

Tape 68, Copy 2

GENERAL JACOB L. DEVERS

August 12, 1958

Fairchild Aircraft Corp. Office in Alexandria

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THIS IS AN INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL JACOB L. DEVERS, FORMERLY COMMANDER OF THE SIXTH ARMY GROUP IN EUROPE, LATER HEAD OF THE FIELD FORCES IN THE UNITED STATES, AT HIS OFFICE IN ALEXANDRIA, FAIRCHILD AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, by FORREST C. POGUE ON AUGUST THE 12TH, 1958.

Q: Gen. Devers began by saying that his two favorite generals of the war were Gen. Marshall and Gen. MacArthur. He thought both of them were very fine men and very great leaders. I said since he knew both of them I'd like for him to tell me something about Gen. MacArthur to start with. So the first part of this interview has to do with Gen. MacArthur. He begins by telling a story of how, when Gen. MacArthur was at West Point as Commandant after World War I, there were some adverse reports when he went there and he had Gen. Devers to do something about cleaning it up. It begins with that story.

A: And so I said, well I don't care for a cigarette. He says take a cigarette; so I took it and he lit it for me and then he paced up and down, up and down, and a most brilliant conversation it was. Well, it ends up by turning to me and saying, "Here is an inspector's report. I want you to clean this job up; I'll give you 10 days, and I'll inspect you." Well, he came down in 10 days and I had lots of things swept into the closets; I had it as clean as it could be done in 10 days. He walked out, congratulated me, and I said, "General, I don't want you to think I don't have a lot of things hidden under, in closets around here." He says, "I know." [laughter] And that's the last I heard from him about my detachment in the three years that I was under him there.

Q: This was 1919...

A: 1919, '20 and '21.

Q: You hadn't been with him during the war.

A: No; I hadn't been with him during the war. And during this period he sent for me - and one other incident that shows how he handled you. I went into his office and he did the same thing; and he walked up and down talking about various items and he said, "You're in charge of the baseball team." I said, "But, General I don't want to be in charge of the baseball team. I've got a tremendous job and you've got a fine young officer, Mike Mitchell, who was brought up when I was here before. I had been in charge of the baseball team before and we'd never lost a Navy game. We had a wonderful coach, Sandy Strangnickolin. He said, "You're in charge of the baseball team and your mission is to win the Navy game." So, I shut up; and I went out of there; and I came back 48 hours later and I said, "General, you gave me a mission two days ago and I've been thinking it over. We just hired Hans Lobert as a coach and he's a fine coach, at \$3,000 a year. That's \$9,000. That's a lot of money. But since you gave me a mission, I would like to know whether I can go after my old coach Sandy Strangnickolin - I don't know whether I can get him." He said, before I could say a word, he said, "You get on the train tonight. What's \$9,000 to us? Go get him." Well, I said "I don't want to get on the train tonight. I don't know where he is. I'd like to have a little time on this." To make a long story short, I didn't get Sandy Strangnickolin, but we won the Navy game. That's just the way he handles you. I always liked the way he went after me and that's the way Marshall handled me - very much the same way.

Q: Were you with Gen. MacArthur after your West Point tour?

A: No, I was stationed at Ft. Myer in command of the 16th Field Artillery and he was Chief of Staff and I probably saw Gen. MacArthur five times during the time I was there. Another interesting thing is, when he left there, I happened to be in command of the post because the commanding officer was on leave, and he said, "You go in and see Gen. MacArthur when he leaves, and give him a sendoff." He said, "He's turned me down, but that doesn't mean you can go in there." The Commanding Officer was Kenyon Joyce - a very fine commanding officer - and he'd gone abroad on a visit. So, I called up and got an appointment with Gen. MacArthur over in the State-War-Navy Building and I thought I had been there about five minutes, and I walk in there and he gets up, puts his arm around me and walks me up and down the office, and we talked about West Point and what we had accomplished at West Point - he being the one that did it, but I was there. Finally I got across to him what I was there for. We talked an hour. He said, "I don't want you to do anything. You just order the enlisted men out if they don't want to do it." I said, "No, General I am not ordering out any enlisted men. The enlisted men who will be there will be the old sergeants and the band and they have come to me and asked to do this; and I want to do it, and I want to do it my way." And he went on to something else. So I went ahead and did it. He came out of his quarters about nine o'clock, put his mother in the car - nine P.M. this was--at night. We had the band there. We had the cavalry on one side in their blues and yellows and the artillery on the other side with their red on horses and we had the band playing. He walks around and talks to this young, this group of officers and sergeants - enlisted men - and - the band for about 15 minutes, and it was certainly a brilliant speech. He gave us that attention and then he got in his car and away he went. Well that's, that's the way I was with him.

