

TAPE 9

Recorded January 15, 1957

On September 20, 1941, General Marshall told his staff that he was going to the White House to a conference in which would be discussed a proposal to reduce the strength of the army in order to make available more materiel for other purposes. He referred to a widely circulated news article which indicated that the trend of the war made participation one basically of navy, air and manufacturing with early need for ground forces lightly regarded. (This article was by Lippmann. In 1947 he told Mark Watson that this view had been expressed in 1941 by the navy, the lend-lease authorities, the British and the anti-Vichy French agents in Washington. The navy was discouraging a large army overseas because of shipping problems).

The chief of staff specified that WPD prepare a study along two lines: (1) argument against a decrease and (2) discussion favoring actual increases in the army for an all-out effort. He took with him to the White House a memo by McCloy and Lovett on morale of the country, a memo listing forces needed for various bases and task forces, a memo on ultimate tonnage requirements to take troops overseas, a memo of need of 1200 men to protect bauxite in Dutch Guiana, a memo on need of men to protect Dakar, a memo on need of strengthening garrison in the Philippines. WPD said to reduce the army at the present time would be disastrous and wouldn't aid our allies.

All this didn't dissuade Mr. Roosevelt and on October 3d there was still talk of a reduction in the army.

78. How serious was this proposal to cut the army (this was after the extension of selective service)?

The proposal was very serious at the time. The opposition to a large army was very widespread and there was a feeling that such an army was passé, no longer needed. Therefore, the other proposals for the navy and the air demanded first attention. I might say now that we found it very interesting to see how long it took to develop various phases of the army and the air and to the extent that I understood, the navy, it seemed to me, though I haven't the exact records here to consult, that the lengthiest preparation was required for what was ordinarily supposed to be the simplest military set-up, that is, a regiment of Infantry.

When one stops to analyze the conditions, it is not so extraordinary as it might seem. If it is in the air, the plane itself is a complicated machine which requires very prolonged and careful manufacture. The running of that plane requires very precise training, but even so, the instruments are right there, the push buttons and the other means of control are fixed close at hand.

The same thing might be said about a great deal of the navy training. The men operate in certain places in battle. They are well known and they report to that place. The things they do are predetermined and the condition in which they do them is in almost violent contrast to the conditions in the ground army.

When you are preparing an Infantry regiment, which has seldom ever been properly prepared, you have to understand that in the first place, a great many mechanisms are involved nowadays that are rather elaborate. Next, that their use comes when the men that handle them are at their worst as to a state of fatigue and discomfort from long marches, from mud, rain, dust, heat, and then they have to operate, as a rule, at the time of real action in a place they have never seen before, that they have probably occupied in the dark. They have to be in close cooperation with the artillery, may have never seen it then and never have seen it later because it comes in far behind them. So they have to be hooked up with something that personally they have never had contact with and never seen.

That applies to a good many of their weapons. All of these things have to be coordinated. And when the fighting starts on the Infantry side, these various things have to be hitched up from the conditions of troops who have had prolonged marches and are very tired and are in an area they have never seen before, and under conditions that are very difficult.

Whereas in the navy, a man can take a bath and put on clean underwear and go to his fixed battle station. In the Infantry regiment, for example, he has no fixed place that he can go to. It is all in a state of transition and change and he is probably extremely tired and probably hungry, and also he is under heavy fire in most cases. He is also probably surrounded by very frightening casualties which are right there for him to see. All this disturbs the ordinary equilibrium of a man and requires a very high state of discipline and a higher state of technique in training.

Therefore, it's a long and far cry from the days when the man took the rifle down from the hooks above the fireplace and went to war. There he had used it many times. He was accustomed to independent action. He was accustomed to the woods. He was accustomed to danger. He was a good shot for the game he had to have in order to live and for action against the Indians who were always threatening him.

All that had changed and now the average soldier had little or no rifle training. He was off the city streets and yet, he had to do his stuff, as it were, under very difficult and strange conditions. Therefore, this all means that the natural assumption was that it was a very simple matter to train the ground forces—the Infantry and the others—and a very complicated matter to train the other forces—the air and the naval forces. That was not the case at all. They had something fixed to tie to. For instance, in our artillery, they required a high degree of training, but that was made easier,

as it were, because of the fact that the men were tied to the gun and the gun prevented dispersal of their efforts and gave them something to hitch to during the action.

All of this affected the public conceptions of what was needed. They knew airplanes were complicated. They knew that they were new. They had a very enlarged idea as to what they could do, particularly because of the German effective use of the airplanes at the outbreak of the war, where they demoralized all the forces of France, both military and civilian. This affected public opinion very decidedly. This made it very hard to get a plain, logical reaction. Everybody was fighting for something. Each service wanted to get an increase. Each service wanted more money and we had the regrettable state of one service working against another.

