TAPE 18

Recorded November 19, 1956

I talked to representatives of a number of womens' organizations about ERP [European Recovery Program]: "You will put it over." And then I went into it. My goodness, they went back home and they scared Congress to death in the next twenty-four hours. You never saw such rapid action in your life as I got out of that. (Oh, dear, I didn't know that I had that thing. I guess I had better put this in here to take with me.) I said the men will agree with me, but they don't do a darn thing. This represented, I think, ten thousand subsidiary little clubs and they went into those and everybody went after these. It was electric what happened, just electric.

Dr. Pogue: I remember attending some of those early debates and the opposition was ferocious and then it began to diminish.

That's the thing I take pride in, putting the damned thing over. Anybody, well, you take a campaign or anything like that, there's nothing so profound in the logic of the thing. But the execution of it, that's another matter. It's like our mobilization here. I flew thousands of miles a week, following through everything that happened in this country. And then when we got the whole thing going, I went all over the world. That was not unlike the Red Cross. I was only with the Red Cross a year, and I went thirty-five thousand miles because I was up against a difficult situation.

But [Arthur] Vandenberg, he was just the whole show when we got to the actual movement of the thing. I used to meet him at Blair House. I didn't go to his office and he didn't come to mine. We would meet over at Blair House and at the time, what's his name, of the *New York Times,* was attacking me for not having any bipartisan policy. He was just about as far off as it was possible to get and still be on the earth.

Pogue: Krock?

Yeah.

Pogue: He just didn't know what was happening.

He was profound in his own knowledge and he didn't know a damn thing. Vandenberg and I were just handling this business. He was marvelous to work with, and fortunately, he thought I was. So the combination. Right funny, he went to Brazil with me, Tom Connally, and Vandenberg and Jewish congressman that was chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee [Sol Bloom].

Pogue: You mean Sabath? Not [Adolph] Sabath, he was a Czech.

No, he wasn't the man. I think he was mixed up with the Jeffersonian-Mount Vernon thing. Anyway, he was chairman of the committee. He went down with us, too. They wanted him to talk down there and he wanted $500 for the talk. [Chuckles] But anyway, when we came out of there, Vandenberg said, "You should never have a member of Congress on those committees." He had a terrible time with Tom Connally. And the point was it wasn't about what Connally was responsible for. It was about what Vandenberg was responsible for. I divided these things up, you see. But Tom Connally got over into Vandenberg's field and objected to everything Vandenberg was trying to do. Vandenberg got irate at me at first because I didn't move in. I just sat there and went through these things and finally, one day Tom Connally said, "Well, if that's the way you feel about it." I grabbed him right there and didn't let him get away and sealed the whole compact in about two minutes.

Pogue: He's an awful talker.

Well, but he was so unreasonable. I was trying to conduct this thing along. This is very intimate and I wouldn't have it ever leak out in any way, but I was immensely flattered once by Vandenberg giving an imitation of Byrnes conducting a conference and my conducting a conference. I can't say much for Byrnes. All right, let's see.

Pogue: I'll get the stuff. If you want a minute, I will just turn it off here.
1. General J. F. C. Fuller attributes much of General Bradley's difficulty on Omaha Beach to the fact that he had refused to make use of several new devices which General Montgomery offered him. Do you feel that this is true?

General Fuller's remark about Bradley on Omaha Beach. I can't believe any of it. It's quite contrary to Bradley. He was an opposite character.

Pogue: Fuller is very critical of our whole policy. He is a Balkanite. He wanted the Balkans and then he . . .

It would lead me to believe that Fuller was desperately looking for something to criticize, and he couldn't have picked a poorer subject. I've known Bradley's reactions since he was a major.

2. Several officers at SHAEF and at Montgomery's headquarters have suggested that they did not want to do the Arnhem drop in September 1944, but that pressure was on from Washington to make use of the considerable airborne force which had been built up and they could not resist the pressure. Do you feel that this has any basis in fact?

I never heard of any suggestion to Bradley from Montgomery of the character described here, or, in fact, any of them. Bradley wanted to get ahead.

Pogue: On both of these I have said flatly that I don't believe it in my own writing, but I just thought I would like to get your view on it.
3. None.
4. The charge has been made that the army never did intend to implement the

ASTP program, and that it was set up only to stop criticism of college presidents. Do you agree in any way with this statement?

There's no foundation for the statement. As a matter of fact, the secretary of war, Mr. Stimson, was intensely interested in the college program and very much disturbed when I tore it apart through necessity. I think in the records you will find a memorandum from me to him in which I outlined what our situation was. And, as I recall, though the memorandum will definitely state this, I summed it up by saying we either did this or we just took apart two divisions.

I made it my business afterwards to see these men at a great many places in the country and explain to them what had happened and why. Our need, I might say, was so desperate that it would have been necessary to reduce the number of divisions in order to get the replacements.

Pogue: It might interest you to know that I talked to General Keating who had either the 102nd or 104th, and he was one of those who got nearly a whole regiment of these men. He said that a lot of people felt that it would ruin the outfit, but that actually they toned it up and helped them on that drive to the Rhine.

The influence of the mothers in this was very profound, where their sons were taken and put into the combat thing. I recall one mother and father writing to me in strong protest, and later their boy was killed in France or Germany, and they accepted my explanation in spite of their great sorrow, and in effect reassured me as to what I had done. This made a great impression on me.

5. Do you feel that the ASTP program was worth the time and effort spent on it?

I really don't know. I was so busy with other things that I couldn't give a reply. Mr. Stimson made this his particular baby.

Pogue: Just to get it recorded here, you told me one day when I had lunch with you about your policy of writing a letter to parents who'd lost sons. Would you say a word about that so I could have it here?

