

Notes 184N, Copy 2

General A. C. Wedemeyer

Friends Advice

Boyds, Maryland

February 1, 1958

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Interview with General A.C.Wedemeyer, at his home, Friends Advice, Boyds, Maryland, 1 Feb 1958, by F C Pogue.

(We had several inches of snow on the ground and I went by bus and taxi out to the General's home. He said it had 33 rooms and three furnaces. It is an interesting place. He, himself, is interesting. He has a curious mixture of great frankness and of insinuated digs. He constantly looks for excuses for people he talks about, and then obliquely ascribes improper motives. He has a habit of making a strong statement and then saying I have a paper sometime I will show you which will prove that. He is very charming, extremely hospitable. I found Mrs. Wedemeyer very nice. I spent about 5 hours).

The first hour and a half was at random and without notes. I have put down my recollections. They are right in essence, but have not his phrasing. He said that MacArthur was a fine man, but kept some weak people around him. Says Whitney responsible for a lot of MacArthur's troubles. MacArthur's fault for keeping him and some of the others.

Willoughby was a man of some ability. Flamboyant. Had him as an instructor at Leavenworth. Great man to quote authorities to prove his points. Found later that much of the history he quoted was not accurate.

Somewhere later in the interview he spoke of Eisenhower coming to OPD. Said he came in with an aura around him. Heard that he had been big man on MacArthur's staff. Didn't know then they had had a big argument and MacArthur had fired him. Thinks this was due in part to the fact that Ike was getting too popular. MacArthur didn't like others to be ahead of him;

At luncheon we spoke of Chennault. Said he had been to Walter Reed to see Chennault and also saw Gerow and Donovan there. Said Chennault was accused, when Wedemeyer went to China, of being in dope ring, speculation and the like. Chennault had asked for an investigation and court-martial. However, he would have had to have a board of men superior in rank to Chennault and there weren't enough men of that rank. Chennault a great flyer. Mrs. Wedemeyer said were any of the rumors true. Gen Wedemeyer said the man he lived with, a flight surgeon, is said to have millions here. Of course, he couldn't have saved large sums from his pay.

Marshall upset because Chennault had an aide--Joe Alsop--who sent personal letters to Roosevelt, his cousin. Chennault wrote to Roosevelt and Hopkins against Stilwell. Expected Chennault to be difficult to get along with. Found him to be cooperative. Also got along well with Chiang.

(We shifted back and forth in a remarkable manner with Gen Wedemeyer running down all sorts of garden paths. However, I may have exaggerated it here).

W. said he met Sir James Grigg here before going to CBI. Grigg said watch out for Mountbatten's duplicity. Isn't that amazing for a Britisher to say a thing like that. Mountbatten was charming. Very nice to me. Very affable. He told me Pownall not really anybody. You are

really my deputy. I said this was OK. I said I always wanted to tell him what I thought and hoped he would do the same. I said I wanted him to speak completely frankly. He agreed he would; but he was not always without guile with me. He was a very sensitive man.

Mountbatten told me Churchill never wrote any message without thinking how history would look at it. Wanted to word it so it would sound well. Thinks Mountbatten did some of the same sort of thing. Doubts if Mountbatten was always above board with me. I liked Mountbatten, but he was sent out to represent the British Empire. He watched the Americans. Of course, they tended to push against colonies. They encouraged revolt by their talk and action. Made colonial powers unhappy. Dutch were much upset.

Mountbatten was close to the Royal Family. Strong influence on Philip. I met Philip through him. Have heard that Mountbatten was communistic. Perhaps socialistic is a better description. Had influenced Philip along those lines. Close to Labor government. Grigg put me on guard.

Later Gen W used the word slippery to describe Mountbatten.

BOLERO ROUNDUP. I went over to UK early. Saw Chaney. I thought that Marshall had picked him to head the operation. I was not impressed by him. I didn't think he was big enough. I told Marshall this. Marshall asked me about a lot of people. He asked me about this and said then who else can we send. I said I have heard a lot of good things about Eisenhower. I actually suggested him to Gen Marshall.

