Tape 6M

# INTERVIEW WITH

# GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

April 5, 1957

## New York and France

Analysis of General Bell

Bell gets ill; Marshall left for several days to deal with organization of new camps in Eastern Department; problems of trying to organize and get equipment in face of terrible shortages

Sibert asks for him for 1st Division

On board the TENADORES (cabin mates are Lesley McNair and Frank McCoy). terrible lack of preparation; untrained recruits; no manuals to study; 80 per cent of division new men, many without drill or training in use of weapons; was to be responsible for French lack of confidence in US troops and lead to trouble for Pershing

Torpedo scare--just porpoises

Bastille Day parade--Paris

Marshall in charge of training in 1st Division--problems of housing and training; helps locate the next four divisions.

Headquarters keeps asking for parades and special exhibits without time to prepare; shortest parade on record; Pershing criticizes 1st Division--Marshall defends Sibert; Sibert relieved; Marshall fails to make chief of staff of division because of temper

Marshall has first sight of battle when he accompanies French Legion of Moroccan Division into battle near Verdun

Views on Plattsburg camps in World War I

Bitter criticism by men of YMCA

Billet at Gondrecourt in home of lady whose son had been taken prisoner by Germans. (Recalls sending Patton to see her in 1944; recalls own visit to her when he was secretary of state)

Views on 1915-16 neutrality; lack of preparedness

Writes report on first U. S. to die in war--1917 On dealing with allies

On handling his temper

Meetings with Clemenceau, Petain, Weygand, Joffre, Foch, Debeney His speech at Neufchateau--does not recall using a single verb

Visit to Domremy and reflections on Jeanne d'Arc

Bitterness over failure to get field assignment

Work on St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne plans

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RECORDED INTERVIEW ON TAPE
BY GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL
April 5, 1957, at Pinehurst, North Carolina

(in answer to questions by Dr. Forrest C. Pogue. Sgt. Heffner ran the machine.)

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## ORDERED TO FRANCE

Q. 1. General Bell seems to have been a very fine person. Any comments about your service with him?

A. General Bell -- my first contact with him, as I have explained, was at Leavenworth where I really did not know him personally but he took some action in connection with my affairs. Then later on in the Philippines, when I was left in command of the larger portion of troops -I say "in command," it was all done indirectly of course. Now when I came back from the Philippines and he made me his aide in order to retain my services in connection with the two training camps for the West Coast, I came to know him very much better. But when I was first made his aide I was not with him at all until the close of the camp at Fort Douglas, Utah, which was in the early fall.

General Bell was a very remarkable character. As a fighter, I don't think he had many equals. He held the Medal of Honor and should have been awarded it on several occasions. He was attacked by many older officers, particularly when he won preferment and promotion over their heads, but actually he was so far ahead of them in ability that there was no question about it. Fortunately, he came into the service under the present General Macarthur’s father , General Arthur MacArthur, who admired him greatly and who recommended him for promotions, first as general officer in the Volunteers and then as a general officer in the Regular Army when he was in his early forties (that is, General Bell). As I say, he was a superb fighter. And in time he came to tell me, through my questioning of a number of performances which were always referred to as being foolish, crazy things, though actually they were very, very clever as well as tremendously courageous. He won his first great fame through the command of a regiment which was organized in the Philippines by General Bell and the men were selected from the National Guard volunteers and it was a superb regiment of all selected men, admirably suited for the sort of campaign that developed. I had a great admiration for General Bell's fighting qualities and his aggressive leadership. I don't think he was a success as chief of staff. He tried to handle things too much by personal associations, by letters. He was having a hard battle with General Ainsworth which was the preliminary to the final battle which took place between General Wood and General Ainsworth. All of General Bell's efforts to modernize the Army were being ruthlessly attacked by those who were opposed to anything of that sort, largely because they didn't want to do it themselves personally.

When I met General Bell he had already been Chief of Staff, he had been in command in the Philippines, and he had returned from the Philippines and had been given the command out in the West Coast with his headquarters at San Francisco. His trouble, if I could so characterize it at this time, was that he was too apt to engage in lengthy speeches. He made a very successful one on one occasion at the request of Secretary of War Taft -- to take his (Taft's) place on a train trip they were going on when Taft had to make a speech at some point and General Bell went out and made a top line speech. The trouble was that started him in making speeches and he overdid it very badly, but nobody could tell him so. When I became his aide -- I was getting pretty well along in years for that sort of duty -- with some hesitation, but nevertheless with a firm intention, I made it plain that I thought he was making a great mistake in making these speeches. Mrs. Bell was shocked that I, a comparative unknown, should dare make such a criticism of General Bell. But I was convinced that that was the trouble and thought that it was my duty to tell him, and if he didn't like that he could relieve me as an aide because I wasn't after that kind of job. But we got along. Mrs. Bell didn't like me at all at first and afterwards we became devoted friends.

In our San Francisco association, it was the opening moves that finally led up to the declaration of war and we were in San Francisco when Wilson made his famous speech, whereupon General Bell was ordered to the East Coast to replace General Wood who was relieved of command of the then Eastern Department and assigned to the command of a former fraction of it with headquarters at Charleston, South Carolina. I have already described, I think, my arrival in Governors Island and General Bell's placing me in a pretty strenuous position while he went off to the hospital. I remember then I would go up every other day to the hospital to see him. I was quite a long drive and took quite a long time. And the visit there always took time because he was intensely interested in what was going on and I tried to tell him exactly what it was and particularly to tell him the displeasure of his senior staff officers with the fact that I was doing several things.

One thing at this time was very interesting. His other aide had taken all of the supply estimates for these training camps of twenty-five hundred candidates each and boiled it down until he had it on the basis of hundred men -- everything down to the sheets of paper you had to have pads, pencils, mattresses, pillows, kitchen stoves, everything was included in it. Ordnance, rifles, uniforms-- nothing was left out. Well, it was really a very valuable work. And when we came into this Eastern Department, we were quite certain that the thing wasn't heading up right because there were so many complaints coming in right away about the lack of this - and the lack of that and when we went to ask the staff about it, these older staff officers, these senior colonels, they just turned us down as not knowing anything about the thing. So I had the aide with the list visit each camp, see what they had and then telegraph me what was lacking and they could calculate on this business of what was needed for a hundred men. We found the lacks were very, very serious. The first one which required immediate attention was that there were not enough blankets, not enough mattresses, and not enough pillows for the candidates that arrived up at Plattsburg where there were two camps of twenty-five hundred each and which lacked all of these things to keep a man warm. He had no pillow on his bunk, many of the bunks had no mattresses, and they all I lacked the necessary number of blankets. Well by multiplying it out on this list we had, he could telegraph me exactly how many to send. Then we began to experience the first knowledge of what the war shortages were really going to be which started in this very small way. We found, we couldn't get the blankets. First the Quartermaster didn't have them and, next, the shops in New York didn't have them and we were getting mattresses and blankets and pillows from as far west as Chicago in order to provide for this camp -- first camp -- at Plattsburg. There were camps all scattered about the country. Maybe they were all similarly short, but we didn't know it at the time. So these telegrams would come in with great frequency, about an hour apart really, telling of these new lacks and this particularly serious lacks which affected their health in that they couldn't keep warm and would stir up a terrific reaction.

I found that trying to get these things I wasn't making much headway with the staff and I directed that everything be sent by express and that raised a racket right away because that would be very expensive. Well I didn't think the expense was going to mean so much with these men freezing up there. The reaction -- the public reaction -- was going to be very severe. The men would probably all get colds and things of that sort, and pneumonia. So I would direct these things be sent by express and then we couldn't buy them around New York. I had them buying them out in Chicago. And I, as a matter of fact, personally sent out here to locate where we could buy blankets, where we could buy mattresses and buy pillows and things of that sort. And then I would send a note over to the Quartermaster, this old colonel, to buy these and ship them by express. Finally he came over to see me and told me that this was very expensive, he knew what General Bell's orders were but he wanted to bring to my attention what I was letting the government in for. And I tried to make clear to him what he was letting the government in for if he didn't have the proper things there for those men. And finally he said to me, "You must understand that we have been here, I, myself, for several years, and we originally supplied these camps with what we thought was necessary. Now you come in with definite amounts of all sorts of things and about every hour you have a new amount. So how can you possibly believe you are right?" Well, I pulled him out this list, which was based on 100 units, and told him that the other aide had the other end of the list and he was visiting each post. Well he had never seen such a thing and of course it was a gold mine of information and he asked if he could borrow it. I said, "Well, you can take it over there and type it and then send me back my copy. But that's where this is coming from and we know what we are talking about. Well that made quite a change in him right away because he saw that we had something he didn't have. He was very much reassured and went ahead from that time on filling the orders that came in over my desk.

You see I had to give the orders in General Bell's name. I tried to tell him a little of this when I went to the hospital and he got excited and proposed all sorts of peculiarities to the thing which we couldn't manage. I just didn't answer those and when the time came around, went ahead the way we were doing until we got out of our jam. We had to do this with camps around near Washington and down in the South and all over the Eastern Department.

This was my introduction to the office there and along with that as I have already referred to, came the terrific pressure to be accepted in these camps and everybody who was anybody in a sense was trying to get in and each of them seemed to feel that political pressure was necessary and I was trying to demonstrate that it wasn't necessary. We would go at these things just on the face value and without any reaction to pressures. I found myself then up against ex-President -- Mr. Taft, for example, and one of his constituents maybe it was his son Richard -- I think it was this son -- and others particularly from the wealthy of New York, J.P. Morgan and Co. and offices of that power, all seemed to think they could get what they wanted right away just by stating their desire. I stood this off, I guess I probably stood it off, better than General Bell because I didn't know them and they didn't know me. And I could go right ahead. But it was a very, very strenuous procedure. As I say I was using three phones at the time and I was being seen by everyone that came to the Island so it was exceedingly hectic and I had to learn how to do business quickly. I had had this in San Francisco just before we left. As a matter of fact I had gone ahead on my own and had rented office buildings across the street from us because I could see right away what was coming and I put a lot of reserve officers on duty there and we got started for the flood that was about to break.