Incidentally, during the early part of the war, when we had so many losses and no victories or successes, I made it my business to write a personal letter to the parents or the wives of many of our casualties. There is on file somewhere there a book of these which I turned over to Mrs. Roosevelt. I continued this until the numbers grew beyond me. I might say that I tried to make the letters individual and in no way form letters. And the replies I received were wonderful in the spirit in which they were written.

We spent a great deal of time afterwards in composing a card from me to the parents or wives of the men that were killed. I went over many suggestions. We were trying to get the card as personal as such a thing can be. And I do recall that there was only one person who replied in criticism of this reminder. Unfortunately, the casualties had gone beyond my personal, individual attention. I had them composed, incidentally, in a rather

graphic chart, in colors, and sent this over the president at regular intervals so that he himself could see just what we were suffering. These things required a great deal of time and much thoughtfulness, but they were critically essential in a war which took place far beyond our borders.

I might say here, although this is not the appropriate place for it, that our people were all in agreement, seemingly, that the fighting, if any, should be abroad and not at home. But on the other hand, they seemed wholly unaware of the great difficulty of conducting fighting far away from home, maintaining the morale of the men at such distances, and of their own reactions to their distant sons or husbands. This was a continued battle which had its beginning with the loss of so many prisoners following the surrender in the Philippines.

There was one state, New Mexico, that provided one regiment, which I believe composed almost its entire National Guard. It was the only anti-aircraft regiment that had its equipment. The Regular regiments did not have more than one battery to a regiment; all the rest were used in training. So it was sent to the Philippines. With the capture of that regiment went the entire National Guard of New Mexico. And from then on I was under continuous pressure from the mothers of these men, and Senator Chavez used to bring them to the War Department at frequent intervals and I had a very difficult time. The pressure was somewhat relieved by the fact that the wife of a Regular brigadier general, who was a prisoner, took it upon herself to try to compose these women's feelings, because there was nothing we could do. We tried every way under the heavens to reach these men with help of some kind, but we couldn't break through the Japanese barrier. Finally, as I recall, we gave a ship to Japan loaded with supplies and, of course, lost the ship.

Pogue: I had never heard of that. Now this wasn't done in the First War was it, this careful business on casualties and all that?

No.

Pogue: I didn't think so.

I don't like to talk about that, but it was just terrible. They didn't do a damn thing of this kind.

Pogue: I'd never heard of it.

I saw the result over there in France, and the minute we got into this war, I promised myself I would not let these things occur. So much of this I saw over in France, first as a member of the First Division for over a year, and later as a member of the GHQ. Now I had instructions from the chief of staff on trips that he sent me all over the SOS [Services of Supply] to report to him anything that I saw that was wrong. At the risk of taking some

of your time, I will explain one of these things to show how it works and why I sent General Lear to France.

Pogue: This is very important, this morale thing.

While I was on a lecture tour on the SOS in 1919, I was sent to talk to the Twenty-seventh Division. And it had just boarded the transport, the *Leviathan,* and I talked to them on the boat. The resentment of this division, and particularly of its leaders, was extreme for the reason that at Le Mans, which was the intermediate area of concentration, they had been called upon to prepare, I think, five copies of these reports on individuals and to see these men were equipped with all these various things, including safety razors and everything of that sort, and they had worked all night for days to get this done so that they could be on their way. When they reached Brest, they were required to do the whole thing over again and they were infuriated. And they poured this all out into my lap. I knew most of them, particularly the commander. So, I talked to our general and his chief of staff at Brest and he said they had to do this because that was the order.

Then I dropped the task I was sent out to do, this lecture, and went to Le Mans and saw the general there and his chief of staff, the latter of whom was a great friend of mine, and I got nowhere there. These were the orders. I explained what was happening and the terrific effect on morale, wholly unnecessary, profound irritation of these men going home. The general would hardly listen to me. He didn't know me and he just treated me as an intruder. The chief of staff, though, was an intimate friend of mine, but I got nowhere.

So I motored down to Tours and saw the commanding general there, and he was a man I knew, but he was intolerant of my intrusion. But his G-4, within whose hands this was, was an old friend of mine, a very nice, gentle fellow. So I tried with him to countermand this damned order, and I couldn't get action there. I've forgotten the reasons he gave me, but he had reasons. So he told me to go back and talk to them at Le Mans. I said I had already done that and the commanding general didn't even want to see me. So he said, "See the chief of staff. You know him."

So I went to Le Mans and talked to him, and he said he couldn't do this thing without an order from Tours. Well, I called up my friend, the chief of staff of SOS at Tours, and told him of my lack of success there and the reasons they gave, and he said he was sorry. I remember saying to him, "You may be sorry, but that doesn't cure anything. Now I have reached the point where I am going to carry out the orders I had and I am going to communicate directly with the chief of staff of the AEF," who was not only a friend of mind, but had been a student under me at Leavenworth—McAndrew. Then he said, "Well, give me two hours." I said, "I'll give you an hour and a half and no longer." He talked to Brest and he talked to Le

Mans and then he called me back and said, "It's all cured."

Well, I saw a good bit of this, and the thing that particularly impressed me—these were all fine men—it was a huge machine and they were reluctant to make changes in it which would complicate things that they didn't foresee. And though they had faith in me, knew me well—I had been an instructor over most of them at the Staff College—they couldn't help but look upon me as rather a visiting fireman. This took place regarding many things in many regions of the SOS.

I finally wrote a letter to General McAndrew. I remember I typed it out myself very roughly, and he turned this over to General Pershing, though I did not know it. General Pershing made a great many notes on it, and in most cases he would say, "do this" or "do this" on the various suggestions I made. I never saw the paper until Mr. Baker sent for me in Washington and produced the paper and asked me about it. He was in a fight then with Congress, defending the AEF.