At this point I asked about the story I had heard that he intervened for Gen Barker and kept him from being held as Colonel. Said this was true story. Barker a colonel on Gen Morgan's staff. Cable came one day from Ground Force Hq from McNair saying if he came back he would get BG. He came to me and asked if he could go back with us, making clear he didn't initiate this. I told him to see Gen Marshall. He failed to make the situation clear to Gen Marshall, who thought that Barker was wanting to go back to wangle for a BG. Marshall got angry and said I will show him. He won't get his BG. And he won't go back. When he said this, I said Gen Marshall, you are going to make a big mistake. Colonel Barker has worked hard. It was not his idea to go back. He willing to stay here as colonel. Gen M. said "humph." But Barker stayed and he ultimately got not one but two stars. Ed Hull told him (?): "I wouldn't have had your nerve. It was a good thing you told him." Barker sent me a fine etching in appreciation.

Here MacArthur came in again. He said MacArthur's friends have hurt his reputation with his books. Tried to make him out to be always right. Gen Wedemeyer agreed with me that Gen Stilwell's book was harmful to him.

Ike no great student. He didn't read much. Fine personality. You had to like him. He could bring people together. Could get things going.

Krueger wanted me for Ike's place. Meant a BG for me. I said I wasn't interested in BG but would like to be with troops. This was taken to Marshall by Hull. Marshall said I'll stop that. What does Krueger mean trying to take my people. He stopped it.

I first met Gen Marshall after spending 2 1/2 years at the War College in Germany. Jodl was one of my instructors. School was in Berlin, but I travelled over Europe. Read a lot. Read Das Kapital in German--both volumes. Found out German views on Communism and its menace. I was not being immodest when I said I knew something about Communism. After all I was where I could hear about these things. I also heard Haushofer. I knew about German thinking. When I came back I was put in plans. Marshall was head of plans. I was sent to various heads of desks. Marshall asked the most intelligent questions put to me. He was nearly the only one who showed intelligent interest. I was impressed by him.

Marshall took me with him a lot. He would ask my opinion and he would let me talk straight to him. I remember once at Casablanca, Arnold sent me to tell Marshall that he would take off after King. Precedence was involved (Navy far more precedent conscious than Army). Marshall glared at me and talked rough. Hurt me.

He sent me around the world. When Marshall came back from conference he called Mrs. Wedemeyer to tell her I was all right and that I was going on (he knew she would be upset when I didn't come back with him). I went to Brisbane to see MacArthur and to Chungking to explain Casablanca decision.

When Marshall came to China on mission, I arranged for his suite at the Hotel Cathay. I had been there two years and I wanted to help him. He showed me his directive. Had John Carter Vincent's initials on it. I said he couldn't amalgamate the two powers. Communists intended to win. He glared at me and thundered it is going to work and you are going to help me make it work.

On the China thing: He wanted me to change part of my report. I couldn't do it. I felt he didn't care for me any longer. I decided I didn't give a damn. I was for my country. I was hurt because of his attitude toward me.

Marshall told Walter Robertson I was getting too big for my britches. He didn't realize Robertson was my cousin. Robertson told me. That hurt me.

Spoke again of study in Germany. Jodl an instructor. Claus von Stauffenberg who tried to kill Hitler was a classmate. I became aware of the Communist menace, which was why I recognized it in China. I used to tell the British about what I had learned about the Germans.

We spoke of people he had worked with. Gerow a wonderful man. Did a lot for me. A good man. Fine mind. Fine person. Became nervous. Didn't show it.

Handy had no imagination. Stable factor. Overworked. I have often found him asleep in his office over a stack of papers. (I asked if Marshall tended to go to sleep after lunch. Said no. Said Marshall did try to rest a few minutes after lunch). Pound would always sleep. Handy a VMI man. Finest sort of person.

