

# TAPE 16

*Recorded February 15, 1957*

*123. What was your view concerning the organization of elite units such as the Rangers? I know that General McNair argued with General Lear about the latter's insistence on the value of these troops. General McNair said that such a practice took the best leaders away from all the units and put them in a few specialized units. I gather that this reflected your thinking?*

This question concerns my views and those of General McNair and others as to the organization of Rangers. I favored this in a way, but felt that it had to be handled with considerable care. The first Rangers, in effect, were the special unit or units that we organized for a possible operation on dropping them on a glacier in Norway, when we were trying to get at the destruction of what was a heavy-water plant of the Germans, meaning something leading up to the atomic energy proposition.

The reasons against the special units is quite well understood. They had exactly the same battle in Great Britain. Mr. Churchill was warmly disposed towards the special units and the head of the ground army training in England was very much against it. Mr. Churchill referred to them—these special fighters—as “the dull mass”—I mean in contrast to the special fighter. He referred to the general organization as “the dull mass” of the army and the special fighters as just what they were, the Rangers, or whatever we choose to call them.

When we had no longer the necessity of holding them in Norway, then the question was what we were going to do with them. They performed a magnificent service in the Anzio battle to retain that salient when it was under—the beachhead—when it was under heavy attack. I've forgotten just now all the places we tried to use them. But there was a very good place for them, but there's always opposition because it takes good men, and to that extent it would take them away from the other organizations of the army. The thing could be easily overdone and it had to be handled, I think, with discretion. But it serves as sort of a model as to what you can get, and it also points out what is the great advantage in having a volunteer service which the marines and the navy and the air corps enjoyed.

We later on organized airborne divisions in which everybody in it, as I recall, was a volunteer from the already enlisted army. And I think their performance and their discipline, their fighting dash was excelled by none. In fact, I hardly think it was equalled by virtually any other troops. I'm

talking about the 82nd Division and the 101st, I believe, and several other special units of that character who rendered such magnificent fighting records in France—and Germany, I believe. It is rather odd though that exactly the same fight was being made in Great Britain with Mr. Churchill backing these units. I do not want under any circumstances to have him quoted publicly as referring to the rest of the army as the dull mass. Be very careful about this, please.

*124. Did you originate the airborne unit? General Ridgway, in his book Soldier, says that you backed his request to increase the size of the airborne unit. He indicates that he sent General Maxwell Taylor back to see you on this at the time of the Bulge. General Ridgway adds that you were the best friend the fighting man had.*

I do not recall about the airborne unit. I think it was a gradual development. I know I was very much in favor of it. You speak in the question of General Maxwell Taylor coming back to see me on the subject of the special units—General Ridgway having sent him back—just at the time of the Bulge. I think I earlier referred to this in saying he was sitting at my desk when we got our first information regarding the Bulge attack, and he left instantly, and as I recall, he went directly to the airport and flew back to France.

*125. What do you consider were the chief wartime problems with training?*

The greatest problem of wartime training. I don't know. The greatest problem was to continue long enough with the basic training, of which they were all impatient. And it is dull, and it is long, and it is very strenuous, and unless it is well done, thoroughly done, the troops are going to be lacking in discipline and performance from that time on. And yet it is very hard to have them see the reason for it.

I remember I had some special professional fact-gatherers for me. And one of the interesting facts was—the file records up there will show it—that they saw the men in training in this country and talked to them about what they thought of the training, whether they thought it was too much, too little of the right kind, and so forth. Then they found these same men on the front after they had been engaged, and they found almost everything the man objected to in this country, over there, after a brief experience, he said there was not enough of. The men can never understand how intense this must be in order to register in long drawn-out engagements and over the severities of a battlefield experience. But it was rather striking that the very men—the very same men—man—that opposed it so in his criticisms in this country when our fact-finders found them—professional fact-finder found them abroad and he looked him up purposely—he found that they

then said the very thing they got the least of, what they objected to most in this country, they now felt they did not get enough of.

The training—the infantry training rather than the artillery training; the infantry training rather than the tank training—is a very trying thing. It is a very monotonous thing, but I repeat again, it is a very trying thing, very arduous, and not anything spectacular about it so that the men naturally object to it. I found that particularly true in the National Guard units, though this was really due to their own leaders not realizing the vast importance of it.

There was also the problem of the land, because the training of ground units, with their tanks, artillery, and other things of that nature, requires a tremendous area of ground and will do a great deal of destruction to crops and things of that nature. So that is hard to arrange.

At first it was very difficult to get the money from Congress and I had to have several special hearings in order to get enough money for the large maneuvers. Senator Byrnes was very helpful in this, and I think one of my hearings with the chairman of the Appropriations Committee of the House—the military section—he was a banker from upstate New York. Senator Byrnes arranged it and I saw this man alone, and Senator Byrnes, as I recall, had my discussion to this representative printed and distributed and given a wide distribution, in order that others might read it and see what the arguments were for the expenditure of these large sums of money for this training—and they were very large sums. But I thought that was one of the most important aspects of the matter, that for once at least America was going to go into the battle with thoroughly trained ground troops.

It wasn't much trouble getting the air trained. It wasn't a great deal of trouble getting the artillery trained, because you could fix very carefully what the things were to do and it didn't involve such arduous service except for the spotters, I might call them—the officers commanding units that have to go to the front and be with the ground units in order to report the necessary firing points. And there is—(Sgt. Heffner: Observation?)—the observation detail and generally the battery commander.

I will repeat again that the maneuvers were not only valuable, but they were invaluable. We never could have made our way in Europe without these. As a matter of fact, our units, after they had been in Great Britain for a time, lost in training, because you couldn't train over there extensively. You would have destroyed too many valuable crops. And the leaders always claimed they landed in France or wherever it was in Italy or Africa at a less high training standard than they had left the United States.

*127. I have heard it said that General Eisenhower was "discovered" by you and others as a result of his work as chief of staff of General Krueger's Third Army in the 1941 maneuvers?*

Regarding the selection of Eisenhower, I had met Eisenhower a long time back. I had wanted to get him to Benning as an instructor for me before the war. I knew of his qualities. He had been with General Pershing for quite a long time. I followed him when we started in the organization of the army and I knew of his work as chief of staff to General Krueger, and I knew also that during the maneuvers that you refer to that he had done an excellent job for General Krueger—all of which bore on his selection by me. But I was looking at him before he ever got to that point in the development of the army.

