

Tape 15M

Interview with General G. C. Marshall

February 14, 1957

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(1939-45)

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TAPE 15

INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL AT PINEHURST, FEBRUARY 14, 1957. QUESTIONS PREPARED BY FORREST C. POGUE. RECORDER OPERATED BY SGT. WILLIAM HEFFNER.

Q. 75. Do you feel that Sherwood's impressions on visit to MacArthur in 1945 are accurate regarding: (a) the difficulty of getting to MacArthur and (b) the attitude of MacArthur's staff toward the outside world?

A. The first part regarding the difficulty of getting to MacArthur. There are some problem of this sort. I recall that the Surgeon General got as far as Leyte and then was not permitted to go into Manila. However, at the time I thought there was a little to be said on MacArthur's side because the accommodations in Manila were extremely limited and if a number of outsiders—if you can call inspectors that—arrived in Manila, there would be extreme difficulty in furnishing them accommodations. Now as to the second part, the attitude of MacArthur's staff towards the outside world, those are the reports I received at the time.

Q. 76. Is it correct to say that American military leaders by June 1945 would have liked to dispense with Russian aid against Japan?

A. I do not think so.

Q. 77. Did you ever have any fear the British wouldn't help in the Pacific?

A. It was a little bit the other way as a matter of fact. Churchill was very anxious to get part of the British Fleet into the Pacific and Admiral King was very reluctant to have it, particularly

because he felt that the American Navy might be embarrassed by the necessity of supplying part of the British units that might come into the Pacific.

Q. 78. Did you share Admiral King's unwillingness to have British help in the Pacific?

A. I have already implied answer to that.

Q. 79. Did you favor island-hopping or bypassing in the Pacific?

A. It was not a question of favoring island hopping. We couldn't very well walk on the water. And you had to go from island to island. And where you could isolate the island as we did, I think, in the Marshalls, that was certainly a great advantage in the saving of effort and of troops employed and of tragic burden for the Japanese to carry out under the circumstances. The only issue that really could be brought up here, I don't think it was a compelling one at all, was to concentrate all of the effort in the Southwest, for instance, in MacArthur's territory. Well, there were a great many things to be considered in connection with this. For example, you take the terrific fighting at Iwo Jima. That was very important to us, very important to us as an air base connected with our operations against Japan. When the B-29s came into full use, Iwo Jima was very much used to salvage planes that had to come down before they got back to Guam or other islands like that. It was very useful for that reason. It made a station, a preliminary station, toward Japan—in the moves across the Pacific. Its cost was extreme, but its usefulness was great. That would have to be considered when you were questioning whether or not you would have island hopping. All of this was stirred up into a newspaper affair in which those that favored the Army side and MacArthur and those that favored the Navy side got a great deal to write about. So I think that logic flew out the window and prejudice took its place.

Q. 80. Don't you feel that the heavy casualties inflicted by the Japanese on American naval and army forces at Okinawa and Iwo Jima show that Japan was far from beaten as late as June 1945?

A. I think that the casualties inflicted by the Japanese in Okinawa and Iwo Jima and particularly the refusals of the Japanese to surrender at all were indications that they were far from beaten. I don't mean that they had any chance of winning. But I do mean that there was little chance of expecting them to surrender. How much greater the difficulties would be when we got on their home grounds in Japan you have to judge for yourself.

Q. 81. General MacArthur in October 1955, in replying to criticisms in Mr. Truman's memoirs criticized you, General Bradley, General Collins and others for recommending his relief. He attributes General Bradley's attitude to the fact that General MacArthur had refused to take Bradley as a commander in the Far East and indicates that he had not taken Bradley because of his failures in the Ardennes battle.

As I recall, when you cabled General Bradley suggesting that General Hodges be sent to the Far East, Bradley did ask for a command there. However, you said that there was no opening for an Army group commander and MacArthur felt that Bradley would not care to take a demotion. If the matter of the Ardennes had been involved, it seems to me that MacArthur would not have taken Hodges who commanded the troops in the area most heavily attacked.

Am I right in my recollection of this? Do you have any comments on this?

A. I am a little in doubt as to how to make the answer to your 81. There was so much deep prejudice involved that it's hard to get at a reason other than that prejudice. I remember we sent General Ridgway out and he wasn't given any assurance of a command and came back actually without orders. The nominations I made in the effort to give MacArthur everything that we had

were largely turned down and my own assumption of the reason was one that it was distasteful to him to take anything from the forces which we had been using in Europe. And he was very confident of very loyal to the people under him.

Q. 82. Do you feel that Ehrman, British official historian's views on British Chief of Staff are pretty accurate? I gathered from some remarks that you made to me about Portal that you might place him a little higher than Brooke, so far as mental ability was concerned. I recall your telling how Portal turned the tables on you once.

A. I think the statement headed Admiral Cunningham is pretty correct. Of the Chiefs of Staff, I thought that Portal was probably the most brilliant, but I had great respect for Brooke and I think the characterization regarding him is quite correct.

Q. 83. Do you think that Ehrman's views on difference in position of Leahy and Ismay and of Hopkins' role is correct?

A. My answer to this long, involved statement will have to be very sketchy because I can't talk about myself with the freedom that would be necessary to such an answer. With regard to Leahy, I will say this: I felt that it would not be a good thing to develop the Chiefs of Staff organization where the Air was a member—its leader was a member of the Chiefs of Staff and yet it was subordinate to me—and where I was senior to King. In other words, in a sense, I would have two votes if it was a question of votes and King would only have one. I, therefore, thought it would be wise if we had a chairman and from the Navy, if one could be found that I thought was entirely impersonal and a man of good judgment. I did not know Admiral Leahy at all well, but I knew of him pretty well. He was at that time in France. So I conceived the idea of having Leahy as the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff. I thought the Navy couldn't resist this and

from what I had learned I was willing to trust Leahy to be a neutral chairman of the American Chiefs of Staff. I, therefore, took this up with the President and Harry Hopkins. And I did not get very far. When I inquired of Hopkins later he said that the President in his political life had never known any politician to resign any office and he had said that about my effort to resign in February 1941, so that I could clear the way to a younger man who could have more freedom in relieving the large numbers of older men who blocked the way at the top due to the manner of Army promotions up to that time.

So I continued to press for Leahy being returned and made chairman of the Chiefs of Staff. The President always answered my proposals regarding Admiral Leahy by saying, "But you are the Chief of Staff." But I said, "Mr. President, I am only Chief of Staff of the Army and in a sense of the Army Air. There is no Chief of Staff of all the military services." "Well," he said, "I'm the Chief of Staff. I'm the Commander-in-Chief." And I explained to him in great frankness that it was impossible to conceive of one man with all of his duties as President being also, in effect, the Chief of Staff of all the military services. That it was a superman job and I didn't think that even the exaggeration of the powers of superman would quite go far enough in this. And I know he was not very much pleased with my statement. But the trouble there was he didn't quite understand what the role of the Chief of Staff would be. While I was in England, he brought Leahy back and Leahy arrived in Washington and was announced as coming on as presumably the Chiefs of Staff. But the President said he was going to be his "legman." And when I arrived in Washington, Leahy was very much at a loose end. He didn't know quite where he stood. He called on me because he had learnt that I had proposed his name. I was the one who urged his return. Well, I had an office fixed for Leahy over in the building where the Chiefs of Staff met and where the British had their rooms. And it was all ready with its secretary. So I

explained to Leahy what I had in mind. And it wasn't at all what the President implied. He had never understood quite what I wanted and the necessity for it. So I took Leahy over and showed him his office and his secretary and I took him in the room where the Chiefs of Staff met and showed him the chair where he should sit, which was unoccupied at the time because it was at the end of the table—because I always sat to one side though I was the senior on the American side then and I proposed to him when the next meeting came, which I think was the next day, he just calmly sit down in that chair. I don't know, but I was told that Admiral King was very much irritated by this procedure. He was not in favor of that sort of arrangement. However, I thought that was very important that we, in effect, have a neutral agency because we would have had trouble with the Naval Air and the Army Air and the Naval – Army disagreements through the years—which were always exaggerated by the fact that the Navy had a fleet; the Army had no Army. It had little detachments around the United States and in various places and even in Hawaii or in Panama there were very small groups of troops, although they were together there. But the Navy actually had a Navy. They had an Atlantic Fleet, but in particular they had a Pacific Fleet and they had an Admiral who was in command of that fleet, which was one of their great posts of service. But we had nothing like that. The real term of 'Army' as we used it later in the war could not be applied properly to the scattered troops we had except as an administrative reference to all the individuals who were in the military service. Therefore, I thought it was particularly important to have Leahy in the chair and I incurred, possibly, Admiral King's displeasure, but whatever it was Admiral Leahy functioned from that time on as the chairman. The matters became very much confused later on because he became more what you might call the Chief of Staff of the President, which was not my intention in making the proposal and urging that he be brought home. It was excellent to have him in contact with the White

House. It would have been excellent if he had kept us straight on all of the political goings-on, like at Yalta for example. I don't know whether he was at Tehran or not. But anyway, he became more the Chief of Staff of the President and less the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff as time went on. And, for example, at Potsdam, he was almost exclusively engaged in attending the political meetings and I know on one occasion we had been trying to get an answer out of the Russians regarding certain things we wanted them to concede. The Navy was particularly anxious for some stations for part of their people up in the—near Petrograd, not Petrograd, whatever the city is up there on the tip of the Peninsula that leans out towards Japan [Petropovlask]. They finally—the Russian Chiefs of Staff—made a written statement of the commitments they would make in the thing and we came to the next meeting, they wanted a reply to that and we didn't have it. It had gone to Admiral Leahy or at the White House, but wherever it was Mr. Truman was out of Potsdam doing some official reviews or matters of that kind, Admiral Leahy was away and King and I had never seen the paper. And we had to get together and we had to answer all of these Russians comments and what concessions they had made and what they had declined without ever having seen their paper. Even though Leahy's time was more completely given to attending the President in his political meetings, nevertheless, it was quite essential to have the arrangement as it was, because it would never have done to have tried to have gone right straight through the struggle with Admiral King in a secondary position and me as the senior where I was also senior of the Air. And it was quite essential that we have a neutral agency at the top and Leahy in effect was that so far as the Army and Navy requirements and positions were concerned.

