
Caughey was in China when China Mission arrived; was then assigned to it. Went from Shanghai to Chungking to join it and later went with it to Nanking. Hutchin in OPD and helped on directive. Went to China in May 1946 and then was later on With Wedemeyer.

Caughey said that when Marshall left China there was left only the rudiments of a file at Chungking. Everything else went back to the State Dept. Hoover Library at Stanford wanted it, but couldn't get it. Included messages to and from Marshall, official correspondence minutes of conferences. Caughey and Hutchin kept minutes.

Both Caughey and Hutchin said you must remember that in 1945-46 we were still trying to think of a single, unified China; a one-world proposition. Hutchin said he had often asked himself if Gen Marshall could have termininated his efforts at a truce earlier. He said Gen Marshall was trying to explore every possibility before he terminated. He didn't want to give up before everything had been tried.

General Marshal was motivated by (1) directive from the President which he tried loyally to follow; (2) deep compassionate feeling for Chinese people. Caughey said he would often say think of the 400 million people. Hutchin said when driving through streets of Shanghai and see dead he always showed great compassion for the people. He was always trying to do something for them.

I asked why he backed Stuart. Hutchin said that he got so frustrated with the Chinese going back in all their discussions to the Manchu dynasty and bringing up odd bits of ancient Chinese history that he finally got tired of it and decided to get Stuart. It was risky since Stuart was no diplomat, but he had been in China over 50 years and knew the country thoroughly.

I asked if Gen M. was impressed by Chou En-lai. Caughey said impressed but not influenced. Hutchin said that Chou was probably the best negotiator in the world. He was polished, educated and suave. Willing to negotiate to a fare ye well. Caughey said Chou honest with himself. : What he had to say he believed. Don't believe he crossed us up. Beautiful documenter of his case. Hutchin said yes but sometimes when Gen M locked into the documents he found that Chou had brought in false material. Made Marshall's job difficult. Marshall had to spend a lot of time checking.

Before I left Hutchin said remember Chou was cunning and shrewd. Master at negotiations. His boy now at Geneva.

Hutchin told of case where Chou brought in details on ambush of Marines. Marshall just listened. Then investigated. Next time Marshall had the facts. Chou bounced right back. Some people looking at the minutes might think that Marshall was accepting Chou's case because he didn't argue. That was the patient way he conducted negotiations.

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Chou would arrive with an interpreter and sit there. On the porch if weather good; inside if not. Marshall would come down and greet him. Caughey or I would write up minutes for record. We usually said nothing. Hart (Caughey) did more than I. Chou would speak and Marshall would seldom interrupt. Gen Marshall's train of thought was interrupted by interpreter. Chou understood some English and could tell what was being said. Marshall did not try to use Chinese. His Chinese of type one picks up in army post; not good enough for negotiations.

Caughey and Hutchin said they could not agree that Gen Marshall was not briefed. His experience with Stilwell made him familiar with China. Had been there before. Got several briefings. True he was busy with Pearl Harbor hearings before he left. Cannot agree that he went there without knowledge.

He had all the background on World War II. Deals with Stilwell and Wedemeyer in China. He had met Chiang and Madame at Cairo. Don't know how you would have found anyone more knowledgeable than he except perhaps someone like Wedemeyer who was there. He was aided by Byroade who had kept up with the situation. Briefed in the State Dept.

Neither would they agree that he arrived worn out. He kept in good shape; took walks often; played croquet; sometime had rub down at night.

If he lost his temper it was calculated. He would say sometime, I am going over to the Generalissimo's and lose my temper.

He had a deep respect for the Generalissimo. Knew Madame better because she spoke English. Madame would play bridge with us (General, Mrs. M, Madame and one of us). Sometime we went over to the Generalissimo's and Mrs. Marshall would play Chinese checkers with the Game. Sometime Generalissimo would have a dinner--perhaps for 50 guests. Somewhere about the fifth course he would clap his hand and a boy would come out with the Chinese checkers. He and Mrs. Marshall would play. Neither could understand the other, but they would go ahead and talk and the checkers gave them a means of conversing. It was a means of communications between the two. Nothing pretentious about the G-mo. Lived in drab circumstances compared to Madame. Marshall had, and has, great respect for the G-mo.