Now I would like to recite one some little thing that happened that always gave me much pleasure afterwards. Before I left San Francisco, I very hurriedly dictated a number of letters to various people around headquarters thanking them for courtesies for whatever it was they had rendered for me, and I did it in about an hour in the late, afternoon, and then I remembered the telephone operator. She had been very efficient and when I called to get anybody anywhere in San Francisco, she would locate them in the barber shop or wherever it might be. So I dictated a letter to her and told her that I had never experienced such high efficiency from a telephone operator. I had never seen her. Didn't lay eyes on her then. I dictated this letter to her and signed it and then sent it down that afternoon and then I went home. Well, a West Coast rain came up that night and it was raining very hard. And I was out at Fort Mason at the foot of Van Nessr Avenue and there was a knock at the door and I went to the door and here was this little woman, I guess she was about 45 or 50, and she was wrapped up in a raincoat. And it was a terrible night out, very hard driving rain, and I brought her inside and I discovered that she was the telephone operator and she said she had been there, I don't know how many years, let us say twenty-five, and that was the first time anybody had ever thanked her for what she had done. So she came out in the rain to thank me. That made quite an impression on me and it controlled a great many thanks to people like that in future years in my dealings.

However, when the future years began to come around after the First World War was over, General Pershing and myself were in San Francisco and staying with the commanding general out at Fort Mason just next door to where I had been living on this other occasion. The commanding general's wife, incidentally, he had married rather late in his career, was a great friend of my sister's back in Pennsylvania, so that threw us together in this momentary time we were there -- which incidentally was at the time of the death of President Harding -- he died in San Francisco you will recall at the Palace Hotel and I was involved in that very heavily -- the arrangements. So I told at the table this story of the telephone operator which had occurred at the outbreak of the First World War which was now over. The General's wife was very much interested in it and she said, "Let's go up and call on her." So she and I walked up. I had not seen the woman since that night -- had never heard of her since that night. We found these two elderly women at the telephone switchboard and, of course, this particular one was very much gratified to have the commanding general's wife call on her and to see me again. But she told me they were in a bad way. There was a new lieutenant in the Signal Corps that had just come on duty and he was going to get rid of all the women and that meant that she and her old friend were going to lose their jobs -- she after some twenty odd years. Well the commanding general's wife was much excited so we went right back to the house and we found the others still at the table -- General Pershing and the general talking there. She told this story to the commanding general who immediately issued an order through his aide that these women should never be discharged except with his personal approval and that was to be by voice and not by paper. So then we advent back up again and saw them again and assured them that their jobs were secure. That was the end of the story so far as I was concerned. I never heard of her afterwards. But it was always a very satisfying memory - that little incident.

However, I left San Francisco that morning after the call on the telephone operator [here he is referring to the 1916 departure] and went directly to Governors Island. General Bell as I said came up from Kentucky and just paused long enough to arrange that I should exercise command in his name and then went to this hospital, though no one knew where he had gone -- they thought he was off on a trip -- but actually he was developing a case of flu. I have already described what was going on.

GENERAL MARSHALL AND WORLD WAR I.

Q. 1a. How did you come to be picked for the first contingent which went to France?

A. The next thing of excitement that occurred was that General Pershing arrived, headed for Europe. I found out that he had asked for my services -- he did not do it personally but his Chief of Staff did -- his new Chief of Staff, General Harbord -- but when General Pershing found that I was with General Bell he had them to drop the request and, therefore, I didn't go, though I didn't know it at that time.

Q. 1b. What was your impression of General Pershing on your first meeting with him?

A. General Pershing arrived in civilian clothes and straw hat. We put him on a ferryboat at Governors Island at a secluded dock and sent him over to the *Baltic* which he boarded for his trip to Europe.

A. 1a. Then I received a telegram that my services were requested by General Sibert, the man who had built the Gatun Dam, the man whose camp I had been required to inspect out into Del Monte, California. He had asked for me to go and I was to report to him. Actually I didn't find him where they told me to report to him and he came in on a train later. He had paused long enough to get married, which had mixed up the appointments, and as I had the only desk around the neighborhood he made my desk, my services, the headquarters for troops just coming in to go to Europe in the first convoy which was to be the First Division. They had called on the training camp I think each camp was to send two hundred candidates, let's say -- I don't know whether it was twenty-five or two hundred, but anyway it was a very small number, and these were to be the needed second lieutenants for this first unit which had very low officer strength and we wanted to go with full war strength, and all of these lieutenants were directed to report to me at Governors Island. So these fine looking young men -- the pick of about 2% of twenty-five hundred from each selection -- and they were perfectly splendid looking men. I remember the first ten that came in -- every one of them had gotten married the minute they got the note and they came to New York and reported to my desk and I gave them directions as to when to report back to me because their unit was not sailing yet -- and I was going to sail with it -which gave them two or three days of liberty in New York with their brides. Of the ten I lost track of two. The other eight, every one was killed in the First Division. I might say they all had their brides with them when they came to Governors Island.

I was only able to find about three hours of clear time too to New York and my purchases and actions there have always -- I don't know whether you will say interested me or has been a satisfaction to me. I first went to Jaeger's store and bought a Jaeger blanket which I still have which took me through France very warm. It was soft -- like silk almost. I bought three suits of Jaeger underwear which almost bankrupt me and two suits of Jaeger pajamas. Both the underwear had a very peculiar history because it began to shrink because of very bad washing in France, and finally it would always get to the point unless they put a big V down there in the shoulders, I would have my chin on my knee cap. These things finally got so shrunk that I finally had to give them up -- couldn't wear them any longer. But it enabled me to go entirely through the First World War without a cold. And I think I was about the only one out of two million who didn't cough every morning with a cold.

Q. Ic. Were there any incidents of interest on your trip over in June 1917?

A. We got on board the *Tenadores* and I was in the same stateroom as Lesley McNair for whom the old War College site was named and who was killed by a bomb in France and who was wounded on a reconnaissance in Africa before that -- and who I had put in command of all the ground troops in the United States -- their training and organization with General Mark Clark as his assistant. Also there was General Frank McCoy whom I got on a more intimate basis of acquaintance with at that time. He had just come out of Mexico as attaché and General Pershing had sent for him. So he was on this boat, going over to join General Pershing who was a ship or two ahead of us.

The men we found had been given their arms on going to the train. They were about twenty per cent of the original regiment. The rest of the regiment had been taken to form new regiments. So all but twenty per cent of these regiments were recruits and it was quite a messed-up affair when they arrived in Hoboken. They had no knowledge of how to drill, no knowledge of how to handle their rifles, and they were eighty per cent of the strength of the companies. Together with the fact that all the men loading the ships seemed to be bull-necked Germans, it wasn't a very encouraging outlook as we loaded at night-there and into the next morning, and finally got underway on this "secret" departure. We were taken up the Hudson and anchored right off the Grant Monument and were visited by excursion boats the two days we remained there.

Finally we started out and I felt the ship moving. So I thought I would get up and see this affair. It was certainly historic -- our troops going to Europe. And I got out on deck and it was about half past four in the morning or thereabouts. Anyway, it was just dimly light. We got down the river and anchored apparently. Anyway we stopped opposite Governors Island. And we had to wait there -- I discovered they were waiting because the chain that was being put across the harbor to check the submarine entrance was either being unfastened or fastened -- I don't remember which. But I know something occurred there that I never forgot, for it was about as significant an indication of our complete state of unpreparedness that I have ever seen. I was standing up under the bridge and they had mounted a three-inch gun on a pedestal mount on the foreword part of the deck and these trim-looking naval files under a naval noncom were rigging up the gun. And having dealt with this multitude of recruits of this regiment as we had and their complete ignorance of their weapons or anything, I thought to myself well, thank goodness there is one thing that's organized -- the Navy. Just then the captain called down to this yeoman, or whatever he was, in charge of this detail and said to him in a very strong voice -- he said -- "Have you your ammunition?" and this fellow in a rather offended tone of voice said, "No sir, we haven't any ammunition." Well, I thought, "Well, My God, even the naval part isn't organized here and we are starting off to Europe." It was altogether a terrible exhibition of our paucity of means with which to go to war.

It caused General Pershing, aside from the fact that the men were hard to handle in their lack of training and all, it made a terrific impression on the French command when they saw these recruits in the First Division because they had been told that the 1st Division was a seasoned division of regular soldiers. Well, you would have to go around with a microscope to find a regular soldier in the First Division. So that the impression that they all got of what General Pershing would have to offer them was colored by this terrific showing of unpreparedness of the troops of the First Division. We were given as we sailed -- in fact we didn't get to open the things until we had gone to sea or at least gone down the harbor -- we discovered that we had units on paper that we had never seen or never heard of. I remember the trench mortar units -- the 37 mm units -- and several others we had never heard of them. Here they were on paper, but there were no weapons and there was no unit. And we were organizing on the ocean. We had no knowledge of whether we had any of these weapons on board and actually we didn't. It was certainly a demonstration of complete and utter unpreparedness such as I had never dreamt of in my life.

I had found out in the records that the first expedition going to the Philippines before the fall of Manila only had 150 rounds per man and were going seven thousand miles from home, when the battlefield allowance -- on the wagon trains and other things and on the soldier and all -- was something like 600 rounds. And here they were going to the Philippines with 150. Now I have just recited the exhibition that we had to give in the 1st Division in going to France. And I repeat again that this cost General Pershing a great deal because it shook French confidence terribly as they thought that was the American Army and nothing we could tell them made any impression. We described how we were getting these officers in this six months course and starting new camps all the time with thee officer camps. That made no impression on them. They couldn't conceive of an officer with six months' training. And some of these only had three months' training. Altogether anybody who went through that first affair got a dose of unpreparedness such as he would never forget. I didn't realize then I was going to have one after another and several when I was in responsible position for all this affair and yet I would have to find some way to crawl out of the difficulties.