I think you have Hopkins pretty well pegged, but I would say this. He was invaluable to me. I didn't see Hopkins very often, because I made it a business not to go to the White House,

but the others like Arnold and Somervell would see him with great frequency. But whenever I hit a tough knot I couldn't handle and seemingly couldn't get anywhere, I would call him up and he would either arrange a meeting with the President for me or he and I together would see the President. And we had a number of talks with the President with no one else present. He was always a strong advocate, it seemed to me, of almost everything I proposed and it required quite a bit of explanation from time to time to have the President see that the set-up could not be handled in the ways he sometimes suggested. And there had to be a very firm position taken in these matters. So he was quite invaluable to me and he was very courageous. And he was particularly so abroad with the British. I heard him make one or two statements to the British Chiefs of Staff—the War Cabinet—and he was certainly was brutally frank. And altogether he acted, I thought, with great courage and particularly in relation to Mr. Roosevelt. Because I couldn't get at the President with the frequency that he could—nothing like it, nor could I be frank, nor could I be as understanding. But he did a job in the war which I thought was of great moment—of great importance to the country. And he showed remarkable courage, but far more courage in a physical way. Because I remember when he first went to London with me and that trip over on the planes of that day were not luxurious and it was rather trying. He had just come back from Russia. Well, I am not certain whether he had just come back at that time. But anyway, I know that in the previous two weeks he had ten transfusions—blood transfusions—and he had been found crawling up the back stairs at Hyde Park because he wasn't strong enough to walk up. And yet Mr. Churchill—Mr. Roosevelt—sent him to London and he took that arduous trip with me and he played a very great part in the affairs that we did over there. He was very honest about the thing. He supported me strongly where I was in difficulties with Churchill and where I was in difficulties with the President. He supported me strongly and he made the

technique, you might say, of the military position—the strategic graphs and all—plainer to the President than I could possibly have done myself.

Q. 85. Do you feel that Ehrman had described the relationship between you and Admiral King correctly?

A. I think the statement regarding the relations between Admiral King and myself is practically correct. Everybody realizes that he was a difficult individual because he was very short of temper and very sensitive, but we got along about as described. I might recite one incident that occurred right at the start. My reception room was across the hall from my office in the old Munitions Building. It was presided over by a young woman. I very purposely didn't have a uniformed aide in it because I had to deal with such a large number of civilians or National Guard Reserves—a problem which the Navy did not have anything approaching—and with a great many Congressmen coming in. I thought it was wise not to have a very stern looking military set-up and I could quite handle the issues without it, which incidentally I think I have said once before—that the reason I continued the headquarters in civilian clothes for such a long time up until actually Pearl Harbor was because I didn't want to antagonize the general public and the Congress with the easily aroused feelings toward the military that had always existed. Now in this case Admiral King came to see me without my knowing he was coming and was received by this young woman in the reception room. Well, he was the head of the Navy and when you arrived on his side of the fence in his offices, a naval aide met you and were escorted very formally in and finally escorted into his presence. It was all done very formally and very efficiently. Here was a young woman receiving the Admiral of the Navy and his not getting to see me right away. Actually, what was happening was the Foreign Minister of Australia who later—I don't know whether he became Prime Minister or not, but anyway he was head of the

United Nations for a period, I have forgotten his name, but he was a very difficult man to deal with. He represented the Labor Party there and he was fighting at the drop of the hat. And at this particular time Australia was in great fear of a Japanese invasion and it wasn't until the battle of the Coral Sea comparatively clarified the atmosphere did we ever get away from that difficulty. And there was also the fear on the part of the New Zealanders who incidentally claimed that the Japanese would be there first and, of course, the Australians said they would go there first and I had to act as the go-between between Australia and New Zealand in this matter which afterwards was treated by both sides with great amusement, but wasn't amusing to me at all at the time when I had to manage the affair. Well, whatever this Foreign Minister's name was—I am sorry I have forgotten (Heffner – Was it MacKenzie? No. Canada). He came to see me on his first visit to Washington. He had only been there about one day, but already word had spread that he created a tempest wherever he came and that he was very frank in his strictures on us and the necessity for our helping save Australia and he was sort of dressing down everybody he came in contact with. Well, I was prepared for him when he arrived at my office. And he immediately started in one what I would call a tirade. And he got a certain distance and I stopped him—sorry I haven't got his name, because it's a little hard to describe it merely as him or he—but I stopped him. I said, "Now, Mr. Minister, presumably we will have a great deal of business to do and over a very vital matter. You are not going to get anywhere by storming in here with me. In the first place, I won't accept it. I won't have you in the office if you do it. So let's get down to business and find a way to get along without this tempestuous performance. I know your country's in great peril, but that isn't going to help you a bit here. That's going to antagonize people. Already, I've heard of how you conducted yourself in other offices. Now you are not going to conduct yourself like that here."

I explained this because at that time Admiral King was waiting in the reception room. I couldn't even give a pause in the conversation to send word out or have them interrupt me to tell me Admiral King was there. Whatever it was when I got rid of him—the Australian—and went over to greet King, I found he had left in a huff and had gone back to his office at the other end of the Munitions Building. So I went right over personally to the Munitions Building and was shown with military formality into King's office. I don't know—remember—just what his attitude was when he greeted me. But I said, "Now, I've come over to talk to you right away and explain what was happening." And I did explain it. Now, I said, "I think this is very important. Because if you or I began fighting at the very start of the war, what in the world will the public have to say about us?" I said, "They won't accept if for a minute. So we just take our tickets and walk out. We can't afford to fight. So we ought to find a way to get along together." King listened to this and sat silent for a minute or two and turned to me and said, "Well, you have been very magnanimous in coming over here the way you have. And we will see if we can get along and I think we can." And we did get along. We had one or two pretty mean fights, but anyone has that.

Now comes to General Arnold. I tried to give Arnold all the power I could. I tried to make him as nearly as I could Chief of Staff of the Air without any restraint though he was my subordinate. And he was very appreciative of this. My main difficulties in the matter came from the fact that he had a very immature staff. They were not immature in years, because they were pretty older, but I would say—I used to characterize them to him—they were, I've forgotten the word—I will say antique staff officers— oh, "passé airmen," "passé fliers," I guess is the right word because they were not trained at that kind of staff thing and they were busy taking stands all the time about promotions. They were already getting more rapid promotions than anybody

else in any Army or military force we had or Navy or anything. But his staff was always agitating about that. And the lesser they were the more they were busy talking about a separate air corps. Well, that was out of the question at that time. They didn't have the trained people for it at all. Spaatz and—who was the man who died the other day? Senator of the same name—Spaatz and the other great airman who was the nephew of the senator by the same name and those people learnt their lesson in the great struggle of the battle and in command of great air forces. So, when they came back, the air corps had the nucleus of a very able staff officers but that wasn't true at all at the start. What's the senator's name? Turn it off.

.....

I've forgotten just where I was. General Vandenberg was one of those highly experienced officers. But at the start of the war he was a major or lieutenant colonel and I took him to England with me as one of my two advisers. I did that with some other airmen. They were all just making their beginnings at the big things. They had beliefs in heavy bombers—they had beliefs in the independence of the Air Corps and all that. But when it came to the management and development of this tremendous force, they were yet without the experience necessary and I had to take what we had—all the various services were involved in the Army—until the other could be developed more. Not that there were experienced airmen in the General staff, excepting for Spaatz and Arnold and about one or two others, there were not for reasons which I think I have given before.

As I have said, I gave Arnold his head as much as I possibly could, but my main trouble was when his staff would get him in trouble. This is not to be repeated in your book, but I told him I was tired of hearing from that goddamned high school staff he had down there. And he

would always take it very well. In fact, Arnold's disposition to cooperate with me was a very wonderful thing. Because I had to be rough time after time. And he was splendid about the matter and there weren't many difficulties. And I might say here that General Arnold had the conception of using a great bombing force out of England over France and this pinpoint bombing to be prior to a landing in Normandy or wherever we decided to land. He was very strong for that conception before he had any planes to amount to anything and he took it up directly with the President in my presence several times and wedded Mr. Roosevelt to that conception of a powerful air force operating into France and later into Germany before we attempted to land on the coast of France and he should get the credit for that. At the time it was a little bit hard to handle because we didn't have many planes and you couldn't talk very forcibly to the British about something when you didn't have it. They had hard fighting there which had been desperately costly in the First War on the Somme—they never forgot those casualties—and in this last war their quick defeat of their few troops in Northern France and in Belgium had left an indelible imprint on their minds and in affecting their reactions. But Arnold was very deep in that first conception of the powerful air preparation for the landing in Normandy which later followed. He had great success in getting the following of the young airmen. They all liked him—they all respected him and they thought he represented their interests. I had to get into some of this very personally. The first fighting out of Australia and the great island just to the north of it, the Japanese were quite successfully using their Zero planes and our Air Corps said our plane then I don't remember what it was—49 or something of that sort—was too slow and not agile enough as it were. So I sent an officer out there to see the young airmen personally. It wasn't Arnold on this trip. Because I wanted to instill the feeling in these young fellows that just because I wasn't an airman or the staff weren't all Air they wouldn't disregard the interests and

the necessities of the Air Service. These young fellows were having a terrible time. They had no prospect of relief. They were flying much, much too much, and they were having casualties and the replacements were not available and wouldn't be for quite a long time and they had a deep feeling that the Zero plane was far better than theirs. Well, the truth of the matter was—I found out by investigation and particularly by talking to manufacturers—our plane had a lot of equipment in it which was heavy, armored, to protect their backs and things of that sort. So I sent this officer out to tell these young airmen that I would have these planes stripped so they would be as light and as easily handled as the Zero if they wanted that. We would take out all this special equipment which rendered it a little less hazardous for the pilot under fire though it rendered the plane heavy and not so easily handled. When the proposition was put up to the young fliers—“just say the word and I will have the plane stripped”—and I made them do it personally for me because I wanted them to feel that we were thinking about them and would do for them directly. All they had to do was say the word and this man would send the cable home and we would start in stripping the planes. And they voted against it. The minute we were going to take out the armor and other things in the planes, then they didn't want it.