The British, for example, were very intense in their efforts in order to get more metal, to get more tanks from us, to get more weapons from us, and they opposed a lot of our proposals, particularly my proposals. So we had the peculiar situation of the British and the navy, as it were, to a certain extent the air, working together to prevent the ground forces from being organized. I was very conscious of this and it required a good deal of self-restraint not to become unduly irritated by the business.

All of it had a background, of course, of public misunderstanding. The airplane is very photogenic. The navy is very photogenic. The airplane was a new weapon. It had been very heavily advertised by the initial fighting in Europe and, as a result, it was not at all dramatic to ask for the forces we needed in the ground army which were going to be compellingly required once the real fighting started. It was rather interesting when we landed in Normandy, to find that the Germans got caught with most of their mechanized divisions up near the front. That was a very serious tragedy for them. They wanted plain Infantry divisions. They had too much mechanized where they couldn't use them at all to their advantage.

We didn't want mechanized divisions even, but to a minor extent at the start. We had to have Infantry divisions and the call from our commanders was for Infantry divisions. All of this was very slow in developing an understanding throughout the army. But as it became evident, if you wanted to get an air base, you used these ground troops. If you wanted to hold an air base, you used these ground troops and without them you were, in a sense, impotent. So the fight at this time, that is referred to in this question, was conducted without any real understanding of the question by the columnists, by the various writers, and certainly not by the public. And they all played to the dramatics, you might say, of the thing, which was the budding air force.

Of course, we had to have an air force, but if we didn't have an army, and a ground army, we didn't have anything. Therefore, the fight was to maintain the ground army. And all the advice and pressure that we were

getting was against a ground army, beginning with the British who wanted the materiel that was going into the ground army and going through our navy and through our Air Corps. I would find that a view of mine expressed in regard to these things was directly opposed by these forces, and I would finally find out in many cases just where the opposition was coming from and who was making it. I notified the British people, their representatives, confidentially once or twice that if they didn't stop this business, I would have to come out and pillory them publicly. But that was about the last thing I wanted to do, because it would be so much to the advantage of the Germans and so much to the harm of the international Allied accord.

This was a very serious affair and it remained serious until the real fighting began and the people's understanding of the situation grew to a proper appreciation of what was needed in a balanced force. We used too many general terms like that in discussing these matters. A "balanced force"—well, that didn't mean anything to the average man. It meant little to a congressman and it was not at all convincing. You had to find some other way in order to explain it. I found these difficulties in dealing with the president. All his advice was coming in from the navy who needed the steel and materiel of that nature, and needed men, too, and he was personally, of course, intimately familiar with the navy and naturally very responsive to its requests, or I might better say, demands.

The air people had a plentiful backing from outside. We had certain columnists who could tell you exactly what to do and how to do it, with regard to the air. There were a good many phases of the matter they did not touch on, as a matter of fact, that they did not understand at all. So I regarded this period as very serious and as very difficult to handle.

I am sorry that I haven't a distinct recollection of my conversations in particular with the president. I had a number on these questions and this particular occasion, evidently, I had a very serious one. I can imagine just about what it was. I might say here that early in my associations with the president I didn't understand that I must find a way to do the talking, because he did all the talking and I just had to sit and listen to the president of the United States. Later on, I found out a little bit better how to handle this so that I could get my points across. But at that time I was not sufficiently adept in dealing with a man who was as clever as Mr. Roosevelt was about holding the boards and putting over his ideas. In this situation he had all the pressures from the outside and against what I was putting forward practically none at all of my issues that I was bringing up, and it required a great deal of wear and tear before I could make an understanding of this clear to his satisfaction. As I repeat again, I don't recall exactly what took place in this particular conversation. But I know I was in a prolonged fight, as it were, in order to bring about a proper understanding of what the question really was, the opposition was in these

forces of our own, and the British who wanted the metal, who wanted the tanks, who wanted the materiel. It was a very trying, maddening situation and it was very difficult for one to keep their temper and to find what was the proper approach to make in the varying circumstances of the case, particularly against the columnists who held the public attention—also the commentators, I might say.

79. *Can you recall high points of your discussion with Mr. Roosevelt on this?*

I have answered practically everything in connection with that.

By late 1940 it was apparent that no reliable planning for possible war with Germany, Italy, or Japan could be carried out without a fairly definite understanding of what could be expected from Britain in such an event. The U.S. Navy at this time was manifestly a one-ocean navy incapable of engaging enemies in both seas. It was accordingly Admiral Stark who took the lead in pointing to the necessity of knowing what could be expected from the British in an emergency and hence in suggesting a conference with responsible British staff officers. The suggestion was welcomed by General Marshall. British and U.S. representatives met in Washington from January to March 1941.

80. *Would you discuss some of the background of these conversations?*

Admiral Stark and I had long conversations on this subject and he conducted the conference. I didn't attend much of it. We were both rather disturbed that this might leak out and that would be worked against us, particularly by those who were opposed to any preparations of any kind, particularly from the Middle West. I felt with Admiral Stark that if we didn't have some talks with the British, we would start with no basis at all if war developed later on, and at the time this conference was first established, we needed to have some at least vague idea of what we could expect from the British—what sort of help they would want and what sort of help they would want from us—the latter was more important in the general situation probably than the first thing I mentioned. So from that point of view it was very important.