Ed Hull a lot like Handy. Not imaginative. Excellent man. I tried to get Eisenhower to make him Chief of Staff. Said he hadn't had enough troop experience. I think he would have done well.

My staff was fine. The two Lincolns, Hutchin, Caughey, Dupuy, Pat Carter, wonderful. Agree with Marshall that he had the finest sort of staff.

Hurley once told me I must watch MacArthur. Yet they were old associates. You have to watch Hurley. He forgets what he once said. Forgets many things. His book says what he wanted to believe at the moment. Hurley submitted bombastic resignation. It is interesting to see MacArthur and Hurley talking well of each other.

Remembers Marshall telling him of unconditional surrender. Had notes on that. I was in bed at Casablanca, sitting up reading. I said it was a mistake. Marshall listened to me.

Marshall took me to the White House often to present views. I presented views to JCS on various pts. I said to Gen Marshall I don't want to be too forward. He stopped and said--his voice almost angry--don't ever fail to tell me what you think. I always want your real views. That's why I wanted to talk to him in China. But he didn't want my views.

When he was at Ft Myer, we used to walk through the cemetery at Arlington. He said one day I was looking tired. What have you been doing? I said I had been up to 2-3 every night. He said you don't have ideas after 5 PM. Take time off. Next day about 4 o'clock, he called and said get up here. And he gave me a job which kept me up to 4 AM. He had forgotten his earlier advice.

Acheson used to be friendly to me. I think he was unfair in publishing my private reports. Asked me what I thought about this. (I said I didn't think I would do it). (The I here is Pogue. Incidentally Gen Wede. as shown in his testimony in the MacArthur hearings frequently spoke of himself as Wedemeyer).

Stimson. I said I thought he was a man of high standards. Wedemeyer said he thought so once, but he had indications that he may have been tempted to try to take us into war. Says Stimson was the man Roosevelt wanted. Knew he had angered Japanese with Stimson doctrine. (I suggested to Gen Wed, that he was following Beard thesis. He said yes he had read Beard and Tansill).

(Says John Magruder thought Marshall let him down. Speck Wheeler a wonderful person).

I once saw Ike and MacArthur put their arms around each other in newsreel during some political affair. Yet I had heard both of them talk terribly about each other. Marshall wouldn't have done that (put arm around). I couldn't do that. Marshall above that.

Marshall was tough on me in connection with Gen Greely in Tehran. Trouble there with American minister, a Jew. I was to investigate. I looked over reports. Greely was ordered home. I said bring back other man too. Cordell Hull was furious. Greely has hated my guts since. Doubt if Marshall ever knew what I did. We had to save aid to Russians. We also sometimes fought.

I didn't want the CBI job.

Gen Embick, my father-in-law, was an admirer of Marshall's. Helped to make him Chief of Staff. You know, Gen Craig was a Catholic. Drum was a Catholic and chief candidate to succeed Craig. Roosevelt didn't want two Catholics in a row. Gen Embick suggested Gen Marshall. Sure he had a great deal to do with his appointment. Gen Embick was a man of great ability.

Gen Marshall's great deficit was his failure to be a human being. He was cold. He would have been President but for his personality. No warmth. He took his example from Pershing. Pershing pushed him; made him. Marshall lacked a knowledge of humanities; how to be human. He wanted to be kind. He was thoughtful. The Greeks play up the value of lack of emotions. I think they are wrong.

King was also cold. Man of great ability. Pity he and Marshall couldn't unthaw. Could have been great friends. King able man. His brother-in-law an army officer. He was interested in army as well as Navy. He fought for US interest. He also tricked the British. They were right in thinking they had to watch him.

Arnold was warm. Not a first rate man.

