

Notes 150N, Copy 2

Col. D. H. Richards

Col. Edward D. Comm

Pentagon

Washington, D.C.

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Luncheon conversation at Pentagon with Colonel D. H. Richards and Col. Edward D. Comm, both of DesLog. Richards is Executive for Gen L J Lincoln. July 7, 1965, recorded by F C Pogue.

Richards wanted to tell me of visit he had with Marshall, Mrs. Marshall and a Mexican aide at Cuernavaca in March 1952. Gen and Mrs. Marshall were there on a visit; he wanted some material from Military Attache's office and Richards brought it out. Richards told him of working on strategy volume in Dept of Army history; got Gen Marshall started and he talked at length.

Richards recalls General Marshall telling the problems he had defending Stilwell. Spoke with distaste of being called to the White House one night and having a talk about Stilwell with Roosevelt. Disliked fact that Currie was there, sprawled on sofa, and that Roosevelt argued with C of S in presence of Currie. Told Richards of extremely difficult time he had in defending Stilwell for so long.

Told of problems with Navy over Guadalcanal. Once when King bucked him over zones and said Navy would do the operation alone, Marshall said the important thing was not the fight between Army and Navy but war against Japanese and made necessary concession.

Said one of cases where Stimson overruled him was once when J. Buell Snyder, chairman of subcommittee of Appropriations Committee dealing with Army Approps. wanted a car and chauffeur. Gen Marshall said no. Stimson came into office and made clear necessity of playing ball with Snyder.

Recalls asking General Marshall about ending war in Korea. General Marshall said did you realize that in peacetime, there is no way we can give our people training comparable to this. (Not favoring war but indicating that militarily the action had some compensations).

Colonel Comm., who had worked as Lieutenant in War Dept early in the war had a number of stories.

Just after the House passed the extension of the selective service act by a one vote margin, it was announced that the Senate would vote next day. (The Colonel was wrong here. The Senate passed the bill first. House passed a different version on August 7 by one vote margin. Was necessary for Senate to approve House version. Administration wanted largest vote possible). To get a quorum (I think he is wrong here) it was necessary to get a least three votes from New England and I was sent to get them--Brewster and White from Maine and a senator from Oklahoma I think it was Monroney (senators then were Josh Lee and Thomas) who was at the races at Saratoga. Wilton Persons, WD liaison man with Congress told Comm. to get them there next day by 12 sharp and not to come back without them. Called Bolling Field; got DC 3 set up. Then called to find out about getting people to Portland. Brewster to drive to Bangor and be flown by small plane to Portland. Arrangements set up after midnight on day he had to have them at Washington. (Richards said would be like now flying from Paris by way of Africa). Was to stop at Saratoga on way back. Time kept running out while he waited for Brewster. His small plane being delayed by headwinds. Used time to telephone Bolling and arranged for three cars to

meet plane. Had plane ready to go; its engines running at end of runway; had Brewster's plane let him out there; pushed him on and they took off. Stopped at Saratoga and picked up Oklahoma man at end of runway. Got to Washington at 12 and put them in cars and rushed them to Capitol. Comm. thought he was ruined; went to get something to eat for first time in 24 hours. No appetite. On way back from Club turned on radio and heard bill had passed. Checked up and found that Arthur Wilson had written speech the night before for Truman and Truman had read it until the three men arrived. (Actually Minton of Indiana also spoke to help kill time until people arrived. Bill passed with 15 vote margin and more than enough there.)

Richards told of Brereton reprimand. Said word taken by Handy and Handy wrote memo on it.

Comm told of going to MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo with Larkin. Had once done favor for Lawrence E. Bunker, senior MacArthur aide. Bunker arranged for Comm. to sit by MacArthur. In course of talk, congratulated MacA on Inchon business. MacA. said it was perfect setup; enemy had his rear sticking out and he couldn't resist hitting it. Wouldn't always work. Shouldn't follow this form. Said didn't like the area; no place for American forces. Planned to pull out right away. This shortly before Wake Island meeting. Doesn't recall anything about having them out before Christmas; but did plan to take them out of that area.

Speaks of John C H Lee and Roy Lord. Didn't know that Lee was on to Lord, but Lord was viper in his bosom. Made everything go through him as CofS. Finally moved Lord out by putting him in charge of assembly area. Phony headquarters to get him out.

Was there when Somervell bawled Lee out; but thinks Bomervell a big factor in putting him there originally.

Plays up Arthur Wilson. Recalls that Marshall liked Wilson's ability to get WPA help fast. Barnes man who threw Wilson out of Australia; MacArthur later got Barnes out. Immell helped with Wilson in North Africa; thinks Marshall grateful to Immell for this. Wilson brought in a lot of civilians; one was young Vanderlip. Thinks he fell afoul of Barnes' jurisdiction; cause of trouble there.

Speaks of Kuter working with Arnold. Says he understands that Kuter is man who leaked the Rainbow 5 plan. Arnold had it done, but Kuter carried.

John C H Lee wanted to command a division under MacArthur. Worshipped MacArthur; tried to mimic his mannerisms.

Robt Crawford supposed to succeed Wheeler as Chief Engr.

Was supposed Dewey would be President. Guessed wrong. Wheeler held up resignation until after election and Crawford lost out.

Richards said in Mexico Marshall told him of Truman coming to him in 1943 to say that Somervell was trying to get Marshall's job. Marshall showed him out. Actually when Somervell thought Marshall was going to be Supreme Commander he floated support for job.

Somervell a hatchet man. His man Clinton Robinson, even a bigger one. (this from Comm). Richards said that Marshall said he ran war through Somervell, Arnold, McNair, Handy, and McNarney. Had to have this to run war; think what problem was like in Korean War. Richards said L J Lincoln recently told staff of working for Eisenhower; often didn't see for week. Worked for Marshall every day, but GCM wouldn't have known him if he came into room. Lincoln wrote piece on strategy for Encyclopedia for Marshall.

Richards and Comm both fussed about lack of real administrative control such as during war. Need someone like Gailey with that kind of power to push things through. Messages now not typed up so they can be easily read. People let suspense dates pass. Bedell Smith a tough type too.

Tells of Eisenhower and Somervell going over to check on situation in UK. Marshall hadn't liked it when he came through; had them to check. Richards guesses that Somervell sold John C. H. Lee to Eisenhower on their inspection trip.