping incident and discussed Ambassador Stuart’s proposal to Chiang Kai-shek that Stuart head a special committee to reach an agreement for the immediate organization of the State Council. Marshall said he was leaving that day for Kuling to discuss the proposal.

Chou wondered “if the Government is now trying to stall by initiating the political discussions while on the military side a full-fledged civil war is being waged.” He described bombing attacks on Yen-an and Wangchiaping, where Chairman Mao Tse-tung lived, and government plans for an offensive toward southern Shantung province. Effecting a truce, not discussing political matters, was the key issue at present, Chou asserted.

Concerning the Anping incident, Chou reiterated Yen-an’s claim that Nationalist troops were present with the Marines, who were engaged in a military movement in a Communist liberated area. The episode was particularly regrettable, Marshall said, because the “Government would probably react to the incident in a manner that was not conducive to a cessation of hostilities.” They concluded with a discussion of the situation north of Hankow. (*Foreign Relations, 1946*, 9: 1443–48.) ★

TO COLONEL MARSHALL S. CARTER
Radio No. GOLD 1258. *Secret*

August 5, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Reference WAR-96471.¹ Doctor Stuart and I agree that Presidential statement at this moment undesirable from local China point of view because in effect it would strengthen the Generalissimo’s resistance to

our demands for his agreement to cessation of hostilities and simultaneous discussions for immediate creation of State Council. A week or ten days later such a statement might prove, in our opinion, advisable draft could be processed now. But, meanwhile we are considering draft of a confidential message from President to Gimo reflecting seriously on evident suppression of expression of liberal views of most highly educated group in China and public spirited citizens generally, while narrow minded and bigoted militarist and a small nucleus of political irreconcilables pursue open civil war.²

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. At the August 2 Cabinet meeting, the situation in China was a major topic of discussion. Under Secretary of State Acheson stated—and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal and Secretary of War Patterson agreed—that the withdrawal of the Marines from China would be a blunder that would lead to increased fighting, economic stagnation, and Soviet intervention. But it was likely that agitation would be increased for immediate removal of U.S. forces from China, and consequently President Truman should issue a restatement of U.S. policy toward China. (Patterson Notes on Cabinet Meeting, August 2, 1946, NA/RG 165 [P&O, China Aid Program, Binder 25].) The State Department was directed to draft the statement, and the drafters asked Colonel Carter to find out if Marshall thought that such a statement should be issued and if he had any ideas he particularly desired that the president include. (Radio No. WAR-96471 in *Foreign Relations, 1946*, 9: 1438.)

2. Carter replied on August 7: “The President will make no China policy statement without your prior clearance. In the meantime the State Department is taking no action to draft Presidential policy statement pending receipt of your suggested confidential message from President to Generalissimo.” (Ibid., p. 1465.)

MEETING WITH CHIANG KAI-SHEK

August 8, 1946, Afternoon, Generalissimo's Residence Kuling, China

MARSHALL said that Ambassador Stuart's August 6 meeting with Chou En-lai, where he communicated the Generalissimo's stipulations for a cessation of hostilities, had accomplished nothing. Marshall was convinced that the “fighting in North China would soon be completely out of control; that once it spread into Jehol, Manchuria would immediately be aflame, and then the fighting would be general in all areas.” His aim, Marshall asserted, was not to turn China over to the Communists, as some of the Generalissimo's advisers seemed to think, “but quite the opposite.” The Nationalists' “present procedure would lead to Communistic control in China. He felt that a chaotic situation was developing which not only would seriously weaken the Kuomintang but would afford the Communists an excellent opportunity to undermine the Government, and it would also afford an exceptional opportunity for Soviet Russia to intervene, either directly or under cover in a manner favorable to the Communists.” Moreover, the government's recent actions against critics had created a body of opinion in the United States unfavorable to the Nationalists and had damaged Chiang's personal prestige, “which was the greatest asset possessed by China.” Just prior to leaving Nanking for Kuling, Marshall said, he was informed that six liberal newspapers or magazines had been suppressed in Kunming, where the recent assassina-

tions had taken place, on the grounds that the publications were not properly registered. “Practically no one in the United States would accept the reasons given as *bona fide*.”

Over the past two months, Marshall noted, the Communists “had asked continuously for a cessation of hostilities to be followed by negotiations for the settlement of the disputed points.” Certain government military leaders, particularly in Manchuria, were taking an “extremely narrow point of view,” seeing “only the immediate objective of the fighting in their particular locality” and seemed quite oblivious of measures—e.g., for unemployed workers—that would help curtail support for the Communists. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 1468–71.) ★

MEETINGS WITH JOHN LEIGHTON STUART, YU TA-WEI, AND CHOU EN-LAI August 9, 1946 Nanking, China

JOHN Leighton Stuart, 9:30 A.M.

The ambassador described his August 6 meeting with Chou En-lai, noting that the Communist leader had objected to all of Chiang Kai-shek’s terms. Marshall expressed his concern over the Communists’ “delay and confusion” tactics at Executive Headquarters concerning the investigation of the Anping Marine incident. He proposed to tell Chou that not only was the Communist attitude on the incident “intolerable from the U. S. point of view,” but that the Communists were “playing directly into the hands of the National Government.” He was going to inform Chou that he proposed telling Executive Headquarters to withdraw American participation in the investigation and to issue a statement of the U.S. position on the incident, Marshall said. He also proposed to tell Chou that the Communists had twenty-four hours to decide to participate in a full and fair investigation. “General Marshall then asked Dr. Stuart if that approach appeared too extreme. The Ambassador agreed that it was not and stated that he believed the time had come for a showdown.” (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 1471–73.)

Yu Ta-wei, 10:30 A.M.

The over-all military situation had not improved, General Yu began, commenting on the fighting in various locations. Ambassador Stuart’s talks with Chou En-lai had produced no results, Marshall said. With regard to further negotiations, Marshall believed that he first had to meet with Chou and then assess the situation; at present, he could not even suggest a reasonable approach. “The political leader in the Government was also the head of the secret police [Chen Li-fu], which was much the state in Germany during the war, the only difference being that the name of the individual involved was not Himmler.” Marshall closed with comments on U.S. public opinion toward China and its potential policy implications. (*Ibid.*, pp. 1473–74.)

Chou En-lai, 4:30 P.M.

His meeting the previous day with Chiang Kai-shek had been “one of the most difficult or embarrassing discussions I have had,” Marshall stated, “not because of what the Generalissimo had to say but entirely because of the extreme frankness that I thought was necessary on my part.” But when Marshall returned to Nanking, he found

a message from the U.S. commissioner at Executive Headquarters (*ibid.*, pp. 1463–64.) detailing the Communists' obstruction of the Anping incident investigation—parts of which Marshall read to General Chou. “I do not feel that, representing the United States Government, I can accept that situation in silence, and therefore I am considering now withdrawing the American member [of the investigating team] and making my statement public as to what I consider are the facts of the matter. I would not hesitate an hour to do that were it not for the fact that such action on my part will have a tremendous and almost determining effect on the possibility of reaching a successful conclusion of the negotiations we have been struggling with so long.” Unfortunately, Marshall asserted, this would tend to confirm the claims of those within the Chinese government who had long insisted that negotiating with the Communists was a waste of time. “I am willing to wait 24 hours to receive an assurance, not a discussion, that this matter will be handled in an ordinary every-day straight-forward manner.” Marshall emphasized that he would “not wait.”

Chou expressed surprise: “My report is almost the complete reverse of the one received by you.” He was anxious that a team be dispatched to the attack site. Furthermore, messages he received blamed the Nationalists for the delay. “I quite share your view that if we let ourselves be over-ruled by our sentiments the matter will only become more complicated and will have a tremendous and determining effect on the successful conclusion of the negotiation.” Marshall then outlined the sequence of events concerning the Anping investigation as he had received them from his Executive Headquarters representative. He then suggested that they move on and asked Chou for his “comments regarding the present situation” in China.

His review of the negotiations of the past three months, Chou said, caused him to conclude that Chiang Kai-shek and the government had decided upon a course of action and nothing the Communists did or agreed to would affect that course. He then elaborated at length on the thesis that the Nationalists not the Communists were responsible for the current military and political problems. “It appears to me that almost nothing can be settled,” Chou remarked. “Every step is designed for propaganda and not for settlement. . . . With regard to the fighting, it is almost universal knowledge that only the National troops attack the Communist troops, but the Government still argues that they are being attacked by the Communists.” United States aid to China was encouraging the Nationalists' war policies, but the Communists continued to desire U.S. mediation and cooperation with the Kuomintang and the United States.

He could not immediately make detailed comments on General Chou's lengthy statement, Marshall said, noting that some of the points Chou made were “highly debatable.” Discovering the facts and motivations behind what was going on in China was more difficult than in other negotiations in which he had participated, Marshall admitted. He hoped that he and Dr. Stuart could soon “develop a definite proposal” to submit to Chou. (*Ibid.*, pp. 1474–89.) ★

DRAFT JOINT STATEMENT¹

August 9, 1946
[Nanking, China]

General Marshall and Doctor Stuart have been exploring together every possibility for terminating the present growing conflict in China and for

initiating the preliminary steps in the development of a truly democratic form of government. The desire for a peaceful solution to the political problems appears practically unanimous on the part of the people. The economic situation demands a prompt solution if a disastrous collapse is to be avoided. The fighting is daily growing more wide spread and threatens to engulf the country and pass beyond the control of those responsible. Both the Government and the Communist leaders are anxious to put an end to the fighting but there are certain issues concerned in the immediate settlements involved regarding which an agreement has not been reached and it appears impossible for the two parties to assent to a settlement of these differences which would permit a general order for the cessation of hostilities. Certain of the unsettled issues relate to the military redispersions of troops, but these apparently present less difficulty of settlement than the fundamental issue as to the character of local or county governments to be maintained in the regions to be evacuated by the Communist troops, pending a decision in such matters by the Constitutional Assembly.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Originals); H

1. Ambassador Stuart sent Marshall a draft dated August 8, but Marshall rewrote the statement on August 9, which is the version printed here. Stuart subsequently made a few modifications in the last three sentences, and the final draft was released to the press on August 10. Stuart sent a copy to the State Department (see *Foreign Relations, 1946*, 10: 1) that was received on September 5. For Marshall's explanation to President Truman as to why they issued the statement, see Marshall to Truman, August 16, 1946, pp. 654–55.

TO MRS. JOHN B. WILSON

August 9, 1946
Nanking, China

Dear Rose: Your entertaining Cape Cod letter¹ reached me here in Nanking on one of my frequent returns from the summer capital at Kuling. You are very fortunate to be so delightfully located for the Summer and so is your young man—who is evidently making a very fine woman of you!!

I have been shuttling between Kuling where the Generalissimo is established for the summer and Nanking where our Embassy is located and where the principal Government officials remain and the Communist negotiators are quartered.

Usually I am about three days at Kuling and four or five days here. The trip is interesting—an hour and three quarters by air along the Yangtze, three quarters of an hour by former Jap gunboat down and across the river to Kukiang (fine china and porcelain), thirty minutes by car to the foot of the mountain, and two hours and a half by chair with eight bearers, up the

3500 feet to the village by a fantastic path of steep stone steps on sinuous courses.

Katherine has a delightful lodge there in the cool of magnificent scenery, actually the Generalissimo's guest house. Nanking is frightfully hot and humid, so I am vastly relieved to have her out of it. The temperature in my room at this writing is 92°. I came down Wednesday (this is Sunday) and probably can not return before Tuesday or Wednesday next.

I had three radios yesterday clamoring for statements to be used on the radio in conjunction with my old associates of the Chiefs of Staff, on the end of the war. That all seems long ago, and still the turmoil continues. My desires focus on Leesburg and Pinehurst and my wants are very simple. It's too bad you and I cannot go picnicking again down the Shenandoah Valley—this time you doing all the work while I loaf selfishly and delightfully!

Give my warm regards to John and believe me always, Affectionately,

G. C. M.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Collection (Rose Page Wilson); H

1. The editors have not found Mrs. Wilson's letter.

MEETING WITH YU TA-WEI

August 10, 1946, 5:15 P.M. Nanking, China

NOTHING definite had been accomplished during that morning's conference with Chou En-lai, Marshall stated. (See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 9: 1493–1502.) "The Communists felt, as a result of the Generalissimo's recent terms, that they were being pressed into a corner because of the additional severity of the terms." Marshall outlined Chou En-lai's position on other aspects of the negotiations. General Yu admitted that there had been a general deterioration in the situation, but he blamed this on the divergence between what the Communists said they desired regarding implementation of the January Political Consultative Conference resolutions and their actions.

Marshall replied that the deterioration resulted more from the two sides' mutual retaliations based only on their own viewpoint and fears. For example, "he felt that the Generalissimo did not hear of the gross misconduct on the part of Military Commanders, but instead only hears of the same sort of conduct on the part of Communist commanders; thus his approach to most of the Military aspects is unrealistic."

While Chou En-lai was an able, liberal-minded man of high integrity, General Yu stated, he "did not represent the true mentality of the Communist people as a group. General Marshall agreed that he was a liberal and said he believed that if General Chou occupied the key position in the new Coalition government he, because of his liberal ideas, would not necessarily adhere strictly to the Communist platform." However, Marshall observed, "the Generalissimo did not want Communism in his Government." But the Kuomintang's anti-communist tactics would, in the long run,

“create conditions favorable for a communistic regime. For instance, a continuation of the present scale of military operations undoubtedly will cause a financial crash, most likely a party dissolution, dissension among party members, and strife and civil war on a large scale. He added that all these factors were fruitful breeding grounds for Communism.” (Ibid., pp. 1505–7.) ★

TO DEAN G. ACHESON

[August 10, 1946]

Radio No. GOLD 1283. *Top Secret, Eyes Only*

[Nanking, China]

Dear Acheson: Herewith is a suggestion from Doctor Stuart and me for a confidential message from President to Generalissimo.¹ If such a message is to be sent it should be dispatched promptly to gain effect at proper moment out here. Also, its delivery by me or by embassy should be avoided if diplomatically possible, to save face.² Could it not be handed to Chinese Ambassador in Washington? The draft of message follows: “Since I sent General Marshall to you as my special envoy, I have followed closely the situation in China. It is with deep regret that I am forced to the conclusion that his efforts have apparently proved unavailing.

I am certain that General Marshall, in his discussions with you, has reflected accurately the overall attitude and policy of the American Government and of informed American public opinion as well.

During recent months the rapidly deteriorating political situation in China has been a cause of grave concern to the American people. While it is the continued hope of the United States that a strong and democratic China can yet be achieved under your leadership, I would be less than honest if I did not point out that recent developments have forced me to the conclusion that the selfish interests of extremist elements, equally in the Kuomintang as in the Communist party, are hindering the aspirations of the Chinese people.

The Agreements reached by the political consultative conference on January 31st were greeted in the United States as a far-sighted step toward the achievement of national unity and democracy. American disappointment over failure to implement these agreements by concrete measures is becoming an important factor in our outlook with regard to China.

There exists in the United States an increasing body of opinion which holds that our entire policy toward China must be reexamined in the light of spreading strife, and especially by evidence of the increasing tendency to suppress freedom of the press as well as the expression of liberal views among intellectuals. The recent assassinations of distinguished Chinese liberals at Kunming have not gone unnoticed. Regardless of where

responsibility for these cruel murders may lie, the end result has been to focus American attention on the situation in China, and there is a growing conviction that an attempt is being made to settle major social issues by resort to force, military or secret police, rather than by democratic processes.

Our faith in the peaceful and democratic aspirations of the people of China has been shaken by recent events, but not destroyed. It is still the firm desire of this government and of the people of the United States to assist China to achieve lasting peace and a stable economy under a truly democratic government. There is a growing feeling however, that the aspirations of the Chinese people are being thwarted by militarists and a small group of political reactionaries, who, failing to comprehend the liberal trend of the times, are obstructing the advancement of the general good of the nation. Such a state of affairs is violently repugnant to the American people.

Unless convincing proof is shortly forth coming that genuine progress is being made toward a peaceful settlement of China's internal problems, it must be expected that American opinion will not continue in its generous attitude towards your nation. It will, furthermore, be necessary for me to redefine and explain the position of the United States to the American people.

It is my earnest hope that I may in the near future receive some encouraging word from you which will facilitate the accomplishment of our mutually declared objectives."³

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Classified Messages)

1. With the exception of the initial sentences directed to Under Secretary of State Acheson and a few changes in capitalization and punctuation, Marshall's final draft is the same as the document signed and dispatched by President Truman.

2. The "face" being saved was Chiang's. A precipitating incident in Chiang's demanding General Stilwell's recall in October 1944 was Stilwell's personal delivery of a "stiff" mid-September 1944 note from President Roosevelt (drafted by Marshall) to Chiang. See *Papers of GCM*, 4: 584-86, particularly note 4.

3. John Carter Vincent, director of the State Department's Office of Far Eastern Affairs, delivered the message on August 10 to Minister Tan Shao-hua, acting head of the Chinese Embassy in Washington. Concerning Chiang Kai-shek's reply, see note 1, Marshall to Truman, August 23, 1946, p. 667.

TO COLONEL MARSHALL S. CARTER
Radio No. GOLD 1293. *Secret*

August 11, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Delivery should not repeat not be completed reference WAR 96621 at this time, on the eight and one third Air Group Program through surplus

property channels.¹ Just how long delivery should be delayed I am not prepared to state at this time.²

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. In various ways since the end of the war, the United States had aided the development of the Chinese Air Force (C.A.F.). In late January 1946, Marshall and Chiang Kai-shek had agreed in principle that the U.S. War Department would help create an 8 1/3-group C.A.F. by selling 781 planes at surplus prices. By June 20, 1946, 652 planes had been transferred leaving 129 to be obtained from various Pacific bases. (See note 2, Marshall Draft Statement, January 18, 1946, p. 425, and *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 767–69. On the number of aircraft involved, see Brigadier General J. P. McConnell to Marshall, October 26, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, Chinese Air Force].) Marshall Carter's Radio No. WAR-96621, August 6, 1946, listed the aircraft types remaining to be delivered and asked Marshall if they should be turned over to the Chinese. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 782.)

2. War Department planners were not pleased with halting the completion of what they considered a contractual commitment by the U.S. government. They were particularly unhappy that the stop order had been issued by the State Department and that Marshall and his Washington staff assumed that a decision by Marshall was the same as U.S. government policy, despite the possibility that such decisions "might in some circumstances not be in the best interests of the U.S. from a global point of view." Some planners also suspected that Marshall was being misled by "the actions of certain individuals in the State Dept." (Lieutenant Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy Memorandum for General Lincoln, August 23, 1946, NA/RG 165 [P&O, China Aid Program, Binder 13, Item 6].)

Fear of Soviet intentions was another factor in the planners' views of Marshall mission actions. On August 14, Colonel Carter sent Marshall a War Department Plans and Operations Division estimate of Soviet aims in China: the exclusion of U.S. influence. Comments in the American press were increasingly common that the Marshall mission's failure might mean that the U.S. would revert to the status of interested bystander rather than active participant in Chinese affairs. This had to be prevented, the planners asserted. As Carter summarized their views: "Our exclusion from China would probably result, within the next generation, in an expansion of Soviet influence over the manpower, raw materials and industrial potential of Manchuria and China. The U.S. and the world might then be faced in the China Sea and southward with a Soviet power analogous to that of the Japanese in 1941, but with the difference that the Soviets could be perhaps overwhelming[ly] strong in Europe and the Middle East as well." (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 27–28.)

TO VICE ADMIRAL CHARLES M. COOKE, JR.
Radio No. GOLD 1302. *Secret, Eyes Only*
OSE 372

August 12, 1946
Nanking, China

Reference your message August 9th,¹ present situation [at Executive Headquarters in] Peiping regarding An-ping incident is that agreement had been reached Saturday evening by American and Communist Commissioners as to procedure and approval of National Commissioner was secured. Then Communist Commissioner, Sunday, added details in wording involving implications that were unacceptable.

Delicacy and embarrassment of situation for me is this: Government profits by delay and growing antagonism between Americans and Communists. Rupture would completely defeat my effort to secure government agreement for cessation of hostilities and action to terminate present suppression of freedom of press and speech and positive steps for reorganization of present arbitrary and concentrated authority of Kuomintang Party.

It would also end role of Executive Headquarters. Hopei and Jehol Communist leaders are evidently most bitterly anti-American and I feel sure have of themselves precipitated this series of incidents which actually are critically harmful to Communist desires. Considerations of Soviet reactions and later procedure are also involved.

I have just completed lengthy interview with Chou En-lai in which I demanded immediate acceptance of procedure tentatively agreed to by Commissioners on Saturday. He is communicating with Peiping and Yen-an. The situation is much that of the proverbial rock and the whirlpool, except that one or two additional hazards are involved.

If you desire to make statement to press in light of the situation I do not object, but would like to see draft of such statement before release.

Delay in answering your message was due first to garbles which incidentally indicated message was from Nimitz² to me, and also my desire to first have this additional meeting with Chou. The other matters you brought up will be discussed later.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. During their meeting that morning, Marshall summarized Cooke's message for Chou En-lai. See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 10.

2. Chester W. Nimitz was commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN

Radio No. GOLD 1320. *Top Secret, Eyes Only*

August 16, 1946

[En route to Kuling,
China]

Dear Mister President: The recent statement by Doctor Stuart and myself was to bring both sides, along with the public in China, to a realization of the crisis and impending chaos and to excite foreign and local

pressure for termination of hostilities. Apparently it has had something of that effect though interpreted from Peiping by irresponsible or notoriety seeking correspondents as signaling the closing up of Executive Headquarters and my early withdrawal.

We have encountered great and anticipated difficulty with combined investigation of Marine-Communist clash at Anping. Delaying tactics, vicious propaganda, etc. have been the order of the day. Finally, on my calling Commissioner Robertson to Nanking and also notifying Chou that I would not tolerate further delays and misrepresentations, an agreement on procedure was reached yesterday Wednesday. Chou and I, with Mister Robertson and Communist Commissioner from Peiping conferred today (Thursday 15 August) for three hours. In fact the conference was still in session without lunch when I left at two o'clock.¹

I am writing this in a plane en route to see Generalissimo at Kuling which I left a week ago. He has just received your message² because of strike delays, and is pressing me to return.

I have characterized Communist tactics regarding Anping in emphatic terms and served notice on Chou that if delays are resumed I will withdraw the American representative and make a public statement. My delays in taking such justified action has been that it plays directly into the hands of the small group in the Kuomintang Party who are blocking me in my efforts to terminate fighting. Admiral Cooke of the Seventh Fleet earnestly desires me to take public action in defense of the Marines, demanding apology, et cetera, but I have felt that I would sacrifice too much in other direction by doing this, though I may be forced to such action within a few days. The tragedy is that it will virtually terminate Executive Headquarters and result in a general military conflagration.

Generalissimo's last terms to the Communists, transmitted by Doctor Stuart on his return from Kuling last Tuesday, were more exacting than those of June 30th when the final stalemate was reached. I made a very frank resumé of the situation to Generalissimo last Thursday on the afternoon of my return to Nanking, emphasizing the growing impression at home that all liberal opinion in China, particularly of intellectuals, was either discouraged or suppressed directly or by intimidation.³

As soon as I see the Generalissimo I will radio his reaction to your message.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Classified Messages)

1. See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 28–45.

2. See Marshall to Acheson, August 10, 1946, pp. 651–52.

3. For a summary of Marshall's minutes, see Meeting with Chiang Kai-shek, August 8, 1946, pp. 646–47.

NOTES ON A MEETING WITH CHIANG KAI-SHEK
Secret

August 16, 1946¹
Kuling, China

Dr. T. V. Soong, acting as interpreter, and Madame Chiang were present during the interview. The entire situation was discussed by the Generalissimo. In brief, his view was that the Communists were violating all aspects of the truce by offensive operations in Kiangsu, the region of Tatung, and east of Sian. He felt that there was no sincerity in any proposals they made regarding negotiations and that they treat the negotiations as a means of prolonging matters, during which they would gain military advantages. He stated that he felt that they were now working close in hand with the Soviet Government and that they would not seriously carry through with any arrangement which might be reached for the organization of a coalition government, nor could the Government have any assurance that they would cease fighting if a formal order for the cessation of hostilities was issued.

The Generalissimo asked me for my estimate of the situation. I stated that the Communists' view as expressed to me was almost the exact opposite of the view he had expressed. They insisted that the Government had led in the offensive operations and that their reactions were defensive to prevent themselves from being squeezed into a corner. I further stated that the events of the weeks following my final interview with the Generalissimo prior to his departure for Kuling from Nanking had almost exactly corresponded to my prediction at that time. I reminded him that he had stated that he could control the situation in Manchuria and the fighting in North China would merely be local; that if I were patient I would see that the fruit would soon ripen and drop into our laps—that the Communists would be appealing to me for a settlement and offer to make the compromises necessary towards such a settlement. I reminded him that I had stated at that time I felt not only would the situation in North China quickly spread beyond control, but that the probability was there would be a resumption of fighting in Jehol and that would immediately relight a conflagration in Manchuria, indicating there would be a general civil war beyond his or Communist control to check, and a catastrophe for China. I also stated that such a catastrophic condition, in my opinion, offered an ideal opportunity for subversive activities of the Communists in spreading unrest and for the Soviet Government in supporting the Communists in a sub rosa or in an overt manner if they so desired, which was probable. I expressed the belief that the Government of China had little, if any, prospect of gaining by pursuing hostilities at the present time and a very definite prospect of a great loss with the possible collapse of the Government and the almost certain collapse of its economy. I outlined the geographical weakness of the position of the Government with long lines of

communications and bordering mountain regions which fitted perfectly into the Communistic method of fighting. I insisted that the present government policy was, in my opinion, ruinous and that the only other alternative was in effect to swallow the Communist Party—which was too large and powerful to ignore.

I again urged that the Generalissimo agree to the proposal Dr. Stuart had put to him to nominate one or two men to meet with a similar number of Communists, Dr. Stuart presiding as chairman, in an effort to agree on precise terms for the Communists inclusion in a State Council to be initiated as the first step towards the genuine reorganization of the government. The Generalissimo stated that the Communists had declined to nominate any members for such an organization.

I reminded him that this was during Chungking days and that more recently the leaders of the Democratic League had advised me that the Communists were ready to nominate the members, and further that they were changing their views regarding a coalition government in regard to mixed ministries. The Generalissimo said that that gave no assurance it was the view of the Communist Party. I replied that the fact of the matter was very easy to ascertain. He requested me to do so and I sent a message to my assistant, Colonel Caughey, in Nanking to put the question to General Chou which he did the following day. Chou replied in the affirmative, but stated several conditions to be met.²

The following morning [August 18] Dr. Soong called on me and reviewed the conversation of the previous afternoon giving reasons why he felt the stand of the Generalissimo was the correct measure and discussing at length the economic situation. He expressed no faith whatever in the Communist willingness to proceed on a normal basis with a reorganization of the Government.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Political Affairs, Conferences Miscellaneous, vol. 4)

1. Internal evidence (see the last paragraph) suggests that this document was written on or after August 18.

2. Caughey replied on the evening of August 17 that Chou En-lai had said that the Communist party was “not prepared to nominate State Council representatives. Specifically Communists will be ready to nominate representatives when terms of cease firing agreements have been arranged and when the small group of which Doctor Stuart would be chairman has worked out a basis of Government reorganization.” (Caughey to Marshall, Radio No. GOLD 1335, August 17, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages]).

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 1334. *Top Secret*

August 17, 1946
[Kuling, China]

My dear Mister President: Since my message of August 10th I have had a lengthy discussion with the Generalissimo and a later discussion with Doctor T. V. Soong just completed. While the Generalissimo did not specifically mention your message,¹ his discussion and questions directly related to it.

In brief, he feels that the Communist Party by its recent military actions in the field has openly declared itself to a policy of force. He does not accept my contention that there has been much on the Government side in the way of indications of a policy of force to excite the present military reactions of the Communists. He reiterates much the same statement he gave to me on my departure from China last March,² which I read to you and of which the Secretary of State has a copy, to the effect that he had no faith in the Communists' intentions to keep any agreement. He felt that their purpose was purely to overthrow the Government and to install their own control.

Evidently referring to your message, he put this question to me: "If the present Government is broadened by the inclusion of representatives of minority parties and of other individuals of high standing, would that be considered by the United States as bona fide action towards the establishment of a coalition government, if the Communist Party or representatives were not included?" Their inclusion or exclusion might be the result of Government action or Communist refusal to participate unless certain demands of theirs were met. This amplification of the Generalissimo's statement is mine and not his. The Communists have been claiming that the Government is moving unilaterally to develop a situation where they can claim that the Communists have been given an opportunity to participate and yet the conditions will be such that the Communists probably could not commit themselves to such participation without condoning the continuation of a government of arbitrary powers.

Doctor Soong read to me his draft of a proposed answer to your message. To what extent it will be modified I do not know. It can mean much or little depending on whether or not a renewed negotiation this coming week with Doctor Soong participating along with me can be productive of a basis for the cessation of hostilities.

At the present moment the Generalissimo seems clearly inclined to a policy of force as the only acceptable solution. I have made very plain my belief that no political negotiations are possible while fighting is going on and that the fighting can be terminated unless it is allowed to spread beyond control. I pointed out that a general conflagration virtually invites Communistic expansion and Soviet infiltrations, that the situation here

must be considered in close connection with the negotiations in Paris.³

This is a dictated statement hurriedly made to catch a plane that is about to leave for Nanking. I will advise you further in greater length following the meeting I anticipate with General Chou and Doctor Soong probably Tuesday.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. See Marshall to Acheson, August 10, 1946, pp. 651–52.

2. See Marshall Memorandum for the President, March 13, 1946, pp. 502–3.

3. Delegates from twenty-one nations (Britain, China, France, the U.S., and the U.S.S.R. plus sixteen smaller allies who had fought in the European war) had begun meeting at Luxembourg Palace in Paris on July 29 for the purpose of negotiating peace treaties with Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, and Romania. For the proceedings of the Paris Peace Conference, see *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vols. 3 and 4. This conference finally adjourned on October 15, after passing a total of ninety-four recommendations, which were given to the Council of Foreign Ministers (Britain, France, the U.S., and the U.S.S.R.), which considered the recommendations at a meeting in New York in November and December 1946. The treaties were finally signed on February 10, 1947.

NOTES ON A MEETING WITH CHIANG KAI-SHEK
Secret

August 19, 1946¹
Nanking, China

I had a final meeting with the Generalissimo before my departure from Kuling though I had nothing new in effect to tell him. He restated his view of the situation and said that he was willing to go ahead with the action proposed toward the formation of the State Council, but he did not wish the committee headed by Dr. Stuart to take up any other matters involved in the PCC agreements. He stated also that he did not agree to a cessation of the fighting until agreement had been reached regarding the State Council and that I must understand that this was great concession on the part of the Government and they were taking a decided risk in so doing.

I said that I did not wish to restate my views with which the Generalissimo was familiar, but I did very briefly summarize them and I also expressed my failure to understand what the added risk to the government was in agreeing to a cessation of hostilities. To my view it was exactly the contrary and I thought every day of delay further endangered the government forces.

In general, we agreed to disagree and the Generalissimo closed by stating that he realized that my efforts were all in the interest of China and that I should feel free to come to him at any time and state my views with complete frankness.

The following morning [August 20], General Yu Ta-wei came to me to resume the discussions of the previous afternoon—he having acted as

interpreter—following a discussion he had just had with the Generalissimo. He was particularly insistent that nothing should be said in my approach to the Communists which would give the impression that the Generalissimo had proposed the effort we were about to make for the creation of the State Council and particularly that while there should be no discussion of other matters by this special group, the fact of such prohibition by the Generalissimo should not be made known. Otherwise there would be the inevitable Communistic propaganda that he (the Generalissimo) was refuting the agreements of the PCC. The Generalissimo, General Yu stated, was prepared to go through with the agreements of the PCC at the present time.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Political Affairs, Conferences Miscellaneous, vol. 4)

1. Marshall returned to Nanking from Kuling on the afternoon of August 20. He may have written this document on August 21.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN E. HULL

August 21, 1946
Nanking, China

Dear Hull: I returned to Nanking last night to find your letter of August 6th.¹ I was much surprised to learn that you had been in Shanghai and very sorry indeed not to have seen you. Thanks for the invitation to stop over with you in Hawaii. Aside from the pleasure it would give me to see you again under such pleasant circumstances, I must admit that I would find a still greater pleasure in the fact that I was returning home.

I want to thank you again for the complete and invaluable support you gave in Washington to my efforts out here. You and Handy and Dean Acheson backed me up in a way, I believe, that no other American representative has ever been supported in the past.

With my thanks again. Affectionately,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, General)

1. Hull had been at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, since July 10 as commanding general of U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific. He had written that he was in Shanghai on his way to Hawaii from visiting MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo. (Hull to Marshall, August 6, 1946, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [China Mission, General].)

TO BERNARD M. BARUCH

August 21, 1946
Nanking, China

My dear Baruch: Your letter of May 24th reached me in Nanking in

June and I immediately acknowledged it with a radio stating that a written statement by me would follow.¹ It so happened that a day later I became involved in the most strenuous and difficult period of my negotiatory procedure out here which absorbed all of my time from early morning until late at night until well into July. During this period I found no opportunity for sober reflection regarding the difficult questions you put to me.²

Since then the situation has been almost as bad so far as I am concerned and in the meantime I read of your own conclusions and proposals.³ I have thought these over to see if I had any definite or additional ideas on the subject and so far have reached no conclusions which would be of use or even interest to you. I do not think my approach to the problem has been clear cut mentally because the distractions here have been so pressing that it is almost impossible to be purely objective regarding other and exceedingly complicated matters.

So far as I can see, the proposals you have made are sound and I have heard of no other procedure which seemed more practical or desirable.

After explaining above my own difficulty in giving clear thinking to the atomic question, I might say that the turbulence in which I am involved and its tragic consequences to almost five hundred million people leads all my thinking to the urgency in this period of our civilization for finding a development without further delay of a positive means to put a stop to the probability of wars. My own experience here has led me to a few conclusions which of themselves might seem rather small factors. It grows more clearly evident to me every day out here that suspicion of the other fellow's motives, lack of understanding of his conception of your motives are the greatest stumbling blocks to peaceful adjustments. When trade factors and the pursuit of the dollar are added to the plot the problem grows even more complicated in time of peace.

Out here I have sat in the middle for many months and listened to an outpouring of suspicions and beliefs of the representatives of each side regarding the other. I find that in most instances neither side properly, or even casually, evaluates the fears or suspicions of the other and their effect on the action taken or the attitude in negotiations. When I emphasize this state of affairs neither side treats it as of much importance, but as a matter of fact from my middle position it has appeared to me of the most vital importance because misunderstandings are a fruitful cause of unhappy situations or events.

I am sorry not to be helpful and possibly if I were in Leesburg with no more serious occupation than gardening, I might be able to contribute something of value to the solution of your problem.

Katherine is, I am happy to state, up in the mountains at Kuling away from the sultry heat of Nanking. She is looking very well and is most

comfortably situated, but continually worrying because she is not here with me in Nanking. She would join me in affectionate regards if she knew I was writing. I do hope that your health has remained good despite the strenuous work you have been doing in the leadership of a matter which may have a determining effect on the future peace of the world.

With my affectionate regards. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. See Marshall to Carter, June 10, 1946, pp. 586–87.

2. In the spring, Baruch had been trying to get the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, on which he was the U.S. representative, to draft a treaty to outlaw the use of atomic weapons in war and to provide for inspections and penalties to enforce it. He asked if Marshall could “offer any suggestion for creating in the minds of men the desire to comply with the Treaty” and how he “would set up in the Treaty a plan for automatic punishment of the violators,” given that the five permanent members of the Security Council (Britain, China, France, U.S., U.S.S.R.) had veto power over all U.N. actions. In a post-script, Baruch asked: “Have you any immediate suggestions as to how our present attitude could be expanded into a movement toward the elimination of war itself? I recognize, in posing this question, that the main purpose of the United Nations is the same objective—elimination of war. But I ask because you may have discovered some short cuts.” (Baruch to Marshall, May 24, 1946, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)

3. At the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission’s first meeting on June 14, Baruch laid out what came to be called the “Baruch Plan” on atomic energy: (1) control over all atomic energy activities would be given to an International Atomic Development Authority; (2) after the authority established its control, the United States would stop manufacturing atomic bombs and destroy its stockpiles; (3) thereafter, atomic weapons would be outlawed; (4) the authority would have unprecedented powers of inspection within national territories; (5) no member of the Security Council would have the power to veto authority actions. On June 19, the U.S.S.R. rejected the Baruch Plan and offered one that: (1) outlawed atomic weapons; (2) omitted effective inspection or verification; (3) required the U.S. to destroy its weapons immediately; (4) rejected the elimination of the Security Council’s veto over questions of atomic energy. (*New York Times*, June 16, 1946, p. 4; June 20, 1946, p. 4.)

TO COLONEL MARSHALL S. CARTER
Radio No. GOLD 1360. *Secret, Eyes Alone*

August 21, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Reference your WAR-97857.¹ My view is as follows: situation critical in the extreme, small prospect for early termination of hostilities agreement—therefore likelihood great of spread of fighting into Jehol Province and Manchuria. On the other hand inevitable leakage of information that departure of dependents has been cancelled will probably be accepted by Chinese personnel of Executive Headquarters, Communists and Nationalists alike, already at breaking point with each other, as final evidence that the end of such mediation procedure has been reached and any remaining effectiveness of that Headquarters will thus be destroyed. Therefore, I recommend that sailing on September 3d proceed as planned

and that we accept later possible embarrassment in handling passengers concerned.

