

TAPE 19

Recorded November 20, 1956

The Joint Chiefs of Staff went to London in June 1944 in case they were needed to make a quick decision. They discussed the southern France operation. Marshall spoke of the possibility of an attack in the area of Sete. Little weight was given to the Marseille-Toulon-Riviera area which the joint planners had envisaged for ANVIL. Brooke, King, and Cunningham tended to agree with Marshall on Sete. Portal and King felt that if the Russians launched an offensive toward the Balkans, a drive might be launched by the Allies against the Istrian Peninsula. A third alternative, if Eisenhower should reach the Loire River, was a descent from that area on the Bay of Biscay. Wilson and Eisenhower were told to plan these three.

1. What was the background of your Sete proposal?

I just don't recall at the present time.

2. Did you feel that the Bay of Biscay operation was practicable?

Pogue: That's the one he tried to get you to do right at the last.

We did not, added to which we knew that it would take us a long, long time to clear the harbors, as it proved later on. We had a very difficult time clearing the harbor in the north. What harbor is that? (Pogue: Cherbourg.) Yes.

The prime minister continued to press for the Italian campaign. He concentrated on the president and on Eisenhower; spoke of an attack eastward across the Adriatic and the capture of Trieste.

The president said that political considerations must be secondary to the thrust at the heart of Germany. The campaign against Istria disregarded the strategy for the early defeat of Germany, and it would take extra time to go through the Ljubljana Gap into Slovenia and Hungary. He added that he would never survive even a slight setback in OVERLORD if it were known that fairly large forces had been diverted into the Balkans.

3. Do you think that the prime minister at this time had in mind the possibility of heading off the Russians, or was he primarily interested in a big victory in Italy under British command?

There are two phases to this question, one with the heading off the Russians, the other the interest in the big victory in Italy under the British command. I don't think it was a question of a big victory in Italy under British command. It was a question of operating in that region and extending it up towards Vienna.

I might interject a rather trivial action regarding the Ljubljana Gap. I,

of course, was intimately familiar with this from map studies, but it is a little difficult to get the complete picture. When I was flying over to the preliminary Malta Conference, I wanted to see Eisenhower and he was coming down from his headquarters to see me. The fighting around the Bulge was still in progress, but going favorably to us now. The weather was atrocious and Eisenhower came down by private car with Bull. [Marshall was in Marseille January 27-29, 1945.]

The liaison official in that region—American—had taken a villa outside of Marseille—incidentally was owned by the sister of the famous Rostand, I think; stage impresario.

Pogue: Maurice Rostand.

Our man was of Polish stock and was a duplicate of Hindenburg. His servants, or soldier assistants, he picked up largely in Northern Italy. I wanted a haircut, so they sent the barber to my bathroom, but they sent with him the head butler, I suppose you would call him, to do the translating. While they were cutting my hair I inquired of the barber where was he from. Well, he was from the crest of the Ljubljana Gap, so I devoted the conversation from then on to descriptions of the country which were going to be helpful to me. Then the translator—or the chief butler—disagreed with my barber and he, it seems, was from the foot of the Gap. So they spent about an hour and a half educating me as to the country.

Pogue: It was an unusual briefing, wasn't it?

It was. Later, when we got into discussions, the British chiefs of staff, they were astonished at my knowledge of the Ljubljana Gap. One of them, I think, said, "You must have spent the summer there." But I didn't tell them it was the barber.

Pogue: While we are on that, I couldn't get much information on that meeting between you and General Eisenhower, except that in Butcher's diary he says that at one point you told Eisenhower if they didn't back you up, if you were he, you'd just quit.

If that didn't back me up?

Pogue: If they didn't back him up on the campaign. In other words, if you were in his place, if you were in Eisenhower's place, you'd quit if they didn't back you up on that.

I don't recall that.

Pogue: But this was something that someone had told him. Butcher was not down there and he just put down some gossip. But you talked about the campaign up there in the north...

Oh, yes, that was what he was down there for; however, most of the

conversation went to the fact that he wanted the mountain division, which had just been given to Clark, and he (Eisenhower) was seeking reinforcements. I wouldn't do it. He was stressing the importance of his situation. I said, "We asked you if you wanted that division and you said no, that its organization did not suit your purposes. We asked Clark if he wanted it and he cabled, yes, within about an hour and is making magnificent use of it." And Eisenhower said, "I said no?" And I said, "Yes, you said no. Now you want to turn around and take it away from Clark who said yes. I won't give it to you." He said, "Bull, how about that?" Bull flushed up to the top of his hair and admitted that they had said no because they didn't quite like its organization.

Pogue: Eisenhower didn't know it.

He didn't know it. He was very much taken back. Bull was very much embarrassed.

Pogue: That had an interesting history, that mountain division, didn't it?

Oh, yes. It did a gorgeous job down there in Italy. I will tell you later about that campaign. The finals of that campaign were extraordinarily interesting. You started to ask me a question?

Pogue: You planned it to be used somewhere else, didn't you?

Planned it to use in the NEPTUNE operation and drop it on the glacier in Norway. Finally, we wiped out the heavy water plant by an operation along the shore.

4. The president's statements were so much like your own that I wonder if you drafted his message to Churchill?

I haven't any idea. As I told you, many of his messages to Churchill he didn't show us, but I generally got them through Dill. This might have been fixed up there by me and my staff, but I have no recollection of what the circumstances were.

Since the war, Churchill has denied that he ever favored a campaign in the Balkans. On the other hand, Istria and Trieste were, he thought, strategic and political positions that might "exercise profound and widespread reactions, especially after the Russian advances."

5. President Eisenhower told me in 1954 that in all this early debate Mr. Churchill never once mentioned the Russian danger as the basis for his argument. Was this also true in your case?

I don't recall their bringing that up.

6. What, generally, were your own relations with the prime minister in these discussions? Did he talk to you much, or had he decided that it was better to work on someone else?

He would talk to me very frankly and very persuasively, and then when he finally couldn't turn me, he possibly did turn to someone else. In these conferences, almost invariably when I arrived, Mr. Churchill had arrived and I think invariably he invited me to dinner with him alone the first night. At Casablanca it was lunch, and at all the other places it was at night. I don't remember at Tehran. I remember most clearly Egypt. We sat and talked from about eight o'clock until about three in the morning. There is when he would put his arguments up to me. They were very charming talks as a rule, because he would be most discursive before we got down to the real business that he had in mind.

I might interject a couple of examples. At Cairo he had taken the house of the British consul general there, or head of the commission there, an Australian. We first sat out in the courtyard where there was a fountain, then went in to dinner, and then continued on to the early morning hours. I had been reading on the plane one of the books in my plane library, I think they're called one man's—well known books, I've forgotten—one man's library or something of that sort, "Every Man's Library." I'd been reading about—I've forgotten for the moment; of course, it will come back—this was the subject of many of our debates and discussions. Who was the Jew, the prime minister of England?

Pogue: Disraeli. Lord Beaconsfield or Disraeli. Was it one of his books?

