TAPE 13M

INTERVIEW WITH

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

February 4, 1957
(1944)

Ammunition shortages in 1944
Marshall and Weygand
Marshall on Petain
Marshall and Darlan affair
Dakar attack
Why he pressed Eisenhower to take personal command in field in July 1944
Montgomery and Patton
Efforts to cutback military production in 1944
Manpower shortage in 1944
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Q. 1. What is your recollection of the case of ammunition shortage? How strong was the pressure on you to cut down on war production and demands for manpower? I am asking in regard to a statement by William Langer in The Undeclared War, page 738. They give the impression that your statement was made at the Atlantic Conference. Actually isn’t it taken from a paper Wedemeyer and others drew up?

A. The latter is my recollection; it is not a definite statement by me at the Atlantic conference.

Q. 2. Did you feel during 1939-41 that Weygand could be trusted? Did you know him in World War I?

A. I don’t recall just what my feeling was at the time. I thought that his statement or demand that at least 250,000 troops should be in Africa before he would make any move was a perfectly
reasonable demand because he felt otherwise it was doomed to defeat and would make
conditions still harder for France and let alone for him personally.

Did I know him in World War I? Yes, I knew him, though our relationship was naturally
very formal. He was Chief of Staff to Foch and I was a mere colonel and aide to General
Pershing—after the war was over—but I knew him fairly well and admired him greatly.

Q. What was your reaction toward Petain during the Vichy period? Did you feel, as did Admiral
Leahy, that he was doing the best he could to save France from complete destruction by
Germany? Had you known him in World War I?

A. My reaction was practically that of Admiral Leahy. I knew Petain very intimately and I
admired him greatly and he seemed to like me. This was at the end of World War I. I saw him a
number of times during the conflict in World War I. I felt, as I have just said, with Admiral
Leahy, that he was doing the best he could to save France from complete destruction.

Did I know him in World War II? No, I didn’t meet him.

Q. What was your view towards negotiations with Admiral Darlan prior to the North African
landings? Do you feel that Darlan acted in good faith with us?

A. I was pretty remote from these and I have no lively recollection of their course. I will say
that I was as much surprised as anyone, that is, at the appearance in Africa at the time
Eisenhower arrived there. I was inclined to feel that he acted in good faith. He was in the most
difficult position, in a sense, on one side in France and on our side in Africa, to be judged by the
French officials accordingly and their feelings were deeply prejudiced one way or another.
Q. 5. It has sometimes been suggested that Darlan was in North Africa by accident. Others say that he came there as a result of a prior deal. Do you have any information on this?

A. I always felt he was in North Africa by accident in regard to the health of his son. I know of no prior deal whatsoever. I know of the shocked surprise of General Clark on his arrival in Algiers and the surprise registered by General Eisenhower.

Q. 6. Langer in his Undeclared War says that Bullitt, George Fielding Eliot, Secretary Knox, and others tried to sell the President on an attack against Dakar in 1941 and that you opposed them. Do you have any comments on your efforts in this connection?

A. I don’t know what influence Bullitt, George Fielding Eliot, and Secretary Knox had in relation to persuading the President to attack against Dakar. We had been considering it right along because it was the apex of the bulge of Africa toward Brazil and we were very much concerned about matters in Brazil in relation to the Panama Canal. But just what these men were doing I don’t recall. Bullitt had his finger into everything that anybody would listen to.

Q. 7. You did not indicate an opinion during this period except to suggest, in August, that it was high time for General Eisenhower to take command in the field. Did you have the feeling that Patton might have been right?

A. In relation to the background given for question 7 in the matter of operations by General Patton and by Field Marshal Montgomery and concerning General Eisenhower’s move to Normandy with his headquarters, I can say this out of my recollection. We felt it was important for General Eisenhower to appear in closer control of the troops because of the buildup in the
press and otherwise in this country and apparently, as I recall, in Great Britain that General Eisenhower really wasn’t in the show and Montgomery was the sole dominant figure.

So we thought for political reasons, it was important that General Eisenhower should get himself established in Normandy. He was reluctant, as I recall, to make the move then because his communications weren’t built up sufficiently. That is a very elaborate outlay of requirements and when he first moved over to Normandy I think he was out of communication to a certain extent in the opening days of that move.

As to General Patton at this time and the matter of gasoline, I think General Eisenhower’s actions were normal to command in that period of the war. Of course, he wanted more gasoline; of course, Montgomery wanted more gasoline and a larger freedom of action. That is just natural with commanders under these circumstances. What was going on was the First Army was making very rapid moves in a very positive manner and getting very little public credit for it in this country. The Third Army was getting far more credit because of Patton’s dash and showmanship. General Hodges was very quiet and some very remarkable actions took place here for which General Hodges was entitled to the credit. All these things are pressed by the Press—twisted by various interests—so that it is quite hard to get at the actual facts of the case. Montgomery wanted to get free and to go ahead on his part. Patton wanted to get free—with the great temptation of running right up to the Rhine—and there was almost no gasoline. As a matter of fact the first gasoline fill-up, as you might say, occurred when the pipelines from the expedition out of the Mediterranean in the south of France were built up to supply the armies on our right and part of Patton’s army. The operation that was so severely condemned by Mr.
Churchill, in which he described a very dubious prospect of success and which actually had a tremendous success far ahead of schedule.

The remainder of question 7 asks if I did not feel that Patton was right. I just don’t know what you mean by that “right.” I think Eisenhower’s control of the operations at that time was correct. And that all the others were yelling as they naturally would yell. There is nothing remarkable about that except one was the supreme commander of the British force which at that time was very small and the other was a very high-powered dashing commander who had the Press at his beck and call—General Patton.