Arnold's role was a very difficult one because he had a budding air force. It had a terrific expansion rate to it. And the upper stories of the Air Corps had a great many of these elderly pilots who were not trained in the staff development. They had kept away from that in a sense in order to make certain that they didn't lose their flying qualification pay. And the result was it was very hard to handle things because they would always be the senior on any group that we would form to study some particular set of circumstances. These young fellows hadn't yet come into any great prominence, like Vandenberg, Tooley Spaatz and other fliers of that category. So we had a hard time. His staff, he had a hard time with. I know one young officer, who right now

is in a leading position in the Air Corps—he has been in command of MATS and he has had other very important commands. I was very much impressed with him when Arnold brought him in as a major. And I said why don't you make that fellow and he said he couldn't make him—he would lose all his staff. They would all quit on him if a man that young was made. And he just couldn't do it. (Heffner—was that General Norstad?) No, I made him a prominent general later. So the next list that came in. I just wrote the officer's name on it. And when Arnold's staff woke up and Arnold woke up this fellow was a brigadier general though he had been a major the day before. And he worked out and I think he is in the Air Corps now on active service.

General Norstad, who is now the Supreme Commander, was one of the young men I looked after with great respect, and, as I recall, I did what I could to push him forward in a hurry.

Q. 87. What were the chief weaknesses in our intelligence system? Judging from our actions in Korea, have we solved our main problems in regard to intelligence?

A. Referring only to the war period and the development of the Intelligence Section, we didn't have enough qualified people. We didn't have nearly enough men in the Intelligence Section. It always got the second deal in it—its head was always a colonel and not a brigadier general because the brigadier generals went to the other three commanding interests of the General Staff. We were not intelligence wise—I will put it that way. We collected a great deal—mass—of intelligence but I thought we were a little slow in its interpretation and the whole section had to be built up. They had a number of heavy thinkers but they didn't impress me very much. It is very hard in time of peace to work up to the state of efficiency you want in a service like the Intelligence Service. They either go far too far and exaggerate the thing or they don't go far enough. Anyway, I was not impressed by so many people in the Intelligence Section and they

led me into some bad pitfalls before I got through. One of the troubles about the Intelligence Service arose out of the fact-finding officers in connection with intelligence in Europe. They were the attaches at the embassies. That's the only way, I guess, you could get them into the country at that time. But the trouble was the Ambassador treated at least one of them as his aide, which he should have, and a little bit the others. Actually what we wanted were attaches for Intelligence who you might say merely were attached to the Embassy—you might say lived there and conducted themselves in a way that did not bring us into trouble with that country. For that, of course, the Ambassador would be responsible. But they ought to have nothing to do with the ordinary attaché business of the Embassy. And it was particularly important that the senior be not depended on for the military intelligence so much because the Ambassador generally used him or his wife used him as military aide as it were. I thought it was wrong in arrangement. I thought the Ambassador should himself have selected who the head man was. And another man could have looked after the wife—which is always essential over there. And they should have been completely under the instructions of the Embassy and no effort made to use them for intelligence at all. The others ought to be attaches by name but in effect entirely independent in their operation and for their purpose.

It takes quite a long time to get the proper kind of intelligence. As a matter of fact until they get into the actual fighting part of the game and realize the necessities and everything there, they probably don't serve you very well in the general sense of the intelligence service. And part of it, of course, is a very restricted matter in one way and very intensive in another. It is a fact-finding and piecing together, with infinite patience of a variety of things of themselves not suspicious, but put together very telling in the information they carry.

I remember a very dramatic bit of intelligence that came to me and it had quite a story—to the individual. The officer, Colonel Truman Smith, who had been with me at Fort Benning when I was running the school down there. I had gotten him an invitation to Germany from the head of the German military service, whose name I've forgotten, but who was later dropped by Hitler as having ostensibly married a carpenter's daughter—and got Hitler to be the best man at the wedding and turned on him and he had to resign. At this time he commanded a division or two in northern Germany and he offered to entertain whomever I sent over. I had Smith go because he could afford the trip and I couldn't get them ordered otherwise. He brought back very complete information about the matters that we wanted to know, particularly about the methods of training of the German forces and just how they were going about the restrictions that had been placed on them against raising an Army. If you will recall in the settlement of the First World War, Germany was restricted to a very small military force and had to have a small officer corps and had to keep these officers. They couldn't go in and out the way they had before—which enabled a great many officers to be trained. He discovered and it became apparent to me what was going on. This small force was of itself literally an officer corps and was being trained like all were to be officers. We got quite a line on this through his visit to this then division commander in northern Germany who later was head of the German Army for a brief period.

All of this has a background relating to the Intelligence Service. It's very hard to say just how the Intelligence Service can best be developed. I am out of touch with it now, but I was in pretty close touch with it during the war and I felt very keenly when there was some failure to get at the most important thing. I would say that the hedgerows in Normandy were a very important thing—the necessity of our artillery training to be a little bit different from that in the wide spaces of Africa. Matters of that sort which were of vital importance to us were not always

accentuated or brought to the front by the Intelligence Service. Though we had a very good Intelligence Service in the war and combined with the Navy Intelligence it was quite effective. And what we got from the British was very effective because they had really developed a very high-rated, in my opinion, Intelligence Service.

Q. 89. Did we rely heavily on British intelligence during the war?

A. We did depend as much as possible on the British Intelligence Service, because it had a long start on us; it was closer to the operations; it had its people engaged a longer period and had had all the while a steady development of Intelligence Service because of its intimate relations with the Continent—affairs on the Continent—which always carried a disturbing characteristic which might threaten Great Britain.

Q. 90. Do you think that democracies can avoid the type of unpreparedness for war which we had in 1939?

A. It would be very difficult for a democracy to avoid some degree of unpreparedness such as we had in 1939. We had almost no preparedness then and I would say the greatest service we have been rendered has been by Molotov and Vishinsky. Because they have kept the Congress so stirred up it has been possible to get military appropriations. If they had subsided, there is no doubt in my mind at all our appropriations would have subsided in a very large measure and there would come the difficulty of keeping the military preparedness. I have felt all along that we should change our approach to this question. The taxpayer is going to dominate and the political action is going to follow. And as soon as it appears quieted down all the appropriations are going to begin to lapse. It has happened and it's happened and will happen again. I went through three experiences of that and the reason I was so—and am so—intensely in favor of

universal military training is that you can create a respectable military force, in a sense, without having the fellows constantly in uniform. And that is the only way you can do it where you have them ready to take the field instantly. There's no other way that I know of. And that's possible to have units at low strength and reserve units with an ability to quickly build up to fighting strength—the product of universal training—the graduate you might say of six months' training—without that you are lost. It took us in some cases twenty-two months to get a division, particularly some National Guard divisions, prepared for service and even then it was not really complete. It took us months and months from September to August to get divisions ready to go to Japan and Korea and then their training wasn't complete. I just sent them ahead. I sent them in April but their training wasn't really finished until August. The same delay took place in connection with the divisions that we had to send to Europe when we increased the force there in the last few years. We've got to remember that heretofore, we have had a year or more or better in which to prepare while Great Britain or France held the field for us. The next time we won't have a day. It will be war from the start and we'll be the leading factor on the Allied side in that war. And unless we have divisions that can instantly take the field and it's not a day when you can take the rifle down from over the mantel piece and go to war. You have to have an immense amount of training or you are just sacrificing your young people and you are sacrificing your cause.

It is possible for a democracy I think to get ready if they adopt some system such as I have been talking about. But the trouble is it's defeated by the articulate opposition which, as a rule, is only a very small percent. But they control votes because they are everlastingly at it. I practically had universal military training when I resigned as chief of staff. And it was only after I went out that they dropped the last more or less inconsequential thing which a small committee

of which Mr. Wadsworth was the chairman had finished its work and I wasn't there to see it completed which was a very small matter of the care that should be taken for young men around the training camps. It was an awful battle getting it carried because the voter is instantly and easily aroused and the congressman who takes a stand with you imperils his seat. And that has to be recognized. But unless we have some system like that anything else would be almost suicidal in expense and my fear has been along in these days that Russia will go along teasing us as it were with the possible threat of war until they break us down economically and that is what I think is their best chance. And that is what, I think, they are looking for.

Q. 91. Considering the way we delegate power to the President and military leaders once we enter war, do you feel that we operate fairly efficiently once war starts?

