

# VI

## A Usable Marshall Plan

If governmental agencies, Keynesian methods of demand management, trade surpluses, and reliance on the public sector are now outdated and obsolete—or suffer from a fatal loss of confidence—and unregulated global markets rule, then it might seem that the time for another Marshall Plan is assuredly past. If so, the Marshall Plan can remind us in such altered domestic and international contexts still not to forget what once informed its formulation and implementation, namely, that economics, politics, and psychology are inseparable in building support at home and in rebuilding other nations abroad.

What also needs to be learned from the Marshall Plan, a lesson that belongs to the category of the “avoidable past,” is its failure to heed Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese military strategist and philosopher, to take full measure of the Communist threat. As a former military man, Secretary of State Marshall understood the difference between Stalin’s strategy and tactics, recognizing that the Soviet leader masked his revolutionary purposes with short-term, reformist, “front” governments in West Europe. The general knew *maskirovka*. The moderation of Communists in the West was classic “cover and deception” for the ultimate goal of domination by Moscow. For his clear-eyed reading of Stalin’s conduct, Marshall deserves high marks. Yet, surprisingly, the ECA’s analysis of the roots of indigenous communism that Stalin manipulated in West Europe lacked sophistication. Marshall Planners adopted the “myth of belly communism” and settled for half-truths. They recognized a mass murderer’s disguise, yet were disinclined to learn as much as they could about the enemy. Theirs was a mistake which shapers of antiterrorism strategy today need to study, lest they commit their own variant.

### Know Well Thy Enemy (and Thy Self)

The myth purported that poverty, hunger, unemployment, and misery were responsible for Communist popularity. Its cognate notion was that chaos and despair bred and fed totalitarianism. But did bad economic and social conditions necessarily constitute fertile ground for the spread of communism? The answer is that the causes and sources of its appeal were misunderstood in the late 1940s and, hence, its strength both conceived too narrowly as well as overrated. Some further telling Gallic evidence must suffice.

From November 1947 until 1949, the French Minister of Interior, reviled by French Communists as the “Assassin,” was Jules Moch. Those were years, of course, when France heaved with violent strikes, revolutionary rhetoric, and widespread civil unrest. In a good position to pass judgment, Moch felt that the Americans blew up the Communist threat into something much bigger than it actually was. His assessment, later shared with an interviewer from the Truman Library, was that “the danger was not so great” and “always overestimated in America.” To illustrate his point he cited the richest village in a wine-growing department in southern France where Communists commanded 100% of the vote. Even landowners with very prosperous vineyards supported the party of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. Moch explained such communal solidarity and Leftist politics as a local tradition that went back a century or more. “Ideologically,” he insisted, “they were nothing.” In fact, the former Interior Minister calculated that a large percentage of his countrymen who voted Communist in the late 1940s did not know its ideology.<sup>1</sup>

Oversimplifications nonetheless underwrote fear of Communist expansion and the zeal with which many Marshall Planners discharged their duties. They exaggerated what they truly had control over, giving too great an emphasis to materialistic explanations of Communist motivation and falling short of Sun Tzu’s standard. They did not know their enemy very well. As a secular religion, like nazism, communism was as much about people’s “souls” and spiritual needs as their material wants. A faith with its own catechism and dogmas, its appeal went beyond the proletariat. Moreover, the global ideological battle between democracy and totalitarianism turned on many axes: one rotated in the Kremlin, where Stalin’s penchant for discrediting Communist movements through misjudgments and misadventures played itself out (and where in 1956 his successors preserved his blundering ways by invading Hungary). Stalin’s behavior, in fact, validated key assumptions on which George F. Kennan erected America’s containment policy. Kennan knew the Soviet enemy well enough. His grand strategy worked, forcing Moscow to regularly expose its immorality.

Since the proper prescription for western Europe’s political woes presupposed the proper diagnosis of the problem, the Marshall Plan’s remedy was deficient. American-sponsored economic renewal was insufficient to undermine the lure of communism in France, Italy, and Greece. Such a shortcoming serves as a caveat to contemporary policymakers responsible for postwar reconstruction in the larger and very likely context of another totalitarian threat to Western values. Their programs must not be structured on oversimplifications of the root causes of Islamic fundamentalism, a more traditional religion than communism. Neither the educated, middle-class intellectuals and merchants in France and Italy who threw in their lots with Maurice Thorez and Palmiro Togliatti, nor Mohammed Atta who accepted a fateful suicide mission for al-Qaeda, had blue collars or empty bellies.