Q: Were you at Myer at the time of the Bonus March.

A: No, yes, no, I was on duty in Washington at that time.

Q: Because Gen. Patton was over there.

A: Gen. Patton was over there and Gen. Patton was over there at this time. But I was on duty in Washington at that time in the Chief's office. I didn't even know the Bonus March was on.

Q: Of course, Gen. Eisenhower was in on that.

A: Yes, he was in on it, because you see, Gen. Ike owes a lot to Gen. MacArthur. No matter what anybody says, he owes a lot to Gen. MacArthur. Gen. MacArthur selected Ike Eisenhower and a fellow by the name of Jimmy Ord and took them with him out to the Philippines because they were two brilliant young men; and they were brilliant. Ord as you know got killed in an airplane accident. Ike had something happen, came back, fortunately, and went on. But I'm sure that Ike did the research work for a lot of the things for MacArthur. He was very capable at that time, and a young officer, and that's where Ike was so close to George Patton, because George Patton was at Myer, as you say, and that little group worked together quite a little.

Q: I suppose he was with Gen. MacArthur what, six or seven years, wasn't he?

A: George Patton?

Q: No, Gen. Eisenhower.

A: Oh, yes, I'm sure he was.

Q: Because he was here for a full tour.

A: A tour and pret'near a full tour out in the Philippines.

Q: I've been told that Ord was a very fine man...

A: Very fine.

Q: And a very brilliant man. Did they name a Fort Ord after him, or Camp Ord?

A: I believe so. I'm not sure. Ord is an old Army family; might be a Civil War Ord.

Q: Well, while we are on Gen. MacArthur: since you are one of those who are friendly to both he and Gen. Marshall, were you ever aware, back in the '20s, of any particular feud between the two men. Now, in late years people are trying to stir up controversy and have tried to say that there was an old feud between the two men.

A: I never knew of any feud. Now you talk about the 1920s; I didn't know Gen. Marshall in 1920. I knew him by reputation. I knew he was a very brilliant young officer in the First World War and I followed him around a little bit from where he went. But Gen. Marshall didn't really know me either until, well I don't know what year, but anyhow it happened when he was commandant at Benning and I was a pencil pusher in the G-3 section of the Chief of Field Artillery's office, about the third degree down, and I was sent down there to maneuvers. And Gen. McCoy, who is another officer I admire greatly, was the corps commander of that corps area with headquarters in Atlanta, and he was running the maneuver. Gen. Marshall was running this Infantry School. And it just had happened that, oh, two years before, or maybe three years before, when Gen. McCoy had been made a brigadier general, he'd been sent to Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to take a course for, I think 30 days. I was the gunnery man. I had the gunnery department and every afternoon I took Gen. McCoy out to the firing point to let him fire, and be present while he was doing it, and brought him back and talked to him; and I got to know him quite, quite well. He didn't stay one month, he stayed three months, so that when I'm standing with this fringe of officers out on the old First Division road at Ft. Benning, Georgia, Gen. McCoy spots me in that group. I was only a major. And he sends for me; and I go over there and he introduces me to Gen. Marshall. Later I go to call on Gen. Marshall, officially, in his office and I had some very good questions that I wanted to ask him: one was...he was then trying to teach them how to use maps without any names or numbers on them, you see, and putting a lot of new ideas into these fellows' heads - how do you write an order when here is just a map? And he explained all these things to me; and that's about the first time that I really got to know Gen. Marshall.