Please make most careful effort to avoid publicity leak of the views I have expressed in this message.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Dependents of Peiping Headquarters Group personnel were scheduled to sail for China on September 3. Prior to this, the “highest levels in [the] War Department” desired that Marshall personally approve the action. (Carter to Marshall, Radio No. WAR-97719, August 16, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Dependents].) In message 97857, Carter asked that Marshall be shown all messages about the issue “in order to relieve acute apprehension” in the War Department. “This matter is considered delicate and dangerous here because of possible repercussions in future.” (Carter to Caghey, Radio No. WAR-97857, August 19, 1946, *ibid.*)

MEETINGS WITH JOHN B. BLANDFORD, PAI CHUNG-HSI, AND OTHERS
August 22–23, 1946 Nanking, China

JOHN B. Blandford, Jr., August 22, 9:30 A.M.

An engineer, civil administrator, and wartime head of the U.S. National Housing Agency, Blandford was advising the Chinese government on financial matters. He briefed Marshall on China’s economic situation. Marshall told him of T. V. Soong’s various predictions as to how long China would be able to carry on a civil war without collapsing economically. At Kuling the previous week, Marshall noted, Soong thought that the government could survive for perhaps another two months at the present level of military activity. Blandford thought that the government’s short-term survival was difficult to determine.

Chiang Kai-shek, Marshall observed, did “not concern himself with the economic question” or apparently see the dangers of an economic collapse to the Nationalist party or as “a formal invitation to Russia to sow further seeds of Communism in China.” Marshall told Blandford of the various warnings he had given to Chiang on the dangers of seeking a military solution. “The U. S. does not want the Communists to rule China,” but “the Generalissimo is leading China right into Communism through his over zealous and unrealistic treatment of the present military and political situation.” Moreover, the “radical elements” in the Nationalist party “do not realize that China is no longer isolated from the rest of the world. The Chinese old philosophy and methods are no longer applicable.” (NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Political Affairs, Conferences Miscellaneous, vol. 4].)

Pai Chung-hsi, August 22, 5:30 P.M.

General Pai, the minister of national defense, said that his ministry was being reorganized along American lines, and he desired Marshall’s comments. A key difference between the Chinese and U.S. systems, Marshall began, was that it was a “cardinal principle” in the U.S. that the military was invariably subservient to civil authority, and thus a civilian always headed the War Department. Placing the military chief directly under the Generalissimo was “a very peculiar establishment for peace time organization,” Marshall believed. He also emphasized the importance of the military budget, particularly in peace time when it “bears a great importance in relation to the

political party in power.” Again, in the U.S., while the chief of staff calculated the budget requirements, it was the civilian minister who was responsible for getting the appropriations.

Having the Chinese navy under the direct command of the chief of staff was a “weakness and inefficiency,” and Marshall urged General Pai “to place an efficient navy man in command of the Navy.” Marshall then described the importance of having a system to train replacements. “What the government needs in Manchuria,” Marshall thought, “is not new divisions but trained replacements.” Fewer full-strength divisions were better than more that were under strength. Poorly trained and locally recruited soldiers tended to “water the stock” of a division. China needed a nationwide recruiting system that could maintain a smaller but more efficient army. (Ibid.)

Yu Ta-wei, August 23, 10:00 A.M.

He had told Chou En-lai, Yu said, that while the government was unwilling to waive its military conditions for peace, it was willing to let them “rest” until Dr. Stuart’s Five-Man Committee had been able to reach a political agreement. The Generalissimo, Marshall recalled, was emphatic in insisting that the Communists not be led to believe that the government was pressing for the organization of Dr. Stuart’s group but that it be seen as Marshall’s idea. The reason he was going to Kuling that afternoon was to press Chiang Kai-shek to appoint members to Stuart’s group.

“The situation was becoming worse day by day,” Marshall said. This could drive the Communists to seek Soviet support, which would make it more difficult for the Chinese to find a peaceful solution. Chou En-lai had given him a letter the previous day asserting that the Communists had reason to believe that the government was preparing to use gas against their forces. If the government had any gas stocks, they should immediately destroy them, which would be the most effective counter to Communist propaganda on the subject. This would not hurt the government, Marshall insisted, since he “was quite certain that they did not have enough gas to do any real harm anyway.” (*Foreign Relations, 1946*, 10: 69–70.)

Percy Chen, August 23, 10:30 A.M.

Chen, whose father had been minister for foreign affairs in the 1920s and 1930s, said he was optimistic about Marshall’s ultimate success. Present problems could have been solved much easier two months ago, Marshall replied; “those liberal elements in the Communist Party are losing control and the radicals are becoming the leaders.” Starting the State Council was important, and “the only chance for the Kuomintang Government to survive is to prove that it is a better government.”

The idea of a State Council, Chen stated, was conceived by Dr. Sun Fo, president of the Legislative Yuan and son of Sun Yat-sen. Sun Fo had a good reputation in the United States, China’s liberals were his followers, and he also commanded respect from Nationalist and Communist moderates, the British, and the Russians, according to Chen; Sun ought to participate in the negotiations. Sun favored some sort of participation by the Soviets in the mediation and thought it was time to find out what they wanted in China. (Ibid., pp. 70–72.)

Chou En-lai, August 23, 11:20 A.M.

He was going to Kuling to secure the Generalissimo’s immediate agreement to designate members of Dr. Stuart’s committee to discuss the organization of the State Council, Marshall began. Chou thought that the government’s attitude on this was still

uncertain. Marshall explained the origins of Dr. Stuart's committee idea and his hopes for its success.

There remained some unsettled points concerning the government reorganization, Chou indicated: the distribution of State Council seats among the parties; an agreed platform; Communist veto power. He agreed with Marshall that fighting should cease or at least be significantly reduced. Nevertheless, the Communists believed that the government intended to initiate large-scale fighting (including the use of tear and perhaps other gases) in two or three weeks. Marshall agreed that continuation of the present situation, with each side accusing the other of perfidy was making a settlement increasingly difficult, and that was the reason he and Dr. Stuart had turned to the effort to institute a State Council to take up political issues. Marshall hoped that if the individuals were nominated to Stuart's committee, the two sides could then arrange an end to the fighting.

Since April, it was the government that had mainly benefitted from fighting, Chou replied; thus the Nationalists posed numerous conditions for a cease-fire, whereas the Communists consistently desired an unconditional end to the fighting. Recent measures taken by the Communists "are only aimed to put up a total resistance" and were defensive in nature. The Nationalists were contemplating calling the National Assembly to meet without Communist participation, Chou said; if they did that, the Communists "will feel forced to call the Delegation Conference of the liberated areas." (Ibid., pp. 72–79.) ★

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 1367. *Top Secret*

August 23, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mister President: Since my GOLD 1334 of 17 August sent from Kuling, I have had several lengthy interviews with the Generalissimo and also with Doctor Soong and other advisors, all at Kuling. Since my return to Nanking, Tuesday, Doctor Stuart and I have been engaged in efforts to initiate a meeting of a small Kuomintang-Communist group under Stuart's chairmanship to reach an immediate settlement of the conditions for the early creation of the State Council with complete party representation. I have had further conferences with Doctor Soong and other Government representatives and just completed a few minutes ago a lengthy conference with General Chou En-lai. I am leaving within the hour for Kuling to persuade the Generalissimo immediately to appoint his representatives for the small group under Stuart's chairmanship to settle the details for the creation of the State Council.

The Generalissimo's present attitude is that he is willing to make a try at reaching an agreement with the Communists for the organization of the State Council through the means suggested by Doctor Stuart and me, but he is unwilling to agree to a termination of the fighting until that agreement is reached and presumably until his military conditions for the ces-

sation of fighting have also been agreed to. He feels that even this concession is a great one and involves a military risk on the part of the Government. I disagree completely with this view of the matter as to risk. To my mind the great risk is involved in the continuation of the fighting. The Generalissimo feels that the Communists are responsible for the fighting and cannot be trusted to go through with an agreement for its cessation. I am not in agreement with this view, at least I feel that the effort is a mandatory requirement.

Doctor Stuart has held lengthy conferences with Chou En-lai in the past two days and the latter has agreed to enter into the meeting of the small group to settle the conditions for the activation of the State Council. It is with that understanding that I am proceeding to Kuling this afternoon to see the Generalissimo.

The military situation naturally grows more serious day by day and there is now an immediate threat of an outbreak of the fighting in Jehol, northeast of Peiping. The Communists' mobilization manifesto, General Chou assures me, was a defensive measure against what they considered was the definite purpose of the Government to settle the issues by military force.

The fact of the matter is that each side takes the same stand with me, that the other is provoking the fighting and cannot be trusted to go through with an agreement. The present effort of Doctor Stuart and myself regarding the State Council is but another move, but on a higher level, to break the stalemate. I was shown a copy of the Generalissimo's reply to your message¹ and I can only repeat the language of my last message that "It can mean much or little depending on whether or not a renewed negotiation this coming week" can be productive of a basis for the cessation of hostilities.

The introduction of Doctor Soong into the negotiations has not yet had any important result as he only had his first meeting with Chou yesterday and has been forced to leave for Shanghai this morning to meet Mister McCabe and others of our FLC [Foreign Liquidation Commission], also he has a high fever.

The investigation of the Anping Marine-Communist incident is progressing slowly but actually is progressing. I doubt exceedingly whether an agreement can be reached as to either the facts, or the responsibility, but at least we will have the testimony of the various actors and the opportunity of the press to hear that testimony.

Admiral Cooke conferred with me at length yesterday regarding this situation and such plans as we should make against various eventualities.

Doctor Stuart and I and some of the Embassy staff are working on a possible restatement of American policy which I will submit to the State Department as soon as completed.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. On the president's message, see Marshall to Acheson, August 10, 1946, pp. 651–52. In his reply (delivered to the State Department August 28), Chiang Kai-shek praised Marshall's efforts but stated: "The desire for peace has to be mutual, and for the Communists, it must mean that they give up their policy to use armed force to seize political power, to overthrow the Government and to install a totalitarian regime such as those which are now spreading over Eastern Europe." He briefly described some Communist provocations and admitted that some government subordinates had made some "mistakes . . . , but they are minor in scale compared to the flagrant violations on the part of the Communists." He promised to do his utmost to cooperate with Marshall and to make peace. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 91–92.)

TO SALLY G. CHAMBERLIN

August 24, 1946
Kuling, China

Dear Sally: Katherine received the final or corrected draft of he[r] book or manuscript in the last pouch.¹ I found that her write up of the Pearl Harbor incident had been almost completely changed and made to include a damaging criticism of the happenings in the Philippines at that time. She is sending back by this pouch a correction of this which in effect changes it back to the original form in which she had covered the incident,² enclosing her page from the initial draft you sent her out here.

I am sending you this note to ask you to check on this matter and make certain that under no circumstances is the version just received to go into the book. It would place me in the impossible position of having her, by implication and certainly with my knowledge, make the criticisms which I have carefully refrained from doing regarding this affair and numerous other issues throughout the war.

I recall that in her description of the meeting in Newfou[nd]land she has Portal present. He was not there—was represented by another air marshal, I have forgotten who.³

This is a hasty note and I will not confuse things with other matters. Faithfully yours,

G. C. Marshall

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General)

1. Mrs. Marshall's book, *Together: Annals of an Army Wife*, was a memoir of her experiences with General Marshall between their 1930 marriage and the end of World War II. She apparently had written part of it in 1940 as a possible women's magazine article, and her husband thought any larger venue was inappropriate given his position in the army. (Marshall to Carl Brandt, November 26, 1940, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].) After Marshall departed for China in December 1945, Mrs. Marshall began working on a memoir. General Marshall did not appear to have known about the project until April 1946, when she returned with him to China. Mrs. Marshall paid Sally Chamberlin, the general's Pentagon office secretary, to type the material she recorded on a dictating machine. General Marshall edited the manuscript. Mrs. Marshall's brother, Tris-

tram Tupper, started a publishing company (Tupper and Love) in 1946, and one of the company's first projects was to edit and publish Mrs. Marshall's book.

2. The published version (p. 99) read: "Since June 1938—three and a half years—he [Marshall] had labored relentlessly against impossible odds to arouse and prepare America; yet America was still unprepared. Panama, Alaska, the Hawaiian Islands, Wake, Guam, the Philippines—all our outposts, were woefully unprepared."

3. Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal was represented at the Atlantic Conference, August 9–12, 1941, by Air Vice-Marshal Sir Wilfrid Freeman. (See *Papers of GCM*, 2: 516[#48].)

TO MR. AND MRS. EDMUND P. COLES¹
FROM KATHERINE T. MARSHALL

August 26, 1946
Kuling, China

Dear Edmund and Sadie: I am up here in lovely Kuling, six miles up stone steps in the mountains. I came up the middle of July with Madame Chiang and the Generalissimo. Nanking was 110° and the dust, heat, and filth were beyond description. Both Chungking and Nanking were an endurance test. They are Chinese cities with no foreign concessions, so we lived right in the midst of the thousands of Chinese refugees who had crowded into these cities. Our house had been the German Embassy. It had a lawn, but you might as well go out and sit in a "Chick Sales"² for a pleasant evening as to sit out there. There were high walls all around it, with guards night and day.

We had ten officers, George's staff, living in the house, two in a room, and breakfast was the only time George and I had together. He was in conference all day and the lower part of the house was packed with Chinese. I ate my other meals at the regular mess (!!) with all the staff. After two months of this I was pretty low. What with the aftermath of eight years of war, inflation, civil war, famine, and epidemics of cholera, it was a pretty grim diet. The charm of China that I had heard so much about was certainly not evident in Nanking or Chungking, the Japs had left little but disease and filth. So you know how glad I was to come up here and breathe this mountain air, have picnics on these lovely peaks and see some fresh, clear mountain streams. George comes up three days out of each week and our house, a lovely little stone one with trees and a lawn, is just across a gurgling mountain stream from Madame Chiang's. When George is not here she comes over each day and has lunch with me and I have dinner with them. They have been wonderful friends and endless in their thought for our comfort.

On week-ends when George comes up we always have a picnic supper high up on one of the peaks. You go in mountain chairs carried by six coolies, or chair bearers. They dress in royal blue and the chairs have white-fringed tops. There are never less than 20 guards who go in front

and in back of the chairs, and it looks like some mediaeval procession as we wind up these mountain paths. The scenery is magnificent and the air cool and bracing. It has worked wonders for both George and me. He continues to hold conferences up here, as it is the summer capital. Three times he has had a stop-fighting order all but signed when new outrages on the side of the Communists or Nationalists have broken out overnight and negotiations come to a standstill again. The hatred is so bitter on both sides that it is hard to get them to see any side but their own. These poor people, I feel so sorry for them—pawns between two political parties—all they ask for is peace. George has had a cruel year and looked as though he had been put through a wringer in Nanking.

I had hoped we would be home in September, but I know that as long as there is a possible chance of his stopping civil war George will not give up, so heaven knows when we can come home. The mail pouch is my greatest joy. I was so glad to hear from you.

There are the most exquisite mountain lilies of all varieties up here. Madame Chiang and I have gotten 355 bulbs for me to take home. Now George says he doubts if they will let me bring them in! I have helped here with her garden and have to laugh—she will have 25 men working on it at once, and moves trees and builds stone work in one day as if it were nothing. I showed them how to build a grill and now they do all their entertaining out on the lawn and love it. Also have showed the Generalissimo how to play Chinese checkers and after dinner each night we have several games. He speaks no English but says now he does not need a tongue.

Madame brought her tailor up here with her and has had five lovely Chinese dresses made for me. I wear them each evening, which pleases the Chinese greatly. I see very little of Americans. There are only a few missionaries up here and now and then one of the diplomats. The cheap shopping in China is no more. Silk is hard to get and is \$4 and \$5 a yard. Servants are eight times what they used to be. Oranges cost \$9 a dozen, shoes \$40 a pair. Inflation is everywhere.

George joins me in sending love, Affectionately,

GCMRL/K. T. Marshall Papers (Correspondence, 1941–49)

1. Edmund Coles was the brother of Marshall's first wife, Elizabeth Carter Coles (1874–1927). Most of Katherine Marshall's letters from China were handwritten; this one was typed, presumably by Sally Chamberlin.

2. An "outhouse." Charles "Chic" Sale (1885–1936) had been a "character" comedian of the 1920s; he performed as a hayseed whose specialty was building outhouses. (See his book *The Specialist* [St. Louis: Specialist Publishing Company, 1929].) Widely read war correspondent Ernie Pyle used the term "Chic Sale" as late as 1943.

MEETING WITH CHIANG KAI-SHEK
August 27, 1946, Noon Kuling, China

THE Generalissimo agreed to nominate government representatives to Dr. Stuart's Five-Man Committee on political issues. He also asserted that a cease-fire order was not necessary because the January 10 agreement provided for a cessation of hostilities. "All that was necessary was for the Communists to cease fighting." There had been great changes in military dispositions since January 10, Marshall noted; moreover, the January 10 agreement provided that troops were to remain in the localities they occupied on January 13 pending further agreements. Did that mean the recent government advances in Kiangsu province were to be evacuated, Marshall asked; Chiang gave a lengthy response but not a definite reply.

Did the Generalissimo imply that while the new State Council was in session fighting would continue? Marshall "thought that was quite impractical." He did, however, offer another scenario that halted the fighting by mutual cease-fire orders (as had been done in Manchuria) after the State Council had been organized and formally opened. On the subject of Manchuria, Marshall wrote, Chiang "referred to my view that once the fighting spread into Jehol, it would result in a general conflagration in Manchuria. He did not agree. He thought that if the Communists felt that they had the power for successful military action in Manchuria they would be fighting there now. I disagreed, and reminded him that this view of his was inconsistent with his statement some months ago that neither the Communists or the Soviets wanted to come out into the open in Manchuria, that they wished to accomplish their purpose or gain control under the cover of the Central Government. He made no reply." (*Foreign Relations, 1946*, 10: 83-86.) ★

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 1422. *Top Secret*

August 30, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mr. President: In a series of interviews with the Generalissimo at Kuling I secured his formal agreement to the creation of a special group of five men with Dr. Stuart as chairman to pave the way for the formation of the coalition State Council of 40 members, and also his agreement to have the conclusion of this group confirmed by the Steering Committee of the PCC. This last was to convince the Communists that he was not seeking to evade the PCC agreements of last winter. Since my return to Nanking the two Government representatives have been designated and they left for Kuling this morning to confer with the Generalissimo. Incidentally, he has not in any way moderated his insistence on certain conditions which must be met by the Communists in order to secure a cessation of hostilities.

In view of the conditions mentioned in the last sentence, Chou En-lai is dubious about the proposition of creating the State Council because he

claims it will only serve to give false encouragement to the people generally, here and overseas, as the Generalissimo has no intention of facilitating the cessation of hostilities by moderating his previous harsh terms.

The general situation is this: both sides claim the other side is leading and pressing the fighting. Both claim the negotiations are being utilized by the other side to gain time for favorable military operations. My estimate and that of my associates and a select few of our most experienced foreign correspondents is that the Government militant leaders feel that they can settle the matter by force or at least can gain favorable advantages of position by force in the near future which will compel the Communists to make the desired concessions in order to terminate the fighting.

The Communists have practically reached the conclusion that the Government does not intend to settle matters peaceably and is deliberately pursuing a policy of force. Therefore they are striking as heavy military blows as possible both to protect their military position and to discourage the Government against a policy of force. Also they are seeking by intense propaganda and any other means available to terminate all American assistance to the Government which they claim is making possible the latter's military effort.

There are leading military participants on both sides who confidentially take a somewhat Chinese view that several months of fighting will be a necessary procedure looking to an acceptable adjustment. What happens in the meantime to the hundreds of millions of oppressed people is ignored. Also what happens in the way of Soviet intervention overt or covert is also ignored or not mentioned.

In this situation Dr. Stuart and I are concentrating on the measure to create a State Council as at least one definite step towards governmental reorganization that may exert an influence sufficient to permit us to secure a basis for the termination of hostilities.

Since the Generalissimo in a statement to me last Tuesday declared that all that was necessary to terminate hostilities was for the Communists to stop fighting, and abide by the cease firing order and terms of January 10th, though under my questioning he admitted that he was not moderating his recent terms regarding Kiangsu, etc. Chou En-lai has been considering the possible effect of an independent declaration by Mao Tse-tung calling a halt to all Communist fighting for a period of say four days to see what action the Government would then take. Chou has radioed Yen-an and expects a reply tomorrow morning. Therefore I am leaving for Kuling this afternoon so as to be there in case the Communists take this step. Dr. Stuart meanwhile will continue discussions here in Nanking and initiate the organization of the group under his chairmanship as soon as the two delegates return from Kuling.

The investigation of the Anping Marine-Communist incident has recently gone forward with less of complication than I had feared but I do not anticipate an agreement on the findings.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

TO JAMES V. FORRESTAL
Radio No. GOLD 1428. *Top Secret*

August 31, 1946
Nanking, China

Previous to receipt of your message¹ I advised Admiral Cooke to instruct Rockey to prepare a reasonable schedule for Marine withdrawals from detached posts and notify the Nationalist Commander accordingly that the Marines would be withdrawn on the dates mentioned whether or not National troops took over.

Admiral Cooke and I discussed this problem at length over a week ago at which time I authorized Admiral Cooke to terminate train convoys and for Rockey to commence the relief of bridge guards. This would permit Marine forces to concentrate at a few points and at the same time, require available National forces recently arrived in Chingwantao and due for Jehol or Manchuria operations to be disposed southward along the rail line of communications to Tientsin.²

Incidentally it is very important in this matter from my point of view that this affair be handled quietly, otherwise it would be a victory for the Communists, encourage them to more extreme propaganda and make it very hard for me to influence them.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal had radioed on August 29 that he did not think that the commanding general of U.S. Marine Corps forces in China, Major General Keller E. Rockey, would be able, through his own efforts, to "bring about expeditious relief of Marine detachments on outpost and guard duty." Forrestal feared that armed clashes with the Communists would "lead to an aroused public opinion here exerting significant pressure to withdraw all Marines from China." He thus asked Marshall's advice. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 872-73.)

2. Marine withdrawals from coal-mine and bridge guard duty began on September 15; by the end of the month the troops were concentrated in the Peiping, Tientsin-Taku, Chingwantao, and Tsingtao areas. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 875, 877.)

Greatest Obstacle to Peace

September 1, 1946 – January 7, 1947

The greatest obstacle to peace has been the complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with which the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang regard each other.

—Personal Statement
January 7, 1947

NATIONALIST-Communist fighting escalated in North China during the summer of 1946 and began to spread into Manchuria. Both sides had seemingly concluded that the political issues could only be settled militarily. Neither, however, desired to appear to be the proximate cause of the end of General Marshall's mediation efforts. For his part, Marshall had no desire to be an umpire in a civil war that he suspected neither side could win and he feared might ultimately involve the United States and the Soviet Union, but he believed that he owed the Chinese people his best efforts to seek a solution as long as any hope for one existed. He believed that there were "liberals" among nonparty leaders—and even within the two contending parties—who might be induced to coalesce to facilitate a reformist coalition government under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership. Despite rising hostility toward the United States in China and Chinese press attacks on his personal integrity, Marshall resolved to continue his efforts a while longer. ★

TO SALLY G. CHAMBERLIN

September 3, 1946
Nanking, China

Dear Sally: Katherine has become much worried over the problem of our Leesburg house in view of our delayed return. . . .¹ I have carefully refrained from mentioning any idea of the possible time of my return, because it is so easy for a casual remark to leak into the press and serious deductions to be made which would complicate still further my work out here. Confidentially, it now looks as tho I could not hope to leave here earlier than the middle of November, if then. For a while Katherine talked of leaving the end of August so that she could see Molly and the children before their departure, but she has given up that idea. It might be that we would return via India and would see them there.² You may tell Allene this but I see no reason why Molly should be told. There is a still further possible complication which I can not mention, and I only make vague reference to it here to indicate that it will be futile for you or Allene to try and dope out my movements. Therefore disregard all press guesses and try none of your own.

I left K. at Kuling yesterday looking very well. The air there has the first touch of fall and the weather was exhilarating. She is very luxuriously established and served.

With my thanks in advance in this matter. Faithfully yrs.

G. C. M.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, General); H

1. The omitted half of this letter concerned arrangements for the Marshalls' house in Leesburg, Virginia.

2. Stepdaughter Molly's husband, Major James J. Winn, who had been stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, since returning from the European theater in the autumn of 1945, had been assigned in May 1946 to be liaison officer and assistant military attaché at the newly established (officially, November 1, 1946) U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, India. Sally Chamberlin observed that "Mrs. Winn's departure is almost as indefinite as your return. It may be the middle of next month, or perhaps not until early November, according to what little information she has been able to secure. The Maritime strike has thrown all sailing schedules into utter confusion." (Chamberlin to Marshall, September 18, 1946, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, General].)

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Radio No. GOLD 1446. *Confidential*

September 4, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Ever since the establishment of Executive Headquarters, Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade has been the Director of Operations. Several weeks ago, as you know, Byroade took sick. He was treated on the USS *Repose*, Navy hospital ship, where his sickness was diagnosed as virus pneumonia. Although he has been pronounced fit for duty, I do not wish at this time to again subject him to the rigors of life in China. I therefore wish to turn over to Brigadier General T. S. Timberman, who has been acting as Director in Byroade's absence, the job of Director of Operations and have Byroade returned to the United States for a period of rest and subsequent reassignment. Byroade and his family could return to the States via one of the two Army transports scheduled to leave Shanghai toward the end of this month.

I would appreciate your permission to transfer Byroade to the Office of the Chief of Staff in Washington from which he could be placed on leave for two or three months with the retention of his present grade until termination of such leave. He is clearly entitled to special consideration in view of his outstanding services in China which have been largely responsible for temporarily impairing his health.¹

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Byroade's tour of duty in Peiping ended on September 27. Marshall himself wrote Byroade's Distinguished Service Medal citation and the press release announcing the award. Byroade retained his temporary rank of brigadier general until his next assignment, as a student at the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia, in January 1947, at which time he reverted to his Regular Army rank of captain.

MEETINGS WITH CHOU EN-LAI AND YU TA-WEI

September 4–6, 1946 Nanking, China

CHOU En-lai, September 4, 4:30 P.M.

The Communists had been awaiting the outcome of Marshall's talks at Kuling with Chiang Kai-shek, Chou stated, but government representatives continued to make unreasonable demands and to indicate "a rather evasive attitude" toward cease-fire arrangements. He had gone to Kuling on August 30, Marshall said, in order to be there in case Mao Tse-tung proclaimed a four-day truce (see Marshall to Truman, August 30, 1946, p. 671); he (Marshall) could then press the Generalissimo to do likewise. Chou explained why the Communists were reluctant to issue such an order. Marshall thought that the Communists were basing their objections on propaganda statements—their own and the government's—rather than on facts.

He and Ambassador Stuart had turned their efforts toward getting the State Council going—hoping that a political breakthrough might lead to an improved climate of opinion and offset the failure "to overcome the impasse regarding the cessation of hostilities." Nevertheless, Marshall noted, the Five-Man Committee idea to solve the State Council problems appeared doomed; "we have apparently failed before we have started." The Communists would not participate in the committee or the State Council prior to a cease-fire, Chou asserted; "regarding the propaganda, I wish to make it clear that it was not initiated by my side." Marshall replied that "if both sides would just stop the fighting and would indulge only in propaganda I would be more cheerful about it."

Marshall undertook a defense of the \$500,000,000 (valued as the original cost of these civilian-type goods—see *Foreign Relations, 1946*, 10: 1049–57) China-U.S. surplus property agreement signed in Shanghai on August 30—to which Chou had vigorously objected. (*Ibid.*, pp. 117–29.)

Yu Ta-wei, September 5, 11:00 A.M.

Marshall gave General Yu a precis of his most recent discussions with Chiang Kai-shek at Kuling. "General Marshall pointed out that the Generalissimo did not wish the military and political situations to be discussed simultaneously nor to be correlated; and that he (General Marshall) had convinced General Chou that this was a logical course; and that now General Chou insisted on the two matters being discussed simultaneously, a position from which he would not recede."

Chou En-lai, Marshall noted, had said "that the National Government was using the gold credit it obtained through the surplus property agreement, plus their gold reserves in the United States, to prosecute the war." In effect, Marshall said, the government's advisers were thus using him "to create a chaotic condition in China," and if knowledge of this were made public, it would destroy "the good faith which the United States was placing in the National Government through him." (*Ibid.*, pp. 130–31.)

Yu Ta-wei, September 6, 10:30 A.M.

At the end of their meeting the previous day, General Yu asked Marshall to check into the State Department's refusal to issue a license to China for the export of 130,000,000 rounds of 7.92-mm. rifle ammunition (see *ibid.*, p. 757). Marshall had asked for more information, and Yu presented him with a brief case history. Marshall said he would look into the matter.

Yu reported that the Generalissimo wished to know the status of the Five-Man Committee. Marshall detailed Chou's views of the previous day; he concluded "that there is still a hope of resolving this matter and added that the numerous statements issued by Government spokesmen in the form of propaganda is making solution increasingly difficult." New instructions from Communist party headquarters had probably caused Chou's attitude to "stiffen," Yu suggested. Yu was also worried by the fact that the government continued to demobilize its military forces while the Communists did not. (Ibid., pp. 152–53.) ★

TO COLONEL JAMES C. DAVIS

September 6, 1946
Nanking, China

Dear Davis: I have just received the card of your new firm announcing your membership.¹ They might have included under "recently"—"an intermediary between the Chinese and the U. S. Governments".

I am glad to learn that you have gotten settled and established again in your profession in civil life because I felt rather badly that I had been the cause of so much delay.

I wish I were equally settled and established in civil life down at Leesburg. This is a rough and apparently a very long road that I am travelling and were it not for the fact that I cannot escape the thought that some 400 odd million people are, to a considerable extent, dependent on my efforts I would lose patience.

With warm regards and every good wish for your legal future in which I have complete confidence. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, General)

1. Davis had recently joined Squire, Sanders and Dempsey, Counsellors at Law, in Cleveland, Ohio.

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 1450. *Top Secret*

September 6, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mister President: Since my message of August 30th, GOLD 1422, I have been to Kuling, conferred with the Generalissimo and returned to Nanking where I have conferred at length with Chou En-lai. Following is the situation:

The violence of the propaganda has seriously compromised the project for the meeting of the small group under Doctor Stuart's chairmanship to find an agreement as a basis of organization of the State Council. Chou

En-lai communicated with Yen-an regarding the possibility of the Communists coming out with an order for the cessation of hostilities by their armies for a given period of days in an effort to bring the National Government to similar action. Meanwhile different Government spokesmen, including the Minister of Information and the Chief of Staff, made public announcements that there would be no abatement of the five conditions or stipulations by the Generalissimo before he would consider a cessation of hostilities. Chou En-lai had hoped that if the Stuart group reached an agreement on the formation of the State Council that this could immediately be followed by the cessation of hostilities. It has been the hope of Doctor Stuart and myself that by addressing our efforts for the time being to the single problem of the State Council we might make a gain which would sufficiently influence mutual confidence to permit the arrangement of an agreement for the termination of hostilities.

As the Government campaign in Jehol continues to develop to its advantage, the Government's stand regarding the Communists has become the more implacable regarding the conditions for the termination of hostilities.

In this situation I outlined for the Generalissimo in a completely frank talk the present procedure of the Government, as I felt it involved me and the United States Government indirectly in procedures which were not to be tolerated. For example, when I directed that the Marines be relieved from a number of detached and therefore exposed posts along the railroad, the Marine Commander was informed that the campaign then in progress required all of the available troops in that region until September 23d, notwithstanding the fact that two armies had recently been landed at Chinwangtao, the last one from Formosa. Since the Marines were keeping the railroad open and the railroad of necessity was becoming a factor in a campaign which I deplored and opposed, this situation had to be terminated. I further pointed out that not only was the Government, in the midst of a deplorable currency and financial situation, utilizing its capital resources for the conduct of the present fighting, but I felt certain it was also utilizing for the same purpose such money as already had been received from the sale of surplus property and was counting on larger sums to become available from that transaction. I referred to the rottenness and corruption and extortion in the lower echelons of the Kuomintang Party and stated that there was little hope for correcting such a condition except on the basis of a genuine two party government.

The Generalissimo turned the conversation to the discussion of the State Council and particularly to the Communist claims he anticipated would immediately follow an agreement regarding the State Council. He was particularly concerned to see that they nominated their delegates to the National Assembly scheduled for November 12th. He inferred that the cessation of hostilities would be made dependent on the Communists'

nominating their delegates and he spoke of having a first formal meeting of the State Council and at the same time the announcement of the delegates for the National Convention on October 10th, the anniversary of the independence in China. I took issue emphatically with the idea of prolonging hostilities in such a manner and insisted again that we were now on the verge of a spread of the fighting into Manchuria and once that developed the situation would be completely out of hand. I maintained that, in my opinion, the Communists' first interest at the present time was in seeing that the draft of the Constitution to be presented to the Assembly was actually prepared by the committee in accordance with the PCC agreement and that the Government should go ahead with the prescribed procedure which had been brought to a halt last April. The Generalissimo felt that the Communists would immediately insist on the reorganization of the Executive Yuan, meaning most of the organs of the government, which would be in accordance with the PCC agreements.

Chou En-lai yesterday, in his second lengthy conference with me in the past two days,¹ expressed his reluctance to proceed with the discussion by the Stuart group of the terms for the organization of the State Council unless there was some guarantee that such an agreement would be paralleled by an unconditional cessation of hostilities. He insisted that he should have some guarantee to this effect, but recognized that the Government would not give such a guarantee and therefore appealed to Doctor Stuart and I to do so. We, of course, informed him that we had no power to give such a guarantee. As a matter of fact this was an exact duplication of the Generalissimo's demand on me from Mukden in May to guarantee certain actions by the Communists.

When the meeting with Chou En-lai terminated yesterday evening it appeared that he would consider going ahead with the meeting of Doctor Stuart's group, but only with the understanding that if an agreement was reached and then if a cessation of hostilities did not follow, Doctor Stuart and I would publicly defend the position of the Communists in not going forward with their nominees for the State Council until hostilities were terminated.

A few minutes ago Doctor Stuart and I completed another meeting with Chou En-lai.² He had listed a series of statements regarding the approach to the State Council meeting which he wished us to comment on before he despatched them to Yen-an to explain the situation accurately and, presumably, to get a clearance to go ahead with the meeting of the Stuart group. I am now leaving for Kuling.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 132-46.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 153-58.

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING WITH GENERALISSIMO

September 9, 1946

Kuling, China

FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYE ONLY

I opened the meeting with a resume of the situation regarding the difficulties which were delaying the meeting of the informal group under the chairmanship of Dr. Stuart [i.e., the Five-Man Committee] to reach an agreement for the organization of the State Council. The principal difficulty is that Chou En-lai insists that if an agreement is reached by the Stuart group and this agreement is confirmed by the Steering Committee of the PCC, then hostilities should cease unconditionally. On the other hand, the Generalissimo's concurrence in the organization of the Stuart group was on the basis that it was not to deal with the military question or cessation of hostilities nor would he admit of any abatement of the terms of his five stipulations.¹ I explained the justification for some misunderstanding on the part of General Chou and that he was taking up the difficulties with Yen-an. I also explained that he had cleared with Dr. Stuart and me his understanding of the situation.

I explained that General Chou had made an important point of the Communist refusal to accept the new State Council, if organized, as a basis for settling the terms of cessation of hostilities because that would be done on the basis of the majority vote which was assured to be Kuomintang. General Chou insisted that the terms for the military agreement should be determined by the Committee of Three.

The Generalissimo stated that he was agreeable to the settlement of the military terms by the Committee of Three if the Communists accepted the proposition that this committee would carry into effect;

- 1) the agreement for the resumption of communications,
- 2) an agreement for the military reorganization which would stipulate the localities or places where Communist troops were to be stationed, and
- 3) the terms tentatively agreed to for the settlement of hostilities in Manchuria.

He stated with reference to the five stipulations or demands he had made that most of these will automatically be covered or settled in the reorganization of the Government (except regarding North Kiangsu—regarding which in reality the Generalissimo will depend upon me to settle).

He stated that I should make suggestions with reference to the five points that did not involve military reorganization, and I replied that the only item that was not covered by military reorganization pertained to local government. I mentioned specifically the stumbling block this had been in the discussions regarding Kiangsu. The Generalissimo stated with

reference to the local government issue, that that could be settled by the State Council *including the Kiangsu issue*.

The Generalissimo stated that before the cessation of hostilities could be agreed to the Communists must announce their representatives for the National Assembly.

He stated that he hoped that the draft committee could resume work on the constitution. He stated most confidentially (that his [is] for my information alone and not even for Dr. Stuart's) that when the Stuart committee had made fair progress the Generalissimo would instruct Dr. Sun Fo to reconvene his committee and go ahead with the draft constitution.²

I stated in this connection that we must have quick action regarding the constitutional draft, otherwise the cessation of hostilities would be fatally delayed and once the fighting had spread into Manchuria, the situation for the time being was well nigh impossible.

The Generalissimo insisted that he felt that the Communists would attach major importance to the reorganization of the Executive Yuan, while I was of the opinion that they gave major importance to the drafting of the constitution as a preliminary to the announcement of the delegates to the National Assembly. He wished me to say to General Chou that *in my opinion* the reorganization of the Executive Yuan could only be arranged after the organization of the National Assembly and he authorized me to say at the same time that the Government will ask the constitutional drafting committee to reconvene and get down to work.