81. *Some of the chief isolationists hold that by these conferences we gave up our neutrality and started on a policy deliberately intended to lead to war. They insist that from this time on the policy of the President and his advisers was to force Germany or Japan to strike the first blow. Will you comment on this accusation?*

I don't think these talks had anything to do with fastening on us the vital problem of war. It was merely a question of knowing what we might run into and what the conditions would be under which we met it. All of these things the British told us largely were a secret, so that we had an understanding of what it was. We were friendly to Great Britain, but how far that friendship would carry us was something else. That was for the president.

We needed to know what sort of response they would like and what sort of assistance they could give. Those things we didn't know at all and these talks gave us some basis for that. I don't feel that in any way we committed the United States to take any specific military action unless we were attacked. The advantage of the talks were, they were done without regard to the president. That was managed that way so as not to involve our government in any seemingly fixed understandings. The president of the United States was not involved in the talks at all and, as I recall, he wasn't even supposed to know about it. It was just done on our conception in order to find out what we needed to know without in any way involving him in any commitments of any kind.

82. *Did you feel that the conversations committed the United States to take any specific military action unless we were attacked?*

They didn't commit us to any line of action. It was thoroughly understood that this was outside of the direction of the commander in chief.

83. *Did you or any other American commander ever contemplate preventive war action against any of the Axis members?*

Not that I recall.

84. *Do you feel that it was a mistake to engage in these conversations while we were officially neutral?*

I felt it was necessary for us to know more about what the conditions were in case we became involved. And the actions of the Germans were so hostile in general, and we were so ill-prepared, that we needed every advantage we could get in case we were drawn into the war.

In January 1941, Colonel Truman Smith, military observer in Germany, predicted that Germany would attack in the spring. He was certain they would hit England. He spoke lightly of a Nazi attack on Latin America, saying that Germany would not attempt something which would be opposed by the U.S. Navy. He said that the Germans were less interested in Latin America than in Russia. He said that if the Germans massed their forces the invasion of Russia would be as easy as ABC.

85. *What was your own feeling in 1941 about the possibility of a German attack on Latin America? It has been argued that there was never any chance that the Germans would hit at the Western Hemisphere, and therefore no reason why the United States should have given any aid to the British or other enemies of Germany.*

My feeling as to Latin America at that period of the war was that they had so many underground movements, that the Panama Canal was threatened. I felt that they could suddenly raise a sort of revolutionary attack. They had German reservists scattered around the country, and we had already had examples of their having the complete set-up to seize a country without hardly any troops being involved. We were very fearful of

the Panama Canal being struck from Colombia or one of these other South American countries. We felt that the movement across the South Atlantic from Dakar could be carried out by very few troops if, on the Latin American side, they were able to spring one of these arranged revolutionary performances that had been so successful in the Scandinavian countries and elsewhere. For that reason we were very much concerned. They had the Germans in the country pretty well organized, and they presented to us a threat to the Panama Canal which could not be ignored. That would be a very tragic matter if they got in there close enough at least to destroy the canal, which by efficient bombing could be done without too much trouble. I didn't think any large troop movement would probably be involved.

86. *Was there a general feeling in the spring of 1941 in the War Department that Germany [Russia] would collapse rapidly in case of German attack? It has been held that on this issue the War Department was more overawed by German strength than was the State Department.*

I think this question has an error in it. I don't understand it, and I will not try to answer it.

The initial meeting of the Atlantic Conference took place on board the Augusta on August 9. This was followed by a meeting of military personnel on the Prince of Wales. Here the Americans tended to be critical of the British review of the situation. General Marshall expressed concern over the need of replacing the Marine garrison on Iceland by ten thousand soldiers. He wanted more information on Dakar. He asked for further discussion on the Middle East. He reminded the British of the mounting pressure on the U.S. for munitions now that Lend-Lease supplies were to be sent to Russia. He explained the difficulties in strengthening the Philippines as a protection for Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. "In brief the Atlantic Conference, eventful enough as a political meeting, owed little of its result to the military staff's participation, other than an agreement between the navy chiefs upon the basis of cooperation in convoy escort, effective in September 1941."

87. *Would you give a little background on this conference, the way in which you managed to preserve secrecy, some of the incidents of the meeting, and your views as to its effectiveness?*

In the first place, the meeting came as a complete surprise. The army members, that is, the air (General Arnold) and others, saving myself, had no knowledge of it until we were well up the coast on the cruiser *Augusta*. Naturally, therefore, there was not much opportunity to plan for a specific meeting.

To me the meeting was largely a get-together for the first time, an opportunity to meet the British chiefs of staff, and to come to some understanding with them as to how they worked and what their principal problems were. We were in no position at that time to lay very heavy matters before them. I think the best answer to those who feel that we were

planning the war in detail ahead of time would be the fact that we had so little basis for planning at the time of the meeting on the *Augusta*. So only the things that were almost self-evident could be discussed by us.

