

Notes 141N, Copy 2

Paul Nitze

Telephone conversation

West Point, N.Y.

June 17, 1959

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Notes on talk with Paul Nitze, formerly head of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, at West Point, N.Y., June 17, 1959, by F C Pogue.

(These notes were made after the meeting).

He said that General Marshall deserved the credit for the establishment of the Policy Planning Staff. Shortly after he became Secretary of State he called in Acheson and told him what he wanted and got Acheson busy on details.

Nitze came to staff later. Acheson opposed him because he thought he was big business and a format partner of Forrestal. Later changed his mind and they became good friends. Nitze in those days was a Republican.

Nitze was working with Clayton on economic matters when Marshall came in. Worried about how various countries could pay us. Sweden was one which was in trouble. Felt that they couldn't keep on the way they were going, Made some Wanted \$5 billion recommendations. Clayton at first not interested in long range aid program. Was conservative. Later became convinced by developments he saw in Europe.

Marshall once told him that when it came to any kind of expenditure they would have to get what they wanted quickly and for a limited time as they couldn't get Congress to back any such program for a long time.

During the hearings before the committees, Nitze helped. Was asked to bring along another man and work with the House Committee. Reached the point that he and his helper were accepted as virtual advisers to the Committee. Remembers once when Democrats were all away, someone said that there was no point sending a lot of money to China. Pouring it down a drain. State Department asking only for \$125 million. Judd proposed \$400 million. When it was argued that there was no point, Judd said the way to kill off Marshall's popularity is to give him more than he asks for. Then if China goes, we can blame him. Thinks the attempt to destroy Marshall very deliberate—this is Nitze view.

Marshall was excellent before committees of Congress. We had a session once on how he should proceed. He said should go in a little late. Would not read statement. Rather he would be briefed and touch on what they had to say. Went in a little late; was dignified and calm. When they asked for a statement, he said I am here at your disposal. They asked him some of the questions he had prepared on and he discussed them almost casually as if they had not occurred to him before. But he was letter perfect. Made great impression.

(Doesn't remember whether Clayton got back from Europe before start made).

Nitze was on U S Strategic Bombing Survey for Japan. Entertained by Kenney -- big feed-- women entertainers. Kenney spoke of Kaltenborn and how he had said air force had overestimated its claims at Bismarck Sea. Said he or someone got in touch with Kaltenborn, reminded him how many airmen there were, how many relatives they had, how they would react

against someone who pulled the air force down. Said next day Kaltenboon said he had new figures. Angered Nitze as it was obvious threat. Went ahead and showed up over estimates. Got backing here.

At one point MacArthur asked him to stay on in Japan. Recoiled when Nitze said he would need a liaison man in Washington. MacArthur was anti-Washington. Perhaps more against Roosevelt than anything else. Wanted people loyal to him find no one else.

Marshall a quick man to brief. Had several talks with him. Marshall told of the period of famine for the Army. Little money for anything. Tended to affect his views on what could be done.

Thinks Marshall's chief mistake as Secy of Defense was reluctance to order MacArthur to stay south of the waist of Korea. Was disastrous that he did not. Didn't want to interfere with Theater Commander. Collins was sent to tell MacArthur, but didn't work.

Marshall once chewed Nitze out. Stettinius was setting up business enterprise in Liberia--partner of some people who were willing to cut corners. State Dept was asked about the situation and Nitze told them it wasn't a good proposition. Stettinius complained to Marshall who fussed at Nitze for putting out a statement without clearing it with him. Nitze explained facts. Marshall still thought Nitze should have come to him first, but he agreed they should not back a dubious deal.

When Dulles came in, he told Nitze he wanted him to stay awhile, but said of course I can't keep you. Dulles' concept was to work closely with National Security Council. Felt Policy Planning Staff duplicating its work. Talked to Eisenhower about it and it was agreed that they couldn't keep Nitze. Part of the trouble came from attacks by McCarthy who called Nitze a right wing Wall Street man. Dulles arranged for Charles Wilson to take Nitze. Assured him that Wilson wanted him. Reported to Wilson, but by this time there was opposition in Congress and Wilson decided it would be hard to take him. Nitze dropped out. About half of the Policy people dropped--Kennan, Nitze, Dorothy Fosdick, Halle, Bert Marshall.

Bedell Smith chewed me out once. Something was messed up and he called me in and said why you people haven't prepared for this situation. I don't think you are very effective. I said you and the Secretary have been deciding things without letting us know what you are doing.

Nitze originally a Republican, but wouldn't stand for the attacks made on Marshall. Once invited by an Air Force Colonel to a party where Freda Utley, James Burnham and one or two others present. They attacked Marshall as a member of a conspiracy. Nitze left the house.