Q. 2b. Could you give a description of St. Nazaire at this time?

A. The same thing went on when we got to France. When we landed -- by a fortunate coincidence I was the second man ashore. I was just behind General Sibert on our first expedition when we landed at St. Nazaire. And when we finally got permission to go ashore that evening, several of the officers, and walk about the town. It was very depressing. They had just gotten the news of the terrible losses on the Somme when the Germans had thrown back this offensive -- that developed afterwards they had learned all about it before it started. And every woman seemed to be in mourning. And everyone seemed to be on the verge of tears. And the one thing we noticed most of all. There was no enthusiasm at all over our arrival. The Canadians had come and were going to settle the war in a month or two and nothing happened. Now the Americans had come and were going to settle the war right off, and nothing happened. The whole thing was a very depressing affair. And the surroundings, everything about it, our first taste of the effect of the war particularly on the rear areas left a lasting impression on my mind and a deep sympathy for the French and, I think, an understanding such as other officers in high staff positions -- that had not gone through that affair -- did not comprehend, and were rather intolerant of the French in some of their peculiarities -- which were not peculiarities to the French but they were to us. And I might say that everything in the way of the large war measures were a peculiarity to us.

As long as I am on the trail going to France I might continue with that. On the ship, of course, the submarine war was at its worst. I think they were sinking a hundred thousand or million tons a month, something like that, I think it was a million tons. And the ocean was just full of German submarines and they didn't have the proper protective measures at that time. So we had a perilous trip. We had a cruiser leading us, the *Kearsarge*, and two others as the wings of the convoy. Finally one night the ships opened fire on a supposed approaching torpedo which had everybody very much stirred up. I wrote in the War Diary about this. And then I wrote in the War Diary the next day that they determined it was a porpoise and not a torpedo. Then I found that this had been radioed home from the ships and had stirred up a grand to do in the United States. So when we pulled into St. Nazaire the place was full of rumors from the United States side on what had happened to us and what was happening to the other convoys. And one of them right after that was struck by a torpedo which had troops on it and that, of course, stirred up a grand to-do. Fortunately, they didn't have any major troop sinkings during the war, though they did have great sinkings of the cargo boats. I think that was the principal happening of the ship going over.

One thing was we were trying to study up what we were in for and we found that there were practically no textbooks of any kind on this trench warfare that we could get our hands to. Finally one Englishman on board -- I think he was an attaché -- he had something they had printed at the last minute and everybody wanted that at once. It was entirely on trench warfare which later became the great argument between the French and General Pershing because he didn't want to specialize in trench warfare. He wanted to get into the warfare of maneuver. And the French felt, of course, that he -- not knowing anything about the situation on the front was hazarding something that there was no chance of putting into effect. The same thing came up in regard to target practice. They had only short range target practice and I had to arrange the target ranges for this purpose and there were no long-range target fields that I could get my hands on. They didn't have big reservations like we do. They had a much more economical and, I thought, fine arrangement whereby you could take over an area for maneuvers by certain advice and arrangement through the political set-up.

Q. 2a. Were things rather confused at St. Nazaire and at Gondrecourt at this time?

A. When we got to St. Nazaire, as I say, there was a state of considerable confusion. But the first thing that happened to us was that they began to taking men away from the First Division because General Pershing's staff had gone over there with fifty men, and I understood that they said in the United States that that was all he needed. But he had to get men for all the various things and setting up offices and the only place he could get them was the First Division. The only place he could get additional officers was the First Division. Now I am very hazy on the figures. But they told him, I think at first, that forty officers would be sufficient and I think that the GHQ down at Chaumont was something like two thousand officers or maybe more. And there were similar other groups at other places scattered over France. And now they were trying to start out with forty, so they took them from the First Division until the First Division was literally stripped of all officers. And they took the men. They were doing port service in England and all up and down the coast of France. And the strength of the First Division was getting lower and lower all the time.

Q. 2c. Were you in Paris for the Bastille Day parade in 1917?

A. I went up to Paris in time to arrive for the Bastille Day parade. I remember that General McCoy -- Frank McCoy -- got me my first Sam Browne belt which I wore, for many years - longer than I should have -- out of sentiment. And I finally put this on for the Bastille Day parade. We were only in Paris for a few days when we started out by motorcar for Gondrecourt south of Bar-le-Duc. I have forgotten now how far north of Chaumont, which later became the Headquarters, and that was north of Langres which became the great school headquarters.

Q. 3. Colonel Marshall was everywhere in these early days. He got many ideas from the French. The 18th French Division was located nearby. Please describe your efforts to get the first units into shape for battle.

A. I became very much involved with all these things at the start. And I was also involved in locating the first four divisions to arrive in France. I was just given the job of locating them and seeing what they needed. So I had to figure out what was required in the way of mess halls and bunkhouses and headquarters and hospital buildings and everything of that sort. Nobody advised me. They didn't have time. They just told me to do it. One of my old friends, a student officer from Leavenworth, John Palmer, who was one of the fine intellectuals of the Army was G-3 at that time. And he just sent me a telegram that they could give me no advice; so just go ahead and do what I thought was wise. So I had a pretty large order for a young officer there and I proceeded to undertake it in as large away as I could. The only trouble was I got everything fixed up for these four divisions and I didn't realize that nobody had fixed up anything for the First Division. So my own division was behind all the others in getting the necessary things. And they had to do greater work, for themselves. And the training program was intense and that made it very hard to conduct the work. I know they ate in the rain and mud for a month or two under miserable conditions because they didn't have anything even to put a shelter up for a roof in which to serve the food. Kitchens were out in the weather and the men were out in the weather as to their billets which were largely in barns.

Well we had all of this to learn. I got a pretty heavy dose of it because I was not only G-3, and then for a time acting chief of staff of the First Division, but I was dealing with this French division whose headquarters was quartered with us and it was trying to take up our training in trench warfare when we hadn't even been trained in squads left and squads right and we were trying to get organized in the way of supply and things of that sort. We had two automobiles, I think, for the entire division and they came from the Marine Corps. This regiments, the Fifth Marines, came in with us and was attached to the First Division at the start. So, of course, the lost the two open Cadillacs -- (chuckles) -- and it was a long time before the First Division got any motor cars at all. And it made it very difficult because the telephones we had to use -- the French phones -- and of course they were overloaded right away and they were not built for any such service as we inflicted on them or any such service tirades as they heard. We called it the “pas fini” service because that's about all we used to get over the phone. Altogether these various affairs were very instructive and very trying.

The trouble was the GHQ, never having dealt with anything like this before, never having dealt with a mobile division in such a way -- except when it was camped down in Texas, imposed demands on us that we couldn't possibly meet.

I remember on one occasion General Pershing was suddenly coming up with Joffre for a review of the division and the secretary of the General Staff, who happened to be General McCoy (who was a colonel then), called me up and said General Pershing and Marshal Joffre would be there at eight o'clock in the morning and to have a review of the division. And General Pershing sent word he wanted the division to pass in the shortest possible time. Well the division at that time was scattered over a strip of the country about thirty miles long and about twenty miles wide. There were no motor vehicles of any kind. Two units I found -- one of them was a Marine unit -- had been marching all day to get back to their billets before dark. And I managed to catch them on the road at the end of the march and they had to march all night to get back to the place for this review. I made a guess at that. I didn't have time to go out and look at one, and I had to get orders to all of these various units by horseback, anyway we could get out to them, and this telephone service which was abominable, so as to get them all started back, all started in, and they had to march all night. A great many of them had been down at this exercise, whatever it was, and they were in the process of marching home, as the Marines were so they were very much exhausted. But they had to start right back. And during the night they got back to this place that I had selected by guesswork. And I got out there and found that it was on a hilltop but the ground was so soggy that you went up to your ankles at every step and at some parts you couldn’t get over. Along with this I had General Pershing's instructions that this was to be a maneuver in the shortest possible time. So I arranged the division so that the preliminary review took place in one formation with the reviewing officers at one place, and the march-by took place with the reviewing officers at another place. This made it possible for the division to move into review formations from where it was standing without marching around at all. And with a large body of troops that saved a lot. We didn't have the artillery with us then. It was training in the south of France. But we did have a lot of horse vehicles -- all the machine guns were hauled by mules, all the 37 mms. -- and there were a number of horse transports involved in the thing and all the wagon trains we had to get into it. I fixed it so that after presenting the division and going down the front of it, if he wished to which he did, that all I had to do then if I moved the reviewing party to another spot, was to have the division perform what was in effect squads left and march by in review in column of squads in mass formation. That didn't take very long. Well, it took quite awhile with this large body of troops. I think there were about eighteen thousand, twenty thousand I guess. The only thing missing was the artillery. General Pershing was stunned with the rapidity of the affair because they just marched right by and the thing was over. He turned to me and said "What is this?" I said, "That's the end of the review, General." General Sibert didn't answer him because he didn't know. I didn't have time to consult him on any of these things and besides he was having a very hard time with General Pershing, which later led to his relief. General Pershing said, "How could they march by this fast?" I said, "Well, they were stationed in position up there and they executed 'squads left' and came down here. The machine gun carts were all in the rear of them and could turn that way and there was no other way to do it. And that was the shortest way that the review could be managed and those were the instructions that I got from the secretary of the General Staff." Well, General Pershing was in a thoroughly evil humor then. He couldn't do much to me because I had merely done what they said and he was taking it out on General Sibert.