A. I think we can operate efficiently under the conditions you mention.

Q. & A. 92. As to dictatorship, I think they have a very easy time of it as the start. They very easily can get ahead of us—way ahead of democracy. I think that when they start to break down they go to pieces completely. And then democracy gradually gets stronger as it goes along. There is always a battle in connection. You take the Civil War—the battle of Lincoln to maintain the Union Armies. You can take our battle in the last war when time after time there would be threats against the strength of the Army and these various groups in this country could fight successfully against it. And of course, we've always got to remember that if we carry out our main policy of keeping the war out of the United States we are always up against a very expensive proposition of transport overseas which runs the costs into billions and billions and the management of the Army and the character of the Army has to be very, very carefully considered because you are not at home—you are not guarding your own fireside. You can possibly, almost

probably, in a country which your father and mother and your wife have never seen and do not understand. You are way away from home. I thought in this World War II one of my great problems was to try to bring the Army into closer contact with the parents and the wives because they are way out in the southwest Pacific or across the Pacific generally and they were in Europe far from us and in Africa and the Middle East. Nowhere were they fighting by their doorsill. It is true the atomic weapon, the long range plane, will bring destruction to us, but it won't bring the fighting which has to conquer those weapons, which is to destroy them at their base.

Q. 93. Did you deliberately play down military parades and military demonstrations after 1939 in order to prevent charges that the government was guilty of warmongering?

A. So far as I could I did. I thought the less we paraded military things, the better it was. I was much opposed in this because they said I should show the boys to the people. Well, there's a great deal of truth in that. But the main thing is the farmer gets very sore when he sees great parades and things when he lacks farmhands. And the manufacturer gets very sore when he hasn't enough labor for what he wants and here is the great number of soldiers—to him—hanging around. Actually going through the tedious training that is necessary before they can be sent overseas and which is necessary to have available here within the United States.

Q. 94. Was the widespread use of civilian clothes prior to December 1941 by troops in Washington and large cities due to your desire to avoid the feeling on the part of the public that this was a military state? Did you have some difference of opinion with Mr. Stimson on this point? (I was told that he wanted troops in uniform before December 7, 1941, and was one of the first things he asked about after the Pearl Harbor attack).

A. I think I have already answered this. I was in favor of remaining in civilian clothes at the War Department and the big city headquarters as long as possible though I was much opposed in every way. And I know how quickly the worm turns on this and while I was asking for large forces and asking for billions, I didn't want a lot of uniforms plastered around Washington. I remember in the First World War we came back and we found one of the acrid comments on the Army then was the number of officers around Washington and up on the Hill and the military automobiles—everything of that sort—and I was trying to play that down as much as possible.

Q. 95. Was the chief key to Allied victory the industrial production of the United States?

A. That was a vital link—the industrial production—in the United States. But to say that was the key to the Allied victory, you might say the plane was the key, but more particularly a man was the key and the degree of his training and the degree of his discipline and the degree of his fighting ability and staying ability—they were all involved in it, and of course, the industrial development, particularly where we helped other countries, was of vast importance, but it was played up so much that you might feel you could handle this matter with industry and not even have an Army. And no greater sophistry than that could be spoken.

Q. 96. What is your judgment on the importance of the work of General Somervell as an organizer, planner, operator? How great was his contribution to victory?

A. I regarded him of tremendous efficiency and what he did was a miracle. I depended on him very, very heavily. His handling of things awakened naturally the hostility of the staff departments. That's always been the case. That was the fight way back between General Wood and the onetime adjutant general of the Army—whose name I've forgotten [Aisnworth] who made himself military secretary and tried to destroy Wood and did raise the devil with General

Bell as chief of staff. The services have a degree of permanency—their head would remain in Washington. They used to say in the old days that any head of a service must be a good bridge player and a member of the Metropolitan Club. But when a line officer came to Washington and was only there a short time—two or three years—he had no particular contacts developed with Congress and he was very easily euchred out by these permanent services and that was a great battle which was finally brought to a head by General Wood. I think that we always run into that opposition and while I was out of the country right after the war, this Second World War, and when they had their reorganization conferences, I think they suffered seriously in their results because very few of them had been in this country during the war—they were abroad—and they were not aware of the advantages we had and not aware of the real cause of the troubles, they all inherited from the permanent services hostility to General Somervell. Actually he was one of the most efficient officers I have ever seen. And he got things done in Calcutta just as fast as he did in the meadows there around the Pentagon. Whenever I asked him for something he did it and he got it. He was very forcible. He reformed, and I am using the word accurately, he reformed the adjutant general's department and others. He found conditions there were just intolerable and naturally they were all bitterly against him. And I think all the reorganization so far as supply and services were concerned was built on avoiding any future development of a man like General Somervell. If I went into control in another war, I would start out looking for another General Somervell the very first thing I did and so would anybody else who went through that struggle on this side.

Q. 97. What is your feeling about the contribution to increased production and supply of Knudsen, Donald Nelson, Leon Henderson, Sidney Hillman?

A. So far as I know—I do know that General Knudsen helped us a good deal. Nelson, I never was certain about. Leon Henderson—I didn't know enough of the details of his work, and Sidney Hillman the same. I was very friendly with them but theirs was such an intricate position that I didn't know enough about it. But I remember I got into trouble with some of the labor agreements when I was trying to get stuff off to help Great Britain when they were going through the—what was the name of that landing operation where we had to get them to escape [Dunkirk] – during the Dunkirk episode. The President got me on the telephone and gave me the deuce for doing some work on Sunday when I was trying to get the ships loaded to get arms—obsolete—obsolescent war arms to denuded England.

Q. & A. 99. I made appeals—but the President made the bulk of appeals and he did it very skillfully. He would set the target—we'll say in planes—at a certain amount, and then just as you would settle down to that about three months later he would raise the target and he just kept on doing that. Where they had covered all the issues at first he was interested almost solely in planes and he didn't realize how much you had to do in training pilots and the care of the planes. That almost took longer than the building of the plane did. And it was very hard to get him into the tremendous increase in the production of ammunitions, notably artillery ammunition and rifle ammunition. We had to hold onto the old artillery ammunition for the 75s because we had the guns and we had that stored ammunition. We had almost no ammunition for the new 105 and I was under continual pressure particularly by Congress to begin on the 105 and not do anything about the 75s. Well, the 75s in a sense were all we had. If we didn't have those we didn't have anything. So it was silly what the contest was. It was a complete lack of appreciation of what we really had to do. The delay in getting powder, cartridges, shells for the small arms and machine guns was very serious and it took quite a while to get the production. I remember we

never were able to send that ammunition out to General MacArthur and the Dutch who needed it so badly.

I made a great many appeals to labor leaders and they were very good about their meetings with me. I found they were very willing to help. It was pretty difficult at times for them. You had a combination of complications there in that industries had to have these men, the labor had to have these men—the farmers wanted these men—the Army had to have the soldiers. So all these combined introduced a very difficult question to solve and put the Congress under a very great pressure from various directions.

Q. 100. What were our greatest feats in production? The greatest feats in getting supplies to troops?

A. I don't recall offhand the great feat in production, because there were so many of them that at the present time I can't remember just which one to dignify especially.

Q. 101. Were you sometimes dissatisfied with the workings of reverse Lend-Lease on the part of the British?

A. I don't recall being particularly dissatisfied with the workings of the reverse lend-lease. My principal concern with it was a proof of good intentions rather than our getting any material assistance from it.

Q. 102. In your opinion which of our weapons contributed most to our victory? What changes would you make if you had to do it over?

A. As to the weapons, again I would not endeavor to qualify exactly what weapons were the most vital. You can say the atomic bomb ended the war suddenly—that's conclusive in my

mind. It provided the shock action that you needed to jar the action into the Japanese military force. But as to the various weapons, I wouldn't know. I think the rifle was very satisfactory. I think the machine gun was very satisfactory—the 105. I think was very satisfactory, and the use of the artillery was very highly developed and very, very efficient. Their fire control and all was remarkably well done and hit the enemy like a blast when we turned it loose on them.

There was great difficulty in getting the Garand rifle adopted because a Marine Officer, retired or reserve, I don't remember which, had developed a very, very effective rifle and he got great political backing particularly from the chairman of the Senate.

END OF SIDE ONE

The chairman of the Senate Committee—military committee, was a warm friend of mine but he was an ardent supporter of the Marine development and finally forced a test for the benefit of the Senate Committee. We had had all our military tests and everything and they were all in favor of the Garand rifle but under this pressure a very difficult situation was created and it wasn't improved by the head of the Marine Corps, long since retired, when he came out naturally in favor of the Marine rifle. I say Marine, but I mean this ex-officer of the Marine Corps who had developed the gun. Those are the things which are always so difficult to handle and take an immense amount of time when there are so many compelling things that you have to do.

Q. 103. What was our greatest strength on the ground—armor or artillery?

A. That is a very difficult question to answer and I don't think you can answer it, other than to say that each one is of vital importance in its particular field. An Army without tanks over in Europe at that time would have been in a fatal position. An Army without ground [forces] would

have been lost. An Army without artillery would have been very sorely afflicted. But if you have them all and they are efficient, they each have their place and you go from there.

Q. 104. What do you consider of greatest importance among our new equipment: bridging, winter clothing, trucks, prime movers, jeeps, etc?

A. I can't answer that because I am not sufficiently familiar with the new developments and the new equipment that is available and its performance.

Q. 105. How did you attempt to handle criticisms of our tanks, planes, and other equipment? Which criticisms caused you the most concern? (You have told me of airmen wanting a lighter plane until they found it meant less armor).

