TAPE 11M
INTERVIEW WITH
GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL
NOVEMBER 15, 1956
Eastern Mediterranean strategy
Occupation zones for Europe
Recollections of trip to North Africa and story of chaplain “who came over here to bury some of you bastards”
The Morgenthau plan—question of going to Berlin
Meeting with Roosevelt in spring of 1940; effort to get increased appropriations; warning of approaching danger
Views on De Lattre
Why Marshall declined decorations during the war
Marshall on going into the Balkans
Army-Air antagonisms
Reorganization of Air Corps
Marshall on Stalin as a negotiator; Marshall on Stalin during and after war
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Q. 1. The Prime Minister has said that one of his greatest pangs of the war came because the U. S. Chief of Staff took a pedantic approach to the Eastern Mediterranean and refused to back him in his activities on Leros and other Islands of the area. He was also unhappy because Eisenhower, strongly backed by the U. S. chiefs of Staff, refused to divert forces from Italy for these activities. Do you feel, in retrospect, that the Prime Minister’s request had any merit to it?

A. Regarding Mr. Churchill’s feeling as to the Greek Islands and our attitude toward the Eastern Mediterranean and General Eisenhower’s attitude. In the first place, as I think I told you yesterday, he acted in regard to these Greek Islands without any regard to the Combined Chiefs of Staff which was highly irregular. And it followed immediately on his recovery—his convalescence—from pneumonia and my action in proposing the Americans release the executive control in the Mediterranean. So to put it very frankly it was in poor taste to say the least and I am not very sympathetic to his feeling deeply about it. Later the question of the Isle of Rhodes came up in which we had to oppose him very strongly. In all these matters, it was very difficult, in dealing with the British Chiefs of Staff, to tell whether we were really dealing directly with Mr. Churchill or with their opinions. Their position, I think, was extraordinary difficult. Mr. Churchill was very intense when he got a certain idea and he did business with them every day—where sometime I didn’t see the President for a month. So our trouble was to
know just when we were encountering Mr. Churchill’s opinion or when it was the British Chiefs of Staff’s opinion. Now in this Eastern Mediterranean question, he directed action there which, as I say, was highly irregular, because we were never consulted—which we had every right to be—and, therefore, he is without position when he feels we didn’t back him up.

As to General Eisenhower’s feeling about diverting forces from Italy for these activities and U. S. Chiefs of Staff backing him, this was the same thing. We were resisting constant efforts to diminish the set-up or time element for the cross-channel operation—I have forgotten the technical name for it—[Pogue:Overlord]—Overlord.

Q. 2. General Marshall soon recommended that the U. S. Chiefs of Staff take the position that a supreme commander be designated for all British-American operations against Germany. At the same time he did not wish to raise with the British the delicate problem of the eventual unification of the U. S. and British air commands until he had an agreement on the overall command. It has been suggested that this arrangement was brought forward by the U. S. planners in the hope that the way would be opened for your appointment to such an overall command. In this way Mr. Roosevelt’s fears of losing your influence in Washington would be met. Is this an accurate statement?

A. Now turning to Chapter 11 Question 2. I don’t know about the answer to 2. And in a way I have forgotten just what conversations took place in the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and with me with the planners and by me with the planners.

Q. 3. General Frederick Morgan was brought over here for several weeks in 1943 to inspect troops and visit American cities. It has been suggested that you intended to appoint him as your
chief of staff in case of your selection as commander of Overlord. Is this an accurate statement? If so, did you have in mind other members of your staff?

A. The suggestion about General Morgan is correct. I had in mind starting off with him, at least in the preliminary stage as Chief of Staff. Just what my actions would have been in the effort to get matters composed when I found that the principal British leader was violently—almost vindictively—opposed to him, I’m, not prepared to say.

Pogue: I believe you have answered part of these questions.

Ch. XII  Q. 1. At one point in the discussions en route to Tehran, the discussion turned to occupation zones. The President drew in pencil his proposed line of demarcation. At the conclusion of the meeting, the President handed this to General Marshall who in turn gave it to General Handy. Was this line entirely of the President’s making or was he reflecting military or diplomatic advice?

A. Reference to Tehran. I have forgotten the details regarding the occupation zones. I know we had rather lengthy discussions with the President. We found him very fixed in his position and as I recall McCloy played a leading part in this.

Pogue: You had nothing to do with drawing these lines?

No, I had nothing to do with the initial proposals for these lines. They came from London I believe. The feelings at the time were rather involved. McCloy wanted one thing, in which we backed him, and the President wanted quite another. And in the background was what would the French get? And on this phase the President was either rather sketchy or antagonistic.
I don’t recall the President giving me a paper. I presume he did. And I don’t recall the paper.

But in all these occupation zone matters—in the back of our heads—I say our, certainly in mine—was the prospect that we would be rather remote from Berlin at the time the Russians got there. Of course, it didn’t work out that way. The rapid occupation of the Ruhr and also the evident desire of the Germans to surrender to the Allies completely changed the military set-up at the finish. (Incidentally, I might say that that conquest of the Ruhr and the fighting immediately following it was really a magnificent performance, because it was a running battle that General Bradley was conducting with the necessity at the same time of taking care of a moving German population. I remember their reporting to me at one place there were twenty thousand moving Germans in charge of one corporal who organized the entire affair, fed them, and managed everything, which was a typical American procedure. This corporal evidently had very fine judgment and was not seeking publicity. Did you find any record of that when you were working over there?

Pogue: Not that particular episode but I have seen enormous number of people coming back under practically no guard at all. I went through to the South of the Ruhr so I didn’t get in on that part.

Do you want me to tell a story on that sort of thing?

Pogue: Yes, certainly.
After the battle in Tunisia and the surrender of the Italian-Rommel forces, I found myself visiting in an olive grove, where a battalion, I think, of the 34th Infantry was bivouacked following the battle and this was on a portion of the battleground and it happened to be Decoration Day. So they planned a ceremony for which they asked me to delay my departure in order that I might witness it. So a couple of hours later—in the late afternoon—I went to the division commander, General Ryder, out on a field where the troops were assembled. This ceremony was conducted by the chaplain. His remarks were largely a repetition of the order for that day, which was a historical reminder of how the Decoration Day affair was organized shortly after the Civil War. So his remarks were not very interesting. But more to the point was the fact that when it came to the singing, he distributed some books. But they had no leaders and he led and he was tone deaf. And they started to try to sing with him, but they quit. It was a very agonizingly pathetic performance. Added to which the men were in deep column, so that only a few were close enough to hear anything. Above all, they were facing the setting sun—it was square in their eyes—and it was not a cool day. Now I had issued an order against the advice of the Chief of Chaplains, Bishop Arnold, charging commanders with the same responsibility for the conduct of the chaplain as the regimental or battalion commander had for the training of his unit. We were not interested in the denominational matters of religious procedures but intensely interested in the effectiveness of the chaplain. Was he carrying his weight? Or was he more or less innocuous? Bishop Arnold was very doubtful about this, particularly as he was the presiding judge, in effect. However, I went ahead with it. So this particular chaplain in Tunisia came to my forcible attention on account of the miserable procedure. While the ceremony was going on I taxed General Ryder with this state of affairs.
He replied by saying that this was the battalion chaplain and that they had a perfectly splendid division chaplain. I replied that I wasn’t talking about the division chaplain—I was talking about this battalion, which was his battalion, and that chaplain. He again tried to tell me about the division chaplain and I refused to hear.