### **The Relevant Past**

To help contemporary policymakers answer the call for informed planning for postwar reconstruction, the Marshall Plan provides ample additional guidance that is usable. What worked once in a bygone era should not be forgotten. While luck was their companion, Marshall Planners did not triumph because they were luckier than other practitioners of American policy over the last sixty years. And success surely was not the offspring of Stalin's blunders. Neither randomness nor destiny had much to do with the ERP's final outcome. What mattered decisively was that George C. Marshall's followers put their breaks to wise use. Benefiting from "accidents of history," they also created optimum conditions for attaining their goals. Superbly equipped to profit from their good fortune, they conceived a strategy based on sound principles of statecraft and leadership. Their script had structural integrity, and they improvised brilliantly when circumstances required.

Though an old conception, the Marshall Plan's distilled essence yields fundamental lessons that override the historical contingencies and context of 1947–51 and still pertain in changed circumstances. Elements of strength that existed in the original have application today. Indeed, the higher the resolution of the historian's photograph of the Marshall Plan, the greater the pertinence of those elements. At the head of any list of general requirements for success as revealed in ECA operations are four prerequisites: national selflessness, the self-help of beneficiaries, a multilateral approach to problem solving, and an understanding of leadership. All were wisely prescribed by the Plan's architects who shared a healthy respect for their own past as a valuable teacher.

The Marshall Plan's soul, never out-of-date, was the same personal sense of public purpose and sacrifice summoned earlier by the New Deal and World War II. Over a span of forty-five months a generous nation transferred 1.2% of its GNP (2% in 1948) and 6–9% of the federal budget into Europe's recovery, reconstruction, and reform. To put such a substantial shift of resources into perspective, \$13,000,000,000 equates to \$100,000,000,000 in today's dollars, or less than 1% of today's GNP and 4% of the 2005 federal budget. The percentages of 1948–52 now translate into \$144,000,000,000 of GNP and a \$180,000,000,000 slice of the federal budget. Although the scale of American help was extraordinary, without the self-help of recipient nations billions of dollars in assistance were fated to descend down Congressman Howard Buffett's "rathole." "We believed with the Marshall Plan's leaders," remembered Henry Reuss, "that our role was not to direct the Europeans but to help them to help themselves."

In all countries bent on self-renewal, but most prominently in the Netherlands and West Germany, the Marshall Plan showcased the superiority of human and social capital over physical assets. Industrious, educated Europeans, determined to rebuild and better themselves, surpassed in importance the wherewithal made available to them by Americans. Not confusing aid with

charity constituted a critical insight with perpetual utilization, as did an insistence on self-investment which took most obvious shape in the counterpart fund, at least partly an emblem of national self-help.<sup>2</sup>

By refusing to be seduced after World War II by their own preponderance of economic and military power into fashioning a unilateral solution to West Europe's predicament, George C. Marshall and his advisers comprehended the dangers of national arrogance, as well as the value of a cooperative effort with friends and allies. They understood well what the editor of *Die Zeit* recently reemphasized: "multilateralism is not muddleheaded idealism, but part of realpolitik."<sup>3</sup> They rejected unilateralism as a dead-end, backing instead an arrangement which fostered habits of cooperation that matured into even greater achievements, like NATO. As a virtue, humility eventually fell from grace in American culture but surely warrants retrieval. It once informed Secretary Marshall's expectation that good works in the national interest did not necessitate gratitude and should not be expected. He advised Congress accordingly. He preferred West Europe's consent over America's popularity and its confidence over its affection. His forewarning eventually cushioned Italian resistance, along with Greek and Turkish resentments.

Unappreciated by isolationists, fortifying America's friends meant strengthening America's security, which Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., of Massachusetts liked to point out. Likewise, ignoring the nation's European allies, as was also the case with unilateral action, courted disaster. Winston Churchill's quip—that the only thing worse than fighting a war with allies was fighting one without them—has always been a valuable piece of advice. Realists like Secretary Marshall, who grasped the limits of American influence, knew what, on their own, they were equipped and unequipped to solve beyond the nation's borders. They entertained no illusions of omniscience or omnipotence.