The Generalissimo would tell Gen Marshall something and then the CC clique would come in and change it. They were top political leaders. They were adept at bringing up things which went back to Ming dynasty. Were keen politicians.

Along here both Caughey and Hutchin said they believed Gen Marshall was a genius of the age.

(They said Gen Marshall pretty good at bridge. Didn't like to go set, so he wouldn't push his hand in bidding. Great asset was remembering what cards had been played. He liked movies. During stay at Pentagon he would leave early sometimes so he could go to first show at Ft Myer with Mrs. Marshall. Movies nearly every evening at Chungking. Liked to have people for dinner. One of his great characteristics was the care he took of himself physically. Moderate in everything. Nap after lunch. Very little to drink. At times nothing at all. No profanity).
Marshall tried to develop a third group between Communists and Chiang. This included Dem League of Carsun Chang.

I asked somewhere in here if Chou had control over irregulars in Manchuria. They thought so. They felt there was nothing to show that Gen Marshall was prejudiced against Generalissimo because of his treatment of Stilwell. Stilwell's situation difficult. There was a feeling back here that he didn't pay enough attention to job --which was his main job--of chief of staff to Chiang. Stilwell said in memoirs he had rather be carrying rifle with Chinese soldier. Maybe he neglected the political aspects of his job and did not delegate fighting in the field to subordinates. Doesn't think Gen M's views colored by Stilwell's experiences. Gen Marshall was intent on carrying out President Truman's directive. Extreme respect for Generalissimo. Generalissimo liked Gen Marshall and still does.

Hutchin said I am sure if I had been given this directive, I wouldn't have said I don't like it. General Marshall same way; he was a soldier.

National policy was in favor of a single, unified China. That was our objective.

I asked if they felt it was possible to have achieved anything without sending troops over to aid one side or other. They said they didn't know this was a guess.

Did they think either side, if it disarmed, had any chance of surviving? Apparently they thought not.

I asked when Gen Marshall gave up hope. Hutchin thought probably in October. Agreed it was hard to know.

In Chungking, Ernest Eng (Gen M's interpreter), Hutchin, Shepley and Caughey lived at Gen Marshall's house. (Caughey sent when Byroade pulled out for Exec Hq).

Gen Marshall had good people on public relations. Tillman Durdon of NY TIMES; Hart Steel of NY TRIBUNE and Hank Liberman of NY Times (Radford thinks a lot of him),

Hutchin said only time he ever saw Gen M visibly upset was when he had been reading a book on guerrilla operations in Philippines. American soldier and Philippine nurse were in love. But American ended by coming home and leaving her stranded. Gen Marshall was furious.

You never lacked knowing where you stood with the General. Once the weather was foul and I knew it would be bumpy. So I went in where he and Mrs. M. were and gave him the full weather information. He thanked me in a calm voice. Then he followed me out and said never give me a bad weather report in front of Mrs. Marshall.

We talked about Gen Marshall and officers. He said you can never be sure who will make a general officer until you make him one. Van Fleet never a great officer in lower ranks. Once he became rgtl cmdr he went up.
What would it take to bring peace? Japanese hadn't pacified China with one million men. We were in the middle of bring Joe home campaign. We had little over there but stockpiles. These being sold off; that's how plasma got into market. Am people got indignant properly over that.

Wedemeyer report: This was withheld, I think, for two reasons: (1) provision in it for trusteeship over Manchuria which was too hot for release and (2) military chain of command. Marshall thought he had sent Wedemeyer out and that W. was his agent and wasn't supposed to be making reports to the general public.

As secretary of state he had the right to decide use made of it. Was for his information. Rpt was TS. Reproduced in Honolulu. Wedemeyer felt there were large parts which could be made public. Hutchin thinks both Marshall and Wedemeyer were tremendous figures. He had worked closely with Marshall and Marshall had great respect for him. Talked with him an hour or two once a week. Fact that they disagree doesn't diminish their stature. Wedemeyer says it's a matter for history. I don't know what the verdict is.