A. Questions of this sort—criticisms of tanks, planes, other equipment, are very common—certainly to an Army of democracy and a particular type of newsman will get on one subject and make that his play and of course every military sympathizer who is an officer in the field, we'll say, feeds him the ammunition for his newspaper gun. And members of Congress will take that up. If they are hostile to you, they can make it very difficult for you. I was very fortunate in having quite a friendly Congress. I had to labor with them. I had to make plain to them these various things. But they were not set out to destroy me. They were set out to help me. And these issues would come up—with which they would be very much impressed by wherever they got it from—a newspaper man who had been on the front or from matters of that sort. But it was done without the prejudices that often accompanies such pressures where they have antagonism to the principal officer concerned. My main trouble was in getting the thing on an impartial basis: for instance, tanks. We had a very difficult time settling on the pattern for the tanks and I finally (naturally I had all the American side, Chaffee was the head of the tank corps at the time).

I got the principal Britisher, confidentially, and I told him to tell me—I wouldn't repeat what he said—but just tell me exactly in the frankest way possible just what he wanted to say about this tank question as to the importance of the American side and the British side. Well, I very readily came to the feeling that the trouble was this—that the American tank was far more mobile. We had had a great deal of mobility involved in the tractors and things of that sort so that we understood that. And I thought that our tank was far and away beyond the British tank in mobility—being able to handle it. On the other hand, I thought that the British tank had its fighting characteristics for the crew and matters of that sort far ahead of ours because they had had experience in that and knew what it was so my effort was to bring about the settlement of the thing on the basis of what the Americans did best and what the British did best without any prejudice in connection with either one. And I literally settled the tank dispute on that basis with the civilian who was largely responsible for the adjustment and who is now one of the heads of industry. I will not go into the question of his name.

With the planes it grew less difficult as time went on. At first, there was a regular war between those who were opposed to large planes and those who were in favor of large planes. Those in favor of large planes were almost to the point of ignoring any plane that could help the troops, which was a fatal mistake and those who opposed the large bomber planes were again, as we can all see today, making a fatal mistake. Well, it was necessary to compromise these judgments and get the thing underway, without prejudice, if it was possible to do so. I would always find certain officers that would approach the thing purely objectively and I would depend on them to a very large degree but I would do it quietly and I would get myself armed for whatever discussions I had to go through and whatever decisions I had to make. But that was

inherent in practically all these questions. The only thing they didn't oppose much was the jeep. They all opposed its development, and then they were all strong for it if they could get enough.

I don't know but what the battle over the tanks was probably the most difficult to handle. There were great difficulties about the planes but they were of a nature that was more you might say was industrial. But in all these things—the difficulties in a democracy are that everybody can find a back door to the White House. And until you have proven yourself and are, you might say, in command of the situation at least you have the respect of Congress, you have the respect of the command in chief and all. It is a very difficult position because this person, a classmate we'll say, of the President's or somebody else gets to him and just proves that we don't know what we are doing at all and he gets to him, and this man probably talks well. I remember taking issue with—(interrupted and didn't finish).

Early in the period between '39 and '40, I had great difficulty in meeting what I would call the back door influences. It would manifest itself in a variety of ways. I did a number of things to meet this. In the first place, I was very careful not to get mad. Then I got a collection of rather leading fellows on the Hill and I would have them come down and give them very intimate talks on what the situation was and what our position was. That helped a great deal. And I was able to meet these difficulties somewhat in that manner. But I repeat again, I had to keep my temper very carefully and I had to be long-suffering, and had to have a tremendous amount of my time consumed in meeting this sort of influence. You couldn't ignore and to get mad didn't do you any good at all. I had officers who had specific individuals they must go around with and keep straight. I know General Collins, who afterwards became Chief of Staff of the Army and was a very celebrated corps commander in Europe and who captured Cherbourg, he had a single individual civilian who was very intimate with the President and Collins had to

stay with him all the time and if he travelled take him around and stay right with him all the time. Otherwise, he would get loose and no telling what would happen next. I had quite a number of these and each one of my people had one. I remember Smith of very conspicuous reputation, Bedell Smith, he had a particular man he had to look after. Any number of them had these assignments. And their job was to keep in touch with these officers and if the fellow wanted to travel, take him, but stay with him and try to keep the thing straight. There would be some man who was the classmate of the President. We had to have an officer stay with him all the time practically. The officer couldn't trail him or anything like that but he was always available and he was always in touch with what was going on. And in that way we could finally get things over the bar in some degree of safety. But you couldn't ignore these things. And I had to do it in some such way as that or I never would have had time to do my own work. But the first rule of all was that I had to keep my temper, because in a sense you had every right to get just furious considering how grave the hazards were. That didn't develop later on in the war much because they conceded that you knew and that you were being successful. But before that they all knew far better than I knew. Anyone could tell me just exactly. You could learn more on Wall Street or up in New York by far than you could in the War Department.

Q. 106. What was your view on the role of the commander in battle? Should he give general directions and leave the main handling of the battle to his subordinates or should he intervene in the battle? (I ask this because some writers feel that General Lee's chief weakness was a failure to intervene. There are some who feel the same about General Eisenhower. On the other hand, I have interviewed officers in World War II who felt that General Patton and General Stilwell intervened at too low a level in the battle).

A. Foch said that the plan was 10 percent and the execution was 90 percent. Well, that is correct today as it was when Foch said it. It has always been correct. It is not very difficult to get at the plan of these things. The great difficulty is observing the execution and pushing it at the weak point and getting it ahead and those things require not only great ability as a leader, great ability to demand the respect all the people, and great ability as a staff officer. But you have got to go. I sometimes have wondered how I could have gotten along with nine different theaters of operations and over eight and one-half million men in the service—of course many more than that counting those that came in and went out again one way or another—if I hadn't been able to fly. During the early formation of the Army, I used to fly every other week, almost all week. Of course, I could go great distances in a very short time and deal with things there. I never got caught in a review but once and I would go right to where they were working when I got to the place. And as a rule, I wouldn't tell them when I was coming because I just wanted to see exactly what they were doing at that particular time and when I left, I tried, as far as I could, to avoid meals and take them entirely in the plane. And we got, the planes were not as well served as they are today, but I got a very good Filipino—they procured him for me—so that he could give me very decent meals and relaxation. I never liked to take anybody with me on the plane. I tried that at first and I found that they talked all the time and kept me from relaxing. What I wanted to do was to sit down and put on a flying coat and put on sneakers and put on what do you call—moccasins—loafers—and sit down in one chair with my feet on the other and probably read the *Saturday Evening Post* or some such book as that. I always had a collection of these Army books that we had printed. So that the big problem with me was to get around and see these things and find out how they were going on at the time and I had to carry that all over the world and I think my mileage towards the end—I don't remember whether it was while I was

Secretary of State or when I ended with Chief of Staff but it was 1,400,000 miles. So I was involved in a tremendous amount of travel. I got caught up with the things right then—saw the situation and could take action in many cases within the hour by communicating back to Washington in regard to these matters which we had not understood or which required something more of correction that had to start from headquarters. But the travelling was very important. I was quite surprised when I got out to Ft. Sill—I was there a number of times—I found it was the first time the Chief of Staff had ever been to Ft. Sill. But of course, they didn't have planes in those days. But on these occasions, I could go great distances in a very short time. And about every other week, I was on the go entirely. And sometimes I went all night and get my sleep on the plane and that saved a day in there. You can't take for granted how things are going to work out. You have got to see. You have got to follow up. Not interfere. Not irritate people. But you get there. I think the best lesson of that sort that you get is Wellington's campaign in Portugal and Spain. His campaigns I should say...(He was interrupted here by the arrival of a little boy. He said, "Johnny, you are going to get shot if you grab that instrument).

I can't emphasize this too much that if you just get out a plan and set back, why you are lost. And on the other hand, if you get out a plan and then irritate the other fellow, you are lost again. And the method you do that has to be very largely influenced by the character of the Army that you are dealing with or the troops you are dealing with at the time.

Q. 107. What were our great virtues and our great weaknesses in command as opposed to the British, Germans, and Russians?

A. I think the German command relationship until Hitler began to take it all apart was so far as military affairs are concerned was the best. Of course, they had a very highly disciplined Army

and a higher disciplined officer force. The Russians, I don't know enough about it. It seems to have been a very arbitrary matter. If they didn't like you, they shot you, which is one way of getting things done. The British, they got people like Montgomery eventually and all, but they had a pretty slow time doing it and great difficulties doing it. They had the same problem as we have on the political situation.