Now this sort of thing was going on, and as I say, with remarkably efficient men. Therefore, I was much concerned at the reports I got from a few trusted officers of what was happening in the rear areas of General Eisenhower's command. You see, the men that were relieved from combat duty were put on duty in these rear areas, so you didn't have the most efficient people. As a matter of fact, it was quite the opposite, added to which they were all disgruntled. And I sent a very splendid officer over to France, and because he had trouble with his heart, he was not allowed to fly. So he motored through the rear areas and the minute he came back, he gave me this terrible report on the conditions he found. On that basis I sent General Lear and several assistants to France and, incidentally, I irritated GHQ very profoundly.

Pogue: Oh, Bedell Smith was just furious about it.

Oh, I know, I know.

Pogue: He said they just dump garbage over here.

Well, I did send a couple of garbage pails. [Laughs] Political pails, they were, but Lear was not a garbage pail.

Pogue: No.

And his first assistant was not. I think I got him from Iceland—I don't remember.

Pogue: Well, you sent Bonesteel.

Well, Bonesteel came from Iceland.

Pogue: Well, he was an able man, wasn't he?

Yes, very able.

Pogue: Well, he was old, he was getting old.

Well, he was in command in Iceland. Yes, very able.

But the point there was the headquarters naturally was looking ahead. They were looking to the front. They were looking to the fighting, and their rear was largely controlled by officers who were relieved from combat duty—as a rule by them. They had a knowledge of administration that we could not lose. For that reason they accumulated in the SOS and also for that reason they were generally senior, which was the main trouble in utilizing older officers.

I might say that the British used to have a system in their navy that a retired admiral could serve as a commodore and they would put him in command of convoys and things. In our navy they could not take these people without putting them in command of larger forces, so I thought that scheme was a very fine one. It didn't reflect on the individual because that was the general practice. Well, our great trouble was these fellows that had been relieved from duty as to combat were senior, were of such seniority that they took the leadership of practically every minor subdivision. My struggle was to straighten this out.

Now as to General Smith's remark [chuckles], we did a miracle in sparing him. He didn't know what such a thing was and could be. He got a couple of high rankers there, who I spoke to you about, but they were capable men.

Pogue: Lear told me that [John C. H.] Lee never did let him operate like you wanted him to.

Lee. Well, I know Lee was very jealous of power.

Pogue: Wouldn't give him any staff, wouldn't give him any cooperation.

On the other hand, Lee had his difficulties. In these matters you are dealing with so many personalities, that it's extraordinarily difficult. And the most difficult duty I ever had, the most embarrassing, of course, was ignoring these personalities as to peculiarities and making them come across. I did that in the matter of leaders, and that was a matter of honor with me, because I felt that in the past that had not been done. That was a great weakness in our system, that we had an accumulation of people at the top who were no longer capable as they should be for such high positions. And my struggles with them were very difficult and embarrassing.

Pogue: Well, if you had had a larger army in peacetime, you could have worked these people out.

The trouble was we had no elimination process. And when they got up and were passed for further promotion, they continued on—well, were just a drag on the whole military system. I remember Somervell coming to me and saying that I had to do something for him. He couldn't handle the SOS unless I got rid of these people, because they had seniority on practically every sub-board he had. And that's when I turned in, I think, I retired nine hundred—maybe it was six hundred. And I was accused right away by the

service papers of getting rid of all the brains of the army. I couldn't reply that I was eliminating considerable arteriosclerosis.

Incidentally, this is, in a sense, not related to this; however, it is instructive, I think. I was so astonished (I am referring now to my reference to arteriosclerosis) to see the changes in men at the ages the change took place. I found that along about forty-six or forty-seven, in some cases, the man began to change in his fine qualities. Of course, often the early fifties the changes were more frequent. When he got near sixty they were very frequent. When they got up towards the ordinary retirement age, very few at that period properly were usable. There were very few Pattons. There were very few people like that. As you went on beyond, it got—greater was the rarity of finding a man that had retained his previous characteristics of command, control, and organization and administration.

What astonished me was to see a man that I had known as a very able citizen, and possibly fifteen years had passed, and I sent for him because I knew him. The struggle was always to get the man that had it. If you knew him, you used him, but the great trouble was to find out who had it. Who was this fellow? And I was so shocked in so many cases in sending for a man that I knew and now suddenly were available where they were, and have him to come to Washington and to find they had completely changed and were just no longer usable, and some at a fairly early age. That was so frequent that it was not extraordinary at all.

I remember one intimate friend of mine, a fellow I was very fond of, who had been very able. And General Hull came to me because I had nominated this man for a command in France. He had just come to a post that wasn't of any particular importance in the United States and he said, "I don't know what to do about your friend. I called him up on the phone and he says he can't go to France because the furniture isn't packed and his wife's away." He said, "I never heard of such a thing." I suggested that he leave his aide to pack the furniture. He had a couple. He said, no, he couldn't possibly leave. So he turned down a command in France for this reason.

I couldn't believe what I was hearing. So I called him up and talked to him—the first time in many years—and said General Hull had told me this and, "How about it? Was that a fact?" And he said, "Yes, I can't leave here now, because so and so's things are out and I can't go off and she won't be back for a month." Well, I said, "Well, my god, man, we are at war and you are a general." He said, "Well, I'm sorry." And I said, "I'm sorry, too, but you will be retired tomorrow." And I just moved him out. He was a very dear friend of mine. That was a deterioration, I suppose; arteriosclerosis.

Now in all of this I was always very sensitive because I was getting old and I wondered if I was functioning this way. [Laughs] And the man himself could never tell. But that was quite marked in so many cases. Man

after man I would find. So I began to believe my young assistants who had seen the fellow when they told me "he no longer had it, if he ever did."

Pogue: That's interesting, because it may explain, too, this thing that you mentioned several times why that they got so they worried more about the two cars and the extra bathrooms.