It was in relation to him, I think. It doesn't ring quite clear in my mind. Anyway, in this particular thing—and I'll give you the name later—I was commenting about this thing that I had just been reading from in "One Man's Library"—"Everyman's Library"—and Churchill picked this up and he quoted whole speeches made before Parliament, word for word; got very intense about it and got up and strode around the room making these quotes. It's a famous parliamentary incident in British history. I should have the man's name on the tip of my tongue. At the moment I can only think of Disraeli, but yet I don't think he was the one. Or Pitt, I think it was Pitt. It was Pitt. It's quite amazing the way Mr. Churchill photographed this stuff.

On the plane, when he and I were flying over to Algiers with Brooke, I was trying to keep him from bringing up the subject of the Washington Conference. Well, all during the earlier part of the trip he was so busy with his own state papers, which he'd gotten far behind in, that the hazard of such a conversation didn't arise. But as we were approaching Gibraltar, Mr. Churchill ran out of work and came back and sat down with me, and then I knew I was in for it. The point was I didn't wish to talk with him till I'd had a chance to talk to Eisenhower—the background where Mediterranean operations—what was that island out in the Mediterranean that we never went to? (Pogue: Rhodes.) Rhodes, Sicily, etc. Rhodes, Sicily, Sardinia, the

southern tip of Italy. (Pogue: Corsica.) Yes, and Corsica. So I hurriedly thought up something to talk about, and I asked the prime minister—told him I had been reading Indian history, not exactly refreshing my mind, because my early reading had been from a very immature standpoint. I know I was trying to dig out innards of it because I was having so many concerns with officers in India in relation to Burma and China. Lord Halifax had loaned me his copy of a very complete account of the famous—who was the head fellow in India? (Pogue: Clive?) No, no, he was the fighting fellow. It lasted ten or eleven years, this attack on him. (Pogue: Hastings.) Warren Hastings. (Pogue: A great trial.) I talked to him about that and asked him if the fact that this thing ran for eleven years and then ended in, you might say, no count had changed any of the procedure in Parliament, rules or procedure in Parliament. He told me it had not. Then he gave me the most astonishing résumé of such matters. I remember he got on old Louis XI of France and went on up into Great Britain, his various procedures regarding this affair. Two things were involved: the impeachment of Hastings, and he contrasted that with a bill of attainder, and he gave me a perfectly remarkable historical discussion of these two factors. I tried to remember them so that I could appear well-educated on the case, but there were so many tricks to it that I couldn't do it.

But he suddenly ran out of soap after about twenty minutes of this. I'd been so fascinated that I hadn't thought up what my next deterrent would be, so I asked him about the famous parachute drop of Hitler's number two man in Scotland, Rudolf Hess, on the Duke of Hamilton, I think his estate. Well, again he opened up in the most fascinating way, because he, of course, was a party to this. They were trying to turn British favor against Churchill and over to the side of opposing the continuation of the war. There was a great deal of interest about the Duke of Hamilton. I know that Brooke had never heard this and he was fascinated. I again was overly fascinated and he got to the end of that—that was about fifteen minutes, and there we were finished again and I didn't have a new subject. And I knew that it was certain as fate before dinner this thing would come, so I just made a desperate grab and in a most impolitic way I said, "Well, now as I recall from the press accounts, you were said to be a leader of the king's party and the great question of his abdication on his marriage to Mrs. Simpson."

Well, he took that right up without hesitation and gave me a most interesting account of it, out of which I remember the one thing, the great mistake the king made was just not going ahead and marrying her. He said, "The king could do no wrong if he had married her, then they could have scratched around and tried to settle this thing." He talked this time for about twenty minutes. It was a marvelous lecture, just marvelous. Then the steward, thank god, announced supper—(dinner)—and it was all over.

Well, I've never heard three more fascinating accounts than he gave on that particular occasion, any one of which could be printed and sold to a magazine for a large amount of money. But I think the most interesting one was the discussion of the bill of attainder and the impeachment and the history of the whole development of such things.

Pogue: MacCauley wrote a long account of that trial of Warren Hastings. It is one of the great classics of English history.

Yes, I've read it in those books.

Pogue: Oh, that's the one you read, Halifax's copy.

I know in relation to these books. Dill was very tired in Washington and he suggested that we fly over to Bermuda. It's only about a three hours' flight and, of course, we could get a plane. And he communicated with the governor general and we had an invitation, of course, to stay at Government House, and we flew over—had a perfectly delightful visit [March 25–28, 1944]. I didn't know anything about these people and was charmed with the wife—Lady Burghley—and went back there afterwards. So we spent a delightful two days or three days there, I've forgotten just what. I know she and I got out there counting red birds and I never saw so many redbirds in my life. I brought them the music of "Oklahoma" and they were very much taken with "The Surrey With the Fringe on Top," because they had one out there with the fringe around the top.

However, going back on the plane to the United States, I was reading my "Everyman's Library" and I came across the discussion of Lord Burghley's progenitor, who had been prime minister under Queen Elizabeth—Good Queen Bess—for almost sixty years, and as a matter of fact, had assisted her in the decision for the execution of Mary Queen of Scots, who's Lady Burghley's direct ancestor—great-great-great-great grandmother, or something like that. I was chiding Dill. We'd gone there and stayed and he didn't know a thing about this; I didn't know a thing about it. We learned it all on the plane going back, so I had to read the book to him as we came back to the United States, which I thought was rather funny.

Pogue: Well, it astounds me to find that you read all these things in the middle of the war.

How do you mean?

Pogue: Well, that you had time for it.

Well, it was on the plane.

Pogue: But so many people wouldn't have thought of getting into that stuff on India and all that.

Well, India was business. My knowledge of India, you might say, was a boy's knowledge of India. I hadn't read these things with discretion and penetration. Now I needed to know. In doing this I ran into this business of Warren Hastings, and I had this thought that I was prolonging the conversation with Churchill. Here was a good one.

Pogue: Incidentally, had you read as a boy, or as a young man, G. A. Henty's books?

I read all of them. I know Hamilcar and Hannibal and all those people much better from Henty than anybody else.

Pogue: I've actually taught about Hamilcar from that book because it's magnificent.

I've found that it is so much easier to understand the things from his books. I read them all. I remember those two in particular.

Pogue: He had one on India that gave me my first picture of the mutiny.

I think I read that. Well, I thought Henty was an accomplished historian.

Pogue: He was.

But he had the great ability to picture the thing so that you wanted to read it. If you could take boys through history with that right off the bat, because they all liked it. I don't remember how many Henty books I read, but I read first Hamilcar and then I read Hannibal, and that's my complete memory of Hannibal.

7. I get the impression that at one time you felt General Eisenhower might be wavering on ANVIL and that you had to keep him firm. Is that impression correct?

I don't recall.

8. Did you have the impression that the British chiefs of staff were less set on stopping ANVIL than was the prime minister?

Yes.

Churchill, in Triumph and Tragedy, says this: "The Army which we had landed on the Riviera at such painful cost to our operations in Italy arrived too late to help Eisenhower's first main struggle in the north, while Alexander's offensive failed by the barest of margins to achieve the success it deserved and we so badly needed. Italy was not to be wholly free for another eight months; the right-handed drive to Vienna was denied us; and, except in Greece, our military power to influence the liberation of southwestern Europe was gone."