Helping others save themselves in the short run while saving oneself in the long run defines enlightened self-interest in foreign policy, another aspect of the Marshall Plan having universal relevance. Henry Reuss has described such statecraft differently, as "a happy amalgam" of softheartedness and hardheadedness. With Clio, the Muse of History, whispering in their ears and with broad vision, his fellow Marshall Planners prodded Europeans to help one another while promoting stronger European interconnections as the best deterrent to the twentieth century's third continental war. They insisted on treating western Europe as a unit, fully expecting that it would "behave as a unit." The Plan marked perhaps the finest hour, in peacetime, of an Atlantic civilization, with America's and western Europe's best combining in a synergy that bequeathed a benchmark for future policymakers. Despite a subsequent outbreak of amnesia in the 1960s, when the Alliance for Progress drew up its development plans on a national basis and *sans* a Latin American OEEC, the principle of regionalizing markets through coordinated multinational effort ought to continue to inspire policymakers today. A collective regional

approach that targeted West Germany, the region's natural economic powerhouse, for inclusion and integration certainly accelerated postwar recovery, leaving in Thomas Schelling's view a model of "successful multinational cooperation to achieve a common goal" as a lasting legacy.<sup>4</sup>

Probably the most helpful tutelage the Marshall Plan can provide is about how most decisively to approach policymaking itself. For an expensive, innovative foreign aid program to fulfill its promise, the American people and their congressional representatives had to understand the reasons for its existence. In first mastering the machinery of domestic politics as well as the arts of persuasion in order to undertake grand strategy, formulators of the Marshall Plan achieved a near-perfect score. They obtained bipartisan backing and great popularity. With a publicity and public relations blitz that lasted nearly six months, they patiently provided the public, press, and Congress with a wealth of facts, figures, and arguments that assured its creation and retention. Thus, Secretary Marshall and his cohorts built a consensus and committed their nation prior to committing its resources and manpower.

As the Founding Fathers imagined, the American people started on a historical departure with eyes wide open. Next, Marshall Planners assiduously cultivated domestic, public, and congressional opinion to guarantee support throughout its four-year life. "In one year," Paul Hoffman's biographer has revealed, ECA's Administrator "personally made about 150 speeches," one nearly every two days, extolling the Marshall Plan's value for America's security and prosperity.<sup>5</sup> In western Europe the planners skillfully exploited a range of media in a vast, innovative propaganda war with the Cominform. Their campaign was directed by high-caliber professionals from the working media with the most advanced celluloid weapons a big part of their arsenal. Their results were consistently high approval ratings for the ERP at home and abroad. Marshall Planners authored, in other words, the classic text on the proper mechanics of making policy, particularly on the centrality of communication and the effective dissemination of information. It deserves, therefore, the closest reading by contemporary shapers of America's foreign relations.

Even if the Marshall Plan's specific design and engineering cannot be replicated precisely or approximately, America's human and intellectual capital—in Clark Clifford's words, those full of "professionalism, daring, inventiveness and sacrifice"—which the Plan drew down on with great profit for nearly four years, can certainly be reconstituted and reinvested. Recruiting the right people means, quite simply, duplicating what the Marshall Plan once prized and frowned upon in its hiring practices. Its stringent regulations resulted in exceptionally low turnover in personnel, with two years a standard tour of service which probably constituted a minimum commitment for success. (See Appendix C.) The resulting continuity of personnel, with Greece's chief of mission one glaring exception to the rule, assured deeper personal relations with foreign counterparts and increased effectiveness in problem solving.

In a highly selective process ECA's leadership preferred, identified, and enlisted a battalion of Phi Beta Kappas, ex-valedictorians, Ph.D.s, former Rhodes Scholars, budding Nobel Laureates and college presidents, future heads of professional associations, masters of business administration, and one-time law review editors to staff its projects. (See Appendix B.) With their objective a meritocracy, credentials absolutely mattered. Qualifications overruled all other considerations. Smart, educated people were essential to success abroad, as were cosmopolites. Those worldly bilingual and multilingual folk who understood Europe well, providing great strength to the ECA's Information Divisions, also taught other valuable lessons: their adopted nation's multiculturalism can be an incomparable asset, America's diversity has always constituted a potent force to be capitalized upon in a foreign crisis, and mastery of foreign languages can neutralize local interpreters while enriching cultural interactions.