Well, during the peacetime there was so little command for a general; so little command unless he was at San Antonio, or at Benning—that wasn't very large, only about five thousand troops—or in Hawaii or the Philippines or in Panama. There were so few soldiers. As a matter of fact, at one time they said you could put almost all the Regular noncommissioned officers in Yankee Stadium, there were so few of them. And you were checked so severely by the War Department for all the minorities, if that is the proper word to use.

I would find at Benning—I almost stopped the instruction in grenades because we had several accidents and little fragments—nobody was killed or anything, but the restrictions they put on us were so severe that we practically couldn't train, because they were so sensitive to any reaction against them if somebody got hurt. And the severity of the criticisms of the military committees and all were such that I felt that the War Department didn't show any backbone at all. This is rather embarrassing for me because it seems immodest, but I swore when I got up there, that I wasn't going to have any of that damn business and I carried the flag when we went before the committees of Congress and I just wouldn't swallow the stuff they were trying to put out, although I was always advised to keep the peace with this. There were some things you kept the peace with, but the boys didn't see that part. They only saw this other part.

There is bound to be deterioration when there is no active responsibility. I was always sort of interested in the reports of the chiefs of staff. They'd take to November, say, to get them out, and there just wasn't anything to talk about. That first biennial report I put out was gotten out in three days—the whole report, which is a book, though there was a particular reason for that haste.

Pogue: Don't you feel that since the war the army has gone back to the business of being hypersensitive to criticism?

Oh, yes, very much so. They always do to a certain extent. Of course, the position, for instance, of the chief of staff now is utterly different. He has so many over him. I don't know how many assistant secretaries he's got, under secretaries and secretaries, and his power is so reduced that he is kept busy explaining things. He just isn't able to stride into Congress and defend himself.

Pogue: It does seem to me that they have ruined their case again and again by just hearing a little something—having rabbit ears as they say—about ball players, and running and changing something, when if they had ridden it out for a week or so, it would have been all right.

I know, I know. I don't know about this now, but I always used to feel that the War Department didn't defend its people. They would just descend on you for this little thing and that little thing. And then some buster that needed to be trimmed, they didn't touch him because that was an embarrassing thing. Unless they could deal with it on a generality basis, they didn't touch it.

Pogue: Then one other thing, when you sent General Lear and Bonesteel over, you wrote a very interesting, fine letter. I think it is one of your great letters, because when I first saw it, I copied it and I did not have a place to put it in my book, but I have always remembered it. You said, "I feel that we lost our army program after World War I because of the resentment of the men who became citizen civilians and voters and I don't want that to happen again." But I do think that you were entirely right there, that that resentment has gone on and on that helps to make us anti-army, don't you?

Very much so. All those restraints after the fighting create all manner of disturbances. The men are impatient of everything. They want to get back and they want to do this and they want to do that. And there all this military repression occurs. That was notably the case in General Pershing's command over there. As a matter of fact, he turned on an extremely heavy program because of his G-5's insistence, and he was rather Prussian (the G-5) in his methods, which the men never forgot. They were getting out in the cold and wet and slime and going through these things in some god-forsaken little village which didn't have a pavement in the place, not a thing to see after dark, and this severe program and they were embittered in a way that they never forgot.

That's one reason at the end of the war, when I began bringing people back, I specified that no movements were to start from the rear. Of course, we had the transportation then. We could do this from the front. And I also specified that in the first return of these commanders, they should bring a certain number—I have forgotten what it was—of men from the front line who had some conspicuous service. But you can find all that up there. It was the program [Richard N.] Young was carrying out. And we moved them by air right from the front line into the United States. Unfortunately, I didn't send them back, which would have been hard on them, but they had a grand trip—sat in on all these big dinners and everything—so they could tell the fellows over there what had happened. It was all right for them, but it wasn't right for the men remaining over there.

Pogue: It still had an effect though, because Stars and Stripes *played it up and I can remember—I was at First Army when the war ended. I was actually with Fifth*

Corps when we went into Pilsen. I went back to First Army to get my gear because I was staying on and they, you will remember, were being pulled out to go to Japan, but they were given new uniforms and they were going to fly back and parade and it had a great effect. But to my mind another piece of interesting psychology on your part, or understanding of psychology, was the letter you wrote General Eisenhower in which you said "A man likes to get away, and if you can let two or three of them have a jeep and some K rations and plan their trip for two or three days, that would be a fine thing, and some did it and it had an enormous effect. But this grew out of your World War I experience.

All those things I saw over there. You see, I toured the whole SOS and I found on every side these things that infuriated the future citizens. For example, one thing that was the most irritating of all, in one town you couldn't go to a cafe before six o'clock. In the next town you couldn't go to a cafe after six o'clock. They didn't have any coordination of that and they had a very severe man at the top—[William D.] "Kitty" Connor. It was like the training program. I always thought General Pershing made a great mistake in not having had [Stuart] Heintzelman in charge of the training program, because he could have done it and made them all like it. Instead of that, they were just thrown into it, forced into it, and I know in the First Division we were just inflamed.

In fact, it almost smashed my career. I got so mad, and I was young. I talked too much. And I would have been in many things if I had kept my mouth shut. I was so infuriated by what was going on. Well, all of this was a profound lesson to me, particularly that trip over the SOS. It took me a month or more, and I saw the whole business. I just gave you one example of the difficulties of getting these things straightened out. So my mind turned in Eisenhower's case to avoid this sort of thing.

I will talk to you at length later about the awful mess we got into [i.e., redeployment and demobilization], because our plans were so beautifully laid at the end of the affair and the twist of the Japanese surrender just turned everything upside down. Everybody was in the wrong place and we just had the devil's own time.

Pogue: I have often thought that from the standpoint of everything naturally but casualties, it would have gone so much smoother if you had had another year of war.