At the end of the ceremony, I took over and faced the men away from the setting sun and had them sit down. And then gave them a talk describing what was going on with the American forces in the various portions of the world—trying to take the curse off part of this miscast ceremony. And when we got into the car to leave, General Ryder asked my permission to tell me about this division chaplain. Well, I said, “All right, you tell me, but don’t forget this battalion chaplain.” He said that the division chaplain drove up there in an open Cadillac at the time of the surrendering of the troops. And on the plain right out there by us were thousands of prisoners who had just surrendered themselves. They were moving in from every direction and, as a matter of fact, in some places the Germans were controlling the movements, just automatically taking control. Our fellows were busy fighting at some other point. This chaplain came up in his car and a German major attacked him on the failure of the Americans to organize this affair—leaving it to the Germans and was very, very caustic and exceedingly arrogant. The chaplain explained that they didn’t have any experience in this and would probably do better the next time—implying in a gentle way that there would be a next time which went over the arrogant German’s head and he held forth again, infuriating the corporal [driving] who was particularly irritated that the chaplain was so mild. But this time the chaplain pointed to the caduceus and he said do you know what these are? The German said he didn’t know at all what they were but he did not see any relation to this situation. The chaplain said, “That means that I am a chaplain. I
have nothing to do with this affair at all.” He said, “As a matter of fact, I came over here to plant one of you bastards.” So the corporal cheered from the driver’s seat. (Chuckle). Now when I returned to Algiers that night or the next morning—I have forgotten which—just in time to return with Mr. Churchill who was busy with a submarine flotilla, I told the story to Mr. Churchill and he was much amused. But the next day after the review of all the troops—the victory parade as it were—he said to me, “You have got that story wrong.” I said, “Was General Ryder telling it to you?” He said, “Yes,” and I said, “What was wrong with it?” He said, “You said ‘bury’ that bastard and he said ‘plant’ that bastard.” He got the word right away—“plant” was very much better.

Pogue: He had a good ear for the proper language.

Oh, yes.

Pogue: I don’t suppose there’s been anyone in our time like him.

He’s the great master for terminology, I guess you would put it.

Pogue: Wilson was our closest man to him in this country.

Yes, he was. But the trouble with Mr. Wilson, I would say, by comparison, was his very perfect English, but it didn’t arouse you. Churchill’s was calculated to put everybody on their feeling. The fact is that he defended England at its weakest point by his statements. He rallied the whole nation.

Pogue: Oh, it was magnificent, like that some chicken, some neck, you know—they are going to wring their necks.
Q. 2. Do you recall any serious debate about the matter of a race for Berlin or the occupation of Berlin? Was the President expressing his views only? Did you share the President’s opposition to occupation of parts of Austria and any area of the Balkans? Did you favor the joint occupation of Berlin?

A. I don’t recall in detail any such conversation. And it would seem to me now looking at it that the President was probably anticipating the surrender before the actual fall of Berlin. In that case, we would be pretty close without resistance. And it might be a race between the Soviets and ourselves.

Pogue: And in case we got there first we would take it?

Well, I didn’t get that specifically one way or another.

Pogue: I think it is possible that that statement may be put down wrong in the record because it is contradictory the way it stands where on one hand, you know, you said he told you he wanted it to be shared by the four and then it says later, the United States should have it.

I don’t recall the discussions regarding Austria and any area of the Balkans.

As to the joint occupation of Berlin, meaning, I presume, four-power occupation, I in effect, favored that, I would say, because it was, in effect, on our hands except as the French and there we had a battle because the Soviets were utterly contemptuous of the French and they still were, as a matter of fact, when I went to Moscow as Secretary of State and Bidault was very much insulted by the way they treated him—when he was actually my senior by time and rank because he was the Prime Minister, and in the seating and all they deferred to me.
Pogue: However, you shared to some extent to the President’s fear of long time occupation because you knew of the public reaction.

Yes. We were worried about that all the time. And I was worried by something I referred to a great many times, to my staff, and which they didn’t understand at all because they had never been through it, which was the change of public opinion, not only as to the time factor but as to attitudes. I had seen that so clearly marked in the Philippines where there was the most friendly relationships between our troops and the surrendering insurgents including Quezon but as soon as it passed more or less to a civilian control, it awakened all sorts of bitterness. The feelings that were dominating action in Europe, I felt certain, would be modified, just as Mr. Roosevelt’s frequent reference to feeding the Germans for years from soup kitchens and giving them nothing else. And I might say, a good many of my embarrassments as Secretary of State flowed from the fact that we got into these things in this revengeful and vicious mood and now we were trying to get out of them, which made our negotiations as pertains to the Soviets very difficult—on our changing attitudes.

That was particularly the case in relation to Japan. As evidence of the bitterness and illogic of the feelings, one of our commanders, I have forgotten his name, but he was a very gallant fighter, was bitterly attacked, I think before Congress, certainly in the American Press, because he had a meal with a surrendering German. But things were just absurd, you know.

Pogue: I know it got so bad you had to send General Eisenhower a message saying be careful with this sort of thing.

They did not understand what was going on, you see.
Pogue: As I pointed out in the chapter in this book I helped to write on Yalta, Mr. Roosevelt and Churchill were captives to the extent of the feeling they had helped work up in order to get immunity against the Germans.

Yes, and you cannot do it. Same thing with de Gaulle. They worked up a great feeling about de Gaulle in England in which Eden played quite a part and now they had him on their hands and they couldn’t unblock. That business about Japan was very striking. General Frank McCoy was chairman of that Russian-American committee they had. And he got Russian agreement on a lot of these things, but we changed our policy. Then we called on him to change it with them. Well, of course, it was quite a different matter then. Then they began to criticize General McCoy. When I came in as Secretary of State, he was under criticism. When I looked into the thing found if there was anyone to be criticized, it was the State Department. But it was the American changing feelings. Here they were violent against Japan and properly so. But they had got their regulations based on violence of feelings which is always bad, but now they had to change them around because they found the apparent enemy was going to be the Soviets and not Japan. In other words, she would not be a feared possible opponent.

Pogue: In Question 3. I have gone beyond 1943 to 1945 but it seemed a logical place to ask this.

Q. 3. Anticipating a later period, what is your recollection of the controversy relative to the responsibility for failure to get firm agreement for access through the Soviet zone to Berlin?

A. I don’t recall about question 3. These things became so highly political at that time.
Pogue: General Clay finally said he supposed it was his responsibility that he should have looked into it?

Who?

Pogue: General Clay.

Of course, in a long period, a lot of these things, we weren’t concerned with at all at the time and afterwards historically they become very important.

Pogue: And the danger is that people read back things into it that weren’t there.

People would not be interested in reading it, but I think it would be very important in any book covering a war over a long period ever so often to resume the status of public opinion at the time. You take a lot of our negotiations. Well you can’t negotiate without any strength at all. You don’t walk up and slap a man in the faced if you haven’t any way of protecting yourself. You may feel the thing, but you have to be very judicious about it. As you become strong, your attitude will become quite different.

That was very much the case in relation to the Soviets apropos of Korea. We just hand nothing there at one time. And we were speaking without backing. We couldn’t get enough—MacArthur was having to put men into battle of Korean birth with only three or four weeks training. We were taking over a year to get a division and he was making those divisions in thirty days. Well, we were speaking from weakness and it had to be judged in that relationship. When we got, as the strength developed which was about 1952—not before that—real strength began to develop—then our attitude towards the Soviets could be very much more frankly stated
publicly and certainly privately—because we were acquiring great power, where before that we just had literally none in ’50 and ’51. By the time it got to ’53 and ’54 we were a very powerful country.

