

TAPE 7M
INTERVIEW WITH
GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL
April 11, 1957

France and Return to U.S.

How he worked on St. Mihiel plans

Later work on Meuse-Argonne

Lack of trucks

French handling of trains

Confusion of battle

Lack of communications

Arguments with the French

School for officers at Langres; Marshall goes to visit; is kept as instructor

Life in a wine cellar headquarters

Bravery of Teddy Roosevelt

Joffre makes an inspection

Pershing as a leader

Lessons learned from the French

General Summerall--who talked like a cathedral

Unpreparedness in World War I

Supreme command in Europe Famous mix-up between 1st and 42nd divisions in race for Sedan; who was responsible for order; Marshall on relations with MacArthur in World War I and later (this prompted by my question whether bad feelings had resulted from the Sedan mix-up when the two divisions overran each other and MacArthur was captured by American troops and held as a German for a time)

Versailles treaty – “too much rigidity and too much bitterness” on part of President and Senate

Victory parades in Europe and U.S. (Marshall rides under Arc de Triomphe, horse falls with him in London parade, N.Y. parade, Washington parade)

In Washington with Pershing, 1919-24; helps brief Pershing for testimony before Congress
Pershing and March

Reorganization of War Dept.

Pershing visits V.M. I.; local oldster unimpressed

Pershing and Marshall come back from West Coast on Harding funeral train

Marshall on concept of universal military training

Opposed Pershing's political activities and that of other generals

On spit and polish

Pattern of cutting the Army in peacetime

Views on arms policy in 1957

(In some of the later interviews there were lengthy digressions on his work at Ft. Benning several pages on training there; a discussion of CCC work; references to work at Chicago with Illinois National Guard; a little on Vancouver Barracks--these will be noted when they occur)

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RECORDED INTERVIEW WITH
GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL
AT PINEHURST, NC - April II, 1957

Questions by Forrest C. Pogue. Machine run by Sgt. William Heffner.

Q. 10a. Please describe the planning for St. Mihiel.

A. The decision for St. Mihiel operation was actually made by Foch who was the Supreme Commander at that time. As I recall he specified three operations that he wanted carried out first. This was his beginning of the offensive following the Soissons fight which stopped the German advance. That occurred July 18-21 of that summer. For the first time the German Army started to the rear. And this was the army of the German Crown Prince. I don't remember where the attack was to be on the English front. But I remember exactly where it was to be on the French front. I know they all referred to communications. And on the American front it was the St. Mihiel operation because the Germans held the point which consisted really of the town of St. Mihiel and the high ground which came down the Meuse River from the north of St. Mihiel. If that was obliterated then the communications to Paris by railroad were free all along, parallel to the entire front. I am sorry I don't remember where the French operations were to be or the British operations were to be, but they were all carried out.

Just how the St. Mihiel was to be carried out, just where the attack was to be launched was another matter and that was for General Pershing's decision. The whole thing was how you would do this thing in order to free the railroad. I was put to work on this and I have always been rather embarrassed by the fact that I submitted a number of different plans -- none of them you might say conclusive. The trouble was that I was first given the problem of how to do this with so many divisions. I've forgotten how many. We will say seven. Of course, that's one thing, working it out with seven divisions. Then they changed this and added two more which altered the possibilities for operations decidedly. Then it was changed again. It was changed four times to finally this large number of divisions came up -- I've even forgotten how many it was now -- which determined the final operation, particularly the fact that we were to attack from both flanks instead of from just

one.

That was the lead up from the American point of view of the St. Mihiel operation and considering the troops in many cases were pretty raw and the army headquarters was brand new -- that's a very complicated institution, incidentally, I think they did very well.

(I see on the next page in paragraph 10, the answer to several of the doubtful points I have just mentioned. One was the indication where the British and French offensives were to be and another was the number of divisions that were participating in the St. Mihiel operation itself. There was some comment there on the troop movement. As a matter of fact the original concentration was not such an unusual thing. It was a big concentration but it had to be carried out at night, of course, which made it a congested affair. The really big concentration occurred later on before the end of the battle and out of its rear area and over to the left for the line up of the Meuse-Argonne. That was a terrific problem of logistics and it had to be met many ways and we managed to carry it out successfully. I had Walter Grant to assist me through this).

I have already mentioned the planning of the St. Mihiel. I came into that battle first on the basis of planning and then Walter Grant and I were called up from Chaumont by General Drum to check on plans that had already been made by his permanent G-3 (I was not a G-3 at that time) for the concentration. We checked over all their orders and plans and they were perfectly sound. Then they (the permanent G-3 and G-5 I think, which was the head of the training staff) were withdrawn without any explanation being made and I was put in charge of the St. Mihiel operation so far as the staff was concerned. I didn't know at all where the others had gone and I didn't ask any questions. I was too busy. So from that time on with Walter Grant to assist me I was busy with the conduct of the St. Mihiel operation. And it went off pretty well. It went off very well as a matter of fact. I think we could have gone a little farther at the end if the corps commanders had followed out their orders. The order provided that when they got to the line rigidly specified specifically outlined and there was any opportunity to go forward, they should send forward battalions with some artillery and reconnaissance units and push ahead as fast as they could. They didn't do this. In one division this was proposed and that was, done by Douglas MacArthur, who was chief of staff of the Forty-second Division. And he wanted

to push right on at that time. The trouble was none of the others had gathered themselves and General Drum and the Army commander thought they should leave well enough alone. Undoubtedly if they had pushed on, they would have gone much closer to Metz at the first lunge. However, they already had authority to organize a battalion or regiment in the division and push ahead with that, but they didn't do that. Of course, it was their first big battle and there was always much confusion and there was always much uncertainty as to what the exact conditions were which is to be carefully considered when you are trying to judge whether you did this just right or not. You didn't have a Stonewall Jackson who had been experienced in many fights already.

Q. 10b. Please describe the task which confronted you in regard to the Meuse-Argonne fight. How did you go about your planning? Who helped you? What were special problems which arose?

A. The complications now began. I had been concerned now with the full battle. Now suddenly I was called over to Headquarters, which was across the street, and they outlined the Meuse-Argonne. That's the first time I have ever heard of it -- and that's what the other fellows on the staff had been working on -- the plan for the deployment for the Meuse-Argonne and the initial plan for the battle. I was told to concentrate the troops and I was given the line-up they were to have in the battle. That was my first intimation of the Meuse-Argonne battle. I went back over to look into this thing and there had been no warning at all. Here I suddenly found the list of the divisions that were to be in the battle, what lineup they were to have, and my job was to get them into battle, which involved not just an ordinary concentration because most of these divisions had to come out from-receive and support positions in the Meuse-Argonne battle which was still going on and added to that had to go perpendicular to the direction of troops in rear areas of the St. Mihiel. In other words they had to go the west while the St. Mihiel troops were all headed due north. That meant a cross-cut office and special army and corps troops, artillery, tanks, engineers, signal, troops, and every of that sort had to be located and drawn out of the battle to move over to the Meuse-Argonne front. A great many of these were French and, we had a great deal of trouble with them because they were tired. They were tired then they got there from fighting and now they were very tired from the St Mihiel thing and now we

were starting off to move them to a new battle. We had quite a hard time moving them. We had a hard time finding them in the first place in the general confusion of the hundreds of thousands of troops involved here and they didn't move very promptly, as was to be expected from very tired, heavily used troops.

However, we got this movement started. At first it had to be handled in extreme detail to prevent complete confusion on the Meuse-Argonne front. Walter Grant was of great help to me in this. That was the most difficult troop movement I ever imagined. And we had some trucks or busses that the French had given us, enough to carry the foot troops, of one division. Our complication there was, our trucks moved at one speed, machine gun carts moved at another speed and the tanks moved at another speed. And it was a very difficult thing with only one or two roads going around the point and up to the north and going entirely at night, to get this in such a fashion that they could manage without confusion.

I remember with some amusement an incident that occurred there in the office. The Chief of Staff of a division -- it was the First Division, incidentally -- came in to consult with me about the order they had received and also to answer some questions as to what other they might do. What was going on there--was that the advance in the battle had been of such an extent that there was a possibility of the division cutting across the salient in the valley, of the Cure. But we did not know how clear that was none of us had ever been through the place, but it would be a tremendous saving in the movement of the machine gun carts, the movement of the artillery and the movement of the trucks if they could get through. We were discussing this and I was changing the orders around in a fashion to do it the way he thought they might be able to do it in the First Division. He was able to tell me where the troops were at that moment in the battle because they had played a leading part in that battle and had moved a great deal and now it was a question of just exactly where they were located and how they could be turned into the valley of the Cure.

At the same time there was an old friend of mine, a much older officer -- he had been a student officer when I was an instructor at Leavenworth -- that is to say he was an old friend of mine. He had just landed in France and he had the good luck to be sent up to that front to be the town major of the town of Bar-le-Duc. He sat there listening to this

Chief of Staff of the First Division and myself going over this and changing the orders around to meet just what the Chief of Staff of the division thought could be done and then he hurried back to rejoin the division with his newly modified orders largely at his suggestion. After he had left the room this newly arrived officer in France, this coming town major of Bar-le-Duc, this old friend of mine, said, "May I make a comment?" I said, "Certainly, you can make a comment. Why shouldn't you make a comment?" He said, "You might be offended." I said, "No, I won't be offended. I might be relaxed by it." "Well," he said, "I want just to observe that if orders are issued they are supposed to be obeyed and not to be discussed and changed." Well, as the orders he had worked with had probably never exceeded a regiment and probably most of his life had been a battalion or a company, we were now talking about hundreds of thousands of troops -- general confusion over the roads-- another big battle pending -- and it was rather absurd, or to be expected, comment. I was always sort of amused by this because he was a rather pedantic sort of fellow. If we had done that we would have wrecked ourselves about every twenty minutes. However, that was the way we were getting started in this troop movement into the Meuse-Argonne. I was interested in having illuminated signs made at some of the great crossroads so that the marches at night could be better coordinated.