And in trying to judge what was the correct disposition of the available gasoline, one has to remember a great many subsidiary facts and prospects. For example, you can take the operation into the Bulge later on. If it was successful it was a grand thing. But it wasn’t successful. It took a chance that could have been very fatal. You can sometimes win a great victory by a very dashing action. But often or most frequently the very dashing action exposes you to a very fatal result if it is not successful. And you hazard everything in that way. For example, the control of the British fleet in World War I. They could lose the war in one action of a few hours. They didn’t dare risk that until the conditions were highly in their favor. But everyone wanted Jellicoe to commit the fleet immediately. It would have been very unwise, it seems to me. At the time it was committed that was the proper time all right. But nobody pays any attention to that. They want the dash in these dashing movements of Paton he was absolutely correct in what he was doing. And Eisenhower gave him a very free hand to do it in his sweep across France. But that is not always to case.
Q. 8. What is your recollection of the causes of the ammunition shortage? How strong was pressure on you to cut down on war production and demands for manpower?

A. I will have to back through all the papers in order to answer this. But my recollection is that the demands were at times totally at variance with the later strictures on the subject. For instance, the action in Normandy where the hedges played such a tremendous part was not easy artillery country at all. And the heavy ammunition had little purpose there. Later on as we came up towards the river Rhine—or the Ruhr River—and so on, the need for heavier artillery then became urgent. The command requests, as I recall, for heavier artillery, were very lukewarm about it as we came during the African campaign. They built up when the Germans put a railroad mount in the side of the Alban Hills at the Anzio operation. Then they immediately wanted heavier armament. Now in all these things it does take a long time to get these things when you go after them. I am probably answering one of the questions in advance here.

The pressure to reduce the requirements for heavier armament was continuous. We suffered throughout by the reaction that every success we won in the earlier operations was taken up in this country as the end of the war when it was far from it. When we took Sicily the war was over; if we took the lower part of Italy the war was over. On going before military committees you would get this idea and you would get it from the Press—from the people generally—each thing was a signal that the war was over. As I recall, when we went into Africa, that was the end of the war. And it was a long time before they came to recognize there was a lot of terrible, costly, hard fighting that would have to come before there was an end to the war. Now the kind of ammunition you needed varied entirely with the operations. Our requirements
for ammunition were built largely, almost entirely on the requests of field commanders so far as it could be. Of course one field commander couldn’t be asking for heavy ammunition for an operation that was not going to be within his scope. But nevertheless the reactions were based very largely on the desires, prospects, held out by the field commanders. There was a pressure, as I say, continuously, to cut down on our ammunition demands, to get back as quickly as we could to normal requirements, to allow industry to take up civilian needs. Demands increased steadily right up to the end of the war. And we were subjected to very heavy criticism.

I remember the last was the bombs needed for Japan. Of course, the whole bomb estimates in that time were based on a very slender need. When these matters are taken up in the staff they begin at the lowest echelon and they figure out, naturally, they figure on a very conservative basis because they are not going to be caught short by the actual happenings. But by the time it comes up to the top in the operations sections and later through the deputy chief of staff and finally to me personally, there are any number of cut imposed—almost invariably cuts and not increases. Meanwhile, there are terrific pressures being brought to bear from every direction to cut these things down so that industry can get back to supplying civilian needs. That was very marked in the last years of the war. And the pressures and influences were very intense. And some of the things were outrageous in the light of the man who was making them—where his main interests were very much involved. In nothing could the stricture be sterner than if we didn’t have enough. I can recall my answer to one question at one time before some committee of Congress when they were holding that we had too much ammunition and other supplies—I think it was in Italy. My reply to that was very accurate as to my own feelings. I said, considering the history we had had of military operations throughout the history of the
United States, I was overjoyed to find one case where we had too much of anything when every time it had been always too little and too late.

Taking the last part of question 8, the pressure on me, I think it could be described as terrific in the period of the war—to cut down, to cut down so that civilian production could be built up and we could get back to normal.

I have already said quite a bit about the pressures to reduce production estimates and in relation to artillery ammunition in particular. The struggle with ammunition that is small arms, machine guns, automatic, ammunition of the smaller calibers that occurred in Europe at this time were largely those of difficulties of transportation and the struggle to get the ammunition, once landed, across France to the front.

In all of this one must bear in mind that after a need for a certain type of artillery ammunition has come up—a special type, heavy ammunition for example, when no heavy ammunition has been used heretofore, unless the staff, the Pentagon staff, has foreseen all this long before the troop commanders, there is bound to be a long delay before it can be secured. I don’t know how many months elapsed but I would say a year as a minimum. As these wants became apparent it is very difficult to meet them quickly. The process of having a great deal of ammunition stored up is rendered most difficult by the tremendous pressures to reduce production. When you are fighting a war under circumstances where there is a battle going on continuously to reduce production to permit civilian production to go ahead for civilian goods, you have a very complicated political situation involved in which the pressures are many and come from every direction.
Q. 9. Any comment on the nature of the problem of getting additional manpower?

A. This manpower shortage was another factor of supply that came very much under the guns at this time. There was urgent need, of course, for men on the farms. Industry wanted more men in connection with production. The Army wanted men and was being strongly opposed. And, of course, until the issue finally arose, like the Battle of the Bulge, the Army was under heavy pressure from all these other sources, which found many friends in Congress, to reduce its demands. Then it was very difficult to increase them because the men had to be trained and we wouldn't put men into the front over there under six months' training and for awhile for almost a year. Because that did more to conserve lives than anything else as well as to guarantee more certain success.

We reached in every way we could to find men at the time of this situation. Eisenhower did all he could. I remember his amalgamating the negro troops with the white troops in a small way but a very successful way, and very many other methods were taken, particularly back home and in the Panama Canal and other places of that nature to find more men if it was possible to do so. In all of these, notable in sending General Lear to Paris, it was sort of opposed abroad, that's not unnatural, they didn’t want anybody to come along and be monkeying with their business as it were. I knew from old experience, particularly in the First World War, that the man who’s fighting is looking to the front exclusively and he doesn’t always have his strongest characters in the rear zones. So I was sending people over there to look for me long before General Lear and others went over, with General Eisenhower’s agreement. It was quite essential to get the rear zone organized better with stronger characters because there again came up the question of when
General Eisenhower relieved a man from a combat command, that man could still be used for rear zone purposes, but naturally he wasn’t the greatest driving power that as a rule you could find. From what I saw in 1918 and the difficulties that came to General Pershing afterwards and the attacks that were made on him in Congress afterwards, I felt that had to be watched very, very carefully and I moved accordingly. I think what I have just said is largely an answer to question 9.