*128. Were you responsible for the organization of the special regiments, such as Japanese, Norwegian, Austrian and the like? Any comment on the work of the Japanese regiment?*

I was partly responsible for the development of these special units. I don't remember very clearly about the Norwegian unit or the Austrian unit and the like, but I remember very, very distinctly about the Japanese. We had a battalion in Hawaii. Our commander out there—I think it was General Herron—urged that we use these fellows. The prejudice against them, of course, back on the West Coast—California in particular—was very strong. So I offered them to—in the first place I knew that it was quite unwise and quite unfair to send them to the southwest Pacific where they would be in contact with their own people—the Japanese Army. It would be too hard on them in every way.

So we sent messages to commanders in Europe and, as I recall—I may be wrong about this—but as I recall, Eisenhower's staff declined them. Then I offered them to General Clark and his reply was, "We will take anybody that will fight." So I sent this battalion over to him. Then we organized another one in California and we finally built this up into a regiment. The division that we first attached this battalion to in Italy were opposed to it—their prejudice was so deep against the Japanese. And the next turn I found was when I was going to take them away and build it up into a regiment, I had political pressure from Congress not to take this battalion away from the unit that it was then with, who had opposed having it in the first place.

I will say about the Japanese fighting then in these units we had: they were superb. That word correctly describes it—superb. They took terrific casualties. They showed rare courage and tremendous fighting spirit. Not too much can be said of the performance of those battalions in Europe, and everybody wanted them with them in the operations, and we used them quite dramatically in the great advance in Italy which led up to the termination of the fighting there.

I thought the organization of the additional battalions was very essential, because we felt unless we did something about the Japanese in this

country, we would have a very hard time afterwards. I don't mean the army—I mean the civil population. As a matter of fact, even with their brilliant performance abroad, some communities rather blackballed the men when they came home as veterans.

*129. How would you compare the fighting qualities of the American soldier with that of British, German, and Russian?*

The fighting quality of the American soldier has to be measured in several ways. In the first place, a man's fighting quality, his stamina, his relentless purpose, comes most strongly from the association with his home and his family, and any American fighting near his own doorsill will display exactly that same spirit. Our great difficulty was that the men were all far from their home; they were far from the issues; they were thousands of miles from home—in the southwest Pacific and Italy, in Africa, in places that they had hardly ever heard of. There was none of that tremendous spirit that comes of defending your own home—your own wife and children—such as would fall to the French soldier in particular, and to the others somewhat the same way. The fighting of men far from home could seldom reach the effectiveness of that close to their homes—close to the issues—close to the realization of what it was all about.

That was one of the reasons I thought it was so vitally important to have the army educated as to what we were fighting about, because it was all done so far from home and always will so far as we are able to carry out our policy of keeping the fighting out of continental United States. That imposes a very great difficulty. That imposes a great problem of morale because a little detachment up in the Pribilof Islands, or in the Himalaya Mountains, in Burma, in Africa and all, has to be handled with a certain spirit. However, in all of this a great deal depends on the monotony of the thing. You know, fighting as a rule is a very monotonous thing unless you are on a grand rush like Patton's move through France. That seldom is the case. And it's the monotony that is very hard to endure, and it's the monotony that has very evil effects on morale, and particularly when you are far removed from home, when you have been in the affair a long time.

I found when I went over to Africa, that after the successful battle in Tunisia, that some of the regiments, some of the divisions, had been led to believe, very unfortunately, that now they should go home. Well, that wasn't possible, because if we used the tonnage to get them home, we'd never get the other troops over and we'd never be able to build up a command. So it was a very difficult thing, even with the old noncommissioned officers—at first when they assembled there in Africa getting ready for the operation in Sicily—to take in the fact that there was no "go-home" to this until the war ended, and there was no possible way to manage it unless you got wounded. We would do everything we could for you while

you were there, but you couldn't be sent home for a rest trip.

Out in the southwest Pacific with malaria as it was, and with the condition of shipping as we were, we did send troops to New Zealand and, I think some to Australia, because they couldn't get ahead in their malarial condition without a real restup. But over in Europe our struggle was to get troops there as rapidly as possible, to accumulate them prior to the prospective invasion—in Normandy, as it turned out. And yet morale suffered very heavily in Africa at one stage by reason of the rumor spread that these men were to go home, and then we broke faith with them and we didn't send them home. I know I talked to noncommissioned officers of my old division—the First Division—and tried to explain to them that the thing was just out of the question. It was hard, but you couldn't help it.

I was always struck by the British troops that took the long indeterminate periods in Africa near Cairo (omit "near Cairo"—that spoils the whole meaning) the way they accepted the very hard life they had to lead and the long time they were away from home, and the heavy fighting they had to do and the losses they had to accept.

The Japanese were a more spiritual fighter, if you accept Buddhism as being a spiritual basis for the fighting. They were all dedicated to the thing. Their lives were involved and they expected to give them up. They could not surrender. They were desperate in the defense of their leader. And they were very well trained as there was plenty of time to train this army which was—well, you can call it a conscript army.

I don't know about the Austrians or the Norwegians, and I wouldn't care to comment on the Austrians as you express it.

The British fighters were very stolid in some respects, very determined, and accepted discipline without question, as far as I could see. This was particularly true of the troops off in northeast Africa.

The Germans are natural fighters. We must accept that. They are natural warriors. And they were very highly trained—very ably trained—particularly in their noncommissioned officers. And the basis of their discipline was unbending. And the thing you would find most effective with the Germans was that if you left a sergeant with a few men, he fought like he had a lieutenant general in command isolated.

Too often our fellows, when they were new at the game, would think that somebody else ought to come right away and reinforce them or take over. And they would tell the press so accordingly. However, when the time came, such as the battle of the Bulge, when they got going in that—not the first surprise which was a new division—they displayed magnificent fighting characteristics. They always would under proper conditions. But they were far from home and the ordinary military quality is not dominant in the American any more. It's no longer the question of taking the gun down off the mantelpiece and fighting against the savages. So often you'd see

newspaper accounts in the early days—particularly the first war—but these men were natural woodsmen and everything. Well, many of them had never seen the woods except in the national park or city park. And all of that had gone with the Indian and with the development of the West and, of course, the development of the East in the earliest days.

The Russians, I think, I wouldn't say he was an intelligent soldier in any way, but he had the courage to go ahead though he didn't understand at all why he was going. He accepted the leadership if it was anyway decent, and took terrific losses and accepted blindly lots of mismanagement. Later on, when the leadership vastly improved after the Russian tsaristic army broke up, they displayed more individual efficiency than they did in the early stages. But I would say in one sense they were dependable, because they would do what you led them to do and not argue about it, as far as I could tell.