I started to talk about the trucks which were a very important part. There were enough trucks for the foot troops or at least the two infantry brigades of the divisions. Of course the machine gun carts were free of that. They would have to go on another column. The 37 mm guns and trench mortar outfits and of course, the horses of the artillery, and all the trains. Well it was a very, very complicated affair and these trucks were invaluable, to us. But they were controlled by Foch's headquarters by a major who was in charge of all of them. So we would run these truck drivers through with the whole foot troops of a division and then have to bring them back. Well the trouble was these fellows were desperately in need of rest because they had been up in the center there on the French front, moving desperately to get the troops around on these offensives that were being carried out and now they were in this thing day and night. They had two men on the driver's seat one would sleep while the other drove. Now the great question was where they could eat and we had great trouble getting them fed. We had some American staff officers, who didn't

understand this thing and didn't comprehend at all what was going on, that kicked about these Frenchmen coming in to get some food and we had to deal very drastically with them to make them wake up to the fact that we couldn't move our troops unless we fed these drivers. And also they had an hour or two to give them a place to sleep, although most of them could sleep in the trucks. Well this went on until some of the trucks were taken away from us and called back to the French. We had only enough for about a brigade and a half. So they were put at the disposal of this division which was to start its move and the division commander wanted to move a complete brigade. He had the trucks for a complete brigade but he also had the trucks-for about half a brigade. And as he liked to move a brigade at a time, he didn't use these trucks. So promptly the French reclaimed them. So we just lost seat places for about four or five thousand men -- I guess more than that. Well that was a calamity and the division commander came in about that time and he told me -- he was a very fine officer and I liked him very much but he didn't understand this business. It was brand new to him and he made a fateful decision. When he came in and told me he wanted to move his division as a unit, so he wouldn't split this brigade and he wouldn't be able to move those trucks until the first brigade of trucks came back. Well I informed him that we had lost all those trucks and if General Pershing ever heard that he would never forgive him. And he had done a very, very serious thing. He was completely flabbergasted, and very much concerned and frightened but he showed complete lack of acquaintance with how these things turn out in a great affair of this character and he would try to do it like it was done on a piece of paper or a map. Well we had all sorts of things like that going on. When we got through with the affair we had to go up in the French Army there and have them take the troops in the last phase of this concentration and then these French troops had to come back. And the concentration finally got into shape roughly on time. Unfortunately, just the day before the battle there was a raid by the Germans and they captured some French prisoners who were put in front of the Americans in the advanced trenches and some of the Americans too, I think. I was terribly distressed over this because it meant to me the Germans would know we were coming in the attack. When I spoke to General Drum about it, he said, "We are not certain about this," and he called up General Craig who was my predecessor as Chief of Staff and who was then Chief of Staff of the 1st

Corps. And he called him by his first name -- Malin -- and he said, "How about that -- how about those prisoners from the raid on the First Corps front." And Malin replied, "There weren't any prisoners taken." And I remember Drum saying, "Malin, you are a joy forever," and he turned to me and said, "There weren't any prisoners." "Well, I said, "Drum, how do you know that?" And he said, "Well he just told me." I said, "How does he know it?" Well, they told him." I said, "How do any of them know it except the first leading battalion and they know whether they lost prisoners or not until late tonight." I had been with troops for pretty nearly a year then and I knew what a great difficulty it was getting any information from the advanced platoons back to the regimental headquarters. Once it got to regimental headquarters it could very quickly be telephone or telegraphed back. And the minute it got back there to the division, to the corps, to the army was all a very quick procedure. But getting it from that front trench back, to the regimental headquarters was a long, long affair. And sometimes it would take all day before you got your correct information. Sure enough there were prisoners taken and it's presumed that the Germans had some intimation that the attack was coming. However, it didn't do any great harm except that we didn't go as far as we thought we should go.

These men advanced very well at the start. Then they got into these dugouts; and they got after souvenirs. They went into the dugout for a German in a sense and then they stayed for a souvenir and the whole advance lost its momentum and the Germans very quickly readjusted themselves and put up a vicious defense from there on. As a matter of fact if the troops could, have been kept together and have gone straight ahead, they probably could have gone as far that first day as we made in the first month, because we fought a very desperate battle with the Germans after that halt or loss of momentum.

I think your comment there about this troop movement that they refer to as being one of those recognized at the time and their judgment has stood through the years as the most, magnificent staff operation in the war referred to the Meuse-Argonne concentration and not to the St. Mihiel, because the St. Mihiel was not so complicated.

Going back to the planning for St. Mihiel, [Meuse-Argonne] I never saw the plans for the tactical deployment until the fight had started because I was entirely absorbed in the concentration of troops, getting the army lined up for the fight. I knew the positions, they

should be in and my job was to get them into those positions. After that I saw for the first time the plan for the battle which was then underway and a few days later the Chief of Operations of the Army was relieved and I was put in his place. That came just at the time there was an order to send some divisions to Belgium and to replace other troops that were going to Italy where there had been a necessity for troops. But it was very hard to get these troops out and on their way up to Belgium to join the Army up there.

At this time, in the early part of the battle, most of our special units were French, but during the battle the newly arriving American troops came in so that we could replace a great many of the French units by American units. I am talking about engineer units and special artillery units and tank units and things of that sort. Once we got into the battle, the great problem was to resume the advance. The division on the left, the division next to the Meuse-Argonne forest, got into trouble and the First Division had to be hurried out of support position and carried up to the front. They had to travel more or less off the road over these deep trenches, and, with the machine gun carts and all, it was a very difficult thing to do. No Man's Land was some kilometers in width and it was a morass that didn't look like there was a space ten yards square that hadn't been struck by a great shell. It was a morass. There was no trace of the roads left at all except the Route National and there was some trace there, but on the retirement of a German attack the Italians had blown up the road so successfully that we had a terrible time getting around the crater.

So it was the crossing of No Man's Land and getting the artillery across that was so very, difficult and so very important. One commander who had previously lost his regiment for something a long time back and now had it again -- he didn't have the light regiment this time -- he had a 155 mm regiment and these heavy guns. And he hastened up on his initiative, crossed No Man's Land, and the weight of these guns completely wiped out this very poorly ballasted trail that we had made across No Man's Land and set the affair back, about a day and a half, which was a great tragedy at the time as we were trying to get light artillery across and supporting troops across. There were the confusions you would expect in newly engaged divisions, in a newly organized Army, in a mixed Army of French and Americans -- the French very, very tired, and the Americans very, very cocky. We worked it out, finally got well settled, but we had a very desperate battle on the left of

the Army up towards the town of Extremont. There the First Division suffered terrific casualties. They had already suffered very heavy casualties at Soissons and now they took an awful beating because they had advanced and continued to advance for quite a distance when they were being shot at from the rear across the valley towards the Meuse-Argonne forest. Then occurred the effort to release the Lost Battalion. And that could only be done by getting in behind the Germans which was finally managed and relief brought to those hard pressed troops which has gained great fame by their predicament. We finally came up against what you might call the northern line and there we got ready for the great attack which led up to Sedan. I've forgotten how many divisions took off in that, but we tried to get them rested a little bit. In order to do that, we had to hold the other divisions in line when they were just tired to death. But there was no other way to manage it. And it was very necessary to go and see the division commanders and see the regimental commanders. In some of them, the regiments had lost all organization and they were groups of men, but they had to hold on and they fought on so that these partially rested divis could go forward in the final attack on November 1st, I think it was, which led up to the heights finally above, Sedan.

Q. 10c. Was the Meuse-Argonne planning task one of the toughest you ever had?

A. You asked the question if Meuse-Argonne planning was the toughest. Well I wasn't in the initial planning. I was only in the planning day by day though we tried to make it cover a week's prospects at least. Though it was so very difficult to do, with these tired divisions and the constant changes in the battle at the front due to the necessary withdrawal of French troops and the induction of brand new American units of the smaller type -- not of the divisional type. However, we managed to get the November 1st attack off, though as I say, before it, was the great problem to hold these tired, exhausted, heavily suffering troops in line long enough to line up to the other troops, partially rested, to have an organized attack. And it was a great relief, great joy to all of us, when the center of the attack carried to the heights of Bathelemont -- I think, I don't know, whether that was the big ridge in the center of the attack or not. I know they said Foch was very, much delighted when word came in of their capture. Then the fight went up towards the Sedan front and they almost stopped fighting the Germans then and it became a battle between the First Division and the Forty-second Division who had the right-of-way and who got to the place first. I think they are still fighting that.