Dill was a wonderful asset. Insinuated himself into Marshall's life. The Dills liked us (the Wedemeyers). We visited them near Dover. I went pigsticking with him near Delhi. He was ruptured there--this after Casablanca. I massaged his back. Liked him. He got extremely close to Marshall. He provided British Chiefs and P. M. with information from Marshall's thinking which Marshall shouldn't have given him. (I argued this point with Gen Wede and said it was clear that P. M. Dill gave Marshall stuff. He said he felt the advantage in the Dill-Marshall relationship accrued mainly to the British). Dill didn't rate Brooke high. At Quebec when Brooke was difficult, Dill made clear that Brooke was not a big man.

The British made the decisive decisions until Tehran. Then that tough old man, Stalin, insisted on decision on OVERLORD). He forced things in focus. Until Tehran the Churchill-Brooke strategy was in focus. Americans were trying to get their plan; British trying to prevent. The British wanted a war of attrition. This was no good. We shouldn't lose the Russians.

I asked was Dill living a lie in his relations with Marshall. He answered with a question: was Marshall doing his duty when he said he didn't know where he was the morning of Pearl Harbor in order to protect the President. Meant to say that Dill, in doing good for Br Chiefs and Churchill, would have felt that he was doing his main duty even if it meant selling General Marshall short. (At various points, it is clear that Gen Wed while he told me he would show me how Marshall strategy would have shortened war if British would have bought it, was actually saying that Marshall gave way to the British).

I asked about the angry memo Wede wrote after Casablanca about lack of US preparation vis-a-vis British. He said they had 20-2 at Casablanca. Cooke and I had to stand up against them. They came absolutely prepared. We were opposed to HUSKY as was Marshall. We feared a vacuum

that would draw our stuff in. British had the answer for everything what they didn't have they made up. We were ready at TRIDENT and Quebec. Marshall liked it.

Back to staff. Caraway, Lincoln and Caughey fine. Hull was bright and knowledgeable. Ike highly thought of. Two gps in Off of Chief of Staff. Marshall and McNarney. Policy and Strategy and operations. Hull handled the using of the plan; my crowd came up with the plan.

(I asked if Marshall was copying army planning group in state. He said that Kennan and Nitze -- came to see him for ideas. Gen Marshall had sent them to get ideas).

I said what about this business that Marshall felt he was doing duty in saying he didn't know where he was. What about it. He said it had been suggested that Marshall was (1) meeting Oumansky (2) riding; (3) at church. But was hiding out. I discussed Beard (Wed. felt he was respected historian, who may have been getting wrong at the last), Tansill and others. I said it wouldn't work on the Oumansky business.

I said what purpose did it serve for Marshall to hide where he was. Said Bratton's testimony had implied something sinister. He said I have known people who like to give the impression they know something others don't. Rufus Bratton was like that. He didn't have much chin. If what he told when he had too many cocktails was true, Marshall and Bedell Smith were liars. Gist was he tried to get word to Marshall. Suggestion was Marshall hid out.

Someone should have been relieved. Gen Sylvester was relieved and broken to colonel for a whole lot less. Remember that Kimmel and Short were not tried. They should have had a court martial. They had a right to try to clear themselves.

Gen W said he didn't think anyone had any idea the attack would have the force it did. (This was in answer to my suggestion that if Roosevelt had plotted to have the attack at Pearl Harbor he wouldn't have risked the whole fleet. Agreed but said no one realized the Japanese could launch such a force).

Wedemeyer said I was a pick and shovel man. I wouldn't have known what all the stuff meant. But the messages coming and going should have gone over the desk of Carl Russell. He was on the Hawaiian desk (he was killed with Atchison). He would have recognized that Short hadn't understood the order. But it was not shown him.

Later I saw to it that this was the big thing: make sure that our orders are interpreted correctly. Make sure they do it.

The trouble may have been the feeling that the more people you tell a thing to, the more it tends to get out. This view was so used by the White House that there was no indication about the possibility of war. This was a White House idea. Probably only Gerow and Bundy knew war was near. But Russell was responsible for the area; he should have known.

