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Tanks # 49

July 26th, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Tank Production.

In response to your direction concerning production of tanks, the Ordnance Department will apply the utmost pressure to attain maximum output. The priority rating for tanks is not a high one, being subordinate to most of the Navy program and also to the aircraft program. Nevertheless, it is expected that by vigorous measures the production of medium tanks can be brought to 1,000 a month by the date you mention, April 1942.

1. Schedule for balance of 1941.

The schedule for the rest of the year 1941, on both medium tanks and light tanks, has been stepped up, due to increased pressure on our contractors and to improved control of the production program.

<u>Month</u>	<u>Medium Tanks</u>	<u>Light Tanks.</u>
August	100	250
September	150	270
October	250	290
November	350	300
December	<u>500</u>	<u>310</u>
Total	1,350	1,420

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Of the 1,350 medium tanks, 537 are estimated to come from contractors working on British orders, and 813 from contractors on our own orders. All light tanks are from our own orders, the British having placed no orders for light tanks.

See # 1728 for President's letter

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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July 26th, 1941.

2. Recommended deliveries to British.

I recommend that on the estimated 1,350 medium tanks the British take the 537 to be produced on their own orders, together with 163 produced for us -- 700 in all. The remaining 650 would be for our own Army. / On the light tanks, I recommend that we turn over 760 to the British, leaving 660 for equipment of our own troops.

We now have four armored divisions, and two more are in course of formation. We also have a number of separate tank battalions. There is equipment on hand for only two of the six divisions. The quantities of medium tanks and light tanks recommended to be retained for our own troops are required for equipment of the other four divisions and the separate battalions. The training of these troops will be seriously impaired if they are not promptly provided with equipment.

HENRY L. STIMSON

Secretary of War

DISPATCHED FROM O.A.S.W. 7/29/41

JUL 31 1941



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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 14, 1941

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have your letter and report relative to the increase of the output of tanks. I appreciate the speed and decisiveness with which the Department moved in regard to this matter and I am sure that Mr. Patterson and General Wesson will get out the tanks.

I think it is very important that we increase to the very limit the number of light tanks during the coming months from existing facilities and that the medium tanks reach the peak production, if possible, by April 1, 1942. Obviously the increase before January 1 should in the main go to the British, because of their very great necessity.


I wish you would send me, first, a schedule of the maximum number of tanks that could be built by months between now and January 1, using every possible device to speed up production, and, secondly, your recommendation as to the division of those tanks between ourselves and the British from July 1, 1941 to January 1, 1942.

Very sincerely yours,

*Franklin D. Roosevelt*

The Honorable  
The Secretary of War.

JUL 15 1941



WAR DEPARTMENT  
ADMINISTRATIVE

JUL 15 1941

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY  
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W. A.

See # 1730  
for reply

Tanks # 48

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