Q: Oh, so you hadn't met him during the First War?

A: I hadn't met him at all during the First War. And then, if you go on from there, complete this and then stop...I was in Panama; I was ordered from West Point. I'd been sent back to West Point as graduate manager of athletics under Gen. W.D. Connor and later Gen. Benedict; and I was graduate manager of athletics. And I also received, in addition to that job, the additional duty of officer in charge - executive for fiscal affairs. So, I really had all the money up there for

General W. D. Conner, who I consider a very fine officer also, and who did a tremendous amount. He's right here in Washington.

Q: Is he in good health? Do you think I could talk with him?

A: Oh, yes, you could talk to him and he'd be glad to talk to you. A lot of people are afraid of Gen. Connor but, and I think he called me a moron once a week. But I think I deserved it; I used to walk out of there and say, well I never realized how stupid I could be. Under those two - from there I was then ordered as Chief of Staff to the Panama Canal Zone by Malin Craig. And I went down on the WOODROW WILSON and on board was a medical officer by the name of Clay Stayer. Now he's up...I don't know whether you've talked to him, but Clay Stayer is up here at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He's a retired medical officer - major general - and I'll bring him into this picture a little bit because he fits...

Q: Isn't Morrison's place there?

A: Yes, that's right. He was on board as a medical officer going down to help us straighten out a very...one of the jobs I found that I was going to have was the medical situation of the Panama Canal Zone between the Canal and the Army; and Clay Stayer had been Gen. Marshall's - had Four section. He'd taken a medical officer and put him in charge of his Four section, which was the logistics section at the Infantry School, for some reason which I don't know. And I remember standing on the bridge as we went down there. I had never met Stayer before. We were talking about what was going to happen and who were going to be the next general officers, and I said, "Well, I see my great friend, Joe Stilwell, is coming back from the Philippines - from China, and is going to retire." I said, "It's too bad, because I think Joe would have made a fine general officer." Joe Stilwell had taught me Spanish at West Point and was head coach of the basketball team of which I was captain; and I admire Joe Stilwell no end; he knew how to get the most out of me. And Clay Stayer says to me, "I bet you he doesn't retire and I bet the first general officer that Gen. Marshall makes will be Joe Stilwell." And by golly, the next morning we look at the bulletin board and there it is - he's the number one man on it. Now that's an interesting story, too, in this thing. Well, when I was in Panama, Gen. Marshall flew down there shortly after he was Chief of Staff, and that was a feat in those days; it was a long ride through the air - not too sure you were going to get there, I guess. We of course were right on our toes. I hadn't been there very long but I had a ride with Gen. Marshall, and the first man that wanted him was Bert Dard, who commanded the Air Force. So he, I'm sitting back of Gen. Marshall and he's sitting up in the co-pilot's seat and Bert Dard's flying this, I forget the kind of plane, but he's flying it around pointing out this and that, you know, and we're going through these clouds and other fighters are going by us, and I'm a little nervous; it was raining. And all of a sudden Gen. Marshall looks down on the Atlantic side, and he says, "What's that ditch down there." I said it's a water line. And he said, "Where does it go - where does it start and where is it going? When I ask you a question, give me a full answer." Gee, I was sunk; and when we got out, we got out in the rain, and I could see he was nervous and I kept in the background from that time on. I thought, "Oh, boy. You're through." [chuckles] Well, I believe I was one of the first general officers that Gen. Marshall made. I was the youngest at the time. And I was ordered, I was told that I was going to remain in Panama; and then all of a sudden, out of a clear sky, secret orders come in 1940. I don't the exact dates, but around June or July. I was told to take the first transport and proceed back and report to the Department of the Army. I could get nobody to tell

