

Notes 127N, Copy 2

Brig. Gen. S. L. A. Marshall

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Interview Brg. Gen. Marshall, formerly Chief Historian, ETO, now with Detroit NEWS, in Gen G C Marshall's office, Washington, 17 Jan 58, by F C Pogue.

First chief of orientation under Osborn (this is SLAM). Became my job to interpret Gen Marshall's directive. Directive was as broad in spirit as humanly possible. In other words gave them complete freedom to determine direction to be taken. This was summer of 1942. My impression was suggested by the President. Spirit of the directive was that we could proceed by stimulating individual spirit and enterprise of soldier or by emphasizing the political causes or by combination of the two.

As I read the directive and judged the nature of the Army, I was convinced we should concentrate on stimulating military efficiency of the soldier. We were doing all we could to build his character as a fighting man. Ran afoul of Osborn and of Huebner (G-3 on training) who wanted a soft policy _____* about causes--a political type of orientation.

All the data is in a memoir I have written and will show you.

Other points at which I touched Marshall: you will find directive to army commanders citing bad conditions, lack of fighting spirit, necessity of something to overcome this inertia. I wrote this directive based on the bad interpretation of army research then going on--led to me to bitterest quarrel with Osborn--he was using material from research, putting the worst interpretation on it to bolster his position. After I wrote directive I found flimflam still going on.

I next was supposed to put together a motion picture for Somervell for his commanders. Was here I found the incorrect data. This kind of thing would emphasize the things the minority were saying and leave impression this represented army. This came to a crisis and the whole research project was nearly junked. McNair was in Africa; Lear in his place. Went after Osborn's scalp. Got him on carpet. I went along on Lloyd Munson's advice. Lear gave Osborn the worst dressing down I ever heard. Lear's C of S, Christiansen, intervened. Lear turned to me and said what have you to say. I said my thinking is so far from Christiansen's I don't agree. Christiansen said the soldier is ignorant; our job is to keep him that way. Lear excused Osborn and asked if I could write formula to get research back on the rails. In the same period I went to Osborn and said you have to tell the truth. He said you mean I'm not. I went on to show him why he wasn't. In two days, we had to write a report to McNair on condition of ground forces. Osborn said this will conflict with what we said to Marshall. I said we must take a chance on telling the truth. It got by. Perhaps McNair didn't study it. Just about time I was getting out.

Other point has to do with origins of Hist Division. Osborn came down from General Staff Meeting. Had bright new job. Was to write little pamphlets for troops that had been in action. Exactly how battle was fought in which men were wounded. Job from Gen Marshall. I looked at him in amazement. I said I can't do it. No resources. He said you have a writing staff. I said that is beside the point. This has to be done in the field. No way to collect. He said I can't tell Gen Marshall I can't comply with his order. He said if you think you can get us out, do it. I went to see Frank McCarthy and said I have to see Gen Marshall. I explained what I was there for. He said you mean you can't get this. I said not in Pentagon; no comprehensive data. Don't have resources. I said historical people still working on WWI. He said you are obviously in no

position to proceed (I gather he was talking about Marshall now). About 2-3 weeks afterwards a directive came out setting up a new historical program. I had pitched back this project to write pamphlets. In the first directive this pamphlet business was included. In my first talk with Kemper I talked about this. Marshall was the moving finger in the historical project.

When I was working in the Pacific I became convinced that Pamphlet thing was the wrong thing to do. Couldn't do both at once.

As in the Japanese thing (relocation) and as happened so many other times, Marshall would have the idea. Then it fell to Assistant Secy to put it on paper (I had asked about McCloy's part in His program). Marshall not strong for official history.

In key moves on history program, it happened McNarney was in Marshall's seat temporarily. Right after I went to Historical Section--Taylor, Lamson and I. Dealt first with personnel. Then with problem of how we would operate. I insisted we had to cover combat. They thought not. I said we must. I think they may have been trying to extend me. Had been a long study of historical failure in WWI. Study by Bull and Twaddle--beautiful combination of names. I was supposed to go over the study and get at roots of failure and then write a memo on what we wanted to do. Brief memo. Had to have access to command decisions. Had to give freedom of movement along combat lines. Sent through CPD. Was kicked back by CPD -----* argument was interference with combat operations. I told Kemper this was fatal to win now or we are sunk forever. Must get C of S to override CPD. Kemper went to McNarney and order came out.

Originally they were going to make me a writer here. After Johnny failed at Kiska because there was no operation, they realized I was the only one who knew command ops and was known to the commanders. So I should go overseas and see what I could do. Johnny called me and said do you want overseas service. I said no. He said I don't understand. I never heard a General Staff officer saying no. I said if you asked me do I want service in Pentagon I would say no. You tell me what you want me to do. Give the order. Don't ask me to salve your conscience for you by deciding myself.

On the Japanese thing, I have all the connecting links. I have it all written out. Good deal not germane to the enterprise. Marshall's part one of the highlights. Fielder got Marshall on the right track.

I am not sure how the thing started. Bendetsen got the exec job. Had to have promotion and DSM. When I first met him He wouldn't talk to me. Thought I was trying to disgrace him. DeWitt didn't know what was happening.

In writing policy I had to steer certain propositions through the General Staff. If we form combat team, this will be policy. I relied on the judgment of Rufe Bratton. Told him what we were trying to do. He was a kindly type of man. Japanese loyalty misunderstood. Widespread disloyalty in small units. Nor true of Japanese regiment. Had to change whole policy. Japanese from Hawaii were the trustworthy and tough ones.

Shortly before MacArthur's relief I was in Gen Marshall's office. He said Marshall praised MacArthur's abilities but said affairs had gone so far something had to be done. Said MacArthur had taken directive as basis of going contrary to Allies. Said he--Gen Marshall--would have to go along with MacArthur's relief. SLAM alerted his publishers and they were all set when story broke.

Says Marshall was sent to Illinois to build him up politically for C of S job. Got support of Kelly-Nash group for him. Illinois people wanted a former BG or Colonel of their Nat Guard for instructor with NG there. To keep him out of the job, he was promoted. This was told me by Col Phil Overstreet who was Marshall's executive officer in Illinois.