With us you had to feel that all of your soldiers were readers of *Time* magazine and editorials from other sources and had listened to all the newspaper men, and all those had to be met in this army of democracy. But it was a magnificent army when it reached its full development. I remember Eisenhower asking me to come over before it began to demobilize, in order to see it as it was. And I don't think you could have found a better, more powerful army in the world than we had in France in 1945. But it takes a long time to make such an army. It's a long time to get the necessary leaders, because the subordinate leaders are so important, and so few of them were of Regular origin. But the whole army, meaning a variety of numbered armies, was imbued with a tremendous fighting spirit and was remarkably well led. We had some of the most efficient army commanders and division commanders and corps commanders that we have ever heard of, except maybe in the last year of the Civil War.

Before going on to the next list of questions, I want to register several comments and, in a way, questions.

In the first place I am dictating this without a mass of records about me and without secretaries and clerks to gather the papers and look at the facts and find them for me before I talk. I am doing this out of hand—off the cuff, as it were, and it should be, so far as the sources are available, to be checked for that reason. You must be very careful not to just publish in any way or broadcast or arrange for later publication just out of hand what I say here—speaking off the cuff and at considerable length—and, of course, at times, when I'm a little bit tired. I am covering a vast bit of ground in a very short time. I would say that if a critic was analyzing this, and particularly was desirous of finding charges against me as to why a lot that I say should be ignored, he could very readily pick up the names that I don't remember and say if my memory's as poor as that, how could I be trusted to this off-hand dictation of a lot of facts which are of great

importance in interpreting what really was going on at that time in the war.

Well, that name problem is almost entirely one of a certain habit that one has when they start to mention a person's name and they have had in their mind one minute and they have lost in the next—which I have always had, and I still have, and maybe in a little bit greater degree than formerly. My memory is just about the same, but Mrs. Marshall and I both have trouble in remembering this name and that name—like the other day I was studying over the name of Senator Vandenberg. Well, there is no political leader that I knew better than Vandenberg and no one of whom I have more vivid recollections than I have of Senator Vandenberg, and yet I was fishing around here for his name.

The last time I dictated I was reaching for the name of the atomic plants and I couldn't remember either one. Well, they were just printed on my brain for a long time and I still haven't remembered the name—I've got Oak Ridge all right, but I still haven't remembered the name of the one out on the Pacific on the Columbia River, that we had to build out there [Hanford Engineer Works]. I will remember it in a minute or two, I would guess, but I've forgotten it for the time being now. I am somewhat—regarding names and some places—in the position of the person who said, "Well, I remembered that until you spoke of it and it knocked it right out of my mind." So that I do not think should be taken as an example of my uncertainty. The fact that I always fished for the name and you find it for me is evidence enough that I am getting at the real fact of the case.

To go back to that atomic question, I might add here that in the location of these atomic plants—maintaining the secrecy of what we were doing—we had a great deal of difficulty because the necessities of such a plant were such that it made a very difficult problem of selection. You had to have plenty of water. You should have had cool water, and for that reason we took the Columbia River. Now that was very unfortunate in one respect, because out there there was a labor shortage and yet, we came in there in a region where there was not much labor available and located a plant which demanded tremendous amount of labor.

Now the civil official, who was in charge of such matters for the president, came to me and, in a sense, rebuked us—not mildly—against putting this plant out there on the Columbia River, though he did not know what the plant was for, without consulting them. Well, we couldn't very well consult them without telling them what we were doing. And I just had to sit silent and take the beating. As a matter of fact, we had to have an unlimited water supply and it ought to be cool water, if we could get it. And I believe we lowered [*raised*] the temperature of the Columbia River some degrees—I've forgotten what—of the water that passed through the plant and then was wasted into the river again on the other side.



We had quite a problem of the labor situation at Oak Ridge, and again we couldn't explain just what we were doing. We were getting in close to the Tennessee [Valley] Authority—the TVA I think they call it. That was the reason we put it there. There were other reasons why it shouldn't be there. But the importance of it, the difficulty of finding any other suitable place, were such that we had to put it there. And yet we had to do it largely without explanation. So this made it very hard to manage these things and rather stirred up the feeling on the part of some of those that were looking into the matter that we were rather dull-witted to do these stupid things without any coordination.

Your letter of February 13th came this morning. You asked several questions in it and made several comments to which I will refer now. The only trouble we were having with the microphone was my voice getting weak. We received all the tapes that you sent or were sent to us. (Sgt. Heffner: Also the cleaning fluid.)

The plant that I was trying to refer to that you got with the word "plank" actually was "blank." I couldn't remember the name so I said "blank." Actually, it was the plant on the Columbia River.

Before I go any further, I want to make some comments regarding your statement that you had about reached the end of the war period with these questions. There are a number of things that haven't been discussed, and I would like to mention some of them that occur to me at the moment.

In the first place, during the period that I was deputy chief of staff, and General Craig was chief of staff and Morgenthau was giving the principal leadership—getting planes for the French and matters of that kind, and being on generally very cool terms with Woodring, who was secretary of war—there were some things developing that I think have a bearing on the question of the mobilization period.

In the first place, I found it was very difficult to bring to Mr. Roosevelt's attention our tragic lack in ammunition. I think I've mentioned this once before, but it won't do any harm to mention it again. I remember distinctly when I was telling him how little artillery ammunition we had, how much we had to have, particularly in the 105s, and these other lacks in ammunition, and he said, "Well, you can have plenty of artillery ammunition. The navy has a plant down here on the Potomac below Washington and they can manufacture it for us."

My Lord, we had plants all over the country before we got through with this thing, and the navy, too. That plant could no more touch the army requirements than a small boy could have. However, those were the points of view at that time when the great strain was the difficulty of getting the appropriations; was the difficulty of being charged with promoting war; was the difficulty of getting along in reasonable harmony with the Middle West,

and was the fact that we were running up to our limit on the allowed amount of money in the public debt which was permitted by law. So that was a battle through this period.

At that time the president's mind was almost solely concentrated on airplanes, and with the particular idea of the great necessity that the French and the British would have where they were not to be interfered with by bombing, as we would be free to do that in the United States. Well, it takes longer we found really to train the pilot than it does to build the plane. We were going to get more airframes than we were going to get conditions under which we could use them. I was trying to get a balanced result. Otherwise, to my mind we were just engaged in a futility. But the trouble was to create in the president's mind an understanding of the ammunition situation.

I remember he was going to Warm Springs and I had, as I recall, I had stated this case to General Pershing who was then at the Walter Reed Hospital. And on his last call, as I recall, on the president, he talked about this. Well, General Pershing was not too familiar with the problem, and was sort of out of touch, although I saw him about once a week, and also was not too strong physically. But if General Pershing said it, that made an impression on the president.