Organizers of the Marshall Plan opted for a blend of dedicated civil servants, corporate executives, and public-spirited professionals from the private sector. They proved to be an ideal mix. By also placing a premium on transferable experience, for instance, prior employment in a government mobilization agency, recruiters merged theoretical and practical knowledge into a winning team. Moreover, they administered no political or ideological tests for employment while imposing a nonnegotiable ban on relatives, cronies, amateurs, dilettantes, and political appointees. Political loyalists and administration favorites received no special consideration whatsoever. The stakes were too high then and certainly even more so today in the war on terrorism for a partisan pickup team with White House connections to be in charge of postwar reconstruction.

In their collective memoirs, Marshall Planners suggested that the ways they elaborated their assignments should remain highly instructive. In fact, they remind advocates of future initiatives in large-scale foreign assistance of how interwoven the original experiment actually was. Besides being an approach to foreign policymaking, the Plan's layers included a decision-making process, a problem-solving method, and a management style. Each presupposed consensus, a continual synergy between donor and recipients, and a constant wariness of "purist dogmatism" in pursuit of the coveted new European order. Knowledge of one's own deficits in knowledge was critical. Alan Valentine's Dutch experience taught him three lessons with contemporary applications. First, it was "a mistake to be doctrinaire about economics"; second, "different postwar conditions [in Europe] called for different treatments" rather than "rigid uniformity"; and, third, Dutch experts "understood the economy of the Netherlands better than the American specialists understood it."

Whether greater productivity, less protectionism, currency convertibility, or increased intra-European trade was the specific, limited goal, Marshall Planners accepted other nations as not necessarily seeing matters as they

did. Because they constructed a framework within which those committed to a “new Europe” could debate those willing to be rebuilt or reformed, the critical hinge was always a recipient’s readiness to change. The essence of their process, method, and style was, however grudging at times, mutual trust and understanding. In the Marshall Planners’ exercise of American power, national and political differences were almost always respected. In the case of Greece, where that rule and a few others went to pieces, considerable frustration and disappointment awaited them. There, promotion of public works succeeded while furtherance of American-style democracy ran aground. An official with more than two years of service in the six-man Civil Government Division in Athens later pinpointed ECA’s mistake. According to C. William Kontos, its “total approach [in Greece] was much too bold.”

Openness was another telltale ECA trait, and more productive than boldness. Tolerance for variety helped to advance an anti-Communist agenda: Socialists, Catholics, and Muslims enlisted as crucial allies in battling Communist influence and stemming its growth. Likewise, it furthered negotiations with Europeans. Since most nations, including the United States, regard themselves as superior, the Marshall Plan method simply amounted to conversations among officials who styled their nations to be exceptional. No overbearing American sense of exceptionalism suffocated their exchanges. The typical Marshall Planner’s mindset embraced long-term thinking, pragmatism, transparency, compromise, and coaxing. It eschewed short-term as well as black-and-white thinking, secrecy, self-righteousness, and bullying.

Unquestionably, ECA preferred certain courses of action and on occasion sermonized. At no time, however, did it imitate Stalin’s coercion in East Europe. Marshall Planners grasped the crux of leadership. They knew how to forge a bond between a leader and followers. Their means were mutual respect and collaboration. For Paul Hoffman, “the essence of genuine leadership” was “to share power with people rather than display power over people.” In dealings with both Americans and Europeans, he practiced what he preached. Alan Valentine has noted in his autobiography that “Hoffman’s policy was to pick men he thought had good ability and judgment and turn them lose.” According to a knowledgeable Dutch official, Americans so entrusted provided assistance “without in any way imposing their will.” To him “this was the key to the way that it could work so well.” The CEEC’s English chairman, Sir Oliver Franks, paid the Marshall Plan an identical compliment. The Frenchman Robert Marjolin echoed their sentiments, lauding the unwillingness of his American collaborators to attempt “to make the Europeans behave in a manner contrary to their fundamental interests.” The genius of the Marshall Plan method, another yardstick for future measurement, was its balance of economic might with political restraint.<sup>6</sup>

A union of American largesse with Washington’s respect for the recipients of that generosity bonded seventeen European nations to America’s leadership. Such “bonding,” in Josef Joffe’s estimation, necessitated “an eye

for the common interest and a commitment to cooperation” and a willingness to construct “an order that . . . advance[d] American interests by serving those of others.” The outcome, in West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s opinion, was that in the late 1940s “the Americans are the best Europeans.” Much like a gifted and devoted impresario, Marshall Planners conducted, in effect, the first-ever West European Philharmonic in which seventeen former soloists followed a single, American-made baton. Only the conductor’s dedication to the well-being of the orchestra earned such acceptance, trust, and collective achievement. Occasional discord was therefore expected.<sup>7</sup>