I would go up to the battle front and it was very hard to get up there on account of the traffic. And then after you got across No Man's Land the only way you could do was to get on a horse and go up there that way. I did that and I did that with General Drum, who was Chief of Staff of the [First] Army, and of course we had a great deal of our debating while we were riding. I remember one night we were coming from Verdun. We had started the battle on that wing and we wanted to go across until we struck the famous *Sacra Via*, which was the great road which supplied the French Army during the battle of Verdun. We wanted to get back to Souilly, the Army headquarters. We were so busy talking that the chauffeur went by this point [he had changed to automobile now]. I came to by recognizing some other point way to the west, so we turned around and went all the way back almost to the vicinity of Verdun and started again and began talking again, and again we talked by the turnoff and the man went by that and went way over to the west again and we had to come back. And we didn't hit it until the third time. And we got home about two in the morning.

The great trouble here was keeping the various organizations -- along the front really aware of what was happening along other portions of the front. Because each one thought he was the only one who was having this desperate situation, when as a matter of fact, everyone was having, it pretty much and we were now getting into some French troops over towards Verdun where we had both Americans and French. The Germans had hard luck on this front. They had had an Italian division, several Italian divisions as I recall, Austrian divisions, on that front. [He obviously meant to say Austrian in view of next sentence]. They were a little bit leery about them and, as you recall, the Austrians surrendered first. And so they kept some Germans there to stiffen up the Austrian front which was to the east and northeast of Verdun. Nothing happened on that front at all so they withdrew the German divisions that were stiffening up the Austrians and the next day we attacked on that front and the Austrians pretty largely folded up and let us make a considerable advance.

I remember there was a corps of French troops, Moroccan divisions, including the Foreign Legion, etc., and the Chief of Staff of this corps had been the Chief of Staff of the Moroccan division with the Foreign Legion when I witnessed the battle of Verdun the

previous August. He came in to see about a change of orders, just understanding of the orders that was going on his corps up near the Verdun front. And he made the remark to me, "I never saw anything like this. It's change, change, change." I said, "Are you talking about the American staff?" And he said "Yes" and I said, "I heard you myself say when you were with the Moroccan division that the French staff changed, changed, changed. It was a *guerre de papier* and a *guerre de changement* and now you are accusing us of it." And he laughed and said, "Yes, that's about true, but I think you make a better job of changing and I don't mean you change better, but you make a better job of changing frequently than even the French did." I know he was so astonished to find me -- I was a captain when I went through the fight with the Foreign Legion -- and now here just a year later I was Chief of Operations of an army that had almost a million men in it. Such procedure such as that was unknown to the French Army.

Q. 11. An often told study is that of the conflict between I and V Corps concerning the capture of Sedan. In the absence of Drum, Marshall and Conner drafted a memorandum to General Dickman and General Summerall relative to the occupation of Sedan. It said that I Corps should go in. Drum later added, "Boundaries will not be considered binding." Summerall ordered the 1st Division to march to Sedan. They marched across the I Corps area and into an area held by the French. A patrol took General MacArthur prisoner. The French exploded. Liggett also exploded, but had to calm General Dickman "beside whose purple wrath Liggett's rage was no more than a spat of temper." Any comment on this episode?

A. You asked for comments on the famous episode of the 1st Division and the 42d Division and General Summerall and General Dickman and the French. Theodore Roosevelt [Jr.] got in front of his old regiment -- I think it was the 16th [26th] Infantry and pushed on as hard as he could. He had to walk with a staff because he had this knee that had been shot up and I had gotten him back for command of the thing and he was held to be absent without leave from his unit he was assigned to in the south of France. But he was going with his old regiment and making a fine job of leadership. And all of this got complicated up on the front and when he went through the French line, they were lying down and he barged on through to head for Sedan and they rushed up and protested that it

was their sector. "Well" he said, "you aren't advancing." And he went right along. And when they discovered he was Theodore Roosevelt, then they all stood up and cheered him and he went on ahead.

The fight between Summerall and Dickman was very intense and it went back to all sorts of jealousies. The real factors in the case were largely ignored and it kept on in a senseless way for almost the rest of their services. The addition of the words -- "boundaries are not to be considered binding" -- I didn't put it in. But boundaries couldn't be considered binding to carry out what we told them to do," which was the center corps to support the corps on its left which was the I Corps and you couldn't get over there and support that corps without crossing your boundary on your left to do it. Drum thought it was sensible to put it in and we put it in. But that was always used as the arguments on the Sommerall side and I don't know how the Dickman crowd called that. But the thing was rather senseless. And it started off with a jealousy they were jealous of General Summerall's great reputation which he had made in the hard fighting. And the whole thing to my mind was out of place. The thing was we were succeeding weren't there to fight each other. There's going to be all sorts of turbulence on the battlefield and this thing was carried back to old animosities. I didn't have much patience with it, but I wasn't the one receiving the animosity--of course, the French exploded because they were standing still and these other troops went through them. I have told you the episode of Roosevelt. The 42nd Division troops that had gotten almost to the heights of Sedan, of course, they got mad. Well, I can understand that in a way. But nevertheless, all of them could get together to do something rather than shoot at each other, which they almost did.

The fellow that released General MacArthur, that is who identified him was Hjalmer Erickson who was in command of a brigade in the First Division and he was out on the road there and he identified him and released him. Of course, there was all kinds of confusion all over the place. The main thing was that General MacArthur was up there trying to press the attack and got the thing ahead when this thing occurred.

Q. 12a. Marshall was requested for regimental command in late September 1918 but, the request was turned down. He became Chief of Operations of First Army and Pershing proposed that Marshall be a brigadier general, but promotions were frozen by the

Armistice. Marshall became Chief of Staff of VIII Corps. Are the above details about assignments and promotions accurate?

A. In paragraph 12, the details about the assignments are correct.

Q. 12b. Could you describe the Victory Parade in Paris? (There is a photograph of you on a white horse approaching the Arc de Triomphe -- a little way behind Pershing and two or three other officers).

A. Well, as to the Victory Parade, I don't know quite how to describe that. It was a magnificent affair, and of course, it was a magnificent occasion. It was the first passage of the Arc de Triomphe since the Franco-Prussian War and, therefore, a very historical occasion. The most beautiful effect of the parade was when we turned up towards the Rue Royale -- I guess -- turned up towards the Madeleine and behind the great pillars of the Madeleine they had dropped red velvet curtains and it gave a wonderful effect. I remember the photograph you refer to.

Q. 13. In March 1919, Gen. Drum, Marshall and Willey Howell went on a lecture tour. Stimson saw Marshall for the first time at Langres and was impressed by his speech. Any comments on meeting with Stimson?

A. Stimson, a fellow named Murphy, and two other very prominent men, who had temporary commissions, had a mess to themselves. I have forgotten for the moment who the other two are. Oh, yes, one was later was then a partner in J. P. Morgan and Co. and died rather young later on. I have forgotten his name. Stimson and I went horseback riding and he talked at the mess about these things. And he talked a great deal on the horse about it. Later on, I saw Stimson before this, I guess I saw him later when he was sent back home to be promoted from Lieutenant Colonel to Colonel and put in charge of one of the new regiments. He didn't get back in time for the final blows.

Of course, my meeting with Stimson led to other things. When I was at Benning I remember I was playing tennis when I got a telegram in which he wanted me, to go to the Philippines with him. And while he didn't say it in the telegram, it was to be the prospective Brigadier General and head of the constabulary. I declined. I was trying to get away from staff jobs, although I was much complimented by his request.

Q. 13c. Any comments on performance at the Opera?

A. I think I've described the opera. [He did not describe the opera]

Q.13d. Were you in Paris during the Peace Conference?

A. I was not in Paris during the session of the Peace Conference.

Q. 13e. How well did you get to know France?

A. I came to know France pretty well in certain sectors, of course. I knew the people pretty well, particularly the country people -- peasantry -- I had lived with them. Various parts of the country I came to know exceedingly well. Northeast of Beauvais -- up towards, I have forgotten the name now -- and of course, around Nancy and Tours and that section of France, Luneville, later on the district of Beaune and, of course, around Paris and Chaumont and Langres.

I might tell of a very interesting affair that occurred at Langres where they had the staff school. They had to depend almost entirely on French and British instructors and there was some little jealousy there among them and there was a preference of one crowd for the British instructor and of another crowd for the French instructor. Largely those who spoke a little French favored the French instructor; the others favored the British instructor. Anyway, they were doing their best to get ahead without having their own talent for the purpose. I came in there as being the first-officer they had at the school to lecture at the school or anything who had been on the staff and during operations -- on the American side --and therefore I was brought back to talk and give my reactions which I tried to do particularly to prepare them for a lot of intense feeling which was really a misunderstanding and I thought if I could save them from a lot of that, I would do the most good. And that was the part that General Dickman, who was there, thanked me and Stimson and others liked the most. Anyway, the great German offensive broke loose March 21st and was going on at the time I lectured. The first day, the 21st, of course we just got the news of the affair and a little bit of the extent of the affair. You will recall the British Fifth Army was literally destroyed in this first part of this offensive and a great gap was made in the line. That's where General Debeney was moved from eastern France to command the new Army forming in the gap in the vicinity of -- well, I've forgotten that -- it was the peak of the great salient of the western front. The second day the thing was getting very much hotter, we could tell that. The German advances were far greater than

had been customary in trench warfare. They generally made very, very short advances. On the third day they made deep advances and we felt it at Langres because an order came in relieving a British instructor to return immediately to his unit. I was called in by the officer in charge of the school, who later became Chief of Staff of the AEF, MacAndrew, and asked to take over his job. They didn't talk to the First Division or anything or at least I didn't know what they did, but at least that's the way it came to me. So this man tried to tell me in half an hour what his whole course was. And I was to take over his course and teach that. So I went back from that and I had no more than gotten in the classroom than another direction came to me to come back to General MacAndrew's office and here were two more British officers and was directed to takeover their two courses. So I retired with them and they occupied about an hour or hour and a half explaining their whole courses to me. I had this first man's course. Now I had two more. And damned if before I got through with them, a fourth man was relieved and I got his course. So I had four Britishers courses that I had to take there in a period of about three and a half hours. I came out so befuddled with data and everything and I was trying to take over a Britisher's appreciation of this thing and technique of theirs, that it was altogether a very hard thing. However, that's the way it was. And that night at dinner, which I had with with General MacAndrew and General (oh, it was a brigadier more or less in charge of instruction, I will remember his name later), we talked this over quite a bit and General MacAndrew was very much concerned about it. And the next thing that happened was that next morning at breakfast an order came in for me to return to the First Division immediately and a car would meet me north of Chaumont near Domremy. And about a half an hour later, or less than that, because I got out as fast as I could, I left for the First Division. And I got up there and found it was just getting ready to leave for the scene of the battle where the British Fifth Army had been driven out, and very badly handled. I remained with the First Division then until towards the middle of July that summer. We moved immediately, going south of Paris motoring. The troop trains were going south of Paris, too, and the motor trains were going south of Paris, too, because there was too much confusion north of Paris in supplying the French Army and everything to meet this great German offensive.