He came back in a few days again on short notice to see an exercise in trench warfare where they used the short range bombs -- not the offensive bombs and so you can throw them and still if you could dodge behind the trenches, you could get out of the way. Roosevelt's [young Teddy] battalion had just been down there and performed such an operation which they had worked out themselves -- which was the custom for that sort of thing -- and he was the first one to do it -- and from quite a distance off and I called him up by telephone if he could get his men down there and do this for General Pershing. It meant they had to march all night. His enthusiasm was very great. Archie was in this too. So he and Archie and their outfit came down -- this battalion -- to put on again this exercise in trench warfare. I am telling this because it had quite an interesting sequel to it. I'll have to be, forgiven for the very personal phase of the thing because if affected me personally very much. It was a triumph to have anybody really to do this because as a rule these things, like a trained chorus, took a week or more to organize for and here we had only during the night and the night was spent in marching. Theodore got down there with His troops. General Pershing came in on the train. General Sibert was late in getting to the train, so I received General Pershing at the train and General Pershing was furious that General

Sibert wasn't there and I didn't know what to say. And General Sibert gave me hell for going down to the train ahead of him so altogether I was in very bad odor for trying to do my best under the circumstances. So we went out to this place where the exercises were to be conducted -- there was a french system out there which the French had dug for us -- they called it Washington Center. Roosevelt was trained on that and the men were familiar with it. So he was ready to go through this exercise and quite thrilled that he was to put this on for General Pershing and he had gotten his men all thrilled. He knew how to stir up morale all right and he had done it very well this time. So when General Pershing got out there he had his chief of staff and he had several new staff officers who later occupied very important positions there who had just arrived and this was their first visit to anything of this kind and their first exhibition of anything like this trench affair. And the rest of this I might get some of the details wrong, descriptive terms which played quite a part in it but I will do the best I can. The men went through the exercises. There was a lot of shooting, of course, a lot of dashing around from trench to trench, a lot of grenade throwing and general hullaballoo and then it was all over.

And then General Pershing said "Assemble the officers." So they assembled the officers and he turned to General Sibert and said "Conduct the critique." Well General Sibert had not had a chance to see the exercise and he started to say two or three things and it didn't go fast enough for General Pershing so he directed a young officer who was in charge of the exercise with Roosevelt to give some of the critique and he made a pretty good stab at it but it still wasn't satisfactory to General Pershing. He just gave everybody hell and he was very severe with General Sibert -- very severe -- in front of all the officers -- and among other things he said that we didn't show any signs much of training -- we had not justified the time we had had here -- and we didn't show an awareness of the things and he said you have changed the names of things. You call a dump, which was a supply thing for general ammunition, you have given a new name for dump and you have given new names for two other things -- I've forgotten what they were -- and generally just scarified us. He didn't give General Sibert a chance to talk at all. Our Chief of Staff, who had succeeded me, was a permanent colonel and he had just arrived and he was rather deaf and he hadn't heard all this. And when General Pershing dismissed General Sibert in a sense with a word and turned to the Chief of Staff and began questioning him, he wasn’t quite aware of what had happened. He hadn't heard at all. He hadn't been there but about two days. He didn't know what the devil was going on and he got pushed out of the way in a hurry. So I decided it was about time for me to make my sacrifice play. While this sounds like much of a personal thing for me to put in here -- I do it with apologies --this is the only way I can tell it -- but I heard of it many, many times from various officers in the division. I went up and started to talk to General Pershing who dismissed the Chief of Staff rather contemptuously and was going off. And I came up to intervene -- to interceded, as it were, and to explain some of the things and he didn't want to talk to me. He shrugged his shoulders and turned away from me. And I put my hand on his arm and practically forced him to talk. I said, "General Pershing there's something to be said here and I think I should say it because I've been here longer." And he stopped and said, "What have you got to say?" Well I said, "To start with we have never received anything from your Headquarters. When I was down there two months ago, as a matter of fact, three months ago I think, I was told about this Platoon Chiefs' Manual which was coming up. It's never come out yet."He turned to one of these officers and said, "What about that, So and So?"  And So and So said. "Well, general, we've had troubles with the French printers. You know they are very difficult to deal with." General Pershing turned to me and said, "You know we have our troubles." I said, "Yes, I know you do, General, I know you do. But ours are immediate and every day and have to be solved before night. Now we never have gotten your Platoon Manual. We have made the best we can of this thing. The only thing you've gotten out was to change the names of the dump and everything and now you are criticizing us for using the names you changed." And he turned to the Chief of Staff and said, "How about that, So and So?" And So and So said, "I'll look into it." I said, "You don't have to look into it .It's right here in orders. It's a fact; it's here. That's the only thing we've gotten from you and now we are being harassed for that. We've had a very hard time -- we've worked very, very hard. The men have had no advantages of any kind and they don't expect any. But," I said, "they ought to get a fair deal at any rate." I was just mad all over. I thought I had gotten in it up to my neck -- I might as well not try to float but to splash a little bit. I've forgotten all that I said, but I had a rather inspired moment. And the others were horrified and General Pershing walked away from me by saying, "Well, you must appreciate the troubles we have," and I said, "Yes," again, "General, but we have them every day and many a day and we have to solve everyone of them by night." And then I left and everybody bade me farewell. I had to be relieved They all came to me really very seriously. General Sibert was very regretful that I had done this and some of my bosom friends came up to me and said, of course, I was finished and would be fired right off. I said, "All I can see is that I may get troop duty instead of staff duty and certainly that would be a great success."

General Pershing never mentioned this thing to me until years afterwards and then he recalled it and his comment on me was that I was pretty hot. Well, as a matter of fact, it made quite an impression on me because instead of ruining me he sent for me quite frequently and when he would come to the division he would get me off away from the others and talk to me about the condition of affairs, particularly when he thought the Germans were going to attack us up near Cantigny in order to administer a damaging blow to American morale. So far as I could see it helped me rather than harmed me but it gave me a key to General Pershing's character which I found held good all the way through. I have never seen a man who could listen to as much criticism, as long as it was constructive criticism, and wasn't just being irritable or something of that sort. You could talk to him like you were discussing somebody in the next county and yet you were talking about him personally. It might be about a social thing -- certainly about an official thing. You could say what you pleased as long as it was straight, constructive criticism. And he did not hold it against you for an instant. I never saw another commander that I could do that with. Their sensitivity clouded them up so it just wouldn't work. I have seen some I could be very frank with, but I never could be frank to the degree that I could with General Pershing. I know the members of Congress were so astonished when he was having his hearings -- that I sat next to him with General Fox Conner on the other side -- that I could interrupt him and talk to him and tell him about something and he could turn around and tell them. He had no hesitation at all of receiving suggestions or advice from me or others about him. And it was one of his great strengths that he could listen to those things. You might get irritated because he didn't do it right away. He always seemed to be very sluggish in finally taking action. But it would appear afterwards that he was just about right as to the timing. The fact that you could talk to him with such frankness meant everything in the world in getting along in such a difficult situation. Now the remarkable part of this was I was a comparative stranger to him because he never called me in to be his aide until after the fighting was over. He called me in to GHQ just about the time of the Soissons fight and put me in the Operations

Section under General Fox Conner. General Eltinge sat in a good bit -- he was Deputy Chief of Staff. That was my introduction to GHQ. I left that and went back to the 1st Army and became Chief of Operations of the Army and later Chief of Staff of the 8th Army Corps, and then General Pershing's aide. I've digressed considerably here but I guess it's all right. That, in a way, is the way w started in France.

The soldiers were immediately inflamed against the YMCA. The poor YMCA couldn’t get the people -- they had to have a great deal -- and it had to be sent from the States in large measure. And it seized whoever it could get in France. I remember the son of the Ambassador was there and they drew on him to help them there in their YMCA huts and it immediately stirred up great criticism because they thought he ought to be in the ranks. They were utterly unreasonable about this. But that's the way soldiers go. I found exactly the same thing later on in the Second World War and I found the same thing when I came in as Secretary of Defense in the Korean War. They are very quick to get worked up to something that they think is not quite as it should be or that is to their disadvantage in particular of course. This was very pronounced over there with the YMCA. It had undertaken the contract to do all the various things and was given a certain allowance of tonnage which I think was something like -- I think it was 130 tons a day -- and it was cut down to 30 tons very shortly after that. But its obligations were not cut down at all. To show you how these things went -- the Red Cross ran a couple of plays which were very good. The Salvation Army put on one play only -- beautifully put on -- cost them quite a lot of money. And I think the YMCA had to put on 260 or 620, I've forgotten which, and was responsible for all of them and had this reduced tonnage and everything to battle with. It was for the reason of the feelings stirred up by these various organizations -- the Red Cross, the Knights of Columbus, the Salvation Army -- one or two others I believe -- that General Pershing made these recommendations which was followed that there would be only one organization in a case of this kind and this would be the Red Cross. Well I was interested to find when I came into the presidency of the Red Cross to find exactly the same reaction against the Red Cross that there had been against the YMCA and for exactly the same reason, because they had undertaken all the obligations and, of course, they had all kinds of difficulties in carrying them out. So they were turned on. And I found when I became President of the Red Cross I had quite a battle with the reporters who were all violently against the Red Cross, particularly if they had been service men -- and it was unjustified in the extreme. But it was exactly the same reason that had turned them on the YMCA and favored the Red Cross in the First World War and the Salvation Army and the Knights of Columbus -- they were all the favored fellows. Whoever is put in that position is bound to catch a very bad reaction, Quartermaster generally gets it, Commissary sometimes gets it, the Staff at Headquarters always gets it. That's one reason I constantly changed the staff officers and brought staff officers from outside from overseas into the Pentagon and sent the others a third of the time out to the other staffs in the field.

I think I've given a fairly good account of our arrival over there in France and some of the conditions with which we had to contend. I went up for my first experience in a battle with the Foreign Legion of the Moroccan Division and I saw them in their fight just west of Verdun -- the western Verdun defense. It was the time of the great attacks in August -- August 20th and 21st, I think. The artillery preparation was five days long beforehand which was considered the greatest artillery preparation in the history of warfare at that time and the greatest concentration of guns and I was with the headquarters of a Moroccan division. During its advance later on I managed to get away from headquarters and to follow it up and to have a most interesting day in following through after the fighting in which it received its third citation which gave it the Medaille Militaire. It was the first division to receive that, as I recall, that in the history of the French army, I may be off about this.