9. Do you feel that the ANVIL operation was without aid to Eisenhower's main effort in the north?

10. Do you feel, as I do, that this statement begs the question by assuming that if ANVIL forces had been left in Italy, they would have cleared Italy in less than eight months, that we could have gone to Vienna, and that we could have influenced decisively the course of events in southeastern Europe?

11. Isn't the prime minister here confusing the possible effect of an all-out effort in the eastern Mediterranean and Italy with the possible effect of diverting ANVIL forces to Italy?

I don't agree with the prime minister on the ANVIL question at all. In fact, I am in almost complete disagreement on every phase of it. He was intent on one thing and he sways all his arguments to justify that one thing. As I told you, there was a paper of data that they prepared for me and I couldn't use it because of the way it was written, the castigation of ANVIL. Almost everything he said to deter us from that operation down there went exactly the other way with a tremendous success. We had very hard fighting on the right in the Vosges Mountains at the end, notably on the capture of that town down there where they had to go up the walls like in the old-fashioned [way]. The Third Division had such heavy losses. It was a large town on the southern front of the Vosges. I've forgotten the name of it. (Pogue: Colmar.) Colmar. We had very heavy fighting there, all of which deeply concerned Eisenhower's procedures. If you take the commander, say Alexander, in that place, of course he wants it there. MacArthur was just as much opposed to ANVIL as Alexander was for the same reason. He wanted the things his way out there where he was. If you followed every commander, you'd just be lost. We'd be sunk; you'd be all over the place. My hardest function was trying to keep to the things we could do.

I had an example of that—that goes into practically everything in the government way—I had an example of that when we [were] trying to get straightened up on the European Recovery Plan. As I've often said, it wasn't the idea of the so-called Marshall Plan—it wasn't so much that as it was the execution and how we got through Congress. It took us from June to the following April.

[Begin cassette side 2]

I worked on that as hard as though I was running for the Senate or the presidency. That's what I'm proud of, that part of it, because I had foreigners, I had tobacco people, cotton people, New York, eastern industrialists, Pittsburgh people, the whole West Coast going in the other direction, up in the northwest. It was just a struggle from start to finish, and that's what I'm proud of, that we actually did that and put it over.

I remember, with some amusement, one day they came in to me and said they wanted me to see some farmers. I thought they were talking about a half a dozen maybe from Ohio. I said I haven't got time for that sort of thing now. Well, they said they've just come from Mr. Taft. Well, I said the farmers were very much involved in this because it effected their farm machinery and all the things they were in short supply of, fertilizers particularly. So I walked into the room and I found there were almost sixty

and they'd just had lunch with Mr. Taft. I sat down at the end of the table and I asked them who was the head fellow and they told me that. I asked them what they were there for and they told me that. And I talked for about forty minutes and then got up and left, and they remained in the room and reversed themselves on Mr. Taft.

Pogue: I'll swear. I knew you were active then, but I never realized you did that much.

Oh, Lord, I traveled all over the country. I'll tell you later about that West Coast thing, because that's really almost dramatic. I did tell you about going out to the Federation of Women's Clubs out there, when I wasn't going to things in general. I remember the farmers had a meeting up there at Des Moines. I almost lost my life in that because I got forced down on the only airport that was available. Then fifteen minutes later, before I even got to the house, a downpour occurred which did, they said, \$10,000,000 of damage in Chattanooga, and they got me a clear wire through to the convention and I talked to them over this wire with a loudspeaker.

I had quite a time down at Atlanta with the tobacco growers and the cotton growers, because they wanted fertilizer very badly and were very strong organizations, and I got them when I got through with my talk there, but I had a very hard time doing it. Then I went down to the West Coast. That was the most interesting and amusing trip, starting with the University of California at Berkeley and going down to the University of California at Los Angeles, and I came out of that successfully.

But I had to just travel all the time. Pittsburgh was a very difficult thing. I had friends there. They were all nice and listened to me, but were wholly and completely unsympathetic. I talked to the [National] Association of Manufacturers up in New York. They gave me a very large luncheon and I had to get them—it was a very hard thing to do—they were always very nice to me there, though. I don't know where all else I talked—I think Philadelphia. There were a number of other places that I don't recall. But that was a hard fight.

Pogue: Oh, it was awful.

That was the thing that I took some pride in. As a matter of fact, the selection of the time and the place was largely down on the basis of what the opposition would be, because all America was opposed to appropriating anything else because of the way that the first appropriation, right after the war, had been wasted. We had Bert McCormick leading the attack out in the Middle West and putting on a very heavy barrage. I remember Vandenberg said to me, "You need to belittle this." He said, "I have to sit up and be called a Benedict Arnold."

Pogue: You mention being forced down there, I mean landing. Did you have any narrow escapes other than that during your time during the war?

Yes. It's peculiar I had most of them near here. I'd get clear around the world and then get in trouble up there in Washington trying to get in. I'd come in and this whole coast would be under fog. In this case came down in a plane . . .

[Begin cassette side 3]

I stopped talking about the difficulty of getting the passage of the European Recovery Plan, and accentuating the fact that the idea wasn't so much—in fact that is very little—but it's the execution that was the great trouble, and that posed a very heavy task. I might continue to say that there was so much feeling about further appropriations for Europe, that we knew the whole problem was how to meet that opposition. And I first decided to talk at the University of Wisconsin at Madison because I thought that was out in the Bert McCormick area, and they were very friendly to me at the University of Wisconsin, and they had been trying to give me a degree and I had declined. The time was the latter part of May, I think.

And then we later decided that was too soon, and we switched clear to Amherst which, as I recall, was about the sixteenth of June. Then things changed so in Europe, it appeared that that was too late. Harvard had offered me a degree several times. I'd declined. And that was the fifth of May [June]. And then I thought that was a very conservative community and Harvard in particular, and that it not be a bad idea to launch the idea up there. So we telegraphed to Harvard to find out if they were still agreeable to give me a degree, and that put me in the position of seemingly not going up there for purely a speech purpose, for the purpose of making a speech. And they said that they would be delighted—and that was the fifth of June—and that's the reason the affair was launched there.

As I have indicated, our principal concern was not with European reception. I was quite sure they would receive the idea only too willingly—maybe not our restrictions on the terms of acceptance. But I was concerned with how we would manage this thing with the Middle West. It was going to be difficult all over the country, but it would be extraordinarily difficult with the Middle West, which inevitably would launch a heavy campaign against it. However, when the reaction came, it was so dramatic—from London and Paris where Bevin and Bidault were sort of in a race for the leader—that there was no reaction from the Middle West for quite some time—as I recall, almost a month, and certainly several weeks. Then, of course, as they got underway, there was a very positive reaction. But we were concerned about the American reaction and the Middle West reaction in particular, and had assumed European approval.

I think that one of the tragic moments in the relationships in Europe was when Molotov took his people back. He had about fifty with him from the meeting in Paris. And he did it all under a misunderstanding. Either the prime minister or the minister of foreign affairs of Poland talked to me at a United Nations meeting—that is, talked to me at my office—and he said that he thought the great mistake I made was in not consulting the Russians, as well as the British and the French, in relation to this recovery plan. And when I told him that I hadn't consulted the British or French, that, in a sense, I hadn't consulted anybody. I hadn't mentioned it to a member of Congress. There were only three or four people that were aware of what I was going to do—I think, two, possible three in the State Department and the president. No one else, because I knew if it got out and got into a debate in Congress beforehand, we would never make the move.