me what this was about. My friends heretofore had given me information and they'd say nothing about this. So, I took off and I arrived back in New York. When I got into the harbor of New York, a courier came aboard with a letter from Gen. Marshall. It said, "The duty for which you were ordered back here no longer exists. You will report to me in Washington and I will explain." I may not have these words exact but this is the substance of it. He said, "You're going to command the military district of Washington for the time being", period. So, I go to Washington. Well, it seems that what happened...Woodering had come down to the Panama Canal Zone with a group to inspect it in the intervening months and I had been in the background with them while they went around. In fact they'd come down there in '39. I hadn't been there long either. Then he had gone back to Washington and he had said to Gen. Marshall and this is what Gen. Marshall told me in his office later, "You were brought back here as Woodering's liaison officer. He wanted a young general officer. He wanted you to come here. That was no job for you and I told him so, but he insisted. So you were ordered back for that purpose. You and I would have had some difficulties, I'm sure, in such a position, but", he said, "in the meantime, Mr. Stimson is the new Secretary of War, so that job no longer exists." [chuckles] Well, that was my first introduction to Gen. Marshall there. I went downstairs, and I had the job of building the first security around that building; and I had a tremendous number of little jobs representing the Secretary of War, going to maneuvers, opening the Pennsylvania Turnpike and things of that sort. And then, now, am I proceeding...what you'd like to get? I'm giving it just the way I remember it.

Q: Yes, this is good because once I know where to look...

A: You can check the documents.

Q: I can check documents. There are too many of them for me to...

A: There may not be any documents on some of these. [chuckling] I don't know. At noon I sat down...Oh, one other thing came up: we were worrying about burying Gen. Pershing about this time, and one of the documents on my desk as commanding general of the Military District of Washington was a lot things like this. And I called in my Chief of Staff - that was another Smith, he just died, here...

Q: Oh yes, I remember reading...

A: I said that I'd better go up and talk with Gen. Marshall about this and he said, "If you go up there you'll get thrown out and probably be relieved." [laughing] So, I didn't do that. I studied that thing pretty well and, of course, that came up many years later. But, I was sitting there with my, relaxed as I am here, and the telephone rang and it was Gen. Marshall. He said, "You report upstairs to the Five section and they'll tell you what you're to do." "Yes sir." So I hung up the phone, I go up there, and they said, "You have been appointed temporarily to a board of experts - the President's board of experts on selecting air and naval bases. And you're to proceed within, you're to report at once to Adm. Greenslade, who is head of this board, over in their board room, and probably take off within two hours for Bermuda. Now, we've been told to brief you about Bermuda." So, they proceeded to brief me about Bermuda. Well, I listened about Bermuda. And I had never been to Bermuda. But I had just read the Reader's Digest within the past six hours and it had a story in it about Bermuda. And it said the island was 21 miles long and ½ a mile wide, that it had no water - they caught it all from the skies and put it in basins - and it gave a lot

of detail. So while they were briefing me they were putting two and three divisions there and heavy guns on that little old island and I said, "Wait a minute. Where're you going to get the water? Where're you going to put these people?" Well, then I listened. I left there; I went over to meet Adm. Greenslade - and he was a very fine person and a good man for this kind of a job - and the other members of this board. Major Gen. Harry Maloney was to be the other member of this board and he was to meet me and he did meet me over there; I think there was one marine and the rest were naval officers. And Adm. Greenslade briefed us very promptly and said, "We expect to take off within two hours and fly down to Norfolk and get aboard the ST. LOUIS and go to Bermuda." Oh yes: one thing they told me over in the Five Section...I said, "When you're sitting on this board, you have a temporary appointment and you can't make any decisions or enter into any real discussions," I said, "Well, why do you send me?" "Well, that's the way it is." So after I had this pleasant conversation with Adm. Greenslade, I said, "Well now, Admiral, I'm only temporary on this board, apparently; do you understand that?" He said, "No, I would like to know whether you are going to be the permanent member or who is going to be the permanent member", and I said, "Yes sir." So I hustled back through those long halls; they were over in the Navy Building and then over in the Munitions Building and up to Gen. Marshall's office I go, and you know his door was always open. I walked in there and I said, "I received a telephone call from you about 3 hours ago and I'm supposed to be on my way to Bermuda to select air and naval bases on some board. Am I a temporary or permanent member? Adm. Greenslade wants to know." He said, "Well," he said, "You're a permanent member. We were thinking about, might need an engineer, but you are a permanent member." I said, "I'm going to have to have an air officer with me on the air bases. I do know something about air bases; I built one at West Point so I know a little bit about it, but I really ought to have an expert." He said, "Take that man right outside the door, Griffis." He could have killed me later. That's the way Gen. Marshall operates.