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (China Mission, Memoranda-Messages-Cables)

1. In early August, in response to Dr. Stuart's proposal that an informal Nationalist-Communist committee be created to prepare the way for establishing a State Council, Chiang Kai-shek set five conditions that the Communists had to meet before he would approve convening the group: (1) withdraw north of the Lunghai railroad in north Kiangsu; (2) withdraw from the vicinity of the Kiaochow-Tsingtao-Tsinan railroad; (3) withdraw from Chengteh and the area south; (4) in Manchuria, withdraw into the provinces of Heilungkiang, Nunkiang, and half of Hsingan; (5) restore to the government territories taken since June 7 in Shansi and Shantung provinces. (*Foreign Relations, 1946*, 9: 1453; see also pp. 1465-68.)

2. Regarding Sun Fo, see the summary of Marshall's meeting with Percy Chen on August 23, p. 664.

MEETINGS WITH JOHN LEIGHTON STUART, CHOU EN-LAI, AND YU TA-WEI September 10-12, 1946 Nanking, China

JOHN Leighton Stuart, September 10, 7:00 P.M.

Shortly after arriving in Kuling on September 6, Marshall reported, he told Madame Chiang Kai-shek "that the Generalissimo's generals had a sense of false power because of U. S. equipment which they had received and that in their enthusi-

asm over little problems such as North Kiangsu, they are putting the U. S. in a very difficult, almost untenable, position in China.”

At their September 9 meeting, the Generalissimo made an important concession: the local administration question (i.e., who would run the areas that the Communists evacuated) could be referred to the State Council for resolution rather than being a prerequisite for establishing the council. Marshall thought that this “should, unless the Communists adopt new tactics designed to delay negotiations, permit progress in the current negotiations.” Stuart and Marshall agreed that it was extremely important to get the Five-Man Committee into operation. (*Foreign Relations, 1946*, 10: 169–70.)

Chou En-lai, September 11, 10:35 A.M.

Marshall had sent Chou a memorandum summarizing the results of his September 9 talk with Chiang Kai-shek. (See *ibid.*, pp. 168–69.) Marshall elaborated on his understanding of the Generalissimo’s ideas, impressions of Chiang’s intentions, and methods of conducting discussions with him. The Communists’ reluctance to implement the Five-Man Committee had made it harder to persuade the Generalissimo to accept it, Marshall noted, but he had accepted it. Chiang indicated that military terms should be settled in the Committee of Three, but Marshall admitted that his understanding of what the Generalissimo really meant by this was imprecise.

Chou said that Marshall’s memorandum indicated that he had made a great effort to explain to the Generalissimo all the Communists’ positions, but it also seemed to show that Chiang was adding new conditions to his old ones, and if the Communist party also brought forth new conditions “we may well anticipate that the war will just go on indefinitely.” Chou was not sanguine about the Committee of Three’s ability to resolve the military issues or the likelihood of governmental reform, given the government’s attitude toward the Communists. Without a cease-fire, the Five-Man Committee would be useless.

Marshall replied that if Committee of Three meetings “are not at least paralleled if not preceded by, an effort to organize the State Council, we are back exactly where we were on June 30, which is a rather hopeless position. . . . I do not now know where to turn.” (*Ibid.*, pp. 171–82.)

Yu Ta-wei, September 11, 6:00 P.M.

“The negotiations at present have resulted in a stalemate,” Marshall said, and “the Communists were very apprehensive over the good intentions of the Government.” He believed that “General Chou was making a mistake by not going ahead but that General Chou was filled with inhibitions.” Yu thought that the key was to solve the Government-Communist troop ratio. “Attempts to resolve this problem,” Marshall replied, “had in fact led to the present stalemate in that is [*it*] brought up the five conditions by the Generalissimo and the civil administration problem which thus far had been unresolvable.” (*Ibid.*, pp. 182–84.)

John Leighton Stuart, September 12, 7:00 P.M.

Stuart reported on his afternoon meeting with Chou En-lai, who had merely reiterated known Communist views and proposed that the Committee of Three meet to settle all military issues. Marshall thought that since the government probably wanted “all the time it can get as time is to its advantage,” Chou’s stand was “harmful to the Communists.” Convening the Committee of Three was useless “since the Government

Representative would be unable to discuss practically anything." The last time the committee met, Marshall stated, he had needed a month and a half to get the two sides ready for a three-day session. "What if we cease our efforts, don't mediate and don't say anything to anybody," Marshall asked. Stuart agreed that "it would probably be a good idea to wait quietly for a few days." (Ibid., pp. 185–86.) ★

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 1491. *Top Secret*

September 13, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mister President: Since my message of Friday, September 6, GOLD 1450, I have been to Kuling, conferred with the Generalissimo and returned to Nanking and conferred with Chou En-lai, also officials of Government. The Generalissimo agreed on several points at issue and made significant statements regarding other phases of the problem. He agreed to contention of Chou En-lai that settlement of military issues should be by Committee of Three and not by State Council where Government majority could dominate, there being special provision for veto action on such questions by less than majority of votes. He stipulated, however, that all matters pertaining to military reorganization and disposition of troops must be agreed to before cessation of hostilities. He further agreed to leave settlement of the critical local government issue to State Council.

He then stated he would not agree to cessation of hostilities until Communists had nominated their representatives to National Assembly scheduled for November 12th. This, from Communists' point of view, involves completion of work by constitutional draft committee prescribed by PCC Agreement and suspended last April. While I protested against this stipulation involving further delay, I insisted that this committee must immediately be reconvened and he finally agreed to take this action, but only after meetings of special group under Doctor Stuart's chairmanship had reached an agreement on membership and veto provisions for State Council.

He further stated that the provision of the PCC which prescribes that the Executive Yuan, that is the principal organs of government, be reorganized on a coalition basis prior to the National Assembly would not be carried out prior to meeting of that Assembly November 12th. He also stated that the places recently occupied by Government troops would be continued in such occupation though this would be contrary to the cease firing agreement of January 10 last.

Chou En-lai considered that the Generalissimo had now added a new demand to the preceding five demands by stipulating that the cessation of

hostilities would be dependent on the nomination of the Communist representatives to the National Assembly. He insisted that the cessation of hostilities should be the condition precedent to all other matters and that the Committee of Three should meet immediately to determine the arrangements for the termination of the fighting and that, unless this was done, he could not go ahead with negotiations for the organization of the State Council. This, in effect, puts us back to the condition of statement of June 30 last, since the Committee of Three can make no progress unless the Generalissimo modifies his demands or conditions. I have urged the Generalissimo to terminate the fighting but he is adamant in his view that the Communists must first meet certain conditions for the security of the Government and that they cannot be trusted to do so except under the compulsion of the prospect of Government military successes. For the moment Doctor Stuart and I are stymied and can only suspend efforts while we wait and see if Chou En-lai decides that the Communists are losing ground and he had best go ahead with negotiations for the State Council. There are other minor considerations and pressures pertaining to the situation too numerous and involved to discuss by radio. Lack of trust and deep suspicion are the fatal influences at the present time and whatever concessions or agreements are made will be made in spite of them.

I am returning to Kuling today I hope for the last time as the Generalissimo is soon due to resume residence in Nanking which will greatly simplify the physical requirements of my task. Doctor Stuart remains here to seize any opportunity to forward negotiations.

Relief of isolated Marine detachments commences with guards at coal lines [*mines*] on September 15 followed by relief of bridge and other railroad guard detachments.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

NOTES ON CONFERENCES WITH GENERALISSIMO¹ [September 17, 1946]
Secret Kuling, China

On the 15th I informed him of the stand Chou En Lai had taken on receipt of the Generalissimo's statements at our previous meeting—(1) Chou's insistence that the cessation of hostilities was of first importance and that the meeting of the Stuart Group must be dependent on that, and (2) That the Generalissimo's statement that hostilities could not be terminated until the Communists had nominated their delegates to the National Assembly in November was but another demand added to the previous five and was intended to delay the peace in order to permit the govern-

ment forces to carry on their planned campaign. I explained Chou's insistence on an immediate meeting of the Committee of Three.

The Generalissimo in a lengthy discussion stated: (1) That he would agree to the Committee of Three meeting once the Stuart group *gave indication of reaching an agreement* for the organization of the State Council, and (2) That all the Communists had to do regarding his qualification as to the National Assembly was to publish the list of their delegates. If there was a delay it would be their fault and not that of the government.

On September 17th, today I gave him an outline of Chou En Lai's three memorandums to me of September [15th and] 16th of which I only had at that time a brief radio summary.²

He stated that Doctor Stuart's information—which I read to him—that the Government delegates for the Stuart Committee had such precise instructions from him that they *could not* discuss the question of number of representatives of each party to comprise the State Council or the question of veto power, was incorrect. He agreed with me that those were the only two, certainly the major questions, to be discussed. He did not agree, however, to their informal discussion before the formal meeting of the Committee but did specifically agree that they would be the principal subjects for the Stuart committee to discuss and settle. He asked me to comment on the idea of a compromise solution that I had mentioned before—9 Communist delegates, four each from the other two minority parties and 3 non-party members. This I did.

The Generalissimo stated that he was unwilling to have his representative participate in a meeting of the Committee of Three until the Stuart Group had met and made some definite progress.

He was disturbed over a press report that Doctor Stuart had stated that a National Assembly meeting without the Communists would be ineffective or abortive. He stated that the meeting would be held with or without the Communists.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Political Affairs, Conferences Miscellaneous, vol. 5)

1. Marshall departed for Kuling after lunch on September 13 and returned to Nanking on the evening of September 17.

2. These documents (MM 145 and SM 820 of September 15 and SM 827 of September 16) are in *Foreign Relations, 1946*, 10: 189–94. Colonel J. Hart Caughey informed Marshall on September 16 of Chou's memos: "One [SM 820] outlined United States support to the Chinese Government through the medium of some 14 loans to China plus the most recent surplus property sale contract, ending with the following statement: 'I am therefore again instructed on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party and the 140,000,000 population in the Communist-led Liberated Areas to lodge a formal protest through you to the United States Government over this sale and to demand that the United States Govern-

ment freeze up all supplies, shipping, etc., covered by this agreement pending a settlement at the time when peace and unity is restored and a coalition government is initiated in China.' A second memorandum six pages long [MM 145] outlines the fruitlessness of recent efforts in breaking the present deadlock, winding up with the request that you immediately transmit the Communist views to the Chinese Government and that you arrange for the meeting of the Committee of Three at the earliest possible moment to discuss the issuing of a cease-fire order. . . . The third memorandum [SM 827] mentioned his trip to Shanghai and stated 'As soon as you have decided to convene the Committee of Three, I will be back on your notice.'" (Caughey to Marshall, Radio No. GOLD 1514, September 16, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages].)

MEETINGS WITH C. P. LEE AND JOHN LEIGHTON STUART
September 18 and 20, 1946 Nanking, China

C. P. Lee, September 18, Noon

Marshall told Lee, one of the government's representatives on the Military Sub-Committee of the Committee of Three, that the Communists, who had insisted on a cease-fire, now would not go ahead with the Five-Man Committee, which was probably the only method of achieving that end. Marshall suspected that "great complications" were being added by the Democratic League, which heretofore had followed the Communist party as its only hope for gaining power and was now fearful of losing power; for their part, the Communists were fearful that they would lose the league's votes, which they needed to achieve veto power in the State Council.

General Lee thought that possibly the Communists were delaying in the hope that in five more months they would have a better chance of winning; as it was, they had destroyed one-fifth of the government's troops in the last few months and captured enough U.S.-supplied ammunition and equipment to organize eighteen new divisions. The government's military campaign had been more successful than he had anticipated, Marshall thought, but he feared that this would lead to fighting in Manchuria, "and then there would be a total civil war."

Lee asserted that the Chinese people expected that there would be a greater chance for peace after the government captured Kalgan, because the Soviet Union would then press the Chinese Communists to make peace lest they lose more territory. The Communists, however, thought that they were losing territory but not strength, that the government did not have the troops to defend all the places they wished, and that the Communists would attack the weak points. Marshall doubted that the Communists could afford to lose so many big and rich cities." Probably they were "deceived by their own propaganda."

Lee gave Marshall a memorandum proposing that a committee be created to discuss the necessary preparations for either the success or failure of the peace negotiations. (See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 201.) He and Marshall discussed possible members of such a committee. His sole interest, Lee stated, was to increase the government's efficiency, no matter who was in the government. "All improvements in a one party government are superficial," Marshall replied; "the only efficiency of democracy is developed from the pressure exerted on the party in power by another minority power. Every government would deteriorate if it were controlled by one

party only. . . . [T]he main trouble in China now is the lack of opposition from a strong and powerful minority party." (Ibid., pp. 198–200.)

John Leighton Stuart, September 20, 10:45 A.M.

Stuart and Marshall discussed Chou En-lai's insistence that the Committee of Three be reconvened—which Marshall had already told Chou that the government would not accept. Marshall thought that "it was largely a game of 'bluff' at the present time with each side attempting to force the other into an unfavorable position." He thought that recent Communist press accounts were an effort to demonstrate that he and Stuart were aligned with the Nationalists and to pressure the United States into forcing the government's hand on various issues. Stuart said that the Democratic League had begun to break up. Marshall suspected that this was the reason Chou En-lai had gone to Shanghai. (Ibid., pp. 210–11.) ★

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 1549. *Top Secret*

September 22, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mister President: Since my GOLD 1491 of September 13 I returned to Kuling and conferred with Generalissimo, voicing Chou En-lai's resentment over the new condition that cessation of hostilities would also be dependent on publication of Communist delegates to National Assembly scheduled for November 12th and Chou's demanding that meeting of Committee of Three, of which I am chairman, should precede meeting of group headed by Doctor Stuart [i.e., the Five-Man Committee] to settle terms for organization of State Council. Meanwhile Chou En-lai was holding discussion with Doctor Stuart in latter's effort to precipitate meeting of his group for organization of State Council.

Last Monday Chou submitted three memoranda to me: one protesting against surplus property deal, which I radioed at his request to SecState; one relating the course of the "fruitless negotiation" of the past three months and requesting me to transmit this statement to the National Government, and finally, calling on me to convene the Committee of Three immediately; and the third memorandum merely stating that he was leaving that day for Shanghai and would return immediately on notice from me of a meeting of the Committee of Three.

A radio summary of these lengthy memoranda was sent to me at Kuling and I presented the situation to the Generalissimo. He stated that he would not authorize the attendance of the Government representative of the Committee of Three until Doctor Stuart's group had convened and shown some evidence of reaching an agreement for organization of the State Council. He agreed to certain compromise proposals I made regarding the organization of the State Council which I could introduce if the Government members failed to carry their initial proposal as to membership.

I returned to Nanking and conveyed the information to Doctor Stuart who was meeting daily with Chou En-lai's representative, Wang Ping-nan, Chou still being in Shanghai. Wang informed Stuart that Chou desired a formal written reply from me, which I then made, stating the impossibility of holding a meeting of the Committee of Three until the Generalissimo's representative was authorized to attend. I sent the statement by courier to Shanghai.¹ Wang Ping-nan brought me a lengthy reply from Chou this morning, Sunday, which was a further argument for an immediate meeting of the Committee of Three insisting that the Government would not boycott the meeting if I called it, and concluding with the statement that if the meeting was not called Chou would publish the minutes of our conversations.² I informed Wang Ping-nan that I would consider the letter and make a formal reply, that the Generalissimo was now traveling on an inspection trip and would not reach Nanking for two or three days and therefore I could not discuss with him his refusal to authorize the attendance of his representative until he returned. I further made emphatically clear that it was Doctor Stuart and I who were pressing for the State Council group to meet, not the Government, in the hope that an agreement there would create sufficient trust in the good intentions of both parties to enable us to compromise the military issues. I also stated that the present practice of the Communist Party to attack publicly in official propaganda the integrity of my actions and at the same time privately to appeal to me to continue in my efforts to mediate must cease immediately for I would no longer tolerate such a procedure of duplicity, that if they had lost faith in the integrity and honesty of my actions they had only to inform me and I would withdraw immediately as a mediator. I had tactfully implied this before but made it emphatically clear today. Frankly, I think they would be very loath to have me withdraw unless the time in their opinion had arrived to go into a state of complete civil war and to seek such Soviet assistance as they could obtain. Incidentally Wang Ping-nan informed Doctor Stuart that the Soviet Ambassador had called on him and, indicating the American failure, had offered to undertake the role of mediation. Just to what extent this was an accurate statement must be a matter of opinion but it is evident that it might well be considered by the Communists as a means to influence more powerful American pressure on the Nationalist Government. Therefore I take the statement with a grain of salt.

I will make no reply to Chou En-lai until the Generalissimo returns, unless Chou himself returns to Nanking and calls on me personally. And I will ignore his implied threat regarding the publication of the minutes of our meetings. They are far too lengthy to be carried in the press and extracts which would be considered favorable to the Communist contentions would be open to certain questions as to remainder of minutes.

The situation now involves maneuvers of such complicated possibilities or motives on both sides that it is impossible to make a logical esti-

mate. The Democratic League which has been allied with the Communists and whose proposed representatives plus Communists in the State Council might constitute a veto power, has been opposing the meeting of the Stuart group and its leader has been attacking me. But two of its leading intellectuals or liberals have just resigned, one forming another group, which indicates a serious break for the Communists and a possible gain politically for the Government. Chou is in Shanghai presumably in frequent conferences with the head of the Democratic League, who is an astute but somewhat discredited and self-seeking politician, so I am told.³ Confused and maddening as are the developments I have not lost hope at all, for maybe yet we can pull this chestnut out of the cross fire which rages around us.⁴

Doctor Stuart is sending by pouch lengthy written statements of the various meetings and points of view.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. See *Foreign Relations, 1946*, 10: 208–9.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 212–14.

3. For background on Lo Lung-chi and his outspoken and abrasive personality, see Fredric J. Spar, "Human Rights and Political Engagement: Luo Longji in the 1930s," in Roger B. Jeans, ed., *Roads Not Taken: The Struggle of Opposition Parties in Twentieth-Century China* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 61–81. John Robinson Beal considered Lo "a disagreeable fellow" and was "repelled" by him. (*Marshall in China* [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1970], p. 77.) Second Secretary of Embassy John F. Melby, however, was somewhat more impressed with Lo and his realistic grasp of the political situation in China. (*The Mandate of Heaven: Record of a Civil War; China, 1945–49* [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968], pp. 201–2.)

4. President Truman replied on September 26 that he had "the utmost confidence" in Marshall. "I know you can 'pull the chestnut out of the cross fire.' If it can be done at all." (*Foreign Relations, 1946*, 10: 225.)

TO VICE ADMIRAL CHARLES M. COOKE, JR.
Radio No. GOLD 1552

September 24, 1946
Nanking, China

Reference is made to your OTP/emf dated 19 September 46 concerning ammunition and equipment for the Chinese Maritime Customs.¹ The amount of munitions involved is not large, but I am concerned over the fact that some of it, regardless of the amount, might fall into hands of combat troops, and also that a damaging publicity campaign can be manufactured out of such transfer. However, I will concur in principle to the transaction but request that the Maritime Customs Office be required to give formal assurance that this ammunition will not be employed in the present civil strife.²

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. In mid-September, Admiral Cooke had recommended selling limited quantities of small arms and ammunition to the Chinese Maritime Customs organization—whose job was to patrol the coast and the Yangtze River and protect against smuggling, theft of cargoes in ports, and piracy. Marshall replied: “I would prefer that you stop any possible sale for this purpose for the time being.” (Marshall to Cooke, Radio No. GOLD 1494, September 13, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages].)

In his September 19 response, Admiral Cooke said he thought that there was sufficient justification for granting the request and recommended that Marshall approve “in principle now, even though it may be necessary to impose restrictive conditions so as to insure that transferred arms and ammunition will be used for legitimate Maritime Customs functions and not for combat purposes.” (Cooke Memorandum for General Marshall, September 19, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, Navy, vol. 2].)

2. On October 4, a message from the chief of naval operations noted: “In view of General Marshall’s comments, the State Department would only with reluctance concur in principle transfer of arms and ammunition. . . . In light of above, transfer of arms and ammunition to Chinese not approved at this time.” (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 762.)

TO BRIGADIER GENERAL THOMAS S. TIMBERMAN September 24, 1946
OSE 461 Nanking, China

Dear Timberman: The details concerning Chavin’s report on the Anping-Hsiangho area brought to me by Mr. Robertson worries me.¹ Aside from the serious embarrassment resulting from the submission of such a report, it seems to me that much of this could have been avoided by some supervision of the activity of an officer engaged in such a delicate and internationally important incident. I was especially surprised that his preliminary report containing a critical confusion of dates should have been received and filed without even being brought to your notice, not to mention Mr. Robertson’s.

Please eliminate from important posts officers who can not be relied upon for a reasonable exhibition of good judgment, and also please have supervisory checks made on the work of officers who are handling matters of critical importance. Faithfully yours,

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, OSE Letters)

1. Concerning the attack on a U.S. Marine Corps convoy near the village of Anping on July 29, see note 2, Marshall to Truman, July 30, 1946, p. 639. Executive Headquarters created Sub-Team 25 to investigate the incident. Continuing lack of agreement on procedures and conclusions between the Communist member on the one hand and the Nationalist and U.S. members on the other caused the U.S. member, Colonel Raphael S. Chavin, to submit a Nationalist-American report on September 7. On September 24, Marshall directed Timberman to tell Chavin that, “in view of the fact that your statements of dates pertaining to various operations are too general and involve possible misunderstandings regarding incidents at Anping on July 29th, you are directed to submit a supplementary report giving exact dates for various events so far as indicated by the testimony taken by the Sub Team.” (Marshall to Timberman, Radio No. GOLD 1555, September 24, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages].) The supplementary report was submitted on September 29.

TO THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE¹
Radio No. GOLD 1556. *Secret*

September 25, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Last night, Tuesday, a representative of Minister Wang of Foreign Office called to inform me of Gromyko Soviet official statement regarding presence of Marines in China and requested advice as to instructions to be sent to Chinese representative in Paris.² On my statement that I would wish first to receive advice from you, I was told that instructions must be radioed Paris last night. I then counseled statement that Marines were in China under the sanction repeat sanction of the Chinese Government, that their original purpose under armistice agreements was to facilitate and expedite repatriation of 2,500,000 Japanese in China, that this repatriation had virtually been completed and the Marines at present were safeguarding the operation of the Tientsin-Chinwangtao Railroad to insure the transport of vitally necessary coal, and that they were further concerned in providing for the maintenance and the security of the numerous individual Americans of Executive Headquarters in Peiping engaged in the effort to promote peace in China. Further, that the original strength of some 55,000 had been reduced to 22,000 and was steadily being reduced week by week.

The representative of the Foreign Office did not think they would use the facts about the railroad mission and possibly other details. I counseled a frank statement of facts devoid of explanations. I will try to ascertain the actual instructions dispatched. I trust that my advice will prove to be in accordance with the considered action of the State Department.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Under Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson was on a trip to Canada; William L. Clayton was acting secretary, so Colonel Marshall Carter sent the message to him.

2. Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Shih-chieh was China's chief delegate at the Paris Peace Conference (July 29 to October 15, 1946). On September 23, Andrei A. Gromyko (U.S.S.R. ambassador to the United States and chairman of the Soviet delegation to the United Nations Security Council conference at Lake Success, New York) requested that the council consider a resolution he had introduced on August 29 directing U.N. members to report the number and location of their forces in all except former enemy countries. The resolution was aimed at the United States and United Kingdom, and Gromyko charged that their troops were causing unease in the countries where they were stationed (e.g., China, Iceland, Iraq, Indonesia, Panama, Brazil, Greece, and Egypt); he cited various persons' objections to the continued presence of these troops. It was clear, he said, that U.S. troops were no longer needed in China to aid in disarming and repatriating the Japanese, and they were aiding one side in the civil war. This was "a question which does not concern China and the United States of America alone." (*New York Times*, September 24, 1946, pp. 1, 18.)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL CHOU EN-LAI

September 26, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear General Chou: Since your departure for Shanghai we have been steadily hoping that you would return here and thus make possible a resumption of the efforts to end the spreading civil war. The disastrous consequences to the nation of a continuation of the present situation are apparent to all. We continue in our belief that both the Government and the Communist leaders sincerely desire peace and the establishment of a coalition government and the adoption of a democratic constitution, and that the difficulties are largely questions of procedure.

We desire to help in this to the utmost of our ability. We venture, therefore, on the basis of our past friendly relations and our personal esteem for you, to urge that you return to Nanking without further delay in order that we may together explore all conceivable ways and means for the objective we are seeking to achieve.

We have been informed that the Generalissimo returns to Nanking today or tomorrow, weather permitting.¹

G. C. Marshall
J. L. Stuart

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, OSE Letters)

1. Chou replied that he was not unwilling to return to Nanking, but not only did the government give no indication of a desire for the cessation of hostilities, further negotiations would only provide it with a "smokescreen for a free hand to make full scale civil war." Consequently, he preferred to wait in Shanghai for the convening of the Committee of Three. (*Foreign Relations, 1946, 10: 237.*)

TO THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE
OSE 464. Radio No. GOLD 1565

September 26, 1946
Nanking, China

There is an urgent economic need for rehabilitation of Hankow-Canton-Kowloon Railroad which is not related to military activities. This project and the initial or first year requirements for the Yellow River bridge project appeal to me strongly, and I do not think can well be confused with general restrictions on aid to Government of China at this time.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

NOTES OF MEETINGS WITH THE
GENERALISSIMO
Secret

September 28 and 30, 1946
[Nanking, China]

On his return to Nanking from the summer absence I called on him at his house at 11 o'clock on the 26th [28th], outlining the situation at that time. General Chou En-lai remained absent in Shanghai and insisted upon a meeting of the Committee of Three before any other meeting should be held; in other words, that an agreement for the cessation of hostilities should first be reached before entering into negotiations regarding the reorganization of the Government. The Generalissimo briefly discussed the situation and stated that he must be prepared for one of two courses of action—one, if General Chou refused to return to Nanking and negotiations were terminated and the other what action the Government should take to break the present stalemate. He thought that some public statement by him would be advisable and that he was giving careful thought to the matter. He stated that he wished that I would consider such a course of action and give him the benefit of my advice.

I replied that I had already considered such a course of action and had taken the liberty of preparing a statement (copy attached¹) which I thought he might well make. I stated that my principal purpose in preparing such a draft at this time was to illustrate what I thought should be the attitude of the Generalissimo at this moment in the negotiations. I felt that whatever is said there should be an evident spirit of tolerance and a careful avoidance of provocative or irritating statements. I also felt that it was necessary that definite positive action be proposed rather than the usual course of generalities. I suggest that it would be best for him to have my draft translated into Chinese so that he could read it at his convenience and discuss it with me later. He expressed pleasure over the fact that I was ready with a proposal, and I then withdrew.

The evening of the same day, General Yu Ta Wei, my liaison with the Generalissimo, called to discuss the statement and have me explain just what was meant by its various expressions. I made clear that it was intended that if the Communists expressed agreement to the general terms and procedure indicated, that hostilities should cease immediately and the discussions by the Five Man Committee and the Committee of Three should be opened.

A day later [September 30], the Generalissimo requested my presence at his house at 11 o'clock. He stated that he had given careful consideration to my draft, but he felt that it should include a statement that the several agreements indicated should be completed before there could be a

cessation of hostilities. In other words, the Committee of Three would have to reach a complete agreement on the redistribution of troops and for the demobilization and integration of the armies before there could be any termination of the fighting and that the Five Man Committee would likewise have to reach an agreement before there would be such a termination. I replied that this would completely cancel the entire purpose of my proposed statement and that rather than amend or qualify the paper as drawn an entirely new approach should be considered. He asked me if I had such an approach in mind and I told him I did not, that I had included in this proposed statement conditions which I thought sufficiently protected the Government and which I also thought might well be accepted by the Communist Party. I added that his proposal would in effect transform the statement, in which I had endeavored to place him on a high level before the world, into a procedure which was merely a prolongation of what we would call "horse-trading".

The Generalissimo then stated that he thought the time for such a statement had not arrived and that he wished me to convey to the Communist Party his willingness to accept "my proposal" for a simultaneous meeting of the Five Man Group and the Committee of Three. I replied that in the first place, I thought such a proposal would lead to no solution and further that I would not carry such a message orally to the Communist Party. If it was given to me in writing I would transmit it without remark, but that the proposal was not to be referred to as mine since the procedure indicated was merely one piece of a general proposal, the other and vital portions of which had been omitted. I stated that I not only thought that his proposal would lead to no agreement for the termination of hostilities, but that I could not continue under the circumstances in my role as a mediator and I would be forced to report to my Government that I should be relieved of further responsibility in this affair. I also stated that if the written proposal was given me for transmittal to the Communist Party that he should instruct the Minister of Information, Mr. Peng [Hsueh-pei], to avoid any reference to this proposal as mine and that if Peng did so, as had occurred in the past, I would officially deny it. This terminated the interview.

I had dinner with the Generalissimo on the evening of the 30th and while it was not a business meeting, he stated to me before my departure that he had decided not to release any public statement at this time regarding the simultaneous meeting of the two committees.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Political Affairs, Conferences Miscellaneous, vol. 5)

1. See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 238–39.

TO FRANK McCARTHY

September 30, 1946
Nanking, China

Dear Frank: I saw your last letter to Hickey and appreciated your generous references to me.¹ I also saw your reply to _____ who is doing an autobiography of me.² Your hesitance about writing to me is quite unnecessary as I would be delighted to hear from you and of you, and Mrs. Marshall would also. I am not so closely engaged now as I was in Washington or earlier out here, so you need not fear that you are bothering me.³

Katherine spent the summer in the mountains at the summer capitol, Kuling—3500 feet above the Yangtze river valley and 250 miles up the river from Nanking. They gave her a lovely and commodious stone bungalow with a couple of acres of grounds and five old and large trees—a rarity in China. Staffed it with servants for her, provided sedan chair and 6 chair coolies and the same for me with 8 bearers.

I, of course, could only be there from time to time. I made 9 trips between the torrid heat of Nanking and Kuling and it is something of a trip—2 hours by plane, 3/4 hours by gun boat down the river and across, 1/2 hour by car and 2 hours by chair up the mountain by a circuitous and fantastic path with frequent stretches of stone steps, one of 937 at about a 40° angle. Down the mountain only required one hour but was rather exciting with running coolies and precipitous steps and sheer drops of hundreds of feet at one's elbow.

Katherine remained at Kuling from mid July until ten days ago. Then she flew straight in to Shanghai with Madame Chiang and was there 5 days shopping and lunching and dining with Madame's relations. She is back in Nanking now and the weather is fallish and delightful.

Sally looks after my affairs at home and does a good job of it. A Colonel Carter is my go-between for the State, War, Navy, Commerce Treasury departments, the President, the Surplus property and Maritime people and the Import-Export bank. He has presidential authority to deal direct with all concerned in my name or the President's, and does a remarkable job of correlating an international problem of vast complexity and many requirements. He should be Executive Secretary of the State Department, its what they need.

I was glad to learn that Capra's boy got the stamps. If he could have just seen the delegation he would have attached more importance to those particular stamps.⁴ They brought Mrs. Marshall an elaborate star like decoration. Just what it is I do not know. Madame Chiang got one like it. They also gave K. some fine fur skins which will have to [be] died and treated, but are probably of fine quality coming from a region of such extreme cold.

I have gotten along well in health—feel well and am told I look very well, but those about me seem to have a hard time. I had to send Byroade home. He had gotten much run down and was off sick for three months. His replacement with me since last January, Caughey, is off now recuperating from a siege of flu and ear trouble. Hickey has only had one cold. He is a splendid fellow. I had him jumped from warrant officer to first lieutenant and I am now initialing an effort to make him a captain. He wishes to finish his college course and I have promised him a release in time for the semester commencing in January. If you people need a very top grade man you should snap him up without delay. Possibly you might take him on a half day, say 8 to 1 o'clock basis until he finishes his college course. You would be the gainers, for he is unusual in general allaround efficiency, integrity, morals, religion, athletics and social contacts. All like him. He has been virtually my aide, yet does all the office chief clerk job and the stenographic work of our conferences.

Katherine joins me in affectionate regards and all of our best wishes for you. The Generalissimo is giving her a birthday party on October 8th which evidently will be quite an occasion. He is her devoted admirer—a new role for him and she has taught him to play Chinese checkers and croquet—the first diversions he appears ever to have undertaken.

Remember me to Byron Price very especially and to Eric Johnson.⁵ Give my best to Capra. Affectionately—

G. C. M.

GCMRL/F. McCarthy Papers (Correspondence 1946–1949); H

1. McCarthy had written to Richard Hickey, who had worked in the Office of the Chief of Staff during the war, that “there could be no finer training for men of our generation than to see him [Marshall] in action and to learn at firsthand that nothing can beat the combination of intelligence, integrity and appreciation.” (McCarthy to Hickey, August 29, 1946, GCMRL/F. McCarthy Papers [Correspondence 1946–1949].)

2. Sally Chamberlin passed on to Marshall Frank McCarthy’s comment to her: “Bill Frye worked on a Marshall book from time to time during the war, and I had a terrible time keeping him from publishing it. [See *Papers of GCM*, 4: 408–9.] Now the thing comes up again. I don’t want to cooperate in any event, and certainly not unless General Marshall approves of the project.” Frye’s manuscript was due to be finished in November, and he asked McCarthy to assist him in getting access to certain documents and allow himself to be interviewed. (McCarthy to Chamberlin, September 3, 1946; Chamberlin to Marshall, September 11, 1946; and Frye to McCarthy, August 30, 1946, GCMRL/F. McCarthy Papers [Correspondence 1946–1949].)

3. McCarthy had told Hickey: “I have purposefully refrained from writing the General and Mrs. Marshall because both of them are so conscientious about replying and because I would not wish to add anything to their burden.” (McCarthy to Hickey, August 29, 1946, *ibid.*)

4. In May McCarthy had asked Hickey to acquire, for Frank Capra’s twelve-year-old son, some Chinese postage stamps and “a few incoming envelopes addressed to General Marshall” with Chinese stamps. Hickey replied with some stamps and “a few envelopes and some Tibetan postage stamps brought to General Marshall by the Tibetan Good-will

Mission." (McCarthy to Hickey, May 6, 1946, and Hickey to McCarthy, July 27, 1946, *ibid.*)

5. Price and Johnson were vice president and president, respectively, of the Motion Picture Association of America, McCarthy's employer.

TO JAMES F. BYRNES
OSE 475. *Top Secret*

October 1, 1946
Nanking, China

My dear Mr. Secretary: I am transmitting herewith the first sections of a detailed report on my mission to China.¹ It appears advisable to forward these without delaying until the termination of my mission or the completion of a full report as they contain many details which could not be incorporated in my radios which may be of important interest to the Department. Subsequent sections will be forwarded as they are completed.²

G. C. Marshall

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Final Report, Section 1)

1. These twenty-eight double-spaced 8½ x 14-inch pages of text plus appended documents covered the establishment of Marshall's mission, his first meetings in China, the January 10, 1946, cease-fire agreement, and the creation of Executive Headquarters in Peiping. The report was written by Philip D. Sprouse. (See Marshall to War Department, April 28, 1946, p. 532.) Marshall Carter informed the State Department that General Marshall "desired circulation of this report be restricted to a limited few people. . . . Any other distribution would inevitably lead to a leak somewhere, an event that would seriously prejudice his present efforts." (Carter to the Acting Secretary of State, October 15, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Final Report, Section 1].)

2. Five more sections totaling 505 pages plus appendixes, were transmitted to the State Department while Marshall was in China (October 28, November 1 and 27, December 4 and 16). Part seven (59 pages) was produced after Marshall departed. See *Marshall's Mission to China, December 1945–January 1947: The Report and Appended Documents*, 2 vols. (Arlington, Va.: University Publications of America, 1976).

MEETING WITH JOHN LEIGHTON STUART
October 1, 1946, 9:40 A.M. Nanking, China

DR. Stuart suggested that he and Marshall urge the government and the Communists to hold "immediate and simultaneous" meetings of the Five-Man Committee and the Committee of Three. Marshall replied that he had told Yu Ta-wei, his liaison with the Generalissimo, that he would participate in Committee of Three meetings, but he doubted that the Communists would do so under the conditions imposed by the government. Moreover, if the meetings stalemated, Marshall said he was "finished. He would not continue to go along in further delays and long dragged out procedures leading nowhere." He could not, in good faith, "become a party to the

Government's evident delays in negotiations while proceeding with a Kalgan campaign against the Communists." Marshall felt that he and Stuart were, in effect, being made "stooges." He was also inclined to attempt to force government leaders to back down on some of their demands. "Perhaps the best idea," Marshall said, "would be to send some sort of a memorandum to the Generalissimo late this afternoon, informing him that General Marshall had practically come to the conclusion that the United States Government could no longer continue to be a third party to the present procedure." Stuart agreed. (*Foreign Relations, 1946*, 10: 260–62.) ★

MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERALISSIMO
OSE 476

October 1, 1946
Nanking, China

Your Excellency: Since our conversation of Monday morning, September 30,¹ and General Yu Ta Wei's call on me the same afternoon, I have carefully considered all the factors involved in the present status of negotiations and military operations. I have also taken into consideration the later developments;

(1) The Communist announcement of yesterday stating their refusal to nominate delegates to the National Assembly unless certain PCC conditions are met and the announcement of the governmental Central News Agency regarding the operations against Kalgan;

(2) The informal suggestions (Incl. 1)² of Doctor T.V. Soong for a series of actions as conditions precedent to a cessation of hostilities, which he mentioned to Doctor Stuart this morning, and

(3) The memorandum from General Chou En-lai to me (Incl. 2)³ which was handed to me by Mr. Tung Pi Wu today.