Tempered by politics, applied economics turned out to be more art than science in the European Recovery Program. Economic theories were at times either inappropriate or ineffectual, as witnessed in Italy’s Mezzogiorno especially. Indeed, the task in developing regions like Greece, Turkey, and southern Italy, in contrast to merely recovering regions like West Germany and northern Italy, was a far greater challenge. Neither “pure market forces” nor Keynesian doctrines always operated as forecast. The ECA’s work validated practical experience, flexibility, and—after considerable American reluctance—deference to local knowledge and priorities, particularly in the diverse management of seventeen counterpart funds. Indeed, if one voice can be heard throughout the ECA’s flexible elaboration of its structured programs, it is George Kennan’s upstaging in effect Woodrow Wilson’s: West Europe must be made safe for diversity, totalitarians excluded of course. A greater American readiness to accept Europe’s variety than to proselytize on behalf of America’s real, imagined, or exaggerated distinctiveness prevailed, notwithstanding the counterclaims of some prominent historians. Frequently, in fact, Europeans treated Washington’s preferences as irrelevant. The Marshall Plan’s rejection of a “one-size-fits-all approach to recovery programs” offers wise and useful counsel to present-day specialists in postwar reconstruction in other parts of the world.

As proof of their characteristic adjustability, which contrasted with the rigidity of Stalin’s Five-Year Plans for the East, Marshall Planners cooperated with governments of the Center as well as the Far Right in Greece, the Center-Right in Italy and West Germany, and the Left in Great Britain, Norway, and elsewhere. Some have forgotten that Belgium’s Paul-Henri Spaak, chairman of the OEEC Council, was himself a Socialist who believed that “the only answer to Communism is Socialism.” Others overlook Averell Harriman’s admiration for the “Socialist government in England” because of its ability “to distribute funds received from the Marshall Plan on a more just basis—giving the workers a greater cut—than had been the case in France and Germany.” Americans even dealt with secular authoritarianism in Turkey.

Though many latter-day New Dealers were in their ranks, with their American-style liberal ideas about proper relations between capital and



labor, Marshall Planners still partnered with Christian Democrats and royalists, along with Socialists and Labourites. In West Germany, avowed Keynesians allied with supply-siders committed to competitive, unregulated markets. In Great Britain, France, and Norway they made common cause with Socialists pledged to nationalize industries. In fact, after World War II British and French governments nationalized big chunks of their private sector—banks, mines, and utilities—with France putting 20% of its industry under state control by mid-1946. As Marshall Planners arrived at their missions in 1948, recipient governments throughout West Europe were enlarging their welfare systems, including national health care. Thus, an estimable trait of those who answered George Marshall's summons was that they seldom preferred, above all else, to be right, a double entendre to be sure. In Italy, West Germany, and Turkey a collision of economic creeds invariably took place, yet American egotism never amounted to an insurmountable hurdle. Today's architects of policy should take note of the zigzagging required for arriving at the ultimate destination.<sup>8</sup>

Some critically important virtues of the Marshall Plan can provide other guidelines worthy of re-creation. In light of the pathologies that of late beset many foreign aid programs, especially the serious problem faced by the World Bank, adopting ECA's principles might prevent a subculture of corruption and scandal. Of the "four great lessons" Paul Hoffman drew from his oversight of the Marshall Plan, two pertained to eliminating waste. The first was that "We Must Use Guided Dollars" that joined a "detailed program of needs" by recipients with "end-use checks" by the donor. The second was that "A Hardheaded Administration of Aid is Necessary" with a premium on "tightfistedness." Wherever ECA operated, accountability was demanded and received. Its anticorruption mentality meant rigorous accounting controls and a disbursement system that minimized, through PAs primarily, the flow of dollars out of the United States and across the Atlantic. Disincentives to skimming and embezzlement of funds extended to a veto wielded over the use of counterpart locally as well as ECA's retention in American banks of its contributions to the European Payments Union. A \$13,000,000,000 foreign aid program virtually free of scandal qualifies as the touchstone for all future reconstruction efforts.<sup>9</sup>

In hindsight, the Marshall Plan's structure serviced its strategies extremely well. Its decentralized theater command, for instance, advanced its purposes and was yet another source of organizational strength. Few features, however, exceeded in overall value the manner in which ECA itself was set up. A small, independent, elite, and well-run government agency, burdened with as little bureaucracy as possible, to handle future initiatives in postwar reconstruction has its compelling historical precedent in the Economic Cooperation Administration. Selecting the "Ad Hoc Option," rather than elevating either the State or Defense Department to the role of lead agency in such an eventuality, is a lesson embedded in the past. Avoidance

of officialism, with its excessive rules, regulations, and red tape, assured ECA's effectiveness. A human scale and autonomy were crucial to more than just the morale and esprit of Marshall Planners; they also fostered innovation while keeping the albatross of careerism flying far away.