I know we spent the night at Fontainebleau and I was very much taken back by

the fact that we ate at the famous hotel there, outdoors, very charming, but we sat at the same table four of us, that Mrs. Marshall and I had sat at not so long previously, made quite a moving reaction for me. Then the next morning we started again up the trail. We were now west of Paris and we finally came into these assembly areas as they called them. I learned a great deal about troop movements during this procedure because it was a tremendous affair and I thought perfectly beautifully done by the French in their handling of the railroads. The trains would come through, it seemed to me, at ten minute intervals and I would have to be at the train when it came in because I didn't know who was on it, maybe part of a French division or part of an American division. And if it was an American division I had to catch the fellow and give him his orders as to where he was to march after he detrained. So we had a very hectic time there grabbing these trains as they came in. And if they were French they went on off. And, as I recall, there were two or three French divisions, moving through there at the same time, and the [American] First Division, and they were doing it without confusion and it was really a great demonstration of the highest form of troop management and particularly as this was being done very hastily.

So we got up near a place called Gisors and in the First Division, that was its center of concentration and where we had our headquarters, and we stayed there several days in training and in open warfare. General Pershing was rather irritated by the French commander moving in and taking charge of the training and we always had those difficulties. And the only way to do was just to make the best you could of the affair. Of course, General Pershing and his staff were interested in a policy being established and not allowed to grow out of these affairs and the French were intense on having American troops assigned to French divisions. So it had to be watched very carefully. So we had several big exercises there and we had some regimental demonstrations there and the French were there all over the place -- rather super critical. There was plenty to criticize, plenty to criticize. But these men they were looking at and all in such a particular way did the most magnificent fighting later on and I think the majority of them became casualties. Because I recall the First Division which had an organizational strength of twenty-five thousand, I think, had a casualty rate of twenty-six thousand. And most of these normally

would come out of the infantry because the artillery didn't have anything like the casualties of the infantry had because they were further back as a rule. So the infantry casualties were very, very heavy. In one fight there of the four colonels one was killed; of the four lieutenant colonels all were wounded and I think one or two killed. Of the majors, there were three to each regiment, there were four regiments, which made twelve majors, every one was killed or wounded. They took a terrific amount of casualties but they went right straight ahead and it was determining -- that and the Second Division really did the determining stroke, which stopped the advance of the German Army. Now that's a rather strong thing to say because the French were putting up a fine fight everywhere. The Third Division had gotten dragged into it there at Chateau-Thierry and had done a fine job there, got very little credit for it because the Marines were referred to by name in one of the radios and that turned all the publicity on them, whereas the Third Division at the crossing of the bridge and all at Chateau-Thierry did a magnificent job and stopped the Germans. All this was a very exciting procedure and, as I say a very interesting one.

When we came north from Fontainebleau, we ran into a new army of the French -- not exactly, it was a group of armies. I reported there and we found out where the First Division was to go, and that was over at Gisors. And we got straightened out of that affair but we learned a great deal about how they were handling these troops -- it was very instructive to see, and a tremendous battle problem to handle without confusion. The railroad part I have already described. The marching part came next and I became heavily involved in that when the movement of the First Division occurred from Gisors north to Froisy which is north of Beauvais.

And when we moved north there, I think we moved with three or four French divisions, and you had to be very particular about how you went about this thing. And there were some roads you weren't allowed to put certain units on. I remember there were a lot of the lighter metalled roads that they didn't want the 155s on and, as I recall, our regiment of 155s went right on this road-and just broke right through it all over. They got up there but they did terrible damage on the way up. It was all in the spirit of getting to the battle and getting up as soon as they could. When we got up near Froisy and turned to our right, it was a very interesting thing to see because the front was marked by observation

balloons in any number right along. And as we went over from Froisy to where the First Division was going to commence its deployment, I found us in the middle of the deployment of the French Aerial Division. The only one they had. And that reminded you a little bit of the Crusaders of old when each fellow had his tent and his shield and coat of arms out in front, because his little tent fly covered his pursuit plane and he was there. It was the French Aerial Division with the great fighters of the French Army, and the air was just full of these planes coming in and going out and they had a terrible job on their hands. I came to know most of them quite well and they were always anxious to get confirmation when they shot down a plane and as a great deal of the shooting was over the First Division they always had to come to the First Division observers on the ground to get confirmation of the fall of the German plane. And I am not ashamed to say that I told our people to be very liberal, because the easier they could get confirmation over us, the more they would fight over us, which was the case. Some of the things that came out later -- the great French aces were there and we came to know them well because they always came into my section when they were trying to get a confirmation of a victory and I was always very careful to treat them in the most complimentary fashion.

I remember one of the most famous ones. As the fighting died down a little bit, abated a little bit, we were finally allowed, two of us, to go off to Beauvais to get a meal. I was desperately tired and I hadn't any real rest for weeks and weeks and General Bullard sent us off in order to get a good meal and get a change. We were living underground entirely and that is pretty depressing, in an old wine cellar that was very deep, in which I tried to take Mrs. Marshall in when I was over there visiting it from the meeting of the United Nations and she wouldn't go at all. She wouldn't believe we ever lived down there. That was a palace in those days because it was safe. Anyway, we went to the hotel in Beauvais and this leading ace was at the table with a very beautiful girl. Of course, he was the great attraction to the women. He was the great hero and they should have made a lot of him because he was risking his life every day and in every way and this girl was awfully good looking. And he came over and spoke to me and he met the others at the table. There were two generals--and one became Chief of Staff of the Army and one became Corps Commander and they were not at all loathe to meet him. But the funny part of it was, and

the reason I tell you is, we got away about two weeks later and went into Beauvais for a meal. And this time he was there with his fiancée and her mother. And the fiancée was anything but good looking. But he was very courteous to her that was an arranged marriage of course. She was going to marry the hero. I don't know what became of the pretty girl he had two weeks previously. When he looked at us, he winked at us but didn't come over.

Now I had better look here and see what you have down for me next.

We learned a great deal about fighting up at this time. It was a continuous affair terrifically heavy artillery bombardment. The night was just hideous. I used to try to sleep upstairs in this chateau but they drove me down when they began hitting the building with these 8-inch shells which sounded like the end of the world. So I found more composed rest down in this deep wine cellar that I have already referred to. Then we had a very difficult situation. We had the first mustard gas attack and that was a vicious thing. The brigade commander had directed the regimental commander at this town -- he sent word up to him to evacuate the town and go out into the fields and woods. Well, it was raining hard and shells were breaking all over the place. So this fellow preferred his dugout. Of course, the worst thing you can do with mustard gas is to get in a wet dugout. That just permeates the whole business. They were ordering him out and he wasn't going. So I was sent up the brigade commander didn't go -- from Division Headquarters with orders to relieve him. And that isn't very pleasant. Well I had a hard time getting up there because I got shelled out about a dozen times and the trouble was that when I would lie on the ground, I would lie in mud or something and also I was very much afraid of lying down in a mustard gas shell hole which would have ruined me. When I finally got into town -- that was a bad trip through the town -- because of the blasting of the buildings -- it was under very heavy artillery fire -- I've forgotten the estimate of the number of shells in there, it was something appalling. I finally got down to the dugout of the commander of the regiment and I went right down in it and I met him there and he had had a gas mask on for about ten hours and that's a very exhausting thing and they all looked very exhausted. And, of course, I came up to order them to do what they didn't want to do. And I was explaining to him that he didn't have much choice, that if he didn't choose to do it, I was directed to relieve him. And we were discussing that when a shell hit outside right close to us and just shook-us

like jelly. And down the steps came a fellow, rather fat, fat-faced, jolly looking, but he wasn't looking jolly then, although he did have a grin at the time and he came down sitting, right down these steps and landed at the bottom. And his dugout had been blown up and he had been blown out of it and found himself outside on the ground. Anyway, I was struggling with this man to make him understand that if he didn't, do this I had to relieve him. And unfortunately I can't tell what happened except they had an awful battle about it and I had a very, very --- (end of side one).