Pogue: That was the case, for example, with Neville Chamberlain and his appeasement policy. He just did not have any strength back at Munich, did he?

No they didn’t have anything. We tried not to appease, but just to go easy. (Chuckles). We didn’t attack. We were playing for time all the time. But there is a great difference in the way you talk if you have any wisdom at all when you have nothing and straight appeasement is unfortunate. But I think there should be brief resumes of the state of public opinion at various stages. You take the state of public opinion just at the time they almost legislated the army out of existence; they only saved it by one vote. I find that people have forgotten all about that—Mr. Roosevelt’s problem with the Middle West—the Bible Belt—and all those things. Very, very difficult. You couldn’t handle that at all the way you might have two years later.

Pogue: This was two to three months before Pearl Harbor.

Yes. That was the end of August. Pearl Harbor was the 7th of December. Just like Congress cutting me down—the Appropriations Committee—to fifty-seven planes for the next year. And I only asked for $11 millions for Alaska which was just to get shelter at Anchorage so that we could begin to defend the twelve hundred miles of the Aleutian Peninsula and all that country—everything being very expensive to do—and this was just $11 millions. And they cut all that out and that was just a few weeks before the fall of Paris.
Pogue: Well the fall of Paris is what woke people up here, wasn’t it?

Yes. I might add here that just prior to that Hitler would do certain things and I would always take advantage of what he did to get something out of Congress. It was very difficult for a long time there to get beyond the budget control because the President was having a struggle with debt limits and matters of that kind and he returned from a fishing trip on the ill-fated Houston and landed in Miami. And earlier in the spring I had had the approval of the Budget Bureau for one sum of $28 millions, I think, a large portion of which was to be for the building up of the protection, equipment and all for the Western Coast against Japanese naval approach—I’ve forgotten—one was $18 millions and the other was for the remaining part of the $28 millions. I received word from Miami that he had approved the $28 million [means $18] but had cut the remaining portion of the $28 million and that I was to see Mr. Morgenthau, who was really controlling the growth of the Army and all, on account of the debt limit. When I went to see Mr. Morgenthau, I found he didn’t want to talk to me about this remaining portion. I always think of $9 millions—I’ll say 9 million but that wasn’t it, apparently it was $10 millions—that had been eliminated by the President, wouldn’t allow us go before the Congress with that, but he was now talking about the $18 million. Well, I was so shocked with that. These numbers were so minute, in a sense, and our needs were so vast and the time involved was so long, that is was just a puzzle in my mind how in the world we could hold out until we got any of these things. So in this case when Mr. Morgenthau apprised me of the real situation, I said a little along that line and he was very much affected. And he asked me if I could come the next morning when he had a free morning. Well, I went over the next morning and I outlined to him the whole situation and he was absolutely appalled when he visualized and grasped the enormity of the problem we had.
The terrific cost and the time which must be consumed before any of it could be realized. So he arranged to see the President after lunch and he and I went into lunch in the Treasury Department and he gave orders that we were not to be disturbed. Nevertheless, he was disturbed three times in connection with messages regarding the possible closing of the Stock Exchange. Then we went to see the President who it was quite evident was not desirous of seeing us. The conversation through most of the meeting, in fact all of it for a long time, was between the President and Mr. Morgenthau and he was getting very little chance to state his case. I rather assumed that the President was staging this rather drastic handling of Mr. Morgenthau for my benefit, because they were old friends and neighbors. The first thing that Mr. Morgenthau took up was the organizing of the civilian group which later developed into a very impressive organization. Knudsen was head of it at one time. Ed Stettinius was the first head of it and the President in reply to one phase of this said that that wasn’t necessary at all. He said “I have Harry Hopkins in the Department of Commerce and I have you in the Treasury Department and you are handling most of the War Department matters in connection with finance and equipment”—and he mentioned somebody else—“and I am handling the rest, so there is no necessity for that.”

Then Mr. Morgenthau got around to military aspects, military equipment, and the President was exceedingly short with him. Finally Mr. Morgenthau said, “Well, Mr. President, will you hear General Marshall?” And the President replied—I remember this most distinctly—“Well, I know exactly what he would say. There is no necessity for me hearing him at all.”
Well, it was a desperate situation. I felt that he might be President but I had certain knowledge which I was sure he didn’t possess or which he didn’t grasp. And I thought the whole thing was catastrophic in its possibilities and this last cut just emphasized that point. So, recalling that a man has a great advantage, psychologically when he stands looking down on a fellow, I took advantage, in a sense, of the President’s condition. So when he terminated the meeting I, not having had a chance to say anything, I walked over and stood looking down at him and said, “Mr. President, may I have three minutes?” And then in a complete change of mood and in a very gracious fashion, he said, “Of course, General Marshall of course. Sit down.” No, he didn’t say ‘sit down.’

I said, “Now, first Mr. Morgenthau spoke to you about this civilian organization to represent all the civil side of these matters and you said that Hopkins would handle one part and Morgenthau one part and he himself was handling one part of it. I said with all frankness none of you are supermen and Mr. Morgenthau has no more chance of managing this thing than of flying. We just had lunch and he gave orders he was not be interrupted. He was interrupted three times by the matter of the closing of the Stock Exchange. He can’t possibly grasp all these things. He was trying to get the straight of the enormity of our situation regarding military preparedness and he wasn’t even allowed to do that.” I said, “If you don’t do something like that, and do it right away and really do it today, I don’t know what is going to happen to this country.” “Now,” I said, “As to the military part, I just came here in the first place about a cut of something that had previously been approved by the Budget Bureau and turned down in the Congress, a very small sum of money. It seems to us large these days but it will eventually going to be considered a very small sum.” I said, “I don’t know quite how to express myself about this
to the President of the United States but I will say this—[this is said very forcefully] that you have got to do something and you’ve got to do it today.” And I went out of the room with $79 billion. [?] And three weeks later we got $100 billion appropriation between the Navy and ourselves and $50 billions or something like that of the 100 billions.

Pogue: Billions or millions?

Billions. He was cutting me on 18 millions and we came out with billions. And we came back three weeks later—oh, incidentally he had spoken about Congress. I said,” I know you can get them to accept it. They can’t evade it.” And I said,” If you will allow me I can help in that and I will send over a draft of the message.” I made a first draft of the message and I don’t remember how much he changed it. He had a fashion of changing things because he had complete confidence in his extraordinary ability in that respect and he just wouldn’t accept anything without changing it. Later on, he accepted the whole damn business that I gave him, in a way which really frightened me, because he always had a wider point of view, of necessity, than I did, and I was always loathe to accept this opportunity. That is what Mr. Truman always frightened me about. I could get him to approve anything, but I knew enough to know I didn’t have the whole field.

Pogue: Mr. Truman had complete faith in you

He would just accept it and I was afraid of that because while I felt that way there were other facets of the affair that I might not understand. Anyway, three weeks later had occurred the fall of France and Morgenthau called me up and told me that the manufacturing industry now would bid on these things which they had refused to do before because they were completely
uncertain as to what the labor situation was going to be. The Administration had left them gasping about that and they wouldn’t risk the stockholders’ money. Now it was the country and they were perfectly willing to take hazards they wouldn’t accept before at all. So, therefore, Mr. Morgenthau called me up and told me he could now place contracts for airplane engines which is what we lacked and so we drummed up a new appropriation which we got. I’ve forgotten, but we got pretty near $800 millions. I don’t remember what the Navy got which included this great air increase in materiel.