Trouble was the amalgam of White House desire to avoid knowledge of fact that war was near getting out and fact that we wanted to protect the fact that Jap. code had been broken.

We talked about Stimson's statement--let them strike first, I said perhaps Stimson was Roosevelt type of man. He said FDR picked him because he was ready to fight Japan. Had favored attack. I am not as sure of Stimson's high standard as I once was.

Suggests if he were a historian he would seek what motivated men. If he has high principles then he can't go wrong. (This is a double barreled insinuation. It could mean that Marshall had no principles or vice versa). Marshall always said tell me what you think.

Hurley claims he had me selected for China. Marshall had me slated for a command. Handy said, he opposed me for Theater Cmdr. He, Handy, thought wasn't tough enough to discipline people. When I began to send them back, he said he was mistaken.

As planner for Marshall, I wanted requisitions for anything by an Ally judged on the basis of use made of it. Perhaps we could make better use of it. Had difficulty getting information from the Soviets. Went with Loy Henderson to Soviet Embassy. Talked to Hopkins.

Tried to find British intentions. Know they promised in April 42 to go across 1 1/2 yrs later. Recognized the basic premise that fighting was to the East. Recognized British Isles proper base, best air effort, recog vital importance of concentrating on that effort. Became apparent they were trying to inject doubt. I got so discouraged that Marshall said I think they accepted with their tongues in their cheeks. I would keep talking to Marshall, to JCS and others. I think I became a thorn in the British side. They were asking for more and more. I urged--along with Cooke--we should threaten to go to the Pacific. Pointed out American people wanted revenge. British kept on. Mountbatten followed a month later by P. M. Shook confidence of FDR. P.M. said he couldn't find mean to sustain self on continent. The full potential of airpower not fully accepted. Churchill and his people and FDR and most of his people were thinking of ground forces. Until ground force was implemented, it was nothing. I said with air (from Britain) we had a second front. Isn't it true that we were implementing forces against enemy in the air.

Churchill comes to the White House. In July Jt Chiefs called in. Churchill had sold FDR the idea there should be some operation. Roosevelt turned attention south. Dishonest to tell American people the Germans would come across to Brazil. (I said might affect pro-Nazi feeling there. Gen Wed smiled indulgently). Medit ops came from that.

(Somewhere here I got the impression Gen Wed was trying to give me the impression he was sent to CBI to get him off planning group in Washington and get him out of the British hair).

Said he never saw any concrete evidence of pro-Communism on part of State Dept people. I gave the four--Service, Ludden et al--letters of commendation. Had confidence in them. Not wrong in the way I used them. Had them making studies. I didn't take their advice on giving arms to Communists. I didn't suppose their favoring war to Communists had anything sinister.

Mention was made of leak of Victory program to TRIBUNE before Pearl Harbor. Gen Wed asked if I knew he was investigated. I said no. I was on Jt Planning staff; I had written program. Scobie had security arrangements. He was investigated. Copy went to Sec War; extra copy to

FDR by Marshall's order--Sept 17, 1941--all copies registered. I kept one. When the thing broke I was away. When I went back to office I got out my copy and underscored in red things in paper. They had it. Next day I came in and FBI people were there. Said open safe. Brought this paper out. Looked bad because there were underscored lines. I had a German name; had studied in Germany. Asked Trohan later who did it. Said he didn't and opposed printing it. Thinks Senator Wheeler had something to do with it. Chester Manly had by line on it. Wheeler said colonel in Arnold's office brought it to Senate building and it was photo stated there. Said he didn't know man's name. Trohan apparently knew but said it's done and there is no use of knowing. Says friendship for J Edgar Hoover dates from the kind way he dealt with me on this. Have had him here in this room. I was finally cleared. Marshall trusted me.

If we hadn't have had Pearl Harbor we would have had trouble because of the paper being printed I went to McCloy. I had admired him. He pointed his finger at me and said there is blood on the hands of the man who let this paper out. I felt he was accusing me. I have had dealings with him since, but I never forgave him. Gerow and Marshall were nice in the whole affair.