SIDE 2

I think that's enough on the First Division fighting up there. I've described the degree of the casualties and all. We had to extend and take over another French division's front, so we had a two French division front because we were much larger than a French division at the time of the great German offensive. And we had quite exciting times then. I remember Roosevelt was worried about the French retiring on his right and he put on a little precipitous counterattack right into the French zone. I know that Debeney had directed that not a foot of ground be given up. And they had a meeting, I had gone to all the previous meetings but General Bullard went to this one and he was congratulated because Debeney told him that the American division was the only one that carried out his orders. And it stood pat.

I remember I had them organize all the men with the trains, drivers, everything of that sort, Signal Corps men that were not in actual use, and we made up two scratch battalions and one was put in charge of the adjutant and one was put in charge of the judge advocate. And the adjutant and the judge advocate came up to my office and my assistant was giving them their instructions. And out of the window -- this valley was right in front of us and, there was a railroad running down the valley. And they wanted to know specifically just what their orders were exactly. He took them to-the window and said, "You see the valley there?" "Yes." "And you see the railroad along there?" "Yes." "Well," he said, "you are to die east of the railroad. And that's all the order you need." Well there was a little bit of a shock of a twist to it, but it was a fact. That's what we wanted them to do. If they were going to die, die east of the railroad. We couldn't give up any more ground.

I've already commented on the Opera. I was not in Paris during the meeting of the Peace Conference.

Q. 13e. How well did you get to know France?

A. I've described how well I knew France.

Q. 13f. How good was your knowledge of French at this time?

A. My knowledge of French as to Military French, I knew pretty well. And I learnt most of it, it seemed to me, in a day when I had to represent the 1st Division when they were talking of organizing a counterattack in this desperate situation during the German offensive and apparently the First Division was largely going to make it alone. And I was insisting that if the First went forward, there had to be a French division on either flank. And we had quite a great tussle there. And I had to understand. I couldn't fail to understand because the whole affair of the First Division depended on it. It seemed that when I came out of there I have never been more tired and I learnt more French under the pressure at that time than I had in previous months. My military French was pretty good. I found the casual French-speaker was untrustworthy on military French because I knew more about the exact meaning and terminology than he did. Salon French I didn't know at all.

Q. 13g. How many of the outstanding French, leaders did you meet during the war (Foch, Joffre, Weygand, Nivelle, Clemenceau, Briand or others?).

A. I knew Joffre fairly well; Weygand quite, well; Nivelle not at all until after the war; Clemenceau very well because when he first came to the division in August 1917 he was not prime minister. He was about to be prime minister and he knew it [he came to power in November 1917]. He insisted that the Americans must get into the action right away they must shed blood. He made an impassioned speech there. Well, General Sibert couldn't do this. This was General Pershing's decision. This was very difficult for General Sibert. But I was present during this interview and did some of the talking in connection with it because we were not at all trained for action -- just really recruits yet -- and yet the situation was desperate. Later on I came to know [Clemenceau] him in a better way. I had gone out one afternoon with a French liaison officer, the son of the great art dealer and afterwards ran the great art store that was on the Rue Royale and on Fifth Avenue in New

York -- Seligman -- and we were sitting on the hillside. It was a sunny afternoon and we had visited a number of batteries and a number of other positions up on the front. And I notice these heavy explosions here and there of trench mortar bombs and they were scattered about a great deal. And we sat there and watched it for awhile and I asked Seligman what it meant, the indiscriminate firing like that. He looked at it for awhile and he said, "I tell you what I think they are doing. I think they are registering preparatory to shooting. They are registering." So we sat there longer and watched just what they did and charted ourselves every place that they struck. Then we went back to the front again and went along and talked to the regimental commanders to see what data they had. They had some but they had not noticed this thing much, because we had an overall view of it all from this high hill. Well, we came to the conclusion that there was one place not far from Seicheprey -- this valley of Seicheprey there -- where the line stuck out quite a ways right on the edge of the woods that seemed to be the center of the registration. So I prepared an order that the platoon commander in that section there should vacate that advanced position at dusk and should not occupy it till daylight and that certain artillery units should be prepared to fire on that area at night in case of a French [German] general bombardment. Sure enough just at dawn the next morning the Germans attacked. Well, it was too bad that one platoon commander was too uncomfortable outside -- it was cold -- that he took his command back in and met the raiders head on. And he lost; I think it was ten prisoners. The other platoon commanders carried out the orders absolutely. And they just shot up these raiders and we captured German prisoners. And it is seldom ever that a raid is stopped because you don't know when it is going to happen and they concentrate all their forward artillery and everything and then pull it and there you are in the dark. But in this case they were ready for them and they shot them up very badly and took German prisoners which is quite unusual under the circumstances and defeated the raid entirely except for the loss of these few men by this platoon commander disobeying his orders and coming back into position at dawn which is exactly the time the raid is carried out. Of course, he was killed, so you couldn't say very much about it.

Clemenceau was now prime minister. Well this was a great astonishment to the French, because as I say in a raid you are almost doomed to surprise. Here's a whole front of hundreds of miles and some one point they pick out for a raid. You don't know that

because they used all the efforts of secrecy they possibly could. And here the Americans had met the first raid and won really a victory. We had captured their flame fighters. We had captured -- I think they had brought up even a gun -- 47 mm gun or something like that. We captured a lot of them. We took a number of prisoners. We killed a great many and it was altogether an American victory.

Well that was so unexpected and quite contrary to French assumptions about our troops-- they had seen so many untrained troops -- that Clemenceau himself came from Paris and came right up there and I escorted him. And he came up and he was giving Croix des Guerre. And he was an old man and in doubtful health. But fortunately he had on rubber overshoes. And he gave these Croix des Guerre, but there was one fellow he didn't get. And as we were coming out -- it was rather difficult because we had to walk beside the trucks and there was only a foot width of path beside the trucks -- this fellow came loping down the road and he was yelling, "Wait for me, wait for me." And he caught up. He was about six feet two and gangling and of course, covered with mud. And he had been through the raid and had done rather a good stunt. He had taken several prisoners and Clemenceau had the medal for him. We had the name. And he was just yelling and yelling. Clemenceau understood a little English. And when the fellow came up, we stood there beside the trucks, having a very hard time finding any place to stand. And Clemenceau put this on him and shook his hand and said, "You called and you were late this morning. But yesterday was what counted and you weren't late yesterday, and congratulated him. It was very interesting that the Prime Minister should come from Paris the next morning and give these Croix des Guerre because it was quite a contrast to what they had expected of Americans because of the number of untrained troops they had met. And untrained troops over there got into terrible situations invariably. [Heffner -- Wasn't he called the Tiger? Yeah.] And I saw him after that a number of times.

Didn't I mention the men I knew -- Generals? (No sir). Did I mention my knowledge of French? (Yes sir). Of those French generals you mention, I knew Joffre well, fairly well. I should say Foch -- I knew Joffre also. Weygand I came to know pretty well. Nivelle, I never saw. Clemenceau I've just-described. Briard, I didn't know at all. There were several French corps commanders that I knew very intimately. I am sorry I can't remember their

names now -- one of them was a famous fighter. And I knew some of the brigadiers very well I know when I received the Croix de Guerre in the Plaza at Metz, poor old, who's the French general, the French general was tried afterwards and imprisoned, I was very fond of him, came to know him very, very well. (Heffner -- Petain). Yeah, Petain. He entertained us all at lunch at the German commander's villa there. The German commander had a long room, covered with deer heads and boar heads and everything of that sort and--we all assembled there. And the two brigade commanders of the Moroccan division-- it had brigades -- the others only had three regiments. The two brigade commanders were there and I knew them quite well from my experiences up there with them at Verdun and meeting them later on when they had terrific casualties on the British Fifth Army front. They came up and greeted me and we were delighted to see each other and we embraced and kissed and went through all the procedures of a French welcome. One fellow stood with his arm around me and I had my arm around him and we were having quite a time -- we had had a lot to drink -- and Petain came up and said, "I'm very glad to see you on such intimate terms with my fighting generals." I told him where I had been with them and that I valued their friendship. I valued their recognition very, very much and we had quite a time. Petain was talking there. Then General Pershing came up and interrupted and said, "General Petain, I want you to meet Colonel Marshall." And, Petain said, "I already know him well -- (had seen him a number of times) -- I already know him well. I just saw him on very friendly terms with two of my fighting brigadiers here." "Well," General Pershing said, "I want you to know him well because I asked him today, while were out of the Plaza to be my aide. His Army Corps that he is Chief of Staff of is being demobilized and he will now come and join me as my, aide." So Petain congratulated me then, and I came to see him quite often just as I did Foch. I wasn't on intimate terms at all with Foch though I travelled with him quite a bit in this country and saw him quite often with General Pershing. He was rather resentful if I said anything when I was with General Pershing. Nobody below the grade of a full general would say anything in front of Foch in the French Army and I was talking up there with very much lower rank to General Pershing when he was in conversation with Marshal Foch.

Q. 13h. Did you meet any of the outstanding British leaders during the war?

A. I didn't meet many of the British leaders. I met a great many afterwards formally at dinners. I met almost every Army commander and I met Sir Douglas Haig, of course. I think I met all their Army commanders. In fact, I sat one night at a dinner the Parliament gave with three of the British Army commanders. I don't remember the names any too well. They could be recalled to me very quickly. I knew more of the British liaison officers -- colonels.