The British would have liked to have gone much further. They were at this business every day, all day, on a very definite war-making basis. We were in the position of mobilizing and equipping an army. Just how this was to be handled on our side largely remained to be determined. Therefore, we were not prepared to give them any fixed advice or agreements, I should say, as to what was to be done. They wanted such things as early as they could get them, of course. But we had to go through a great deal of get-together on our own part with a solid understanding of just what the plans were that we were struggling to carry out.

We had very weighty matters on our hands. The battle for the maintenance of the army, which we only won by a single vote, was being fought out at this time. People don't even recall that today. It seems to be a very negligible matter. It meant the complete destruction, the complete destruction of the fabric of the army that we had built up. We would be in a worse predicament than we were a year before. It would have set us back about a year and a half or two years, and of course, that would be the greatest of tragedies.

Rather than the actual war-making plans, we were in a struggle for survival against the misunderstandings of our public and the failure of our Congress to resist the criticism and the magazines who played up the men to desert, according to the "OHIO" cry ["Over the Hill In October" 1941] that *Life* [magazine] utilized quite freely. We were in a very desperate situation to maintain the little we had and not have it entirely destroyed, because we had largely dismembered the Regular Army in order to permit the buildup of the new army; because some of the increases were almost a thousand percent and we had to take our few existing Regular organizations completely apart and parcel them out, some at the rate of about twenty men per the new organization. Now this was all threatened and was only saved by one vote.*

* On July 21 President Roosevelt sent a message to Capitol Hill urging Congress quickly to enact legislation which would extend the service of selectees, national guardsmen, and reservists in the army beyond one year. Roosevelt stated that the danger to United States national security was "infinitely greater" than the year before. "It is true that in modern war men without machines are of little value. It is equally true that machines without men are of no value at all. . . . Within two months disintegration, which would follow failure to take Congressional action, will commence in the armies of the United States. Time counts. The responsibility rests solely with the Congress." (*The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, 1941 volume, ed. Samuel I. Rosenman [New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950], pp. 272-77.) In August the Senate, by a vote of 45-30, and the House of Representatives, by a vote of 203-202,

So these matters were weighing on our wisdom and we were in a very desperate plight. The British would have liked to go ahead with fixed plans. We were in no condition whatsoever to go ahead at that time with fixed plans. I think that the tragic situation that we were involved in should be much better understood when it is realized how complete would have been the destruction of our army. Moreover, we would have been in a worse predicament than we were the year before, because we had destroyed the organization of the Regular forces in order to give a nucleus for the new forces. Now all of that was to be wiped out and we would be completely back, not back to a thing, but far removed from that. We were just literally destroyed for the time being.

And the people don't understand that at all today. In fact, they have forgotten it entirely, how close a squeak it was that we were saved by a single vote. It is hard to realize that such a thing could happen, but it so very nearly happened that all our minds and concentrations were centered on that, trying to find some way to avoid the issue.

It was rather striking, the fact that we were able to go up to Argentina without it becoming public. Later on, we got to the first meeting at Casa-blanca that way [January 14, 1943]. But the minute we began to enlarge on these meetings, began to take suites of people there, then the secrecy evaporated and we found ourselves proclaimed by the Germans to the world as to just where we were going, notably Cairo [November 22-25, 1943], and the secrecy part of it dissolved. But here it was secret. And I know when General Arnold, who was representing the air—I told him what was happening, what we were going to do after we were at sea—up to that time all he knew was that he was to take heavy clothes.

88. On his return from the Atlantic meeting to Washington, General Marshall asked members of his staff for expressions of opinion on British proposals. General Kibler found no cause for optimism as to British victory and criticized a tendency of the British to assign to the United States the protection of the British Empire. Allen denied that American strength was great enough to make an impression on military operations and felt that Germany should be engaged by our economic force. Wedemeyer saw a defeatist attitude in the British paper. Said we should not become an active belligerent until we had the means to achieve our national objectives. General Gerow felt that the United States would be of more assistance as a neutral able to supply munitions in large quantities. Any comments on these statements?

authorized extension from twelve to eighteen months of service under the Selective Training and Service Act. President Roosevelt approved the Service Extension Act of 1941 on August 18, and three days later he issued Executive Order 8862 extending active military service to eighteen months.

It was very difficult for us to understand the British. They had been through a terrible series of events. They were, in a sense, very poorly prepared, except as to their naval strength. I think the word "poorly" hardly describes it. I could not say "utterly unprepared" because they had made certain preparations. The Germans had made every preparation and they had made it, which is generally overlooked or forgotten, for war at a specific time. They were appropriating fabulous amounts of money, as it seemed to us then, but it was for a war at a specific time, not in an indefinite future, which was what we were up against, not knowing whether we would actually go to war with Germany and certainly hoping that we would not.