I am not in agreement either with the present course of the Government in regard to this critical situation or with that of the Communist Party. I disagree with the evident Government policy of settling the fundamental differences involved by force, that is by utilizing a general offensive campaign to force compliance with the Government point of view or demands. I recognize the vital necessity of safeguarding the security of the Government, but I think the present procedure has passed well beyond that point.

On the part of the Communist Party, I deplore actions and statements which provide a basis for the contention on the part of many in the Government that the Communist's proposals can not be accepted in good faith, that it is not the intention of that Party to cooperate in a genuine manner in a reorganization of the Government, but rather to disrupt the Government and seize power for their own purposes.

I will not refer to the circumstances connected with the ineffective negotiations since last March. I wish merely to state that unless a basis for agreement is found to terminate the fighting without further delays of proposals and counter-proposals, I will recommend to the President that I be recalled and that the United States Government terminate its efforts of mediation.⁴

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, OSE Letters)

1. See Marshall Notes on Meetings with the Generalissimo, September 28 and 30, 1946, pp. 694–95.

2. See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 267.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 258–59.

4. Chiang Kai-shek replied the following day with a list of Communist military provocations and the assertion that: “The Government is more eager than any other party for an early cessation of hostilities, but past experience shows that the Chinese Communist Party has been in the habit of taking advantage of negotiations to obtain respite and regroup their troops in order to launch fresh attacks on Government troops who have been abiding by truce agreements.” Chiang listed two concessions he was willing to make on the number of Communist members on the State Council and the reorganization of the army. (*Ibid.*, pp. 417–18.)

TO THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE
Radio No. GOLD 1587. *Top Secret*

October 2, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mister Secretary: Since my message to the President of September 22d,¹ the following has occurred: Chou En-lai from Shanghai made another demand on me in writing to convoke the Committee of Three stating that he did not believe the Government could boycott a meeting called by me. Meanwhile the Generalissimo had not yet returned to Nanking. On September 26th Doctor Stuart and I jointly addressed a memorandum to General Chou En-lai urging him to return to Nanking expressing our desire to help solve the situation, and stating the Generalissimo was scheduled to return that date, which he did.

The morning of the twenty-seventh, Friday, I saw the Generalissimo and he reviewed the situation stating that he must be prepared for two situations; one, a final rupture with the Communists and two, a method to break the present stalemate. Regarding the latter course, he contemplated a public statement and said he would discuss this with his associates and would appreciate my advice and asked me to consider such a statement. I replied that I had already done so and had taken the liberty of preparing such a statement in order to illustrate importance I attached to his appearing tolerant in attitude and avoiding any provocative or irritating statements and also avoiding generalities and making definite concrete proposals. I handed him draft of a suggested statement which incidentally

had been concurred in by Doctor Stuart. (See GOLD 1588)² Meeting adjourned to enable translation to be made. This was on Friday.

On Saturday [September 28] his representative called on me for an explanation of various portions of the statement. The same day I received a note from Chou En-lai³ thanking Doctor Stuart and me for our message of the twenty-sixth and stating that he would not return to Nanking until the Government gave factual evidence, in reply to his demand for cessation of hostilities, that the negotiations were not to be a smoke screen of delay while an active military campaign was in progress.

On Monday the thirtieth, the Generalissimo saw me and stated that he was agreeable to publishing the statement I proposed if there were added to it a sentence that all the negotiations referred to in that statement must be completed before there could be a cessation of hostilities. I replied that this would vitiate the entire purpose of the statement and that some other approach would be necessary rather than have such a modification of the terms of the statement. I informed him I had no idea what such other course might be.

The Generalissimo then proposed that I inform the Communists that he had agreed to a simultaneous meeting of the Five Man Group under Dr. Stuart and the Committee of Three under me. I told him that I felt certain the Communists would not accept that unless there was an understanding that the Committee of Three would first settle the question of the termination of hostilities and further that I would not carry the message orally but would merely transmit any written proposal he or his representative cared to make. He then directed that such a written proposal be prepared stating "General Marshall's proposal for simultaneous meeting of the two committees" was acceptable to the Government. I stated that that was not my proposal, that it was but a small part of it and he directed the deletion of that phrase. I added that his Minister of Information should be warned not to permit any announcement that this was my proposal because if he did I would publicly deny it.⁴

There were several meetings with his subordinates later and the Generalissimo finally decided not to release to the public his limited proposal.

Yesterday, Tuesday, the frank admission was made to Dr. Stuart by T. V. Soong that the Government desired to capture Kalgan before terminating hostilities.⁵ This reportedly could be accomplished in 10 to 15 days. I should add here that the Generalissimo had agreed, to me in June, that Kalgan was to remain in Communist hands. I also received a letter from Chou En-lai stating that he was instructed to serve notice that if the Kuomintang Government continued the military operations against Kalgan, the Chinese Communist Party would be forced to presume that the Government was thereby giving public announcement of a total national split and that it had abandoned its announced policy for a peaceful settlement.⁶

I decided that a further participation by me in protracted negotiations or time consuming message-carrying would inevitably be judged in effect as participation in negotiations which were a cloak to the continued conduct of a military campaign. I therefore sent a memorandum to the Generalissimo which concluded with this paragraph: "I will not refer to the circumstances connected with the ineffective negotiations since last March. I wish merely to state that unless a basis for agreement is found to terminate the fighting without further delays of proposals and counter-proposals, I will recommend to the President that I be recalled and that the United States Government terminate its efforts of mediation." (See GOLD 1589)⁷

Today, Wednesday, the Generalissimo discussed with Dr. Stuart my memorandum and expressed surprise that I should have raised an issue regarding Kalgan. Dr. T. V. Soong saw me at lunch and went over the situation. I made my position emphatically firm that I would not continue with the negotiations during the conduct of an aggressive campaign. Dr. Soong hoped that some formula for the reaching of an agreement could be found, but his suggestions involved matters of lengthy complication regarding the redistribution of troops in China and Manchuria.

Later in the day, the Generalissimo's representative brought to me a personal reply to my memorandum.⁸ In his reply, he proposed a definite compromise regarding the representation in the State Council and tied to it the demand for immediate implementation of the program for the reorganization of the army and location of the 18 Communist divisions to be settled and the dates determined for the arrival of the Communist troops in the assigned place. If those agreements are reached, he would agree to a cessation of hostilities. The second portion involves a complicated logistical re-study in view of the confused state of troops and the paucity of communications. If literally complied with, a considerable time would be involved while the campaign progressed. The Communists I am certain, and I,⁹ would be opposed to this requirement. I merely transmitted his proposal in writing to the Communist representative. I am aware of the delicacy of the position my communication to the Generalissimo places the United States in its relationship to the situation in the Far East but I do not think our government can be a party to a course of questionable integrity in negotiations and I therefore felt that this fact must be made unmistakably clear to the Government.

I am addressing this message to the Secretary of State rather than the President because of its length and because I felt that while he need not be troubled until the matter progresses further, it is important that the State Department be immediately aware of what is happening.¹⁰

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. See above pp. 688–90.
 2. GOLD 1588 transmitted to the State Department the draft in *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 238–39.
 3. See *ibid.*, p. 237.
 4. The Central News Agency published such a statement on September 30; Marshall's denial was released on October 3. See *ibid.*, p. 280.
 5. See *ibid.*, pp. 266–67.
 6. See *ibid.*, pp. 258–59.
 7. GOLD 1589 transmitted to the State Department Marshall's Memorandum for the Generalissimo of October 1, pp. 699–700.
 8. See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 270–71.
 9. The words "and I" are not in the version of this document in *Foreign Relations*; see *ibid.*, p. 274.
 10. In an October 3 recapitulation of a conversation between Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs John Carter Vincent about this letter from Marshall, Vincent noted that they thought "the chances are better than 50–50 that the jig is not up; that there is better than an even chance that the General will be successful in calling Chiang's hand. General Marshall is obviously mad. . . . He clearly feels that his honor is at stake." After noting three conditions under which the negotiations might break down, Vincent stated: "In any event we should make it clear to the Chinese and to our own public that we mean to stay with the problem but stay out of involvement in the civil war." (*Ibid.*, pp. 276–77.)
- On October 4, Acheson told Marshall that he had discussed Marshall's latest messages with President Truman. They continued to have "confidence that you can do the job if it is humanly possible," and they would do nothing about recalling him until Marshall indicated that it was advisable. (*Ibid.*, p. 289.)

NOTES OF MEETING WITH THE GENERALISSIMO
Secret

October 4, 1946
[Nanking, China]

The Generalissimo made the following comments on my memorandum of October 1st (OSE 476), stating that unless certain action was immediately taken I would recommend to the President that I be recalled and that the American efforts at mediation be terminated. He stated that he had searched his mind for any action that might have been construed as lack of integrity in action on his part without result. Such an action by him was unthinkable—that, aside from his position as head of the Government of China, his own conscience as a Christian would forbid. He regretted exceedingly if anything had occurred to give rise to such a belief and he could only assure me that I was mistaken. He did not feel that it was a matter that could be discussed.

The Generalissimo stated that my departure from China was unthinkable. I could not possibly cease my efforts of mediation, that the crisis in China was the most important in the world at the present time and my efforts were of great historic significance. He could not consider such action on my part; that nothing that he could recall had affected, surprised

or had disturbed him so much mentally. He also said that a satisfactory basis could be found for the continuation of my mission.

I replied that I was not implying any question of the integrity of the Generalissimo, but rather to my actions and position and to that of the United States as represented by my actions; that I was convinced that a campaign of force was in progress and the negotiations could be charged as a cover for the campaign and as such I could no longer participate. I cited that in June he had acceded to my proposal that Kalgan be left to the Communists and at that time the Government was in a very much weaker position than at the present time, (Chengteh had been captured, most of Hopeh and Jehol had been taken over and his troops had advanced well beyond Peiping in the direction of Kalgan, and also were about to capture Chihfeng and Tolun—all critical strategic points). To say at this time that Kalgan was of such strategic importance that the Government could not consider any arrangement whereby it would not occupy that place was not consistent with the action in June in view of the much weaker position of the Government at that earlier date. The present procedure therefore clearly meant to me a campaign of force and not a settlement by negotiation.

I reminded him that at the end of June I had opposed the whole procedure indicated for July and August where he declined to accept the agreements openly reached, and stated that there would be only local fighting in China Proper and no fighting in Manchuria; that I disagreed not only with that conception, but I thought it inevitably meant the development of a full-fledged civil war entirely beyond his, or the Communists', control for a long time to come and also that it would provoke a situation which would be an invitation to the Soviet Government to intervene in Manchuria.

The Generalissimo replied that his reference to Kalgan in June was not an agreement—that the Communists had not accepted the proposal. I replied that it wasn't a question of agreement, what I referred to was a statement of a condition that existed then when he was willing to submit himself to such agreement in contrast to the strong position of the Government at the present time when he was unwilling to call a halt to the operations against Kalgan unless the Communists agreed to its occupation by Government Forces.

The Generalissimo made a lengthy statement—more or less reiterating the matters referred to above and also going into the various aspects of negotiations with the Communists—but he gave no indication of stopping the operations against Kalgan.

In conclusion I stated that I regretted to inform him that nothing had transpired in our discussion that caused me to alter my point of view—in fact, I was the more convinced that the U.S. Government was being placed in a position where the integrity of its action could be successfully questioned and therefore I must recommend to the President my recall.

Note: That evening General Pee,¹ the Generalissimo's aide, called on Dr. Stuart to make some inquiry regarding a meeting Dr. Stuart had had with Communist officials. Dr. Stuart remarked to General Pee that General Marshall was sending a message to the President recommending his recall. About a half-hour later General Pee called up Dr. Stuart and stated that the Generalissimo would like to see him immediately, that was 8 p.m. Dr. Stuart reported to me about 9:30 the substance of the conversation which involved a discussion of the declaration of a truce for a short period halting the advance on Kalgan. I had already dispatched my message to the President (GOLD 1000 [1600]) and thereupon sent a message in the clear (GOLD 1605) directing that its delivery to the President be delayed until further instructions from me.²

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Political Affairs, Conferences Miscellaneous, vol. 5)

1. This was Brigadier General Peter Pee.

2. GOLD 1600 is the following document. GOLD 1605 is Marshall to Carter, October 6, 1946, pp. 710–11.

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 1600. *Top Secret*

October 5, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mister President: Since my message of October 2d to SecState (GOLD 1587)¹ the following has transpired. While I have not yet received a reply from Chou En-lai in Shanghai to the Generalissimo's proposal of Wednesday October 2d, his representatives did spend two hours with me Friday morning² explaining that they had sent the message both to Yenan and Chou but no answers had been received. As the message made no reference to Chou's demand for cessation of advance on Kalgan they pressed me to obtain some answer to that specific point. I told them to put their query in writing and I would transmit it but would no longer be a messenger for oral communications. They wished to know if the Generalissimo would abide by the agreement of January 10th which would require all troops to withdraw to their point of location on January 13th. I replied that while I had no positive information on this point my impression was—actually I am certain—that the Generalissimo will insist on maintaining military occupation of the various places or regions recently occupied. While the interview was lengthy it consisted mostly of repetition of past contentions or events.

Last night, Friday, the Generalissimo called Doctor Stuart and me into dinner. We had a conference of about three hours. He made a lengthy statement to the effect that my memorandum to him of Tuesday, October 1st (GOLD 1589)³ had caused him more distress than anything that had

happened in years; that he had searched his thoughts and actions and could not find anything that might have given the impression of ulterior motives or deception; that such would be intolerable for him personally and he felt that we should jointly endeavor to clear up any misunderstandings. He stated that it was unthinkable that I should cease my efforts at mediation and leave China; that this was he thought the most important issue before the world and my mission was of great historical importance. He recited the actions of the Communists which justified his mistrust and which demanded of him, as President, that the security of the country be a first consideration. He referred to the strategical importance of Kalgan as a Communist threat to Peiping as well as a barrier on one rail line south, and for the National Government a point of separation of North China Communists from Manchuria. He said that once Kalgan had been occupied—it may take about ten days or so—he would be ready to cease hostilities.

In reply I summarized the lengthy negotiations of May and June, pointed out the fact that then, when the Government was in a far weaker North China position than today, he had conceded to me that he would agree to the Communists holding Kalgan but insisted that they must evacuate Chengteh—northeast of Peiping. Today with the Government in possession of Chengteh and the surrounding region, he now asserted that the possession of Kalgan was of vital importance to the Government. I was not disputing the importance of Kalgan, that was a matter for the Government to decide, but the course of events and statements made convince me that while the Communists were demanding a cessation of the fighting, the Government was actually pursuing a policy of force. I was also convinced that any negotiations not only specifically included complicated questions which would be time consuming while military operations progressed, but also that the Government's proposal for negotiations now were definitely made at the point of a gun. I could not serve as a mediator under such conditions. I based my discussion on the grounds that there must be no question regarding the integrity of my position or actions, that I could not place the United States Government in a position where the integrity of its actions as represented by me could be successfully questioned.

There was a lengthy discussion back and forth with frequent references by him to the bad faith or unjustified actions by the Communists and my counter examples of questionable actions by the Government representatives. He insisted that a solution must be found and that he could not accept my withdrawal. But he did not concede an inch regarding the continuation of the campaign against Kalgan. I think his leaders have carefully played their cards to create this situation believing that, because of

Soviet considerations, we would be forced to go along with protracted negotiations while the campaign progressed as they desired.

Despite the present vicious Communist propaganda of misrepresentation and bitter attacks, and their stupid failure to agree to the proposal of Doctor Stuart and me for the Five Man Group to settle the State Council issue—actuated, we think, through fear of exactly the delays their refusal has led to with its attendant military crisis for them—my view is that the United States Government cannot afford before the world to have me continue as a mediator and should confidentially notify the Generalissimo accordingly.

I believe that this is the only way to halt this military campaign and dispel the evident belief of the Government generals that they can drag us along while they carry through an actual campaign of force. If I am recalled, Doctor Stuart will be here in a position to negotiate if so desired when the two sides reach an impasse as they undoubtedly will, but just when I cannot estimate with any prospect of accuracy.

I therefore recommend that the procedure indicated by the following suggested message from the President to the Generalissimo be considered, it being understood that if the time involved in deciding on, and in sending, the message and in awaiting a reply exceeds a week the prospect is that the Government will have achieved its purpose in capturing Kalgan. Just what the Communist reaction to that would be, particularly regarding any degree of genuine cooperation in National Assembly or reorganization of the Government, I can only guess. You at home can judge of Soviet reactions. Should you feel that our Government can accept the situation I have outlined until the fall of Kalgan, I will go ahead gladly in my endeavors to bring about a cessation of hostilities.

Suggested message: “Your Excellency: General Marshall has advised me of the situation regarding his efforts in mediation and of his discussions with you. He has recommended that his special mission be terminated and that he be recalled. He has explained to me, as he informs me he has explained to you, that he feels his continuance in the role of mediation under present circumstances of extensive and aggressive military operations would place the United States Government in a position where the integrity of its action, as represented by him, would be open to serious question.

I deplore and I know the people of the United States will deeply regret that his efforts to assist in bringing peace and political unity to China have proved unsuccessful, but there must not be any question regarding the integrity of his position and actions which represent the intentions and high purpose of the United States Government. I therefore with great regret have concluded that he should be immediately recalled, and I do so

with a full realization of the great consideration and distinguished courtesy with which you and your people have welcomed and received him.”

If I am recalled for consultation as suggested in Mister Acheson’s message of October 4 (WAR-82325),⁴ or otherwise, I think a declaration of policy and directions regarding United States personnel in Executive Headquarters and the MAG [Military Advisory Group] can await my arrival home, leaving Doctor Stuart possibly to profit by the effect of my withdrawal. Naturally the contents of this paragraph should not repeat not be made known to the Generalissimo.

The message should be sent through our Embassy here for delivery by Doctor Stuart in order to save time involved in Chinese Washington Embassy use of commercial communications. While there is still time for the Generalissimo to reverse himself, I think it of the greatest importance that no intimation of this action leak into the press where it would do irreparable injury to the Chinese Government in favor of the Communist. Finally I believe that while the Communist would welcome any action from the viewpoint of possibly forcing the Government to terminate hostilities they actually would be much worried to have me leave.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. See Marshall to the Acting Secretary of State, October 2, 1946, pp. 700–703.
2. See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 281–87.
3. GOLD 1589 transmitted Marshall’s OSE 476 to the State Department. See Marshall Memorandum for the Generalissimo, October 1, 1946, pp. 699–700.
4. See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 289.

TO THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE
Radio No. GOLD 1601. *Secret*

October 5, 1946
[Nanking, China]

The Commanding General of the Marine Forces in China has submitted to COM Seventh Fleet a request to obtain authorization for dependents to join the officers and men of his command in China. I am in sympathy with this request, but must consider the world reaction in view of the current reports regarding presence of Marines in China. Arrival of dependents could and probably would be misconstrued as evidence that the United States intends to keep the Marines here indefinitely.

On the other hand, the move might be justified as a privilege accorded Army and Navy personnel now serving here,¹ to the Marines in view of the fact that this station for several years will be in the Pacific when they are withdrawn from China. If handled in this manner by a planted question in a State or Navy Department interview immediately following notification of families, I would offer no objections from this end, but the

question I am sure is one requiring consideration by the State Department.²

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. The first ship carrying U.S. Army and Air Forces dependents had arrived in Shanghai September 22. Due to the severe housing shortage in Nanking, Shanghai, and Peiping, Marshall had to intervene with the Chinese government several times to arrange for housing rentals. The War Department was warned that an officer who tried to rent housing on the open market would discover that it cost more than his salary. (DETCO Shanghai to War Department, Radio No. 260530Z, September 26, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Dependents].)

2. Someone wrote on the War Department's received version of this message: "Navy takes dim view [of sending Marine dependents], but if they consider, *will* coordinate with State." (CM-IN-1214. [October 6, 1946], *ibid.*)

TO COLONEL MARSHALL S. CARTER
Radio No. GOLD 1604. *Restricted*

October 6, 1946
[Nanking, China]

I recently learned that during the late war, a Swiss parasitologist, Doctor R. J. C. Hoeppli, looked after the American Consulate in Peiping in a highly creditable manner and was largely responsible for the care given Doctor Stuart and his two companions in captivity.¹ During most of the Japanese occupation period, he lived in the American Compound. I am told by Doctor Stuart and Peiping authorities that his exceptionally thoughtful and considerate handling of American interests evoked favorable comment on all sides.²

Walter Robertson reports Doctor Hoeppli was commended to the Department by Roger Peter Butrick, Counselor of Embassy. Butrick's reports may reveal more details.

The point is that Dr. Hoeppli has apparently received no official recognition for his interests. He is an exceptionally fine man according to all accounts and he did the United States a great service. I understand he is very much interested in further research study in the States. Please see what State Department might be able to do for him. This question was raised solely by me on hearing casually from Doctor Stuart of what had happened.³

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. As president of Yenching University outside Peiping, Stuart had refused to close the university or to move its students and faculty when Chinese troops evacuated the region in 1937. On December 8, 1941, the Japanese placed him under house arrest for the duration of the war.

2. Hoeppli was on the staff of the Peiping Union Medical College, whose building had been occupied by Executive Headquarters since January 1946.

3. Marshall soon discovered that the Swiss government would not permit its officials to accept foreign decorations for the neutral services they performed during the war. Consequently, the State Department was seeking to arrange to present engraved silver trays to the nearly 180 people, mostly Swiss, who had helped the United States in various ways, but this needed congressional authorization, which was likely to take considerable time. Congress had also failed to pass legislation the department had requested that would have funded government-sponsored research study in the United States, so Marshall directed the Embassy to arrange a trip to the United States with "VIP treatment and plush handling." The medical college, which was largely funded by private contributions from the United States, gave Hoeppli a year's leave with full pay and all expenses. (See the file on Hoeppli in NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Miscellaneous II]. The quote is in Carter to Marshall, Radio No. WAR-84204, October 29, 1946.)

TO COLONEL MARSHALL S. CARTER
Radio No. GOLD 1605. *Top Secret, Eyes Alone*

October 6, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Reference my GOLD 1600 dated October 5, consider all of that message which follows the sentence commencing "Despite present vicious Communist propaganda etc." shall be considered cancelled and the following paragraphs substituted: "Sunday, October 6, since the foregoing was written and dispatched to Washington the following transpired: The Generalissimo learned indirectly yesterday evening that I was dispatching a recommendation to the President that I be recalled. He sent for Doctor Stuart and discussed with him the possibility of a truce in the operations against Kalgan to permit of a meeting of the Five Man Group to determine the representation on the State Council and also regarding the announcement of the Communist delegates to the National Assembly, and a meeting of the Committee of Three to determine on the reorganization and redispotion of the troops under the basic agreement of February 25.

This morning Doctor Stuart and I had a two and one half hour interview with the Generalissimo with the following results. He remained unwilling at this time to utilize my previous recommendation for a public statement by him including specific conditions (see GOLD 1588). He insisted upon the method of a ten day truce at this time to meet the situation, during which the Five Man Group under Doctor Stuart would settle upon a representation for the State Council and establish a basis for the announcement of the Communist delegates to the National Assembly. At the same time the Committee of Three under my chairmanship would meet to arrange for the immediate implementation of the program for the reorganization of the army, the location of the Communist divisions and schedule of movements thereto. He desired that this method be put forward as a proposal of Doctor Stuart and myself to which we agreed.

He agreed to the arrangement whereby teams from Executive Headquarters would insure that no movements or actions occurred on either side in violation of the truce. The teams within the Communist lines are not repeat not to have a Government representative and the teams within the Government lines are not repeat not to have a Communist representative. The teams between the lines would have a representative from both parties. The American member would have the sole right to determine where and when a team would move and would report on the situation direct.

He further agreed that both Government and Communist parties should refrain from any announcement regarding the truce, leaving that function to Doctor Stuart and myself.

Chou En-lai's representative here in Nanking will be called in this afternoon and informed in accordance with the foregoing. Under these circumstances the latter part of my message of last night, GOLD 1600, should be cancelled but I think it would be to your advantage in reaching an understanding of the situation to read what I then proposed and later directed Colonel Carter to delay in transmission until I could learn this morning of the intentions of the Generalissimo.

I will inform you as quickly as possible of the reaction of the Communists."

Note for Carter: Submit to the President and Acting Secretary a redraft of the message as above directed and attach to it plainly labelled "Cancelled portion of GOLD 1600 for background information only."

NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages]

TO WALTER S. ROBERTSON¹ AND BRIGADIER
GENERAL THOMAS S. TIMBERMAN
Radio No. GOLD 1606. *Top Secret, Eyes Only*

October 6, 1946
[Nanking, China]

The Generalissimo has agreed to halt advance on Kalgan for a period of ten days (date of initiation not yet determined) to permit further discussions here regarding number of seats to be held by Communist Party in the State Council, the submission by Communists of delegates to National Assembly, and the terms for the implementation of 25 February reorganization agreement. The Communist are not yet aware of this proposal and may not agree.

In order to supervise and control activities, both Government and Communist, in the field it presumably is to be agreed that teams will

be quickly dispatched to insure the observation of the truce as regards movements or regrouping of troops. Government representation will be omitted from teams within the Communist lines and Communist representation will be omitted from teams within Government lines. Full representation will be had on teams or team between the lines. The American member to have complete authority to determine where and when a team shall go and both sides to guarantee general safe conduct. The American member to make reports direct to Central Control team, if there is such, or to Executive Headquarters commissioners.

This truce is to apply to operations against Kalgan and is not to be confused with a general cessation of hostilities.

Make your plans accordingly but until receipt of notice of acceptance of truce by both parties do not disclose foregoing information to any Chinese.

I don't know how many teams or how many individuals should be involved, you are a better judge of that, but it should be a considerable number in order to avoid any recriminations.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. October 11 would be Robertson's last day as U.S. Commissioner at Executive Headquarters. Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., replaced him and also assumed command of the Peiping Headquarters Group.

MEETINGS WITH JOHN LEIGHTON STUART, CHOU EN-LAI, AND OTHERS
October 8–10, 1946 Nanking, China (except as indicated)

JOHNS Leighton Stuart, *October 8, 11:45 A.M.*

Chou En-lai's response to his and Marshall's proposals on Kalgan, Stuart reported, was to demand a cessation of hostilities everywhere, not just around Kalgan. Marshall and Stuart agreed that this was a reversal of attitude by the Communists. Marshall thought that Chou's assistants (Wang Ping-nan and Tung Pi-wu) ought to be asked to attend a meeting that afternoon to determine if the Communists' attitude had really changed. Marshall then dictated a press release on the current state of negotiations. (See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 312–13.) "General Marshall concluded by stating that General Chou En-lai's reply appears to make further negotiations impossible and that the Government now will find justification for continuing the advances on Kalgan." (Ibid., pp. 311–12.)

John Leighton Stuart, Tung Pi-wu, and Wang Ping-nan, October 8, 4:00 P.M.

"I am completely baffled as to what your position is now," Marshall told the Communist delegation. When he was pressing the government to halt the Kalgan advance, Marshall said, government leaders had told him that meeting the Communists' demands would simply result in their bringing forward "other complications." He had denied this, but "apparently I was entirely wrong." When he and Stuart had proposed the Five-Man Committee in the hope of ending the hostilities, "Yenan twisted that

into a Government effort to provide delay as a cover for their campaign. . . . Now here again Doctor Stuart and I make a definite effort, far greater than you gentlemen evidently comprehend, to obtain what General Chou was asking for, with this futile result. . . . What now do you expect of Doctor Stuart and myself, if anything?"

Tung and Wang blamed the government for the negotiations problems, but Marshall rejected this. A ten-day truce was insufficient, Tung said; the Communists wanted a complete and indefinite cessation of the offensive against Kalgan and its vicinity and a return by government troops to their original positions. Mr. Tung said that while the Communists appreciated Marshall and Stuart's efforts, he hoped the mediators could stop the United States government's "one-sided aid to the Chinese Government" and "have a fair mediating process which would be acceptable by both sides." Marshall replied: "I don't accept the statement regarding the United States Government and I don't like the inference of the second portion of your statement. My impression at the present time is that I very much fear my efforts in negotiations have terminated. That is all I have to say." Ambassador Stuart sought to elaborate on the reasons for his and Marshall's proposals. Mr. Tung said that he would tell Chou En-lai of their conversation. (*Ibid.*, pp. 314–19.)

Chou En-lai, October 9, 11:30 A.M., Shanghai

Marshall had Alvan Gillem invite Chou for lunch at his house in Shanghai, and Marshall left Nanking by air at 9:00 A.M. When Chou arrived, he was surprised to find Marshall there. "I made this engagement to meet you in this manner in order to avoid any publicity," Marshall explained, and told him of the previous day's "unsatisfactory" interview with Tung Pi-wu and Wang Ping-nan. When Chou expressed some objections to the wording of Marshall's October 6 memorandum to Stuart and the Marshall-Stuart public joint statement of October 8 (see *ibid.*, pp. 299–300, 312–13), Marshall replied that he had hurriedly dictated both documents and the felicity of his writing style was not the issue; the point was that Chiang Kai-shek had had no hand in either document. The key problem was "to so arrange matters that the active operations in the region of Kalgan could be quickly terminated." Marshall said he assumed "that there would be a general discussion the moment we get this fighting stopped."

The Generalissimo considered his proposals the maximum concessions he could make, but from the Communists' point of view they were not concessions but conditions, and Chou listed some examples. Marshall interrupted to note that "the limitations on matters to be discussed results from my effort to put as few difficulties as possible ahead of the termination of hostilities," not from anything Chiang Kai-shek had decided.

The attack on Kalgan convinced the Communists that "the situation has come too far to be saved," Chou said, and described the extent of the government's military initiatives in recent weeks. Since June 7, the government had occupied 107 cities formerly under Communist control; the "Communists are offering little or no resistance." Thus a mere temporary armistice was not crucial for the Communist party, in Chou's opinion. Moreover, Chiang's ten-day armistice proposal was merely a breathing spell in order to move troops and supplies. "We have learned a lesson from the two armistices in June," Chou stated, "that despite the fact we made tremendous concessions there will be no settlement." He then listed three military prerequisites for a successful truce: (1) troops of both sides to return to their positions of January 13 in China proper and June 7 in Manchuria; (2) locations of both sides' troops to be fixed; (3) government forces that had moved since January 13 were to return to their origi-

nal locations. In addition, Chou listed eight political points that had to be discussed. He also complained about U.S. assistance to China's government and about a seeming anti-Communist bias in Marshall's and Stuart's public statements. "Having heard your statement," Marshall responded, "it would seem that my efforts of mediation appear futile and I see no practical basis for any other action on my part." (Ibid., pp. 332-41.)

Yu Ta-wei, October 10, 10:45 A.M.

The tenor of Chou En-lai's written statement to the government setting forth the three military and eight political points "would indicate a more amenable attitude" than he had indicated the previous day, Marshall thought. Marshall outlined the salient points of his meeting with Chou. In response to General Yu's question about what he (Marshall) would do now, Marshall replied that there was nothing he could do and that he would let Ambassador Stuart handle negotiations for the time being. (Ibid., pp. 348-49.) ★

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 1627. *Top Secret*

October 10, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mister President: As indicated in my GOLD 1605,¹ the Communist representatives in Nanking were immediately advised of the proposal of the ten day truce with meetings held by the Five Man Group and the Committee of Three to carry out, or to consider, the matters stated by the Generalissimo in his reply to Chou En-lai of October 2d. As a safeguard against misunderstanding in handling this business orally, I immediately dictated a personal memorandum for Doctor Stuart stating the conditions of the truce, as I understood them. However, the Communist representative Wang Ping-nan had called so quickly following Doctor Stuart's notice to him that my memorandum did not reach Doctor Stuart until a few moments after the departure of Mister Wang. I therefore sent a copy of the memorandum to Mister Wang and another copy by plane to General Chou in Shanghai. Doctor Stuart's oral statement incidentally had been in complete accord with my written summary (the reason for this detailed information will be evident later).

Two days later, on October 8th, Mister Wang delivered verbally the reply from General Chou in Shanghai to the effect that the truce should be without a time limit and the Government troops should withdraw to their original positions. Also, that the discussions should not be limited, and further that no reply had yet been made to the Generalissimo's communication of October 2d, because the Communist Party had been hoping that some word from General Marshall and Doctor Stuart would be forthcoming clarifying the situation, and finally stating that the latest proposal implied that the situation had not changed much.

Doctor Stuart and I decided that it was important, particularly in view of my previous strong stand to the Government, that the situation be made accurately and publicly known and therefore prepared within the hour a joint public statement (copy is transmitted in the clear as GOLD 1628).

The same afternoon I had an unsatisfactory interview with the Communist representatives, Mister Wang Ping-nan and Tung Pi-wu, in which they alleged evil or subtle motives on the part of the Government in accepting the truce proposal and brought forward other contentions which I felt were not supported by the facts and so informed them. They finally made a statement criticizing the American policy in supporting the Kuomintang war effort and implying a partiality on my part. I informed them I would not accept the first statement and I did not like the implications of the second.

I then decided that in order to make every possible effort, I would go to Shanghai the following day, yesterday, and have an interview with General Chou En-lai, which I did. He was unaware of my purpose or presence until he arrived at General Gillem's house. We had a three hour interview, the first portion of which was devoted to a lengthy discussion of the expression used in my personal memorandum to Doctor Stuart of October 6th: "The purpose of the truce is *to carry out* the two proposals of the Generalissimo in his communication to me of October 2d," and the expression "to consider" the two proposals of the Generalissimo in his communication of October 2 as used in our public release. It was difficult to understand what was in Chou's mind for his reactions were clouded with suspicions and seemingly the more innocent the procedure, the greater are the suspicions, as in this case. Actually the Communist Party felt that they were not being invited to sit down at a table to negotiate, but rather to sit down at a table and accept conditions virtually of surrender, which was not at all the case, and yet it was almost impossible to convince them to the contrary.

Doctor Stuart and I have been struggling to initiate actual negotiations between the two parties, but the suspicions are so overwhelming that thus far, as you are aware, we have been unsuccessful.

I found it impossible to convince General Chou that the truce was not repeat not a Government maneuver to permit them to regroup, reinforce and resupply. I could not repeat not tell him, of course, that I have literally forced this much of a concession out of the Government though I was struggling for far more. I think at the moment of this interview General Chou was taken back and rather put on the defensive by two things, one was our public statement of successive events from September 30th on and the other was my unexpected arrival in Shanghai in contrast to his rather indefensible position of remaining aloof from negotiations. He resented the public release and asserted that while we did not express an

opinion, nevertheless the timing had been to the disadvantage of the Communist Party. He objected to the so-called limitation of the matters to be discussed, notwithstanding the fact that I had held these down to the very minimum in favor of the Communist desires, that is, to have as little as possible to clear up as conditions precedent to the cessation of hostilities. There was no thought of preventing unlimited discussions once hostilities had terminated. This Communist position presents a strange paradox because it would imply what is plainly contrary to the facts, that they were insisting on the continuance of hostilities until all matters had been resolved. The fact is the Government has been proceeding somewhat along this line and I have continually objected. As a matter of fact, the Communist reactions now are really somewhat psychoneurotic, induced by an overwhelming suspicion and the feeling that the life of their party is being threatened by military and secret police action of the Government.

Chou finally summed up his views and the Communist stand on the various questions as follows: . . .²

I then replied, "All I can say is that, having heard your statement, it would seem that my efforts of mediation appear futile and I see no practical basis for any other action on my part. I will deliver the eight points to the Government. I hope that you will make your own written reply and I can but express my regret at this ending of our discussions.

I told you some time ago that if the Communist Party felt that they could not trust to my impartiality, they merely had to say so and I would withdraw. You have now said so. I am leaving immediately for Nanking. I want to thank you for coming over here to General Gillem's today and giving me this opportunity for a direct conversation with you."

While the foregoing would appear to indicate the termination of my negotiations with the Communists, I do not think that will probably be the case.

This morning, representatives of the Young China Party and the previous Secretary General of the Democratic League who had resigned because of his disapproval of their procedure [Liang Shu-ming], called on Doctor Stuart and proposed, for my agreement, that they interview the principal Government leaders and then proceed immediately to Shanghai and bring General Chou back to Nanking. Doctor Stuart is arranging to have the Government leaders give them a very considerate hearing, and they seem to feel they will have no trouble in bringing back General Chou in a manner that will be face-saving.

I apologize for such lengthy statements regarding minor details of these complicated and vexing negotiations, but it is difficult to condense the happenings without probable distortion of significant phases. Post script with reference to termination of my negotiations with Communists,

while checking this message a request from Communist Wang Ping-nan to see me has just been received.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. See Marshall to Carter, October 6, 1946, pp. 710–11.

2. What followed was, in 723 words, a reordering and close paraphrase (to protect U.S. encryption integrity) of Chou's October 9 memo to Marshall listing the Communists' three military prerequisites for a successful truce, the eight political points that had to be discussed, and the Communists' objections to United States and Marshall's policies. See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 345–48.

MEETINGS WITH JOHN LEIGHTON STUART AND WANG PING-NAN
AND C. P. LEE

October 10 and 12, 1946 Nanking China

JOHNS Leighton Stuart and Wang Ping-nan, October 10, 6:00 P.M.

Marshall described to Wang his surprise at discovering, during his Shanghai meeting with Chou En-lai, that Chou made a “great issue” of the wording of two Marshall-dictated documents. (See the meeting summary on p. 713.) “We have so many things that are in dispute, are genuinely in dispute,” Marshall continued, “that it seems too bad when differences between the Government and the Communist Party develop over my wording. I tried to say all this to General Chou but I did not appear to make him understand. I could only guess that his general suspicion was so overwhelming that he could not accept my explanation.”