But when he told me what had happened, and he made the familiar remark that Mr. Roosevelt had done practically all the talking, I began to be very fearful of whether or not he had been able to make his point. So I prepared a letter for General Pershing and got his stationery. I dictated the letter and it was to the president on the grounds that he—General Pershing—had been too hurried in his call on the president the other day and he wanted to make certain that the president understood his—General Pershing's—view with regard to the necessities other than airplanes. Therefore, he took the liberty of writing to him since my—General Pershing's—arrival in San Antonio, and disturbing the president in his rest period at Warm Springs, and I dictated the rest of the letter, stating our tragic munitions situation—all General Pershing telling this—to the general and writing it at San Antonio and sending it to the president at Warm Springs.

So then we sent this letter down by plane to General Pershing and, fortunately, he accepted and signed it and mailed it from San Antonio to the president. And it had a tremendous effect. And we began to get a little ground in the approval of effort to get appropriations for ammunition, as well as other things that had to be, but that most of all. I just remember this rather intricate procedure that we followed in order to get this going.

There was another thing that occurred during the mobilization period, I think about February 1941. Our promotion situation in the army had been, in a sense, on an elimination basis. The only trouble was the

eliminated fellow continued in service. So we got an accumulation of colonels—senior colonels—at the head of the army. In the navy they were retired so they didn't have this accumulation of fellows that still had a desperate hope and still had a strong feeling against the position in which they had been placed.

We had gotten working down in age to about fifty-four at that time for a brigadier general. But we had an accumulation of colonels who were in the sixties, and it was very difficult to handle, because if you had any board of any kind with a colonel at the head of it—one of these colonels would be the head of it and he was the senior. So you ran upon the same block to progress that comes when you use men that have sort of lost their touch; in other words, they are no longer the vigorous men that they were in their thirties and forties.

This situation had resulted in the accumulation of large numbers of these senior officers who I felt were not suitable for combat command. And it was a very embarrassing situation, because no man will agree to himself to the fact that he is not quite up to the punch, and certainly his family will not. And yet we had to get ahead and get ahead fast. It took a great deal of imagination. It took a great deal of vigor in order to lead the mobilization of this vast army which we were starting to build up.

Now in that situation I felt I was greatly embarrassed because of my age, because I couldn't be so aggressive regarding these fellows if I was so old myself. And the whole point was that not everyone of that age is lacking, but it is the average of that age that is lacking. For instance, General Patton was up in years and, incidentally, would always talk to me about the age question all the time for fear we would apply it to him. Well, he was the epitome of vigor and leadership and that sort of thing. But he was an exception, and there were not a great many like him.

But this presented a very serious problem and a great morale problem, because an officer of that age—he has a sort of clientele of younger men about him and his feelings are passed on to them, and you would build up a very discontented feeling in a large group of officers in the army who would naturally weld together in opposition to what they would consider ruthless procedure in eliminating them or retiring them, or finding some way to use their services other than with combat troops or vitally important mobilization duties. So it seemed to me the only way that this could be done, and not hurt morale generally in the army, would be for me to resign and state exactly my reason, that I thought this was vitally important to be done and that I was old myself and, therefore, I would forfeit my career in the effort to make it possible to do this by a younger chief of staff and not stir up too much of turmoil and damage to morale.

So Hopkins and I went to see the president in February—I think—up in his study, and I proposed this to him and explained exactly why that I

thought that if I did this relieving of people and retiring of people the way it was going to have to be done and done very quickly, that it should be done by a younger man and, therefore, I wished to tender my resignation as chief of staff. He listened to me and thanked me, and that was the end of it. Talked about something else right away.

A week or two passed, and I spoke to Hopkins again, and I said how about that, and he said the president just laughs at you. He says no politician ever resigns a job and that's just talk. And Hopkins told him, no, it wasn't, that I really meant it; I was sincere about it and that I was pressing him to get the president's conclusion.

So then I went and saw Mr. Roosevelt again, and I told him again just what this thing was and how important that I thought it was to do it, and I explained how I wanted it done—how I suggested it be done—to let me pick the man I thought ought to be chief of staff and get Mr. Roosevelt's approval. Nobody else would know anything about it. I would bring the man into the War Department—keep him there two months—put him in touch with what was happening and then I would send him to Panama; I would send him to Hawaii; I would send him to the Philippines (we were just in the mobilization period then), and I would send him even to Iceland so that he could get in touch—in Alaska—so that he could get in touch with everything that was going on. Then I would bring him back to Washington and have him there in the General Staff until he became thoroughly familiar with the conditions there, guarding as much as I could against any feeling on anybody's part that he was headed for any other job except in the normal routine of affairs. Then the president could announce my resignation and announce the man's appointment all in the same day.

Well, I never got any action out of Mr. Roosevelt. As I say, after my second trip over, I told him, I think, I told him then that Hopkins had said it didn't make much impression on him, the president, because he never knew a politician to resign. Well, I told him that wasn't the case at all, that really I was dedicated to try to do this thing, and I had this serious situation in the army and that I didn't think it could be cured without terrible damage to morale if it was done by an old man—like I was in years—an older man, I should say, like I was in years, but the issue died there and my efforts to resign were defeated.

I might say that I had been pretty fortunate during the war in selecting commanders—theater commanders in particular—men like General Eisenhower, General Bradley, General Smith, and so on. But my proposed selection to be my successor as the chief of staff would have been an utter failure I learnt later. So I was spared that horrible error in judgment by the president not accepting my proposition.

Now there was another factor I wanted to discuss that took place

during this mobilization period. I'm sorry, right now I can't remember it. But it covers quite an area of development and of great interest, and I will hand it to you later when it pops into my mind. I had it this morning, but I haven't got it now.

*130. Did you ever feel that we were weak in the true fighting qualities of ground troops, so that we depended on air and artillery fire to achieve our goals? (It was a familiar criticism by the French during the war and by the Germans afterwards, that American troops lacked the true fighting spirit and that they refused to advance unless they had used the maximum in firepower.)*

Now as to the fighting quality of troops. Did I ever feel that we were weak in the true fighting qualities of ground troops? Until they were thoroughly trained, decidedly so. And we had some issues in Africa that would prove this. But it was through lack of training, not lack of leadership—though there were some mix-ups in that respect, too. It was much easier to train the air and to train the artillery. The general feeling was that it was much more difficult, but it was not, because they had something fixed to work with, whereas the ground troops were not in that fortunate position. They had the ground in tremendous areas and the dark and uncertainties in every direction, and tremendous fatigue and problems of endurance which the others didn't have at all to the same extent. Just the fact of an artilleryman having a piece of artillery there gave him a sort of a rallying point. There was nothing like that for the infantry soldier. Most of his fighting was done when he came forward in the dark, never having seen the ground at first and going into a general confusion of action, which is bound to be the situation almost in any ground combat today. When we had time to thoroughly train them, I thought they were magnificent.