The observations of the various staff officers are rather typical of the time, but I was more interested in Wedemeyer's expression as to the defeatist attitude of the British papers. There is no getting away from the fact that they were pessimistic. Equally, there was no getting away from the fact that Mr. Churchill was the buoyant force in maintaining the Empire, together with the characteristic attitude of the British to hold out under very difficult circumstances.

My own thoughts at the time were of the extreme difficulty I found in getting what seemed to me was a proper appreciation of the situation. There were many things in the British procedure of which our people were very critical. On the other hand, issues had arisen which proved to me we had a failure in many cases to understand the situation. For example, it will be remembered that Congress had passed a law which restrained the president from making any allotments of materiel and so forth to Great Britain, of a military nature, without the approval of the chief of staff. The same applied to naval materiel and Admiral Stark. I think the law was entirely unconstitutional, but there was not time then to work this out. It therefore fell upon us to do the best we could under the circumstances, which often were quite embarrassing.

But things arose under these conditions which were somewhat illuminating. For example, as I recall, we turned over fifteen, I think it was, Flying Fortresses to the British for experimental purposes. I was a little ashamed of this because I felt that I was straining at the subject in order to get around the resolution of Congress. Actually, when we got into it and did it, it soon became apparent that the important thing was exactly that, to let them have planes for experimental purposes. And we should have done it much earlier, because we found difficulties with the planes that the Air Corps had not perceived at all and they could hardly be used. I remember there was a complete absence of tail gunners and some other things quite evident later on, but not at that moment.

There were other things of a similar nature—while they were related to this factor which involved me in the difficult business of deciding whether a

certain thing should be done for the British or not—deciding with or against the president. And Mr. Stimson would become very much worried. He was intensely desirous of assisting the British and he would speak to me as a man of high honor, trying to find some way for me to do these things when I couldn't find it. And I felt it was important to be very strict in the matter, because I thought the law was unconstitutional. I thought that the important thing was to get it revoked. The important thing, therefore, was to be very exacting in carrying it out and not try to evade it and defeat its purpose. And in due time they did revoke it.

But it was a very difficult situation, and it was under the conditions of that law that I had to approve the transfer to the British of large amounts of arms at the time of Dunkirk. I have forgotten the numbers now, but that could easily be checked. As I recall, it was something like a million rifles and six hundred thousand machine guns and a large number of automatic rifles and some five or six hundred 75-mm guns, which was a very peculiar situation when the chief of staff of the army can turn down the president and the secretary of war—to my mind wholly unconstitutional. Nevertheless, it had to be carried out until it was proven unconstitutional, and I felt it incumbent on me to be extremely exacting in observing it, because I thought in that way we would get the earlier repeal of the law, which we did. I know the great problems of the rifles was that we only had about ten rounds of ammunition for each gun and we could not cut down on our ammunition in reserve that we had beyond that point.

In these various situations I began to learn things about the British and their attitudes, their confusion about us, and our confusion about ourselves and about them. The matter of the Flying Fortresses was very illuminating to me, that we could be so far off-center on the matter and not realize it at all.

We got into somewhat a similar thing on the question of tanks. Our tanks were easily the most mobile, the most perfectly controlled of all the tanks. But they were deficient, very decidedly, in their fighting qualities, in the arrangement of the tank so they could be fought with efficiency, as that came out. So we had the British disapproving our model and ourselves being very contemptuous of theirs, when the issue was the British had it right on the fighting part and we had it right on the mobility of the tank, and not until I got a prominent, informed Britisher in my office and told him, "Now, just confidentially, between you and me, tell me what is wrong about this tank affair." And he told me what they saw, and I looked into it and found out about our side of it, and they were both wrong, and then it was comparatively easy to get the matter adjusted, but doing it all behind the scenes.

Well, that was the case in so many things. We just didn't understand them and they certainly didn't understand us. And they had information

as to the battle efficiency of things that we just refused to accept, and yet we were without experience in this matter. We did have experience in the mobility of tanks, because we could do that without a battle, but we didn't have any experience in the fighting of the tank and we had that quite wrong. So I had to follow a scheme of very confidentially getting certain Britishers to give me their side behind the scenes, and then to go on the other side and get our side, confidentially, and then try to act in a very even way towards both sides.

All these things affected the opinions of the various officers concerned. And many things that came up in Great Britain and the misfortunes, which were many at that time, caused very decided feelings to develop among some of our best informed officers, which was only natural. The main point was to control them in such a way that we eventually came out with a sound decision.

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89. Aren't these reactions something of an answer to those who argue that the army and navy were plotting for war throughout 1941?

I think these reactions are somewhat of an answer to those who argue that the army and navy were plotting the war throughout 1941. The trouble in all of that is that there were those who felt politically that we must do nothing, that we must be utterly defenseless, or we were plotting war. Well, that would have been suicidal. And the fact that we made ourselves capable of exerting military influence made the Germans very much more cautious in their procedure.