Q: Just take him right on.

A: Yes, and, well, I said, "How do I get him on this board?" He says, "That's your problem." He said, "It's the President's board, the President's board of experts." So, out I go and I got a telephone call and we weren't going to leave for two days. That gave me a little chance to do it. So I called Adm. Greenslade and went over and saw him, and asked him how I could get Griffis to go along as an expert for Maloney and I and he said, "Well, let's go in and talk to Adm. Stark." We went in to see Adm. Stark, and Adm. Stark says, "Well, you'll have to go see the President." Also, he said something else; he says, "Are you the Devers that wrote a memorandum that I just received here from Panama." I said, "If it's got six lines in it it's me." He said, "Well it's certainly short and to the point." We had been ordered to go into Panama on a war footing. Close one side of the locks. That meant that we had to put booms out on the Atlantic side and we didn't know whether we had all of this stuff. So when we went to carry out the plan, we didn't have it. The Marines were supposed to be there to get on the boats; they didn't have the Marines to do it. We had to put Army people on them and train them. When we had to have boats to patrol the minefield, they didn't have them; so, I had to use the Coast Artillery Fleet and this was a very short thing showing the mix-up of command. It said, for instance, I knew in the naval side of this picture the Admiral down there commanded the district. Only he commanded the Navy ashore; he didn't command the ones that were in the water. We had a special fleet under Adm. Wilcox; it reported to the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Stark, in Washington. We had patrol squadrons - air - they reported to the head of the fleet and sometimes he was in San Diego and sometimes he was in the Hawaiian Islands. This

memorandum simply said we should have unified command down here and no matter who it was, we should have it. So anyhow, to get back to the story---so then I walked out of there and I said, well how in the devil does a young guy like me see the President? Well, I happened to remember that I had a friend over there by the name of Pa Watson, who was the aide, and also, I had, his secretary had been the secretary to a long list of aides around there and had helped me once run a polo ball here to collect money for the polo people. So, I called her, and I hadn't talked to her for five years, and she said, "I'll get a hold of Gen. Watson", she said, "Come on over here and in the meantime we'll think up how we'll get you into this thing." So, when I arrived at the door I was met by the Chief of Detectives there - he's dead now - but, I had known him because I had been with the President around various places, posts, and when he'd come in, he said "Come on in here, and tell me what your problem is." So I told him what my problem was. So, he says, "Come on." He goes up to Watson's door and he opens it and he says, "Pa, you're wanted out in the powder room." Watson's in here, "Yes, Mr. Congressman, yes, Mr. Senator." He comes walking out and he goes out in the powder room and I tell Pa my problem. And he said, "Well, that ought to be easy." So he walks back, walks in there, and I don't know whether the President was in there, but anyhow I don't think he had very much time to walk in there and to walk out. He came out and said, "The President said you can have Griffis as your aide on this and that you're a permanent member of this board." And that's the way it was settled. That was my first experience with Gen. Marshall.

Q: This was after the destroyer...

A: Yes. This was the 90 destroyer deal. We went to Bermuda; and then we came back and we made a report; and we went up to Newfoundland and we selected our naval bases up there. We went to Guantanamo, Cuba, too on these trips.

Q: Let's see, now Trinidad was brought in on that.