Pogue: The big block had been broken even before the fall of France as a result of this conference.

Yes, this second one [appropriation] was just three weeks later. The President was furious. He didn’t like this first one. This second went through—was passed right away. I don’t remember any prolonged budge hearing on it. They were getting all restless by that time. He said, “I just sent a message to Congress just three weeks ago. What will they think of me?” “Well,” I said, “Mr. President, the world has changed since three weeks ago. But what is more to the point, industry will accept contracts now that it didn’t dare accept before. And I am certain you will have no trouble whatever.” And then some fool (chuckle) came up with the statement that if they would let me handle it, I could put it right over and of course that just infuriated him. As a matter of fact that was true for this reason—in the first place they were certain I had no ulterior motive. In the next place, they had begun to trust my judgment. But most important of all was, if Republicans could assure their constituents that they were doing it on my suggestion, and not on Mr. Roosevelt’s suggestion, they could go ahead and back the
thing. He had such enemies that otherwise members of Congress didn’t dare, it seemed, to line up with him. And that was true of certain Democrats who were getting pretty bitter.

Pogue: Of course the election was coming up that fall and they wanted to stand clear of anything that would help him.

Well, anyway, that was the great breach in getting our money started. I always had a firm feeling, a tragic feeling, that if we could have done that in the fall of ’39 we could have shortened the war by at least a year and probably much longer. We would have saved hundreds of billions and a hundred thousand casualties.

Pogue: Well, you might have avoided Pearl Harbor altogether because you would have had all kinds of warning systems and controls that you didn’t have.

There was so much mismanagement on that, God knows whether it would have helped or not. Is this of any value to you?

Pogue: This is magnificent. You see this sort of thing is material we can’t get out of the record because it’s something you and the President knew and Harry Hopkins. You are the only one left on the American side who knows any of this story and the President did not put his down and Hopkins did not put all his down.

What Hopkins really did was quite remarkable. All those General Staff, Combined Chief of Staffs, U. S. Chief of Staffs’ records are supposed to be highly confidential. Well, he had to make himself in a large measure, reporting to the President what was happening and then filed
the darn things in his file so he has them all available where in a sense they weren’t supposed to
be available to anyone.

Pogue: Yes, I know he had a copy for example of all those files of Potsdam and Yalta.
You turned your copy over to us. I used your set in writing on my book.

Q. 4. What was your view as to the time we should occupy Germany? Did you feel that one or
two years was enough?

A. I don’t recall.

Pogue: In 1943 it would not have been ten years. You wouldn’t have dreamed of ten
years, would you?

Well, I don’t know. If we were going to feed them out of soup kitchens all the time, it
would take guarding them for a long time. I don’t know what my feeling was.

Q. 5. Did you share the President’s aversion to having any responsibility for France after the
war?

A. I shared in a measure the President’s fears about France. And it was stirred up to a large
measure by de Gaulle.

Pogue: You had good friends though in France below his level.

Oh, yes, very good friends. He had already begun to do things you see—in relation to—
who was that fellow they sent over to Asia, in that fighting in Indo-China [de Lattre]. De Lattre.
I ran into de Lattre down in southern France when he had replaced Juin and I was much outraged
by him. Later we got into an impasse there when he gave de Gaulle’s orders interfering with the conduct of the armies which were under command of Clark in Italy in that northwestern section there. He was attacking Devers—was it Devers?—[Truscott]—criticizing Truscott very much. He wasn’t getting the proper amount of supplies and all, coming up the trail toward the Vosges, and the truth was there were no supplies to get. A division was supposed to have nine hundred tons a day, I think. And they were cut down. Patton was getting only three hundred tons and all action had ceased on the front because we couldn’t get supplies to them, particularly gasoline. And on top of that de Lattre was making this a triumphant march and they were delaying in villages after villages and cities and they were not up to the place, you know, and he was very bitterly critical of Truscott in front of the French reporters. And this bird from Philadelphia who is now over in Formosa, who was Ambassador to Russia one time, ambassador to France [Biddle]. Oh, no, he is a Philadelphian. [Bullitt]. Bullitt. He was a major with him and was doing nothing but playing up—Bullitt—and bootlicking the French. And I just terminated the proceedings. Right in front of the French reporters and American reporters. I restrained myself by not blowing off his head. But I just stopped the thing right where it was and walked out.

So when they proposed him to have the ground command in NATO and I was in Paris with the United Nations, he came to see me to see if I was opposed to him because of the business down in northwest Italy where he had orders from de Gaulle, who had no right to give him any orders because he was interfering with command. I said, “No, de Lattre, I understood that. It was completely irregular and he had no authority to do that, but your position was quite difficult and I accepted that. But when it comes to the other thing—what you were guilty of when I first saw you in France, you have none of the qualities at all of an Allied commander. I
said that was the most outrageous business of yours. I restrained myself very, very carefully from tearing you down to the ground. Because what you did was a most culpable performance for a man who had any idea of how allied forces must get along. And in the next place you didn’t have a leg to stand on. You celebrated all the way up the road. You were late on every damn thing (chuckle) and there wasn’t anything to divide and you are critical of Truscott who is a fighter and not a talker.” I said, “I am not going to oppose you on this at all because as a matter of fact that command doesn’t amount to much right now. It will, but it doesn’t right now. You are no man to command any allied thing because you are a politico.” Actually he was a good fighter. He did a good job out there in Indo-China, where he died as a result of it. But that performance there was terrible, right in front of all these reporters. But fortunately, they didn’t bring it up at all. I think they spared me because I was so outraged by it. I was outraged at my people. I was outraged at Devers for standing there—no Truscott—and letting it go on. I was outraged with him. I shouldn’t have been because he was being attacked. Bullitt didn’t say a damn word. He just stood there and smirked. God knows what he told the reporters. I was out with him right then. He was just a high rider.

Q. 6. Can you throw any light on the apparent contradictory statements noted above: one that the President favored joint occupation and secondly that he said the United States should have Berlin.

A. If he said we ought to have Berlin he was just talking. Of course we would have like to have Berlin.
Q. 7. Churchill is supposed to have said that had he been the Russians in 1943, he would have asked for Germany up to the Rhine. Do you feel that the boundaries, as drawn in 1943, were highly satisfactory under the circumstances?

A. Oh, those boundaries. I was so absorbed in the battle to get France some representation particularly in Berlin. We had to give up part of our holdings to France because the Russians wouldn’t make any compromise on that at all.

Q. 8. After Marshall explained the case against going into Balkans, the President said that the Russians were only sixty miles from the Polish border and forty miles from Bessarabia and might shortly enter Poland. They might ask that the western Allies go up the Adriatic to the Danube to help defeat Germany. General Marshall said that he would have to be prepared to explain to the Russians the implications of such a move. If the Soviet forces got to the Bug River, the Western Allies could force the issue from England by throwing in air support. He doubted that any troops the Allies might send to the Balkans would have an appreciable influence on the situation. Was the President reflecting Churchill’s arguments here? If so, it is rather evident that the stress was on helping a Russian advance rather than blocking Russia in the Balkans?