Q. 10. What was your reaction to this placing of Montgomery over the American forces north of the Ardennes?

A. I accepted it at the time as a very natural reaction on General Eisenhower’s part. Afterwards I came to regret it because Montgomery, I didn’t think, played at all square on the deal. He made use of it politically and to the press to General Eisenhower’s and particularly to General Bradley’s disadvantage. He didn’t function here as I think he should have. All through there had been difficulties because Montgomery had never attended a single conference in person. Eisenhower had to go to him, which was quite wrong. In this situation, he allowed to build up, maybe assisted in the building up, I don’t know, a feeling that he was being put in charge there in the north because of his superior abilities. That was not so at all. It was a matter of communications, and then, of course, Bradley felt rather deeply about it. And that was unfortunate because his business was fighting and not “arguefying” in relation to command arrangements. He was thoroughly capable but I think the fact that a divided command was set up there was seemingly quite essential at the time it occurred.
Q. 11. Do you have any general comments on (a) Allied intelligence prior to the German attack, (b) basic weaknesses in the German plan, (c) the performance of the American soldier in the fact of a surprise attack (there are some commentators who think that this counterattack saw some of the finest American fighting of the war), and (d) the containing of the German penetration?

A. In relation to the Battle of the Bulge, I went through this district and along that front, I think, about three weeks before the battle. It was rather thinly held and the reason for that was explained. They were getting ready to launch an attack towards the Ruhr River and they needed all the men they could get for that. The problem was one of either suspending the idea of the attack they were then building up preparations for or stretching the already lightly held front against a very rugged territory, as they did. I was familiar with that territory because I had gone through it in 1919 following the First World War. I knew what it was like. And I had just gone through the front about three weeks, I believe, before the battle developed. We talked then about how lightly this was held and discussed that in the light of the thinly held front. I don’t know just how you would comment on this.

There were those, I believe it was General Bradley, who felt that it was desirable for the Germans to attack there and get themselves involved so that a better job could be done in other directions. Actually, the battle of the Bulge resulted tremendously to the Germans’ disadvantage and led to the victory later on. But you couldn’t say that during the fighting because they would immediately react in the press to a built up defense to excuse the failure on their part.

The weakness in the German plan was—it was a deep plunge utilizing the really last well-trained and rested reserve they had, which was due to appear near Budapest to resist the
coming Russian attack. If it was successful, it was fine but it was a very hazardous procedure as it turned out to be. They made every conceivable preparation for it, in the way of planning, particularly as to the weather. The weather stations that they set up on an ice floe, I believe, in the Arctic, and over toward Greenland and other places in order to give them a fairly accurate estimate of what was going to happen at that particular period because they all recognized if the airpower we had got loose it would be ruinous to the German efforts.

I think that the statement is correct that some of the finest fighting of the war developed on the part of the American troops in the battle of the Bulge. It was very desperate fighting, and the show up of the divisions that we put in there after the fight developed was very positive proof that we had developed our men to the point where they could outmaneuver and outfight the best trained Germans that there were which they did in the battle of the Bulge. I am referring particularly to those divisions that were brought up from the camp in North Central France and others that were brought into this fight at that time.

I remember there was one comment by a retired Army officer who had a most prominent position in the past that the whole thing was being mismanaged—that no fighting at the tip of the Bulge was going on. Well, that was much commented upon in the Press. But to me that was the best example of a misconception of how you fight such a fight that I read, because naturally what you have got to watch is to see that the base does not spread and to let the point go out as far as it may in a sense. And as long as the salient becomes acute it becomes very hazardous, which is exactly what occurred in the battle of the Bulge. The fighting at the flanks of the Bulge, notably that on the north flank, was one of the best examples of American resisting, disciplinary training,
and fighting that we had during the war. Almost the nearest approach to it, if not the real
approach to it, is in some of the fighting in the Anzio bridgehead.

Q. 12. The Malmedy massacre has been much discussed and became the subject of one of
Senator McCarthy’s first bitter attacks on the Army. He attempted to prove that Jewish officers
in the American Army were allowed to force confessions out of the men responsible for the
Malmedy killings. The total impression left on some people was that no killings took place. Did
you ever check into the Army investigation into these matters? (I knew at least one of the
investigators and he was not Jewish and he did not apply illegal methods in getting information).

A. As to the Malmedy massacre and the question of weather I ever checked into the
investigation other than those matters, I did not. I thought that such investigation that was going
on was sufficient to the purpose. And in a way, it had become political and when one of these
matters becomes political, it is rather hopeless in a military way. This factor plays a great part in
a lot of this. The minute you turn the political factor on this, why everything is right on one side
and everything is wrong on the other. It’s a very unfortunate thing, particularly in a democracy
that such affairs as that build up and I thought it was very much to the credit of the British
government that they did not have to undergo such a performance as we did. It seemed almost in
many cases that the greater our success, the more severe later on were the criticisms of it.

Q. 13. The sharpest statement you sent to General Eisenhower during the war was over the
failure of his headquarters to better anticipate civilian supply needs in Belgium and France in the
winter of 1944-45. As a result of this failure, they asked to dip into Army stockpiles. Any
comment on this? Was it largely an administrative matter?
A. As to civilian supply needs in Belgium and France, my recollection of the matter is somewhat limited naturally as I had so many irons in the fire at that time and I was turning to the Pacific. In order to shorten the time of distribution, the supply buildup in what you might call Army dumps was treated directly from the supplies coming into Antwerp. Instead of a great supply base being developed in Antwerp and then from there supplies sent to various Army dumps, to save time they omitted that as I recall and went directly through Antwerp to the Army dumps without the subdivision of supplies being made at Antwerp. Well, when the battle of the Bulge developed, that of course threw this whole cutoff procedure out of gear and made a very dangerous situation because they no longer could ship the supplies directly out the way they were and it posed a most difficult question. As is often the case, it looks easy to do a thing by a short cut but it proves almost calamitous if the enemy tends to his business.