General Pershing as top commander operated very largely through his operational staff that was General Fox Conner who was head of the G-3 organization so far as fighting was concerned. And he would make a temporary headquarters at the front. And, of course, for quite a long time, he commanded the First Army before it was split up into two armies. And then he commanded the group of armies. But he would either live on his train or otherwise get disposed on the battle front in order to be near the fighting and continue to command. And every now and then he would have to go off to Paris when some momentous meeting would occur.

Q. 13i. Did you have occasion to see President Wilson or to meet Franklin Roosevelt?

A. I had no occasion to see President Wilson.

Q. 14. How did Pershing operate as top American commander? What is your estimate of him as a leader?

A. General Pershing as a leader always dominated any gathering where he was. He was a tremendous driver, if necessary, a very kindly likeable man on off duty status, but very stern on a duty basis.

Q. 15. Any comments on the chief American, British, and French military leaders of the war?

A. I watched more in World War II about the effect of commanders. General Pershing had several staff officers, one in particular, that did a certain amount of his planning and they were very, oh, rather the German type of man. (Turn it off). To straighten myself out -- one or two of his officers, and some trying to copy his style, without his talents or without his prestige, were very severe and their requirements for the troops were unduly difficult, I thought. And no complaint was tolerated. Well, I think this did a great deal, of harm, allowing a man with that state of mind, that personality, to be in

a commanding position, a central position, I should put it. And I was very careful to watch out for that in World War II. If I found I was running into an officer that was sort of harassing everybody, I either relieved him or tamed him down right away, because it was very important that the High Command be understanding -- be understanding. What the High Command had to do, and which unfrequently they were loathe to do, was to see if his generals did their job and not the junior officers and not at all the men. The hard thing was to make them handle the upper crust. That was embarrassing and the War Department, I thought, always failed in its handling of its corps commanders and high officers. If they acted up and did something, there was never any reprimand, as far as I know, private or otherwise. I would write to the fellow in the frankest possible way and tell him exactly what was wrong with him and I would tell him that this letter was only seen by my stenographer who could be trusted and it would not be put in the files. But I wanted him to understand exactly how I felt and if it occurred again I would relieve him. And that happened oh, -- I wrote three or four letters like that to the highest -- very high--commanders and as long as it was quiet, you might say, if you were in the regiment, as long as you didn't tell your wife and the adjutant, you could do most anything and they would accept it. What they couldn't tolerate was the thing being discussed around. So, I found most of the men that I had dealt with very harshly, very arbitrarily I would say, became my very close friends afterwards.

Q. 21. What lessons did you learn in France that were to influence your actions in World War II?

A. Well, you asked me to recite the lessons I learned from the French that influenced me. Why, it was a continuous series of lessons. Most of them, what to do and quite a number what not to do. I learned the technique of high command, the technique of logistics, the technique of a great many of those things and I saw troops under various conditions. I saw their regard for them in many ways that were an education to me and I saw so many of the things they did wouldn't have worked with American troops at all. That was all very, very helpful and I would find myself leaning on that knowledge in dealing with things in World War II. The big thing I learned in World War II was the urgent necessity of frequent visits. Well, as I used a plane all the time and about every other

week, I would go on the road before we got into the general war. I would visit most of the places in the United States with fair frequency. I know when I went out to Fort Sill the first time; I find that that was the first time the Chief of Staff had ever been there in the history of the place. I was there time after time, but I could move quickly and I could act quickly. And I was abreast of what was going on all over the place. I could sense their reactions and I could see how they felt urgently about this or that which we at Headquarters did not feel so much and I would come to an understanding in their way and I could correct things almost instantly, particularly after Congress -- without my request -- placed first \$25 million and then \$100 million at my disposal with no accounting required. Most of this, however, was used for underwriting you might say. When something came up we thought we ought to do, it would take months to go through ordinary channels to get it through the hearings in Congress and the Budget and everything of that sort. But with this money I could put up the first \$10 million, let us say, or the first \$20 million and get the work all started right away and then when the appropriations got through we would get that refunded from the funds allotted for that purpose.

I couldn't recite the lessons. They were just without number. I had the observation of a number of high commanders. I saw General Summerall who was really the iron man. He was the nearest approach to the Jackson type that I saw in the war. And he was a wonder to watch when the fighting was on as a leader. His influence on the men was tremendous. And my admiration for him was very, very great. I thought as Chief of Staff he was a failure because he didn't fit into that and he was sort of suspicious of this or that and he had people that were exciting his suspicions you might say.

He and I got along very intimately throughout though he was antagonistic at the last toward General Pershing and General Pershing was antagonistic towards him. And it was all the fault of their followers. But as a commander he was superb. I never saw anything to beat him on the battlefield. I remember once he took the British division commander around. This man was going to relieve him. And Summerall took him on an inspection trip. And when he got through walking around and talking like a cathedral, as he did, with his cane, and shells breaking all over the place, this Britisher, who was accustomed to pretty hard fighting, came back. He said he had had enough of that he never

wanted to make another inspection with General Summerall. General Summerall was really unconscious of any feeling of fear. Somebody called his attention one day in the fighting off at Exermont, that where they were the shells were just skipping their heads and coming back in just showers. "Well," he said, "you mustn't feel that way about it. Every shell that comes here is one less over our devoted infantry."

Q. 22. I understand that General Pershing wanted to go on to Berlin. What was your own view?

A. At the time of General Pershing's problem of maybe going on to Berlin one of the great troubles was there wasn't the transport. The horses were all gone largely. And when they started the march into Germany, I had to unhorse brigade after brigade of artillery and leave them on the foot near the railheads and take their horses for the units that were, going into Germany. We were very hard put in those respects and if the battle had been carried on into Berlin, I don't know how it would have folded up. Of course, there was this to be said: The Germans needed to be licked well - to be licked well -- so they would not get back as really they did, marching, back ostensibly in triumph which was, of course, all hocus-pocus.

Q. 23. Did your failure to go to Berlin influence your views in regard to the unconditional, surrender formula in World War II?

A. As to the surrender terms, no.

Q. 24. Did you go into Germany during the occupation period?

A. Yes, I was in Germany during the occupation period.

Q. 25. Frazier Hunt, one of General MacArthur's biographers, says that General MacArthur went over General Pershing's head on 1918 to prevent Pershing from breaking up the 42nd Division. He said that thereafter Pershing and his close friends did everything they could against MacArthur. He says that Pershing influenced Conner and that Conner influenced you. Any comment?

A. Well, Frazier Hunt knows a lot more than I do [note of asperity]. I don't recall enough of this incident about the Forty-second Division to comment. But that was going on with practically every division always with very deep feelings on the part of the divisional people. And I just don't recall what happened there. It didn't make enough

impression on me. But as for General Pershing influencing General Conner on account of this and General Conner influencing me on account of that, that's nonsense.

Most of these troubles of that kind came from the staff. I saw that so many times. And I am happy to say that the staff I had around me never tried anything of that kind. And if I would lose my temper privately there about somebody in the field, General Hull in particular, and others would tame me down and persuade me not to send any message, or anything of that sort and I would cool off and decide in the end it was very much better not to do it, although I felt the way they were handling the thing was very much out of place. I always felt that General Stilwell had a very hard time in China because he talked in front of his staff and his staff reflected his coloration and that antagonized the British and, of course, antagonized the generalissimo [Chiang Kai-shek].

I would say this in regard to all this being written about my being hostile to General MacArthur. In the first place, it is damn nonsense. I did everything in the world I could for him. With the Assistant Secretary of War, who I had a letter from yesterday and have forgotten his name today (chuckles), now the Chairman of the Chase National Bank, McCloy. With McCloy we worked terribly hard and it was a hard job to do to have MacArthur put in command in Japan. Because the Navy wanted to control that and they put up quite a battle to get it. But we managed to control for MacArthur. All these things were too much feeling expressed by the staff. And a lot of that comes from the general talking in front of his staff. I don't think I ever said an adverse word about General MacArthur in front of the staff though he was very difficult -- very, very difficult at times -- particularly when he was on a political procedure basis. I don't ever recall saying a word in front of the staff. And I do recall suppressing them. I wrote his citation for the Medal of Honor to see that he got it. And I will tell this now. The British, the New Zealanders, and Australians knew nothing about his getting out of the Philippines and we didn't dare leak it any way and it had to be a success before we could really decide about it. And they had proposed a certain man to be commander there, an American. I am not going into that, who he was, but anyway they had proposed a certain man. I didn't answer because I was waiting to work this thing out of getting General MacArthur out of Corregidor. But when MacArthur landed in that desert country of Central Australia and we got the word -- I got the word --

confidentially, privately, that same morning early, before my breakfast as I recall. I called up by telephone the Prime Minister of Australia and the Prime Minister of New Zealand. Because what I did was I released a news thing immediately when the word of his landing in Australia came and saying that he was coming back to take command of the troops in that region - be the Allied commander. Well, as a matter of fact, there was no agreement for him to be the Allied commander by the Australians or the New Zealanders. They had proposed another man because they didn't know MacArthur was coming out. And, as I recall, before breakfast, I called both of them up -- got them on the phone -- and explained why I had made this news release that he would be the Allied commander, because he would be our proposal for it, and I wanted to release it instantly so that the Japanese couldn't say that he had deserted his command. And, the same thing was in connection with the award of the Medal of Honor. I wanted to do anything I could to prevent them saying anything about his leaving Corregidor with his troops all out there in this perilous position. I thought a Medal of Honor would be helpful so I communicated with him -- his chief of staff, Sutherland -- and as I recall Sutherland came back to me and asked me to draft it. And I drafted the citation for MacArthur's Medal of Honor. And I remember Mr. Stimson paid me a compliment. He didn't know I had done it at first. And he said -- to do a little personal bragging for which I must be pardoned he said, "Well this is very well done" when I said I did it. And he took it right to the President. And the President OKed it. All these things were staff stuff. And if the commander himself was of a suspicious nature and MacArthur was very much so -- he thought we were playing him down the river all the time, which we were not at all, it made it very, very difficult. It was very hard at first because we could give him literally nothing. We weren't in quality production. We didn't have hardly anything to send to Europe we had a campaign going on in Africa and we just couldn't give him anything. And Sutherland would come over -- his chief of staff -- and see me, to see what they might get and I was forced into the embarrassing position of really giving him nothing. It wasn't until August before Pearl Harbor that we began to get anything in any quantity and then we immediately started to send these things to the Philippines -- (Heffner -- 1941) -- 1941 -- what we could do we did do. It was a very trying thing for him because he just had nothing he just had nothing. And another thing was that I

found out during the course of affairs that the initial air men that we sent in were not up to standard at all. And I picked out the man he was very fond of and did great things out there --Mac -- Mac something or other --I've forgotten his name. And he was the first very good one he got and he was splendid.