A. I don’t know about question 8.

Q. 9. I gather from your point about that you felt the Russians would be upset by our movement into the Balkans. Don’t you feel that any strong move by us in that area might have stimulated a push by them toward important cities of the west which we later occupied?
A. I don’t know about question 9 either. So many of these things seem to go to some chance remark. You could well understand some fellow might turn away from the table and say, “God damn these Russians anyway.” Well you might say that reflects complete opposition to the whole thing. We probably said somewhat similar things about the British at times and I know they did about us. But they are not the basis of historical evidence. They are part of the historical atmosphere of the times. For example, I was very much opposed to receiving decorations. I thought during the war for me to be receiving any decorations while our men were in the jungles of New Guinea or the islands in the Pacific especially or anywhere where there was heavy fighting, it wouldn’t appear at all well for me to be [Tape stops here] receiving decorations, so I declined them.

SECOND SIDE

To repeat what I said at the end of the other reel, I wouldn’t take any decorations after we got into the war which led to a good many difficulties. And I have declined to take many since because I wouldn’t involve myself in getting the authority of Congress to approve it. I got one from Russia, I think on Harriman’s insistence. I insisted I shouldn’t get the decoration. But the night, the evening, almost the hour, of the landing in Normandy, they presented me this decoration at the Russian Embassy—Gromyko—I was much opposed to that. And this thing came up and came up. And I didn’t want to be put in the position of taking any decoration like that while our men were fighting, particularly when they were in such devilish country. The pressure would be very considerable at times. One or two put it over by voting the decoration and coming up with it before I had a chance to control the thing. I relieved tow attaches because
I found they were conniving, though they all had instructions to oppose any proposition to give me a decoration. There, I had a particular reason because of Lend-Lease. When a country was pressing for Lend-Lease affairs and then gave me a decoration—that just wouldn’t do at all. I found these attaches would get a decoration with me. So they had verbatim instructions on the matter and I found, as I recall, two who tried to evade and get a decoration and I relieved them.

Pogue: Frank McCarthy said you told him once that if you got honorary degrees and decorations, he was going to get thrown out.

I depended on him to stop these things too. It got you nowhere. I think I declined twenty or thirty. I haven’t got any from Norway, Sweden, Holland or Belgium. They tried and tried to do it, but I was out of the country when they made their presentations and that congressional law permitting me to accept the decorations had lapsed. They came to me, particularly Holland and Belgium, a number of times to try to get me to accept one and I wouldn’t do it.

Well, however, to show the part they played. They were after me to get some other decoration. I have forgotten what it was. There was quite a bit of pressure. And we were having a meeting of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff, Potsdam, I think, and Leahy came by to make his departure for a holiday they had there. The President was going away, and others were going various places. And we were going to stay and work with the Soviet Chiefs of Staff. And I told Leahy—he was going to England—and I said, “Don’t you accept any medal up there.” To me it would be very embarrassing but it wouldn’t be with him at all the way he was fixed. So I was just doing this as a joke. But Jack McCloy came in from somewhere and he say Leahy and he said they told him that I had said Leahy had gone to England to accept a decoration. And Leahy
had practically never spoken to me since—perfectly furious. Well, if I really say it, he had a right to be furious. He took it up and discussed it before the Chiefs of Staff and I couldn’t explain what I said because of his impeccable position, I made this jocular reference. But McCloy came along and gets it as a statement and Leahy and I broke right there and it had very serious consequences.

Then I got involved in a decoration from Columbia University because I found that all the rest of the commanders were getting theirs the same day. I think even General Eisenhower. I am not certain. I know the others were all there. I know Nimitz was there. I would have declined that but that was afterwards when I was still trying to go along and not take anything. I had to compromise on one or two things. I comprised on Harvard at the time of my Marshall Plan statement. They had invited me and I had declined three or four times. And we decided suddenly that that was the date. We thought first one about two or three weeks earlier, they University of Wisconsin was the date. And then we went to the 15th of June, thinking Amherst would be the date. And then suddenly, the way things were unfolding in Europe and affairs over here, too politically, we landed on this Harvard date. They had asked me, I think three or four times and I declined. So I telegraphed them were they agreeable to still give me the thing, and that’s the way we made the date.

Pogue: Oh, I see.

There were one or two others things in there. Amherst—I had promised McCloy that I would take a degree from Amherst. And when I went up there, he drove about thirty miles to meet me and he and the dean took me to the Dean’s house, all for this date, and he promised me I
wouldn’t have to make a speech or anything. And the ceremonies were outdoors. When we came, we went down the aisle between the students and mounted the stand. I say previously we sat at the dean’s house. I think it was the dean. He was a classmate of McCloy’s and they had a great deal of persiflage there, very amusing. And his wife served us Scotch, and I had three Scotches. I never drink Scotch. In fact I don’t drink much of anything, but I sat there laughing with them and I drank these three Scotches. And suddenly the time for the ceremony came up and we went over and robed and went up there. I found myself sitting in the front seat. I sat down on the programs and the President sat next to me. Some kindly soul in the rear of me handed me the program. And I opened the program up—very impressive looking—there were only two speeches. There was one by the Secretary of State of the United States and I wasn’t to make any speech at all—and I was sitting there with three Scotches aboard (Chuckles). That was the darnedest dilemma I ever got into. I turned around and got McCloy’s eye and he just shriveled all up. They had broken faith with him, too. The President was to talk and I was to talk first. My God, my only hope I have is what I can think of while the fellow is making—what is the religious statement at the start [Pogue: Invocation]—the invocation. Well as a rule that fellow tries to settle everything you know. Well this one did it in one sentence (chuckles).

Pogue: You were hoping for a long one.

I got up and I had found out four hundred of this class that were all veterans. Quite unusual that they had gotten into the first class. So I just proceeded to talk to the veterans and apparently I made one of the best talks I have ever made with those three Scotches aboard. They printed it and circulated it all over the placed (Many chuckles). I never will forget my feelings. I
couldn’t duck. It was a very formal thing. I had to be very careful what I said—Secretary of State. I was so damned mad at McCloy. I tell that because I had to accept a decoration to oblige McCloy.

Then they took me down to Brown. Down to Brown it was quite different. The President was a bachelor [widower?] and his engagement was announced that night. They had a benedict’s dinner. I arrived during the dinner at his house and his daughter received me and the former lady General Staff officer, who kept all of the Chief of Staff records, Miss what’s her name—she became a lieutenant colonel. She ran all of the records for the Chief of Staff. Incidentally she knows a lot about all of this. You ought to talk to her. She’s over in CIA.

Pogue: Not Miss Nason?

Not Miss Nason. I would have taken her around the world with me except King would have gone crazy if he had a woman on these things. She knows a great deal about it and she would brief me before the meetings. And Arnold heard this and then Somervell. So she had to brief Arnold and she had to brief Somervell. She would bring us up to date on all these various things, particularly about the Combined Chiefs of Staff. She was very, very well informed and she handled all these records. I brought her in as a WAC, as a receptionist, without ever seeing her. I wanted to have some WAC near the office and pretty soon they came to me and said would I object to her briefing papers. They were getting pretty far behind and then later they came to me. Would I object if they made her a member of the General Staff because she was doing General Staff work all day, every day, and doing it surpassingly well? She has quite a leading spot over in the CIA. [He never did think of her name, but it was Florence Newsome].
At Brown, his daughter and I hadn’t had any dinner. About nine o’clock his daughter said, “Where did you eat dinner?” I said, “Well, I didn’t eat in the plane.” And she said, “Where did you eat?” I said, “I haven’t eaten.” She said, “I don’t know—I don’t think there’s a thing in the house.” She came back and said, “Do you like ice cream?” I said, “I love it.” Well this woman you see, this ex-WAC who had married a doctor, came in not knowing I was there, but knowing I was coming, came in with a cake he had made to prove she could something besides General Staff papers. She had made a delicious cake with almost liquid icing. So I just ate cake and ice cream. Well, when this bird came in from his benedict dinner—he was not exactly a surly person but he wasn’t a very charming person—he met me and right away turned to his daughter and said, “I would like some ice cream.” She said, “There isn’t any.” I had eaten it all up and he was a sore as a pup.