Pogue: You didn't talk to Vandenberg beforehand?

No, not at all. Well, this Polish official wouldn't believe that.

Will you stop the machine? [Pogue: Here he said turn it off and then said: I made the speech without telling the president. The speech was not finished when I left Washington, so I worked with it on the plane and then at Conant's house. I realized just before making the speech that he hadn't seen it. Of course, he knew what we were doing and we were thinking along the same line.]

The way the speech was primarily built was this. I talked it over with George Kennan in the Plans Section [i.e., the Policy Planning Staff] and Chip Bohlen, and I told them to each start out wholly independent of the other and give me what they thought. Then I got impatient and right away, and I dictated something that I thought. And when theirs came in, they were quite apart. It was not a case of one opposing the other. It was almost a totally different approach. And I cut out part of Kennan's speech and part of Bohlen's speech and part of my speech and put the three together, and that was the beginning of the talk.

Pogue: You didn't use any of Acheson's stuff? You didn't use anything from Acheson?

No.

Pogue: Because he'd made a speech, you know, in Mississippi.

Yes, I know he did one down there. You heard more of that speech afterwards than at the time.

Pogue: That's right. It attracted no attention at first, and they are two different thoughts.

I know they are. Cohen cut loose. The president got Acheson to do that. I was opposed to all these things. I didn't want anyone to get stirred up until we went off on our—I know Cohen made a speech out in California in which these large figures became involved and I was very much put out about that, because I wanted to get at the money question very, very carefully. [Benjamin V. Cohn was State Department legal counselor.]

And then the [Harvard] speech wasn't at all finished, and I took it on the plane and worked on it there. I remember there was one part of the speech that both Chip Bohlen and Kennan were opposed to. I was just trying to think what that was now, but it became one of the most effective parts. It's the one that Hoffman uses all the time in his quotes as his guiding instructions. [Paul G. Hoffman was head of the Economic Cooperation Administration after April 5, 1948.]

But as I say, we were looking for the storm in the direction of the Mississippi and, actually, it didn't develop at all until much later. And then we were under the extreme difficulty of dealing with things all of which were in short, in deficiency status—fertilizer, farm machinery, all sorts of tools, a great many things like that, wheat. And then on top of that, the Russians, as usual, put on a strike or something in France and tried to keep it back, and we had to appropriate additional money—for which it was a very hard thing to get; I've forgotten how many, \$500 millions or something like that—which cut right into our available funds. They did that, I think, three times. I never went over to London or Paris, it seemed to me, that the French didn't stage a strike right away. Coal, as a rule. It was no easy performance. Well, I got way astray here.

Pogue: Well, I'm delighted to get this. We'll go into it more thoroughly sometime, because in many ways, don't you feel that this is one of the greatest pieces of work that you've ever been associated with?

Yes. Well, I think it had more momentous consequences. Everyone has forgotten what Europe was at that time.

Pogue: Absolutely, and the victory in Poland and the move toward victory in Hungary, it seems to me you have to go back to the Marshall Plan on it to find the reason, because it began to—a lot of those people began to wonder about the Russians sacrificing them when they could have been in on it, too. And I did want to ask one question. You brought up Bevin. I recently read a life of Bevin which gives him great credit on this, because they said you had a great vision, but that if Bevin had not pushed forward and approached it very dramatically, it never would have been the big thing that it was.

Well, he helped a great deal with that. There wasn't any question of that. And then it became more or less of a race between Bevin and Bidault as to who would have the leadership. [Ernest Bevin was British foreign

secretary, 1945-51, and Georges Bidault was French foreign minister, 1947-48.] They helped us because it took us away from the Middle West where we were prepared to have a very difficult fight. I know they have come out for Bevin as to—what is the force you have in Europe now, the organization? (Pogue: NATO.) NATO. I haven't read that in full detail, but I started NATO, actually, from the first jump. I got every living soul, one after the other, in talk to me personally on the thing and to get them stirred up to do this business.

Pogue: It seems interesting, doesn't it, after you had practically finished, supposedly, your career that then you got into things that were just world shaking.

Yes. Well, the world was just ready to be shaken to pieces there any minute. Most of my mind was made up in Moscow [at the Foreign Ministers Conference of March-April 1947] and returning to Europe—Germany and France—where I could see that the disintegration was moving so rapidly that something had to be done in a great hurry.

But this fellow from Poland wouldn't believe that nobody knew about this. But it went much further than he dreamed, or I dared to tell him. I was very much afraid—what's his name in the planning section? (Pogue: Kennan.) George Kennan—that some of his assistants might talk or something of that sort.

Incidentally, I created that section [Policy Planning Staff]. I was horrified when I got into the State Department to find that what they had said was true, and they took pride in it, that each subdivision was a separate industry—a compartment by itself—which is all of the nonsensical organization things I have ever heard of. And I take great pride in that and what happened when I was first made secretary of defense in how I achieved the change. It wasn't a question of going to law. Byrnes had an associate, a friend of his from down in Spartanburg, I think, was his number two man there in the State Department, and he had a secretary who was a girl and had a desk in the little room outside of my door. She handled his letters and things of that sort. When she left, [Special Assistant to the Secretary of State Marshall S.] Carter took her desk, and I found out in about two days about this complete state of disorganization. I don't know as you'd call it disorganization; you'd say lack of organization. They just didn't have any. I got to thinking then, as a matter of fact, almost always it [secretary of state] had been a lawyer.

Well, lawyers aren't organizers at all, and that holds for Mr. Stimson and all of them. Probably the best legal fellow from that point of view was Elihu Root. He saw the necessity for organization, though he didn't attempt to carry it out himself in creating the General Staff. So I told Carter to deal with this thing right off. I didn't mean the reorganization plan, but to deal with it that way—that everything would come in there through him. He

wasn't policy, but he would see what it was and he would refer it around to the various people so we would have some coordinated action.

Well, he began doing that on the second day I was secretary of state. And then, I think, got out some short memo on the thing—I'm not even certain of that. But Carter told me would take about six months for them to get the idea of what we were trying to do. Then we began right then to get the thing together so that there was some related continuity in the operations of the State Department. Well, I was horrified to find this condition of affairs, and I don't want this to ever get out, but as a matter of fact, it was Eisenhower's—since he's been president—comment to me that his great difficulty in dealing with other sections of the government other than the services, that they didn't have any kind of an organization of that sort, and you couldn't get your fingers on the damn thing—which was very evident all the time.

Pogue: You talked about putting Kennan in there. Did you find that he was one of your best people?

Yes. But the point was to get him in there. I found out that there was nothing, no planning agency, at all. You can't plan and operate at the same [time]. They are two states of mind. Then I started right off to get that. And when we made the move over there, I kept available the office space for that agency before it was ever organized. My trouble was to get the people. Almost all of them were in very important positions or I wouldn't have wanted them, and I was very much averse to taking them away suddenly from their positions.