Well, if we had had a month, one month would have changed the whole thing. But actually, it caught us. The thing was beautifully arranged in every way—everything that happened, and bang! this thing occurred. Well, it caught everybody in the wrong position. The men that were home—had been sent home—were the ones that should have stayed in Europe. They were going to the Pacific, you see, because they had enough service to perform. Instead of that, here they were home and they wanted to be released.

Pogue: The pressure was enormous.

The whole thing was just a contwisted affair. Everything was exactly wrong, whereas—it was beautifully planned—would have been right. The perfection of the plan was its destruction, and you just couldn't deal with it. Someone said you ought to have known the war was going to end. Well, we didn't know the bomb was going to go off.

Pogue: Or have the effect it did.

Well, we were calculating on that if it went off the way they said it would. We thought the shock would be enough for most anybody.

You take the preparations for the schools in Europe. Those were tremendous. I think we had three million volumes—or some tremendous number—in Paris.

Pogue: I know there were.

I had insisted that the selection of instructors be such and such, and everything should be such and such. All this was set up to go and, of course, the top blew out of it and afterwards, when I was in China and I read these terrific performances of the troops in Europe—at least they were getting an awful press back home—I didn't follow it very closely. As a matter of fact, it wasn't until a year later [that I learned] that they had named a bridge—the first bridge over the Rhine—for me.

Pogue: Yes, they did.

That bridge up there . . .

Pogue: It's near Düsseldorf.

Anyway, they named for me and I didn't even know it for over a year.

Pogue: There was a Patton bridge, a Marshall bridge, and so on. I crossed it. It is not too far from Cologne. But another time I want to go into this very thoroughly, because many people assume—I have seen it many places—Marshall is an old-time Pershing type disciplinarian who put above everything else this ramrod discipline. Your approach has never been that. You wanted them to be right, but not that.

It was just the opposite. I remember just before the battle of the Bulge, I was up in Holland at Maastricht and the men were terribly tired and there had been no relief for them. We couldn't move these other divisions in because there weren't any supplies. So I proposed first that they bring the new troops forward without their equipment. That would reduce the carriage and everything of that sort and gasoline consumption and only allow them so many jeeps or whatever it was, and relieve these troops that were so tired and move them back, because they had been fighting and

fighting since June and they were just worn out. Then I proposed that they take Maastricht and those other resort towns and do them all up as a resort place for soldiers, and pretty girls and everything of that sort, and no Military Police—in sight—and that was to be done because I ordered it to be done. And then just about then—bang!—came the battle of the Bulge within about ten days or two weeks. But they were not doing anything about it and the men were just exhausted.

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Pogue: I didn't know that you had ordered that as a result of it. But I was up there on the Belgium-German border and that had begun to happen. I would go up to interview people and they would say the men you want have just been taken back ten miles. They are going back to have a warm bath. They are going to sleep in a warm place. They are going to get a change of clothes, and then the USO is bringing a show up. I've seen them come back and they were just like brand new people.

What made me tired was that these things weren't looked into. That was Bedell Smith's great error. He was so intent on the forward part of the thing, you see, that he didn't have somebody that would do that and could break over the restrictions. It is a very hard thing to break over the restrictions. The demands were severe and you had to be severe. But there was a change here to modify the thing, you see. It is very difficult for me to talk about these things because it puts me in the position of knowing it all and the other fellow did not. But the point was I had seen all this. I had always had the habit of drawing conclusions and I had seen all these things happen. Sometimes I made General Pershing perfectly furious with the things.

Pogue: This is most important. I hope that one whole batch of this material can be used by the service schools on leadership and on this sort of thing. So some time when we have finished the basic questions, I would like to go into this.

Well, you have to play it largely from the point—not to put me in a terrible position—largely from the point of view that I saw all this and I fortunately was in the habit of drawing conclusions, and I was determined it shouldn't happen again.

Pogue: Another thing, I have seen your directives and all that, but for a long time supposed it was something that somebody in your shop drew up and you merely signed it, but it is quite clear it came from your past experience. It is awfully important that young officers, I think, know that people like yourself value and put great stress on this looking after morale instead of just merely the spit-and-polish type of inspection.

This thing of the hazard of sticking to the ninety division basis. No, that was not the hazard. The hazard was having badly trained divisions. Patton could never have carried out his performance if we hadn't had highly

trained divisions. And you can't have highly trained divisions and keep watering them down in order to maintain a very large number.

The new Allied set-up in the Mediterranean gave Churchill a freer hand and played a more direct role in the conduct of the Italian campaign. He was determined to break the stalemate. At a meeting with the Allied commanders at Carthage on December 26th, 1943, he reached the decision to launch an attack at Anzio. Was this altogether a British decision? Did you or other Americans oppose it at the time?

As to the Carthage debate, I don't recall the situation there except that Churchill was just taking command. Wilson was not able to control the thing at all. But Eisenhower was at Carthage.

Pogue: Wilson wasn't a tremendously able man.

No, that was a bad choice. As a matter of fact, Dill told me that Wilson was the ablest one. Maybe he was the best we could get. And poor Wilson, quite evidently, was trying to imitate Dill with me, and I didn't rise to it very well, I'm afraid.

Churchill took able advantage of the conservatism of staffs and that played quite a part in the approach to AVALANCHE, Anzio, and all. He was strong for action and, of course, the staffs were conservative. The commanders got to be pretty conservative, but he was pushing for action. I was always pushing for action, but I didn't push them over the head the way Churchill did. Part of my thought was I wanted Eisenhower to feel that we were always behind him. We might push, but we were behind him.

I know we pressed him to move to France and take command over there before his communications were ready, and he said he found himself out in an orchard with no communications. As a matter of fact, that was politically necessary. The thing, the pressure was getting so great on this end that we were letting it all go to somebody else, that we had to take cognizance of that and get some action. So we pressed him to go ahead of the time he thought he should go, which was when his communications were all established.