I am going to jump way back now to a note I see I haven't touched on to the training camp at Fort Douglas, Utah. I was taken away from the camp at Monterey and set out to the fort.

## ORDERED TO FRANCE

## SECOND SIDE

I am now going back to the questions on the period I was with General Bell and the training camps of that period.

Q. 3. What were your reactions then and later to the Plattsburg experiment?

A.I think Plattsburg had two or three sides to it. One was the political significance when the President, as it were, was opposed to all preparations in order to preserve a neutral front and General Wood's and Theodore Roosevelt's actions in order to stir up preparations. Of course, Plattsburg was the answer to this. Of its kind, it was inspirational and had a great effect on the men that were in it -- affected all their later lives -- as a matter of fact. It did a wonderful job in a very brief time. It was all we had to reach for. Under the circumstances, a very, very fine job was done.

As to its effects, it rose up later to make things very difficult for me in preparation for World War II. It was the best we could do for World War I under the circumstances -- with the President's attitude -- with no money from Congress -- with the general staff cut down to 16, I believe -- that was the pressure of Chairman of the Military Committee was to get everybody who had any experience in Washington out of Washington -- to get rid of the staff. We would run the war without any staff, of course. The fact that you had two or three thousand on the same staff later on was no proof you should have had more than sixteen at that time. These were terrible things that were done because of political twists. And I suppose they always will be done. So I had quite a difficult time at the start of World War II because I was determined that we would train our officers thoroughly. Presumably we were going to have time to do it and I intended to do it. Of course, we started off with a great shortage. Until the first reserve officers had had about a year's experience they were not successful really as teachers of an intense course of training. They didn't know assuredly enough themselves. Fine men and all, but not enough of that. So it was quite a period before we had practically anybody to conduct this training because the Regular Army was now scattered so thinly that people weren't available. I was opposed to the inception of the draft as early as it went into effect -- violently in favor of it -- but I wanted the thing to be approached in a little better ordered way. I was told that politically it was essential to go right ahead with it at top speed otherwise I would lose it. The trouble with that was we didn't have instructors and I remember finding the now head of the Federal Reserve Board -- one time President of the Stock Exchange and then President of the Stock Exchange -- who had been drafted in one of these earliest drafts -- and I found him being instructed by a corporal who had only been a corporal a month and who had been in the Army thirteen years and never even made the grade of corporal. Well, of course, his instruction was an absurdity so far as the quality of the man he was trying to instruct. And that was our trouble all around. Now the pressure was terrific to increase the size of the training Camps -- the early training camps -- particularly because of what we had done in the first World War and the fact that Australia was doing it again at the present time. The whole staff combined were violently opposed to this because we didn't have the instructor material and we wanted to make a much slower start and work up to it. And the others maintained that it was not time for that and public opinion demanded it and I had a very difficult fight. And when Mr. Stimson became Secretary of War, before he came to his first office, I went to Long Island to see him and that was the first thing he talked to me about and he was interrupted twice during the talk by telephone messages from previous Plattsburg Camp men. Grenville Clark being one of the leaders who wanted him to change things instantly the minute he got into position as Secretary of War. When he came down to Washington he was still of that temper and the new Undersecretary of War was a Plattsburg graduate and was now a judge and has since died in an airplane crash. The whole set-up then was to restore the Plattsburg movement immediately and in quantity. Everybody in the staff was opposed to it because we knew perfectly well we didn't have the people to conduct the training and I was determined that we were going to do this thoroughly and it had to be thoroughly for the kind of war we were going to fight. We had to turn out trained divisions that could fight their first battle -- not a learning battle -- but a battle to the death -which they later did with great triumph at the time of Patton's and the 1st Army's moves in Northern France and the Army that moved up about May 14th in Italy, with these new divisions, the first of the new divisions to get in the war. I'll talk about them more later on because something has been overlooked and I think was a very wonderful exhibition.

So I had a very difficult time. Here was the new Secretary of War, a man I greatly respected, who had asked me to go with him to the Philippines in order to make me a Brigadier General of Philippine Scouts -- constabulary or something of that sort -- and I declined to go -- I wanted to get away from staff duty. I had the greatest respect for him and yet he was obsessed with this -- he was a Plattsburg man and there weren't any questions about the great benefit of the camps at the end of the First World War. But this was a totally different situation and I was determined that we were not going to get into that. This was going to be a thoroughly done thing and we succeeded, but we had to go very slowly. I had difficulties in my own staff where I tried to give a little so the thread wouldn't break. They didn't want to give a dern inch. And I would have to make a slight concession, as I say, in order to keep the thread from breaking -- but they were violently opposed to it. There wasn't anybody on the staff in favor of this and they were travelling all over the country because we had gotten into a minor mobilization right away when we tried to bring five divisions of the Army -- the only existing divisions -- together and they varied from about 60 percent complete (one) down to about 10 percent complete. They were just little sketchy things scattered all over, the country. You would find one company belonging to a division out in Seattle or thereabouts and the other companies here in the East and altogether it was an almost ridiculous setup for an Army. That's what I had to dig it out of to get ready to organize this Army for the Second World War. So I was determined not to be pushed into this, but it was a very difficult thing with both the Secretary and Undersecretary -- splendid men, both of them -- ex-Plattsburg men and strongly in favor of it and the ex-Plattsburg leaders - Grenville Clark and the others -- holding up Australia to us as an example. Well, I won't go into what happened to Australia, but we had a very difficult time. Fortunately, I had an absolutely united staff on this. They were all together -- very fine men -- we were doing the best we could. It finally got to a showdown and this was one of the few times -- I think it was the only time -- I think there was only one other time -- I did this -- but it looked like it was a lost cause. And I told the Secretary that if that was the case I would resign as Chief of Staff and he could get somebody else. And I think I got a little sarcastic and said you get a Plattsburg man and run it to your own satisfaction. Well he didn't want to have that happen. And I didn't want that to happen either and we finally got compromised around and began to get these classes started. Next thing we didn't have the textbooks. I explained once, I think, how I managed to get that done by holding Leavenworth instructors over for a period and putting them into the preparation of -- I think it was fifty-two textbooks -- and doing the same with a certain number that I held down at the War College of the ex-instructors and when I suppressed the school in its ordinary routine. But one way or another we were getting this thing out of the kinks. But it was a very difficult time and a very tortuous time and one in which I was treading on very delicate ground -didn't have the confidence of the President -- I don't mean I lacked his entire confidence, but he didn't know me. He had made me on the recommendations of other people and now with all of this coming up and they were coming to see him -- even one of my -- well I better not get into names here -- very high government official -- who was seeing the President and they told me this -- he was having great influence on him -- he has very, very high position in the country and I think I did a very wise thing, but it was a difficult thing to do. I made his acquaintance and I won him over, not by arguing about that at all. I did not even mention it. I won his respect. He thought I knew what I was doing and he was advising the President to follow my advice and he remained my supporter for many years. All of this was the struggle which was the back kick on a very fine thing -- the Plattsburg camps. Our great struggle I say was to find instructors. Everybody was on a job. A tremendous expansion was underway and that was coming much faster than I wanted it and as I say I couldn't slow it down because they told me I would find the selective service act -- the draft act, as they called it -- revoked if in any way I delayed its procedure. The divisions were organized way ahead of the rate I wanted them organized.

Q. 4. Any comments on the Army of the 1916 period and its preparation for warfare?

A. Most of all these occurred in 1916. That was when I was having some of my greatest problems -my most instructive problems -- and my most difficult problems and my broadest experience preliminary to the actual going to France.

5. Q. Any comment on the tour at Governors Island?

A. I have no particular comment on Governors Island except for my own experiences there which I have already described.

Q. 6. When did you first begin to feel that war with Germany was inevitable?

A. When it comes to the question whether war with Germany was inevitable, I didn't get into that. I was so busy with the Army itself and the national defense you might call it that I didn't cogitate much over the political significance of things and whatever momentary opinion I had at the time I couldn't put into words at the present time. But I was so intense on the thing I was doing that I wasn't going off and trying to advise the President and the American public how to handle their international diplomatic troubles. I knew if they went to Europe what they had to have and I was prepared to try to give that to the best of my ability.

Q. 7. Did you feel that we should have given up neutrality earlier?

A. These various questions here, 5, 6, and 7, on the neutrality and when we should have first gone to war, I won't go into at all because I didn't have in my own mind very strong stands in regard to them. I did have a very strong stand in regard to Mr. Wilson's neutrality program. Neutrality, yes, if that's what he wanted. But to prevent us from making any measures at al I to get ready was terrible. He didn't have any comprehension of what a pathetic -- that isn't the real word -- it goes way beyond pathetic -- situation we were involved in, and only time can cure that. And if you have lost the time you can never get it back. My only observations in regard to that is that we could have gone ahead and done these things and still have remained neutral. But we would have been treated with greater respect.

Q. 8. In the 1939-41 period did you have the feeling that you were seeing 1915-16 all over again?

A. In 1939-1941 I saw very much the reflection of the things of ‘15-‘16 all over again. In fact in some ways very little occurred that didn't seem to me was a repetition, but what disturbed me most of all was to find the Army, the War Department, and the country in the same shape again -- the same shape again. And I was getting rather hardened to coming in when everything had gone to pot and there was nothing to get your hands on and darned if I didn't find the same thing when I came into the Korean War. There wasn't anything. We had a terrible time getting ourselves together.

On the heading , World War I, question I and sub-question as to my first contingent to France and General Pershing and his first, appearance and points of interest on the trip over I have already referred to all that. The American landing at St. Nazaire -- I've covered that. I have answered the question of being in Paris, not for the 4th of July parade -- but for the Bastille Day parade I think. I have also described St. Nazaire at that time.

Question 3 I’ve pretty largely answered.

Q. 4. American units moved into the line near Luneville at Sommervilliers in November 1917.Shortly thereafter they suffered their first casualties. Colonel Marshall was directed to report on the attack. He also attended the funeral of the three men near Bathelemont. Any comment on this?