Kennan was there in the War College. I had struggled for a long time to get the State Department to have people there, and every time they had turned it down and the last time I brought it up just at the close of the war. I sent a note to Stettinius that they always told me the same thing—they didn't have men to spare, but I said they certainly didn't have any knowledge to spare either. He revoked their reaction and they sent the first people down to the War College for that course.

Pogue: Well, I didn't realize that that came from you. I thought that they had asked to do it.

Oh, asked? Hell, no. I had to gouge them into it. And they, I remember I made it so drastic to Stettinius, he did it within the hour almost.

Well, as I say, I had no planning section and you can't operate and plan at the same time. One or the other is going to suffer from it. Well, as the operation is the forcing procedure—it's on your back every day—you naturally do that, and the result is the other suffers.

Now my problem was to get the people and Kennan was my first choice, but I had to wait until about April to get him without disorganizing

the course at the War College. But I finally—I didn't expect to bring him until June—but as I recall, I brought him in part-time in April, just part-time, but mainly to select the other people for me. And at the end of the first six months, I think I only had five or six people; maybe not that many, because I told Kennan I just didn't want to accumulate any ordinary people. They had to be very good or not at all. I'd rather have one good man than five mediocrities. Now once we got that, then the problem was not to have a lot of stuff referred to them.

After I left, they got most of these things enacted into law that Bob Lovett and I had created. Almost everything they did we had already planned, but we had working in a large respect just about the way you do a battle. You see your colonels, your generals, and so on, and you talk over all this thing and get them all started on it, each on his part, and then you issue an order which is largely to confirm what you have said orally.

Well, I followed that same procedure in connection with that subdivision of the State Department. It wasn't understood at all by the other people. And then my problem was to prevent them from overloading it with a lot of things which were excrescences, and to get rid of them they wanted to refer it to that section. Well, I wanted that to handle the most important things we had. Of course, when the press got hold of it, then they wanted to exploit it. Well, that was the last thing in the world that you wanted. Finally, we got the thing going. But you can't imagine what it was when you had no definite planning agency of any kind. You just had a hit or miss affair going on around there.

Pogue: Well, they've got some very fine people. I know about half a dozen.

Well, it was a very slow process getting them. I preferred to go right along. For a while we only had three, and then finally we began to accumulate.

Pogue: Finally got ten or twelve, didn't you?

That's what it was supposed to be.

Pogue: Then Dulles came along and threw nearly all of them out, because, well, he said they were mixed up with bad plans.

Mixed up with what?

Pogue: Bad plans, you see, that weren't Republican plans. He threw out Kennan, you remember. They have never used him since, which was a great pity.

Didn't have anything to do with politics. In fact, I had them when they submitted a plan, they had no indication of what we wanted when they went to submit it.

Pogue: That's one of those things where he ducked because McCarthy was attacking this planning group, you see.

I see.

Pogue: He ducked out on it. Nearly all of those men have found big places, oddly enough, in either businesses or universities. One's at the University of Virginia. One is the dean of the School of Advanced International Studies in Washington. Kennan, of course, is at that advanced school up at Princeton and it shows what fine brains they were.

I'm still on Chapter 17.

Pogue: You've more [or] less answered that under question 9.

Well, I think I've answered that under question 10, too.

Pogue: That's what I meant.

I made a very positive statement.

11. Isn't the prime minister here confusing the possible effect of an all-out effort in the eastern Mediterranean and Italy with the possible effect of diverting ANVIL forces to Italy?

Pogue: What that eleventh really means is that the prime minister, it seems to me, from his messages at this time in late '43, was mainly interested in the Italian campaign by the British, but now he tries to make it out to be that he was trying to head off the Russians, trying to do a lot of stuff there.

I think so. I don't know. Keep in mind that when you take the commander, he's always prejudiced in favor of something in his neighborhood. You take the number two man for General Lear—Bonesteel—Bonesteel was a very fine fellow. He was in command up in Iceland. I stopped at Iceland coming back from something in Europe and just before we left—we were just there a short time (Bedell Smith and myself)—Eisenhower [Bonesteel] took me in his bedroom—we were in this little hut—and he said what about the—I've forgotten the word—it isn't "aggrandizement"—augmentation program? I don't know what they had then. I think maybe they had about twelve thousand troops, I don't remember, and the augmentation took them up to thirty or forty thousand, I don't remember. But I had the sad news of telling him we were going to cut his existing command in half, because the defensive importance of the place had dwindled decidedly by our change of position in Europe. That just about killed Bonesteel. We were cutting down everywhere we could, you see.

Pogue: Incidentally, speaking of him when you sent to Iceland, did you have in mind the possibility he would go to Europe, possibility that he would have a command in Europe later?

No, I hadn't thought of that, I don't think.

Pogue: You see, the newspapers—I remember in going back through it—played him up that you were actually picking him to give him experience so that he could ultimately go to Europe, but that's the typical way they do things.

The man that was more or less seemingly prepared for this thing was—what's his name in the Air Corps that was killed in Alaska [Ice-land]—Andrews, because he was first made G-3 of the War Department, and then he was made commander down in the Caribbean area, Latin American area, and then I sent him to Cairo to get into touch with the British and to get their way and to work in there with Eisenhower's headquarters, and then I sent him to England. So he had a real preparatory course. But I didn't have in mind that he would be the commander over there. Devers got in there temporarily and he thought right away he was the coming commander.

With defeat and retreat in prospect for the Chinese in the summer of 1944, Marshall asked Stikwell on July 1 if he thought that he could help save the China situation. The pressure on the War Department, Marshall stated, was to increase the Hump tonnage for Chennault and equip and supply Chinese ground troops. "The latter presents the problem of an immense effort in transportation with a poorly directed and possibly completely wasteful procedure."

Stikwell's affirmative response was conditioned upon the president's obtaining the consent of Chiang to Stikwell's command of the Chinese forces. Without this authority, Stikwell felt that little could be done. Marshall secured JCS and presidential approval of a proposal to promote Stikwell to a full general and to urge Chiang to accept him as over-all commander. Chiang agreed in principle, but weeks dragged on without any further developments. Later requests to Chiang failed to get any action, and in August the president decided to send General Hurley as his personal representative to China.

12. Who was responsible for the selection of General Hurley for this mission [president's personal representative to China]?

I don't recall. I selected Hurley in the first place way back and sent him over to Australia. The president had called me up and asked me who should be the ambassador to Australia. And I said, "Well, I can't answer you that over the phone. One man that I can think of—I don't think is a Republican." "Well," he said, "that may not matter." I thought Hurley was a Democrat. I don't know what he was. I don't know what he is.

Pogue: He was a Republican.

He's a Republican. He said, "Who'd you have in mind?" Well, I said, "Hurley." Well, he said, "That's all right, we'll make him." And he had his people get in touch with him. They found him in New York and they brought Hurley right down.

Then the president called me up in great distress and said I made a

mistake about that business. It's the ambassador to New Zealand and not Australia. Hurley didn't want that a damn bit. But he [Roosevelt] said, "I'll send him over to you and you can settle it." So Hurley came to me, and I said, "Hurley, the best I can do for you is delay your appointment to New Zealand, and I'll send you with your reserve appointment to Australia right away." He saw a message from MacArthur there. (He had been secretary of war when MacArthur was chief of staff.) MacArthur was appealing for something from Corregidor. And he said, "I can just help Doug. If I can just help Doug." I said, "All right, you can help him."