More important than this, in Marshall's view, was Chou's opinion that for the Communists even to consider the Generalissimo's most recent propositions was equivalent to a surrender. He and Stuart did not believe that the Communists were “committed to anything except to sit down at the table.” Chou had also reversed his position on the extent of negotiations: previously he had sought to limit discussions to the Committee of Three and the cessation of hostilities; now he wanted unlimited discussions. This, Marshall told Wang, “left me completely baffled.”

Doctor Stuart commented on Chou En-lai's October 9 response to Chiang Kai-shek's proposals and to Marshall and Stuart's mediation efforts. (See the meeting summary, *ibid.*, pp. 713–14, and the document in *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 345–48.) He and Marshall thought the ten-day truce with negotiations was a good idea, and they were disappointed with Chou's indication of “an uncooperative attitude” and with a morning press story stating that a Communist spokesman in Shanghai asserted that he and Marshall were deliberately helping the government. Marshall concluded that he was hopeful about the possibility of successful negotiations, if undertaken. He then delineated his understanding of the government's minimum demands, so that the Communists would not misunderstand what might be achieved. Wang Ping-nan promised to report the gist of the meeting to Chou En-lai and to Yen-an. (*Ibid.*, pp. 354–58.)

C. P. Lee, October 12, 9:40 A.M.

General Lee came to report on developments in his effort to assemble a group of influential people to help Marshall and Stuart with Chinese political issues during the

mediation. "General Marshall wondered whether this is the right moment to initiate such a group, in view of the fact that Kalgan is now captured and the Communists have declared a National split. And yet, if we should wait for further development, it might be too late." Marshall thought that Lee might discuss his ideas with the Communists, so long as Lee did not reveal that he had already discussed it with Marshall. (Ibid., pp. 360–61.) ★

DRAFT NOTES OF MEETING WITH GENERALISSIMO¹ October 13, [1946]
[Nanking, China]

General Pee and Dr. Stuart interpreted.

The Gimo inquired if there had been any further proposals by Communists.

Doctor Stuart replied in the negative and at Gen. M— suggestion related what he had learnt from Mr. Liang that morning.

Gimo discounted statement that minority parties had united in stand against [a meeting of the] National Assembly under present conditions. He thought a different reaction would be apparent in a day or two. He explained that formal confirmation [by the government] of assembling meeting was a routine procedure, completely justified, in *his* opinion. He wished us [Stuart and Marshall] to consider the possibility of his making a statement as suggested by General Marshall on the Gimo's return to Nanking; modified in accordance with recent changes in the situation.

Gen. M— had understood the Gimo at their last meeting to suggest this [statement], specifically mentioning General Chou's last memorandum, of October __ [9]. The Gimo said he did not want any reference to General Chou's memo. General Marshall replied that it was not a question of reference to the memo, but of consideration of the statements in the memo. The Gimo stated that he was not considering that. Gen. M— asked what change in the situation was to be considered then other than the occupation of Kalgan?

Gen. M. continued by stating that the important factor was the immediate cessation of hostilities; that even if the Communist were forced to submit to various agreements by the pressure of armed action there could be no healthy result in the political negotiation and reorganization of the government—the bitterness engendered would be too deep and the spirit of revenge and distrust too great.

The Gimo said that he could not agree to an unconditional cessation of hostilities without some evidence for the people and the government leaders that there had been advantages gained for the reorganization of the government. He mentioned the announcement of the Communist delegates to the National Assembly as an example.

Gen. M reminded the Gimo that in early July he [the Generalissimo] had stated that it was necessary first to deal harshly with the Communists and later after 2 or 3 months to take a generous attitude. Certainly now, 3½ months later with the government in possession of all the important strategical points, it was the time for a generous attitude.

The Gimo agreed but repeated his previous statement.

Gen. M— questioned the Gimo regarding the reorganization of the Ex[ecutive] Yuan. The Gimo replied that he would make no reference to that in his statement, it must come after the National Assembly.

Gen. M questioned the Gimo as to why the Constitutional Draft Committee was not reconvened. While the answer to this indicated willingness to have that Committee get back to work it was not clear as to “why etc.”

The Gimo closed the meeting by saying that he wished to wait a day or two, watch developments and then make his decision.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Originals); H

1. Another version of this document is in *Foreign Relations, 1946*, 10: 363–64.

MEETINGS WITH JOHN LEIGHTON STUART, S. A. TRONE, AND C. P. LEE October 14–16, 1946 Nanking, China

JOHN Leighton Stuart, October 14, 5:00 P.M.

The previous day Marshall had written a new draft of the public statement he and Stuart wished Chiang Kai-shek to issue. It called for immediate and simultaneous meetings of the Five-Man Committee and the Committee of Three based on nine “understandings”: five on troop dispositions; four on political problems (i.e., the P.C.C.’s Steering Committee was to confirm any understandings reached by the Five-Man Committee, the State Council was to settle questions of local government control, the Constitutional Draft Committee was to be convened at once and a draft submitted to the National Assembly, and the Communists were to announce their participation in the National Assembly). (See *Foreign Relations, 1946*, 10: 367–69.) Stuart and Marshall agreed to send the statement to the Generalissimo.

Stuart reported that Sun Fo was going to reconvene representatives of the minor parties to discuss the measures the Generalissimo indicated the government was now prepared to initiate. When he had seen Chiang Kai-shek earlier that day, Stuart said, the Generalissimo wanted the United States to guarantee that the Communists would negotiate in good faith. Marshall replied that “it would be equally impossible for the American mediators to guarantee the actions of the Communists as it would be for the Generalissimo to guarantee the activities of people like Chen Li-fu and other reactionaries in the Kuomintang.” (Ibid., pp. 366–67.)

S. A. Trone, October 15, 10:15 A.M.

Trone said that he had spent many years in Russia as an electrical engineer for the General Electric Corporation. The Soviet Union was changing but was still a socialist state. Moreover, “there is no need of personal individual freedom to live and to

develop; and, Russia, as a state, is powerful and strong” and greatly desired peace. He thought that it would be impossible for the Chinese government to develop Manchuria economically, and the Soviet Union represented a great danger to China’s economic self-sufficiency. Consequently, peace with Russia was extremely important, not merely a paper peace between rival parties in China.

Was he suggesting that Russia be brought into the present Chinese negotiations, Marshall inquired. Trone implied that Marshall was correct, and Russia would want assurances from the United States that the United States would not attack the U.S.S.R. Russia had no ambition to control Manchuria, because it was engaged in developing Siberia. Marshall observed that developing eastern Siberia would be extremely difficult, but with 50 percent control of Manchuria it might not be necessary. Furthermore, “logistically speaking, it would be extremely difficult for the United States to attack Russia. Therefore, it is nonsense to ask for such an assurance.” The United States wanted a united, prosperous, and strong China, nothing more. Mr. Trone stated that Russians were unconvinced by American professions of sincere and unselfish intentions, but an agreement between the countries would be mutually beneficial. (NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Political Affairs, Conferences Miscellaneous, vol. 5].)

C. P. Lee, October 15, 11:15 A.M.

Lee reported that Tung Pi-wu of the Communist delegation had told him that the fundamental question in China was between the United States and the Soviet Union. Tung also asserted that the Communists’ loss of Kalgan was not important because they had not lost military strength, but that the United States’ China policy would not determine the issue. “American policy is one thing and [Communist] propaganda another,” Marshall responded. The Communists, General Lee observed, were now accusing the United States of gathering the world’s conservative elements, including the Philippines, to oppose Russia. Marshall said he “resented very much the bringing of the Philippine Islands into the discussion,” and that “American policy toward the Philippines was one of the most honorable episodes in world history.”

The Communists were being badly defeated, Lee said, and if the government showed leniency toward them, peace was still possible. Dr. Sun Fo, a pro-democracy member of the Nationalist party’s left wing, had created an organization similar to the Five-Man Committee and was conferring with the Generalissimo. Marshall thought it “best to wait and see what Dr. Sun and his group would do.” Liang Shu-ming of the Democratic League, however, believed that Chiang Kai-shek’s announcement of the convocation of the National Assembly had “closed the front and back doors for further negotiations.” Marshall did not agree. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 372–73.)

John Leighton Stuart, October 16, 11:00 A.M.

Ambassador Stuart outlined recent developments in the negotiations. Marshall reported that the previous evening Madame Chiang had called to show him a rewritten version of the statement he had produced for the Generalissimo. The revised version “was jumbled in thought and provocative in nature,” so he “struck out considerable portions of the Generalissimo’s version.” (The revised version is *ibid.*, pp. 373–75.) Even so, Marshall said, there remained three important matters to be settled: (1) an understanding by both sides as to what the statement actually meant; (2) a method for putting the procedure into effect after it was agreed to; (3) a resolution of the local administration issue for Manchuria. Given the “vicious personal attacks

of the Communists on him," Marshall thought Dr. Stuart should handle the negotiations until the Committee of Three actually began meeting. Both men agreed to "exert every pressure on the Generalissimo" to issue their statement without delay. (Ibid., pp. 375–76. Chiang Kai-shek issued the redrafted statement on the evening of October 16; see *ibid.*, pp. 377–78, 380–81.) ★

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 1663. *Top Secret*

October 17, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mr. President: Since my message of October 10, GOLD 1627,¹ Dr. Stuart has had frequent interviews with Government officials, the leading member of the Democratic League and the leading members of the Young China Party, as well as with non-party men of prominence. A lengthy message from Shanghai dated October 9 was received by me from General Chou which was transmitted to the Government.² It is repeated to you in GOLD 1662. The Generalissimo made a broadcast on the tenth reiterating his stand and reasons therefor.³

As a result of the interviews with Dr. Stuart, a group representative of the leadership in the Democratic League and the Young China Party proceeded to Shanghai with the purpose of inducing General Chou to return to Nanking. Unfortunately at the same time without notice to us the Government issued an official confirmation of the date for the National Assembly, November 12. This aroused strong feeling in all minority parties and made it impossible to persuade General Chou to return to Nanking. The Generalissimo in explanation to Dr. Stuart and me stated that the formal confirmation of the November 12 date was merely a routine procedure, a matter to which he felt no proper objection could be taken. The regulations of the Kuomintang required a formal notification and confirmation one month before the date of meeting. The minority parties on the other hand claimed that this is a matter of great importance to them and an evidence of unilateral and dictatorial action on the part of the Government. Dr. Stuart and I thought the proclamation at that time was tactless, an unnecessary irritation, but it did not appeal to us as a matter of great moment. However leaders of the Democratic League insisted that it was of great moment and we would make a serious tactical error in not repeat not considering it as such. Their reasoning stems from an oral discussion and claimed agreement on April 24 between representatives of all the parties and the Generalissimo at the time of the decision to postpone the meeting of assembly scheduled for April [May] 5.

Since October 10, Doctor Stuart and I have had frequent interviews with the Generalissimo, which finally resulted last night in the issuance

by him of a public statement based on my original proposed statement (see GOLD 1588) with modification by him in the introduction, with additions by me to the conditions or understandings, which in turn the Government modified in part (see GOLD 1661).⁴ The most serious modification related to the exclusion of Manchuria from the regions in which the Government agreed to settle the question of local government in the State Council. However the Government conceded that the location of troops, Communist and Government alike, would be settled by the Committee of Three and, probably most important of all that the Constitutional Draft Committee would be immediately convened and its draft would be the basis for discussions by the National Assembly.

This morning the Generalissimo sent me a formal letter transmitting the body of his public statement and requesting Dr. Stuart and me to transmit it to the Communists.

Just what the Communist reply will be is difficult to predict. During the last call on Chou En-lai in Shanghai by representatives of the other minority parties, he listened in silence to their persuasions, making no reply whatever. There is the possibility that the Communists will decline to accept my services in the Committee of Three. Dr. Stuart, however, does not share this fear. While I felt that Dr. Stuart's position in China was beyond attack as to the integrity of his actions, yesterday an attack was made on him as being subservient to a U. S. governmental policy which was hostile to the Communists. We must await and see the developments of the next few days before attempting to estimate the situation.

Incidentally, we should have in mind that the Communists are, I think, sincerely convinced that the surplus property transaction has had and is having an important influence on the continuation of military operations. As a matter of fact it will be several months before the non-military products of this negotiation are received and ready for distribution in China, and probably four or five months before the truck transportation, for example, will be received and sufficiently reconditioned to be available for use. Nevertheless the Communists' belief, while exaggerated in propaganda, is fairly sincere. They are of course unaware of the restrictions that have been placed on the National Government in the shipment of ammunition, airplanes, and similar items. Their rank and file very naturally, particularly in view of their vigorous and skillful party propaganda, is embittered by the fact that they are confronted in the fighting with American munitions. The fact that this equipment of the armies of China is based on agreements as far back as 1943 does not enter into their reasoning. They themselves lack in equipment and ammunition and they are driven back by American equipment and ammunition. Their argument, in effect, is that the National Government should be disarmed, which would be the case if denied the use of the American munitions which are the

basis of their army organization. I elaborated on this point of view not at all as an argument but merely to assist you in evaluating psychological reactions at the present time.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. See above, pp. 714–17.
2. See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 345–48.
3. See Ambassador Stuart's report on this, *ibid.*, pp. 359–60.
4. Versions of Marshall's statement for the Generalissimo are all *ibid.*: pp. 312–13 (first draft, October 8); pp. 367–69 (second draft, October 14); pp. 373–75 (third draft, October 15); and as issued by the Generalissimo on October 16, pp. 377–78.

TO GENERAL OF THE ARMY HENRY H. ARNOLD

October 17, 1946
Nanking, China

Dear Arnold: I have lost all contact with you aside from the knowledge that you are Fish and Game Commissioner of California.¹ This one item of information suggests to me glorious fall days in the mountains for fish, and pheasant hunting de luxe. I envy you your freedom. Make good use of it.

My work goes on interminably, rather like the seemingly never ending battle to establish Overlord.

Katherine and I live comfortably, possibly luxuriously by U.S. standards, but our thoughts and longings are concentrated on Leesburg and Pinehurst.

Molly may be leaving Washington now with the children in the Generalissimos new C-54, headed for a fast trip to Nanking. She has been waiting since September for ship passage to India where Colonel Winn is located as a military attache.² Katherine of course is thrilled with the prospect of being a grandma again.

My plane—Churchill's old one—hit a soft spot in the run way or taxi way here a week ago while turning, sank one wheel in deep, breaking off the nose wheel and twisting the nose out of plumb.

I am completely out of touch with home affairs, Army, etc and can hardly recall when I was in the midst of things. It is a great relief not to be burdened with War Department responsibilities, but my troubles have merely been transferred to another issue and other surroundings—while you fish and shoot, damn it!!

I wish we could go again in the higher altitudes for golden trout. You must really organize a good expedition for me on my return, that is after I finish my gardening chores at Leesburg and Pinehurst.

Give our affectionate regards to Mrs. Arnold and keep a fair share for yourself—and my best to David.³ Aff[ectionately],

G. C. Marshall

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Collection (H. H. Arnold); H

1. Arnold had stepped down as commanding general of the Army Air Forces on February 9, began his final leave on March 3, and formally retired as of the end of June 1946. He lived on a farm near Sonoma, California, and was serving as a member of the California Fish and Game Commission.

2. On the Winn family's transportation problems, see Marshall to Chamberlin, September 3, 1946, pp. 675–76. Hearing of their plight, Chiang Kai-shek volunteered to fly them over in his new plane. In March 1946, the Chinese National Aviation Corporation had requested Pan American World Airways to procure and convert a four-engine Douglas C-54 Skymaster military transport for Chiang Kai-shek's use. General Wedemeyer asked that the commanding general of the Army Air Forces (General Carl Spaatz after February 9) help expedite the process. (Wedemeyer to Spaatz, Radio No. CFB-26400, March 23, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Miscellaneous].) After many delays, the aircraft and Winns arrived in Shanghai on November 11.

3. David Lee, Arnold's youngest child, was a member of the class of 1949 at the U.S. Military Academy.

TO MRS. JOSEPH W. STILWELL

October 20, 1946
Nanking, China

Dear Mrs. Stilwell: I hope my cables reached you, though they are a poor medium for sympathy.¹ Katherine and I both feel deeply for you and the children, especially as the time had just come for Stilwell to settle down with you in the lovely surroundings of Carmel and enjoy the peace and comfort of life that had been denied him for so long a time.

Yesterday we attended a memorial service in his honor in the Hall of the Ministry. About 1500 were present, including a large representation from the troops that he had commanded in Burma, flown in here for the occasion. The ministers of the government and the leading officers of the army were all present. The decorations were rather unique and very elaborate, the altar or dais was set with flowers, ceremonial incense braziers, huge candles, etc. The walls were hung with panels of writing, tributes from the leading governmental figures. (A printed volume of these I believe is being prepared for you). Altogether it was a very impressive setting and ceremony and at least a partial tribute to Stilwell's services to China.

Our stay here remains indefinite. Katherine longs to get back to her house at Leesburg and the lodge at Pinehurst. However, she is radiant now over the expected arrival of Molly and the two children, en route to India to join her husband at New Delhi. She has been trying to get transportation since mid-September and has finally gotten an air lift this far. From

Shanghai she will probably go on by a freighter as no passenger boats seem to be scheduled.²

Please give our love to the family and for yourself our affectionate regards and understanding sympathy. Faithfully yours,

GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)

1. Stilwell, who had been commanding general of Sixth Army since March 1, had entered Letterman Hospital at the Presidio in San Francisco on September 28 for what was described as a check-up. He had an operation for a liver disease on October 3, but his condition was soon reported to be "critical." He died on October 12 at age sixty-three. On the sixteenth, his ashes were scattered at sea off Carmel, California, from his former plane by his crew from the China-Burma-India Theater. (*New York Times*, October 10, 1946, p. 14; October 13, 1946, p. 1; October 17, 1946, p. 9.)

Marshall had written to both Stilwell and his wife on October 5 expressing sympathy for his illness and to Mrs. Stilwell on October 13 expressing sorrow for the general's death.

2. The Winn family departed for India by air on November 20.

MEETINGS WITH HU LIN, CHOU EN-LAI, AND OTHERS October 22, 24–26, 1946 Nanking, China

HU Lin, October 22, 6:00 P.M.

Editor of the country's most respected newspaper, *Ta Kung Pao* (*L'Impartial*), which prided itself on its journalistic objectivity (see newsman John R. Beal's opinion in *Marshall in China*, p. 64), Hu Lin thought that the Third Party Group was beginning to exercise some influence to help the mediation. It could guarantee fair treatment and overcome the deep Nationalist-Communist suspicions. Marshall agreed and outlined the background of the Five-Man Committee and the current negotiating situation. Since the Communists had turned down the government's eight points, Nationalist leaders would insist that this proved that the Communists would not abide by agreements. Marshall also elaborated on his idea that the Communists were captives to their own propaganda regarding U.S. actions and intentions, especially regarding surplus property transactions. He thought Hu Lin "might be able to break down this particular theme of propaganda through judicious application and treatment of this subject in his paper." (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 409–12.)

Chen Cheng, Yu Ta-wei, and John Leighton Stuart, October 24, 10:30 A.M.

"General Marshall stated that he had been more or less forced to withdraw from negotiations since the Communist Party is of the firm belief that he is backing the National Government." He had received from Dr. Stuart a copy of Chou En-lai's response to the government's eight proposals (see *ibid.*, p. 412). Marshall described the Third Party Group's current role in the discussions.

General Chen thought that "recent Yen-an broadcasts would indicate that the Communist Party was not in a frame of mind conducive for a peaceful settlement." Consequently, the Third Party Group would have difficulty in resolving the issues raised by the Communists in their response to the government. He agreed with Marshall's assertion that "the reorganization of the armed forces was the basic factor in the present negotiations." Marshall said that the government was being "unrealistic" in

attempting, under the February 25 military reorganization agreement, to fix the location only of Communist troops, not of government troops; this merely stimulated Communist fears. Marshall then questioned Chen and Yu about Chiang Kai-shek's proposals on Communist military withdrawals in Manchuria. Dr. Stuart commented on his meeting with Chou En-lai, noting that, in essence, the Communists had rejected the government's eight points. (Ibid., pp. 414–17.)

Miao Yun-tai, October 25, 2:00 P.M.

Mr. Miao, a Yunnan province financier and a nonparty member of the Third Party Group, thought that it might not be a good idea for him to participate in the political talks as the key issues were military. Marshall discussed the military problems briefly and noted that Third Party Group influence was the only real hope for a settlement—provided they had “wise direction” and remained unified.

Personally, Miao said, “he was not adverse to letting the two major parties fight it out *if* the Kuomintang leaders could give some assurance that they could destroy the Communists.” He asked Marshall what he thought of the idea that he (Marshall) or some other American be given command of all Chinese forces. This was impractical, Marshall replied. “Command amounts to nothing unless it is respected.” The government's power would be undermined if an American commanded, and “it would create an international political situation which would be unacceptable.” As an example of what could happen, Marshall observed, Communist propaganda “had almost completely destroyed the effectiveness of Executive Headquarters.”

The Third Party Group was the key, Marshall reiterated. They could examine both sides of the situation; furthermore, the government was dependent upon them for the success of the National Assembly. Marshall advised that they “should get down to the fewest possible issues, get the fighting stopped, and settle certain fundamental issues, particularly like the organization of the State Council.” (Ibid., pp. 421–23.)

Chou En-lai, October 26, 11:30 A.M.

Chou briefed Marshall on six military operations, saying that the government had occupied nineteen cities so far in October. If these advances continued, Chou said, he could see no necessity for continuing to negotiate. As the Committee of Three still formally existed, he desired that it take action on the military problems.

Marshall noted that he had gained the impression that Chou's mind was closed, so “there would be little purpose in my arguing with you regarding various aspects of the situation.” Marshall also explained wherein he thought Chou was incorrect in his views, information, and presumption of evil purpose in the various proposals the government had made (e.g., regarding the ten-day truce). Chou denied misunderstanding the Kalgan truce idea or the government's publicly stated eight points. He then examined the eight points and how they amounted to a government demand for surrender. If there was a total breakdown in relations, he asserted, the Communists would not only adopt a stance of all-out resistance but would attack the government's numerous weak points.

The discussions seemed to “be going somewhat in a circle,” Marshall observed. “What I most deplore is allowing any small thing, any matter of form, to delay or prevent an understanding for a cessation of hostilities.” The question was, “What are the small things and what are the large considerations?” He recognized that each side assumed that the other would not abide by any agreement. “From my point of view,” Marshall said, “both sides have been pretty wrong.” Moreover, “the Third Party group

appear to be endeavoring to act in a strictly impartial manner,” and Chou would be making a mistake to go to Yen-an in the next few days on the basis of the discussions held so far. Chou replied that he would wait a few days and see if the Third Party Group could construct some compromise formula. (Ibid., pp. 425–35.) ★

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 1695. *Top Secret*

October 26, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Since my GOLD 1663 of October 17, the so-called Third Party Group consisting of the Democratic League, the Young China Party, and the politically active non-party people have sent an important delegation to Nanking to act as intermediaries in the negotiations. The same morning, Monday last, General Chou En-lai returned in a US Army plane. Unfortunately, the Generalissimo had previously been long scheduled to leave Sunday, the day before, for his first visit of Formosa in 40 years. He postponed his departure 24 hours so as to receive Chou and the Third Party Group personally on their arrival. His action in this matter, I am certain was without intention to influence one way or another the negotiations. Chou's decision to return to Nanking was not made until late Saturday and was unknown to the Generalissimo until eight PM Saturday. The previous information from the Government representatives who had gone to Shanghai to persuade Chou to return and had reported to the Generalissimo Saturday morning, was that Chou had refused to return.

Since arrival in Nanking the Third Party men have been continuously occupied in discussions with Government representatives, Communists, Doctor Stuart and me. They are acting as a united group, at least for the time being, and are very earnest in their endeavors to bring about a peaceful settlement. They state that unless certain commitments are made by the Government regarding the procedure for convocation, delegates, etc., for National Assembly, the Third Party will not attend. This incidentally is their principal weapon to influence action on part of either Government or Communists.

General Chou rejects the eight-point statement of the Generalissimo, refusing to revive those portions of the June negotiations on which a tentative agreement had been reached. I think this action is based on two considerations, one pertaining to complete distrust and consequent misconceptions and the other one to establish a basis for maneuvers or trades in getting some concession regarding Kalgan and the continued Government military occupation of places recently taken over. Incidentally, Antung in Manchuria was taken over by the Government today and an operation against Chefoo is fully under way. The Communists are trading,

I believe, between their stand for the return of all troops to their January 13th positions in China and June 7 positions in Manchuria, against the Government's stand to continue in occupation of places recently taken over. Communists' present occupation of Harbin might possibly be traded by them against Government possession of Kalgan, etc. The Communists had agreed in June to release Harbin to the Government, the Government on the other hand was then ready to accept continued occupation of Kalgan by the Communists.

Since Chou's return he called on Doctor Stuart once, Tuesday. Doctor Stuart reported on this, "The interview was a long story of distrust and misconception". Chou did not communicate with me until he appeared unannounced late this morning and had a two hour conference with me, not including the half hour we devoted to lunch.

Doctor Stuart and I have, in effect, kept clear of the negotiations this week, endeavoring to push to the public forefront the Third Party and Doctor Sun Fo. At the same time, the Third Party members have reported to us and consulted us.

Chou today recited most of the differences from the Communist point of view taking the stand that the Government had stipulated unacceptable terms which amounted to a surrender, and was at the same time determinedly pursuing a full dress military campaign. He said Yen-an, learning of the Generalissimo's departure, had recalled Chou but he had advised against his leaving Nanking for the next few days in the hope that some good might come from the Third Party effort. He then covered the military situation of aggressive Government actions and said he made those comments to me as a member of the Committee of Three. I asked whether or not he was suggesting an immediate meeting of the Committee and while his reply was a somewhat complicated statement, apparently he was not asking for such a meeting at this moment. I tried to disabuse his belief regarding the Formosa trip and informed him that the Generalissimo returns tomorrow, Sunday, at two PM.

We had a long talk but it was without much effect as he adheres stubbornly to his belief in Government duplicity of intent as to the Kalgan truce episode and prejudiced action by Doctor Stuart and me in giving a press release on it, and regarding unreasonable or evil purposes of the Government in putting forward the eight points in the Generalissimo's statement of October 16th. The important point of the interview today was the fact that Chou called on me despite his attacks on the impartial integrity of my actions and my final statement in our Shanghai interview that by his own statements he had terminated my services as mediator.

I can make no predictions favorable or unfavorable. Negotiations are still underway and, very fortunately, I think, under the public auspices of Chinese mediators instead of American. The Generalissimo's return may

either help or hinder. The Marine Corps incidents concerned with hunting parties complicate matters.¹

The best we can do at the present moment is to wait and see. As you and the Secretary realize, above all men, the state of peace appears at times more difficult than the state of war.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. On October 23 Marshall told Admiral Cooke that he had read his messages “concerning three recent incidents involving recreation and hunting parties, hunting outside of fully controlled areas, and being attacked by Chinese bandits who are anxious to acquire their equipment and transportation. It appears inadvisable for me to remonstrate Chou En-lai for these incidents when we are concentrating all efforts on the negotiations which have just been resumed.” Marshall approved of Cooke’s taking the incidents up with Executive Headquarters, issuing press releases deploring the incidents, and restricting the hunting parties’ freedom of movement. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 879.)

MEETINGS WITH YU TA-WEI, THIRD PARTY GROUP,
JOHN LEIGHTON STUART, AND CARSUN CHANG
October 27, 29, 30, November 3, 4, 1946 Nanking, China

THIRD Party Group Representatives, October 27, 5:20 P.M.

Lo Lung-chi (Democratic League), Miao Yun-tai (nonparty), and Li Hwang (Chinese Youth party) told Marshall that they were “facing a crisis in their negotiations” with Chou En-lai because of the recent capture by Nationalist forces of Antung on the Korean border. When he heard this news, Chou “became very excited” and thought the Communists should break off all negotiations.

General Yu had told him, Marshall recounted, that the government’s attack on Antung was a counterattack against Communist forces that had attacked in the vicinity and that the government was surprised to have the city fall to them so easily. “He urged the Third Party delegates not to be too discouraged over what had happened; it had happened several times before and it may happen again. It was decidedly a two-sided proposition. Maybe some day, they could get both sides together.” Meanwhile, the Third Party Group had to “sit squarely in the middle” and be “even more determined.”

With regard to the convening of the National Assembly on November 12, the Third Party Group was considering having an opening ceremony but postponing business for thirty days. Marshall was opposed to an indefinite delay as probably leading “to a winter campaign of total war.” The Third Party Group should “do everything possible” to get the assembly into action early. He suggested that they insist that the government be reorganized within some stipulated period in the near future. The representatives asked if Marshall would use his influence on the Generalissimo to stop the military campaign in order to give them time to work. Marshall said he would try. He concluded by suggesting that when the Third Party Group representatives presented their proposals to Chiang Kai-shek, they take up political issues first; if they began with military considerations “they may never get to discuss the political issues.” (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 438–41.)

John Leighton Stuart, October 29, 10:45 A.M., U.S. Embassy

Dr. Stuart reported that the Third Party Group had sent a three-point proposal to the Generalissimo, who rejected it in favor of his own eight-point statement of October 16. Marshall outlined his conversation with the Generalissimo the previous evening. The Third Party representatives were very discouraged and talked of returning to Shanghai, Marshall told Chiang, and the Communists did not believe anything the government said. The Communists had no intention of surrendering, Marshall thought. They were losing cities and towns but not their armies; moreover, they had no intention of standing and fighting major battles, but would strike where the government's forces were weak. The Generalissimo's forces doubtless could take Harbin, Marshall told him, but subsequently the government "would be in for endless tribulation." The Third Party Group "appeared to be the only hope" of achieving a settlement, Marshall insisted, and he urged the Generalissimo to build up the group's prestige by making some concessions and having frank conferences with its representatives. (Ibid., pp. 445–48.)

John Leighton Stuart, October 30, 5:30 P.M.

He had met with the Generalissimo earlier that day, Dr. Stuart reported, and encouraged him to reduce and modernize the army and reform civil administration. This could be accomplished by using the country's intellectuals and by immediately establishing the National Assembly with Communist participation. Marshall told Stuart that he was "rather impressed" with General C. P. Lee's efforts "to reduce the various outstanding issues to a practical basis with the object of establishing a *modus operandi* for continued negotiations." He and Stuart discussed reorganization of the Executive Yuan and what ministries the Communists might logically hold—e.g., agriculture and communications. (Ibid., pp. 451–52.)

Carsun Chang, Lo Lung-chi, and Yeh Tu-yi, November 3, 3:30 P.M.

Chang thought that Chiang Kai-shek and Chou En-lai were both receptive to holding an informal Nationalist–Communist–Third Party meeting. As the Committee of Three could deal only with military issues, it was irrelevant at present, Marshall thought, and suggested that the Third Party Group concentrate on settling the political issue of naming Communist delegates to the National Assembly. At Marshall's suggestion, the Chinese discussed what Communist and Third Party people might be appointed to the Executive Yuan as an initial step toward reorganization. Marshall thought Chou En-lai should be considered for minister of communications, which would probably solve the problems of railroad destruction, rail police personnel, and communication censorship. (Ibid., pp. 466–68.)

John Leighton Stuart, November 4, 4:00 P.M.

Wang Ping-nan of the Communist delegation had asked what the U.S. reaction would be should the National Assembly be convened without Communist participation, Stuart reported. He replied that the Generalissimo might postpone convening the National Assembly if the Communists indicated a definite intention of participating and he might issue a cease-fire order if the Third Party Group would indicate that they would join the assembly. Marshall said that the major issue was the Communist desire for reorganization of the Executive Yuan; resolve this and "most of the outstanding political questions could be easily handled." He then apprised Stuart of his discussions about this with Carsun Chang.

Chiang Kai-shek had said, Dr. Stuart noted, that he would not reorganize the Executive Yuan until after the National Assembly met. Moreover, just that afternoon T. V. Soong had said that no Communist should be included in the Executive Yuan until the government was reorganized and popular elections held. With regard to Marshall's idea of making Chou En-lai minister of communications, Stuart remarked that it was common practice in China for an entire group to resign under circumstances of displeasure or disapproval. If this was the likely reaction, Marshall said, then it would be unwise to suggest a ministerial position for Chou. (Ibid., pp. 468–69.) ★

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 1716. *Top Secret*

November 4, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mister President: Since my radio of October 26 (GOLD 1695) there have been numerous interviews or negotiations with Third Party Group taking leading part and Doctor Stuart and I refraining from participating in negotiations. However we have been frequently consulted by Third Party and Government and infrequently by Communists.

Government officials' rigidity or uncompromising stand following Generalissimo's return from Formosa and the capture of Antung caused Third Party Group to consult me regarding their abandonment of effort and return to Shanghai. I told them that they could not give up so easily especially since I had experienced a number of almost exactly similar impasses, that they must continue and redouble their efforts.

On the Generalissimo's return I had told him, in outlining the situation, that the Communists had not reduced their demands or objections; that they doubted the sincerity of every proposal by the Government; and that the active operations at Antung in Manchuria and at Chefoo in Shantung were proof to them of the Government's determination to follow out a policy of force. I urged that he receive the Third Party people with special consideration and that he see them the morning after his return, which he did. He later sent for Doctor Stuart and stated that he was willing to concede that the matter of local government for all of China (including Manchuria) would be left to the State Council, whereas previously he had excluded Manchuria, and that the Government would not dispossess the local governments in the cities and hsien [counties] along the Changchun trunk railroad in Manchuria except those already in Government control prior to the organization of the State Council.

The Third Party presented a proposed compromise solution to the Generalissimo which he refused, stating that the eight points of his statement of October 17 must be the basis of discussion. The Communists also

objected to this compromise proposal. The Third Party then recommended that there be an informal discussion by Government, Communists and Third Party together. The Generalissimo agreed but insisted that his eight points constitute the agenda. Chou agreed but I do not yet know his reaction on agenda. The meeting was scheduled for this afternoon. The Third Party consulted me yesterday regarding agenda and course to follow.

There have been several developments that affect the negotiations (A) We now learn indirectly that Chou En-lai would not agree to return to Nanking until the Third Party Group bound themselves to stand with the Communists against nominating delegates to the National Assembly until the Government had reorganized in strict accordance with the PCC agreements. This is now proving very embarrassing to the Third Party Group. (B) The main issue at present boils down to this: The Government will not agree to a cessation of hostilities until the Communists submit their list of delegates to the Assembly and on the other hand the Communists will submit their list only to a reorganized government—meaning now in particular the reorganization of the Executive Yuan by appointing seven or eight ministers from the Communists and the Third Party, five of whom may be without portfolio. This the Government had indicated it would not do before the meeting of the Assembly. (C) The Third Party Group have been urging Doctor Stuart and me to take the lead again in the negotiations but we have declined to do so because it is very important that if possible a Chinese neutral group act in mediation at least on political questions and also because the urging seemed to have behind it a suspicion of the pass the buck complex.¹

There are rumors regarding a delay in meeting of the National Assembly scheduled for November 12th but I know nothing of this reliably. I do know that they have had in mind the possibility of formally meeting and then adjourning for a period to permit the delegates appointed at the last moment to assemble. Mister Mo Teh-hui of Manchuria a non party man of fine reputation and highly regarded by both sides is taking a prominent part in the negotiations; also Mister Hu Lin the leading liberal editor in China, who brings to the negotiations a most practical and selfless influence.²

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Marshall followed this message with a Top Secret Eyes Only message for Colonel Marshall S. Carter to deliver verbally when he presented GOLD 1716 to the president: "(D) T V Soong has submitted his resignation as head of the Executive Yuan and Chang Chun is supposed to be his successor. Involved in Soong's resignation, I am told by a person who should be well informed, has been a demand by Doctor Sun Foo [Fo] for a \$500,000 advance from the Government to his son for a business venture which Soong refused. Doctor Sun Foo who has been taking a prominent public position in the negotiations left for Shanghai last night on the eve of the combined meeting for the informal discussion." (Marshall to Carter, Radio No. GOLD 1717, November 4, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall

Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages].) Sun Fo was Sun Yat-sen's son; he had held numerous government positions since 1921 and had been president of the Legislative Yuan since 1932.

2. In a memorandum for U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff General Thomas T. Handy, who was planning a trip to the Far East, Colonel Carter wrote: "The President asked that you convey to General Marshall the following remarks from him, which are quoted as nearly verbatim as I can remember them: 'The President stated that he was continually and deeply grateful for General Marshall's patience and perseverance in China. He wanted General Marshall to be told, as he has so often told him before, that the President has the most complete and unwavering confidence in General Marshall's activities. He wanted General Marshall to know that he relied entirely and only on General Marshall's judgment in the China problem and that he would continue to do so, "At least as long as I am President".'" (Carter Memorandum for General Handy, November 7, 1946, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [China Mission, Carter Files].) Handy arrived in Nanking on November 21 and departed the next day.