How can the State Department with thirty thousand employees, or even the World Bank with more than ten thousand employees worldwide, achieve the same rapid response, creativity, and efficiencies that ECA once did? There is, of course, nothing magical about improvisation. After all, what is one to make of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, or CPA, which undertook postwar reconstruction in a single Middle Eastern country with a cumbersome force of fifteen hundred employees at its peak continually rotating in and out of Baghdad's Green Zone? The answer: probably no one in authority cared much about extracting history's lessons beforehand.

With considerable congressional nudging, Marshall Planners also incorporated a psychology of human nature into their programs. Their insights contributed critically to realizing their objectives. First, they guaranteed West European recipients assistance for the duration of four years rather than for either a year or as an open-ended commitment. They predicated their sunset provision and specific timetable on the assumption that lasting recovery required time, yet too much time was counterproductive to achieving that goal. Second, they made all aid conditional and conditionality mandatory. They clearly understood that incentives to compliance, particularly concerning pledges of financial and budgetary reforms, were crucial. Failure to uphold provisions in bilateral contracts could mean sanctions or loss of funding. Realistically, the donor attached strings, or *quid pro quos*, and then spelled them out in formal treaties. In light of its good effect, this portion of the ECA contract ought not to be tampered with or discarded by the next organization of postwar region builders.

### A Final Rumination

Twenty years ago that indispensable European, Robert Marjolin, called the Marshall Plan "the most dazzling political and economic success in the history of the western world since 1914."<sup>10</sup> Since then, not every economic historian or economist has espoused his view. Chiefly in European academic circles where multivariate regression analysis, counterfactual simulations, and input-output methods rate highly, Marjolin's superlative has encountered dissent and skepticism. To being a Marjolinite I confess, though I also admit doubts as to whether a reproduction of that "dazzling success" can grace the twenty-first century. In order to weigh the odds for that actually happening, some day, the consequence of one factor, relative to other determinants, needs highlighting—lest history reproach this author unmercifully.

That quintessential American, Ralph Waldo Emerson, once avowed, "character is higher than intellect." Too infrequently quoted since the passing of

George Catlett Marshall and his generation, Emerson's aphorism penetrates to the heart of the Marshall Plan. Compared to the dominant role of character in the self-image of ECA's leaders and staffers, everything else wanes in significance. In at least one vital way, Marshall Planners are reminiscent of the nation's Founding Fathers. They were avatars in that, like Washington, Jefferson, and Madison, they clung to a conviction: power and influence derived from personal merit. Despite flaws in their nature, they nonetheless rechanneled their energies, talents, reputations, and personal ambitions into the "service of benevolence." They believed that curtailing special interests and doing the public good were, in fact, instruments for achieving individual greatness.<sup>11</sup>

The character possessed by most Marshall Planners, surely inspired by George C. Marshall's life of selfless service, lends itself poorly to quantification. When General Marshall served as Army Chief of Staff, he was, in his own words, "always on the lookout for the real performers who are self-effacing."<sup>12</sup> Somehow, Paul Hoffman and Averell Harriman managed to find those American hybrids in abundance. Today, character seems in much shorter supply than in the late 1940s. But if force of character were reinvigorated in American culture, and Emerson's truth widely reembraced, another Marshall Plan would become more feasible. Americans of character and intelligence, free of hubris, mindful of history's warnings, equipped with realistic objectives, proven methods, and proper procedures, might then be equal to the uncertainties, mysteries, and imponderables implicit in a "new" or "second" or "present day" Marshall Plan. When they are committed to Marshall's prescription of trading "sacrifices today" for "security and peace tomorrow," the outlook brightens even further.<sup>13</sup> When America's best once again see themselves as national servants, in the image of George C. Marshall, the time will have arrived to entertain that prospect seriously.