In August 1941, Major Hansell reported to General Arnold from London that it was probably possible to cause a German breakdown by means of prolonged bombing and that it would not be possible to land in Europe in less than three years. If the air offensive were successful, a land offensive would probably not be necessary. General Chaney supported the view of a sustained air offensive against Germany and said it should be planned and executed at the earliest possible moment. In November the British, while holding on to the importance of an air offensive, gave assurances of their ultimate intention to land on the Continent.

90. Did you ever agree with the idea that an air offensive would make a land invasion unnecessary? In retrospect, are your views on this any different from what they were during the war?

I never had any idea that we could settle the question in Europe by purely air offensive, and my views are the same today as they were then. And I think they will continue to be. You've got to get down and hold things. You can't treat them purely by air. A very good example of this, I think, was the war in Korea. We had complete air superiority. We had all the air. They had none and yet, we couldn't do anything until we got the troops to get down on the ground and move in and take these places. The

greatest mistake the air people make is talking about doing things by air alone. It just isn't done that way. You can destroy plants. You can destroy cities. There is a great deal of work of that kind that can be done, but that doesn't win. That aids you, if you do something else, but something else had got to go with the air offensive.

91. *Omitted.*

In 1933 General Embick declared that because of the decline of our defenses in the Philippines, the islands had become a military liability of a constantly increasing gravity. In 1934 the War Department indicated the desire to keep up existing strength in the Philippines and to provide defense for Manila Bay but to go to no further expense unless thereby ultimate saving would result. This declaration was approved by General MacArthur, the chief of staff, and it was repeated by the War Plans Division in 1936, and in a summary for the chief of staff in 1940.

In August 1939, WPD told the chief of staff that there should be sound planning and a clear definition of national policy on the Philippines. They suggested three alternatives: (1) to maintain the existing defenses, although inadequate against a determined Japanese attack; (2) to withdraw from the Philippines to a point east of the 180th meridian; (3) to provide adequate defense for the naval base. The paper was returned in May 1940 by the chief of staff with the comment "noted" and without any explanation for the long delay.

In February 1940 the navy suggested the wisdom of increasing army and navy aviation strength in the Philippines. This was opposed by General Marshall unless it was sufficient to provide an actual self-sustained defense.

92. *Was this neglect of Philippine defenses in the 1930s due largely to economy drives? Or was it because we were expecting to get out of the Islands?*

I was not in the War Department at that time, but I imagine that was the case. Beyond that I can't answer this question.

93. *Do you feel now that we might have been wise to have withdrawn from the Philippines in 1940?*

It's very hard to answer this question. There were certain things starting to increase the defensive power of the Philippines, but they had not yet gotten well underway and they would proceed very slowly. The quantity production for materiel had not yet developed. That refers to airplanes, ammunition, antiaircraft materiel, all things of that general nature which were so necessary in the Philippines. Until they began to be received in adequate supply, there was little that could be done.

Now the question was whether we would find time to build up the defenses in the Philippines. There was General MacArthur's plan for raising a Philippine Army. That had been started. But it takes a long time to develop an army. It takes a great deal of time to develop the discipline and the training of such an army. Again, this proves that time was lacking. The only successful development that we achieved was by doubling the size of the Philippine Scouts. The Philippine Scout organization was a very fine,

disciplined organization, and it was a comparatively simple matter to double its size because it could absorb that many new men and maintain its disciplinary standards and, very shortly, its training standards. The whole question then was how long would they have in which to develop these things—the new organized force, the materiel requirements.

It takes a long time to get materiel on the development, the quantity production basis, and that was absolutely essential to the Philippines. As a matter of fact, the quantity production in most of these things didn't really come until the last two months, as I recall, and then we shipped just as much as we could get out there. I remember they were unloading boats all night in Manila, trying to get it out to the troops.

Of course, that didn't admit of getting this army trained. There was not time for that. You can't quantity production an army until you get one thoroughly disciplined, thoroughly trained and organized. If that had been developed, had there been time for that, then there would have been a very stable base and the Japs would have had a very hard problem to solve, a hard nut to crack. The development of the supply thing was really tragic as regards Hawaii and as regards the Philippines, because these things came into quantity production at the very last minute. And when we started to get the materiel to them, some small amount we actually did get out, but a great deal was on shipboard in the process of being sent out.

I remember the tragic result of a lot of fighter planes. This one group of fighter planes had gone through its training program complete, and I sent it down to the Louisiana maneuvers to give it two weeks, as I recall, of maneuvers with the ground troops, which would be its main purpose in the Philippines, before starting it off for Manila. Now they had to pack up part of the planes in order to ship them and they were on the Pacific when the war broke out. They landed in Australia, requiring a certain set-up preparation.