MEETING WITH JOHN LEIGHTON STUART

November 6, 1946, 10:30 A.M., Stuart's Residence Nanking, China

AT their meeting the previous evening, Stuart said, the Generalissimo had asked him what United States policy was going to be. The time had come when that policy might change, Marshall responded; "it all depended on what the Generalissimo's actions were in connection with the cessation of hostilities, convocation of the National Assembly, organization of the State Council, etc." Holding Committee of Three meetings now, as the Communists asserted they desired, probably would not be fruitful. "It is up to the Generalissimo," Marshall insisted, "to issue a statement that would give the Communists sufficient encouragement for them to continue with negotiations toward a reorganized government." They discussed the content and form of such a statement. Then Marshall and Stuart called in W. Walton Butterworth (minister-counselor of Embassy) and three of his assistants, summarized their discussion, solicited the Foreign Service officers' advice, and directed Butterworth to prepare an appropriate statement for the Generalissimo to issue. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 473–75.) ★

TO COLONEL MARSHALL S. CARTER
Radio No. GOLD 1726. *Confidential*

November 6, 1946
[Nanking, China]

I concur in the view expressed in the next to last sentence of WAR-84773.¹ I regard the Aid to China Bill as indispensable to the planned establishment of an effective National Army. It should be given a high priority so that immediate consideration by Congress will be possible when permitted by the political situation in China.

I will reserve decision as to the amount of pressure to be exerted until Congress convenes.² Can actual consideration of the bill be deferred without the priority being forfeited?³

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Colonel Carter had written to Marshall on November 5 that the War Department was preparing its legislative agenda for the congressional session due to convene in January 1947. "Question is the priority, importance, and amount of pressure, that should be placed on the Aid to China Bill. Unless this legislation is passed, the United States will soon be in a position where it will be legally impossible to assist the Chinese Government with an advisory group or essential supplies for their long range peacetime army program." In the message's penultimate sentence, Carter noted that he had already told the War Department that the legislation was extremely important and required a high priority; the question he had for Marshall was the amount of pressure that should be applied for the bill's passage. (*Foreign Relations, 1946, 10: 765.*)

2. On November 19, Carter was notified by the State Department that it concurred with Marshall's views. (*Ibid.*, p. 766.)

3. Carter replied on November 9 that the bill could be deferred without forfeiting its priority, since the chairmen of the foreign affairs committees in each house of Congress were anxious to cooperate with Marshall's desires. In order to preclude public attacks on the measure, however, he recommended that introduction of the bill be delayed. Marshall concurred with this procedure. (*Ibid.*, p. 766; Caghey to Carter, Radio No. GOLD 1739, November 11, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages].)

TO COLONEL MARSHALL S. CARTER
Radio No. GOLD 1727. *Secret, Eyes Only*

November 6, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Reference my GOLD 1673 and your WAR-84274 please arrange to have private interview with Eisenhower and Handy. Request Eisenhower to read GOLD 1673, Nanking Embassy 1737 to Sec State and his Byrnes 979 dated November 3d and finally your 84274.¹ State that I do not wish to run contrary to War Department desires but am very much puzzled regarding logic of statements of OPD and G-2 in your 84274. For example the statement "There are no offensive implications in the plan" is so completely the opposite of my impression that I am at a loss to comprehend OPD or G-2 reasoning. Also the statement "It is limited to China and will not include foreign areas contiguous to China" seemingly invites a facetious retort since the first priority for action includes Manchuria. While the outlay is not my business anymore yet I am puzzled by the contrast between such a critical shortage of United States ground personnel in China that safe flying has at times been endangered and the requirement for 2,000 United States personnel in China. Naturally the Government here is agreeable to mapping plan because it implies United States backing of Kuomintang Party by introduction of large increase in United

States Army personnel and also their thesis and hope that we must become involved in backing them in possible strife with Communists, Chinese or Soviets.

I have struggled against a continuous series of factors which have been productive of bitter feeling and offensive propaganda, KMT political intrigues inciting demonstrations, Soviet action in Manchuria, United States congressional discussion of Lend Lease, Military Advisory Group and munitions, Marine incidents, and lastly the surplus property transfer which has invoked more of misunderstanding and bitter attacks than anything else. Now the initiation of the mapping project with the much advertised and feared B29s as an important factor will cause silent rejoicing among KMT political die hards and general confusion of issues and question of American integrity of purpose in connection with my mission. Get Eisenhower to give me the benefit of his completely frank opinion.²

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. In November 1945, the War Department began pressing the Chinese government for permission to take aerial photographs in order to make a map of China and Formosa (with the subsequent addition of Tibet, Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, and Manchuria). On October 17, 1946, the Sino-American Cooperative Mapping Agreement was signed in Nanking. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 1261–63.) In GOLD 1673 of October 20, Marshall instructed Colonel Carter to talk to the War Department Plans and Operations section and John Carter Vincent at the State Department about the project: “It seems to me that if the operation gets underway in the near future it will inevitably raise a Soviet, if not a Chinese Communist, storm of propaganda to the effect that United States is openly preparing for war against Soviets in Far Eastern Theatre.” (NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages].) Ambassador Stuart (Radio No. Embassy 1737, October 25) recommended to the State Department that the project be “held in abeyance” until the political consequences of public knowledge of the project could be ascertained. The State Department agreed. (Radio No. 979, November 1.) (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 1265–67.) The editors have not found Carter’s WAR-84274.

2. Eisenhower replied that he agreed with Marshall’s “estimate of probable effect on the political situation. I know that you appreciate the great desirability from the purely military standpoint of having adequate map coverage in the China area and realize that you considered this factor in reaching your conclusions. In all matters affecting China I have consistently acted on the basis that the success of your mission is over-riding and you must have the eventual say.” He would halt further action on the mapping project. Marshall replied: “I wanted your brutally frank opinion rather than your expressions of complete willingness to cooperate with me of which I already felt assured. I am sending this to make sure that you are not repeat not acting against your own best judgment. I am clear in my view but nevertheless I wanted to have the benefit of yours.” To which the army chief of staff responded: “I thought I had made it perfectly clear that no repeat no military desirability of a mapping program should weigh repeat weigh against any slightest element involving the suc[c]ess of your mission. I assure you that my views completely parallel your own and I have issued orders accordingly.” (Eisenhower to Marshall, Radio No. WAR-85025, November 8, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, Carter Correspondence, vol. 3]; Marshall to Eisenhower, Radio No. GOLD 1734, November 8, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages]; Eisenhower to Marshall, Radio No. 85216, November 12, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, Mapping Project–Top Secret].)

MEETINGS WITH JOHN LEIGHTON STUART
November 7–8, 1946, Stuart's Residence Nanking, China

NOVEMBER 7, 10:30 A.M.

At the Generalissimo's request, Marshall and Stuart met with him on the evening of November 5. (See Marshall's November 8 report to President Truman, pp. 739–41, and his notes on the meeting in *Foreign Relations, 1946*, 10: 486–87.) Before Marshall and Stuart could prepare a policy statement for the Generalissimo to release, they received Chiang's 1,950-word version. Stuart thought this document was too long and omitted some key points. Marshall said that "he had been so discouraged upon reading the statement that he felt a completely new statement would have to be prepared. The Generalissimo's provocative, confusing, and irritating language so submerged the principal idea of the cessation of hostilities that the true significance of a statement would be lost." And, he said, Madame Chiang had agreed with his assessment not thirty minutes previously on the telephone. Dr. Stuart suggested that General Marshall attempt to rewrite the document. (*Foreign Relations, 1946*, 10: 481–82.)

November 8, 9:30 A.M.

Members of the Democratic League had reported to Ambassador Stuart the previous evening on their meeting with Chou En-lai. The Communist leader expressed to them complete disdain for the Generalissimo and said that the Communists should not reply to Chiang's October 16 statement. Marshall and Stuart then carefully worked over the previous day's first draft of a statement for the Generalissimo. A version showing the differences between the two drafts is printed below. (Ibid., pp. 482–84.) ★

DRAFT STATEMENT FOR THE GENERALISSIMO¹

November 7, 1946
[Nanking, China]

On October 16th I made public a statement regarding the policy of the Government, with a series of proposals as a basis for the termination of hostilities. ~~This was formally transmitted to the official representative of the Communist Party, but as yet no formal acknowledgement has been received.~~ I had hoped that this would evoke a response from the Communist Party leading to a final and complete cessation of war. Today, on the eve of the meeting of the National Assembly, I wish to reassert the consistent policy of the Government to promote internal peace and national unity and to carry through to consummation the conclusion of the period of political tutelage and the inauguration of constitutional democracy. As a further evidence of the sincere desire of the Government to achieve a lasting peace and political stability for the country, orders have been issued for all Government troops to cease firing except as may be necessary to defend their present positions. ~~Further, I wish to announce that the Government desires to reach an immediate agreement~~

~~with the Communist Party for the unconditional termination of hostilities.~~

In accordance with the resolutions of the PCC, the National Assembly was to have been convened on May 5th, 1946. However, the Communist Party and the Democratic League declined to submit the list of their delegates. Later, on July 4th, an announcement was made by the Government to the effect that the National Assembly would be convened on November 12th thus leaving a period of four months for discussions and preparations by all parties concerned. There has been objection to this procedure made by minority parties, *especially* on the grounds that ~~the~~ certain steps in the reorganization of the Government under the PCC agreements had not yet been carried out. To these objections I would say that the general situation ~~had changed~~ greatly ~~changed since~~ after the determination of the agreed procedure for the political development of the Government, serious fighting having developed in Manchuria and spread into North China, *and the demobilization of the Communist forces was not initiated as agreed upon and has not yet been started. Under these conditions* ~~In this situation~~ the ~~normal~~ procedure for reaching political agreements was rendered ineffective. However, ~~any further postponement of the National Assembly would only serve to intensify the political and military instability as well as the sufferings of the people.~~ *legally elected delegates to the national Assembly have already arrived in Nanking and any further postponement of the Assembly would serve not only to intensify political and military instability with the consequent sufferings of the people, but would deny the only legal step by which the Government can return political power to the people. Therefore, it is the decision of the Government that the Assembly be formally convened on November 12th.*

~~The Government is prepared to agree to an immediate but temporary adjournment of the National Assembly after formal convocation until the following conditions shall have been fulfilled:~~

- ~~1. Sufficient time has been allowed to permit the selection and arrival of the delegates who have not yet been selected.~~
- ~~2. Reorganization of the State Council has been agreed to by the PCC Steering Committee and the council established.~~
- ~~3. The Draft Constitution Committee shall have completed its work on a basis of the principles set forth in the PCC agreements.~~

~~When these conditions have been fulfilled, the National Assembly shall reconvene and proceed to the adoption of the Draft Constitution in the form presented.~~

~~As regards the reorganization of the Executive Yuan that, according to the PCC resolutions, is a function of the State Council. Furthermore, it involves a drastic change in the administration of the Government which must be approached with careful deliberation.~~

In my recent statement of October 16th, the Government showed a spirit of conciliation which it was hoped would be accepted by the Communists in order that a complete settlement could be reached on all pending problems. The Government stands ready to provide ample opportunity for the Communist Party and other parties to develop along truly democratic lines. Militarily, however, no political party should maintain a private army. All troops should be servants of the state.

In the meeting of the National Assembly, the Government would reserve the Communist quota of the delegates in the hope that they will participate in the making of the constitution. The Government also hopes that the Communists will authorize their representative to participate in meetings of the Committees to discuss the immediate implementation of the measures for the restoration of communications and the reorganization and integration of armies as proposed in my statement of October 16th.

An agreement for the reorganization of the State Council should be reached and the Council formally established in order that it may immediately carry out its function for the reorganization of the Government in accordance with the PCC resolutions. As such reorganization involves a drastic change in the administration of the Government, it must be approached with careful deliberation.

As regards the draft of the Constitution, the Government will submit to the National Assembly the uncompleted draft of the Constitutional Drafting Committee. Whatever decision is made by this Assembly should be regarded as tentative pending further revision by a body representative of all parties, to be adopted at the following Assembly.

The next few weeks are of fateful importance to China. It is within our power to lay the foundations for a strong and prosperous democratic nation. We must overcome ~~natural~~ the serious but natural divergences of views as well as deep suspicions and much bitterness. The time has come to rise above these difficulties and dedicate ourselves purely to the ~~service~~ interests of the people. I am keenly conscious of the services and sacrifices of the armies of the Government and I am deeply aware of the political convictions and long and patriotic service of members of my party, but I feel compelled to act at this time solely in the interest of the people who so urgently need and desire peace and security. I appeal, therefore, to the members of my own and all other parties, to my colleagues in the Government and in the National Army, and to all others concerned to unite in a final effort to reach an agreement by peaceful means for achieving "the democratization of the government" and "the nationalization of the armed forces."

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Originals)

1. Marshall's first draft of November 7 is the basis for this document. Lined-through characters were dropped in the revised (November 8) draft; characters added in the revised

draft are indicated by italics. The revised draft and Chiang Kai-shek's actual statement are in *Foreign Relations, 1946*, 10: 484–86, 493–94.

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 1735. *Top Secret*

November 8, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mister President: On November 3d the Government agreed to attend an informal discussion of the various issues with the Communist and other minority parties. The following morning the representatives of the Democratic League called on me and asked my advice as to the agenda for the meeting that afternoon. Later Doctor Stuart was informed that the Government had not attended the meeting and that the Third Party had merely asked General Chou to state the Communist demands, which he did in an expansive manner covering every issue.

On November 5th, the Generalissimo sent for Doctor Stuart and me and questioned me regarding the developments. He explained the absence of the Government members in the informal discussions, previously agreed to, by stating that there were a number of indications that the Communists wished to eliminate American mediation. I expressed regret that the failure of the Government to participate in the meeting was for this reason stating that the Communists either accepted us as mediators or did not; that they either trusted us or did not and Government action could not force a decision in this particular matter. After much talk, the Generalissimo stated that the time had come to stop the fighting and he was prepared for an unconditional termination of hostilities. He wished Doctor Stuart and me to advise him as to an announcement to that effect together with a reference to the approaching meeting of the National Assembly in which he hoped the minority parties would be represented. Doctor Stuart and I then prepared a draft of a statement which we thought presented the Generalissimo's views as to the termination of fighting and met the issues that were bound to be raised by the minority parties regarding the conditions under which the National Assembly would meet and adopt a constitution.¹ Meanwhile, we received a draft of a statement prepared by the Generalissimo which we felt would further complicate the situation as it was highly provocative, lengthy, argumentative and difficult to understand.² Furthermore, it would not terminate the fighting in a way that promised more than a threat of future use of force.

On November 7th, Doctor Stuart and I again met with the Generalissimo at his request and presented him with a Chinese translation of our draft and frankly criticized his draft, particularly as to the reception it would receive abroad, and stated our certainty that it would merely aggra-

vate the situation here in China. In a lengthy speech the Generalissimo explained that in preparing his draft he had had to take into consideration a number of important points, namely:

a. That while there had previously been a divided opinion in the Government as to the proper course to be followed, now there was a complete unanimity of opinion, that no further compromise should be made and that the Communists should be defeated by force.

b. That he must give careful consideration in relation to the organization of the Assembly to the delegates who had been legally elected in 1936 and now were assembled in Nanking and not emphasize the dominant importance of the PCC agreements in contrast to the 1936 draft.

c. That he must also give careful consideration to the morale of the Army considering the losses that had been recently sustained, if they were to be greeted by the announcement of an unconditional cessation of hostilities which amounted to the virtual unconditional surrender of the Government's position and contentions. He added that the statement in our draft of an unconditional termination of hostilities could not be supported by him before his military and political leaders of the Kuomintang, and further explained that he stands practically alone in the belief that matters could and should be settled by peaceful negotiations and the fighting stopped.

The Generalissimo asked us to reconsider our draft in the light of his statements and to advise him accordingly. I replied that I would have to have an opportunity to consider with Doctor Stuart the points of view just expressed as I was seriously concerned as to whether or not I should participate, as a representative of the US Government, in the preparation of a paper in accordance with the points of view he had indicated which were antagonistic to my views and those, I thought, of the US Government.

That evening General Chou En-lai and the Third Party Group called on Doctor Stuart. Chou was bitter in his expressions regarding the Generalissimo, and suspicious and opposed to virtually every proposal.

On November 8th, today, at the Generalissimo's request, Doctor Stuart and I called on him at 1130 hours. We had hurriedly prepared a redraft of our statement to include the points of view expressed by him the previous day and to eliminate the portions of our draft which were opposed thereto. He notified us that there was to be a meeting of the political and military advisers at one o'clock today at which they would decide whether or not there should be a cessation of fighting and whether or not the National Assembly should be postponed.

In submitting our redraft I stated that it must be clearly understood that this draft did not have my approval as a representative of the US Govern-

ment; that we had merely endeavored to help him as staff officers might assist him in drafting his views in the least provocative manner, but that the draft we had submitted not only did not have my approval but that I was in rather complete disagreement with the attitude of his military leaders.

This evening he sent us the draft of the statement that is to be made by him, presumably tonight.³ As there was some confusion in the translation, I cannot quote it at this time, but will send it on in the clear as soon as we receive the authentic copy.

As to the fighting, I think the wording will be as follows:

“Orders have been issued for all Government troops to cease fighting except as may be necessary to defend their present positions.”

The remainder of the statement was largely in the terms of our final draft, but contained some important modifications. Through his staff officer who brought the draft statement to me, I sent him word that I appreciated his affording me an opportunity to read the statement in advance of issue, but that I expressed no repeat no opinion as I was not in agreement with the procedure or position indicated.

I have taken this position very carefully to avoid having the Generalissimo imply that his announcement met with American approval.

The trouble is, the method of stopping the fighting is not conclusive and still holds in effect a threat of renewed battle to force a political decision. More important, the Government approach to the National Assembly is not, in my opinion, in sufficient accord with the PCC agreements and means even if all delegates appeared, that a simple majority vote of the overwhelming KMT numbers could determine the character of the constitution without much consideration of the fundamental guarantees agreed to in the PCC. Also, the approach to the Assembly does not now permit an opportunity for delegates of minority parties to assemble. The Government is unwilling to agree to any temporary adjournment after the formal convocation, which was the proposal of Doctor Stuart and myself. What the reaction of the minority parties will be to his statement, particularly as regards the order for cease firing under qualified conditions, remains to be seen, but I think the Government missed a great opportunity in not capitalizing in a large and conciliatory way on the proposal to stop the fighting, and I fear the Assembly will be an ineffective one party proposition.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. See the previous document.
2. See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 476–81.
3. See *ibid.*, pp. 493–94.

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 1743. *Top Secret*

November 11, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mr. President: Yesterday, Sunday morning, the Chief of Staff, General Chen Cheng sent me a request to call a meeting of the Committee of Three. I sent the request to General Chou who was due to call on me at eleven. He came and remained three hours, including lunch. He was opposed, in an indeterminate way, to the Committee of Three meeting in view of complete failure to reach any agreement regarding National Assembly, which they wished to have postponed until representation, reorganization of State Council and Executive Yuan and draft of constitution could be completed. However, he finally agreed to a meeting, termed by him as informal, which the Government then agreed to for ten this Monday morning.

Meanwhile, there was an informal meeting of the PCC Steering Committee, the first since April 24, I think, which terminated with a Communist request for a postponement of the National Assembly until end of the month. This request is being transmitted to Generalissimo by a non-party member of influence, Mo Teh-hui of Manchuria.

The Committee of Three met at ten today at my house, the Chief of Staff Chen on one side and Chou on the other. Much talk recounting past bitter experiences, but at my request carried on with considerable restraint. Chou's point is that it appears futile to go about arrangements for termination of hostilities when unilateral and unswerving action of Government regarding illegal (according to PCC resolutions) convocation of National Assembly means a definite split in China. However, I had the Government submit its proposal in detail and finally secured Chou's agreement to transmit it to Yen-an for prompt reply, he meanwhile studying the matter and proceeding on basis that whatever the political impasse at this time, he would go along with us in working for an agreement for formal termination of hostilities.

That is the situation at the moment. I will notify you promptly of last minute actions regarding National Assembly.¹

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. A few hours later, Marshall cabled that he had "just been informed by message from Generalissimo that at urgent request of non-party delegation he has agreed to delay convocation of National Assembly three days. They promised that if such delay was granted the Third Party organizations would submit names of their delegates and possibly the Communists but I think the last unlikely." (Marshall to Truman, Radio No. GOLD 1745, November 11, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages].)

MEETING WITH CHOU EN-LAI

November 12, 1946, 6:00 P.M. Nanking, China

GENERAL Chou reported on his meeting that afternoon with the P.C.C.'s Steering Committee, saying that the government's unilateral opening of the National Assembly in three days had caused a political split, and its recent capture of Antung had caused the Communists "bitter resentment." Negotiations would be pointless in view of the government's use of the National Assembly meeting to put pressure on the Communists. "If the National Assembly is called off," Chou responded to a question from Marshall, "then I fully subscribe to the procedure of having first the cease fire agreement and then the discussion of all the other matters."

Marshall repeated his belief that agreement was "being defeated by suspicions and misapprehensions. . . . There has been undoubtedly a very serious battle within the Government ranks, and what I believe you do not perceive nor understand is the fatal effect on the liberals in the Government of the abrupt, almost contemptuous, refusal or suspicion by the Communist Party of proposals which have been wrung from Government military and political leaders with the greatest difficulty." The National Assembly issue was not a mere matter of procedure, Chou replied, "but a question of fundamental principles." Marshall said he failed to see why this was so. While he realized that he did not understand the many ramifications of the political situation, Marshall said, "from an American point of view, the great issue is the draft of the Constitution and the basis of its acceptance—for the new law of the land," not the allocation of ministry appointments in an ever-changing bureaucracy. Chou expressed surprise at the importance Marshall placed on the draft constitution. China had to have an organized, legal, opposition party in order to achieve reform, in Marshall's opinion. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 524–34.) ★

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALVAN C. GILLEM, JR.
Radio No. GOLD 1750. *Top Secret, Eyes Alone*

November 13, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Heavy reduction of Marine forces has apparently become a political necessity.¹ Initiative must be mine in immediate recommendation to President. Problem of logistic support of Executive Headquarters is an important consideration. Let me have your preliminary comments and suggestions as quickly as possible.² You will be given opportunity to comment on proposed message.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. In addition to the well-known Chinese Communist opposition to the Marines' presence, the previous week Marshall's liaison in Washington, D.C., warned him that the general question of troops stationed in foreign countries (including the U.S. Marines in China) would soon be raised in the United Nations General Assembly, a growing number of members of the Senate and House of Representatives were asking what the Marines were doing in China and when they would be withdrawn, and the Soviet Union seemed likely to make

an issue in the U.N. of the Marines' China contingent. (Carter to Marshall, Radio No. WAR-84987, November 7, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Marines].)

2. There were approximately fifteen thousand Marines still in China at this time. On November 16, Marshall and Admiral Cooke agreed upon an immediate reduction of five thousand. Five days later, Marshall reported an agreement to reduce the force by yet another five thousand. Most of those remaining would be combat troops—available to “insure safe evacuation of American personnel of Executive Headquarters in event of open civil war and collapse of Executive Headquarters following withdrawal of Marines”—and support personnel for those troops. These reductions, Marshall told the secretary of state, would “purify U.S. position to the maximum, while there is an absence of pressure in China,” and would help to remove “a continual source of incidents.” (Marshall to Carter, Radio Nos. GOLD 1764 [November 16, 1946], GOLD 1781 [November 19, 1946], and GOLD 1792 [November 21, 1946], *ibid.*; Marshall to Gillem, Radio No. GOLD 1766, November 16, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, Executive Headquarters, vol. 6].)

MEETINGS WITH WANG WEN-HAO AND LO CHUNG-SHU
November 13 and 15, 1946 Nanking, China

WANG Wen-hao, November 13, 6:00 P.M.

Dr. Wang, vice president of the Executive Yuan and former minister of economic affairs, expressed the government's alarm over the United States policy of rehabilitating Japan, which he thought would hurt China through loss of reparations and economic competition. (This issue was to grow rapidly in importance hereafter; see Thomas D. Lutze, “America's Japan Policy and the Defection of Chinese Liberals, 1947-1948,” in Larry I. Bland, ed., *George C. Marshall's Mediation Mission to China, December 1945-January 1947* [Lexington, Va.: George C. Marshall Foundation, 1998], pp. 461-97.)

Marshall promised to ask the State Department, and possibly Douglas MacArthur's headquarters in Japan, about the reparations issue. He concluded, however, with what he termed a “brutally frank” statement that while it “was very interested in helping China . . . the U.S. would not support a Government which was not representative of the people.” In February, the United States had been “prepared to assist China with large amounts of money and supplies, . . . [but] some of the assistance had had to be curtailed because of certain of the political group in power who had exercised a determining influence on procedures detrimental to political reformation.” (NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Political Affairs, Conferences Miscellaneous, vol. 5].)

Lo Chung-shu, November 15, 10:00 A.M.

Professor Lo, of the West China University of Chengtu, came to acquaint Marshall with the East and West Cultural Association, a group of people, mainly university professors, interested in international affairs. Lo believed that the key need at the moment was reform of the Kuomintang. “It is necessary to have an opposition party to insure reform of the party in power,” Marshall replied. “It had been my great hope that the Communist Party with its thorough organization and strong hold on the peasants

could function as a constructive opposition party. Although the Communists sometimes do outrageous things, their faults are party faults and different from the individual corruption which plagues the Kuomintang Party and China with extortions and misgovernment." Moreover, "the Generalissimo does not hear the true story regarding activities of his party except possibly in a limited way from me. His political leaders intentionally misinform him." The Kuomintang did not understand democracy. Opposition parties were normally obstructive forces; this obstruction had to be overcome by better government by the party in power. In addition, Kuomintang leaders seemed not to recognize the Communists' well-founded fear of government police organizations. "I did not expect the Kuomintang to surrender its power without a struggle, but I also did not expect the chicanery which they have practiced since February."

Marshall thought that "one of the dangers of the present situation is that many of your young university graduates are going over to the Communist Party. . . . The Kuomintang party has erred by failing to absorb liberal elements into the party. . . . If activities in Manchuria and manipulation by the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee had not destroyed the gain made through negotiations in March of this year, I believe that by now, a sizeable liberal party would be in existence" that initially would have served as a holder of the political balance of power and eventually "would have become the dominating party, and either the Kuomintang or the Communist Party would have been forced to join with the liberal party. . . . A liberal party must attract the businessmen, recover the young intellectuals from the Communist Party, absorb the liberals now in the Kuomintang Party, and must also include the women of China. Such a party had been my hope. I even had considered lending support to such a liberal movement. . . . If the liberals had gotten together in July (as I urged) as they got together recently, it could have been a great help to me. . . . Now, however, they are falling apart through the division tactics of the Communist Party and the Kuomintang Party." (Ibid.) ★

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 1765. *Top Secret*

November 16, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mister President: The National Assembly convened November 15 with a decidedly limited representation from non-Kuomintang ranks. Some more delegates from non-party men and Young China Party were submitted last night I understand. While Doctor Stuart attended as US Ambassador, I thought it best for me to be absent as I did not wish it to appear that I concurred with the Government in its approach to this Assembly. Doctor Stuart's presence I felt took care of the diplomatic requirements.

The Assembly is proceeding on a rather tentative basis for the first two weeks. Just what this will mean remains to be seen. The delay of three days from the original date, November 12, secured the promise of attendance by some Third Party men, but not all. It had the effect of disrupt-

ing the unity of action of the Third Party Group and seriously weakened its influence for good in acting as a balance between the two dominant parties.

General Chou En-lai called on me this morning. (a) He wished transportation for himself and nine others to Yen-an on Monday. Today is Saturday. I agreed. He stated he was leaving Tung Pi-wu and thirty-nine others here in Nanking as a liaison group and he was reporting to Yen-an to reanalyze the situation with the party governing group. (b) He wished Executive Headquarters continued for the present even though there was little it could do. I agreed. (c) He feared a large offensive operation against Yen-an. If this took place Communists at Executive Headquarters in Peiping and Changchun and in Nanking and Shanghai would have to be evacuated for safety. Where to would have to be decided later. Would I assist. I accepted obligation to evacuate by plane to place of safety where appropriate field was available for these Communist people. All along I had felt that this was my obligation as I had been largely responsible for their presence in Government controlled cities. (d) He felt that an attack on Yen-an meant the termination of all hope for a negotiated peace. I have no information of Government plans for attack on Yen-an and would deplore such action and would oppose it strongly. If initiated I would feel that it terminated my mission.

Doctor Stuart left for Peiping this noon and returns Tuesday or Wednesday.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

MEETINGS WITH C. P. LEE, W. WALTON BUTTERWORTH, AND OTHERS
November 18–19, 1946 Nanking, China

C. P. Lee, November 18, 10:00 A.M.

General Lee was discouraged. The only possibilities that he could foresee were: a bloody revolution that would destroy the government; a renewed possibility of a peaceful settlement through outside action by the United States or the U.N.; or Chiang Kai-shek's resignation. Public opinion was rapidly turning against the government; the Third Party Group had lost stature; and the government had thrown all its financial resources into the war—which drove many people into the Communists' camp. The military and political cliques now dominating the government were convinced that no successful agreement with the Communists was possible, Marshall responded; it was clear that the government was "merely using the negotiations to prove its point of view regarding the Communist Party." Lee hoped that the United

States would force the Chinese government to change its course by openly announcing that it would no longer support the present regime. "The U. S. Government cannot pursue a course of action that will destroy the foundation of the Chinese Government," Marshall replied. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 550–51.)

W. Walton Butterworth, November 18, 10:45 A.M.

Marshall and Butterworth discussed the upcoming meeting with Wang Wen-hao regarding a memorandum from T. V. Soong proposing a comprehensive, expensive, and long-range United States economic program for China. (See *ibid.*, pp. 1021–22.) "He was prepared to emphatically point out," Marshall remarked, "that continued hope for financial support from the United States for the purpose of economic stabilization could hardly be entertained by the Chinese when the need for such stabilization had been caused by military leaders and 'diehards' in the National Government who, during the past year, had shown no cooperation whatsoever with General Marshall." Butterworth thought that Marshall should hold out hope for assistance providing the government was reformed. (*Ibid.*, pp. 1020–21.)

Wang Wen-hao, November 18, 11:00 A.M.

He "was rather surprised" at the comprehensive nature of Dr. Soong's memorandum, Marshall indicated, since he had agreed at their November 13 meeting only to suggest to the State Department the possibility of establishing a small confidential committee to discuss reparations. Moreover, Marshall pointed out, "prospects of financial assistance . . . were growing dimmer and dimmer." American taxpayers, "particularly under a Republican Congress, certainly would not be willing to support a country whose financial condition was continuing to worsen because of military campaigns" and forces that consumed over 75 percent of the Chinese government's budget. Dr. Wang reiterated that U.S. assistance was necessary to save China from the economic collapse that had already begun. Marshall promised to contact the State Department and General MacArthur's headquarters regarding Japanese reparations and to send Dr. Soong's memorandum to Washington. (*Ibid.*, pp. 1022–23.)

Lo Chung-shu, Wu Chi-yu, and Professor Yi, November 19, 11:00 A.M.

Marshall "emphasized the urgent need of a party to offset the one-party domination of China. He further pointed out that the Communist Party must be handled politically instead of by force." Liberal elements had to join together quickly. He frankly noted that university professors like his guests could not produce the tactical leadership for such an organization, which had to be furnished by politically experienced people. Marshall thought the liberal elements should avoid forming a new political party but should be an informal group—Executive Headquarters being an example of a balancing organization. He did not believe that, as yet, Soviet actions had been other than of a negative character, but the government's military policies invited Soviet intervention. Professor Wu observed that the mutual distrust about which Marshall complained "was due to historical hatred which can be traced back to the revolutionary days of 1923." European liberal elements had emerged and reformed their governments "due to the presence of external forces." Marshall believed the Chinese could bring about social reform without pressure from outside powers. (*Ibid.*, pp. 551–53.) ★

TO COLONEL MARSHALL S. CARTER
Radio No. GOLD 1800. *Top Secret*

November 22, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Doctor T. V. Soong and his Vice Minister Doctor Wang Wen-hao express great concern over the Japanese reparations program, fearing that rehabilitation of the Japanese economy is being overemphasized to the detriment of China whose economic recovery is hampered by delay in provision of reparations materials. Specifically, they fear that the recent rapid progress of the Japanese in the light consumer industry field may force China to purchase these articles from Japan. Ambassador Koo¹ is reported to be alarmed over the reparations problem and to have recommended through Chinese channels that flow of reparations materials to China be started at once. Chinese here have suggested creation of a small high level Sino-American committee in Washington to review most confidentially the Japanese reparations policies in the light of China's economic situation.

At the same time Chinese are privately disturbed over SCAP [Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Japan] handling of operational phases of Japanese reparations. They sense a somewhat anti-China attitude and cite as an example Russian commission [in Japan] of 750 while Chinese commission is limited to approximately 100.

I do not wish in any way to embarrass General MacArthur or to encourage Chinese division tactics. Moreover, I have stated vehemently to Doctor Wang that in spite of long range United States interest in assisting China economically, no help could possibly be expected in the face of the present deplorable political and military situation in China with military leaders absorbing 80 to 90 per cent of budget. However, I have agreed to present to the State Department informally the Chinese desire for the committee in paragraph one above. I wish you to introduce the matter into the State Department based upon this radio to obtain their free reaction for my guidance. I will not approach General MacArthur on the problem in second paragraph above until I get State Department reaction just referred to.

At our last meeting Doctor Wang Wen-hao presented a letter from Doctor T. V. Soong² outlining a lavish, long range program for United States economic assistance to China. I will forward this letter to you separately for background information of the State Department. I desire no action on this letter at this time.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo had been China's ambassador to the United States since July 1946.

2. See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 1021-22.

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 1804. *Top Secret*

November 23, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mister President: The National Assembly has not yet proceeded far enough to give clear indication of its course though reactionary KMT leaders' domination is evident. Meanwhile I am awaiting communication from Chou En-lai at Yen-an. His representative called on Stuart yesterday deeply concerned over threat of all out Government attack on Yen-an and question as to whether we were continuing to exert our influence to compose the situation. Chou En-lai is committed to make a report to me as to whether or not the Communist Central Committee desire me personally to continue my efforts in mediation and so far I have had no word. He saw me for a lengthy interview two days before he left and called formally with his wife the evening before he left.

Meanwhile I have held aloof from the Generalissimo. The Deputy President of the Executive Yuan has been pressing me in the matter of financial assistance to meet the growing desperation of the economic situation. I have been very emphatic in stating to him that it is useless to expect the US to pour money into the vacuum being created by the military leaders in their determination to settle matters by force, almost 90 percent of the budget itself highly inflationary, going to military expenditures. Also that it was useless to expect the US to pour money into a Government dominated by a completely reactionary clique bent on exclusive control of governmental power.

I am leaving for Tientsin this morning to talk to General Howard¹ regarding immediate reduction of Marine forces to a level of about five thousand. I am trying to accomplish this now while there is no pressure no heat over some minor crisis, and also because the larger force is of no particular advantage and merely increases the chances of trouble. From Tientsin I will go over to Peiping to arrange some adjustments there in Executive Headquarters, returning here about Wednesday.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Major General Samuel L. Howard commanded the First Marine Division and all other Marines in China.

MEETING WITH W. WALTON BUTTERWORTH AND OTHERS
December 1, 1946, 11:00 A.M. Nanking, China

MARSHALL had requested a meeting of his political advisers (in addition to Butterworth were Raymond P. Ludden, John F. Melby, and Philip D. Sprouse) because Chiang Kai-shek had requested a meeting with Marshall that afternoon, and

the draft constitution might be a topic of conversation. The Foreign Service officers agreed that the new constitution was generally democratic and adaptable to China's situation. There was nothing about the constitution they wished Marshall to contest with the Generalissimo. The group discussed ways of implementing a coalition government.

Marshall asked Butterworth's opinion on continuing the mediation. Butterworth thought the general's presence had a desirable restraining influence on the government, and his "departure would be catastrophic, and in view of Dr. Stuart's inclinations, would cause the United States, as far as its policy is concerned, to drift toward full support of the National Government." Marshall suspected that many Chinese found his role "an undesirable necessity since by keeping him continually in the picture the Government reactionaries could continue their undemocratic practices and military campaigns under the guise of willingness to negotiate." (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 573-75.) ★

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 1827. *Top Secret*

December 2, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mister President: Last night, Doctor Stuart and I had a three hour conference with the Generalissimo which opened with his query as to my estimate of the situation.¹ I gave him a lengthy summary on the various aspects of the confusing military and political factors. Referring to the Communist failure to answer my direct question as to whether or not I was still acceptable in the role of mediation and to their overwhelming suspicion of every proposal or act of the Government, I emphasized the fact that the Communist Party, Army and people constituted too large and powerful a group to be ignored. I referred to various military and other acts of the Government which I thought had defeated conciliatory proposals by the Government, notably the attacks on Antung and Chefoo at the very moment of the Generalissimo's eight point proposal of October 16th. I gave a resume of my information regarding the economic situation which I thought was approaching a collapse; that the military effort was creating a financial vacuum and that at the same time I was being pressed more frequently to recommend loans for a variety of purposes. I stated that the constitution just introduced in the National Assembly appeared to be in reasonable agreement with the PCC commitments. Whether or not it was amended would be an important factor in determining what next might be done. Also to be considered would be the proposed method of putting it into effect. If it were adopted as now written; if the State Council was formed with seats made available to the Communists and the Democratic League and if genuine steps were taken for the reorganization of the Executive Yuan then Doctor Stuart and I thought a renewed invita-

tion by the Government to the Communists, privately extended by an envoy sent to Yen-an, might possibly be productive of good results, providing aggressive military action had entirely ceased and that so called defensive action was not a disguise for retaliatory fighting.

The Generalissimo then made a lengthy statement of more than an hour to this general effect: the Communists never have had any intention to cooperate; their overwhelming suspicion of the present time is merely a means to an end; they act under Soviet influence; they desire to disrupt the Government and influence its foreign policy. These statements are almost identical with those he made to me in March on the eve of my departure for Washington and which I turned over to the Secretary of State in writing and read to the President. The difference was only in regard to the overwhelming suspicion of the Communists which I had emphasized as the great change in their attitude since last February.