I published an article by a private in a regiment in Africa who was writing up the duties of a reconnaissance platoon. And he went on to explain some of the tragedies that were happening. And he likened it to the fact that the men didn't realize what they were getting into. They didn't realize the brutality of the war. They didn't realize the determination and ruthlessness of the Germans. And he went back to say that these men had probably seen the ruins in London, but they were other peoples' ruins and they didn't make much impression on him. He saw—he knew there had been a lot of bombing and he knew there had been a lot of lives lost—but not until the thing landed in his lap did he fully comprehend how ruthless war was and how ruthless the Germans were, and he had behaved very badly in some of the earlier encounters in Africa.

Their training was only partially completed and Rommel's people came at them in a very vicious way and rather surprised them it seemed. They walked around and displayed themselves, looking at the souvenirs they could get out of a village, while the Germans observed them in their

performance and in due time came down on them with ruthless force and savagery. But they quickly got over this, and as the trained divisions arrived—it takes a long time to complete this training—that disappeared and they became magnificent fighting men. I don't think you could find any more wonderful fighting than that which was done by the troops in the Bulge after the first surprise of this newly-arrived division, widely scattered, in a strange place.

[Begin cassette side 2]

*131. Did we use ground-air operations properly early in the war? Do you feel that we worked out our problems before the war ended?*

No, we didn't use ground-air operations properly early in the war. We hadn't maneuvered enough with them. Our planes were too scarce to give us all we needed back in the maneuver areas and it's very hard—very hard—to get across air-ground training and have the soldier realize what's to be done and have the airman—in particular—realize the importance of what he's trying to do because he gets no reaction at all in his ordinary training procedure. Therefore, it is very hard to get that properly done, and not until he's been in action does he really get at the training right. Then he gets it. Then he's determined about it and then he brings every pressure in the world to bear on the air to do their part. And the airman generally responds in a like manner.

I felt that we had worked out our problem very well—very, very well—before the war ended. I remember having a German officer, a captain in the German army, that we had as a student officer at Leavenworth. He had been in nearly every engagement practically from the outbreak of the war—the first advance into Belgium, up until the final action when he was a prisoner. And he described the reaction of the German infantry to airplanes when they first came up as the German army made its initial advance down through Belgium into France in the First World War. And they did everything wrong. They conceived everything wrong. And he had to be very careful about allowing me to print it for fear it would get him in Dutch with the authorities back in Germany.

*132. What do you feel are the chief strong and weak points of the American soldier?*

The strong and the weak points of the American soldier. I think the first thing is that he has to know what it is all about, much more than any other soldier. I think the next thing is there has to be time to get him trained. I think the next thing is we have to have very competent instructors, which we lacked at the opening of the war because they were not available in any number at all. We were taking in at one time, every month, as

many men as there were in the entire United States Navy. Well, we couldn't—we had to do that. We were being pressed to do that. I wanted to slow up on the draft act, but I was told I couldn't politically do that without having it cut off on me. We just didn't have the instructors.

One of the reasons that I was very loathe to expand very rapidly our officers schools at the outbreak of the war—Mr. Stimson and his friends from the First World War experience were trying to force the issue—was I didn't have enough competent instructors and I was unwilling to have these men put in there for being instructed when we couldn't line up the necessary number of competent instructors, and it wasn't really until we had had the reserves in line for about a year that we began to develop a plenitude of instructors—which we didn't have at first. And as soon as I could bring recovered wounded men back from France, that changed the whole complexion of the instructional question. In England, where they were pretty close to the conflict and saw the scars and strokes of some of the conflict, and in France, of course, where they were close up to it, it was quite another matter.

Now when the American soldier knew what it was all about—when he saw the results of his training, as I have said before—the very things he objected to in this country were the things he thought he hadn't got enough of when he was questioned abroad. And also you have the question of his fighting for a cause that is very remote from his own affairs. You take an Iowa farmer—you can't get a much stronger character than that man—yet all of this thing was in a distant field from his home, among distant people, and for a cause that couldn't cut it right down to something like an Indian shooting at you or a local army fighting against you.

*133. Did you agree with those who felt that we tended to coddle the soldier too much? That we made life too easy for him?*

As to coddling the soldiers, I was responsible probably for as much of that abroad—not much of it back here—as anybody, because I felt that we had to do everything we could to make the men feel we had the highest solicitude for their condition of affairs. They were being taken from home. They were being taken away from the plow and their wives and families and everything of that sort, and in a distant country where the fighting was quite desperate and, as I say, the reasons were a little bit remote from them, although I had done everything I could to illustrate those through Capra's famous movies, and I felt that we must do all we could to convince the soldier that we were all solicitude for his well-being.

I was for supplying everything we could and then requiring him to fight to the death when the time came. You had to put these two things together. If it were all solicitude, then you had no army. But you couldn't be severe in your demands unless he was convinced that you were doing

everything you could to make matters well for him. Also we had the papers going to them—to some extent—and certainly the magazines, and he saw what was happening back in the States. He saw about labor strikes; he saw the high wages of labor. He was losing his job; he was separated from his family; he was risking his life; he was drawing very, very low pay. All the conditions were hardships, and yet here was labor back home getting a very high salary and having all sorts of advantages which were undreamed of among the troops abroad. Therefore, I thought it was quite essential—quite essential—that the soldier be convinced that so far as we were concerned in the Pentagon or the Munitions Building or wherever we were—we were doing everything in our power we could to help him.

I remember when I took over several breweries in France—I thought I would be investigated for that—that's about the only thing I wasn't investigated for—but they never picked that up. But I saw every brewery we could get our hands on was re-created, put into service for our men who liked beer. I suppose now, if this came out, I will be able to be attacked again. But I didn't get into the production of hard liquor, but I did all the beer that we could possibly manage.

I was challenged once about trying to have orange juice for these men. Well, we couldn't have much orange juice—it's bulky and hard to ship—but we got some shipments through just like we did Thanksgiving turkeys, to have them feel that we were trying to get them what they craved so much in this touch of home. That was the reason that I had for doing these things. And they responded, I thought, magnificently to that.

I went over the post exchanges in France and Italy very carefully. And some of them were models. Particularly, I saw one in Naples which was the most perfect little shop I ever got into for its kind and in the condition of affairs. But those have to be evidences that you were thoughtful of them. And it might have seemed like coddling.