McCarthy was mentioned. Says we initially supported him. Felt he was doing important work. I always said he would never support him if he found he was doing all this for own aggrandizement. Always felt he was a dedicated man. Says man high in Republican Nat'l Comm. told him that McCarthy was personally a rotter.

If Taft was an isolationist, he was my kind of isolationist. No one can be an isolationist today. He wanted what we did abroad to be in our interest. I said I had respect for Taft, but couldn't stand his attitude towards Texas delegation in 1952. Wedemeyer said he was strong for Taft. Was head of Citizens for Taft. Says Ingraham relative of Taft didn't handle things right. Thinks if more experienced man in charge this would have been all right. Says you have it wrong about those delegates. I am glad you brought it up. I have some papers I will show you sometime which shows there was nothing wrong. (I never say them.)

SLEDGEHAMMER----thinks Brooke willfully misleads by saying Marshall no strategist because he proposed this as workable solution. Thinks Brooke jealous. (Brooke had Wed. to dinner in London and gave me a copy of the book). He says Marshall didn't know what he wanted to do and it was impossible to do this opn in 1942. I was convinced that Marshall was trying out the idea; trying to force the British to stick to their commitment. None of us wanted to go across in 1942; wanted to stick to Bolero-Roundup. Bolero contemplated increased ops by air forces and Navy. Increased pressure by air and sea. Try to attract their air force so we knock down. Have a canopy of air superiority by June or July 1943. Reason Marshall wanted to put up idea of operation in 1942. Marshall didn't emphasize sufficiently it is air and navy we intend to use at first. Marshall had no intention of using unsound strategy. SLEDGEHAMMER to be used under two contingencies: (1) if Russia about to fold, then make a desperate move--Marshall and I agreed; (2) in case the Germans are about to fold; defeatism on a vast scale could have done this. We would threaten British to keep them in line; wanted to make realistic Bolero-Roundup possible.

Landing craft is factor. Argued that this hurt OVERLORD. In April 1942, having the task of accompanying Gen Marshall, you can be sure any American officer would check on every factor

which would influence his plan. I threshed out these issues with the Knudsen myself. I had worked on the Victory program. There was stuff in the British Isles for training. Navy people began to doubt if the British were sincere. Navy began to stake out boats. Get from the Navy what was produced in June 1942 and Dec 1942. Then go to April 43 and June 43. Where were the boats? They were not supposed to be out there. We were on the strategic defense in the Far East and defensive-offensive in Europe. They were taking air and navy stuff. I think we may have held up victory in Europe by sending stuff to the Pacific. Marshall in last report said fact we didn't have landing craft was the thing which postponed the attack until 44.

Hull and I were in on work. I had something concrete to do on the Victory program. Ed nothing as concrete to do in his job. When Bundy was killed, Handy was put in on planning. Divided job into geographic areas. Russell in Hawaii. Ridgway and Hal B---in on Latin America. We asked what objectives? What obstacles? What countries neutral? Potential enemies? To cope with enemy you have to have this kind of stuff. You have to know how much you can take. Question of using women instead of men in certain types of skilled work. Worked with Dept of Labor on info for the plan. Studied the armies of the world. Found about 10 per cent of the population could be taken without militating against healthy war economy. Means use of women workers. We could have an army of 15 or 15 million (that is army, navy, air). How many divisions, battalions, tank and artillery units needed? Air Force. Has Kuter, Hansell and George helping me.

We wanted 8,700,000--defensive and offensive org in either one of two theaters. Didn't want two fronts. Navy added 1 1/2 million to ours.

In making this kind of study, you have to go to G-1, G-2 and G-4. Went around to them and then to departments of the Government.

Had to go to training groups--G-3 and Ground Forces--and would ask how rapidly can you mobilize. Had to be dovetailed in. By the first of certain period would have so many divisions. Then gave schedules. When this was started and approved, McKelvie took it over.