He dismissed the economic question with a statement to the general effect that while conditions were bad in large cities such as Shanghai, China largely depended on the agrarian situation which would help the country to carry on despite the inflation and labor difficulties of the large cities.

The Generalissimo then launched into a detailed statement regarding the military factors. He reaffirmed his previous statements that apparently military force was the only method by which the issue could be finally determined. He then contrasted the difficulties of such procedure in earlier days with the situation at present because of the building of many roads. He expressed confidence that the Communist Army could be destroyed in from eight to ten months and that thereafter it would be a simple problem to handle the Communist Party without its military power.

Turning to Manchuria he stated that the most valuable portion of Manchuria to China proper was that south of Changchun and he felt that the Government was strong enough to maintain that area now that Antung had been taken over. He did not propose to advance to Harbin because he felt that that would create a Soviet reaction. Incidentally, he stated that whenever the National Government had taken a strong stand against the Communists and had been successful, the Soviets had invariably responded by willingness to negotiate matters in a normal manner and cited their change of attitude following the fall of Antung.

He stated that he could not go on simply waiting on the Communists and that they were doing nothing but allowing the situation to deteriorate. He added that he was now 60 and could not carry the burdens with the vigor that had formerly been his, and thought he should retire. Yet, he felt that he must first conclusively settle the Communist issue.

The Generalissimo then expressed his belief that I should not regard my mission as exclusively concerned with the development of an accord

between the Government and the Communist Party, but that now that the Communists had shown their unwillingness to cooperate, I should direct my efforts toward the development of stability in the Far East and prosperity in China, as well as friendly relations between our two governments. He stated that he felt that the United States should redefine its policy towards China, quite evidently having in mind the definite endorsement of the Kuomintang Government and acknowledgment that the Communists could no longer be considered as a possible factor in the Government.

The Generalissimo concluded by stating that he would do everything in his power in a last effort to bring about an accord with the Communists.

In reply I only made a brief reference to his view that I should not consider my mission as being directed toward establishment of accord between the Communist Party and the National Government, stating that he and I were in disagreement as to what could and should be done and I was firmly of the view that the Communist Party could not be ignored, and that it could not be eliminated by military means before an economic collapse would undermine the Kuomintang and threaten the stability of the present National Government of China.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Marshall's notes on this meeting are in *Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 575-78.

MEETINGS WITH YU TA-WEI, JOHN LEIGHTON STUART, AND C. P. LEE December 4-5, 1946 Nanking, China

Y*U Ta-wei, December 4, 11:00 A.M.*

Marshall said he was still awaiting a formal reply from Yen-an to his November 29 request for a statement on whether the Communist party wished mediation to continue. They then discussed the leak to the local press of the minutes Marshall had given General Yu of his November 16 meeting with Chou En-lai.

Yu discussed events at the National Assembly meeting, particularly with regard to the draft constitution. The government should adopt the P.C.C. draft "without disrupting it by amendments and tricky phrases," Marshall thought. If subsequently the State Council were reorganized and reorganization of the Executive Yuan begun, and if vacant seats were left on those bodies for the Communists and the Democratic League, this would place the Communists "in a rather difficult position" vis-à-vis public opinion. While this was being done, Marshall suggested, the Generalissimo should send a representative privately to Yen-an to discuss ways the Communist party might come into the National Assembly. Marshall hoped the Generalissimo would avoid making a public statement about this, because "that would invite the usual Communist reaction of distrust and suspicion." Meanwhile, the government should cease aggressive actions and not "resort to much abused 'self-defensive' measures" against

Communists. He was encouraged by an apparent relaxation of government pressure on the independent press.

He “disagreed entirely,” Marshall told Yu, with Chiang Kai-shek’s belief that: (1) now that the government had better roads and communications, it could defeat the Communists in eight to ten months; (2) the agrarian population backed the government and could continue to save China from economic collapse. Recently, he noted, for the first time the Export-Import Bank had rejected loans for two projects he had supported, because there was “not sufficient prospect of amortization.” The problem, Marshall thought, resulted from the character of the Nationalist government, the open corruption in it, and its militaristic policy. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 584–88.)

John Leighton Stuart, December 5, 10:00 A.M.

Marshall told the ambassador that he had just received a letter from Chou En-lai saying that the Communists would resume negotiations only if the National Assembly was dissolved and government troops returned to their positions as of the January 13 cease-fire order. (See *ibid.*, pp. 590–91.) Dr. Stuart recommended that the United States support the National Government, provided it ceased hostilities, reformed the Kuomintang, and reorganized. Since the government always claimed to be fighting in self-defense, Marshall responded, he doubted that the government could stop hostilities unilaterally. He also doubted that the army could be much reduced, given the problem of guarding long communications lines against an enemy the Generalissimo had vowed to destroy.

Marshall recounted his various efforts to break the power of the reactionaries in the National Government; he, unlike Stuart, thought it unlikely that Chiang Kai-shek would break with the group. The previous evening, Marshall recalled, he and his wife had dined with the Soviet ambassador, who demonstrated considerable curiosity concerning Marshall’s assessment of the current situation in China. Marshall was critical of Kuomintang reactionary elements and how the Communists had played into their hands through their suspicions and refusal to negotiate. Marshall expected the ambassador to report the conversation to the Chinese Communists.

Chou En-lai’s letter, in Marshall’s view, “was tantamount to Communist acceptance of the Generalissimo’s challenge to settle the issue by force.” Dr. Stuart believed that the United States should continue its present policy toward China in the hope that the government would be reformed. Stuart also thought that such strengthening of the National Government would surprise and give pause to the Communists. Marshall thought there were practical and political difficulties to announcing a new U.S. government policy and getting the public to accept it. (*Ibid.*, pp. 591–94.)

C. P. Lee, December 5, 11:00 A.M.

General Lee told Marshall that the U.S. government’s (i.e., Marshall’s) policy of not rendering financial assistance to a China engaged in civil war would have a beneficial effect on the situation. “General Marshall retorted that he could not see what was good about it, since actually the Chinese people would suffer from it instead of the rival political parties.” Lee was reluctant to give up hope for continued negotiations even after Marshall outlined Chou En-lai’s response to the November 29 request. The Communist party had done practically what the CC clique and the militarists in the Kuomintang had wanted them to do since April, Marshall concluded; consequently, it “had practically defeated” his mission.” (*Ibid.*, pp. 594–95.) ★

TO COLONEL MARSHALL S. CARTER
Radio No. GOLD 1850. *Top Secret, Eyes Only*

December 6, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Reference your WAR-86819.¹ Please give following to McCloy.² "I have already read Time's comment on China situation favorable to KMT and advocating termination of my mission;³ also Scripps article in local press in effect along same line but addressed to John Carter Vincent's speech.⁴

The most serious complication in the problem and the one tacitly ignored by Luce is the fact that controlling reactionary group in KMT and Government and KMT military clique have upset by indirect action or aggressive military operations whatever success I have had with the Generalissimo; and these people have coolly calculated on inevitable support of their party government by United States. Their actions have been cleverly provocative, arousing the Communists to inexcusable retaliations on their part both in action and in propaganda. They also feel that now is the time for destruction of Communists in belief that Soviets cannot give open assistance for about five years. This leads to a situation where the present refusals of Communists to accept various proposals because of complete lack of trust in good faith of Government even though proposals were largely generated by Stuart and myself, of which the Communists cannot be convinced, play directly into the hands of the governing reactionary clique. The violent Communist propaganda attacks on United States policy and me, personally, I think are welcomed by the reactionary clique as evidence in support of their position that the United States is backing the KMT against the Communists.

My problem has been while endeavoring to develop an accord to bring the heaviest possible pressure on the Government to be genuinely sincere in its stand for peaceful negotiations, and to lend the least possible encouragement to the controlling clique that the United States will fill the financial vacuum now rapidly being created by the military campaign on which this clique is intent. From 80 to 90 per cent of the budget is now going for the maintenance of the Army and capital assets, such as enemy property, are being converted into cash for the conduct of the war.

On the Communist side, their actions have been dominated by an overwhelming suspicion of every proposal of the Government because of past experiences. This is a definite contrast to the situation last February before the Kuomintang clique initiated a deliberate campaign to incite retaliatory action by the Communists, along with the tremendous embarrassment to the Central Government created by negative action of the Soviets in Manchuria and the present Communist propaganda campaign has been successful in stirring up an active and unreasoning anti-American feeling in many localities. Their publicity campaign is without

any regard to the facts but has a well defined purpose. On the other hand, the Government publicity has the same disregard for the facts but lacks clever direction. The great misrepresentations relate to the Marines and the surplus property transaction. The latter was propagandized as being for the purpose of giving immediate assistance to the KMT armies last August. The items are of a non-military nature, but the principal misrepresentation relates to the fact that only the first small loads of this property have reached Shanghai in December and that largely consisted of medical supplies, blankets, K rations and dock yard machinery. The contracts for the evacuation of the property from Guam, Saipan and Okinawa have not even yet been completed and the property itself, particularly motor transport, has to be completely reconditioned and vital parts supplied from the States. Therefore this had no relation whatsoever to the military campaign and was agreed upon in late August because of the necessity of terminating this business in the Pacific and because I felt the people of China should not be denied this form of economic help in their poverty stricken condition. There was no pressure on the part of the Government to effect a settlement which I had been endeavoring to secure since the previous January. But the Communist attacks on this have really been welcomed by the reactionary clique as evidence of United States support of the Government, meaning to them the KMT.

The other misrepresentation refers to the Marines. I kept them on the railroad because the economic life of the Yellow River and the Yangtze Valley and Tientsin and Peiping depended on the coal from Tongshan. If that coal were cut off the railroads in Central China would cease to operate, the utilities and factories in Shanghai, Nanking, Hankow, Tientsin and Peiping would be crippled. The Communists would not agree to any Government troops to relieve the Marines, which I endeavored to arrange in April and finally succeeded in managing by diverting the National Army from Formosa intended for an active campaign against the Communists to the relief of the Marines on the railroad in September. This force, however, has been unable to keep the railroad continuously open and a shortage in coal is now developing.

In all these matters, a frank statement of the facts as I see them would have terminated my usefulness in mediation because one side or the other would have been badly damaged in the public eye. They both were so frequently in the wrong that there was never a clear case for either side, except possibly in last February when I felt the Communists had played the game with cleaner hands than the Government. I have had to be very careful not to tear down the Government by public characterization of its deficiencies or machinations, which would be playing directly into the hands of the Communists, but I have characterized or condemned the Government's actions with brutal frankness to the Generalissimo time

after time and have won the decision on numerous occasions to be defeated either by Communist suspicion or the persuasions or actions of the Government military or political clique.

The problem is how to proceed in a continued effort to hold the door open for the Communist Party to participate in the Government and how to proceed without so encouraging a corrupt government that there is little chance for its improvement. The United States Government cannot afford to be dragged through the mud of such corruption and there is small chance of improving the political situation and methods without the activity of an organized minority party. It was this action of the Communist Party that I thought would be most helpful and which the Government most feared.

Luce has warm friendship for the Generalissimo and quite evidently is much impressed by the Generalissimo's statements. I am fond of the Generalissimo but recognize unmistakably the state of mind and governmental procedures which are the opposite of our desires. So, in effect, I stand between the rock and the whirlpool.

At the present time I have been using all my influence to force the adoption of a constitution in keeping with the PCC resolutions. This was not at all the original purpose as the Assembly was convoked. They were going back to the one party constitution of 1935 and it required mercilessly plain speaking on my part to secure consideration of the present draft which the Generalissimo, personally, is now endeavoring to carry through against energetic opposition of the reactionary groups. The next few weeks should determine whether or not there is any possibility as a result of the action of the Assembly and possible action of the Government in organizing a State Council and commencing the reorganization of the Executive Yuan to bring the Communists into the Government and again initiate the demobilization and reorganization of the armies.

The statement of Time and Roy Howard's articles will seriously weaken my hand because of encouragement to the controlling clique. However that cannot be avoided and I do not repeat not believe there is any use in endeavoring to change Luce's point of view and such effort might easily back fire. Better utilize the New York Times, the Herald Tribune, Kansas City Star and some well chosen columnists and commentator."

You, Carter, can show McCloy in strict confidence such sections of my message to the President as dealt with my recommendation for recall and also GOLD 1827.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. The editors have not found this December 3 message.
2. John J. McCloy, who had ended his five-year stint as assistant secretary of war about the time Marshall arrived in China, tended to favor Time, Inc., head Henry R. Luce's views that the United States should back Chiang Kai-shek in unifying China and should give him

a chance to reform his government *after* peace had been achieved. (Robert Edwin Herzstein, "Henry Luce, George Marshall, and China: The Parting of the Ways in 1946," in Bland, ed., *George C. Marshall's Mediation Mission to China*, p. 122 [emphasis added].)

3. Under the heading "End & Beginning," *Time* magazine commented that, with the convocation of the National Assembly, "China entered a new phase in her long search for democratic unity. By calling the Assembly in the face of a Communist boycott, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek underscored his recent military victories over the Reds. He could proceed—unilaterally, if necessary—to establish the forms if not the substance of democracy, could tell the Communists and other dissenters to like it or lump it." President Truman's directive to seek and Marshall's attempts to get a compromise conclusion of the civil war "had been outdated by events. Chiang's successes in the field had invalidated it. The Assembly meeting made hope for mediation dim as starlight." Nevertheless, "no shadow of blame could be cast on George Marshall." But "now that there was no longer room for the delicate—and probably impossible—task of mediating between a sovereign government and armed rebels, U.S.-Chinese relations could return to normal diplomatic channels"—i.e., Ambassador John Leighton Stuart, "a good, old friend" of the Chinese people. (*Time* 48[November 25, 1946]: 34.)

4. Addressing a luncheon of the forty-third annual Foreign Trade Convention on November 12, Vincent had issued what the *New York Times* termed a "sharp warning" against public or private investments in countries where the government was corrupt, there were excessive armaments expenditures, and there was the threat or fact of a civil war. (*New York Times*, November 13, 1946, p. 39.)

5. Roy W. Howard was editor and president of the *New York World-Telegram* and president of the Scripps-Howard newspaper chain.

MEETINGS WITH JOHN LEIGHTON STUART, WEI TAO-MING,
AND W. WALTON BUTTERWORTH
December 9–10, 1946 Nanking, China

JOHNSON Leighton Stuart, December 9, 11:00 A.M., Stuart's Residence

Stuart was still convinced that Marshall's mission "was possible of fulfillment," and announcing a firm U.S. policy supporting army reorganization and technical assistance would bring the Communists back to the bargaining table. Marshall said he doubted that this program could be carried out under existing conditions. Limited U.S. support for the government would only encourage the reactionary elements and the military clique, making it even more difficult to reform the government, break Kuomintang domination, and keep open a way for the Communists to reenter negotiations.

Henry R. Luce had sent a telegram the previous day urging all-out U.S. support for the Kuomintang. Marshall thought Luce's analysis of the situation in China was shallow and completely biased by his personal attachment to the Generalissimo. Implementation of Luce's ideas might have the opposite effect from what he desired, Marshall suspected. Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson had just suggested to him that the United States might wish to prepare a high-level statement clarifying U.S. policy toward China. Marshall thought this was a good idea, and the timing of public release could be decided later.

Ambassador Stuart thought that if some kind of territorial agreement could be reached, government-Communist negotiations could begin again. Marshall agreed, but added that the idea of a territorial agreement would immediately raise the ques-

tion of control of the two key north-south railroads. If the Communists could retain their positions and agree not to molest the railroads, that "might constitute a new beginning for negotiations." Stuart agreed to sound out Wang Ping-nan on the subject. Marshall reiterated his previous rejection of the idea of serving as an adviser to the Chinese government after the mediation mission ended. (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 599–602.)

Wei Tao-ming, December 9, 5:00 P.M.

"If a good, sound, democratic constitution were passed," Marshall remarked to the vice president of the Legislative Yuan, "some hope for peaceful settlement might result. If not, the military clique in the Government would probably be given a free hand to attempt extermination of the Communist Party through force." General Marshall "was convinced that the military clique had over-estimated the Government's capabilities and that a final all-out campaign would be overtaken by financial chaos." While he was "pleasantly surprised at the behavior of the National Assembly," Marshall said, he had been optimistic before and was now "simply waiting and watching." He thought that "democracy probably could be made to work in China if there existed both a free press and an active, unrestricted opposition party."

Government leaders seemed to believe that economic collapse was at least two years away, but Marshall thought it was possible in a matter of months. The government's inability to keep the Tientsin-Chinwangtao railroad operating was proof to Marshall that the government could never attain total military victory.

The pro-Kuomintang publicity campaign being fostered by Henry Luce and Roy Howard might lead to a counter campaign critical of corruption in China's government, and the "dirt" exposed would aid neither side. "It would be a serious error if the reactionaries crippled the Constitution now before the National Assembly on the hope of aid from the United States as a result of the Luce-Howard publicity campaign" or American fear of Russia. Moreover, "public opinion in the United States was affected by corruption within the Kuomintang more than by fear of Communist ideology." Marshall concluded by summarizing his belief that negotiations might be resumed if a sound democratic constitution was adopted, the State Council and Executive Yuan reorganized, the door left open for communist participation in the government, and effective measures taken to enforce the constitution. (*Ibid.*, pp. 602–5.)

W. Walton Butterworth, December 10, 6:30 P.M.

After studying the U.N.R.R.A. aid situation, Butterworth recommended that its China program be completed. Marshall approved a dispatch to the State Department on this, but opposed Butterworth's sending a letter to the department censoring John King Fairbank, formerly a department employee in China, for his writings critical of the government and Marshall. With regard to Dr. Stuart's suggested territorial settlement, Marshall thought the idea was sound, but "he did not see how the situation in the field could be kept quiet long enough to permit political aspects to be worked out."

Butterworth noted a new criticism of Marshall by Chinese ambassador in the United States Wellington Koo. Marshall thought it another aspect of the Henry Luce–Roy Howard effort to force all-out U.S. support for the Chinese government, but he wondered how this support would appeal to the anti-Communist but also anti-spending Republican party majority in Congress.

"A matter of great concern" to Marshall was "what sort of statement he might make in case he was recalled to Washington. . . . He must not tear down the National

Government, and at the same time he could not ignore the reactionary elements." The best course, he suspected, "was to stress the adverse effect of the reactionaries and military clique in the Government toward the reformation of the Government itself, and at the same time stress the obstructionist attitude on the part of the CCP and their vicious propaganda." Marshall directed that Butterworth's staff develop a carefully written draft. (NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Political Affairs, Conferences Miscellaneous, vol. 7].) ★

TO MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES D. HERRON
Nanking, China

December 11, 1946

Dear Herron: I just learnt today of your great misfortune,¹ though even now I only have a vague idea of what happened. But I am relieved to know that you have been making a remarkable recovery. Please accept my real sympathy and my regret that I have been so long learning of what happened.

Katherine left here by air for Guam four days ago and left there by Naval transport the following day.² She will spend a month or two in Hawaii, in a bungalow at Fort De Russy I think.

My plans are of course undetermined, along with the hopes and sufferings of some hundreds of millions of people.

I did some foothill mountain climbing yesterday, flushing one deer and stretching my tendons quite a bit.

Katherine and I are looking forward to a quiet life at Leesburg and Pinehurst which we do not seem to be allowed to enjoy. She has been much concerned about her book, as she could not see the proofs or illustrations and when she left here had not yet received any of the criticisms. She did it in 3 months at Pinehurst, largely at night when she was troubled with insomnia.³

With affectionate regards to both of you and my sympathy, Faithfully yours,

G. C. Marshall

GCMRL/Research File (V3499); H

1. Herron, who lived in Bethesda, Maryland, had broken his back. Marshall had known him since they were student officers at the Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth in 1906.

2. On December 1, Mrs. Marshall wrote to Sally Chamberlin: "I will leave here by plane on Dec 8th arrive at Guam 10th. Board a Navy transport at Guam and arrive in Honolulu on Dec 20th where I will stay until Gen. M. comes through and picks me up on his way home. . . . I have no idea how long I will be there but expect until after X'mas anyhow maby into Feb. all depends on Gen M. and he has no idea as yet. Winter has come here in Nanking— snow wind & cold & my sinus is getting bad. So he wants me to get to a warm climate before I am too miserable to travel. Will pick me up when he can. I hate so to leave him right here at X'mas but he insists— so there is nothing else to do— and Honolulu is

lovely—ideal for these winter months.” (K. T. Marshall to Chamberlin, December 1, 1946, GCMRL/K. T. Marshall Papers [Correspondence 1941–49].)

3. Regarding Mrs. Marshall’s memoir, see Marshall to Chamberlin, August 24, 1946, pp. 667–68. Mrs. Marshall wrote on July 11 that her manuscript “has been gone over by Gen. M. and rearranged— . . . George likes the Title ‘I Married A Colonel’. He will not use [‘]My husband— Gen M.[’] because it sounds like a biography & he has declared many times he would not have one written.” (K. T. Marshall to Chamberlin, July 11, [1946], *ibid.*) Within two days, however, she had settled on *Together: Annals of an Army Wife*. Review copies of the galleys were distributed in mid-October and the book was put on the “recommended” list of the Book-of-the-Month Club. (Tristram Tupper to Chamberlin, July 13 and October 19, 1946, *ibid.*) The book went on sale in November.

SECRETARY of the Navy James Forrestal had been incensed of late by criticisms of the navy in particular and U.S. military policies in general by liberal former Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes (e.g., “The Navy at Its Worst,” *Collier’s* 118 [August 31, 1946]: 22–23, 67). Viewing Ickes’s ideas and statements as exemplifying widespread misconceptions in the United States about policy toward China, Forrestal called Ickes’s writings to the attention of Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson. At a November 20 meeting, Acheson told the secretaries of war and navy that it would be a good idea to clarify Truman administration policy and that the State Department was drafting a statement reviewing developments in China since the president’s December 15, 1945, public statement at the start of Marshall’s mediation mission. (Carter to Marshall, Radio No. WAR-86395, November 26, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Recall and Appointment]; J.H.C.[Colonel J. Hart Caughey] Memorandum for General Marshall, November 29, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Originals].)

Marshall told Acheson on December 8 that he supported “issuance of a résumé of American activities in furtherance of the 15th December 1945 policy statement. My own concern in this matter led to the early preparation and dispatch in sections of my so-called final report. While this is not the favorable moment for such release, it may be advisable within the next few weeks.” Acheson replied that, given the contentiousness of the issue on the political left and right in the United States, and “a widely expressed feeling among impartial observers that they have not been kept fully informed of our actions in China,” it might be a good idea to release the statement “as soon as you think that its issuance will not interfere with your mission.” The thirty-paragraph statement was radioed to Marshall on December 11. (*Foreign Relations, 1946*, 10: 598, 609–10, 610–17.)

Marshall met with Ambassador Stuart and Minister-Counselor Butterworth to work on a redraft, which Marshall transmitted to Acheson on December 14. “I am agreeable to its immediate issuance,” Marshall

stated. The draft reviewed the Marshall mission's background (particularly regarding economic aid to China), organization, early successes, the breakdown of the agreements in the spring, and the role of U.S. forces in China. It asserted that the principles expressed in December 1945 remained valid, expressed "deep regret" that unity had been impossible to achieve, and recognized that the Chinese had to solve their own problems. "In short," the draft concluded, "we believe that our hopes for China are identical with what the Chinese people themselves most earnestly desire. We shall therefore continue our positive and realistic policy toward China which is based on full respect for her national sovereignty and on our traditional friendship for the Chinese people and is intended to promote international peace." (Ibid., pp. 624–29.) A slightly modified version was released by President Truman on December 18. (*China White Paper*, pp. 689–94.) ★

MEETINGS WITH LO LUNG-CHI AND JOHN LEIGHTON STUART
December 18, 1946 Nanking, China

Lo Lung-chi, December 18, 10:00 A.M.

Dr. Lo asked Marshall if he had any advice to give Democratic League delegates preparing to meet in Shanghai. "There was so much Chinese maneuvering taking place," he responded, "that it was difficult for an American to accurately assess the situation." He reiterated his displeasure with reactionary elements in the government, the Communists, and the minor parties' inability to unite. He "remained in China in the hope that his presence would facilitate the adoption of a genuine democratic constitution by the National Assembly."

Communist party members had repeatedly told him, Lo stated, that they wished American mediation to continue. Marshall replied "that he had often felt in the past that the National Government desired his mediation as a shield for its military aggression." Now he had "become a convenience to the Communist Party," because they feared the popular response to rejecting his mediation. He would allow neither his own nor his country's integrity to be questioned regarding China policy. Moreover, "he did not intend to serve as an umpire on the battlefield."

Dr. Lo did not think the government could implement the new constitution because the Communists did not accept it. Everything depended on how the government enforced the constitution, Marshall thought. "If the constitution was vitiated and circumvented in favor of a policy of force, tragic economic collapse would follow and China might fall back to the dark ages of warlordism. It was very difficult because of twisted propaganda to make a correct estimate of the military situation. However, he considered the Communists capable of waging effective guerrilla warfare, but incapable of formal positional warfare. On the other hand, the Government was not capable of destroying the Communist Party by force nor was it capable of defending itself against the guerrilla tactics of the Communists."

Successful negotiations were still possible, Lo thought, but the government first had to make broad political concessions. He also thought it was still possible for the

minority parties to cooperate. After the Shanghai meeting, Lo said, the Democratic League might wish to send delegates to Yen-an. Marshall replied that he would try to furnish air transportation. (*Foreign Relations, 1946*, 10: 632–36.)

John Leighton Stuart, December 18, 11:00 A.M.

Ambassador Stuart recounted his recent meeting with Wang Ping-nan and Marshall his with Lo Lung-chi. Each side, Marshall said, had its own reasons for desiring continued U.S. mediation. They discussed the Chinese intellectuals' views on the government and Chiang Kai-shek. The Generalissimo was "perfectly aware" of their views, Stuart noted, but his "mentality would not let him reform." They also considered the possibility of a government delegation going to Yen-an for talks; Marshall said he would encourage this, but "he felt that a renewal of negotiations at this time had very slender prospects." In fact, he informed Stuart and Butterworth (who was also present) that he believed that he should return to the United States, where he would issue a statement critical of government reactionaries and militarists and of Communist obstructionism. He hoped that this would "build up the liberals in both parties and at large" and appeal to the Generalissimo "to rely on these liberals for a reformed government establishment." (*Ibid.*, pp. 636–40.) ★

TO COLONEL MARSHALL S. CARTER
Radio No. MING 58

December 19, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Last two pouches have not carried press clippings of editorials, commentators etcetera on China situation. I suppose this is result of recent order restricting pouch contents. This denies me valuable information which I need promptly and not after issues are dead or situation overtaken by new events. Incidentally my advice on Presidential messages needs such background information. Please get this service promptly restored to pouch. I am at war.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, MING Messages)

MEETINGS WITH PENG HSUEH-PEI AND LI WEI-KUO
December 20 and 23, 1946 Nanking, China

PENG Hsueh-pei, 10:30 A.M.

The minister of information said he considered President Truman's December 18 statement "fair and highly informative," and the Chinese people would benefit from it. Marshall replied that Nathaniel Pepper, a professor of international relations at Columbia University who was traveling in China as a guest of the State Department in connection with the Cultural Relationship Program, had told Ambassador Stuart, in Marshall's words, "that most liberals and educators and many top-level businessmen and bankers in China now felt that the United States had caused the prolongation of

the civil war in China by the material assistance which it had given to the National Government.” Moreover, “there appears to be a growing solidarity of feeling within China against the Kuomintang Government. Much of this feeling is directed against the United States at present because of the strong anti-American Communist propaganda. However, the National Government should expect this feeling to shift directly against the Government in the near future.” It would benefit the government in the eyes of foreign correspondents, Marshall believed, if its press releases stressed accuracy and detachment rather than the Kuomintang party line. (*Foreign Relations, 1946*, 10: 644–45.)

Li Wei-kuo, December 23, 6:00 P.M.

Vice Minister of Information General Li informed Marshall of the National Assembly’s recent actions on the new constitution. He was “becoming increasingly disturbed that the National Assembly and the Government might indulge in excessive changes in China’s laws and procedure,” Marshall commented; “China already had many good laws and that the prime need was for honest, thorough enforcement.” General Li noted that Chiang Kai-shek tended to rely on his old associates from revolutionary days. In a crisis, Marshall noted, the Generalissimo “always turned to the reactionary or conservative elements in the Kuomintang for guidance.” Marshall thought that “a vigorous attack on these elements might well constitute the best service which he could render China at this time.” General Li agreed.

A unified party of progressive elements “represented China’s best hope,” in Marshall’s opinion. “It was imperative, one way or another, to destroy the reactionaries’ control of the Government and the associated feudalistic state of mind in the Government.” General Li described the historical background of the Generalissimo’s reluctance to rely on the Kuomintang’s younger leaders and his fear of a split within the party. The general said that Marshall needed not only to “convince the Communists that a party army should not be used to attain political ends,” but also to “modernize the Generalissimo mentally and persuade him to lead a new revolution of progressive, liberal elements”—perhaps even to influence the Generalissimo to travel to the United States to see democracy at work. Marshall doubted that either goal could be attained. The Communists kept an army “primarily because of fear of extermination through secret police and other terroristic organizations.” Moreover, mere observation would not convert the Generalissimo to democratic processes. “It would probably be better if the Generalissimo had near him a great student of constitutional government and democracy who could constantly press those issues.” (*Ibid.*, pp. 653–55.) ★

TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Radio No. GOLD 1891. *Top Secret*

December 28, 1946
[Nanking, China]

Dear Mister President: I have just concluded a two hour conference with the Generalissimo. Following the adjournment of the National Assembly, he wished to discuss with me the steps that might be taken in an effort to reopen negotiations with the Communists. Doctor Stuart and I had previously suggested that if a sound constitution were adopted,

which is the case, and the Government proceeded with the establishment of the State Council and started with a genuine reorganization of the Executive Yuan, then two or three representatives of the Generalissimo, men of importance and liberals, might well be sent to Yen-an to discuss matters with a view to reopening negotiations for the cessation of hostilities and the participation of the Communists in the reorganization of the Government, the matter to be done quietly without public announcement. However, there immediately leaked out, intentionally or otherwise, a statement of this purpose of the Government before its good faith had been at least partially established by the adoption of a sound constitution in keeping with PCC agreements. The Communists' reaction was, of course, unfavorable. Since then I have learned that the Communists would probably resent reorganization of the State Council and the Executive Yuan before any consultation with them, for the reason I suppose that they would feel that the door would already have been practically closed on any possibility of responsible participation on their part.

I therefore suggested to the Generalissimo that the visitation be carried out before the reorganizations just referred to. He agreed to my point of view and, in connection with my insistence that there be no public statements in advance, he wondered if it would not be advisable to consult the minority parties. I thought so but also thought that it would not be advisable for the Government to declare its position as this would inevitably result in a public leak and would precipitate a propaganda war on the part of the Communists. I stated that I thought that the Government, if it took this action, should make a genuine effort, carefully avoiding any complications by military actions or public statements of a provocative nature, such as have wrecked our previous efforts time and again. He appeared to accept my suggestions and stated that as the minority parties were shortly to have a meeting of their executive councils in Shanghai he thought it would be best to wait until that had occurred.

The Generalissimo then asked me for my further comments on the situation. Stating briefly the substance of a lengthy presentation, I said that I thought it unlikely that the Communists would commit themselves to an agreement at this time because of their overwhelming suspicion of the military purpose of the Government to destroy them; that I felt that the Government military commanders were considerably in error in their optimistic estimates of what they could do towards the suppression of the Communists, citing the statements of last June that the province of Kiangsu could be cleared in two months and it had not yet been cleared and, at the same time, that the Communists could be brought to terms in a military way within three months and that had not occurred after six months; and that the Government refusal to terminate hostilities in order to force the Communists to commit themselves to the attendance of their

representatives at the National Assembly had failed of its purpose. Therefore, I felt that it was important that his military leaders not be permitted to destroy by statements or actions the possibility of successful negotiation, to which I felt they were inalterably opposed.

I stated that if the Communists would not repeat not re-enter into negotiations, then it was most important for the Government to go ahead immediately with its reorganization, leaving the door open for Communists' entry and that of the Democratic League allied with the Communists. I felt that the Generalissimo, by his leadership in the National Assembly in opposition to the reactionaries, which had secured the adoption of a reasonably sound constitution, had gained a great moral victory which had rehabilitated if not added to his prestige. Therefore, it was most important that he now demonstrate that the constitution was not merely a collection of words and that he was determined to institute a democratic form of government. Therefore he should proceed without delay in the reorganization of the State Council with a conspicuous presence of liberals from the KMT and with vacancies left for the Communists and the Democratic League. Also that he should start at once in the reorganization of the Executive Yuan. But the most important point I made was that he must by his own indirect leadership father a coalition of the minority groups into a liberal party; that unless there was such a sizeable minority group, his efforts in the National Assembly to secure the adoption of a sound constitution would be regarded as mere camouflage of the intention to go ahead with the one party Government. Also, that [if] the various minority groups of themselves could not manage an amalgamation, such would require his active assistance. And, also, that he should call on their leaders to nominate men for various appointments rather than to follow the past practice of neutralizing the opposition leaders by bribing them off with attractive appointments. I emphasized the fact that if he did not take such action there could be no repeat no genuine two party government. Therefore his integrity and position would be wide open to serious attack. On the contrary I felt that the organization of the minority parties into a large liberal group would be of great assistance to him and that he could move more into the position of the father of the country rather than to continue merely as the leader of the Kuomintang one party Government. I emphasized this in every way within my power because I am convinced that this is the key to the immediate future in China.

I went on further to state that I felt that if the Communists declined to reopen negotiations—in other words if they repulsed the effort of the Government—if and provided the Government was not guilty of provocative statements or actions, then I thought the time had come to begin the dismantling of Executive Headquarters. I was already of the opinion that the Communists no longer had any intention of accepting American medi-

ation along the former lines and that I was definitely *persona non grata*. Under these circumstances I felt that their recently expressed desire for the continued operation of Executive Headquarters had for its purpose maintaining the American air facilities for communication with the scattered Communist forces throughout North China, its representatives in Nanking, Shanghai and Chungking, and its people in Harbin. I had but recently directed the withdrawal of our representative from Harbin because he was allowed little liberty of action or movement and I felt that his continuation there was merely a convenience to the Communists, providing them with air passage to and fro on the weekly plane.

The Generalissimo expressed complete agreement with my ideas as to a liberal party. He gave no expression to his reaction regarding Executive Headquarters. I think he recognized the situation much as I did.

About two weeks ago he had a long discussion with me, seeking to persuade me to accept the position of Advisor to the Chinese Government and guaranteeing his full backing of my position. I explained to him that I could not repeat not favorably consider such a proposition for a number of reasons. In the first place my acceptance of such a position would tend to stultify what I had been doing in my effort to mediate between the Communists and the Central Government. Also I felt that so much of anti-American feeling had been developed by outrageous propaganda distortion or complete misrepresentations of the facts that my position as Advisor would be very seriously affected, and further, that within the Government the reactionaries and the military group were antagonistic to almost every idea I had and if I could not overcome them in my present position, I certainly would have a limited chance to do so in the position of Advisor. What I did not say to the Generalissimo was that I felt there was bound to be a consideration in the matter of holding me here to increase the possibility of American support and to indicate the US Government's heavy backing of the Kuomintang Government.

As matters now stand, I foresee these developments: The Communist Party will refuse to reopen negotiations and the Government will probably resort to aggressive military action to reopen the railroads. Under these circumstances I think Executive Headquarters should be reduced to a mere cadre and the American participation in its purposes for mediation should terminate. This would immediately facilitate the withdrawal of the Marines from Tientsin and Peiping. At the same time I think I should be recalled. I am of the opinion that I can do much to destroy the power of the reactionaries and bring a liberal element into control of the Government by a frank statement on the occasion of my arrival in the United States, and, at the same time, I will be in a position to paint the Communist picture of misrepresentation and vicious propaganda efforts against the United States in such a manner I hope as to weaken their position and

give a little guidance to misinformed people at home. It is rather paradoxical to find that at the present time a large number of the university and business groups have been so naive in their acceptance of propaganda that they have become honestly convinced that the United States is responsible for the continuation of the civil war and that I personally have directly contributed to that situation. The surplus property and Lend Lease transactions play a large part in this. Fortunately, Doctor Stuart has been built into a position where his services in negotiations will almost automatically continue to be sought by all sides and will increase in importance as time goes on. While even his integrity has been questioned, nevertheless I feel that he can triumph over that phase of the situation. It is quite clear to me that my usefulness will soon be at an end for a variety of reasons. I have continued on since the break in negotiations in order to make certain that a respectable constitution was adopted. The initial outlook was very depressing and I had to make it unmistakably clear that anything less than a fair approximation of the fundamentals agreed upon by the PCC would be fatal to the National Government so far as the US was concerned. Now that the constitution has been adopted there is no real place for me in the coming maneuvers to reopen negotiations and my continued presence will constitute an embarrassment to future adjustments, especially if I speak out frankly as I feel I must, which will generate bitter feelings among many on both sides. It is now going to be necessary for the Chinese, themselves, to do the things I endeavored to lead them into, but I believe I can strengthen the position and influence of the better elements by the procedure I have indicated.¹

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Secretary of State Byrnes replied on January 3: "We are in hearty accord with the course you have pursued and the views you express as to future action. However, the President is of the opinion that no decision should be made as to mediation activities of Stuart after your departure until you have returned and we have had opportunity to discuss that particular proposal.