Now when they wanted to go home and get a rest and not stay in the fighting, then I was adamant. They couldn't go home. They had to stay right there. When the time came up when they wanted to be relieved from the line, we probably couldn't relieve them from the line. And I was adamant again so far as that was concerned. And they would respond because they felt that you were really trying to do for them. And while they wanted this—and were encouraged in those demands—they in the end gave away to sober thoughts and responded the way you wanted them to.

When it was written up that we had these divisions in Italy and they were forgotten, well, if anyone can forget twenty-seven divisions, he's got a marvelous forgettory. That hit morale a dreadful blow—a really dreadful blow—and some of the corps commanders told me they didn't know what to do about their troops. They had gotten obsessed with this fact that we had forgotten them entirely.



Well, of course, the semi-amusing part of this was the troops in southwest Pacific had exactly that same feeling about the troops in Africa. All the writing was about the troops in Africa and the troops in Sicily, and they felt that they were being ignored. Now they were into the fighting and the troops in Italy were obsessed with the idea that they were forgotten. And this thing just rattled back and forth, but the great trouble was the way it was approached by some of the press or some particular writers who I will not name. The battle to maintain morale under those conditions was very, very hard, and it was quite amazing that we got through that as well as we did. But I think the battle in Italy, where they were told we had forgotten those divisions there, was one of the hardest of all—was one of the most absurd—one of the most absurd challenges that you could have gotten.

*134. What caused the big civil affairs flare-up in Italy? Did this cause you a great deal of trouble?*

The civil affairs flare-up in Italy. It caused us more trouble, but it caused largely to Mr. Stimson because I didn't concern myself much with it. We had one military official of rather high rank who was in the temporary army and who didn't like the way something was going. And he announced, as I understood it, that if they didn't change that he would resign and come home. And I sent him word by an officer—I didn't put it in writing—by an officer, he wouldn't resign and he wouldn't come home, and I'd put him in the front rank as a private if I heard another damn word out of him. I didn't hear any after that from him.

*135. What was your view as to the success of psychological warfare in World War II?*

As to psychological warfare, I don't know about that. We did our best with it, but it's very difficult to be certain that you are accomplishing something, although tremendous things can be done in psychological warfare. I think the main trouble was—we took it—our instructors in the development took it too seriously in trying to do it in a grand way, when, as a matter of fact, very little things, very little things psychologically can almost wreck the morale of the army. I just referred to one in the case of Italy. Little moves like that can do more to upset the applecart than grandiose schemes, though it's all right to have the plan, but we didn't get very far with the grand planning as far as I could see.

*136. Did you have major difficulties in dealing with General Donovan and the OSS generally? What changes would you have liked to see in that organization? How valuable do you think was the work of OSS?*

At first we had considerable difficulty in dealing with General Donovan and the OSS generally. This was composed of a very fine group of men—a

rather brilliant group of men—and it was led by Donovan who was a very effective soldier, and had been a very gallant soldier as measured by his Medal of Honor. But he was also a classmate of the president and that presented complications right away, because I could deal with all manner of things in one way, but when I ran into a classmate of the president's, I may have run into a complete stumbling block.

I remember in General Donovan's case—I admired him—he was a very able man and had been a very brave man and had been a very fine leader, and he wanted very much to be commanding general of the Twenty-seventh Division in New York and was very strongly opposed by the then commander who was about to retire or had retired. I didn't blame him for wanting the job and I didn't blame the other fellow for his opposition. I didn't blame any of them, as a matter of fact, for being quite human. But I took an officer who had a very distinguished record, afterwards, and he had to see that Donovan got what he wanted that we could give him without complicating our setup. I remember he went on trips with him and things of that sort, and he was a very brilliant young officer. This same problem applied to others and I took the same means to settle it.

One of my dear friends and one of the great helpers I had in the war was Barney Baruch, and he was very strongly in touch with the president and could exert a powerful influence. So I had an officer—and I don't mind telling who it was—it was General Bedell Smith of the later distinguished career as chief of staff to General Eisenhower, ambassador to Moscow, and was head of the CIA and undersecretary of state and so forth—and I detailed Smith to be in touch with Baruch and he did it very, very successfully and won Baruch's confidence, and in that way eased my problem because I didn't have to try to settle so many of these things myself.

Afterwards Baruch rendered me a very invaluable service which I think I might describe right now, lest I forget it later on. During this mobilization period—during the period we were trying to get these big appropriations through—during the period we were trying to build up the army and all—I think it must have been about April 1941 [1940]—I called in Baruch for very specific services. He would always come in to see me and would always tell me that he stood ready to do something for me the minute I wanted it done. After he would see the president, he would generally come in and see me and then see Mr. Stimson. I didn't have need for his services right then. It didn't pan out quite the way I wanted it. And when I used it, I wanted to use it the way I thought it would be most profitable.

Well, I had an appropriation in that had been once accepted by the budget committee, which was pretty hard to pass some of these things through, and it had been accepted by the Appropriations Committee of

the House, and then on the resumption of the question at a later date, they struck out—the committee—the two things that I had in this proposal which were most important at the time. They were so insignificant in the light of later appropriations that people would not treat it seriously, I don't think, in listening to it. But it was very serious to us when it was very hard to get a dollar.

I had \$10 or \$11 millions—\$11 I think—for Alaska. We wanted to develop, start the defenses of the Aleutian Peninsula, but we had to have some place for our people to weather, to endure this very cold weather, so I wanted to build up at Anchorage a base point—now a very large post and quite an air base. So I wanted \$11 million for that and I wanted \$11 million for Alaska, and I wanted a complement of planes that I could reinforce the army with during the ensuing fiscal year. I'd just had an increase in planes which the president had got, which was his first great defense effort. But I needed—I've forgotten how many, the records will show—oh, say fifteen hundred or two thousand planes, whatever it was.

[Begin reel side 2]

I want to say before I leave this subject of the SOS [OSS] and General Donovan, that the organization he built up was a very efficient one. It had very fine men in it and they did a very fine job in the end, and they cooperated very completely with the army—largely due to the missionary work of General Smith. There was one time, I believe, when General Donovan and his headquarters were in differences with Elmer Davis and his work, and during that period General Smith effected a great many adjustments which were very effective in the long run of things.

*138. Do you have any comments on the value of the work of Elmer Davis and Lowell Mellett in regard to press and public relations?*

I do not wish to comment on the work of Elmer Davis and Lowell Mellett. Lowell Mellett was at the White House and Davis was running a very large concern. I don't know enough about their work. A lot of these things would hit at me in one way or help me in another, and I think it is better that I don't comment. And I might say again—I want to emphasize this—that most of these problems that we've been talking about now developed during the mobilization period. But once the fighting started—once we got deeply into it—during most of that time I didn't have these troubles at all. Everybody backed us and tried to help us, and it was only occasionally that we got into difficulties, and that was only natural.