In February [1944], while the question of postponing the southern France operation was being debated, General Marshall wrote Eisenhower: "I will use my influence here to agree with your desires. I merely wish to be certain that localitis is not developing and that the pressures on you have not warped your judgment." This matter of localitis is mentioned in your letters two or three times. Were you worried mainly about the personal pressure from Churchill and the British chiefs on General Eisenhower, or was it the feeling that he was letting his clear view of the needs of the ANVIL operation?

My worry was in regard to Churchill and the British chiefs of staff. At Malta we had a very acid meeting, and Smith came on and the British put great pressure on him. They were opposing the previously agreed upon

plan and General Eisenhower's procedure and, in particular, the advance to the Rhine. In describing the advance, the Americans on the Combined Staff had let themselves in for a British term "close on the Rhine," which Churchill seized and whipped the whole affair with. Smith was trying to explain it was a British expression, but to me it was the sort of Gettysburg Address stuff, not a simple statement of what you wanted.

At this meeting, having heard from Smith as a result of some of his conversations with the British, Brooke was presiding for the British. I was presiding for the Americans. [Brooke] said the British chiefs of staff were very much worried by the influence on General Eisenhower of General Bradley, and I think he mentioned General Patton. And I said, "Well, Brooke, they are not nearly as much worried as the American chiefs of staff are worried about the immediate pressures and influence of Mr. Churchill on General Eisenhower. The president practically never sees Eisenhower, never writes to him—that is at my advice because he is an Allied commander—and we are deeply concerned by the pressures of the prime minister and the fact of the proximity of the British chiefs of staff, so I think your worries are on the wrong foot." We had a terrible meeting.

Pogue: I remember that you insisted on reworking the cable that was sent to Eisenhower so that there would be no question about the fact that you backed him. I've forgotten the exact wording of it, but you rewrote part of it.

Incidentally, whenever the "I" is in it, it's mine. I wouldn't allow anyone else to use an "I" for me. For instance, that was used freely early in the game, but long towards the last, before we went into the Rhine and times like that, I would recall a cable if I found the personal pronoun "I" in it and I hadn't personally OKd that particular thing. I noticed this one little statement I just read has two "I's" in it.

Pogue: It was always interesting to watch his action after he'd gotten one of these rather stiff cables in which you said we're behind you 100 percent and an hour or two later he would see Churchill and he would hit him hard.

He would.

Do you feel that you could have launched both OVERLORD and ANVIL on June 6th if Eisenhower and his staff had held firm for it?

I don't remember the dispute about this date June 6.

Pogue: That was that debate in March and April when we kept arguing here that there was enough stuff there to do both of them. Eisenhower said so at first, and then, finally, under pressure from Bradley and Montgomery, he said, "Well, I'd rather give it up and have a strong OVERLORD."

[Begin reel side 2]

About the criticism of Bradley produced by Fuller. I was talking of Benning. Bradley was a major there and very competent and very quiet. Incidentally, Collins was a captain, an instructor. Smith I brought in to be assistant executive officer, though I had never known him before, and as I said, Vinegar Joe Stilwell was the leading tactical instructor and there were many, many others. But Bradley was conspicuous for his ability to handle people and his ability to see things very simply and clearly.

I was trying to get the Weapons Section straightened out beyond the mere shooting of the guns. For one thing, for example, they were obsessed with the idea of machine gun barrages with the .30 caliber weapon, and they wished to practically equip the companies with a great deal of the communication set-up of a battery of artillery. I was opposed to this, not that I knew much about the details, but I was certain it was not a good thing to load down an infantry company with so much equipment.

I transferred Bradley to the leadership of this Weapons Section and told him to take a close look at this machine-gun situation. After about two weeks, I think, he asked me to come to the field with him to see demonstrated the fact that the companies already had enough equipment to do the entire thing, but it wasn't being used. It wasn't being utilized to its proper purpose. A calculation that had required, as I dimly recall, several hours, Bradley had cut down to six minutes. There were many other things of this same nature that he attended to.

I might say here that the general supply system of the army for regiments, battalions, divisions grew out of demonstrations at Benning under the leadership of [Harold R.] Bull. The manner of the development is rather interesting. We had little to guide us, and a demonstration of supply took three days in the field. The pamphlet on supply was on a mimeographed basis. Benning didn't have the equipment to print anything until I got it out of our own funds from our book shop. And this pamphlet was 120 pages mimeographed, single-spaced typing. I informed them they would have to cut that down, that the way it was set up now would indicate that only a trained Regular could even handle supply, certainly only a trained Regular in the early part of the war, and I doubt if he would understand it.

After about a year, I found they had reduced this 120 pages to 90-odd, and when I sent word that this must be cut down, the head of the Editorial Section, Major [Robert H.] Fletcher, came to me and said this couldn't be cut down any further; it would have to be rewritten. So I sent word to cut this down to 12 pages, and I think I prescribed that it should be double-spaced, though I'm not certain about this. Anyway, the two instructors, one of whom became a great battle leader later, resigned, or tried to resign, and I composed them a little bit by telling them I didn't admire them as editors at all and they hadn't written this in the first place. But they

were very much worked up over it. One of them was [Clarence R.] Huebner, who afterwards commanded our troops in Europe, and I'd known as a lieutenant in the First Division in France in dugouts, and trenches, etc., and I had a great fondness for and admiration for, particularly for his fighting qualities.

So I changed the set-up in control of this supply business and gave it to Bull and told him to demonstrate this as a mobile supply problem, not a set-up affair, and to do it as quickly as possible. Bull had paid no attention to supply and was very emphatic in telling me that. I told him to go ahead. And I must say I gave him no ideas at all except time limits. I might say I was working on the proposition that we had to hurriedly train an army, and if we couldn't be concise and brief, there was no hope in the manuals.