Q. 26. Did you ever share the view that the United States troops won the war for Britain and France? (Some people say that we didn't win the war, but merely made it possible for Britain and France to dictate the peace).

A. No, I never shared the view that the United States troops won the war for the British and the French. [He is talking about World War II in his answer]. They won the war for the French all right. But the British endured -- fought alone with great heroism and great persistence and endured terrible hardships and terrible casualties and I tried to make that plain in my final report and I think if you will consult that you will find that I do that and pay a tribute to the Russians, which was not just a paper tribute, it was a fact. Their fighting was a tremendous, tremendous factor in the eventual victory. We came in time. Our arrival was determining but the great fight was made before we were even ready. We were the victims of unpreparedness. We were not on the too late and too little basis because I went in for enough stuff so that we really had it when it began to come. And I remember I was being severely criticized by certain congressmen who were starting on the economy hunt because I had too much of this and too much of that. And I had a committee call me up -- a friend on the committee asked that. -- I didn't want to go up myself on my own initiative -- I went up on this request to answer this specific charge. Well, I said that delighted my soul. That was the first time I knew of in American history where American troops in the field had too much of anything. And that I was very, very happy that was responsible. And they shut up then and didn't make any more criticisms.

Q. 9a. I notice that a number of these places were in the area where Patton's troops fought in World War II. Did you re-visit any of these places in 1944-45?

A. I didn't visit those places in 1944 and 1945. I was at Verdun. I was in the air over those fronts. In fact my most perilous flight was with Bradley from Verdun up to that place up in Holland which was only about five minutes flight from the German lines and I have forgotten the name of it. It was Montgomery's headquarters. I went over many of them, visited divisions

from Switzerland clear up to Holland just before the battle of the Bulge.

Q. What was your view about the establishment of the Supreme Command in 1918?

A. I had no particular views about the Supreme Commander in 1918. I thought they should have a Supreme Commander. How they were going to compose their various difficulties, I don't know. Fortunately, General Pershing who didn't have much in the way of troops ready at that time came out in a very generous disposition. But it is very difficult, very, very difficult, to manage a thing like this, and without Churchill and his tremendous influence with the British Parliament, we would have had a very hard time during the war and later on.

The Supreme Commander at the start was not a very good thing. I was opposed to our taking it right at the start and they didn't take it while I was Secretary of War [Chief of Staff]. I thought it hadn't been clarified enough, the fellow didn't have enough power and he would just be the goat as it were. Poor old Montgomery took it and I thought did very well in gradually getting the thing worked out. It was quite awhile on the side of having an American.

Q. 27. Colonel Marshall returned to the United States in 1919 on the Leviathan as Pershing's aide. There was a parade down 5th Avenue and a reception in Washington at the Willard Hotel. Marshall went with Pershing in October 1919 to Brandreth in upstate New York; for a brief rest. Any comments on the welcome which Pershing received on his return?

A. There were a number of triumphal parades, first in Paris, which I think I have referred to. Then one in London, where I know I had a devil of a horse. The Inspector General picked the horse out because of his appearance and he was a bad actor and he, couldn't manage him and I took it over from him and I had a terrible ride. And he went over backwards in that small Admiralty Arch, I think they call it, and broke a bone in my hand. I got one hand under him as he came down but I was able to finish. But I was a very grateful person when I got by the reviewing stand and then went in the stand and sat in the rear row. General Pershing and the King and Queen were in the front row with all the great leaders -- that is all of the citizen leaders because all the troop leaders were in the parade.

Then again I was in the parade in New York and then the final parade in Washington. A crowd is a funny thing and yet very natural. Here was this great parade. We cured the defect of the New York parade which was too much strung out, and massed the troops in Washington so that they came by in masses and of course the parade took about a third as

long and was much more impressive. But the people were most impressed of all by one mule licking the soup that was coming out of the back of a rolling kitchen. I think that took more attention than anything else in the parade. (Heffner: Wasn't there a parade in Philadelphia?) Not a great parade in Philadelphia, it was a smaller parade.

The trip up to the Brandreth, Fox Conner's family's camp, was very, very agreeable. We stayed up there about a month. I would stay up until nearly midnight every night going over the congressional hearings with General Pershing in preparation for his hearing. Then, I sat with him during his hearing.

Q. 28a. Do you have any recollections of the fight over the Versailles treaty and the League of Nations?

A. I have a recollection over the fight over the Versailles treaty and I myself had no stand in it. My view of the thing, of course, was they could have compromised it and still had the main effect of the treaty by very slight modifications. I thought that the President was too rigid and the others were too bitter and his rigidity didn't go very well with their bitterness. I heard the debate one day, one morning, but that was all.

Q. 28b. What were your views on the League of Nations in 1919-20?

A. I wouldn't express any views on the League of Nations because I was not a deep student of it at the time. The general idea of it appealed to me.

Q. Did your views change later?

A. My ideas crystallized later on when it became a matter of deep concern to me, in my business.

Q. 28d. What was your general impression of President Wilson?

A. I won't express any views about Mr. Wilson. I was too far from him. I knew his secretary of state. There were two of them that I knew. Lansing was one of them-- fell out with him. Then the other one I have forgotten, a New Yorker. I knew his family better than I did him. I knew some of the others. I knew Mr. Hoover, who didn't say anything at all, so I couldn't know him at all. In fact when he was secretary of commerce I traveled with him on the Harding funeral train. He used to sit in the observation car for hours and he very rarely said anything at all.

Q. 29a. Can you give me the background of the Pershing - March feud?

A. I had rather not go into the Pershing - March feud. They had it out and I'm not an umpire on such things. I leave that to the columnists.

Q. 29b. What was involved in the fight over the organization of the War Department?

A. I don't know that there was any particular thing involved in the fight over the reorganization of the War Department. One wanted it one way and the other wanted it the other way and the men already in positions wanted it more or less the original way and the men General Pershing was going to put in the main positions wanted it the other way. And it was worked out the other way. That's all there was to that.

Q. 29c. What was your role in this fight?

A. My role in the fight was largely keeping in touch with the various ones of General Pershing probable staff and making certain that I didn't get tied up in some of these staff jobs that, I didn't want.

I would prefer that you do not pass on anything to the young man that's writing up about the March - Pershing feud. I don't want to figure in that in a star position. There are too damn many feuds. History is the more important thing. I thought that General March was a great administrator and a very arbitrary, tactless man. I think his greatest error was having around him a number of men that copied his type. He needed exactly the opposite type as his principal functionaries, it seemed to me.

Q. 30a. Major Marshall accompanied General Pershing to V.M.I. in 1920. Any comment on this trip to V.M. I?

A. The trip with General Pershing up to the V.M.I. was very interesting and delighted him up there. I had insisted on his going there because he had gone to West Point and there were so many V.M.I. men in lead positions in the Army -- not so much as in the second World War but in that world war.

I might pause to say that in the Second World War, at one time, we had the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, the Secretary of the General Staff and I don't know how many division commanders and corps commanders and things of that sort. When the Deputy Chief of Staff was made Deputy Chief of Staff I didn't even know he was a V.M.I. man. When the Secretary of the General Frank McCarthy came in, I didn't bring him there

at all. Another officer brought him in as an intelligence reserve officer and he was brought down to be an assistant secretary by a certain other officer and, I didn't know anything about him until after he became secretary. The thing got so numerous there with V.M.I. men that I called for the President of the Alumni Association and requested him personally for them not to make any point of it all because no one would believe that it hadn't been done on purpose by me because I was a V.M.I. man and actually it was not that at all. Way early in the game when we had Army-Navy board, we had one meeting at which three out of the four Army fellows were all V.M.I. men. I didn't know it at the time. I knew I was, of course. And as we were leaving the meeting, the Chief of the Air Corps commented on the fact that it was rather unusual that three out of the four should be from the V.M.I. That was the first time I knew it. I was very anxious for the Alumni to have nothing to say about this in the way of tooting it up because I would be the sufferer for that for everyone would believe I did it purely because of my V.M.I. affiliation. As a matter of fact I didn't know a one of these men at the time they were made and I didn't bring any of them in the War Department or near the Deputy Chief of Staff job or Secretary of the General Staff's job.