*139. I have been told that generally press relations was the most poorly handled thing at most headquarters. Was this your view?*

As to press relations, I think we got a pretty well organized press relations section.

*140. Did the handling of press relations cause you a great deal of trouble? How effective was General Surles in this connection?*

I think in the main the handling of the press section did not get too difficult, and I think General Surles did a very good job. I know he did for me and I think he did for Mr. Stimson.

*141. Were you briefed daily on editorial opinion? How did you attempt to handle the press? What use did you make of press conferences?*

I was not briefed daily on editorial opinion. I got general statements at times, but I couldn't get into all this all the time. I was briefed daily on the complete layout of our operations when we had nine theaters of operations, which was beautifully done, and I'll describe in detail later on. But I was only told about editorial things when they were very pointed.

I, myself, scanned nine papers every day, so I saw a good bit of this for myself. I found that if I got too deeply involved in this sort of thing, I lost my perspective about the war generally. However, that press relations, editorial opinion and all was very important during the mobilization period, but after we got entrenched and at war, it was not so difficult to deal with. Every now and then some particular thing would come up and some representative of the paper would encounter a discontented officer—particularly a senior officer who didn't think his way of doing the things was being followed, which he thought was far better than the way we were doing them. But if that officer was very articulate, sometimes that would be brought in heavy pressure on me. But that's only to be expected and was treated in that way.

*142. Were you strongly in favor of Stars and Stripes and Yank? Did you feel that they were allowed to get out of hand?*

I was in favor of the *Stars and Stripes* and *Yank*. I thought, of course, that they got away with themselves sometimes. I think in a democratic army a paper such as that is quite essential, as long as you don't find some individuals who are rather brilliant and take a particular joy in trying to take cracks at the officer corps or a particular commander. It's very difficult to control that, because if you begin to restrain it, the paper loses its cast as the voice of the enlisted man. In an army of democracy that's pretty near a necessity, and for that reason I was in favor of the paper, though it was very provoking to commanders and all who had the responsibility for this thing—and here these privates or others with some writing ability were criticizing them or holding them almost to contempt to their troops—not quite as bad as that, but almost that.

And yet I had seen it in the First World War. I knew General Pershing's problems with it. Some very famous writers came out of the *Stars and Stripes*. And he had to uphold them against the strictures of the troop commanders who were violent over what the *Stars and Stripes* used to write. But if they were particularly violent, that was considered an achievement for the *Stars and Stripes*. And, of course, the men liked that. It's one of those things that requires very delicate handling, because it can easily go wild and you can have one or two men in there—the more brilliant they are, the more dangerous they are—who stir up these things and who are just trying to stir up a mess between the officers and the privates. The fellow is making a reputation for himself that he couldn't get in any other way, and generally you found him in prominent positions in writing after the war.

143. *Some people have charged that after the war Communist influence got into Army Talk and Stars and Stripes. Did you ever feel that this was true? Did investigations ever show that this might be true?*

144. *What episodes in public relations gave you the most trouble during the war—Patton slapping, Patton's speech in England, the Darlan episode, the yoo-hoo incident with General Lear (this was, of course, before Pearl Harbor), etc?*

All the incidents in 144 that you mention about public relations were difficult—the Patton slapping, his speech in London, the Darlan episode, the yoo-hoo incident with General Lear, which was played up in a fantastic way by the press and made it extremely difficult for General Lear. Maybe he shouldn't have said it. Well, there are lots of things that you shouldn't have said yesterday that you are talking about today, but you don't have it handled by the press of the country to hold you up to. Everything, for instance, you said to your children they could make quite fun of you, if they could publish it all. And yet that was a very serious thing, because it was hitting at the prestige of a commander. But you have to tolerate that with some tactfulness in an army of democracy. But you certainly shouldn't encourage it.

Now in the Darlan episode I brought down a group of members of Congress—particularly of the Senate, very carefully selected men—and explained to them what the situation was and read them a message, a long message I just got from General Eisenhower that day, which explained his point of view at that moment. That helped a great deal, because it gave us defenders on the floor of the Senate and the floor of the House. And they were very loyal in the fact that they didn't spread this all over the place. And there were some very strong men in it who were very settled in their own opinions.

As a matter of fact, we had about as much difficulty with English opinion as we did with American press opinion, and Eisenhower and

General Clark had a very, very difficult time. It was hard enough fighting on about a six-hundred-mile front with only 105,000 troops. But when you have to fight, really literally fight, all the editorial press and everything of your own country, that was really—that was really a difficult proposition. And I thought General Eisenhower carried it off very, very well and with great restraint.

145. *What papers gave you the most intelligent support?*

As to the papers that gave me the most intelligent support, I wouldn't care to go into that. Some of them did—quite a few of them did and were very loyal about it throughout the war. I'll only mention one—because it's in sort of a part by itself—and that was the *Christian Science Monitor*, and I felt a great admiration for the way they met the problems—not only then, but later when I was secretary of state.

146. *Were you in close touch with any of the chief publishers?*

147. *What efforts did you make to keep yourself informed of soldier gripes and to remove their discontent?*

Morale. I had trained men—civilians—travel all over the army and see the individual soldiers. That had to be handled very carefully, because you don't want to begin encouraging the men to make criticisms, and yet we wanted to find what their reactions were. But they did it very well and they graphed it for me so that I could see the thing graphically when they came back and rendered their reports. In that way I kept fair contact. I did a tremendous amount of traveling myself, and I had all the officers who went make these surveys for me in addition to what other duty they were performing. But having the airplane, we did a great deal of traveling and covered vast territory in order to keep in touch with what the morale factors were.

148. *What is your view as to the value of the work of the Red Cross with men during the war?*

149. *How valuable did you think the U.S.O. was?*

The U.S.O. was invaluable. I started to organize that before they came out with the ordinary U.S.O. thing. I was doing it in another, more primitive way, but one which would have gotten results much more fast. And then I discovered that Mr. Stimson had already started on the thing. And the funny thing was that I sent for this prominent civilian to come here, and he reported then and the message went to the secretary of war that he was coming. Mr. Stimson thought he was coming to him, but I had sent for him. And the officer didn't know what I'd gotten him for. So he worked out on the train how he thought this ought to be done—not the officer but the civilian—he worked out on the train how he thought this

ought to be done and Mr. Stimson approved it. And he never even heard from me why I brought him back. So I had quite a difficult time over that and it was concerned with the U.S.O.—that I wanted him back, but not the formal organization. I wanted to do something in the next two weeks, because the conditions in some of the southern towns were just terrible and something had to be done instanter.