Well, when we got out on the stand the next day—Dulles’ brother was there then—he got a degree too—he wanted to talk about his performance, instantly, in relation to the Italian treaty he hardly let me get into the place before he cut loose with that. And just after the President made a talk he turned to me and said, “Anything you want to say?” And I said, “No.” And they were all trying to find out why I didn’t say something.

Pogue: You had the ice cream.

There wasn’t any doubt about what he meant. He was still sore about the ice cream. And I think he was sore anyway.

Pogue: I think the point you made a while ago about these little asides is most important, because I tried to argue that in the introduction to my book on SHAEF, that if you read nothing
but record, you’ll likely think that these people were always trying to dig traps and to see if they could defeat their allies, when actually this is a natural outgrowth of irritation and all that. But you have to look at the broad points of agreement. Isn’t that true?

I think I told you, didn’t I, about Hull bringing in this paper of the planners, when they opposed this thing of the British and I got over there and found it was a quotation of ours?

Pogue: Portal caught you on it.

Yes. He was the one who did it. I didn’t know why they were going about the thing. Hull said we think it is advisable. They were very suspicious of the British and anything which seemed to involve a semi-political background, you see.

Well, I know we were afraid about this supply thing of the Turks. We were just being hounded in every direction there. And the President would get into these things you know without realizing what it was doing to the makeup of the existing Army.

Pogue: It sounded good to him.

Wanted to give them something. God knows they had appropriated enough money. But he didn’t realize on the money, you see, it takes a long time. I became Secretary of Defense about the 20th of September in 1950 and one $22 billion appropriation had become effective about the week before, and outside of food and pay and clothing, virtually nothing of that was delivered before the 1st of September [1951]. In fact I had ceased to be Secretary of Defense before that got through.
Q. 2. Pre-conference papers in the War Department indicate that the American delegates feared that Russia might back Britain’s efforts to shift the main effort toward the Balkans. On what was this based? (Actually the Russians gave no support to this, but instead backed OVERLORD down the line)

A. I don’t know anything about shifting that thing to the Balkans.

Pogue: Well, for some reason, in October and November, 1943, you will find in the Planners papers over and again this worry about the Russians going to shift and General Morgan who was over here at that time wired back and said we may lose Overlord entirely because Mr. Roosevelt seems interested in the Balkans. It must have just been a quick flare-up.

I think so. We were always scared to death of Mr. Roosevelt on the Balkans. Apparently he was with us, but we couldn't bet on it at all.

Q. 3. General Deane had strongly advised General Marshall and through him the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take a more aggressive approach than had been taken at the Moscow Conference and had urged that specific requests be made of the Russians. Great publicity was given to this letter at the time the Yalta papers were published. Did it influence your actions to any great extent?

A. No, I don’t recall about the pressure exerted by Deane’s letter.

Pogue: this is another one of those things they read stuff into. It was the kind of letter that you wrote General Eisenhower later and you said, “Talk tough to the Russians.” But the impression that enemies of yours tried to give was that you were warned and paid no attention to it, you see.
Well, it’s like those things out in Hawaii and all—air and all warning—if I had taken those sort of things, I would have been so involved in warnings I would have done nothing anywhere.

Pogue: Like your statement about the over cautiousness of staff members.

You have to trust in the Lord that they are conservative. You are the fellow who has to be unconservative. I am critical of the commander that is ultraconservative, but it is quite essential that he gets a conservative staff. Maybe some of them off the record can suggest this or that. Now I say anybody, not anybody but a number that had special ideas. There was one fellow the whole artillery was after condemning him. I had him in and let him expose his whole plot to me and they were just practically excommunicating him. I had the air fellow in that was trying to advocate these things for France. I let him come to me and go over the whole thing and sent them all over there to France. [This, I think, was Colonel Bidwell on strategic airborne drop in 1944]. I saw all those people and then judged whether they had a real show or not. Anybody who opposed and is pretty voluble about it, particularly when it begins to leak out—the staff procedures—the staff is very critical about it.

In fact when I went into the War Plans Division, I found the War Department staff was wholly so antagonistic to the Air, you couldn’t get a hearing on anything and things I took up, although it wasn’t my job—I was just War Plans—that I took up with General Embick and General Craig, to have them do—and Craig would agree, but he had a hard time agreeing because I was new in the sense. I was junior to all of his assistant chiefs of staff and they were all bitterly antagonistic to the Air Corps, because they had slipped into Congress and gotten their
thing. They were bitterly antagonistic to any large bombers and even Embick who was very logical would sit there and tell how ridiculous the whole thing was to think you could have a large bomber—where it could land, where it could do this, where it could do that. Of course, if you followed all that up, they would just be screaming heebie jeebies now. I had gotten the air fellows on the thing—but the prejudice was very deep so that when I went in as deputy chief of staff, damn if I found they hadn’t done any of those things yet. Now they had been complaining—I don’t know what they were doing—about the fact that they are losing the personnel in the Air Corps and they are being bought up by private industry. Well, I found the Air Corps was just losing everybody. They had a course which took about a year and a fellow who had graduated from the course would be offered a large sum of money taken by one of the big air companies. They wanted all sorts of people. I required when a fellow took his course, he had to sign an agreement to re-enlist for three years—two or three, whatever it was—as he graduated. So he couldn’t resign and wouldn’t be purchasable. So we kept the man. In other words if we trained the man, if the man wanted to take the training, he had to do this or he wouldn’t get the training. I just stopped it right off the bat. Now they are talking about a lot of elaborate things. Well you don’t have to have a lot of elaborate things. You can stop it in a second. And then your counsel says you can’t prevent them from buying out.

Q. 4. The President and General Marshall both felt that the problem of how to approach the Russians on the question of their entry into the war against Japan must be handled gingerly. The President told the Joint Chiefs of Staff not to discuss the question with the Russians. General Marshall felt that the Combined Chiefs of Staff was also not the channel. It was agreed that the
matter would not be discussed unless the Russians brought it up. Did this question worry you very much in December 1943?

A. No, this question didn’t worry me very much about the Russians there. Stalin stated what he wanted. And he did it.

Q. 5. What was your impression of Stalin at Tehran? Did he seem offensive in his manner of merely firm?

    Pogue: Actually is a general question as to your overall impression of Stalin. This was the first time you saw him, at Tehran?

A. Yeah, he was a very [Something interrupted here and went to Question 6].

Q. 6. Sherwood says that there was a story to the effect that Stalin was told unofficially at Tehran that you would be appointed commander in chief. Do you know whether or not this was true?

A. I don’t know whether he knew it or not. But he pressed for me all the time. And made it quite a point and I could take it or leave it as to whether it was just because he thought I was the man or whether he was trying to precipitate the Second Front. He was very insistent and took quite a part. He was insistent about the date. He was insistent about the operation in southern France and played quite a part in those things.

Q. 7. Do you recall discussing with Mr. Roosevelt the possibility of making concessions to Russia in Manchuria and Japan in return for Russian aid against Japan?
A. I don’t recall any of that. I have a faint recollection but I am not even certain that I asked something about his, of the Chinese reactions, but I am not even certain about that.

Pogue: Can you give me a general description of your reaction to Stalin and what you thought about him?