The trip up to Lexington, as I say, was very interesting. The thing I mostly remember was trying to find a certain place where the corps deployed in the battle of New Market and I was not making very much headway about it. I had forgotten entirely where the place was and was looking for a hill slope when actually it does not look like a hill slope when you get to it. And I asked this old, gaunt, bearded farmer who was back raking in the barnyard if he knew anything about the circumstances of the battle. And he said, "Yes, he seed the Corps march right by on the hill there." He was a very young man. "Well" I said, "I had General Pershing out there-- the Commander in Chief in France -- and we were trying to find the actual battle site." And he didn't offer any other information. And I repeated again, "I have General Pershing out there in the car -- the Commander in Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces and he is going to the V.M.I. and I am trying to show him the battlefields." And he didn't say anything and I looked at him and he said, "I heard you the first time." That's all we got out of him.

Q. 30b. Do you regard yourself as a Virginian?

A. Regarding myself as a Virginian, this is by general reference. I didn't do it.

My family were Kentucky. And I myself was the only member of the family born up north and I was born in Pennsylvania. And then I went about my business and that's about the end of that. I married two Virginians, very ardent Virginians, and I went to school in a very ardent, historical Virginia section school, and I have many, many, many friends that are Virginians. I might say also that I pay taxes in Virginia and I know all about that.

Q. 31. Marshall worked on some say wrote all of the report of First Army and of G-3. In 1921, Pershing became Chief of Staff and reorganized the General Staff.

A. The report of First Army and of G-3 was written by Drum and revised by me to suit General Pershing's criticisms of the original report. It took quite a long time to do it because there were many compromises involved. All the maps and everything with the First Army draft were prepared at Leavenworth under Drum's supervision.

Q. 31b. In 1923 -- Pershing accompanied by Marshall went on a tour of CMTC camps. They were the official military escort for the Harding funeral train on its return from California.

A. In 1923 where you say that General Pershing and I were the official escort for the Harding funeral, that's not so at all. His train, that took his party up to Alaska or took them up to where they embarked for Alaska and brought him back to California where he died at the Palace Hotel at San Francisco, was used for the trip and his own staff and own people and others brought on at the time -- the Attorney General who afterwards had a hard, time being tried -- and others that came to join him at San Francisco. The car that General Pershing travelled in was hitched on the train and that's the way General Pershing and I came into it.

Q. 32h. How did Pershing operate? (Was he a "driver"?)

A. I have commented on General Pershing and his method of doing business and the proposition of working with him. I haven't mentioned his friends like Dawes and others that he was very intimate with, particularly Dawes who I came to know very intimately myself. But I don't think to explain there is anything for me to give other than I have given to explain, how General Pershing worked. I might accentuate the fact that he was very delightful, very delightful, to go along with when we weren't working. He was almost boyish in his reactions and we would have a very pleasant time. The minute we came to

work he was very serious minded you might say almost implacable executive.

Q. 32b. The General has been described as representing a Regular Army attitude of disliking the "civilians" and of feeling that civilians were the natural enemies of the Army. One book, which I read not long ago, said that it was not until you came along that the Army began to shift its views and understand that the Army must understand civilian thinking. Any comment?

A. I don't know about the citizen soldier. I was deeply interested in it and John Palmer, General John Palmer, was immersed in it and wrote a book about it, and he was a very deep friend of mine. And I had him made an aide to General Pershing, so he could bring that special knowledge of his to General Pershing's attention. Altogether we were in a period there where it, was rather formative of the new Army organization and it was very important that the citizen soldier aspect be most carefully considered. And it was, and we made I think, considerable progress in it. The trouble was there were those who were little-minded that understood much about the main thing and they just cherished their own grief and their own prejudices and that was soon both sides. And you just got to work against that all the time.

Q. 32d. Did General Pershing have any hope of becoming a candidate for President in 1920?

A. I think early in General Pershing's period of return from France some of his friends deluded him into this Presidential aspect. I know one group came up from Tennessee and I sent them back home. He was away at the time. And he was furious with me. I didn't even consult him. I knew pretty well what the general reactions were and I thought it was a shame that he might in some way cut down his prestige by being involved in that sort of thing. Less it was almost by acclamation.

Q. 32e. Were you acquainted with General Wood's efforts to be President?

A. I was somewhat acquainted, at a distance, with General Wood's efforts. He was very highly regarded by many.

Q. 32f. What was the impact of General Pershing on the U.S. Army? Did he raise the soldierly standards of the Army by his insistence on discipline?

A: I think he and Pershing did raise the standards of the Army by his insistence

on types of discipline. Very naturally he would. And he was a very imposing and impressive man.

Q. 32g. I have read statement that you absorbed from General Pershing his insistence on "spit and polish" and strong discipline - is this true?

A. I don't think I learned from him the spit and polish part. I knew how to do that long before I ever saw him. It has a decided place and is pretty much evidence of the general state of discipline of the command. The point is when it's overdone, of course, it's harmful as anything is as a rule that is harmful and that would be particularly harmful it took away a lot of time from the other training. The trouble with the other training is that not a tremendous number had the imagination and everything to make it interesting to intrigue the soldier and it was very difficult to do, it because it required so much of movement, so much of territory, so much of expense, all of which, a matter of fact, they leaned against in time of peace.

When I was called in by General Craig and made Deputy Chief of Staff, I used to go over all the papers. He would sit in and just listen in the Secretary of the General. Staff and others would bring up for various decisions. And we would spend more damn time over the right to run a road or run a sewer line and something else across a reservation than we would on all the basis for training for the summer camps. The minute you got into training of that sort you were pushed out by the money factor pretty quickly and you had to have so much ground. You had to do so much maneuvering to get it done. And unless they were all intent on that instead of being distracted by these other things, it was very difficult to handle it. I was intent on it and I made myself very unpopular.

Q. 32m. Any other comments on General Pershing or on your service with him?

A. I have given enough incidents on General Pershing I think. I don't care to go into any more of these things. I think I've done enough on that. And I'm not writing a history of General Pershing.

Why I would say that the severe cut in the Army's strength was a tragic affair. I remember General. Pershing coming back from Europe and writing me a letter which I just happened to find when they were debating all these affairs he outset of World War II preparations that he had come back-to-find that the total strength there considering was 110,000.

Well, we had had 180,000 before the war began and now it was down now to 110,000 actually it came out to 118,000, but what was more all the teamsters and men around the hospitals and any things of that sort who had been civilians before now were taken out of the soldierly ranks. And the next thing was they began to draw the soldiers from the special units in the ground troops in order to provide the men for the Air Corps. They wanted the Air Corps increased in a certain way. They had boards to investigate it. The Congress did. And then they accepted the Board report and then they drew the men from the ground troops. So finally we just had nobody. You couldn't even train a battalion you had no communications people, you didn't have your special platoons. I think at one stage there we had one horse as the transportation for the battalion commander. The orderly had to get off the horse apparently and walk about that time. I have forgotten just how bad it was, but it was pretty bad. When the Headquarters Company was supposed to be, I think, 318 men, it had gotten down to about 18. You couldn't train; you didn't have any normal facilities except for the individual soldier. That's about the only thing you could get at. And it was a very tragic thing, because the knowledge of command and control of such units was disappearing from Army. And I had a very severe battle over this when I first started in as Deputy Chief of Staff and later as Chief of Staff. This denuding of the Army always occurs. I have suffered from it myself. I walked into it in the First World War with the First Division when we had nothing. I walked into it in the Second World War when I come in as Chief of Staff. And I walked into the some effect exactly when I came into the Korean affair. And I'm an expert on what a dire situation it is. And it seems to be the democratic way of doing it. They will spend billions as a result of the war and they won't spend a million or two to prevent the war. That's just about what it amounts to.

I thought the disintegration in '46 and '47 was the most amazing thing. I was out of the country most of the time in China and I didn't realize how complete it was till I went over as Secretary of Defense and I just found literally nothing and you have to start clear back and begin all over again. And, of course, all the money that was involved in that, all the lives that were lost in that, all the bad feelings and confusions that were built up out of that came into it. However, the minute you come in again, they are having a battle now, of course, of too much. Well you have to be very careful about that and see that it's done very carefully.

My feeling now is-- I'll say it -- my feeling now is that, the mistake they make is by trying to add a few or trying to trim a few, trimming the appropriation by paring this down a little and paring that down a little. My reaction now -- I don't want to go into it now, in a sense, but I will put this much into the record. My reaction now is what they should do what is lacking is a study of how to find an attitude of preparedness that is not going to beggar the taxpayer and that is going to be able to be maintained in time of peace, through a long peace and, of course, that goes back inevitably to compulsory service. That is one of the incidents only, but it is one of the inevitable incidents in that. But about 15 per cent of the public which is articulate -- certain fellows fighting about the enrollment in college, although the big universities have come in correctly on this and other things like that and political things in Congress. They go right back exactly to the same thing they had in 1898, the some thing in 1914, and in 1917 -- the some thing they had in the second World War and the same thing they had in the Korean affair. There is literally no change at all. I know when I left the General Staff as Chief of Staff I talked to the staff. We were differing. I thought at the time it was the finest staff I had ever seen so far as the quality of men were concerned and their understanding of their war duties, but I don't think there was a single one on that staff -- [the tape ran out here --768. He had something like this on November 20 in which he said they didn't understand they would have the same problems again. (THIS WAS THE LAST THING HE DICTATED).