I sent him around to Handy's organization and had Mac [James McIntosh], my little lame messenger, take him. And then I telephoned them and told them Hurley was coming, and I'd have a letter there of instructions for him just to keep him there, but he was to go straight to the plane. I never let him get out of the department. And I wrote the letter which Hurley always liked, because it gave him pretty broad authority. But there was nobody in Australia but a sick ambassador. So Hurley went off and had this money to his credit in Melbourne. And he went up and got into the thing up there, and he got hit on the head by a fragment of a bomb and showed everybody that hole in his head where the bomb hit him, and did a pretty good job. He was always very proud of that fact and very disposed towards me because of the way I sent him off.

And about that time the fellow who used to be head of the American Legion and who was a fine fighter in the Twenty-third Infantry, although he was a Reserve officer and had a couple of Distinguished Service Medals, but was an ardent Republican, from Iowa, I think. Anyway, he was quite a political factor, having been head of the Legion. He came in and he said he'd been looking around "to see if I could get something," but he said, "I can't get anything." He had tried to see the president and "he doesn't even want to see me," because he was a very ardent Republican. I said, "What do you mean you want to get something?" He said, "I want to go to this thing. I want to go to this thing. Damn this political business!" I said, "You mean you really want to go right away?" And he said yes.

I said, "Just take this," and I sent for Mac and gave him a note, and told them put him right on a plane and don't let him come back here for his hat. And they did put him on and sent him out and he became one of MacArthur's right-hand men. Now what the hell's that fellow's name? [Hanford] MacNider. He lost his hat. I put him on that convoy that was just about to sail from Panama.

Pogue: MacNider had been assistant secretary of air, hadn't he?

Yes, and he just hazed General Summerall. He and—there were two assistant secretaries then—they made it almost unbearable for General Summerall.

I remember those two getting off. They went off so damned fast they didn't have time to get their handkerchiefs out.

Pogue: Well, I've heard some of your couriers who'd say that they'd be called up to the office and they never had a chance to go get their hats. They'd go off and their next stop would be Casablanca or somewhere. It impressed the life out of them.

There was another thing, too. I didn't want them to hang around talking.

I think—Question 12—that Hurley himself was responsible for it. He was always pushing to go, and the minute he got started he wanted to go to Moscow. He always stopped at Moscow en route.

13. *Do you feel that he helped or hindered the situation?*

I think he complicated it a great deal. And I must say that Stilwell always got in his own way and just was duck soup for Chennault's gambling. Chennault was playing right up to the Generalissimo. And he had [columnist Joseph W.] Alsop working with him. Alsop even went over to India and told them all there that Stilwell should be relieved. I got the proof and everything on that and the president wouldn't do a damn thing about it. That's when I wanted Stilwell to let me relieve him.

In August 1944, the Operations Division's strategy section recommended that since the main objective of the U.S. forces in the CBI was to assist China, American and Chinese forces should be withdrawn from Burma after Lashio was reached, so that the British could reconquer their own colonial empire and the United States would not receive the stigma of helping them resubjugate the native populace. This mounting political consciousness was typical of army strategic planning during the summer of 1944, when the problems of peace began to weigh more heavily upon the military staff. The United States was committed to aid China, but even this was now a limited commitment aimed merely at keeping China in the war, rather than at any scheme to use China as a battleground or at any reliance upon the Chinese war effort to contribute greatly to winning the war.

14. *Dr. Matloff was criticized by some who read this chapter. They said that he had attacked the British for being political minded in their planning, but that he overlooked the fact that we were often political, too. Do you feel that we were inconsistent on this point during the war?*

No, I don't think they were too insistent on that point. As a matter of fact, they might be criticized for not being enough.

Pogue: In a question I haven't phrased there, we did feel as the war went along that we didn't want to get in on a business of handing stuff back to the British.

Yes, we were trying to avoid the colonial thing throughout. I heard the president say that the French had made such a mess of Indo-China they ought not get any of it back. I heard Mr. Roosevelt say that. That was before we had gotten into that mix-up there.

In June MacArthur insisted that the military and moral aspects of the Philippines question was an important element that could not be disregarded by the military leaders. General Marshall and the army planners investigated other possibilities, and the chief of staff pointed out in late June to General MacArthur that personal and political considerations should not be allowed to override the main objective—the early conclusion of the war against Japan. The capture of Formosa or Kyushu would also serve to liberate the Philippines.

While the Washington planners were outlining bold, opportunistic courses of action, the Pacific Theater commanders tended to become more cautious. Nimitz clung to the strategy already agreed on. In his opinion, MacArthur's basic concept of advancing land based air forces, ground troops, and naval forces at the same time was sound. Nimitz did not accept the MacArthur view that Luzon should be taken before Formosa.

The Pearl Harbor conference between the president, Nimitz, and MacArthur did little to clarify the strategy picture. The president evidently acted as an intermediary in the meetings and lessened the areas of conflict. The case for capturing the Philippines appeared strengthened at the end of the conference.

It is difficult to reconcile Leahy's statement that "MacArthur and Nimitz were now in agreement . . . that Japan could be forced to accept our terms of surrender by the use of sea and air power without an invasion of the homeland" with a teleconference report between General Handy in Washington and General Giles and Hull in Australia on August 7, in which it was stated that "General MacArthur feels that the greatest time saver would be to by-pass Formosa after the seizure of Luzon and go on to Japan."

15. Do you have any reactions or comments on any of the above?

I am inclined to think that Leahy's reactions are aftermaths rather than current reactions.

Pogue: There's a great deal of controversy over that Pearl Harbor conference. That red manuscript they sent you brings it up, and that's one question they wanted to ask. About six writers, who weren't in on the conference, say that the Pearl Harbor Conference settled everything, but Leahy denies it, and I suspect he is right on that—that it still was not completely settled, the whole strategy. Well, did you have any strong feelings about this either way? You tended to follow MacArthur's suggestions on whether or not they should go to Luzon or bypass it?

Well, I was listening very carefully to the navy reactions on the thing, and I was always ready for any development in the situation which would make it clear, and it came there because when the famous fighting admiral [Halsey]—when he reported in his fliers what was going on in the Philippines—we switched the whole thing and jumped an operation of MacArthur's and went one ahead to land at Leyte. You know about that, of course. The change we made at this dinner going on up in Canada—Clark's dinner [Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King's dinner on September 15, 1944, at the second Quebec Conference]—when we left the table and went out there and settled this thing, and sent a message to MacArthur that night and altered the thing by abandoning one operation

entirely—it was an intermediate jump—and took the next one to the Philippines.

I would say the Philippine operation, in a sense—taking particularly MacArthur's arguments—was a political decision as much as it was a military decision. MacArthur thought we never could explain to them if we by-passed them.

Pogue: He had an argument there, didn't he, from the standpoint of the future?

Oh, yes, he had an argument there. He had made all of his arguments on the "I shall return" and all that stuff. Now if we went on by them, he was going to be in for a terrible reaction.