Q. 14. Another pointed statement was sent in the summer of 1944 when you felt that General Smith and other members of Eisenhower’s rear echelon were failing to keep you in touch with the developing military situation. Did you lose track of the battle for several days around the first of September 1944?

A. I don’t recall this incident.

Q. 15. You were rather barbed in your remarks in January 1945 when a truck of the 28th Division containing codes was stolen. You felt that the “busting” of the corporal who left his truck to get some food and the relief of the signal officer was rather mild punishment for something which might have forced you to change the whole cryptographic set-up. Do you recall this incident?
A. I do recall that, and I did not think they understood what a terrific mess that was going to make for us in this country and I thought a better example should have been made in order to preclude any similar happening abroad.

Q. Another hot cable came in the summer or fall of 1945 when the circulation of Russian occupation money published from Treasury plates began to find itself into the hands of Army personnel and to be sent home in great quantities. Will you give some background on the matter of the plates?

A. I recall the confusion, but I don’t recall the details. Sorry, I can’t answer on this. I know there were certain plates that the Russians had of this money which caused us embarrassment.

Q. 17. After the failure of the Ardennes attack, Hitler opened a heavy attack in Alsace. General Eisenhower decided to pull back his troops from Strasbourg in order to shorten his line. De Gaulle became much worked up over this—on political grounds—and ordered French troops to hold fast. De Gaulle cabled both Churchill and Roosevelt protesting against Eisenhower’s failure to hold the city. Churchill came to France on another matter, but it was widely believed that Eisenhower rescinded his order because of pressure from Churchill and Roosevelt. Did you draft Mr. Roosevelt’s message saying that the matter was up to Eisenhower? Did you communicate with Eisenhower about this matter?

A. I have just a faint recollection of the details. Whether or not I drafted the message or not I do not recall. I know I drafted a good many in relation to De Gaulle because he was a very difficult person from every respect and from every point of view, I should say, as he proved for the French government later on.
Q. 18. After the encirclement of the Ruhr, you sent a cable to Eisenhower saying that Secretary Stimson wanted him to refrain from destroying the industrial potential of that area as much as possible. It was clear that he wished to have nothing to do with the Morgenthau idea of pastoralizing Germany. Do you have any comments on this incident?

A. My comment is that Mr. Stimson was very, very much upset over the proposition to pastoralize Germany which Mr. Morgenthau proposed. He was particularly outraged by the idea of destroying the Ruhr and making it no longer accessible to the Germans after the fighting was over. And his memorandum on the subject which is on file and maybe it is quoted in his book, is a very fine public document.

Q. 19. During the period, November – March, 1944-45, our troops suffered a great deal from trench foot. Both the German and British troops had less difficulty in this regard, because of their longer experience. It was some months before we had the problem under complete control. Do you recall efforts made by the War Department to deal with this problem?

A. I don’t recall very much of this, but I have a faint recollection that the troops were not well enough trained in it. We found this very much the case in the troops we sent to Alaska, notably Attu and places like that. It is a laborious procedure and it is very hard to enforce it and, unless you have been at it quite some time, it is very difficult to have the troops take the necessary precautions. I have just faint recollections, as I say, of the difficulties we had at that time. I might say though that it is always very hard to act on these things from Washington, because quite naturally there is resentment of the Pentagon, we will say, coming in and telling you how to do your business. Of course, commanders don’t like that and that was notably the case in the
Pacific. Our trouble was that the commander himself, as a rule, was so involved with considerations in front of him that he was apt to be slack in his follow-up on conditions in rear of him.

We had a somewhat similar battle in the Pacific over malaria, screening, etc. Now there we found the main trouble was that we gave the authority to the commander to have his people designate what was to be shifted from the base port at San Francisco and Los Angeles, for example, or Seattle. Naturally, the staff, the G-4, wanted ammunition, wanted fighting equipment, wanted that sort of stuff for the front, because they were under heavy pressure to provide it. But, as a matter of fact, what they needed more than anything else in a sense, at the time, was screening and things of that sort, which they were not shipping at all because they took up a lot of space. So I sent out one or two malarial experts out to the Pacific to investigate and I had to caution them very carefully how tactful they must be about it, but I had the screening banked up on the West Coast so it could be sent in a minute and we went ahead and sent it the minute their reports came in. There I felt fully authorized to proceed despite the fact the command did not because it was costing us dear. We had divisions, as I recall the First Marine Division was out of the line for over a year—thirteen months I think. We couldn’t supply troops on any such basis as that. We had to take better care of them. Again they were all so busy with the fighting that what went on in rear didn’t receive proper consideration. And the G-4 supply people, they were under pressure to provide munitions to provide this and that and the other for the combat fighting and they were very loathe to take up any of this available ship space for anything like netting, screening, and yet it was costing us many, many troops because they were all being stricken down by malaria.
One of the complications about that came up there in the Pacific which was very unusual but it threw us completely off base. We figured out on the replacement basis that the first people that would have to be replaced and fresh ones put in would be the aviation—the combat aviation—but we came to find the people that first needed replacement badly were the ground fellows that were working on the aviation. The trouble was they had to work all night and naturally they had to have glare lights and naturally the mosquitoes swarmed and under the conditions they couldn’t wear any screening and they were so filled up with atabrine that they became unsteady. And I remember some pilots stating that they were unwilling to have these fellows work on their planes because they thought they were too uncertain and they would leave vital cotter pins out of place. But it came from the fact they had to work at night, as well as the day time, under bright lights and the mosquitoes just swarmed and they couldn’t use screening and they were too full of atabrine which was a preventative. So the ground people were needing replacements before the air fighters.