I found the Generalissimo a very astute negotiator. He had a dry wit. He was agreeable and in regard to me he made sort of semi-affectionate gestures. When we were in opposition he would stand with his hand on my shoulders. He was arguing for an immediate Second Front. And he was explaining the way how to make a landing, using the Volga River or one of the Russian rivers as his example of how you do it. We recognized that the great effort then was to get us to do these things. And he was turning the hose on Churchill all the time and Mr. Roosevelt in a sense was helping him. He used to take a little delight in embarrassing Churchill. The Russians were very antagonistic to Brooke and at the birthday dinner, Stalin made some very acid, but amusing, remarks about Brooke, when he came to Moscow, which Brooke endeavored to reply to. Stalin was very free in his probing Churchill and did not follow this course at all with Mr. Roosevelt. Henry Hopkins in his speech at the dinner was very amusing—and I would say pungent—but his talk was largely addressed to Mr. Churchill and it was very amusing and very clever in his comments about the convenience of an unwritten constitution. He described the English procedure making use of that to their own advantage. Throughout all of this Stalin was very flattering. [Broke off to go to the bathroom].

When it came to the exact discussion of the military phases, Stalin was reasonable precise and as later evidenced, very sincere, because he carried out his agreements to the day. I am
referring now to the matter of moving his armies to Manchuria. I have in contrast to this Stalin in the political field where I met him as Secretary of State in Moscow in 1947. There has was completely evasive and would receive the most, almost brutal assaults as I felt I was making, without changing countenance—you might say a trifling reference to later on. I talked to him at one stretch for almost an hour in the effort to get him to admit what was the purpose of deliberately antagonizing the United States when they had stood in very high regard at the end of the war, more so than the British as a matter of fact. I proceeded to recite all the things they had done to arouse the antagonism of the citizens of the United States, certainly of its officials, and sought from him some reply as to the explanation. At that time I was hoping to succeed in getting their agreement as to the Austrian treaty which was practically complete at the time and very much in the form that it was finally adopted. As nearly as I can recall though I think this is a matter of record, his reply to most of this was well these are just opening skirmishes. You have to get by, go through that phase first, but my impression was I was getting nowhere. At dinner where he and I sat together, he was very agreeable and very informative. As a matter of fact I found Molotov the same in dinner table conversation, very interesting in his account of his own banishments from Russia. But his attitude completely changed the minute it was business.

So, in effect, Stalin personally is a very clever negotiator, a man who could lighten the serious part of the affair with rather dry retorts—the kind he turned on Churchill—and when it got into the field he didn’t intend to do business with you, the political field, you got absolutely nowhere.

Pogue: Did you find him lacking in social graces or anything like that?
No. He was very nice in those things.

Pogue: You did not get the impression he was an illiterate peasant?

No, I was surprised to find seemingly none of our people had read his early history and I thought that was quite essential when you were dealing with a fellow who had done the things he did in the early days to get money for the Communist Party.

Pogue: Highwayman?

Oh yes, robbed banks and everything else.

Q. 8. Sherwood has detailed account of the factors resulting in the President’s decision to keep you in Washington and to name Eisenhower as Supreme Commander. Do you have any details to add to the account you wrote Sherwood relative to the appointment?

Pogue: Let me explain a little on that one. You remember that Mrs. Marshall in Together has the bulk of your story and later Sherwood wrote you about the appointment of Eisenhower as Supreme Commander and he says you wrote him some of this material. All I am asking here is there anything you can think of you did not cover in those two accounts?

A. I don’t remember. I can tell you very briefly I was determined that I should not embarrass the President one way or the other, that he must be able to deal in this matter with a perfectly free hand to whatever he felt was the best interests in the matter. Well, of course, I was pulled from many quarters and I wouldn’t express myself on any of them and the thing never came to a head in any way until Hopkins came to me at Cairo and told me that the President was very much concerned because he felt he had to make a decision. The decision apparently had been
conclusive at Quebec, but it had all come up again and had been stirred around politically over here in this country, more in the Press rather. So I went to see the President, I think after luncheon, at his villa in Cairo, and as I recall he asked me after a great deal of beating around the bush just what I wanted to do. Evidently it was left up to me. Well having in mind all this business that had occurred in Washington and what Hopkins had told me, I just repeated again in as convincing language as I could that I wanted him to feel free to act in whatever way he felt was to the best interest of the country and to his satisfaction and not in any way to consider my feelings. I would cheerfully go whatever way he wanted me to go and I didn’t express any desire one way or the other. Then he accepted that as the evident—then he evidently assumed that concluded the affair and that I would not command in Europe. Because he said, “Well, I didn’t feel I could sleep at ease if you were out of Washington.”

I might say in regard to this there was a great deal written and said, one way or another, a lot of it just silly. One time, notably led by a newspaper publisher in Tucson, who was supposed to have intimate contacts, who had known General Pershing intimately when he was sick out there, that the British were trying to kick me upstairs and get me out of the way from opposing them on the Chiefs of Staff affair. That was not true at all. That was not true. That was absurd. As a matter of fact Churchill, picking up the President’s hesitation in confirming my appointment, had told Brooke he should have it. So Churchill was very much embarrassed in transferring it to Eisenhower. I was unaware of the fact that the Chiefs of Staff had gone to see the President opposing my transfer. I was unaware of the fact at the time that General Pershing had made a special written appeal to the President not to move me out of Washington.
These various factors, of course, aroused Mr. Roosevelt to a reconsideration of the decision that had already been made. Well, I was utterly sincere in the desire to avoid what had occurred so much in other wars—the embarrassment of the feelings of the individual rather than the good of the country.

Mr. Roosevelt gives very good expression of his feelings in regard to me in a very generous attitude in replying to General Pershing’s letter. But most of this stuff was whipped up for publication purpose without any sound basis.

Pogue: They said at one time they were trying to get you out of the way so that Somervell could have your job for politics—so they could re-elect Roosevelt in 1944. Some of the same people that said you were in the way of Roosevelt’s political ambitions said four or five years later that you were playing his game for him.

Perfectly ridiculous. Well there is not any consistency. As a matter of fact I had a letter less than a year ago from Justice—I guess it was Justice Douglas—maybe Mrs. Marshall took it, I don’t know, I will ask her, otherwise Frank McCarthy will have it up there. Wrote and told me that his lips had been sealed, but the President had told him—which campaign it was, whether it was 1943 or the one before that, I don’t know—he rather intended to put me up to President.

Q. 9. Were there ever any possibilities that any American besides you or General Eisenhower would be named for supreme command in Europe?

A. I had no idea of anybody else.

Q. 10. Had the President ever made any flat promise of the command in Europe to you?
A. He had never made any promise.

Q. 11. General Morgan once said that he supposed that it was probably a good thing that you didn’t get the European Command. “I don’t believe that he would have put up with Monty?”

A. Well, I think I would have. As a matter of fact I came pretty near to blowing off out of the turn as it was. I called on him at his headquarters up in Holland, I guess it was, and he was criticizing the fact that he had been relieved from command—from active command as he called it—and things had gone to pot with the Battle of the Bulge and all since then and I was under terrific urge to whittle him down. And then I thought now this is Eisenhower’s business and not mine and I had better not meddle. Though it was very hard for me to restrain myself because I didn’t think there was any logic in what he said but overwhelming egotism.

Pogue: Eisenhower was one of the few people, I think, who could have put up with him and got work out of him.

Well, he never came to see Eisenhower once.