I might say that I was very fortunate in regard to that. I was very fortunate that the President didn't interfere with me on command and allowed me more or less complete freedom of action. And it was only when I got into the business of reducing these fellows that I got into difficulties with the President because that instantly produced great political pressures. That we were doing all wrong. That we were victimizing our individuals and that he shouldn't be reduced. And that became particularly evident when we started to demobilize and you naturally had to cut down command and that was a very tragic thing to have to do. But when it got into a political swarm then it was all the worse. I recall one situation that took a very curious trail. In the first place, it was man that I knew very intimately out in the west who had gotten into the school that I had started myself at Charlottesville for the training of officers to be put in villages and cities and towns to conduct that part of the administration of captured territory or freed territory for that matter. I had gone in myself as a second lieutenant with no instruction of any kind whatsoever—no school of any kind whatsoever—and not even an Army regulation. A storm had destroyed practically all the papers and what I could find were in a barrel, rain-soaked, and I had to make up all my returns—I was the only officer there—and I had some of my early returns for property I had to deal with and supplies I had to issue—were made up almost out of my imagination. But I was given no instructions at all and I was practically governor in effect of quite a large territory, about half an island. And I remember in the First World War it was not

until after the actual fighting that they started in to try to get hold of officers that had been trained—some by Funston in Mexico—and began circulating to get any copies of the information of the regulations which had been gotten out at that time. So I started this school in Charlottesville and the head of this school was confirmed by the Secretary of War. It was a very fine lawyer of New York whose father had been, I think, Attorney General before him. Now, of course, I have forgotten his name at the moment. He was put in charge of the school down there, and a very capable colonel of the Regular Army was put in charge of the real management of the school, and we got this started. Well, the first thing I had to do was to stop division commanders sending officers there they wanted to get rid of. They didn't want their chief of staff, but they didn't quite have the nerve to reduce him or get him transferred. So they would want to sent him to a school like that—kick him upstairs as it were—and I had to act very drastically with several of them for using this as a convenience to get rid of people that they didn't have the nerve to do it themselves. And one of these was a fellow from the Midwest. And he was well-known for his characteristics which we weren't very excited about and by his same name was another officer who was another individual—who was the intimate of one of the distinguished Republicans and was anathema to Mr. Roosevelt. There were some accusations that this school down there was teaching a kind of government that was not compatible with our American type of government. That we were trying to organize a new government. I think they said we were doing everything. They didn't claim we were making glass, but I never heard of so many foolish cracks about it. Mr. Stimson came back from a cabinet meeting that lasted almost all afternoon and I discovered they had been discussing entirely this particular officer whose name was the same as that of an intimate of onetime Republican leaders. And Mr. Roosevelt was very bitter about this matter and Mr. Stimson was very much stirred up over it. I listened to this thing and I finally found out

they were talking about somebody they didn't even know—who wasn't the officer at all—and I was already investigating because I thought they had kicked him upstairs and loaded the school up with a man who had no business up there. And I was shocked when I found out how long the cabinet spent—all afternoon—warring over this thing. And I expressed my surprise and incredulity that such a thing should happen and Mr. Stimson called up the President then and explained they were talking about the wrong man all the time that they were so excited. But they got the school on the carpet as it were. And they claimed all sorts of things about the school. I called attention of Mr. Stimson to the fact that he had confirmed the head of the institution who was a very fine officer—he was a reserve officer and he was a general and his father had been in high cabinet position and he was altogether a fine man, but the thing got so bad that I had an investigation of a certain individual who was on the Army staff and Mr. Roosevelt got after him once or twice and finally I called this man in and said, “Why haven't you reported back the result of your investigation about this?” “Well,” he said, “I was ashamed to.” “Well,” I said “what were you ashamed about?” And he said, “I don't want to tell you.” I said, “My gosh, you were to investigate. Now what was it?” “Well,” he said, “I found out that there was supposed to be—just supposed to be—a plot of which this particular individual, who they were all talking about, was to be the President of this new republic and you were to be the Vice-President.” “Well,” I said, “I can tell you right now the first part of it, if there is anything to it, I was going to be President, I was not going to be the Vice-President.” “But,” I said, “The whole thing is utterly ridiculous.” And yet that had gotten to the point among people of some sanity and some reserve—that had gotten up and twisted clear round to the Cabinet. So I took it to Mr. Stimson and he was very much embarrassed at talking to the President about it and then the President showed me a list of couple of fellows that were reserve officers—who were generals—and who were going to be

relieved. We were reducing in every way we could because the discharges were going on very, very fast—demobilization—and they thought this showed a determination to expel all these people out of the Army and build up a new republic or something of that sort. Nothing was too wild not to mention. I was having the two officers relieved because there was no job for them. So they came to me to consult me. Did they dare to relieve those two political National Guardsmen? That's what it was. That is they were marshalling political power. And I said, "Go ahead and do it." And I told Mr. Roosevelt about this. (Chuckles) He was very much taken aback but he was very much embarrassed. Because there was heavy pressure to retain them. "Well," I said, "Mr. Roosevelt, you just have to make a decision. You are going to have a reserve army and no Regular army. We'll demote all the regular officers and keep all the other officers." Of course, I exaggerated it. He said, "Not that exactly." "Well," I said, "Will you let me handle it?" And he said, "All right" and he never spoke to me again about it and we went ahead and reduced these people. But we had to get them out. We had to reduce our own regular generals, and I objected very much to be held as Chief of Staff because I had made all these people. I had relieved all the ones I thought were not efficient enough to be retained. I had many enemies of them and their families. Now I was being called on to reduce about six hundred generals and make enemies of them too. I wouldn't have anybody left but my wife by the time I got through this thing. And I wanted to be relieved as Chief of Staff. And he made me hold on—Mr. Truman did that—until he brought Eisenhower back and he was very slow about bringing Eisenhower back. And Eisenhower, he didn't want to come back either, nobody wanted that job. So it was a very difficult period and there were these wild ideas that people were plotting this and plotting that.

I might go further about that school. In the first place, we got in trouble with it because Mr. Roosevelt forbade us to put these people into Sicily. We had sent them over and established a pool there in Africa and we wanted them to go into Sicily and be the men trained to take charge of these villages. So right away we would have somebody regulating those matters. And the village was picked out that each man was to take and he was educated in connection with that village and everybody in it who might have influence in the matter. And Mr. Roosevelt at first forbade us to put them in there. We had them in a camp in Africa and we couldn't do anything with them. Finally we got so we moved them in and this book that was a great best seller, I forget the name of that—that gave Patton the devil for shooting a hole in a tank or something—something of that sort—was made into a play—a best seller as a book and very popular as a play—but that was the officer that we had educated who was conducting this thing and was on the side of the villagers and in a sense against what the military were doing at that place. All of those things were very difficult to handle and so extraordinary you would hardly believe them today—the feeling of uncertainty about such things as that—and all these plots that were taken to the President and he had to pick out what was important and what was not. And it was no easy thing because the people who went to him were deeply prejudiced and very active. And I seldom went because if I got into all those discussions, I would soon exhaust my power entirely.

A. As to that further answer to that 107, I don't know what weakness I would say in command we had. I think our command questions worked out very, very well. We had comparatively speaking few reliefs. We relieved men. General Eisenhower was very firm about that and very courageous about that. And we relieved men on a number of occasions. But we did all our weeding out in this country whereas in the First World War they left the weeding out to General Pershing in France. And he had a terrible time. I remember one period, as I recall it; there were

thirty-two regular brigadier generals on the road at the same time going to the rear. And I may be off in that number because it is years back. But they had given them all physical examinations—things of that sort—but that didn't matter about the physical examinations—they were going to get shot. He could function until he got shot. If he was going to get sick, he could function until he got sick. But what you wanted was a vigorous man, who could command the respect the troops, who could go at it aggressively in his leadership, who was not fatigued and therefore lowered in morale by reason of that fatigue.

Q. 109. I have read that we would have adopted the title “marshal” for five star generals but for the fact that you felt that Marshal Marshall wouldn't sound very good. Isn't it rather that “marshal” has a foreign sound?

A. I didn't want any promotion at all. I didn't need it. The Chiefs of Staff on the British side were already field marshals so they would be senior to me whatever I was made. I didn't think I needed that rank and I didn't want to be beholden to Congress for any rank or anything of that kind. I wanted to be able to go in there with my skirts clean and with no personal ambitions concerned in it in any way, and I could get all I wanted with the rank I had. But that was twisted around and somebody said I didn't like the term marshal because it was the same as my name. I know Mr. Churchill twitted me about this in a rather scathing tone. I don't recall that I ever made the expression. But my reason for not wanting it was that I felt that it was much better that I personally shouldn't be beholden to anything for Congress except for fair treatment which they gave me.

Q. 110. Were you ever put under political pressure to give certain divisions to particular individuals?

A. Of course, I was under some pressure but not as much as you might think. The pressure there came when I was relieving the man. I remember one occasion I had thirteen senators come into my office at the same time to defend this man. And I finally said, "I'll put it this way gentlemen. I don't understand your position because I should think your constituents should be your principal interest, and here it seems to me you are only considering one constituent and ignoring all the other constituents who are members of the division. I am concerned with them and I am determined to see that they get the best leadership that there is available. And I said in this particular case we were very generous with the individual. We have him a long time to ease himself out of this thing and I don't think we could have done any better. "I am not going to leave him in command of that division. So I will put it to you this way—if he stays, I go, and if I stay, he goes." And that broke up the meeting. And one senator came back the next day and he said, "You know, I told my wife about the meeting yesterday"—and incidentally he was the only one who spoke to me about it—"and she said she was very happy, that her son was in the army and that you were head of the army."

I don't care to list these divisions and corps commanders unless I had some special reason for it at the time because comparisons are odious and if this book is a lot of comparisons with respect to efficiency to this, that or the other person, nobody will read the story except as to get at the acrimonious features such as that.

(Chuckles. What's he got? Johnny, you want an orange? He looks so pathetic...)

Q. 113. You have told me some of your problems with National Guard commanders. In view of recent controversy, do you have any comments on the problem of getting good National Guard commanders?

A. I will comment to you on this personally.

Q. 113A. What were some the chief advances of medicine in World War II over the earlier wars?

A. Wartime medicines. I won't comment on that. You have better sources of information. What I wanted particularly from the doctors—there was one group of vast importance to us—to man the hospitals and everything of that sort—where the scientific information was invaluable to us. There was another group that had to be executives and handle things in the field and that was quite apart from their specialized knowledge for which they were famous you might say in medicine or medicinal practices. I had great difficulty with that. I wanted the head of the medical corps during the war to be a great executive who could develop the medical corps and could see in the field that it was properly handled. And the pressures all were directed towards getting the great surgeon or the great medical leader. What you needed in Europe with the armies was the great executive to get these things set up—to get the hospitals—temporary things, the evacuation, everything of that sort, going and to see that the attention at the front was absolutely up to the peak of perfection. So I had some difficulty about this. A man might be a wonder on running a hospital and yet on the other hand be unfitted for a field executive which was the essential thing in the European theater.