A. I was starting out to inspect the American battalions that were included in French regiments in the line in that Luneville sector and I was leaving at four in the morning. The French division commander was very sensitive to having any American interference possible with his control and he didn't want me to go out. When he found I was going out that morning he had my car stopped at his headquarters and I had to wait until he came out. And then he told me "les premiers Americains sont tugs." The first Americans have been killed. And that was the first notice we had of the deaths of these men and the capture of 14, although that hadn't yet been reported. So we went out and he went, of course, to the brigade commander's headquarters and that was a loss of time which I didn't like, but that was the formality and they always went through it and then he went from there to the French regimental commander's headquarters in which these battalions were scattered. And that was a loss of time. However, just as we were leaving there the adjutant of the regiment, a captain, ran after us down the field and said there had been a raid. They had proof positive that there had been a raid, because the Germans had announced the capture of North Americans, north of the Rhine-Marne Canal, so we knew we had been raided. But at that time they didn't know it. And we went on up and came to the headquarters of the battalion commander, which was in a stone quarry as I recall -- and he didn't know there had been a raid then. There had been a heavy artillery bombardment, but he wasn't aware of the fact there had been a raid. He didn't go forward with me incidentally. I didn't ask him to and he didn’t say anything about it -- he just didn't go. So I started forward with Jean Hugo, who was my interpreter and liaison officer, and a very fine fellow, and the French general. I had to go the way he went. But we went up this communications trench, which was splattered with fire, all the way up, beautiful target shooting, and then we got into this deep front line trench. In those days the front line trenches were very deep and the principal dugouts were under the frontline parapets. Later on, that was changed, of course. The principal line was in the rear of this first line. Then it was not only in the first line but under the parapet of the first line -- large dugouts that would hold 15-20 men. We met a French officer who had been assigned to this battalion which had just gone in the night before and the French had left a few officers there to help them. And he told us there had been a raid and there had been Americans killed and he thought Americans captured but he didn't know. The battalion commander was still under the impression that there hadn't been a raid and we told him to go on back and tell the battalion commander. Then we went forward till we came to a place where the trench had caved in and I remember climbing up on top of the trench. Everything was very quiet. No Man's Land was about a half mile wide there and I got up on top and here down below me, just a little to my right front, was the blasted gap in the wire which was about sixty yards wide there. The white tape to guide the raiding party right through the wire leading up to the front trench -- here was the scene of the raid -no question about it now. We had a hard time to get up to the part of the trench which this tape came in and where the defenders had been surprised. And we went down into this dugout -- where there was quite a bit of blood about -- where some had been killed or wounded -- and then we came up and found the dead on the ground and the wounded had gone back. There were quite a few wounded -- I saw quite a few -- it was something like fourteen captured and eighteen wounded -- or some thing of that sort. Most of the wounded had been wounded by the artillery bombardment. And I went back with the General and we met some of the wounded and he questioned them quite a bit. And then Jean Hugo whispered to me that the General was trying to find whether the Americans showed fight. So I interrupted him and said, "General, I understand you are trying to find whether the-" Americans showed fight or not. I don't think there is any necessity for your questioning that -- they had been surprised and they probably put up a-disordered fight. Most of them were trapped in a dugout. But I don't think that is the thing to investigate. I think it would be very much more to the point if you look into the fact that you forbade the Americans to go beyond the wire in any reconnaissance and now they are surprised by the assault right through the wire. I think General Pershing is going to be very much interested in that reaction of a French commander to American troops." This went on -- I mention it here because it went on to quite a serious matter later on as I will explain.

The French commander was getting very stiff and I was getting very anxious to get back. I went first to the triage or first line hospital and there I found these wounded men being treated. But the principal thing I noticed was a large typewriter of a size that would take a big form. And the principal sergeant had this form in the typewriter and was typing away and when I looked to see what it was, it was what was called the sick and wounded report. He had gotten through, I think, one name and maybe two. It was a very lengthy thing and it might be as carefully done as your description for your doctor or your situation in connection with pneumonia or something of that sort. I could see from the number of wounded he had and the progress that he had made on this thing it was going to take him about all day long to complete that form. So I said, "What the hell are you going to do if you have a battle with a thousand casualties? This is absurd." I said, "Just drop that for the present and get to work on these men." So he was very uncertain about doing this thing that I was so freely ordering. But I bluffed him out of it and then took his typewriter and there I wrote the report that's on file regarding the raid. I met right after that, still on the field, a colonel of the Surgeon-General's department -- over in

France making an inspection. And of course, as this was the only place where there were men in the field, he came there. And, he was very anxious to come up there to the hospital where the first wounded were in. I told him then that the first thing was that he might change that sick and wounded report so there was some possibility of getting it out if there were any more than fifty wounded men in a day. It was a ridiculous thing, they way it was now and I had forbidden the man to finish it until he went about his regular duties. And he did do that. I think he changed it after he got home. It was an absurdity the way it was arranged. It was all very well for an investigation after the war, but it wasn't at all a practical proposition if you really got into a first class action. To go on with this thing -- I might as well finish it up while I'm at it. When I got back to Headquarters I wanted to go and see the corps commander and the idea of a captain (I don’t think I was yet a major) going to see the corps commander was unheard of. But I was representing the division commander who was 100 or more kilometers away so my rank didn't cut any figure with me as far as I could see. My job was to represent him and his interests and his interests were very heavily involved here. It was our first American action and we had been surprised. And prisoners had been taken. And the Germans were advertising it. And we had our first dead and we had our collection of wounded. So I had written my first report of the affair on the typewriter of the sergeant I had displaced from getting the sick and wounded report out and now I wanted to do another one for General Sibert in explaining the situation in where they had been forbidden from going beyond the wire in making a reconnaissance and then were surprised through the wire with this blast of a Bangalore torpedo and the rush of the men.

The division commander (here he means the French division commander) sent for me and asked me -- said he understood that I was going to see the corps commander and I wanted to know what I was going there for. And I told him exactly. Well, he said he would prefer that I restrain myself and not do that. He said, "You are a very young officer and this is a very serious matter." I said, "That's the reason I am going there. It is a very serious matter and I am representing the division commander. And I have got to consider him and his rank and his position and the fact that this is the first unit and the first engagement. Just then the corps Chief of Staff, I think, arrived. He was very much exercised when he found out what I was going to do and he begged me not to embarrass the corps commander at this particular moment. Well, I said, "I'm going to report it to General Sibert and he will report it, of course, to General Pershing."

Meanwhile, a message had come in from General Pershing's headquarters, wanting a report direct from me. Of course, they were still in the business of trying to command minor units. And I explained that would have to go ahead and report this to General Sibert and I was going to say this because it is a very, very serious matter and I don't have to be a general to see that. I said I wish you would tell your corps commander so he can interest himself in it right away. Because the order still stands and General Pershing, I know, will want to know about it right away and General Sibert must know about it right away. And we had quite a scene there. I reported this to General Sibert and then I reported it to General Pershing.

Then they arranged the funeral of those three men and I have always been sorry since that they didn't allow them to remain buried right there because that was very historic. And this division commander that I had been arguing with and had been so strict with me made a very beautiful talk at their grave which is in this little town -- I think -- of Bathelemont. It was in the rain, mud, and the town was just a crossroad and a manure pile. That's about what it amounted to-- and a haystack or two around. The French sent up a battalion of infantry, a troop of cavalry (I don't think they had their horses though-- not certainly at the funeral), some artillery, some engineers, some signal corps. They had every unit of this first corps as I recall present and they made it quite a significant occasion. And the first Americans were buried there. And I took the French division commander to go into a dugout with Jean Hugo and had him to repeat his remarks at the grave and Jean Hugo wrote them down. And they are on record in the War Department now. And when I was questioned the other day from France as to what would be the proper inscription on a monument they were putting up there, I suggested the best thing they could do was this paragraph out of this speech. I think they adopted that. It was their own division commander's speech. The division 'commander was transferred to a mission to Greece immediately and he disappeared from the scene at that time. I was very much gratified when I went to a church service in Paris --I have forgotten for what -- it was of military significance and a number of French commanders were there to walk with me to the church -- this was when I was Secretary of State and this particular general [Bordeaux] had come up from the provinces to attend the service and came up and spoke to me and was very cordial and very generous in his comment. When I came over later to attend the United Nations, he communicated with me again. He has since died.

I had another thing that taught me quite a lesson there. We had no transportation and the French had to lend us trucks -- or Lorries as the British called them. I don't know what the French called them -- I've forgotten that, but they loaned us the trucks and we didn't have enough. The 1st Battalion had about enough for their battalion headquarters and in this battalion that was coming up next was also included the regimental headquarters. It was going to require some delicate shuffling to be able to haul them up. So I had to get into a discussion with the French staff about loading of these trucks -- what we should put in them. They would come up with this relief and the additional unit of the Headquarters. And they would go back with the troops that had had their first experience in the trenches. Well we agreed on something in principle (en principe) and there I learned my lesson which served me well in after dealings, particularly with the French units in the Meuse-Argonne battle and other places. En principe, in my mind, applied to one thing only; to the French it applied to everything. The result was that all the machine gun units were grounded and not loaded on the trucks and didn't get off to Gondrecourt and were left up there without any transportation. We were short in the first place and this thing occurred and I discovered it all hinged on the translation of the full meaning of en principe. So after that whenever a Frenchman brought up something and would summarize by saying en principe, So and So, I would stop him right there and say now you write that out -you write out exactly what you mean. And they all got to laughing at me later on. When I had several French corps -- three or four French corps -- in the 1st Army -- and they would send back their chief of staff or somebody to make arrangements and he would come to the usual French expression -- en principe -- and I would say, "wait a minute, wait a minute -- take a pencil and write out exactly what you are talking about." So I never had any more accidents of that sort and it was a very valuable lesson.