Q. 20. The Anzio operation has been severely criticized. Wasn’t it largely a British decision? Do you think it was as bad a decision as Mr. Truman suggested?

A. I do not recall the exact details of the procedure except that Mr. Churchill had had pneumonia after the Cairo Conference and as he recovered he had several conferences I think where he was at the resort where he used to use as his base for sketching—towards the interior from Casablanca. I have forgotten the name of it right now—quite a sizeable city—and he had meetings there. Just how much approval and detail we were drawn into I don’t recall. But there was no meeting of the Chiefs of Staff—the Combined Chiefs of Staff—and the pressure was
very great on the commanders, notably General Wilson and others at that time regarding the
Italian operation.

(Heffner—that wasn’t the French Riviera? Marshall—what? Heffner—where Churchill
did his painting? Marshall—No, no. It was over there in Morocco).

I didn’t read Mr. Truman’s criticism of Anzio. I thought it was the Salerno operation he
was criticizing.

Q. 21. Were you involved in the decision to bomb Monte Cassino? Were the orders to fliers to
spare cathedrals and historical monuments imposed on you by the President or did they originate
with you?

A. I was not involved in the operation regarding the bombing of Cassino. As I recall, it was
done at the request of the New Zealand troops who were going to make an attack. I don’t recall
where the order originated regarding the bombings near cathedrals and historical monuments.

Q. 22. Were you involved in high level discussions relative to our policy toward the Prime
Minister’s intervention in Greece in 1944-45? Weren’t we afraid that he might get us involved
militarily there?

A. We were very much afraid that Mr. Churchill’s interest in matters near Athens and in Greece
would finally get us involved in that fighting and we were keeping out of it in every way we
possibly could.

Q. 23. Were you involved in discussions relative to the rival partisan groups in Yugoslavia or
was this left up to the British almost completely?
A. I was not involved in the discussion relative to the rival partisan groups in Yugoslavia as far as I can recall. I think it was left up to the British to decide, but I am not certain as to this.

Q. 24. What were your reactions to Admiral Halsey’s actions during the battle of Leyte Gulf? Did you feel that he jeopardized landing operations?

A. I would state no reaction Admiral Halsey’s action during the battle of Leyte Gulf. We were too far removed from the cause and effect of those matters and I would not hazard a statement.

Q. 25. What were your reactions to the opposing views of British and American bombing commanders concerning area versus precision bombing? Did you take part in the decisions to use one or the other?

A. I was remotely concerned with the decision as to area bombing and precision bombing and our first demonstration of precision bombing was very effective. The whole matter became sort of twisted as it were when we got into bombing of ships in the Pacific when the precision bombing did not work so well as the ship itself could maneuver out of the way after the bomb had left the plane.

Q. 26. Were your comments invited by General Eisenhower and others in Europe during the argument over what is called the railroad or transportation bombing scheme in the spring of 1944? I suppose that you usually left these matters to General Arnold?

A. I don’t recall just how I became involved in the railroad and transportation bombing scheme in the spring of 1944. I know when we were preparing for the landing in Normandy we insisted on knocking out every marshalling yard along the railroad and in doing this, of course, we
touched some of the villages which caused loss among the civilian population, and there was strong cabinet resistance to this on the part of the British, but we felt that the security of our move into Normandy—the safety of our soldiers—demanded that every marshalling yard be completely destroyed and that could not be done without in some places involving the civil population.

Q. 27. Were you concerned over the placing of supply headquarters in Paris in 1944? (General Eisenhower was much opposed to this move of General Lee’s and I thought perhaps he was reflecting your views or those of General Somervell’s).

A. I do not recall the argument over placing the supply headquarters in Paris.

Q. 28. In August 1944, a colonel in the Paris headquarters sent Secretary Morgenthau a copy of the proposed civil affairs directive to be issued by General Eisenhower when troops entered Germany. Morgenthau took it to the President and the result was a violent eruption followed by a strong cable to Eisenhower telling him to withdraw the directive. Do you recall the background of the situation?

A. I do not recall the incident.

Q. 29. Do you have any comments on the efforts to give aid to General Bor and his followers in Warsaw in August 1944 when the Russians stopped their advance and permitted the Germans to destroy many of the Polish underground fighters?

A. I cannot make any comments on the details of this because they are not clear enough in my mind at the present time.
Q. 30. Did you have any dealings with President Benes of Czechoslovakia during the war? Didn’t his desire to keep the goodwill of the Russians make it difficult for us to give aid the Czechs in the closing days of the war?

A. I had some dealings with President Benes but largely as I recall with his son, who later committed suicide—or supposedly committed suicide—by jumping out the window of the bathroom of his house. [He has confused Benes with Masaryk]. He came to me and he was in great distress and his situation was tragic.

Q. 31. In March and early April 1945, there was considerable speculation in Intelligence circles about the possibility of the Germans creating a National Redoubt in Bavaria and Austria for a last stand against the Allies. Recent writers have blamed an exaggerated belief in the National Redoubt by the Americans for General Eisenhower’s decision to stop at the Elbe. Do you recall whether or not there was any wide acceptance of this National Redoubt theory in Washington?

A. There was a general feeling in the Pentagon that the Germans would build up a last stand in Bavaria. Already one or two of their commanders, notably their air commander, the head fellow, were down there and we felt they would make a last desperate try to support themselves and prolong the war. Because, as Hitler had said, Germany would commit suicide and he was in the business of seeing that they did commit suicide, which was largely done particularly in Berlin and other places of that nature. I don’t know how wide the acceptance was but I do know we felt that there was a strong possibility that a strong force would be built up in Bavaria and we must get there before they could spread it out into a well fortified force. That was one reason we wanted to get there as quickly as we could.
Q. 32. In the spring of 1945, we had considerable difficulty with the Russians in Europe in the effort to get proper coordination for purposes of bombing and for proper action in case of the meeting of Russian and Allied forces. These difficulties were partly responsible for Eisenhower’s decision to stop on an easily recognizable line such as the Elbe. Any comments on these difficulties?