"The President states that as 6 months have elapsed since your last visit to talk with him he would appreciate it if at your earliest convenience you would return for consultation on China and other matters." (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 680.)

MEETINGS WITH S. J. HASAN, AND SUN TAN-LIN AND WU CHI-YU
December 30–31, 1946 Nanking, China

S. J. Hasan, December 30, 6:00 P.M.

Captain Hasan, chargé d'affaires of the Indian Office in Nanking, came to hear Marshall's views on the political-military situation in China. No one knew what the Communist forces' logistical position was, Marshall responded, although they claimed to have captured considerable government equipment. Moreover, guerrilla

warfare did not require great quantities of supplies, and the Communist troops' fanaticism compensated for shortages. Communist strategy, Marshall added "was based upon the expectation of an economic collapse before the National Government could achieve total military victory. At the same time the National Government was making very faulty and optimistic estimates of its ability to exterminate the CCP army." The Communist assertion that the government would soon collapse "might possibly be correct," given that the military campaign was consuming 80 to 90 percent of the budget. "Marshall then described at length the plight of the common people of China and that his prolonged stay in the face of distressing experiences with the Government and the CCP was based upon his hopes for doing something to improve the lot of the Chinese people." (NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Political Affairs, Conferences Miscellaneous, vol. 7].)

Sun Tan-lin and Wu Chi-yu, December 31, 5:30 P.M.

Professor Wu served as interpreter for Mr. Sun, a former minister of the interior and a nonparty man who wished to hear Marshall's views on China's future. Marshall expounded on his liberal coalition ideas, with which Mr. Sun agreed, although he was dubious about its accomplishment given the pressures from Nationalists and Communists. Marshall admitted the difficulties; "the idea would be impossible of accomplishment without the indirect support of the Generalissimo." When pressed by Marshall to name some people who might lead a liberal minority party, Sun suggested the names of three businessmen, whom he labeled the Chinese equivalents of Henry Ford and John D. Rockefeller. Marshall was dubious; "the experience in the United States had been that this type of person did not do well in politics—that they were not equipped for the type of considerations necessary in political workings." Unlike financiers, however, lawyers "seem to have the facility of moving in." (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 669–71.) ★

TO COLONEL MARSHALL S. CARTER
Radio No. GOLD 1897. *Top Secret, Eyes Only*

January 4, 1947
[Nanking, China]

Please pass to SecState.

Dear Mister Secretary: Your message (WAR-88875)¹ has been received and the President's desires regarding mediation activities of Doctor Stuart and my return home for consultation have been noted.

I think it best for me to delay my departure and any notification to the Generalissimo and others of this purpose, until a decision is reached by the Government regarding a mission to Yen-an and the Communist reaction is known. Also I would suggest that the first public notice of my intended return should be in Washington but only 24 hours repeat 24 hours before my departure from Nanking. Otherwise I will be consider-

ably embarrassed by a series of governmental formalities. End of Sec-State message.

For Carter: Since writing the foregoing your WAR-88932 has arrived regarding President's desire for me to arrive in Washington by January 10.² To do so I would have to leave here tomorrow morning or make a day and night continuous flight which imposes too much of fatigue for my years. Please urgently see President again and find out if January 10 is an imperative date. He may possibly have expressed himself carelessly. I had planned to rest up a week in Hawaii. I think I fully understand matter to be discussed. My answer is in affirmative if that continues to be his desire.³ My personal reaction is something else.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. See note 1, Marshall to Truman, December 28, 1946, p. 767.

2. Carter noted that he had shown President Truman Secretary Byrnes's message (Radio No. WAR-88875). "Mr. Truman suggested that I advise you in the utmost secrecy that he hoped you could be back by 10 January. Mr. Truman's concern is connected with the last two words of Mr. Byrnes's message [i.e., "other matters"], and the project that the President has previously discussed with you." (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 681.)

3. Carter reported (Radio No. WAR-88993, January 4, 1947) that the president indicated that there was "nothing imperative about your presence here on 10 January," when Truman expected to announce that Marshall would be nominated to be secretary of state. (*Ibid.*, pp. 681–82.)

TO COLONEL MARSHALL S. CARTER
Radio No. GOLD 1907. *Secret, Eyes Only*

January 5, 1947
[Nanking, China]

Reference your WAR-88993¹ my decision is to leave here Wednesday AM the eighth local calendar stopping over for rest in Honolulu. Request following White House announcement be made 24 hours earlier: "The President has directed General Marshall to return to Washington to report in person on situation in China. He will probably leave Nanking tomorrow morning." In case there is a leak from out here, which is quite possible, make the announcement immediately correcting time element accordingly. I decided that the general effect out here would be better, first to have the shock of my immediate departure with its various implications, to be followed a few days later by the added shock of the January 10 announcement.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. See note 3 of the previous document.

TO COLONEL MARSHALL S. CARTER
Radio No. GOLD 1910. *Top Secret, Eyes Only*

January 5, 1947
[Nanking, China]

Reference my GOLD 1907. It appears that my frank statement regarding situation in China which I had intended to make personally in Washington should be made before my status has been changed by reason of Presidential announcement on January 10th.¹ Therefore I now repeat now propose that the statement included in my GOLD 1907 should be released by White House or President at about four o'clock Monday afternoon [January 6] Washington time and then on Tuesday morning at ten o'clock² the following statement by me to be released by White House or State Department.

Submit this statement to SecState for clearance. If there is anything in it which it is felt would be embarrassing for our Government especially in view of my proposed change of status I agree now to the changes thought advisable.

The statement should be introduced by the following White House or State Department comment: "The following personal statement by General Marshall on the situation in China is released for publication." . . .³

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Colonel Carter told Marshall on January 8 that President Truman had "expressed regret" to him that news of James Byrnes's resignation as secretary of state had leaked to the press in Washington, forcing the president to make a premature announcement of his intention to nominate Marshall for the post. The announcement had originally been intended for January 10, by which time Marshall would have been in Hawaii. The president insisted that Marshall's vacation plans remain unaffected. (*Foreign Relations, 1946*, 10: 691.)

2. This would be 9:00 P.M., Wednesday, January 8, in Nanking.

3. For the omitted portion of this document, see Personal Statement, January 7, 1947, pp. 772-76.

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALVAN C. GILLEM, JR.
Radio No. GOLD 1912. *Secret, Eyes Only*

January 6, 1947
[Nanking, China]

Most secretly I am leaving for US Wednesday morning. This fact will probably become known here Tuesday morning. Decisions regarding set-up out here cannot be taken until I confer in Washington. I expect to recommend the immediate demobilization of Executive Headquarters and relief of all Marines in North China except those at Tsingtao.¹ I will propose demobilization to proceed as fast as transportation can be arranged. The recommendation of course will be dependent on course of events out here next two weeks.

Upon arrival in Washington, I intend to cause an appropriate directive to be sent back to China establishing my present office as an Executive Office immediately under the Embassy. This directive also would charge the Embassy with supervision of policy matters, political, economic, and military, for all US activities in China. For your information, I am presently considering having General Timberman head up the Executive Office to assist the Embassy in taking care of the military aspects of the over all situation. Timberman would not come to Nanking, however, until word was received from me or my representative in Washington. When and if Timberman does come, he can move into my present house with Mrs. Timberman.²

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Executive Headquarters was inactivated on February 6, 1947. After the September 1, 1947, evacuation of Tientsin, the only remaining U.S. Marine Corps duty station in China was at Tsingtao, and that was evacuated in June 1948. (*History of the Executive Headquarters*, p. 24; Shaw, *United States Marines in North China*, pp. 23, 25.)

2. After Marshall left China, his mission office became the Embassy Liaison Office. On April 11 this office was replaced by the Embassy Executive Office, which included army and navy sections, and Brigadier General Thomas S. Timberman became chief of the Army Section. He remained in Nanking until mid-September 1947, when he was assigned to the War Department General Staff. (Timberman to Office of the Chief of Staff, Radio No. GOLD 2148, April 2, 1947, and Timberman to various headquarters, Radio No. GOLD 2154, April 7, 1947, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages].)

MEETINGS WITH W. WALTON BUTTERWORTH AND T. V. SOONG January 6–7, 1947 Nanking, China

W. *Walton Butterworth, January 6, 7:00 P.M.*

Marshall said that during a discussion with Dr. Stuart at lunch about how the Embassy should be run after he (Marshall) departed, they agreed that Butterworth should carry on the Embassy's diplomatic business and that the Embassy should acquire an executive officer to oversee administrative matters.

Marshall was "quite sure that the Communists would be highly inflamed when they read his forthcoming statement, and their attitude is going to be, no doubt, a strong 'To Hell with the United States, and to Hell with the National Government!' . . . The Generalissimo may also be infuriated, when he reads the statement, to a point that he may be moved toward the necessary governmental reorganization." (*Foreign Relations*, 1946, 10: 683–84.)

T. V. Soong, January 7, 5:00 P.M.

Soong briefed Marshall on China's economic hopes for the year. Marshall said that he would soon be releasing a frank statement that would doubtless arouse anger in some Chinese, but he hoped it "would make possible the organization of a patriotic, liberal group under the indirect sponsorship of the Generalissimo." He had, however,

been "receiving depressing reports on the military situation in the field"; government "losses were heavy, the troops were becoming apathetic, and poor leadership was evident everywhere." Marshall wondered if the Generalissimo "knew of the real situation existing in the field." Moreover, "he feared that most Chinese lacked the courage to speak the truth to the Generalissimo." Did Soong? He was brutally frank, Soong replied; "the trouble lay with the military leaders who clouded facts to prove their point." Marshall observed that "he had always been vastly impressed that he himself could speak so frankly to the Generalissimo, and yet the Generalissimo remained courteous, composed and cordial. It took a really big man to so conduct himself." (Ibid., pp. 689–90.) ★

PERSONAL STATEMENT¹
[Radio No. GOLD 1910]

January 7, 1947
[Washington, D.C.]

The President has recently given a summary of the developments in China during the past year and the position of the American Government toward China.² Circumstances now repeat now dictate that I should supplement this with impressions gained at first hand.

In this intricate and confused situation, I shall merely endeavor here to touch on some of the more important considerations—as they appeared to me—during my connection with the negotiations to bring about peace in China and a stable democratic form of government.

In the first place, the greatest obstacle to peace has been the complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with which the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang regard each other.

On the one hand, the leaders of the Government are strongly opposed to a communistic form of government. On the other, the Communists frankly state that they are Marxists and intend to work toward establishing a communistic form of government in China, though first advancing through the medium of a democratic form of government of the American or British type.

The leaders of the Government are convinced in their minds that the Communist-expressed desire to participate in a Government of the type endorsed by the Peoples Political Council [*Political Consultative Conference*] last January had for its purpose only a destructive intention. The Communists felt, I believe, that the Government was insincere in its apparent acceptance of the PCC resolutions for the formation of the new government and intended by coercion of military force and the action of secret police to obliterate the Communist Party. Combined with this mutual deep distrust was the conspicuous error by both parties of ignoring the effect of the fears and suspicions of the other party in estimating the reason for proposals or opposition regarding the settlement of various

matters under negotiation. They each seemed only to take counsel of their own fears. They both, therefore, to that extent took a rather lopsided view of each situation and were susceptible to every evil suggestion or possibility. This complication was exaggerated to an explosive degree by the confused reports of fighting on the distant and tremendous fronts of hostile military contact. Patrol clashes were deliberately magnified into large offensive actions. The distortion of the facts was utilized by both sides to heap condemnation on the other. It was only through the reports of American officers in the field teams from Executive Headquarters that I could get even a partial idea of what was actually happening and the incidents were too numerous and the distances too great for the American personnel to cover much of the ground. I must comment here on the superb courage of the officers of our Army and Marines in struggling against almost insurmountable and maddening obstacles to bring some measure of peace to China.

I think the most important factors involved in the recent breakdown of negotiations are these: On the side of the National Government, which is in effect the Kuomintang Party, there is a dominant group of reactionaries who have been opposed, in my opinion, to almost every effort I have made to influence the formation of a genuine coalition government. This has usually been under the cover of political or party action, but since the Party was the Government, this action, though subtle or indirect, has been devastating in its effect. They were quite frank in publicly stating their belief that cooperation by the Chinese Communist Party in the government was inconceivable and that only a policy of force could definitely settle the issue. This group includes military as well as political leaders.

On the side of the Chinese Communist Party there are, I believe, liberals as well as radicals, though this view is vigorously opposed by many who believe that the Chinese Communist Party discipline is too rigidly enforced to admit of such differences of viewpoint. Nevertheless, it has appeared to me that there is a definite liberal group among the Communists, especially of young men who have turned to the Communists in disgust at the corruption evident in the local governments—men who would put the interest of the Chinese people above ruthless measures to establish a communistic ideology in the immediate future. The dyed-in-the-wool Communists do not hesitate at the most drastic measures to gain their end as, for instance, the destruction of communications in order to wreck the economy of China and produce a situation that would facilitate the overthrow or collapse of the Government, without any regard to the immediate suffering of the people involved. They completely distrust the leaders of the Kuomintang Party and appear convinced that every Government proposal is designed to crush the Chinese Communist Party. I must say that the quite evidently inspired mob actions of last February

and March, some within a few blocks of where I was then engaged in completing negotiations, gave the Communists good excuse for such suspicions.³

However, a very harmful and immensely provocative phase of the Chinese Communist Party procedure has been in the character of its propaganda. I wish to state to the American people that in the deliberate misrepresentation and abuse of the action, policies and purposes of our Government this propaganda has been without regard for the truth, without any regard whatsoever for the facts, and has given plain evidence of a determined purpose to mislead the Chinese people and the world and to arouse a bitter hatred of Americans. It has been difficult to remain silent in the midst of such public abuse and wholesale disregard of facts, but a denial would merely lead to the necessity of daily denials; an intolerable course of action for an American official. In the interest of fairness, I must state that the Nationalist Government publicity agency has made numerous misrepresentations, though not of the vicious nature of the Communist propaganda. Incidentally, the Communist statements regarding the Anping incident which resulted in the death of three Marines and the wounding of twelve others were almost pure fabrication, deliberately representing a carefully arranged ambush of a Marine convoy with supplies for the maintenance of the Executive Headquarters and some UNRRA supplies, as a defense against a Marine assault. The investigation of this incident was a tortuous procedure of delays and maneuvers to disguise the true and privately admitted facts of the case.

Sincere efforts to achieve settlement have been frustrated time and again by extremist elements of both sides. The agreements reached by the Political Consultative Conference a year ago were a liberal and forward-looking charter which then offered China a basis for peace and reconstruction. However, irreconcilable groups within the Kuomintang Party, interested in the preservation of their own feudal control of China, evidently had no real intention of implementing them. Though I speak as a soldier, I must here also deplore the dominating influence of the military. Their dominance accentuates the weakness of civil government in China. At the same time, in pondering the situation in China, one must have clearly in mind not the workings of small Communist groups or committees to which we are accustomed in America, but rather of millions of people and an army of more than a million men.

I have never been in a position to be certain of the development of attitudes in the innermost Chinese Communist circles. But, certainly, the course which the Chinese Communist Party has pursued in recent months indicated an unwillingness to make a fair compromise. It has been impossible even to get them to sit down at a conference table with Government representatives to discuss given issues. Now the Communists have broken

off negotiations by their last offer which demanded the dissolution of the National Assembly and a return to the military positions of January 13th which the Government could not be expected to accept.

Between this dominant reactionary group in the Government and the irreconcilable Communists who, I must state, did not so appear last February, lies the problem of how peace and well-being are to be brought to the long-suffering and presently inarticulate mass of the people of China. The reactionaries in the Government have evidently counted on substantial American support regardless of their actions. The Communists by their unwillingness to compromise in the national interest are evidently counting on an economic collapse to bring about the fall of the Government, accelerated by extensive guerrilla action against the long lines of rail communications—regardless of the cost in suffering to the Chinese people.

The salvation of the situation—as I see it—would be the assumption of leadership by the liberals in the Government and in the minority parties, a splendid group of men, but who as yet lack the political power to exercise a controlling influence. Successful action on their part under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would, I believe, lead to unity through good government.

In fact, the National Assembly has adopted a democratic constitution which in all major respects is in accordance with the principles laid down by the all-party Political Consultative Conference of last January. It is unfortunate that the Communists did not see fit to participate in the Assembly since the constitution that has been adopted seems to include every major point that they wanted.

Soon the Government in China will undergo major reorganization pending the coming into force of the constitution following elections to be completed before Christmas Day 1947. Now that the form for a democratic China has been laid down by the newly adopted constitution, practical measures will be the test. It remains to be seen to what extent the Government will give substance to the form by a genuine welcome of all groups actively to share in the responsibility of government.

The first step will be the reorganization of the State Council and the Executive Branch of Government to carry on administration pending the enforcement of the constitution. The manner in which this is done and the amount of representation accorded to Liberals and to non-Kuomintang members will be significant. It is also to be hoped that during this interim period the door will remain open for Communists or other groups to participate if they see fit to assume their share of responsibility for the future of China.

It has been stated officially and categorically that the period of political tutelage under the Kuomintang is at an end. If the termination of one-

party rule is to be a reality, the Kuomintang should cease to receive financial support from the Government.

I have spoken very frankly because in no other way can I hope to bring the people of the United States to even a partial understanding of this complex problem. I have expressed all these views privately in the course of negotiations; they are well known, I think, to most of the individuals concerned. I express them now publicly, as it is my duty, to present my estimate of the situation and its possibilities to the American people who have a deep interest in the development of conditions in the Far East promising an enduring peace in the Pacific.

NA/RG 59 (Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages)

1. Marshall's handwritten first draft is dated December 15. (See NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Originals].) Marshall sent Colonel Marshall S. Carter a final draft appended to GOLD 1910 on January 5. Carter made a few editorial changes and responded: "For your information, Mister Byrnes thought your statement exceptionally powerful, although depressing, and certainly one that should be made now. Mister Acheson said it was a clear-cut and tremendously impressive statement of the situation." (Carter to Marshall, Radio No. WAR-89047, January 6, 1947, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Recall and Appointment].) The statement was later published in *China White Paper*, pp. 686–89.

2. See the editorial note on pp. 760–61.

3. See Marshall's Off-the-Record Statement to Editors, February 23, 1946, pp. 470–75. John F. Melby commented on another of these affairs—in Chungking on February 10, while Marshall was meeting with the Committee of Three. A dinner guest, who had been injured in the melee, "confirmed the growingly ugly story of that business. It now seems that the CC clique (extreme KMT right wing) held a powwow on Saturday [February 9] and decided to show the boys who really had the power. Then while it was on the Chen Brothers (origin of name CC clique) went across the river to spend Sunday with the Gimo. Maybe he knew of the plans, maybe he didn't. Certainly he knew as soon as it broke and the KMT police started throwing bricks. One of them was unfortunate enough to be caught with written orders in his britches. It has caused a bad impression that the Gimo left town on Monday in the face of the howl and without settling it." (Melby to Lillian Hellman, February 13, 1946, HSTL/J. F. Melby Papers [Hellman Correspondence]; an edited version is in Melby's *Mandate of Heaven*, pp. 89–90.)

Appendix

Principal War Department Officials and Major Theater Commands January 1945–December 1946

Organization charts and officials lists were published in *Papers of GCM*, 2: 697–702, 3: 712–20, and 4: 724–27. The persons below served in the designated capacities during the period covered by this volume. The dates given here are from the official beginning to the official end of service in the position. It was not uncommon for an official to take several weeks of accumulated leave prior to the official termination of his duties; designated successors often served as “acting” officials during this interim. The War Department listing is derived in large part from James E. Hewes, Jr., *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900–1963* (Washington: GPO, 1975), pp. 379–409. A reorganization in June 1946 changed a number of titles and duties.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Secretary of War

Henry L. Stimson July 10, 1940–September 21, 1945

Robert P. Patterson September 27, 1945–July 17, 1947

Under Secretary of War

Robert P. Patterson December 16, 1940–September 26, 1945

Kenneth C. Royall November 9, 1945–July 23, 1947

Assistant Secretary of War

John J. McCloy April 24, 1941–November 29, 1945

Robert A. Lovett (Asst. for Air) . . April 26, 1941–December 15, 1945

Howard Peterson December 29, 1945–July 31, 1947

W. Stuart Symington (Asst. for Air) February 1, 1946–September 17, 1947

Bureau of Public Relations

Alexander D. Surles August 6, 1941–December 31, 1945

J. Lawton Collins January 1, 1946–July 20, 1947

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Chief of Staff

George C. Marshall September 1, 1939–November 18, 1945
 Dwight D. Eisenhower November 1945–February 6, 1948

Deputy Chief of Staff

Thomas T. Handy October 22, 1944–August 30, 1947

Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division/Director of Plans and Operations)

John E. Hull October 22, 1944–June 15, 1946
 Lauris Norstad June 16, 1946–October 29, 1947

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1/Director of Personnel and Administration

Stephen G. Henry August 19, 1944–October 22, 1945
 Willard S. Paul October 26, 1945–November 14, 1948

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2/Director of Intelligence

Clayton L. Bissell February 7, 1944–January 25, 1946
 Hoyt S. Vandenberg January 26, 1946–June 9, 1946
 Stephen J. Chamberlin June 11, 1946–October 19, 1948

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3/Director of Organization and Training

Ray E. Porter May 16, 1943–February 13, 1945
 Idwal H. Edwards February 14, 1945–July 9, 1946
 Charles P. Hall July 10, 1946–November 11, 1948

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4/Director of Service, Supply, and Procurement

Russell L. Maxwell September 30, 1943–March 14, 1946
 Stanley L. Scott (acting) March 15, 1946–June 9, 1946
 LeRoy Lutes June 11, 1946–January 4, 1948

Secretary of the General Staff

Frank McCarthy January 15, 1944–August 21, 1945
 H. Merrill Pasco August 25, 1945–November 11, 1945
 John W. Bowen November 12, 1945–May 11, 1948

WAR DEPARTMENT SPECIAL STAFF

The Inspector General

Virgil L. Peterson December 24, 1939–June 5, 1945
 Daniel I. Sultan July 14, 1945–January 14, 1947

The Judge Advocate General

Myron C. Cramer December 1, 1941–November 20, 1945
 Thomas H. Green December 1, 1945–November 30, 1949

Chief of Finance

Howard K. Loughry April 23, 1940–June 1, 1945
 William H. Kasten July 1, 1945–January 31, 1949

Legislative and Liaison Division

Wilton B. Persons March 9, 1942–July 28, 1948

Civil Affairs Division

John H. Hilldring April 7, 1943–March 19, 1946

Oliver P. Echols March 20, 1946–December 20, 1946

Special Planning Division

William F. Tompkins July 23, 1943–June 29, 1945

Roy E. Porter June 30, 1945–June 9, 1946

New Developments Division

William A. Borden August 18, 1944–March 27, 1946

Gervais W. Tricel March 20, 1946–June 5, 1946

WAR DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATIVE & TECHNICAL SERVICES

The Adjutant General

James A. Ulio March 3, 1942–January 31, 1946

Edward P. Witsell February 1, 1946–June 30, 1951

Chief of Chaplains

William R. Arnold December 23, 1937–February 14, 1945

Luther D. Miller April 12, 1945–August 1, 1949

Provost Marshal General

Archer L. Lerch June 21, 1944–December 3, 1945

Blackshear M. Bryan December 4, 1945–April 9, 1948

Chief of Engineers

Eugene Reybold October 1, 1941–September 30, 1945

Raymond A. Wheeler October 1, 1945–February 28, 1948

The Surgeon General

Norman T. Kirk June 1, 1943–May 31, 1947

The Quartermaster General

Edmund B. Gregory April 1, 1940–January 31, 1946

Thomas B. Larkin February 1946–March 20, 1949

Chief of Ordnance

Leven H. Campbell June 1, 1942–May 31, 1946

Everett S. Hughes June 1, 1946–October 31, 1949

Chief Signal Officer

Harry C. Ingles July 1, 1943–March 31, 1947

Chief of the Chemical Corps

William N. Porter May 31, 1941–November 28, 1945

Alden H. Witt November 29, 1945–September 30, 1949

Chief of the Transportation Corps

Charles P. Gross July 31, 1942–November 30, 1945

Edmund H. Leavey December 1, 1945–June 10, 1948

MAJOR UNITED STATES THEATER COMMANDS

During the course of World War II, theater commands sometimes overlapped and their designations and boundaries frequently changed. At times United States Army commanders were deputies to British theater commanders: these are indicated by an asterisk. These nuances are described in Ray S. Cline, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*, a volume in the *United States Army in World War II* (Washington: GPO, 1951, pp. 374–81).

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, U.S. ARMY (ETO)

Dwight D. Eisenhower January 15, 1944–July 1, 1945

NORTH AFRICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

Joseph T. McNarney* October 22, 1944–October 23, 1945

(Theater Commander: General Sir Harold Alexander)

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, U.S. ARMY (MTOUSA)

Joseph T. McNarney November 1, 1944–October 23, 1945

GHQ, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA (SWPA)

Douglas MacArthur April 18, 1942–September 2, 1945

U.S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC (AFPAC)

Douglas MacArthur April 5, 1945–December 31, 1946

U.S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS (USAFPOA)

Robert C. Richardson, Jr. August 1, 1944–March 17, 1946

SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND (SEAC)

Raymond A. Wheeler* November 12, 1944–October 4, 1945

(Theater Commander: Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten)

U.S. FORCES, CHINA THEATER (USFCT)

Albert C. Wedemeyer October 31, 1944–May 1, 1946

U.S. FORCES, INDIA-BURMA THEATER (USFIBT)

Daniel I. Sultan. October 27, 1944–June 12, 1945

Raymond A. Wheeler June 23, 1945–September 28, 1945

U.S. ARMY FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST (USAFIME)

Benjamin F. Giles March 10, 1944–March 1, 1945

U.S. ARMY FORCES AFRICA–MIDDLE EAST THEATER (USAFAMET)

Benjamin F. Giles March 1, 1945–February 13, 1946

PERSIAN GULF COMMAND

D. P. Booth. December 15, 1944–August 15, 1945

U.S. ARMY FORCES, SOUTH ATLANTIC


R. H. Wooten May 16, 1944–October 30, 1945

CARIBBEAN DEFENSE COMMAND (CDC)

George H. Brett November 12, 1942–October 15, 1945

ALASKA DEPARTMENT

Delos C. Emmons. June 21, 1944–June 30, 1946




The War's Final Phase in Europe

— — — Front lines as of **DATE**
===== Soviet occupation zone border

0 MILES 50 100 150 200
0 KILOMETERS 100 200 300







The War's Final Phase in the Pacific

- - - - - International border


[Shaded Area] Approximate area controlled by Japan on V-E Day (Aug. 15, 1945)



China's regions as defined by the Military Sub-Committee on February 21, 1946.
(See Foreign Relations, 1946, 9: 268.)



North and Central China. Maps showing the approximate areas of Communist control and of famine in the spring of 1946 are on pp. 487 and 478.




Northeast China (Manchuria) and its key rail lines. Prior to Japan's creation of Manchuko in 1931, the Northeast consisted of three provinces: Heilungkiang, Kirin, and Liaoning. (Jehol was added to Manchuko in 1933, but the Chinese never considered it part of the Northeast.) Out of these three, the Japanese created nine provinces with a capitol at Changchun. The Kuomintang government retained the nine-province division after the war's end. (The Communists returned to a modified version of the tripartite division after 1949.)


..... 1931 provincial borders - - - - - post-1931 provincial borders



The Russian-built Chinese Eastern Railroad runs from the Trans-Siberian Railroad through Harbin to just above Vladivostok, and the South Manchurian Railroad runs from Harbin to Port Arthur.

Chinese Government, Nanking, Mid-1946



Executive Headquarters, Peiping, Mid-1946





Glossary

I. Abbreviations and Code Names

If an abbreviation or code name is used only once in the volume, it is explained in brackets in the text or in a footnote.

A.D.C.	=	Aide-de-camp
AFWESPAC	=	Army Forces, Western Pacific
Alpha	=	Specially equipped and organized Chinese divisions or force
ARGONAUT	=	Code name for the conferences held at Malta and Yalta
A.S.F.	=	Army Service Forces
A.S.T.P.	=	Army Specialized Training Program
CC clique	=	Conservative KMT group led by the Ch'en brothers
C.C.C.	=	Civilian Conservation Corps
C.C.S.	=	Combined Chiefs of Staff
CGUSAFCT	=	Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, China Theater (i.e., Wedemeyer); also CG USAF China
CINCAFPAC	=	Commander in Chief, Army Forces, Pacific
CINCPAC	=	Commander in Chief, Pacific [U.S. Navy]
CINCPOA	=	Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas
CM	=	Classified Message [-OUT, -IN]
CNO	=	Chief of Naval Operations
C.N.R.R.A.	=	Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Agency
COMGENCHINA	=	Commanding General, U.S. Forces, China Theater
C.O.S.	=	Chiefs of Staff (British)
DDEL/	=	Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas
D.S.M.	=	Distinguished Service Medal
E.T.O.	=	European Theater of Operations
Exec.	=	Executive Group File, O.P.D. files in NA/RG 165
FILBAS	=	Philippine Base (Army)
F.L.C.	=	Foreign Liquidation Commission
G-1	=	Personnel Division, U.S. Army General Staff
G-2	=	Intelligence Division, U.S. Army General Staff
G-3	=	Organization and Training Division, U.S. Army General Staff
G-4	=	Supply Division, U.S. Army General Staff
GCMRL/	=	George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Virginia
Gimo	=	Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
GOLD	=	Code name for a class of messages from Marshall's headquarters during the China Mission
GPO	=	Government Printing Office (U.S.)
HMSO	=	His/Her Majesty's Stationery Office (U.K.)
HQ or Hqs	=	Headquarters
HSTL/	=	Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri
J.C.S.	=	Joint Chiefs of Staff
J.P.S.	=	Joint Staff Planners
J.W.P.C.	=	Joint War Plans Committee

- KMT = Kuomintang—Nationalist Party of China
- LST = Landing Ship, Tank
- M.A.G. = Military Advisory Group
- MML/ = MacArthur Memorial Library, Norfolk, Virginia
- NA/ = National Archives and Records Administration,
College Park, Maryland
- RG 59 = Department of State
- RG 165 = War Department General and
Special Staffs
- RG 218 = Joint Chiefs of Staff
- RG 319 = U.S. Army Staff
- RG 331 = Allied Operational and Occupation
Headquarters, World War II
- RG 332 = U.S. Theaters of War, World War II
- RG 338 = U.S. Army Commands, 1942–
- RG 407 = The Adjutant General's Office, 1917–
- RG 457 = National Security Agency
- O.P.D. = Operations Division, War Department General Staff
- O.S.S. = Office of Strategic Services
- O.W.M.R. = Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion
- P&O = Plans and Operations Division, O.P.D.
- P.M. = Prime Minister
- Reurad = Regarding your radio message
- R.F.C. = Reconstruction Finance Corporation
- R.O.T.C. = Reserve Officers' Training Corps
- S-1 = Code name for the atomic bomb
- SACMED = Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean
- S.C.A.E.F. = Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force
- SCAF = Designates cables from S.C.A.E.F.
- SCALS = Shipping Control Authority Liberty Ships [China]
- S.C.A.P. = Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Japan
- S.E.A.C. = Southeast Asia Command
- SGS = Secretary, General Staff
- S.H.A.E.F. = Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
- S.S.U. = Strategic Services Unit (formerly O.S.S.)
- S.W.N.C.C. = State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
- S.W.P.A. = Southwest Pacific Area
- TS or TOPSEC = Top Secret (document classification)
- U.M.T. = Universal Military Training
- U.N. = United Nations
- U.N.R.R.A. = United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
- U.S.M.A. = United States Military Academy, West Point, New York
- USSTAF or USASTAF = U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces
- V-E Day = Victory in Europe Day (May 8, 1945)
- VICTORY [-IN, -OUT] = Code name for certain Potsdam Conference messages
- V-J Day = Victory over Japan Day (August 15, 1945)
- VLR = Very Long Range
- V.M.I. = Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Virginia
- W.A.C. = Women's Army Corps
- WARCOS = War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff
- Yale/ = Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University
Library, New Haven, Connecticut

II. Chinese Names

The State Council of China decided that as of January 1, 1979, the Chinese phonetic alphabet, *pinyin*, would be used exclusively to standardize the romanization of Chinese names and places. The United States government also adopted the system on that date. The previous system—the Wade-Giles (named for two nineteenth-century linguists)—was the one used at the time of Marshall’s mission to China.

Names that do not change in *pinyin* romanization are not included (e.g., Shanghai, Changchun). In addition, some place names have dropped their foreign names (e.g., Mukden, now Shenyang) or were later renamed.

Usage in Text	Pinyin Romanization	Usage in Text	Pinyin Romanization
1. Place Names			
Anhwei	Anhui	Kiangsu	Jiangsu
Canton	Guangzhou	Kiaochow	Jiaozhou
Chefoo	Yantai	Kirin	Jilin
Chengteh	Chengde	Kueisui	Huhehaote
Chengtu	Chengdu	Kukiang	Jiujuang
Chihfeng	Chifeng	Kuling	Guling
Chinchou	Zinzhou	Kwangshan	Guangshan
Chining	Jining	Kwangtung	Guangdong
Chinwangtao	Qinhuangdao	Liaopei	Liaobei
Chiuchiang	Jiujiang	Linch’eng	Xuecheng
Chungking	Chongqing	Lingyuan	Lingyuan
Dairen	Dalian	Lunghai	Longhai
Foochow	Fuzhou	Manchouli	Manzhouli
Hailar	Hailaer	Manchukuo	Manzhouguo
Harbin	Haerbin	Mukden	Shenyang
Heilungkiang	Heilongjiang	Nanking	Nanjing
Hokiang	Hejiang	Nantung	Nandong
Honan	Henan	Nunchiang/Nengkiang	
Hopeh	Hebei	/Nunkiang	Nenjiang
Hsiangho	Xianghe	Peking/Peiping	Beiping (Beijing)
Hsingan	Xing’an	Port Arthur	Lüshun
Hsinhsiang	Xinxiang	Pukow	Pukou
Hsuchow	Xuzhou	Shansi	Shanxi
Hulutao	Huludao	Shantung	Shandong
Hupéh	Hubei	Sian	Xi’an
Jehol	Rehe	Suchow	Xuzhou
Kalgan	Zhangjiakou	Szechuan/Szechwan	Sichuan
Kiangsi	Jiangxi	Taku	Dagu
		Tientsin	Tianjin
		Tolun	Duolun

<u>Usage in Text</u>	<u>Pinyin Romanization</u>
Tsaochuang	Zaozhuang
Tsinan	Jinan
Tsingtao	Qingdao
Tsitsihar	Qiqihaer
Yenan	Yan'an
Yingkow	Yingkou

2. Personal Names

Chang, Carsun	Zhang Junmai
Chang Chih-chung	Zhang Zhizhong
Chang Chun	Zhang Qun
Chang Fa-kuei	Zhang Fakui
Chang Kia-ngau	Zhang Jia'ao
Chang Nai-teh	Zhang Naide
Chen Cheng	Zhen Zheng
Ch'en Li-fu	Chen Lifu
Ch'en Kuo-fu	Chen Guofu
Chen, Percy (Pi-shih)	Chen Pi-shih
Chen Ping-hsieh	Zhen Bingxie
Cheng Kai-ming	Zheng Kaimin
Chiang Ching-kuo	Jiang Jingguo
Chiang Kai-shek	Jiang Jieshi
Chou En-lai	Zhou Enlai
Chou Hsien-chung	Zhou Xianzhong
Ho P'ang-chi	He Pangji
Hou Yeh-chun	Hou Yezhun
Hsu Yung-chang	Xu Yongchang
Koo, V. K. Wellington	Gu Weijun
Ku Chu Tung	Gu Zhutong
Ku[o] Chi-chiao	Guo Qiqiao
Li Chen-pien	
(C. P. Lee)	Li Zhenbian
Li Hwang	Li Huang
Li Kung-pu	Li Gongpu
Li Wei-kuo	Li Weiguo

<u>Usage in Text</u>	<u>Pinyin Romanization</u>
Lin Piao	Lin Biao
Lo Chung-shu	Luo Zhongshu
Lo Lung-chi	Luo Longji
Mao Tse(Tze)-tung	Mao Zedong
Miao Yun-tai	Miao Yundai
Mo Teh-hui	Mo Denhui
Pai Chung-hsi	Bai Chongxi
Pee, Peter Tsong-kan (Chung-kan)	Pi Zhongkan
Peng Hsueh-pei	Peng Xuepei)
Shang Chen	Shang Zhen
Shao Li-tze	Shao Lizi
Soong, T. V.	Song Ziwen
Sun Tan-lin	Sun Danlin
Tai Li	Dai Li
Tseng Chi	Zeng Qi
Tsiang, T. F. (Ting-fu)	Jiang Tingfu
Tu Li(Yu)-ming	Du Yuming
Tung Pi-wu	Dong Biwu
Wang Ping-nan	Wang Bingnan
Wang Shih-chieh	Wang Shijie
Wang Wen-hao	Wang Wenhao
Wei Tao-ming	Wei Daoming
Wen I-to	Wen Yiduo
Wu Chi-yu	Wu Chi(Ji)yu(you)
Wu Yi-fang	Wu Yifang
Yeh Chien-ying	Ye Jianying
Yeh Tu-yi	Ye Duiyi
Yen Hsi-shan	Yan Xishan
Yu Ta-wei	Yu Dawei

3. Other Names

Ginling College	Jinling College
Kuomintang (KMT)	Guomindang
<i>Ta Kung Pao</i>	<i>Dagong bao</i>

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