It also brought up another thing which shows how difficult it is for armies of different nations to work together with full harmony though it’s to their best efforts to do so and that even was the occasion with the British when we thought spoke the same tongue. But we discovered afterwards that the meaning we gave a word was not all the same in many instances and we had to be very careful in what we said. The only place I ever got this right was over in China because when the Communists, met with the

Nationalists and I sat in as the middle party they used my translation -- of my interpreter -- as the guiding rein in this thing and the thing was translated according to that. It was safer to translate the English to Chinese -- together these two -- than it was to use either one of the Communists or Nationalist Chinese record of what was said. And they always wanted my English one in order that together they could translate that so that the significance of each term could be fully understood. I started to refer back to something that occurred of that nature and I think it was in connection with the British but my memory has played me false and I have forgotten it already.

Q. 5. Bullard took command of the 1st Division in December 1917. In January 1918 the Division took over the Ansauville sector of the line. Frank Parker and B.B. Buck commanded the brigades. Col. Fuqua was Chief of Staff. Colonel Marshall was G-3. Division headquarters was at Mesnil-la-Tour between St. Mihiel and Pont-a-Mousson. Seicheprey was on the right and a lake oft the right.

A. General Sibert was relieved and General Bullard sent up to take command. In your question five or statement five, you say Colonel Fuqua was Chief of Staff. He was not Chief of Staff -- he did not become Chief of Staff -- until practically the end of the Meuse-Argonne battle and under me before that in the G-3 section of the staff, looking after the troop movements and thing of that sort.

A very interesting thing took place in my career here. I learnt afterwards that General Bullard when he came to the Division, he had been rather topped off. I had met him before and he had been temporarily in command of a brigade before which I was dealing with when I was acting Chief of Staff, and he complimented me on the way I was doing it, I remember. So when he came up from wherever he was to become the new commander of the division, I learned much later, almost at the end of the war as a matter of fact, the intention was to make me Chief of Staff. Campbell King, a very dear friend of mine was adjutant -- who had been temporarily at Chaumont with the General Staff. And he had come up there and gone back to his original post as adjutant of the 1st Division.

When General Bullard came to the division, we were infuriated by the misunderstanding of our situation, which culminated with the relief of General Sibert at GHQ. These fellows at GHQ were almost all my close friends and associates at

Leavenworth and most of them had been student officers under me at Leavenworth. And they were some of my dear friends, but we were wholly out of sympathy with each other and I felt that they didn't understand what they were doing at all. They had become very severe and they didn't know what they were being severe about. I would explain it just that way. General Pershing was severe, so they modeled their attitude on him. I was so outraged by this and I talked a great deal and I made a great mistake which held -- I learned the lesson then I never forgot afterwards. But when General Bullard came to the division, all of us were airing our views and being very vitriolic. Because it was very difficult what we were trying to do -- it was almost impossible -- and we were bitter. What I did was I demonstrated to General Bullard that I had no business being made Chief of Staff in that state of mind and he didn’t make me Chief of Staff. He made Campbell King Chief of Staff who was a much more moderate person and didn't get "het up" to the extent I did. I learnt my lesson. Nobody ever told me that but I could see perfectly well what it was. And I agreed with it thoroughly. And I never made the mistake, I don't think again. And I often commented on how in the world I ever kept my temper through all the vicissitudes which I had to go through political and otherwise. And this was the lesson that I got right there and I never forgot it. I think I delayed myself a great deal. I think I would have been Chief of Staff of the division and I would very quickly have been made Brigadier General. As a matter of fact, I wasn't recommended for a Brigadier General until in the Meuse-Argonne battle. And while it was approved by the Secretary of War, General March never sent it to the Senate for confirmation.

You mention Seicheprey of this description on 5 and that was quite a difficult time, because it was down in a hollow and very difficult to defend. We had to build up the trenches, weaving these sticks together in order to hold up the dirt wall, to screen us from the view of Mont Sec on which now is a very beautiful monument and observation stations all over the battlefield, of which I am somewhat in charge as Chairman of the Battle Monuments Commission.

Q. 5a. Any comments on Generals Sibert and Bullard as commanders?

A. I don't care to make any comments about General Bullard and General Sibert.

Q. 5b. Would you give a description of the sector into which the 1st Division went?

A. The best I can see about this section is that we took over a very large section because our division was about twice the size of the French division and the whole sector was under observation. It was dominated by these heights on the other side and particularly by Mont Sec.

Q. 5c. What was the situation with French troops which you relieved? (Many of these units had low morale didn't they?)

A. I didn't see so much of the French troops that were relieved as they went out very quickly. They were there for a rest and were very much opposed to our stirring up the sector and making it active in a battle way. We were very proud of it and we were very foolish. Though as a matter of fact, I suppose, with new troops, it was rather important that they get that much experience to make them battle worthy.

The French morale at that time was all right. It had suffered of course by the Verdun fighting and the terrible losses they had there -- by the reversal along the Somme -- they had suffered very much from that. But the great disaster was impending which came on March 21, 1918, shortly just as we were moving from that sector.

Q. 5d. Were you actually called G-3 at this time?

A. I think I was actually called G-3 at this time. We made up the proposals of how the staff should be formed and I don't remember whether we proposed G-3. I think that was proposed down at Chaumont. Incidentally that 1, 2, and 3 that you had in the division then, I organized without knowing anything about this thing in the Philippines with this force that I was dropped into a sort of peculiar command of. I didn't have a G-2 much. I had a man who did something like that, but I specifically had a G-l and specifically a G-3 though I didn't call them that. And it worked like a machine. They were very excellent officers. I know the main thing I used to insist upon after we got through the tactical deployments was to see that the troops went into bivouac without halting, that they shouldn't be waiting on the road to find out where they were going to camp, but all should be decided ahead of them and they should come up and be shown where to wheel into line and stack arms and bivouac, which this impromptu staff that I had designed -- I had organized it accidentally you might say -- always did.

Q. 6. In April 1918 the Division was attacked by the Germans, but the enemy was beaten back. In the middle of the month the 1st Division went to Montdidier to aid in meeting the German offensive in that area. Colonel Marshall reported to General Debeney, another writer calls this Dubonnet--which is right? In May the Division attacked Cantigny and took heavy casualties. Bullard praised the plans drawn up for the action.

A. “Debeney” is the correct name for General Debeney and I knew him very well because is son was with the French division that had the same headquarters we did. And he and I became very close together. He had one arm shot off and I knew his father for that reason. He commanded the 1st French Army and I thought he was a very fine man. And I met him again when we all moved to the west to fill in -- he was given the job to command. The British 5th Army was destroyed and the Germans almost broke through. The end of the point of that thing was Montdidier. So I saw General Debeney very often and he was always very nice to me. So far as I could tell, I always thought he was a very fine Army commander. At least about the Americans he knew something about them and whether he admired them or not, he knew about them and could act very intelligently about his handling of them. That came out later when we were in the middle of a counterattack at the end of the German great attack.

Q. 6a. Bullard in June recommended that Colonel Marshall be promoted, but the War Department said it was opposed to policy regarding line officers detailed on staff duty.

A. The recommendation went through that I be promoted. I had already been advanced on Christmas Day to Lieutenant Colonel, but when the recommendation came up that I be made colonel they had already gotten out a rule at GHQ, Washington, that you couldn’t promote these men on staff duty until they had served a certain line. Of course, that had been made up for staffs in the U.S. and not at all for the staffs over there in Europe, and there weren't very many over there. We were mixed up in the fighting right and left, as you can tell by my descriptions and yet we were barred from promotion. I came into circumstances somewhat similar to that in the next World War and I knew perfectly well what lines of action to try to take in order to correct it. I was finding very rapid promotions over here in the new divisions being assembled and the big training camps and over in Africa they were only promoting the men who had been very special in action or wounded. This restriction on my promotion continued until the time of the Meuse-Argonne battle almost half a year later.

Q. 7. Frye mentions that on July 4, 1918, you attended a party at French corps headquarters and made a speech in French (this was reported by Hagood).

A. The speech in 7 which you refer to when I was first sent into the region where the

1st Division was coming up and I was ordered to provide arrangements for the reception of the four divisions that were coming later. One was the 2nd Division, one was the 42nd division I've forgotten the other two, but they were all to be scattered around that region. I came into Neufchateau. I was the first American officer to come there. Neufchateau is probably identified better by being southwest a short distance from Domremy Jeanne d'Arc's home. Well, anyway, when I came into town there was very great excitement and the prefect had a luncheon for me that was very hurriedly organized -- but it was a very delicious luncheon. All the schools let out. And they were jammed with people around this place where we were having lunch. And the sergeant who drove the Marine Cadillac I had, he was at the table with me, he and I were called out and I was introduced by a very bombastic speech in French (I said bombastic -- a very enthusiastic speech -- in French) which I couldn't understand but very little of. And then I was introduced and under the spur of the moment -- under the pressure of the moment -- I made a speech which was received with tremendous cheers and great enthusiasm and as far as we could figure out, there wasn't a verb in it. But it went all right. I was always amused at myself when I got involved in this affair there at this time. I've already forgotten the name of the place.

But I might mention something about Domremy. I had to go by Domremy very frequently in my trips back and forth through this region and of course it always appealed to me because of its historic significance. But what made quite an impression on me was there seemed to be so little change in the town. As far as I could see it was the some old town it had always been and Jeanne d'Arc's home -- it looked like just all the rest of them. It didn't look like something that had been kept in repairs through the years and everything else was new in the village. There didn't seem to be anything new and they all looked about alike. And while I was standing in the church next to Jeanne d'Arc's house and looking at this groined ceiling I commented to my interpreter whose name was Crocker, well known Crocker family up in Massachusetts, paper mill people and he had been at the Sorbonne and was drafted as an interpreter and was very good -- had him with me. And I asked him what he thought the age of that church was. And his reply was very significant to me. It conveyed years in a way I had never heard before. He looked at it a long time and said, "I think this church was built about as long before Jeanne d'Arc as we are living after Jeanne d'Arc." Well that was one way to grasp it because Jeanne d'Arc was in the dim and distant past to me and I imagine to all the rest of us.