So Bull went at this thing and he was to set up this demonstration. As I recall, he finally succeeded in getting this thing on the basis of a day and a half. And as I absolutely recall, as I perfectly recall, he later on cut this down to a half day. That is the supply basis for our army, his development.

In all this I must say, in a sense, I had no part. I merely furnished the directives and the drive and the arbitrary orders it must be done. From being the most unpopular course in school, it became one of the most popular. The only trouble was, they were always afraid that the man who wrote the 122-page mimeographed affair would learn about it, because he was filling a leading position at Leavenworth.

I might say that the battalion command at Leavenworth there in some of the problems was several pages long. I turned our battalion problem solutions into about one-third of a page, and later learned to my delight, and to the great influence of the instructors, that the Germans were giving division orders orally.

This is entirely confidential. I had a terrible time getting instructors to simplify these things, because they'd had this elaborate Leavenworth training which was really based on a static war. I was familiar with the static war. I had gone through one, but we weren't training for that sort of a fight. But this particular procedure of which Bull had charge had very phenomenal results. I might say that during all this I had many visitors and they often wanted to write up these things, particularly Johnson Hagood. And I had to use pressure to see that they wrote about nothing, because I knew I would be suppressed by the War Department and Leavenworth. But I was assisted by a very brilliant group of young instructors: Stilwell, Bradley, Collins, Bull, and a number of others.

Pogue: [Charles T.] Lanham was there part of that time.

Yes, Lanham was a student, I think. I used to have these fellows to come to my house. I was a bachelor—or widower—at the time and we would have an evening of discussions with various ones taking the lead.

These were very interesting, and very helpful, very illuminating. I noticed shortly after the war that General Collins wrote an article in the *Saturday Evening Post* about his services in the southwest Pacific and Guadalcanal, in Europe, the surrender of Brest, etc., and he has made reference to these meetings as being the most uplifting—though he didn't use that word—in his army career.

Pogue: Then you would say this was one of the most profitable parts of your own career, one of the most important from the standpoint of the wartime army?

Oh, my, yes. I was left there for five years, which gave me time to make changes without doing it with violence.

They had developed a very effective system of instruction, extraordinarily so, and they had followed the best recommendations on the—what is the word—pedagogy of the day. A professor from the University of Wisconsin, who was a leader in this field, visited Benning and thought the procedure there was more advanced than anywhere in the United States. Of course, you could do that there because the faculty was young, and if the individual was reluctant, it was very easy to get rid of him. This occurred before my time.

I was interested in brevity. The instructor used to read his lecture, and it had to be sent to the Editorial Section about a month in advance to make certain that it didn't contravene any of the agreed policies. I finally forbade any reading and allowed them to have a card to note down the principal factors, but when I heard an instructor say one morning, "I am required this morning to discuss"—and then look down at his card to see what to discuss—it was merely a nervous gesture—I suppressed the card, too, because I found it was many times more effective when a man talked off the cuff, as it were, although it was a very well ironed cuff.

I also revoked one of the binding rules of the school that when you finished, you stopped, and you didn't prolong the session until the end of the hour. That was enthusiastically received by the students. Strange to say, opposed by all the instructors.

I had a very amusing experience in my effort to have them brief their presentations, make them more incisive. So I quoted from a story where a little girl is writing to her guardian and describing what she has just had in rhetoric. She writes a very amusing letter to her guardian after the style indicated in rhetoric, numbered 1-5, which exactly equalled our field order distribution. I read this to them and it proved highly amusing and they tried for several weeks to find out where I got it. They finally traced me to the library in Columbus and discovered that this was "Daddy-Long-Legs" of Mary Pickford fame. As a matter of fact, I had to use every device I could think of to carry my point, because it doesn't do to just issue a ukase,

if that is the word, regarding such matters. They have all got to believe them. So "Daddy-Long-Legs" won the day.

Pogue: What, did you just run across it in reading it?

I remembered it and went back and looked it up. It was funny as the deuce. You ought to go look at it. It was funny as the deuce.

Pogue: That would make a beautiful little story in a book, you see. It lightens it, but it gets the point across. I'll look it up.

"Daddy-Long-Legs. It's very short and very charming little story, you know. We better get down to business here.

Pogue: Well, this though is business, not these particular questions, but I'm delighted when you . . . there are a lot of things I don't know enough about to ask you about, you see. Some day I'll say, well, let's talk about Benning, but you may not talk about all of them then, so I'm delighted if, when one of these hits your mind, you'll go into it, because I have a feeling that some of the most fascinating part of the book for service people is going to be this part.

As I have said several times, this puts me in the embarrassing position of seeming to be the one who knew. Well, as a matter of fact, throughout all of this I'm largely recording my reactions to the experiences of the AEF and later training the army when I was with General Pershing, and my own experiences in these schools.

Churchill, in the spring of 1944, continued to press for operations in the Aegean. The president said he would not consider even token forces for such a project. General Marshall agreed emphatically "that it would be very bad indeed and would probably be bound to result in a new war."
10. Did the president take this view as a result of arguments from you and Mr. Stimson, or did he reach these views on his own?

I don't recall, except that the president was getting very cautious about getting our troops involved in distant fields.

11. Do you believe that General Eisenhower would have kept Patton in without your very strong backing?

I don't know. I know that Mr. Stimson was very much pleased with my letter to Eisenhower, because Patton had been his aide, and he was much distressed at the hole Patton had gotten himself into. I might say that I heard Mrs. Marshall say to Patton, when Patton was a colonel, "George, you mustn't talk like that. You say these outrageous things and then you look at me to see if I'm going to smile. Now you could do that as a captain or a major, but you aspire to be a general, and a general cannot talk in any such wild way." He just laughed at her and that was the end of it. But she hit the nail on the head.