A. I can’t answer that. It seems logical. That may have been one of the reasons because a firm boundary would be a great advantage and the Elbe certainly provided that.

Q. 33. In October 1944, military planners in Washington discussed the possibility of ending the war by the end of the year. While it seems doubtful that anyone believed that this was really possible, it was decided to make an all-out effort to end it. One result of the discussion was the decision to release the proximity fuze for use. How seriously was this chance taken by planners in the fall of 1944?

A. There was a feeling among the Chiefs of Staff and their immediate advisers that events might develop which would lead to a breakup of the war in the close of 1944 or the very early spring of 1945. This would refer quite definitely to the satellite states and their actions. If they began to break off that might precipitate the action. And we knew in a way—I don’t recall just what details—that the commanders of the German Army, the old regular army, were in favor of surrendering. And the whole question was whether they got dominance in the matter or not. So to us, certainly to me, it was not a hopeless proposition that the fighting might be ended at the end of 1944.
Q. 34. Since the rough session Malta was held in private, I had to depend in my earlier writing on statements by Alanbrooke, Cunningham, and others, all of whom agreed that it was a warm session. What is your version of the episode?

A. The session at Malta was, as described, a very hot one. We had great difficulty in reaching a general decision. As I recall, the troubles at the time were these: Montgomery wanted certain troops and a lead in the control of the crossing of the Rhine. The troops had to largely come from the American forces because he did not have a great many. And he was very urgent that he be given complete control at the time. Eisenhower gave him practically everything he asked for. I think he gave him everything he asked for. But that did not satisfy him. It was quite evident that what was wanted was complete command. And prior to that the Prime Minister had approached me and in discussion, I think, with Mr. Roosevelt present at Malta, to put General Alexander in general command of all the ground troops. We were successful in resisting that but it was growing difficult and more difficult. It was getting to be quite a serious political matter—and it was a political matter. And we had a hard time beating it off. Our first conversation, as I recall, took place on the President’s ship in the harbor at Malta. Now as we got up to these meetings, leading to the advance on the Rhine—the “closing on the Rhine” was the language used—to which Mr. Churchill took exception—it was a new term to me in a military way and I found out it had been lifted from the British, but it was a little bit too fancy. And it was advance on the Rhine what they were after and the eventual crossing of it, and we had a very, very difficult time. And I found out—I have a clear recollection of this—I found out that they had told General Smith, who had come down, that they were fearful of the effects of my talks with General Eisenhower—that I would prejudice him out of his position as Supreme Commander.
So I said, as I recall, at this meeting that when it come to that I would like them to take another view of it. I said I saw General Eisenhower very seldom. And Mr. Roosevelt hardly ever saw him. But he was under the guns from Mr. Churchill almost twice a day at times and very, very frequently all the time. And if there was anybody to be worried about the matter it was the American government in regard to Prime Minister Churchill’s influence on General Eisenhower and they would have to take that from me. And General Bradley felt the same way I did. And we had this argument about the matter and they were trying to restrict this thing so Bradley couldn’t advance to the Rhine—close on the Rhine as they said. There was a great deal of conversation as to what they meant. They were all afraid of Patton getting loose down there. Well, the end was Bradley got the Remagen Bridge and crossed the Rhine before the big operation took place and exploited it promptly and very efficiently. And then Patton, to exaggerate a little bit, got hold of a few boats and made another crossing to the south. So we had two crossings going on and getting well established in the operation of encircling the Ruhr district which later on we found we had cut off a very large number of troops. Meanwhile, Montgomery came up to the Rhine with everything that could be supplied him—with naval forces, he had everything—and he crossed the Rhine and went forward then. But the excitement had been somewhat taken out of it by the fortunate development of the Remagen Bridge and the quick way it had been realized by General Bradley.

I must say now though that all these matters there are the pressures from home to be understood. The pressures, particularly by the British Cabinet—the American Cabinet didn’t get into this sort of thing—it was purely Mr. Roosevelt and the Chiefs of Staff, rather than the Cabinet. But, of course, public opinion got into it very largely and public opinion had to be
considered by us. And in Great Britain they were up against public opinion, notably because they had given the command to General Eisenhower and how by their Press had been led to believe that Montgomery had saved the situation, when it was nothing in the world but a very proper division at a certain stage of the fighting of the battle of the Bulge.

The dissension wasn’t too much considering the conditions under which we had to operate. I think it was rather remarkable that we were able to do it with as little dissension as we did and with as much concession as we found on the part of the British. Because one must never forget…

(End of Side One.)

SIDE 2

I am going to repeat what I started to say in answer to question 94 [i.e. 34] as to the rough session at Malta. I have already explained that it was rough and I have explained what the great argument was at the time. And my comment to them about the fact that they were worrying over Bradley’s contacts with General Eisenhower when we had much more reason to worry over Mr. Churchill’s constant overseeing of what Eisenhower was doing which our President was not doing at all. Didn’t have much opportunity to do it in the first place and he was very guarded that he didn’t try to influence an Allied Commander, purely as President of the United States.