Q. 7a. At this time, Marshall moved to GHQ under Colonel Fox Conner. "Marshall went through Beauvais a disappointed and bitter man." He tried to get duty with troops but Bullard turned him down. He did agree, however, for him to go to GHQ. Any comment on this? Were you bitter?

A. The next part of 7 is a little bit out of place. It speaks of my bitterness in going through Beauvais-- disappointed in not getting duty with troops. I was ordered away from 1st Division just as it was going into the Soissons fight and just after we had gotten out of quite a fight in the Beauvais sector, as we called it, I think, south of Amiens and north of Beauvais. It seemed to be hopeless. There were very few graduates of the staff college and they were all older than I was. They were given divisions, but I wasn't given a division. I was jerked off to Europe before they organized these divisions. And when I was made acting Chief of Staff of the division I was a captain. And the temporary promotions had started in the United States but they hadn't reached to Europe so I didn't get in on that and these other fellows were made colonels and lieutenant colonels and chiefs of staff of divisions. I as still a captain, lingering over there with the First Division in France -- great opportunity to be with divisions and get into its experiences but it was developing into a great blockade of any promotion chances for me until I got this one Christmas. And then I found that there was an order which prevented me from being promoted at all until the Meuse-Argonne battle and they changed the order or I couldn’t have been promoted then, though I had been recommended by General Pershing to be a Brigadier General. I think I went in on the first recommendation for general's officers succeeding from the St. Mihiel battle on into the Meuse-Argonne battle.

They finally got an order out signed by the Chief of Staff at Chaumont that under no circumstance would I be detailed away from the General Staff. Well that was the final blow. They had me pinched then. I suffered all the way from lack of promotion in my early days. I had to do a great deal of work as an aide because if I wasn't an aide I was merely a lieutenant in a company. That lasted for pretty nearly fifteen years. They couldn't give me these things they wanted to, because I didn't have the rank to take them. So I would always, have to act in the general's name as a lieutenant and then finally, when I became a captain, it was just when we started to begin the concentration in the First World War and we moved on to Governors Island. I think I got my captaincy at Governors Island. I'm not certain. But it affected my entire career in getting started because I was held back all the time and having to be an aide all the time purely for the reason the General could use my services as an aide by having me act in his name. I never was an aide as a young officer.

Q. 8. Colonel Marshall now came into closer contact with General Pershing. He had first met Pershing at Bell's headquarters in New York in 1917. He next saw him during some training exercises in France. Pershing was strong in his criticisms of the men and Colonel Marshall said he was expecting too much of the men. Pershing later came to discuss plans for the attack on Cantigny in 1918. He had a long discussion with Marshall. Are these statements correct?

A. You got question 8 down here about General Pershing. I've told several things about General Pershing. I didn't say to him he was expecting too much of the men. I commented on the fact that he was ordering things from there in the evening that required a 20 mile march in the morning and during the night and some arrangements none of which could be made. They were losing track of the distance entirely around Chaumont and we had no motors.

I think I have told enough about this sort of thing of General Pershing at the present time.

Q. 9a. In his new job, Marshall was to work on plans for reducing the St. Mihiel salient. The 1st Division moved up to the Foret de Compiegne. The 1st and 2nd Divisions were put into the line near Soissons and took heavy losses. Foch became Supreme Commander in July 1918. A firm decision for an American attack was made at St. Mihiel on August 9th. 1st Army was being organized at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre. Drum was Chief of Staff. Marshall and Walter Grant joined G-3. I notice that a number of the places were in the area where Patton's troops fought in World War II. Did you re-visit any of these places in 1944-45?

A. I did not visit any of these fields in ‘44 and ‘45.

Q. 9c. What was your view about the establishment of the Supreme Command in 1918? Did recollections of the tardiness in establishing that overall command affect your views in World War II?

A. I was not in a position to express myself about the Supreme Command and all that was concerned with it and what powers the British government would have to resign to the French and the same thing for our government. I know General Pershing was for unity of command, but it is hard for me to tell when I knew it because I heard so much of it afterwards. Of course, there was tardiness in deciding on a supreme commander. Only a disaster would have brought it to a head because the governments themselves had to give up too much. That's an extraordinarily difficult thing to do and it was only through the actions of Churchill that we were able to get adjustments on everything at that time and also the fact that so much was to be expected from America at the start [here is talking about WW II] and also these early arguments with the British staff officers, which you see now reflected in some of their books, was when we had virtually no Army in trained existence and they had all the troops. But, of course, that changed decidedly till we had tremendous numbers of divisions, comparatively speaking, seventy-nine, I think in all, of ground divisions alone and very large numbers of special troops and special brigades and artillery and tanks and engineers and things of that sort -- and the Marines in addition, and a terrific air force in numbers. None of that was available for argument or pressure or anything. It was all problematical. Nobody had ever dreamt of Patton being able to go over Europe at the rate he did or our troops being able to go through the line as they did at St. Lo the way they finally fought" out in First Army and then virtually surrounded the Germans at the outbreak from the first European entry, the Normandy beachhead. The later moves of the First Army, which was the initial army to move in, were very spectacular but Patton was moving at such a rate the attention moved to him and he was himself, of course, very dramatic and that focused attention on him. But some of the First Army's performances there were magnificent, notably in making the Avranches Gap for Patton to go through, that was made by First Army then the counter attack that Hitler ordered himself –I've forgot, The Cantain or something like that [Mortain] -counterattack, which Bradley chose in a sense to ignore to fight off while he was going ahead with his operations. Which he did until they finally surrounded completely quite a section of the German Army and I think that's where General Eisenhower tells afterwards of seeing a large area where you could step from body to body. [He means the Falaise Gap]. All those things were done by First Army. And then their eventual move out of the sector and wheel to the left and final battles up on the Belgian border and into the Hindenburg line.

I might tell one thing about General Patton. South of Bar-le-Duc I guess about 30 miles was a small town called Gondrecourt. That's where I first went to and was the seat of First Division schools and Corps Schools afterwards -- officer schools. And I lived with a very interesting landlady -- she was a very amusing woman -- ran a wonderful mess for me and I had three other fellows in it, one of which was Jean Hugo. We had a very relaxing time in that mess. It saved me from the terrific strain we were going through in our other situations, at that time. So Mme. Jouatte became very much endeared to me and I to her, I think. I stayed there six months and had a little, tiny room with a sort of Napoleonic looking bed and she looked after me in every way she could. And when I left there she kept in touch with me all the time though I didn't see her again. And she wrote to me -- first used to write me each season, winter, summer, fall and spring. Then she got so she would write twice a year. Her boy had been a prisoner in the woods that I had gone through with the Foreign [French] Legion when they recaptured it. I brought some of the things back from that woods, machine guns and things which I gave to her which she treasured highly. Then this next war came and of course she couldn't write to me after that because she was in the occupied zone. And finally Patton's troops drove through there and into the vicinity of Metz. So I sent him a message and told him that I thought Gondrecourt was in his rear zone -- that is the zone he would be responsible for, and that if he got down there on one of his inspections to look up one of my dear friends -- Madame Jouatte, 2 Rue Saussi -- and the next I heard of it, he sent me the photographs and a description by a staff officer. Patton arrived there with five thousand armored troops, two revolvers on, a whole truckload of supplies for Madame Jouatte. The town turned out in fear and trembling -- the mayor and town council came to him trembling and Patton growled at them in his best rough French "Where is Madame Jouatte?" Well, they had never heard of Madame Jouatte. And he turned over to her a whole truckload of supplies, enough to last her family a long, long time and made quite an impression in Gondrecourt of the importance of Madame Jouatte.

I came along while I was Secretary of State and was at the United Nations and one weekend I went to Metz and went over the northern most Meuse-Argonne battlefields and came on down through Tours and Gondrecourt. I had my aide go ahead of me [George and Walters and Carter all agree to this] in another car and find out if Madame Jouatte was there but not tell her that I was coming. And when I got there he told me she had moved and that she was at, such a place in the main square of the town. (I'll take a milkshake) So we drove there and Mrs. Marshall didn't get out of the car and I told her to stay in a second. I wanted to go up and surprise Madame Jouatte. But the square was pretty full of people going to church. The church bells were ringing, it was a peaceful Sunday. But the fact of these two limousines there in the courtyard attracted all their attention. When I got out of there, they all stopped and stared. And Madame Jouatte's curiosity had been aroused. She came out of her doorway in an old wrapper and carpet slippers. She wasn't a very dressy old lady anyway and she looked pretty slack in these clothes. But she was unchanged otherwise. And she came out and I had crossed about half the distance when she looked up and recognized me. And she dashed at me and threw her arms around my neck and kissed me on both cheeks. So I embraced her and I kissed her and we had a great scene out there with all the people in the square cheering. And then Mrs. Marshall got out and came out and went into the house and we had gotten some things for her at Nancy which Mrs. Marshall gave her , and a present of something, I have forgotten what ,of a waiter or tray or some things to go. I don't remember what it was. But anyway her excitement was intense and it was a very joyful occasion and I got great satisfaction of it and Mrs. Marshall got particular satisfaction out of it. And as we were driving off -- we had to hurry to get back to Paris -- Mrs. Marshall began peeling out of her only fur coat. When we had gotten down the street about a block, I said what you are doing. And she said, "I am going to give this to Madame Jouatte.” I said, “No you are not. (Laughs) I don't have enough money to buy you another. You'll have to keep that." And I wouldn't let her give it to Madame Jouatte. I was sorry afterwards I didn't, but the fact was I didn't have enough money to do that. I went through the war when my responsibilities ran up to eight and a half million to ten million troops and nine fighting sectors -- my salary was $10,000 a year. I spent all my savings. That didn't meet my bills and I had a very, very hard time all the time I was Chief of Staff. And then when I was Secretary of State all I got was $15,000 a year.