Q. 114. You have told me of some of your work in dealing with malaria in the Pacific. Was this your chief medical problem during the war?

A. The principal medical problem was malaria and I explained to you about that where we had to go at that in order to save ourselves in the southwest Pacific. We would have a single division

to be out of action for over a year, as was the case, I think, of the First Marine Division, which was sent down to New Zealand.

My chief medical problem was getting the hospital started in time. The draft was going at a tremendous rate. I know at one time there we were taking in as many men in a month as there were men in the entire Navy. And the hospitals weren't finished. And you might say that the patients went in one side and the shavings came out of the other. And I had to get them started and one officer who played a great part in this is now the medical aide to the President—General Snyder—I picked him up and sent him all over the world but particularly all over this country when the hospitals were being established and he saw that the thing ran—that these overwhelming numbers of recruits coming in were attended. There was a flu epidemic at the time and he saw that the proper steps were taken in advance in connection with that and he had a very hard time because he never had a good plane and flying was a little bit primitive at that time in some respects and he just had to fly all the time and had some dreadful flights and very dangerous flights. But he was perfectly splendid in what he did and should have received great rewards for it. However, his work now is very much appreciated, I believe, with the President. I made him, incidentally, assistant Inspector General. I don't recall that I even spoke to the Inspector General department—they were pretty much hidebound, those fellows—so the first he knew about it I think was when Snyder was made a brigadier general. The Medical Department didn't know about it. I put his name on the list and appointed him the minute he was made an assistant inspector general. Then he was put in charge of all the inspections and everything of that sort relating in any way to medicine or health in connection with the draft. And that's where he came in—these new hospitals—the handling of all the recruits on the medical end. That gave me something to lean on which I felt up to that time I didn't have at all.

I did virtually the same thing with production. I had one inspector general whose practically principal job was to be in touch with all the production plants and things of that sort—and equipment—and travelled all over the country to keep me advised of what was needed—where we were limping and what should be done. Theretofore, the Inspector General was generally kept busy trying to figure out some question of an officer's payments to his divorced wife and things of that sort. I got them right down to production, to health, and one or two others things which I won't mention here. One of them, I will say, was the colored question.

I might say right here and now that I figure one of the greatest mistakes I made during the war was accepting the pressure of the staff—I don't want exactly to pin it on them—but they exerted the pressure of me and I failed to sense what was going to be a real, vital quality involved, denouement involved. I wanted the camps kept largely in the south because they didn't have to have such construction as they would in a northern climate and in addition to that training would be much facilitated because they could train outdoors for more days in the year. So I wanted, incidentally, all the colored division trained in the south, and the staff was very much opposed to that. They thought the division should be near the district it came from and they insisted on putting some of these colored divisions in the north. And of course they practically couldn't train at all it was so cold. And what was the real difficulty was—I overlooked entirely—and I say it frankly—I overlooked entirely...

That's my wife, Johnny. Will you give this cannibal something to eat out there?

I completely overlooked the fact that the tragic part of it would have these northern Negroes in a southern community. We couldn't change the bus arrangement, we couldn't change any of the things of that nature and they found themselves very much circumscribed—to

them outrageously so—because they were in there to train to fight for their country and put their lives ostensibly on the line and they were being denied this and denied that and denied the other things that the white troops accepted as a matter of course. And it made it extremely difficult and I know Jack McCloy, who was the assistant Secretary of War, that was one of his particular pigeons and he would come down to see me with great frequency because he was always in trouble and as a matter of fact at that time, under those conditions, there just wasn't any solution. We never should have coagulated the south with these Negro camps. We should have kept time in the north, but my refusal was not based on that understanding. I failed to visualize what was going to happen and it caused us all sorts of difficulties and I regarded it as one of the most important mistakes I made in the mobilization of the Army because, as I say, there was no hope of settling that at that time. Anything of that kind would just lead to dissension and we had enough on our hands to get a fighting Army.

Q. 115. You mentioned to me your part in providing air evacuation for Wingate's raiders. Did you press for this in Europe also?

A. I did not press for air evacuation in Europe. As a matter of fact my pressure was the other way around. That was a very desirable thing—that air evacuation. But the trouble was we didn't have enough planes and we wanted to use the planes for another military attack but they were absorbed in air evacuation. Now the question was did we evacuate more efficiency and progress with the war more slowly. And I felt that the saving in the end was in expediting the business of the war and that; of course, led to taking these planes away from the evacuation of the wounded earlier than otherwise would be the case. So I made it my business—particularly when they sent women to France—to explain this thing to them before they got there and heard the doctors appeal for more planes. They had the planes until we had to have them for further military

operations. But that must not be delayed because it was to our interest to end the war as quickly as possible. And while the evacuation of the wounded was better they were actually by doing so would be losing the battle they were wounded in trying to win for us.

Q. 116. Any general comments on the work of the medical corps?

A. I thought the Medical Corps, as a whole, was very efficient during the war and I know that the handling of the wounded on the battlefield always won great plaudit, great appreciation, from all the men. And I think the Medical Corps acquitted itself very finely. The medical profession I should say. Training.

Q. 117. Did we develop unrealistic views about training in the 1920-39 period? Was there too much "spit and polish" and not enough field training? (Frye in his book on you tells how when you were in the Philippines you won a bet in which you said the inspecting officer would find three things wrong in regard to barracks and men's clothing, but overlook three basic errors in field activities). Is this true?

A. I do not think we had too much spit and polish. It has a certain disciplinary effect. It was very hard for the men to keep up anyway and if you let that deteriorate, it was very, very bad. And the deeper the mud, the more important it was to spruce them up as quickly as you could thereafter. But if you let them rest in the mud their morale went to pieces. So I would not say that spit and polish at all adversely affected the training. It had a very strong disciplinary effect. The training was realistic enough, In fact we had the greatest maneuver I think in peacetime that any military force has ever had. In fact we took over West Texas and almost all of Louisiana for a field maneuver. We took a large part of Tennessee and, I believe, a little of Kentucky in the same way. And I know we took in the Carolinas, large acreage, in order to have maneuvers.

And we had as many as five hundred thousand men in a maneuver. I saw in a paper just yesterday some reference to the “giant” Army maneuver they are going to have—and there are twenty thousand troops involved.

(Don’t do that Johnny)

And we had them up to five hundred thousand. I remember one senator who had since retired coming to me and said—no I went to him because he was on the committee up in Congress and I think he was chairmen of the committee.

(What is it you want Johnny?)

This senator objected to what I was doing—objected to the money I was expending on maneuvers. He said they had a critique and they exposed all these mistakes—when did they do it with all those mistakes. I said, “My God, senator, that’s the reason I do it. I want the mistake down in Louisiana, not over in Europe, and the only way to do this thing is to try it out and if it doesn’t work, find out what we need to do to make it work.” And here for the first time High Command could be trained, because we could use these divisions. They weren’t just called in, the men, for two weeks’ training and we could march them long distances and do the things you have to do in war, which is a very strenuous, terrible strain on the individual. And that gave the commanders an opportunity to exercise command and bear the results of their errors and profit by their successes. Eisenhower, for example, was Chief of Staff of General Krueger’s command in the south. He came on from the northwest for that purpose. All of them learnt a great deal. I remember in the five-hundred-thousand- man maneuvers down in Louisiana, I directed that they change their bases on each side and they told me it would take a month or something like that, and be very, very expensive. Well, I said, they would have to do it anyway. They would have to

do it in Europe and I wanted them to do it here. So they changed the bases. I know in one case, I remember exactly what the result was. It only took ten days and it only cost \$40,000, I think. That seems like a large sum for a maneuver like that. But it is a very economical sum when it came to the efficiency it developed in the troops and that's the reason that Patton and Hodges and the others and Bradley were able to move as rapidly across the face of Europe.

Q. 118. Did the OCS School at Fort Benning proceed along lines you had laid down earlier at the Infantry School? What part did General Bradley have in organizing the OCS organization?

A. I think the officers' school went along about the lines prescribed. Of course there was much less time in which to do it. And there was a much less qualified group to take the training. But they did a very satisfactory job.

Q. 119. The Marines argue that the Army is too lax in training and that we coddle our troops. Could we have done more with draftees particularly when many of them were older than the men training them? (Apparently the Marines have been having some trouble in peacetime with this).

A. I think the Marines' argument about the training is a little big off. They have a great advantage in that their service is almost entirely voluntary and it's small. For instance, during the war they really only got, as I recall, only four divisions into action. Well, we had seventy-nine, I think. And we had a force about a third as large or maybe half as large in special troops all of which we had to get trained and we weren't allowed to take volunteers to any extent at all. Mr. Roosevelt allowed the Navy to proceed with volunteers and the Marine Corps to proceed with volunteers for a long time. That made it very hard on the Army—very hard—and I think it is a most unwise procedure. I know it is in the end. There's no doubt about it at all. Of course they like it. Of course the Navy liked it and, of course, the Air liked it. I say the other day when

they were commenting on this lieutenant general—this superb leader we had developed—this Oklahoman—when he died he wrote an article—before he died—for *Life* magazine and went on to say why we should have universal training and everything of that sort. And at the end of the article in *Life* they said, of course, the Air and the Navy and, he may have said, the Marines don't agree with this. Well, naturally they don't agree. They had every advantage in the world to have that and it was not right.