I think I was concluding by saying that while these sessions of lively arguments came up—and they were lively and they were very frank—but we always came to a harmonious conclusion. We Americans must keep in mind that the British made tremendous concessions
that posed for them a very difficult situation regarding public opinion. They gave supreme command to General Eisenhower in Africa when we had very few troops there and they had the dominant armies. They gave the Supreme Command and reiterated it to General Eisenhower when General Montgomery’s famous Eighth Army came up along the northern rim of Africa after its triumphant career from the initial flight near Alexandria to the final fights in Tunisia. The British public would undoubtedly demand for him supreme command. And yet the Prime Minister was able to manage that Eisenhower continued in supreme commander and was able to have this reiterated at the time the two armies came together. What was in North Africa on the western part of British troops of First Army and American troops that were just slowly collecting there—and I say slowing collecting—because it was a very slow business. Now here came the victorious Eighth Army, but in the face of that situation Mr. Churchill went ahead and saw that General Eisenhower was confirmed as Supreme Commander. He was outranked—one was a Field Marshal—and he was, I don’t recall whether he was a General then. I think he was though, but he was not a five star general, I don’t believe. That can be easily checked. And I thought it was very, very wonderful that Mr. Churchill was able to put across those arrangements because it must have been exceedingly trying to justify them to the British public and first to the British War Cabinet. So I think that we have a great deal to remember in relation to matters of that kind. Where Montgomery irritated and craved command and tried to get a hold of it, Mr. Churchill went straight ahead, I thought, in a very fine way. He had to represent Alexander’s interest and Montgomery’s interest, but he stood by his commitments and was able to put them by with his own public and his own political situation and he had many striking against him in Parliament at that time.
Q. 35. Would you discuss something of arrangements for entertainment at Yalta? Several accounts mention that you and others teased Admiral King because he was given the Tsarina’s boudoir for his room.

A. I think I had the Tsarina’s room. And his had been an open sort of veranda which they said was where Rasputin came up the ladder to see the Tsarina. However, we were both right there together and we didn’t personally fight over who had the Tsarina’s room. That was a secondary affair at this time.

As to entertainments, Mr. Roosevelt entertained at dinner—I don’t recall in a big way—but he tried to have each of his suite for dinner with him which I though very unwise because he looked very, very tired. I remember he had some of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (American) for dinner one night and he was quite late coming from his meeting with the Russians and the British, presumably, and looked very, very tired. And I thought it was most unwise that he had to put himself out for a gesture of that sort at that particular time.

As to the general entertainment, I was somewhat amused nearly as one could be with the political heights in which apparently I was king at Yalta—so far as the Republican attacks on me were concerned. As a matter of fact when they had the final dinner at Yalta, and it was organized by the Russians and the Americans submitted their guest lists, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff weren’t even invited. The senior chairman, Leahy, was invited. The British Chiefs of Staff were in attendance, but the American Chiefs of Staff were left out. So that was the dominant position I occupied at that particular time. But to lead the debates in Congress one would have thought I was cock of the walk all the way through. And I remember that Mr. Byrnes was very critical of
the fact that the British Chiefs of Staff were present and King and I were not present at all. I don’t recall the other entertainments that went on, but I know when Stalin came to a meeting or dinner he was accompanied by his guards who always stood at port arms with submachine guns.

Q. 36. Do you feel that Churchill’s earlier concessions to Russian on the Baltic states and on Poland prejudiced his chances to get any favorable action out of Russia at Yalta?

A. I do not think so.

Q. 37. Do you feel that the earlier talks of Churchill with Stalin about special British interests in Greece and Yugoslavia and special Russian interests in Bulgaria and elsewhere in the Balkans prejudiced any Allied appeal to Stalin based on moral grounds?

A. I would not know how to answer that.

Q. 38. Did we give Russia anything at Yalta which she did not have or could not have taken?

A. I don’t recall what we gave her at Yalta outside of the President’s Chinese agreement with which I had nothing to do.

A. 39. In a chapter I wrote in a book on Yalta, I suggest that not only were American leaders aware in February 1945 of the possible need of Russian help in defeating the Japanese, but also of their continued help in the fight against Germany. I mentioned the fact that Eisenhower had only recently pressed you to make sure of Russian help for the spring attack on Germany and that General Smith at Malta spoke of the possibility that Russia might not take an active part in the war hereafter, leaving us with the main job of fighting the Germans. Was the German
situation in your mind at the time of the Yalta meeting? Had Eisenhower discussed with you at Marseille the need of Russian help against Germany?

A. [German situation] Well, it was very serious. They were being pressed continuously by the Russians and we were bending around and getting our way very largely on our portion of the front in Western Europe. It was the question of pressing them in a well-regulated strategy that was all-important at this particular time.

(Meeting with Eisenhower at Marseille). I don’t recall his accentuating the need of Russian help against Germany. He had already communicated with us time after time asking us to press the Russians to hasten their attacks. What we needed was a clearing of the weather in order that the Russians might be able to handle the bad roads situation which confronted them in western Russia.

Q. 40. Did you get the impression that Leahy and King were strongly opposed to Russian help in the Pacific at the time of the Yalta conference?

A. I did not get the impression at all that Leahy and King were strongly opposed to Russian help in the Pacific at the time of the Yalta Conference. This was news to me when it came out in recent years.

Q. 41. Did you talk with President Roosevelt about the need of making concessions to Russia in order to get help against Japan?

A. I did not talk to the President about the need of making concessions to Russia in order to get help against Japan. Stalin had been very specific as to what he could do if we gave him the time
in which to do it. He discussed with me how long it would take to move the troops they would have to move through Siberia to get ready for the attack in cooperation with us against the Russians [he means Japanese]. He went into the days required, the character of the attack, as I recall, and actually he followed out the schedule that he talked over to the day, when the event finally developed in the opening of the war with Japan.

Q. 42. Did you feel the Russian demands excessive in view of their strength, sacrifices, and our notion that we might need help?

A. I wouldn’t comment on this because it involved so many political factors.

Q. 43. Were you aware of Stalin’s demands to the President in regard to the Far East during the Yalta meeting?

A. No, I was not aware of Stalin’s demands—to the best of my recollection.

Q. 44. Were you impressed by General Groves’ estimate as to the availability of at least one A bomb by August 1945—at the time of the Yalta meeting?

A. Yes, I guess I was impressed, though I don’t recall my exact reactions until we got around to figuring the use of the bomb in connection with our prospective move into Japan.

Q. 45. Do you feel that Army briefing for the Yalta meeting was adequate? Did you make use of material furnished by the State Department?
A. I do not recall the material furnished by the State Department. I presume it was. And I did not feel that we had a dearth of material at that time. I was not called into the political conferences.