There is one very small instrument which enables the pilot to fire the wing guns. I forget what you call it, but I certainly knew it then, because it had such fateful consequences for us. In opening the crates hurriedly, just starting up any base operations in Australia, they threw away these vital little solenoids, I think you call them, because they were nailed to the side of the crates. Therefore, we had no way to fire the guns. And to get the planes to the Philippines, we had to fly them up halfway to the small islands east of Sumatra—I've forgotten their names now—up near, well, they were Dutch islands in the main. We could renew their gas there and they could get to Mindanao, and we had the pilots to fly them. But we had no solenoids. We tried to get them out to Australia. We sent them on plane after plane to try to get them out there. All the time these things had been thrown away while they were uncrating the planes in Australia, very hurriedly by very crude work direction. So when these planes were finally

equipped with the solenoids and all ready to go, you could no longer land in the Dutch islands and, therefore, they could not be shipped to the Philippines, which was a tremendous loss to General MacArthur.

All these things were working against us. The same thing happened at Honolulu. We had to hold planes there for a long time because that was a long flight for planes in those days, waiting on delivery of more and waiting on favorable winds, because they were unfavorable, and the flight could not be made to Honolulu if the wind was the least unfavorable. All of this came into importance as we got along now. But the tragedy of it all was, to me, that just as we got quantity production, our delivery possibilities were cut off. The ammunition was very serious, particularly for the Dutch, and we wanted to give them some ammunition, but we hadn't got any yet from our supply. But it came in, in about two or three weeks, but not in time. Not in time.

So the neglect of the Philippine defenses was the matter of the fact that our country had never appropriated the money for the equipment and the materiel that was needed, because it takes at least almost a year to get most of these things, and a year and a half to two years to get the others after the act is once passed. And, of course, all that worked against us when it came to the question of the Philippines.

I recall very well, when I was struggling to get larger appropriations from Congress in order to get in orders of some size of materiel and things, an officer of great distinction, I mean, of very great distinction, who is highly respected today, coming to me and trying to persuade me not to ask any more money of Congress because he said it was useless. We couldn't get into France or western Europe. The Germans had it and we never could get them out, and the best we could do was to make ourselves safe here in America. Now when that comes from a very high ranking person in our country, one whose views are highly respected, you can see how hard it was to get these appropriations through. I ran into almost the same reaction regarding appropriations in Korea. "Well," they said, "if you haven't gotten it now, you won't have time to get it. In other words, just don't try because you probably won't get it in time." However, we did get it in time, in both cases, although it was too late for the Philippines entirely.

Just what the decisions were regarding the Philippines before I became chief of staff, I don't know. And the events happened so rapidly when I did become chief of staff, because we were then plunged into a situation where the war was started by the Germans and we had to get ready for whatever possibility we ran into, that I didn't have any time to go into past history of these various affairs. The lack of antiaircraft guns was tragic and particularly for the naval anchorages and bases at Cavite and other places in the Philippines. We just didn't have them at all. So my action in many of these cases was purely because we just didn't have the materiel. It meant we had

to take it away from something. I didn't dare take it away from Europe, because if we lost in Europe, we were sunk completely and we had to win that campaign.

There are too many *ifs* and *ands* and *buts* involved in this matter [i.e. the question of whether the United States should have withdrawn in 1940] to give a definite reply. It was a matter of months until we got any quantity production. It was a matter of months until we got the Philippine Army organized. All these things were factors which had to do with the increased defenses of the islands, and you couldn't tell way back just how that would work out.

In 1935 General MacArthur had gone to Manila as military adviser to the Philippines government. In 1941 he took up with the War Department plans for preparing the commonwealth's independent defenses by 1946. General Grunert urged strengthening of the defense of the islands. WPD questioned the urgency of the Luzon-Visayan project in comparison to the need of the same equipment at more critical points. General Grunert also questioned the Luzon-Visayan project, but did indicate his concern over the Luzon defenses. General Marshall recommended to the president the grant of the seacoast defense material available. General MacArthur pushed the Luzon-Visayan project with energy. His high optimism over the project was revealed from time to time. In August General Marshall sent extracts from a personal letter from MacArthur to the president, saying that Roosevelt's proclamation mobilizing parts of the Philippine army for training in the USAFFE [U.S. Army Forces in the Far East] had changed a local feeling of defeatism into the highest state of morale he had ever seen. He added: "I wish to express my personal appreciation for the splendid support that you and the entire War Department have given me along every line since the formation of this command. With such backing the development of a completely adequate defense force will be rapid." Ten days before Pearl Harbor, General MacArthur wrote in such an optimistic vein as to bring from General Marshall the statement: "The Secretary of War and I were highly pleased to receive your report that your command is ready for any eventuality."

94. *How can the general's friends accuse you of failure to help him in the light of this?*

I wouldn't undertake to answer this.

95. *One general, once with General MacArthur, told me that he felt that General Marshall failed to tell Quezon all the facts about the lack of preparation, because Quezon didn't want to spend any more money on defenses. My informant says that General Eisenhower upset General MacArthur by opposing this policy.*

This is a little indefinite. I don't recall my telling Quezon about the lack of preparations because Quezon didn't want to spend more money on defenses. As a matter of fact, as he told me afterwards, that is, Quezon, he was very anxious to do things there. I couldn't answer this.