MacArthur was anti-naval all the way through, you see, and his staff—Sutherland and all—promoted it, and the young navy went at it. I wouldn't have you get this out, but as a matter of fact, up to that time I had a very strong position with the young navy. They were apparently very strong for me and liked the way I was doing things, and was somewhat opposed to the way some of the older ones were doing things.

Pogue: But that older bunch certainly has it in for you, because several of them have written books and they pick you for their main target.

I know they do, but that's just part of that.

Pogue: And someone told me that King started to attack you and then after his first stroke, he changed and took it out of his book—not only you but the army, you see, but that he originally was very bitter. And, of course, they blame you for the whole reorganization thing, the Department of Defense, and they think that hurt them, that it was aimed at them.

Some of those older fellows who were my good friends, I notice, have turned around on this thing. Of course, that sells the book. You've got to remember that. In this writing it's very hard for a man to write a thing without trying to justify his position and all that sort of thing in connection with it.

Pogue: Well, if for no other reason, the fact that you know your own position quite well and are aware of your good intentions, just a statement of that tends to give it a bias.

Now you must remember there's that particular cable exchange between MacArthur and myself on the landing in Japan, when he turned down the naval proposition very strongly and advocated the landing. It was a very courageous cable on his part.

Pogue: He'd like to deny it, though, because later on, you see, it goes counter to his statement that he never did want to go to Japan.

It's right there and specific, because I asked him that pointblank question. Have you read the cable?

Pogue: That's one of those that the Department of Defense published last fall after that Yalta business got up, you see, which just gave the lie to his original statement.

Who is General Roberts?

Pogue: General Frank Roberts, of the War Department, your planning staff.

I don't remember him.

Pogue: I think he came in after General Wedemyer left. He was a colonel.

Have you talked to McCloy?

Pogue: No, sir, I haven't.

He is the man on all this. He has all this. He's the leading actor.

Pogue: Well, this is pretty much right, that you just didn't worry much about it. Those three lines there: does that pretty well summarize your [views]?

That's about it.

[Begin cassette side 4]

The COSSAC report in late January 1944 had opposed a shift in the zones of occupation, since the British forces would be on the northern flank in the drive into Germany, and a change in position would necessitate administrative and logistical delay and confusion. Leahy, in commenting on these objections, admitted that there were no essential military grounds for a reversal of zones, but the president clung quite firmly to his desire that the United States take over northwestern Germany. He said he did not want the United States to have the postwar burden of reconstituting France, Italy, and the Balkans. To the army planners, the presidential stand presented firm guidance on American policy in Europe during early 1944 and evoked a hearty "hooray" from General Roberts.

The president turned down flatly efforts of McCloy, Stettinius, and Hopkins to overcome his objections to American occupation of a southern zone.

"There does not seem to be convincing evidence that Marshall or the Army planners felt very strongly about the question of zones in Germany, but rather that they simply followed the presidential lead. During the pursuit of the Germans across France in August, 1944, Eisenhower's decision to move allied troops into Germany according to previous plans—the British in the north and the Americans in the south—if Germany should collapse, met with no opposition from the Washington staff."

17. Was General Handy reflecting your views in August 1944, when he suggested that we should be careful not to over-extend by acquiring bases, since we would likely not have the forces to defend them?

What bases is he talking about in this question 17?

Pogue: Air bases, naval bases.

Where?

Pogue: All over the world, Pacific and—

Oh, that's coming up all the time. I was very much opposed to that. I was against them on this base thing all over the place—in the Admiralty Islands and all those things. I wanted them to make a deal with Australia—Australia to run the base and we would give them some small sum a year, and the authority to keep somebody there, stores there, and all that, which was the economical way to do it. I had quite a continuing fight about the matter of bases. I remember we first got into the question of the Admiralty Islands, up north of Australia and New Guinea, and they wanted to have quite an imposing base there. And there were other bases they had picked out in other places. And I was very much opposed to it, because I felt certain that they wouldn't be able to support them and we would be land poor all over the place.

I tried to get Arnold to give me a list of air bases that they absolutely had to have, and the air could never settle on just the ones they absolutely had to have. They had all of these various places in mind. Well, I was firmly of the opinion that you were not going to get the means to support these things and they would be a weakness instead of a strength. And I made a particular effort to see if I couldn't get them to make this arrangement—taking first the Admiralty Islands and having that under the control of Australia, and we would pay them a certain sum a year, say, \$500,000. They could obtain labor and all for just a fraction of what it would cost us. And they could have certain supplies there, certain gasoline reserves, maybe only one or two men. But we would have the right to go there for maneuvers and, of course, the immediate availability in case of war. And then I thought we could maintain several that otherwise we wouldn't be able—couldn't possibly support.

I couldn't get anybody to treat the matter seriously and I was about to leave. The trouble was the staff didn't visualize what was going to happen. They were almost destroyed as it was by evaporation, but [Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei] Vishinsky saved them in good measure—which they would never have gotten otherwise.

I had seen all this. I had gone through it. I had a little note I had picked up in my loose records from General Pershing coming back from France, writing me that he just couldn't understand what was going on. They were cutting him down to a 140,000 men or something like that, and the army was growing less than it was at the beginning of the First World War. I knew the same thing was going to happen, which it did happen. The thing was to have certain things that we felt we had to have and concentrate on them and let everything else peel off. But the trouble was nobody saw that, and they'd always come back with the same remark that we had learned our

lesson. Well, my insistence was that we hadn't learned it and mine today is that we haven't learned it. The American reactions are always going to be quite a bit the same, because we live far from the trouble, far from the battle area, and we just have a cat fit when it's even momentarily threatened us.

Pogue: It's not like Germany or one like that which has an army right at their border.

Yes, they're constantly on their guard. Great Britain's life depends on this thing. I thought at the end of the war that I had about the best staff that ever was created, and yet in these major things none of them agreed with me. But that didn't mean they weren't about as fine a staff as you could get. But they couldn't visualize it. I had gone through this thing before and I knew what it was. I didn't realize I was going to come in as secretary of defense and be the victim again of the same damn thing.

Pogue: Do you remember one of your men, a General Lincoln, G. A. Lincoln?

Yes.

Pogue: He was a very fine person.

Yes, he was very able in his reactions. I trusted his reactions quite a bit. He had a very prominent nose.

Pogue: I think he is in a very good spot because he's thought a lot about history and he, as you know, head of the History Department at West Point, which I think is valuable to have a man that's seen the things he has there to impress it on the cadets.

Yes, he could draw the conclusions and all from it.

Pogue: Of course, you had a good man there during the war. Colonel Beukema was very good, wasn't he?

Yes, he was very good, but Beukema, as I recall, was, well, I shouldn't say this because I don't remember the details, but he got his—I don't know if you would say that he got his foot off the base, but I know he barged into a lot of these things that I don't believe at the time were his business—and Mr. Stimson was very friendly to Mr. Beukema. Mr. Stimson gave me specific instructions that nothing was to be done to Beukema to line him up. Well, I wasn't even thinking about Beukema. I didn't know him, had never seen him, and don't even remember just what the things were, but he had the War Department very much stirred up.

18. Do you know why the president changed his mind on the zones of occupation by the time of the second Quebec Conference? (It has been suggested that he did it to get the prime minister to accept the Morgenthau Plan.)