If we lacked men and tanks, & we would put down needs. Would report to Marshall and Knudsen.

Right after Pearl Harbor we went to federal bldg across from munitions (public health). Ultra-secret. Jt. Planning staff there 2-3 months. Before I went there Ike had come. Then we were writing the plan. Presented it to JCS. Maddox and Capt Rogers (USN) and Forrest Sherman and I went down the line. We presented and JCS bought. BOLERO-ROUNDUP.

Never in working, for obvious reasons, did we say we wanted Anglo-Am forces to overrun the Balkans. However, I felt we should get in Europe before the Russians. I told them several times--Hopkins, Harriman, Eisenhower. They said Russians our ally, so we couldn't do it, they didn't agree. I always felt Marshall agreed with us on need of forestalling Russians by getting into Continent early. He was not taken in by Russians.

After Casablanca, Marshall and I were supposed to go to Moscow. Soviets wouldn't let us. That is when I went to Brisbane and Chungking.

Marshall had a clear concept of overall strategy before Gerow left. How could we have drawn up victory program without a plan.

We had poorly defined national aims, but definitely had idea of going into Europe first. Also, although this was unsaid, we had the idea of occupying the important places first. We always had a political concept.

Navy officers had read more widely in general than had the army officers. Navy people more rank-conscious. (Somewhere in here he said Stark was a weak sister).

Two and half years in Germany had pointed up the dangers of communism for me. I found how Russians had never kept any agreement. I found we recognized them on the basis of a number of agreements in 1933 and they broke every agreement.

I criticized British strategy in 1938-39. I believed if Castlereagh, Palmerston, Pitt or Disraeli had been prime minister; they would have not guaranteed territorial integrity of Poland. They knew they didn't have the wherewithal as Chamberlain and Churchill knew. Thinks these older statesmen would have stayed out, realizing (I gave this dope to the British intelligence officer-- Hatblock or Hotblock) there were two things drilled into the Germans: Drang nach Osten was one. I am sure Disraeli would have evaluated this. They should have let the Germans go east. Germans didn't want to fight to British. Hitler felt inferior to British. British had been lenient over German colonies. Germans had great respect for French army (I got this from Beck). Beck said French had best army in Europe. Beck was pro-British and pro-democracy. He resigned over Czechoslovakia.

Disraeli would have said Churchill was no strategist. You can start at Gallipoli and see his mistakes. His overall influence on our strategy was great. Brooke no great strategist. Morgan said he was unsound.

In 1941 I was worried until the Germans attacked the Russians. After the Russians got in, I said Gen Marshall take advantage of this. Use this powerful ground force as soon as possible. Raise a force for invasion.

He spoke of Robert E. Wood. Fine man. Good person. That Jew of Sears, Roebuck liked him. Gave him a job. I spoke in Chicago once. He had 10-12 people to meet me. Someone asked about Marshall. Before I could answer, he said Marshall is a god damned liar. All the businessmen there will remember that. This is the thing which conditions view of Marshall. I defended him.

Hurley claims he had me selected. Marshall had promised me a command. That was it.

Gen Marshall asked me in China if I would like to be Ambassador. I said all right, but would like to have it held to a year. Didn't want to get out of Army. He recommended me. Then I was told I

was to have the job. I came back and bought \$800 worth of clothes at Brooks Brothers. Thinks I would never have worn otherwise. Morning coat. Marshall sent word back that news of army appointment was out. Said Communists objected. Thing was dropped. Communists shouldn't be able to pass on American appointments. (Acheson told me to send the bill to him. I bill and clothes. He sent clothes back and they are upstairs).

I got to know Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-Lai pretty well. Have some rugs they gave me. Chou very pleasant and charming. Couldn't trust him. I told people they were indoctrinated in Marxism. Couldn't trust them

(Some handwritten notes by Dr. Pogue written on the lower half of this sheet.)