A: Yes, Trinidad came in a little later. Then we went down on the Trinidad trip.

Q: But you were picking out bases that you were going to ask for. Is that it?

A: We were, yes, we were locating them, definitely, air and naval bases. And we were trying together because at that time we thought maybe they would have to retreat back to this line; and if they did, the Army would have to guard the naval bases and so we didn't want the naval base one place and the army establishments another. So it was a coordinating job. There's a long story on the bases. It was well done, very harmoniously led by Adm. Greenslade. When I came back to Washington I went into the RG-4 section and got an engineer assigned to this job. We had with us a civilian naval engineer by the name of Bragg who was very fine and helpful, before I got our engineers. We went down into Georgetown, St. Lucia. We selected all of those stops we made with the ST. LOUIS and with patrol planes and as far as I know we had to come back to Bermuda and we put the base then where I wanted to put it. The Navy, because the Navy then decided to move their base up into St. George's Harbor is it, I guess?

Q: Now, were the British along on this too?

A: Oh no, the British had nothing to do with all this, except that they met us there and we got cooperation from them - let's put it that way - but we had quite a problem in Trinidad.

Q: But you were allowed to pick your own bases.

A: Yes sir. Well we, what we did, as a matter of fact we got Juan Trippe with Pan-Am and got his engineers. We were put in touch with him and we got his engineers and contacted them - they'd made one of these surveys. So we used all the data that they had as a study. Then we talked to the British; and from that we knew where to look. And I took the Air part of it and the ground part, and Maloney on the Army side would go in and talk about the logistics side from people's viewpoint, and of course the Navy were interested only in their Harbor establishment; but we did a fine job. And I said, I had some experience here and I don't want to use this word "I" too much because after all it wasn't the deal, but nevertheless it was my responsibility. I'd been, at West Point one of my jobs was to get a lot of extra land around West Point. So I ran into a problem called "meets and bounds." I'd studied it once; and I found none of these "meets and bounds" ever were where they were supposed to be. In fact some of West Point was in Highland Falls and some of Highland Falls was in West Point. And I knew what a terrific job it was to plow through those things, and if we got into any argument, in any way, with the authorities on the ground about "meets and bounds" we'd never get it. So I said, "Forget the "meets and bounds"; just let's get what we want. Then we'll go back to Washington, make our report and then they can send you, Harry Maloney, or somebody else, and I'm going to recommend you from our side, and you can get these "meets and bounds" straightened out." Now Harry Maloney can tell you a lot about that because he did go to England and Churchill settled that whole business of "meets and bounds", and after they'd been sitting around there for quite a few months, with a telephone call - that's the way they finished it. In the meantime we were building these bases. Well, finally I came back from this deal to Washington and Gen. Marshall sent for me and he said, "I'm going to send you down to Bragg to command the 9th Infantry Division and build that post. It's three months behind schedule, and, when can you go; when can you get off of this board?" I said, "General, I don't think I can get off this board; but if I'm going to Bragg, I can fly up there and work with Adm. Greenslade and anything he wants; and I'm sure he'll give permission for me to do it. I'd just like your orders to send me to Bragg. I'll guarantee there'll be no trouble about the other part because Maloney and I can handle it." We then had an engineer by the name of Arthur, and we had our section pretty well broken in. So I went to Bragg and I couldn't get on the post. It took me three hours to get on the post; I got there just at 5 o'clock. I sent my aide ahead because the traffic coming out...well. Gen. Marshall had made a small statement; you know that's just the way he was - he'd just say, "Go down and let me know." And he'd back you up. He would back you to the hilt. So I called together the people the next morning after they got through with all of these flurries and things you have to go through to be received on a post, and sat down with the construction quartermaster and the engineer-architect and the contractor; and I spent, oh, 24 hours going over the situation. I said, "Well, I'm interested in only one thing: roads. How do you get the people in and out of here; who are these workmen?" "Well they're from North Carolina; they're the people that are on the farms. This is the approaching winter and they have work. So they're all in here and they bring their hammers and saws and that's the way we're going." But the engineer-architect was a man from Charlotte, North Carolina, and he had a reserve commission in the engineer corps, and his name was Peace [?]; and the contractor's name was Loving and Co. from another part of North Carolina - I'll think of it in a minute - and they were quite frank about what the problem was. They said, "We want to build these roads but we can't get authority." I said, "How about this." They had pointed it out. "How soon can you get that road in?" Well, they said, "If we put our bulldozers on it and have no interruptions and you give us the go-ahead, why, we'll have it in Monday morning. This