I remember I went to Lilysville, I think it was, down in Georgia. I think it was Lilysville, but wherever it was, I wouldn't allow anybody—I didn't have any aide with me and the local commanders—there were two big training camps there—I had them just reserve a room at the hotel for me and then I didn't have them stay around, because I wanted to be perfectly footloose and I was in civilian clothes. The net result was it was half past six when this started and I never got anything to eat until it was half past ten that night. Every place was crowded and I got up to a lunch counter where I just had some warmed over biscuits and things of that sort. There wasn't a place to sit down. It was a town of very wide streets—and I think Lilysville is the town—very wide streets and a lovely central park down the center of the streets and there were some benches there. But the town was so overstocked with soldiers that there wasn't anywhere that you could relax. It was quite evident that unless we had something done immediately, that the situation could not continue without some outbreak of some sort or other. That was so even to a greater extent in some very small towns, particularly, I think one in Mississippi, where there was a division camp and almost no town.

*151. Did you ever get promotion policy organized to suit you?*

It took me quite a while to get the promotion policy settled. The trouble was the board I had with General Craig at the head of it to control the thing would clear these blocks of promotion—and the trouble is the officers in command would want to do it all at once. It was very nice to promote a whole lot of fellows. And over where the divisions were engaged in Africa, they held up a very high standard, a very high standard, with the result that that man on the quiet front back home was getting promoted and his teammate, so far as time of service went, was going through battles and getting wounded and not being promoted. And I had a very hard time getting this straightened out.

I had to block the promotion, very decidedly, of some of the new services—like the antiaircraft service and all—where they had tremendous increases, because they were promoting the men way ahead of, I thought, the time that it should be, considering the man's efficiency. There was a place in the organization for him, but I thought the time had come when we could have too many second lieutenants and not untrained first lieutenants. And I finally got to the point where I wouldn't promote a division

commander, a brigadier to a major general, until he had served in command of that division in the field as a brigadier. But that was a long time before we could do that, because a great portion of the early army had to be organized without any fighting at all and you had to have commanders. I remember when I had a delay in getting promotions done and I was trying to impress on the president the authority to do this. I found in some places—one place in particular—I found a major in command of twenty thousand troops, and I was trying to get a brigadier general to command that lot of men.

At first, with the tremendous increases in the army and the necessity of having some rank to control it, we had to promote a great many men far ahead, you might say, of their training, their experience in that rank. I think I recall one case where we had twenty thousand men under a major. Mr. Roosevelt was very slow about this—brigadiers—because it was so much faster than the navy. But he never could take in the fact that I was taking in as many men in a month as there were in the entire navy. And once he proposed that I take the naval policy of doing it on a percentage basis. I accepted it instantly, and he got suspicious and questioned me and found out that I would be making brigadiers twice as fast as I was already asking him to make them.

*152. You made every effort possible to use decorations for the purpose of promoting morale. Unfortunately, in many cases, the way in which decorations were given led to dissatisfaction. Any comments on this?*

In the matter of decorations for the purposes of morale, I insisted that they be given as near to the performance as possible—that is, on the battlefield, just as quickly as they could find the thing to promote the man, or decorate the man, if that seemed advisable. I thought that was twice as effective if it were done there, would have immediate effect on morale, would put new fighting spirit into the men. That was opposed by the ordinary staff in Washington, because there would be mistakes made. Well, of course, there are mistakes made. But it was a great deal better to have a man rewarded right then in the presence of the soldiers, than to have to wait maybe six months when it was done without any immediate relation to what his performance had been of that day and hour.

This was quite a battle, but I had seen what happened in the First World War. I remember one case in particular, where I went up to see about a big raid that had been conducted, and there had been very heavy casualties in the raid and very large captures by our men. It was a very successful raid, and I found in the group of eight men selected for Distinguished Service Crosses four who had been wounded in a previous raid and never been rewarded for that yet, and when raids and contact were very rare occasions which ought to be treated immediately. And



before I finished getting these fellows started, these four men, one in particular, the commander, had been in a raid that night which had been very successful, and he was covered with blood from a hand-to-hand encounter with a German officer. And then word came that General Pershing was coming that day—that hour—and to that place. And I very foolishly—very foolishly—allowed them to borrow somebody's clothes for this officer who was covered with blood—and I had them paraded particularly for General Pershing to see. And I had quite a hard time getting his staff to slow up—he had a long way to go, you see—to see these men and hear what they had done. And I regretted bitterly at the time that I hadn't left the fellow in his clothes covered with blood, except that I thought General Pershing might have thought that I was trying to force the issue.

But the great trouble then was in the first war they had an officer for a time in charge of promotions and in charge of decorations, and he was about six months behind time. I remember I got a *croix de guerre*, and I was about five months before it was delivered to me. I had forgotten all about it by that time and anyone else who might have had any concern about it. And it was very harmful to morale, because if you decorated a man then and there, he got it and everybody else reacted to the spirit of the occasion.

So I insisted on having battlefield promotions and battlefield decorations, and we put a limit on the number. I vaguely recall this, but I think I said the division commander could make one decoration for every four he recommended. Well, they said he'll make a whole lot of extra recommendations. And I said, "I'll relieve him if he does." And I let that be scattered around so that put a little brake on the thing. But it was very essential if you were going to get your true reward for them—that was the purpose of the thing—to have it done at the time when everybody else could see what was happening and how the fellow was esteemed by the higher authorities.

*153. One of your efforts to raise morale was your order to have pamphlets prepared on various actions which would be given to soldiers who were wounded in these actions. To a great extent the army historical program grew out of this. What other such measures did you take?*

I had a great many measures of that kind, but I can't remember them all right now. But I tried throughout to keep the reactions of the fighting men very alive and without the delays that come in red tape and approvals and everything.

I remember I got the service medal out when there was a sort of stalemate there and no fighting particularly going on, and these fellows out on these islands in the Pacific, and it was a new decoration and the president was rather critical of it. But I wanted it, because I wanted these

fellows on these islands to get something to show for what they were doing. And they all value a ribbon tremendously. So I insisted that the ribbon be given to them when they landed. Well, I found out that the terms of the issue of the ribbon was that they had to submit a request to the Quartermaster General in Washington. So I ordered the Quartermaster General to send a paper bag of ribbons to each port and that fellow was to get that the day he landed there. Well, they thought that was a wild performance. Well, I thought it was a very wise performance.