"The record available at this time does not reveal the chain of circumstances that led in late July 1941 to the return of General MacArthur to the active list of the U.S.

Army as commanding general of all U.S. Army forces in the Far East." There is no hint in the papers that the staff expected such a development. WPD in July 1941 said there was no present need to make him Far Eastern commander at the moment. However, General MacArthur must have received encouragement from some high authority in Washington since in late May he wrote proposing a Far East command with himself as the commander. "No tangible evidence of who provided such encouragement has yet been found." However on May 21 Secretary Stimson's diary says that General Marshall said he had decided to restore General MacArthur to the active list in case of a sufficient emergency. In late June, General Marshall wrote General MacArthur that he and Secretary Stimson had decided about three months before that MacArthur would be the ideal Far Eastern commander in case of crisis. "But the files reveal no other evidence and while General Marshall's letter to MacArthur makes reference to 'your letters to the President and the Secretary of War,' those two documents also remain undiscovered at the time of this volume's preparation (1950). If it was Mr. Roosevelt who initiated the MacArthur appointment the records available at present do not prove it."

96. Did the decision to make General MacArthur Far Eastern commander originate with you, with Mr. Stimson, the President, or someone else?

I do not recall clearly how this matter of MacArthur's command in the Far East was established, but to the best of my recollection, I proposed that he be made in command.

On May 21, 1941, General Grunert recommended that the commonwealth officials, and General MacArthur in particular, be invited to conferences on plans to improve the Philippine defenses. On the same day before the Grunert message arrived, Secretary Stimson received from Joseph Stevenot, a Manila telephone official, a suggestion of closer contact between General MacArthur and General Grunert. Mr. Stimson relayed this to General Marshall who, on May 29, approved General Grunert's similar proposal. "It is interesting to note that General MacArthur already knew that this step would be taken, and also was acquainted with certain connotations that are not apparent in the Marshall-Grunert letter. On 29 May in Manila (a half day ahead of Washington in time) he addressed to General Marshall what must have been a singularly authoritative letter, for in it he disclosed a fuller foreknowledge of events than General Marshall himself seems to have possessed. General Marshall said: "In your letter of May 29th you state that the Philippine Army is to be absorbed by the United States Army in the near future and, consequently, you are closing out your Military Mission. At the present time the War Department plans are not so far reaching."

97. This seems to imply that someone at the White House was dealing with MacArthur and that you and the secretary had to get your information from General MacArthur. Is this accurate, or is the author of the official history misinterpreting the correspondence?

I do not recall enough about this to give an answer.

On November 26, 1941, at a staff conference in the office of the chief of staff, the notes indicate that the chief of staff reported that the president and the secretary of state anticipated a possible assault on the Philippines. General Marshall said he did not see this as a probability because the hazards would be too great for the Japanese. "We know a great deal that the Japanese are not aware we know, and

we are familiar with their plans to a certain extent. . . . We are not justified in ignoring any Japanese convoy that might be a threat to our interests. Thus far we have talked in terms of the defense of the Philippines, but now the question is what we do beyond that." In the course of the discussion, General Gerow spoke of instructions to General MacArthur in case of a state of war. General Marshall said "actual hostilities." "There is war in China and there is war in the Atlantic at the present time but in neither case is it declared war."

98. *Any comments? (These notes were apparently never used in the Pearl Harbor inquiry. It seems to be an answer to the suggestions that you were aware for many days before the attack that Hawaii would likely be hit.)*

I have no comment to make because I do not recall the details discussed.

Difficulties between General Van Voorhis and the Commandant of the Fifteenth Naval District in the Canal Zone became such that General Marshall wrote a sharp note to the chief of naval operations, saying he thought they should arrive at some satisfactory basis for the defense of the canal. General Andrews was finally sent down as commander of the Caribbean Defense Command and the Panama Canal Department.

99. *Any comment on the problem and on General Andrews's handling of the situation?*

We were having constant difficulties over the command question which I was endeavoring to settle. I wanted the navy to have overall command in the Alaskan district, and I proposed that, thinking if we'd get that settled, then we could move down to Hawaii and settle that in time and then go down to the Panama Canal and settle that. But the navy was very loathe to accept my proposals about the Alaskan theater, and I suppose for the reason that they thought that would obligate them to accept my views as to Hawaii. My view as to Hawaii, although I had not expressed it, as I recall at that time, was that the navy should have the overall command. But when it came down to the Panama, I thought the army should have the command. But it never got around to my expression of that fact.

However, after this trouble with Van Voorhis and some other details that do not come out in your presentation, I notified them that this thing had to be settled right away. My dim recollection is that they removed the commander they had there then and we began to get the matter somewhat straightened out, though it was a very tragic affair. I was much concerned that it gain no publicity, because the public would have been highly aroused if they had found such a thing as that was hanging fire over the various disagreements between the army and the navy.