At the time [June 21, 1942, following the British surrender at Tobruk]

we were having discussions with Mr. Churchill here in Washington about sending troops to Cairo at the moment of British distress there—or Alexandria—I was vigorously opposed to sending troops, but very much in favor of sending tanks. Incidentally, it was very embarrassing to me because if you sent them, we had to take them away from the divisions that had never had the new tanks before, and had only had these for two weeks. Yet, we couldn't explain why we were doing it and received rather heavy lambastings for our inconsistencies of our staff procedure. So these tanks were sent out and a whole lot were lost when the vessel sank, and we had to go and skim the rest away from the troops so that they had none left at all.

Well, I brought Patton on and sent him down to the War College to make the plans for moving a division into this thing, hoping against hope that I wouldn't have to do it, but feeling I should be prepared to do it in case the president ordered the move. I told Patton when he came that we were all opposed to this, but I thought it was necessary to make the plans. I said there had been a big discussion about it, particularly as to what we would send and the decision is final that it would be a division, a total of eighteen thousand troops (a division then was about twelve thousand). That's all the special troops we could send. But there would be no question of sending another division—make it a corps. I didn't want that brought up at all. I didn't want to hear from him on that. That was settled.

So he'd get down to the War College and get to work on the thing. He went down to the War College, and to my intense surprise, early the next morning I got a letter from Patton vigorously proposing sending an additional division. So I sent one of the secretaries of the General Staff to get General Patton and put him on a plane and send him back to California that morning, which they did. Scared him half to death.

DR. POGUE'S NOTES

(These notes are not on the tape but attached to the transcript.)

12. You have already told me something of General Patton's habit of saying something outrageous and then of looking to see how it went over. Will you go a little further into his personality and tell me a little more about his strength and weaknesses as you saw them?

Would you have ever considered Patton for a higher command than that of army? Do you feel, as many do, that he was the best combat commander of the war?

How much difficulty with the Congress and the press did the slapping incident and the outburst in England cause? Was the final outburst which caused his relief worse than the others, or just the result of a cumulative development? Was he

relieved as a result of presidential pressure? I have been told that Mrs. Patton was very bitter at General Eisenhower. Don't you feel that he rather should have had the gratitude ot the Patton family?

Part of question 12 relative to Patton is discussed here. Patton not only indiscreet, descended almost to buffoonery at times. I liked him. Had lived with him at Fort Myer for a time [July-August 1939]. I remember a colonel of his who wrote some sharp criticisms of the War Department, wholly unjustifiable. I know that Patton had encouraged him. He liked the idea of taking slaps at the War Department people while he was striding about with two revolvers on his hip in the field. It wasn't right because a lot of these people he was criticizing—like Bull—would have given anything to be in a command.

Later, when I was overseas, he [Patton] asked me to promote the colonel. I said no. Then at the table one night he pressed the matter. I said to him, "This is not the time to bring this up. This is a social gathering, not a business meeting. I am speaking now as the chief of staff to General Patton and not to my friend, General Patton. You have encouraged the colonel in his attacks and you have destroyed him. I will not promote him. Never mention it to me again."

Here he took up the matter of tanks to Egypt and how he disciplined Patton. He then told how he went to maneuvers in North Carolina and picked Patton over John Magruder. In late November 1941, Marshall went to North Carolina to watch how the two men handled armor. In the maneuvers Magruder got captured every day. Patton never got captured. Marshall decided that Patton was his man. This was the time, General Marshall said, when I was away just before Pearl Harbor.

Eisenhower was under great pressure in the spring of 1944 to remove Patton. I know Stimson was pleased that we saved Patton. He had been Stimson's aide.

Patton was a natural fighter and a very skillful one. It was amazing how he could plunge ahead and then check himself. One of the best examples was at Coblenz when he turned south against the German Seventh Army. He turned south and went twenty-two kilometers against the enemy, and we in the War Department expected him to do it again. To our surprise, he didn't. What he did do illustrated his talent as a commander. He reorganized his troops and then was ready to finish the Seventh Army when they moved against him. Clever leader.

Members of his staff told me that when he moved northward from near that place where the truffles and liver comes from, (I ventured Perigord and Strasburg and he took Strasburg) he moved mostly at night, on icy roads, in great confusion. He interviewed several commanders. In each case they, in accordance with their training, began to tell him about enemy movements. They were doing what they were taught. But this was a

great emergency. Everything was in confusion. In each case Patton would interrupt them and say, "I don't want to know a goddamn thing about the enemy. What are you doing?" This changed their psychology. It was a perfect example of leadership.

I don't condone his profanity. I have a story about that. I had a friend who was a great bishop in the northwest. I used to go fishing out there; slip away with Frank McCarthy and be there a few days without people knowing where I was. Erskine Wood owned the place. I would have him arrange a dinner for twenty-five to thirty without letting them know I was the host. I would come in at the end of cocktails and then entertain.

On one of these occasions I had the bishop on my right. He had written to me after Patton had gone to Los Angeles and had cursed on the radio. Bishop had said, "Can't something be done to stop this? Children listen to him." I said I regretted it and that I didn't think it would happen again. I told him that in nearly all of our orderly rooms there was a facsimile of Washington's order forbidding swearing, but that it was a little hard to keep it under control. I said he wasn't able to handle it in his army and we have a much larger one.

That night, some time later at dinner, the bishop said, "How large was Washington's army?" I said, "I think never more than ten thousand." I said, "You are thinking about that profanity question. If George couldn't do it with his small force, think of our problem with eight million men." Then I said, "Look at your constituents around the table. They have all made a speech. I have never heard more profanity than I have here." He said, "I see your point."

I used to swear a good bit during the war. I told Frank McCarthy I did it for emphasis, but it is the poorest way to get it. I was ashamed of doing it and stopped after the war. I didn't take it up again until I had to spend a lot of my time in bed. Now I do sometimes. (He grinned.)