Pogue: Treated him like a subordinate

Deliberately, then, when Eisenhower put him in that Bulge thing he turned around to get public opinion to back him in it. And Mr. Churchill and Alexander, prior to the Malta meeting, I think, wanted to put Alexander in the position of ground commander of the whole thing. All in criticism of Eisenhower’s handling of the Bulge. And they approached me on the subject.

Pogue: You gave them a rough time, didn’t you?
No, I didn’t. I was pretty politic. That was hardly the time to be—see they had worked up a great feeling, because it was a complete surprise you see and they don’t forgive commanders for surprises. It was an English G-2 who let them down. I worried about this thing. I had just gone along that front just before it happened. All the way up. I went to every division along that front all the way up. And then they ended up with calling on Monty. We talked over this long—twenty-two kilometers, I think or fifty-two, I’ve forgotten—with one division in it. Fifty-two was it. I knew that they had moved one particular division, from two to three months of rest, which was now over-strength, which was quite unusual for German divisions of that day, across the Rhine, but the conclusion of our intelligence was that it was over there to throw back any attack to cross the Ruhr River. Bradley felt they could cross the thing—he didn’t say without difficulty, but didn’t have any seeming doubts. I didn’t see how he was going to do it myself. Here were these rested, over-strength divisions to meet him. Actually the division was over there for the battle of the Bulge.

Pogue: Bradley talks of his taking a calculated risk. I don’t think he believed it was as serious as it was.

I don’t think so either. I think they got soaked.

Q. 12. Do you feel in retrospect that it was probably better for the war effort that they President selected as he did?

A. I can’t make any comment about myself in this thing at all.

Pogue: General Eisenhower did a fine job.
He was completely loyal.

Pogue: You were here to hold up his hands.

I think this. I don’t think he appreciates—not that he ever depreciated—I don’t think he appreciates the half of what I did to hold up his hands in respect to Congress and all—things I did innumerable things I did; particularly the dinners I would give to the Alibi Club to leaders of Congress and bring in this person and that person. I was all time building up his position, so that he could resist any attacks that would come with any misfortune. Old Senator what’s his name from Texas, he just iterated and reiterated about the battle of Bulge. [Connolly]

I will take you in on one thing, I was rather proud of. I told you first about when I left for Brazil with that mission, Craig wanted to know what he could do for me. I wanted him to see that this one sentence was put into the appropriations about the engineers. In accordance with the regulations undertaking all the construction of fortifications and they said an airfield wasn’t a fortification. I said, “You’re just insisting that it has to have a parapet. That’s nonsense, it is a fortification. In any event you can call it a fortification.” Well, he didn’t do a damn thing about it, it got into law and I had this dreadful time and that’s where Somervell comes into the play. Another thing I wanted to do was to get the law passed, which they had been fooling around with a long time, to have lieutenant generals to command the corps area. It was very important—very important—because out in Chicago, for example, they had, I think, three commanders in less than a year. Well, it would take a man almost a year to know the Adjutant Generals and the National Guard all through and all those things you had to deal with. It wasn’t a question of commanding these little Regular troops of little driblets around. And you had to take the senior
fellow and I wanted to be able to put your finger on the man you wanted and he would work like the devil instead of being interested in something besides the two cars and his wife's bathroom he wanted—at the end of his career he would be working on his particular job. I am not exaggerating about that car business and bathroom business. Their wives would be right on their backs and there wasn't anything else happening and they didn't have any time to learn their corps area and that was the situation. As I say I wanted to touch the fellow and his rank depended on his performance, because he lost the rank the minute he was relieved from that command. And Craig said he would do something about that he didn't do anything about it. So I had been back only three days when I announced I was going up on the Hill to see Senator—damn it, I keep forgetting his name [Connolly]—Connolly, who had thrown out the consideration of this thing by opposing it either on the floor or in the committee. I have forgotten which. It was being handled by the old Senator who brought in the Volstead Act—Sheppard—and he was the senior fellow and Connolly caused it to be pushed aside. And the other man was from Utah who was the man they used to object to everything. You couldn't have those things—have to have unanimous consent—he just objected right off the bat. So I was going up there and they came right in and said don't you do that. If you do that you are lost. And I said, "Well, my God, you can't do that sitting here." And I went on up there and my first appointment was with Senator Connolly and I decided I would enumerate all the objections I thought he would make and then I would proceed to destroy them. But, well he beat me to it, because he never—he told me to sit down and I sat down and he began talking before he sat down. And he just tore the Army to ribbons. And what he was attacking of course was all the generals who were around Washington—who were heads of bureaus and assistant chiefs and no
troops and lots of generals which you see around Washington, you see, and they were very
prominent in those days. And I just puzzled my head what in the world to say because he was
tearing the whole thing down and he was a very potent and powerful senator. And I was trying
to figure this thing all the time he was talking and it was getting worse and worse and I couldn’t
get any line of departure. And he ended up by saying—young man—I said, “Thank you for that
compliment, Senator,”—“young man you don’t appreciate the historical significance of the grade
of lieutenant general.” Well, old boy you walked right into my lap that time. So the minute he
stopped talking I said, “Senator what state are you from?” Well, he was just infuriated that I
should ask him what state he was from and he said, “Why I am from Texas.” And I said, “I
thought you were.” And he said, “Why did you ask me that?” “Well,” I said, “the Southern
Army, Jackson and Longstreet and those people had lieutenant generals right from the start and
Lee was a full general and Bragg was a full general and they had a pretty successful Army. At
least I think as a Texan you would agree to that.” He just grunted. I said, “I asked you that
because finally Lincoln made Grant a lieutenant general and from that instant on they just licked
the Confederates right and left.” “Well,” he said. “I don’t know about this thing” and I said,
“Senator, you have such power” and he said, “I will not act.” And I said, “Senator, you have
already acted. With your prestige you have opposed the thing. What I am asking you to do is
undo what you have done. And I think it is quite essential.” And I told him two or three of the
things I was interested in. And then I went to the fellow from Utah and I got to state my case
first. He said, “Well, how about—how about that arsenal out in Utah” and he traded me right off
the bat. (Guffaws). Well that settled it in about ten minutes. I agreed to the damn arsenal. I
didn’t know what it was or anything else. It was a logical storage place, you know, for that area.
His was just right off the bat. When they say I don’t know anything about the workings of
democracy, politically, I know so damn much more than the average fellow, but what’s his name
never stopped talking about that lieutenant generalcy. After I was secretary of state he still talked
about it and still thought it was unconstitutional.

Well he never dropped it and he seemed to be convinced that it was unconstitutional.

And he took that long list we were making—and they made too many of them and they
have too many of them now—and it stuck in his mind. He was licked and I said, “Senator, I am
sorry about this, you are utterly sincere in opposing this thing as unconstitutional and I just don’t
see it at all.” I said, “It is almost as bad as the President who took such violent objection to
Brigadier Generals who cost twenty-five dollars a month and a thirty-five cent flag.” (Chuckles)
I used to hit Mr. Roosevelt with that. If it was a certain job, it didn’t cost him anything. On a
post—I don’t know which it was or vice-versa—it was twenty-five dollars a month when I was
made a Brigadier General. That was my profitable pay. I was on a post and I don’t think I got
the twenty-five. I used to take after Mr. Roosevelt on that and he would get so damn mad at me.
I would feel out these things until I got some particular thing. My closest shave was with
Connolly and not until he said I didn’t understand the historical significance of the grade of
lieutenant general did I nail him. And he admitted I had him, but he never admitted the thing
was constitutional.