I might explain that the first meeting at Yalta, according to my recollection was, all the principals were present, meaning the President, the prime minister, Stalin, the British chiefs of staff, Russian equivalent formation and our formation, and I don’t remember who else but it was a large circular table full and there were others sitting on the outskirts. Just who they were I don’t recall now. I recall specifically that when the meeting got underway Stalin read a paper outlining the Russian situation in a military way—all was written and he read it through. Then when he put it down it was time for the Allies to proceed. And Mr. Churchill suggested to Mr. Roosevelt that I be called on to state the American side. Well, I had nothing in writing at all and had no intimation that this was coming. But I had done it before at Tehran—the situation at that time. And Mr. Churchill called on me again here at Yalta—the military set-up of the Allies. I went through the description of the set-up, which was a rather lengthy one. That completed my part in the conference aside from listening to discussions which continued on in a very general way.

Q. 46. Did you ever get the impression that Alger Hiss was exerting a great influence at the Yalta meeting? Is the view that he kept mainly to matters relating to the organization of the U. N.?

A. I think I met him together with three or four other state officials. Ed Stettinius made the introduction. I didn’t recall Hiss at all nor did I see these other men after that meeting because
they went into the political business which Admiral Leahy attended. And we, Admiral King and myself, and the airman, who was acting in the place of General Arnold, proceeded with our own meetings with the Russian Chiefs of Staff.

Q. 47. Did you have the impression prior to Yalta that General MacArthur was opposed to Russian entry into the war in the Pacific?

A. I had no impression that General MacArthur was opposed to Russia entering the war. Quite the opposite.

Q. 48. Did you feel that we mistreated China by concessions to Russia at Yalta?

A. I expressed no feelings in the matter at all because I didn’t learn of it until later. My own feeling was that it was going to present a very difficult situation for the President with Chiang Kai-shek.

Q. 49. It has sometimes been said that if General Arnold had gone to Yalta, he could have made the President listen to Air Force information which showed there was no need of Russian aid in defeating Japan. Did he mention any such information to you or did anyone mention this to you?

A. Omitted)

Q. 50. Were you aware of any widespread opposition to Russian participation in the war against Japan until April or May 1945?

A. I don’t recall it.
Q. 51. General Courtney Whitney in his book on General MacArthur tells of a paper drawn up by senior intelligence officers in the Pentagon about April 1945. He says that they opposed bringing Russia into the war and wanted you to bring MacArthur back from the Pacific so he could tell Roosevelt this. This paper hasn’t been found. Do you recall any such report?

A. I don’t recall the paper that Whitney refers to.

Q. 52. What was your feeling about Roosevelt’s health at Yalta? Did you get the impression that he was being pushed about because of ill health?

A. I thought Roosevelt looked very badly at Yalta. In fact, I was quite shocked by his looks. The more so, General Watson’s appearance. I thought he never should have been allowed to come on the trip. I know when Mr. Roosevelt had us for dinner, just an informal dinner at the end of a day’s conference with the Russians which we did not attend—the chiefs of staff, thought he was very tired and I thought the dinner should never have been had.

Q. 53. Did you oppose any of the President’s actions at Yalta?

A. I was not asked to oppose any of Mr. Roosevelt’s actions or approve them other than the military part which went right along in the way we had planned.

Q. 54. Any general comments on Yalta in retrospect?

A. I think Yalta has become so much a political factor, a political discussion that it would be almost impossible to get at the real reactions of the day and the time. I find in all these things when you go into history, the historical discussions, and they get into Congress and other things, they are so con-twisted that it is almost impossible to discuss them. And you find on the part of
officers very frequently, tragically, I think, too frequently, that their later states of mind don’t accord with what they had in mind at the time. Apparently they are sort of “backed out” by the political recriminations and accusations. But this is to be expected though I think it was far too common except that we had a tremendous political war on. We had a Republican party that had been out of power for a long time. They had built up a great deal of feeling towards Mr. Roosevelt and there was some Democrat assistance to it, I believe. And they were trying in every way to find a basis for defeating him in case he ran again for re-election. So that you say all is fair in love and war, there was certainly plenty of the unfair in this war; however, much there may be in the matter of love. But in all these matters I find that the minute it gets into the political ring, it would be very difficult for the ordinary citizen to ever ferret out what would be the truth of the matter. The accusations are so numerous, so altogether remarkable at time, theat you can hardly believe what you read. But, of course, you have a large number who want to get in the public print. And you have others who feel very deeply and are quite prejudiced. And you have other historians who really try to get at the basic truths in the matter. Unless you diagnose which crowd you are dealing with, it is very hard. It is literally like the Civil War afterwards. You find that General Lee seldom did anything right—the other fellow could always have done something better, but actually General Lee dominated an army and led it in a magnificent manner. He had his troubles. Everybody in the world has his troubles. And he might have done something different, yes. But there was nobody else to take his place and put up his superb demonstration that he did. You might go into Grant’s campaigns in the Wilderness—terrific losses that he suffered. I believe that the soldiers called him “The Butcher” at the end of the thing. But he became triumphant and he won and that was the great factor. The war was over.
Grant was triumphant. There you were. It was a long time before they began to dig up
Confederates who felt they could have done better than General Lee. Well, I have not yet read of
anyone who put up a logical argument to that effect. Of course, you are dealing all the time with
a Monday quarterback. In many cases, most cases, he wouldn’t have dared to do the things he
talks about. But after it is all made clear and all is seen, he can tell you pretty well how it ought
to have been done.

Dr. Pogue, I hope this record proves readable and understandable. It covers a wide
ground of dissension and criticism, and I am just dictating out of hand as I read the questions. I
think you ought to follow the system of noting down certain things you don’t think you have
gotten a satisfactory reply from me or you think my reply is rather bad judgment and keep all
these summed up and when I get back to Leesburg then you can come down in person and we
can discuss all those various matters.