You take in the naval thing. That is to get a very efficient infantry outfit requires a world more training than it does for these other jobs. Because in the Navy you know your job, you know where it is. You know the exact place you are going to stand—for most of them during the battle. You take a bath before you go. You put on fresh underclothes. You sleep in the same bed that you slept in before you got into action. While the poor devil in the Army is marching tremendous distances, he is in the mud, he's filthy dirty, he hasn't had a full meal and he makes him maximum exertion before the fight and a minimum of sleep and a minimum of well-prepared food and then he fights in a place he has never seen before and probably goes into it during the hours of darkness. His communications are not fastened in by some contractor like Westinghouse of that is a ship; his communications are mobile and have moved about and generally go into place during the night or very hastily in the daytime. He may never see them. He may work with artillery he never lays his eyes on which labors far in the rear and with communications that carry back reports on targets. So we almost never have completely trained infantry. We came more near it is this war than in any other, but we were under great disadvantage in the fact these other services had volunteers and we did not. It was under a completely mistaken illusion that that was easy to train. It's been easy to badly train and it's been badly trained in practically every war we've had. And I made a herculean effort to see it

was rightly trained in this war. And if I hadn't had a very friendly Congress with me, I never would have gotten by with it because they thought I was taking too—doing too—much in the way of preparations with these men. I was moving them out to the west Coast in that Desert Training Center and that cost money to get them out there. I gave them every bit of training every time that we could work out for them and they profited greatly by it when they got over to Europe. General Bradley had quite a bit to do with the primary organization of the officers' school.

Q. 120. Did you originate the World War II practice of insisting that the soldier be informed of what he was fighting for? Did you set up the Information and Education program? Were you ever satisfied with it?

A. I did insist that the soldier be informed of what he was fighting for. At first they prepared pamphlets—very well-prepared by experts from the colleges and all—but I found as a rule they were presented after lunch and the man was tired and he went to sleep and the company officer who was explaining the thing was a very poor actor or performer and I called in Frank Capra, the leading motion picture director at that time and had him prepare the films which were a complete education I think on the war to civilians as well as to the recruits in the Army. And I had to do it, you might say, on the Q. T. I never allowed the Secretary of War to see it or the White House to see it until we had it finished. And Mr. Truman [Roosevelt] was thrilled by it, but still he had a great many ideas. We got it over to the White House—Lowell Mellett was mixed up with it—and I didn't get it away for four months. I had to get it out to the troops in two weeks. I was raising on Army and I required that every soldier see that before he left the United States. And I think—I remember the reports they gave me of the millions that saw it. Mr. Churchill got hold of them and showed them all over England and even prepared and delivered an introduction to

the films. I think they are one of the best educational set-ups that I have ever seen and they were very interesting and they were done very expertly. They were amusing—they were serious—they were tremendous in their scope. I remember I took Mrs. Churchill over to see one that had not yet been released. And I remember I would only do it on the basis that she would not mention it to anybody at the White House. Field Marshal Dill took her up and I went up to the little War Department projection room in the Pentagon. And she looked at this thing. She cried; she laughed and she was just thrilled to the last and just begged me to let the Prime Minister see it. Well, I said, I can't exactly promise for the Prime Minister. I don't want him to speak to the President because I am not ready for the President to see it yet. And to put it frankly, I wanted to get it on the road because I knew it would be called in and we would fool around for a month or two, trying to get the thing fixed up. And time was golden with me and that had to be gotten out as fast as possible. Well, she promised me and then she went over there and got to talking to Harry Hopkins, and they told the Prime Minister and Hopkins got on the phone and said the Prime Minister wanted to see it. I said he couldn't. Then the Prime Minister got on the phone. Mr. Roosevelt was out of town at the time at Hyde Park at the moment. Mr. Churchill wanted to see this right away. "Well," I said, "I'm sorry, Mr. Churchill, because I don't want that to get out until it's ready because I will have all sorts of trouble with it if it does." There was a series of these pictures you see and when you got it into the White House with a thing like that you just never got it back. And as I say, time was golden with me. And I was perfectly confident with what I had that Capra in each case had done a superb job. They could use those things yet for great historical purposes. Anyway, Mr. Churchill came on and said he wanted them right away. I said, "Mr. Churchill, I'm sorry but I can't give it to you." "Well," he said, "I'm asking you, I'm asking you." And I said, "I know you are, Mr. Churchill, and I know you are the Prime

Minister of the British Commonwealth and you are a guest of the President, but he hasn't seen it yet and you are not going to see it ahead of him." "Well," he said, "when are you going to show it to him?" I said, "When it is finished. It isn't finished. I'll never get it finished if I get involved in this circuit you are proposing." "Well," he said, "I want very much to see it, Marshall." "Well," I said, "if you will swear to me that you won't mention it to the President or anybody else—anybody else. Mrs. Churchill promised me that and she went and mentioned it to you or Harry Hopkins, but if you will promise me that you won't mention it to anybody else, I will send it over there for a private showing for you." "Well," he said, "I think you can hardly exact a promise from the Prime Minister of the British Empire that you just referred to." "Well," I said, "I can't, but I'll just not send the picture. That's the way to do it. I won't send it over." He said, "You've got me there. I'll just have to wait until the President gets back. I said, "Well, if you tell him, you'll break a promise there. I'm not going to do it. I'm not going to have this thing stalled by this sort of procedure." I said, "Even the Secretary of War hasn't seen it." Because I knew if I got all those people into it, I would never get it done. And Capra is a great expert and he had all of the data and he made up the thing and I'm for it the way he's got it. Of course, there was a whole series of these pictures—the Prelude to War and then the things on the various countries—they were beautifully done. They would educate our men who were going into these countries. Well, anyway, I sent it over and Churchill had it and Churchill immediately sent back and he wanted to take it to England. "Well," I said, "you can't do that until the President sees it." "Well," he said, "I'm going to hurry it up. "Well," I said, "it's the last damn thing you are going to get from me if you try to hurry it up. I'm doing a job and you are interfering—I'm doing a doing a job and you are interfering." I remember I repeated it twice. "Well," he said, "you certainly are stubborn." "Well," I said, "I'm not half as stubborn as you

are. But I'm not going to get this out." I said, "I am very, very fond of Mrs. Churchill. I admire her greatly, but I will never forgive her for telling you, because I might have known that this would happen." Well, that is the way we got into this thing. I didn't send it over to Mr. Roosevelt for quite a long time. And they kept it four months. But meanwhile, three million troops had seen it. I would not let it go until three million men had seen it. I don't know how much Lowell Mellett had the thing, but I know he was in the figure that our moving picture theaters didn't show it because it was over fifty minutes long. And every moving picture theater in England showed it. And the whole English people got this education and were crazy about it. And I always thought it was very tragic that our people didn't get the chance to see the picture—or pictures rather.

Q. 121. What were our strong points in training and the weak points?

A. The weak points in training are the great difficulty of making it practical and the great difficulty of taking any officer, we'll say, of company grade and having to accept him as your professor because it takes a great deal of imagination and a great deal of showmanship to make the maneuvers really as valuable as they should be.

Q. 122. Was General McNair the best training general we had in the whole training period?

A. General McNair. He was a senior officer. He was in charge of all ground troop development in this country. And I felt he was about as able a trainer as we could get and very, very thorough. General Clark was his principal assistant and he was one of the best training actors that I know about. And a lot of the organization of the new units which played such a dominant part in the war were of his devising. We would sit down together at my desk and work out together how these new units would be formed, where everybody in it was selected.

Q. 124. Did you originate the airborne unit? General Ridgway in his book *Soldier* says that you backed his request to increase the size of the airborne unit. He indicates that he sent General Maxwell Taylor back to see you on this at the time of the Bulge. General Ridgway adds that you were the best friend the fighting man had.

A. The airborne unit was a collective enterprise. I was very strong for it. I opposed the way the air was used even to the last. The pressure, of course, is to give each person air. They used it very much like the Federal Army, until Grant came along with Sheridan—used their cavalry in the Civil War. They pieced it all over the place. I've always felt, for instance, that in the final battle in Normandy, that the plan they had worked out in detail for the air, but which Eisenhower's people didn't think they could safely risk, was the quick way to end the battle—and that was to seize a field near Paris with glider planes, with parachute troops, and then fly in these small tractors and other things and then gather in all the motor transport of the surrounding country and of course all the French undercover units would have joined us and built up there with the ammunition—which of course we could do—we could put in these 105 guns and build up a force there right behind the German lines before they had time to get things together and make it almost impossible for them to do anything but to fight you with small groups. However, that was a hazard. It was a brand new thing and Eisenhower's staff and Eisenhower, I guess, himself, I guess, himself didn't feel it was proper to take the risk. But I always thought it was wrong to divide up these men into little groups everywhere. It was very natural for the commander to want them. It was very natural for them to want certain passes, certain crossings in connection with the first landing—going up on the right flank on Utah Beach and with General Montgomery on his part of the front. But I believe the air could have been used with great effect in splitting up the Germans very quickly at the start. And the minute it was a little

split up the whole thing would more or less fall because the continued reinforcement would have been a very simple matter and I think you would have all the undercover troops of the French accumulating there and we could have let the ammunition and everything go into there very easily. General Maxwell Taylor came back to see me about the very thing you referred to here. Incidentally, he was a superb commander of this unit—I don't mind, let it go. [He apparently was referring to the fact that he was near the end of the tape.] He was sitting at my desk in the first conference we had on this matter when he got news of the attack in the Bulge and he left and as I recall he left his hat, but I'm not quite certain, his cap. Anyway, left my office and went straight to his plane and got in it and flew to get over to France and got over very, very promptly. But he got the news while he was sitting at my desk.

Ends on 720.