This zone of occupation thing, I can't recall at all the business, but Jack McCloy is the one that knows this.

Pogue: Somebody makes the flat statement that they think that Mr. Roosevelt changed as a deal to get the prime minister to accept the Morgenthau Plan, but I can't find any basis for that.

What really stopped the Morgenthau Plan was a very fine memorandum by Mr. Stimson.

Pogue: Oh, he wrote a rough one.

He was so horrified when he found that Morgenthau had got the initials on this plan over there, and that's the reason he went over himself. He went over without being invited. He just went.

Pogue: You know one of Morgenthau's former associates tried to involve Eisenhower in that. Morgenthau talked to Eisenhower in France and later this associate said, well, all he did was to get the ideas from Eisenhower, which isn't true, of course. I think Eisenhower—this was in June—was naturally angry at the Germans, but he never proposed such a plan as that.

19. In September 1944, Colonel Billo of the Strategy Section of OPD, indicated that in postwar settlements the United States was willing to permit the return of all former British possessions except Hong Kong; that the United States wanted to remain the dominant power in the Japanese mandates, the Philippines, and China; that the United States would like to see Indo-China and Hong Kong returned to China; and the Philippines to be freed except for certain bases. Did you agree with these views in September 1944?

When you say the return of all former British possessions, do you mean the return to Great Britain?

Pogue: Yes.

Well, I don't recall about this question 19.

Pogue: At any rate, that was not a general War Department thing.

Not that I recall.

Pogue: You see, I think this is the sort of thing that the man was just throwing out as a suggestion, but quite often the historians who don't know the story pick up this thing and they will say—now that's what General Marshall was thinking—that's what the War Department was thinking.

20. In March 1944, Marshall wrote the president, "Lend-Lease is our trump card in dealing with the U.S.S.R. and its control is possibly the most effective means we have to keep the Soviets on the offensive in connection with the second front." Does this indicate that you felt you might have to use such pressure on the Russians to keep them on the offensive?

I don't know quite how to answer that. Can you give me any suggestions that might lead me to—

Pogue: Well, unfortunately, I don't have any background on it, but he quotes it in this book and his impression was that you had decided that the Russians had to be held to this offensive. You see, they weren't attacking in March because of the weather, March 1944. And he wanted them to attack at the same time Eisenhower did in June, and Matloff, reading this message of yours, gathered that you meant that the only way we could make sure they would attack was to threaten to withhold some of the Lend-Lease stuff. But from what you tell me, I don't think that this was in your mind.

Well, I just don't recall enough to give you an answer. I know that their failure to attack there—I was defending them at that time—Mr. Stimson thought the whole thing was going to change, you know. They just couldn't get their vehicles off the road.

Pogue: Well, Mr. Stimson's was later at the end of the year, wasn't it, at the time of the Bulge?

Yes.

Pogue: This is at the beginning before we had landed.

I don't recall.

Pogue: But I found nothing else in your papers that indicate that you were worried about this.

I was worried about the Russians, that they might be defeated.

Pogue: Then, too, this may have been something in connection with keeping Lend-Lease going, that you were giving an argument for.

Stop your wheel.

DR. POGUE'S NOTES

(These notes are not on the tape but attached to the transcript.)

On the matter of Lend-Lease. ("Don't print this"—the General has a habit of saying this about things which reflect credit on him.) British had no master plan. We had more plans than troops at first. We had some basic plan. We were the only ones with a plan which was comprehensive. When the first hearings came up on Lend-Lease, I hadn't seen the estimates for month. I was always doing this—starting plans, then going ahead with operations. I was called on suddenly to testify. I felt we were in a leaky position. Papers were spread out. But I had not time to read them. One of the men began to belabor me. He said General, don't you know anything

about this? I said I haven't seen them for six months and have had about six battles since then. He said, but you have approved it. I said, yes, but they went on to others for comment. I went through them and cut some out, but my familiarity is dulled by lapse of time and six or seven campaigns. (I may be entirely wrong, but my recollection is that he said I will accept it then on your say so.) Stimson had been testifying, but he was pedantic (that isn't exactly the word, but you know what I mean.) When they got the fact that I had gone over them, they began to be conscious of the delays they were imposing.

Later we got on to fact that *Time* once bragged on him (for such things as putting through Lend-Lease), and then turned against him. He said that is because Luce was pro-Chiang. He went over there and saw only a part of the picture, then began to hit me. Of course, the China lobby was bad. Then the Republicans got the whole thing in politics.

I will show you what the situation was like in China. I was there once when a delegation came up to see the generalissimo. They were set upon by a mob. Chou En-lai appealed to me. Unfortunately, I didn't know there were women in the delegation or I would have gone to check on the situation. It might have had a dynamic effect. They got it stopped about midnight. One woman was about seventy. She was beaten black and blue. Some of the men were over seventy.

I went to Madame (the generalissimo was there, too) and said, this is a most terrible thing. The generalissimo said he would have to check. I said, you have your army headquarters here and many of your troops, and yet this thing went on from seven to twelve. I asked madame to go to the hospital. She didn't want to go, but she went. I said to the generalissimo, what you are saying is that your army is completely impotent and I can't swallow that at all. His foot just went a wiggling, as it did when he was angry or upset. The people were just coming to talk to him. I don't think they were communists. His people were doing a terrible thing. It got so I was constantly being appealed to by women whose families were being attacked.

The *Life* man was impressed with the people who received him. He convinced one of my staff officers that I was wrong. Thought that Chiang was popular. Roy Howard was also convinced.

[End of Dr. Pogue's Notes]

21. Would you say that the belief that Russia would have little capacity to fight for some time after the war was one of the major factors in our misjudging the Russian position after the war?

No.

Pogue: You answered that next one yesterday pretty much.

22. Political difficulties with de Gaulle arose from D-Day. In the face of the political impasse, General Marshall attempted to keep the question of French military rearmament on a military basis. Any comment on this problem?

. . . suffers from lack of proper coordination. The State Department, in a sense, wasn't functioning much. The foreign relations field was almost entirely under the president. And there wasn't, in a sense, much to turn to over there. With all great respect for Mr. Hull, he wasn't given much of a field to operate in. Sumner Welles played quite an active part for awhile, but he went under in a very questionable situation and, as I recall, during these periods we didn't have very much to go on.

A great contrast to that when I was secretary of defense—the Korean War was going on—the secretary of state, Acheson, would come over with two or three of his men at the Pentagon and sit with me and the chiefs of staff for hours at a time while we were trying to work out these matters. But there was no such rule with the State Department during the war. As a matter of fact, it seems to me on the guidance thing, they got it directly from the president, and that not in concise form but rather casual statements.

I know at the time of the Mediterranean affair [TORCH], when we were talking about going in to Casablanca and Algiers, all the conferences were in effect put under the War Department to control until this operation was accomplished. At least I was told so and I went ahead on that basis. [Robert] Murphy would report to me.

Pogue: As a matter of fact, the State Department had to ask the army for copies of the cables in order to write their account of that whole business in North Africa, because they all came through the War Department.

Well, that was natural, because we couldn't afford to risk any leaks which would have been disastrous to us in a military way and a naval way, also.

Pogue: Well, that's a pretty good place to stop, isn't it?

Yeah, I guess.