is the week that we're going to work over the weekend and work round-the-clock." I said, "That is what I want done." The construction quartermaster says, "You haven't got the authority to do that. Where are you going to get the money?" I said, "Before we get through this morning there's going to be so much money spent here it won't make any difference. [laughs] We'll get the authority." And they went ahead and we opened up that post and to make a long story short, we got up on schedule, we got that division trained properly, and I had, probably, my first experience there with public relations. I was invited up to Raleigh, the Daniels brothers'. The old man was then the ambassador to Mexico, but he had sent a cable up there that he wanted...

Q: Josephus.

A: Josephus. ...he wanted to get together on this. So they invited me to a dinner up there with his staff and with about 20 of my staff. And we went up there, and when I sat down at that table I had the out-going governor on one side of me and the in-coming governor on the other. And Huey was the out-going - going to be a senator and he was a great talker and, oh boy, could he pour it on and on the other side - I've got to think of his name, too...They're both dead - and he was a talker. And here I am; I'd never done anything like this and we are talking to the whole state of North Carolina. But I got up and just stated what my problems were and I got away with it and I really got a lot of help from the state of North Carolina from that time on. I bring up the point because if you work with the communities and the road problems, meet them half-way, they just came through no end.

Q: Of course, a lot of your help came from knowing that as long as you produced you had the backing of the War Department.

A: Well I did; and I had the backing right from Gen. Marshall. That was one of my great lucky pieces. It will come up a little later. Now at Bragg we were harassed and there's a long story about Bragg, but most of it is about me and not Gen. Marshall so I'll omit it, and what we did down there. But anyhow, we did the job and we did it well and we fought for paint and we did a lot of things. And I'm sitting there one day - he'd sent for me, and had me come up and testify on the draft, and I had to fly up in a rain storm. He just called me up one night and said, "Get up here. Tomorrow morning you've got to testify on this. We've got to get this draft across." Well, I did that and got a favorable reception and I'm sitting there, and he calls me on the phone and he said, "Is anybody listening on this phone?" And I said, "Well, if they are they're off, General." He said, "I want you to get in your plane this afternoon" - this was at noon he called me - "and, fly to Ft. Knox, Kentucky", he said. Now some of this might have to be eliminated but, he said, "Chaffee's dying, and I don't want to announce it right now but I'm going to put you in command of the Armored Force. I want you to go down to Ft. Knox and find out what the trouble is and spend as much time as you want. Then fly into Washington here and tell me what the trouble is; and in the meantime we'll get your status cleaned up and decide what we've got to do." Well, I did that and I found a pretty bad mess down there.

Q: Chaffee had been dying for 6 or 7 months.

A: He'd been dying for pret'near a year. He had lucid intervals. He had a cancer and some of his staff was running the post.

Q: He'd been a very brilliant General, hadn't he?

A: I think that Chaffee is one of the finest, brilliant - as fine and brilliant an officer as you would want, and a hard working one. An old army family; he just worked himself to death.

Q: He had trouble with his lungs.

A: He had cancer and lung trouble. I never did know, really, what the trouble was, but I do know that staff of his hadn't been doing so well. Gen. Marshall had, of course, been getting reports. I went into this cold. I wasn't a tanker. I was training an infantry division.

Q: I started to ask a while ago if you had cavalry background.

A: No sir. I'm an artilleryman all the way through and I don't know - Gen. Marshall'll have to tell you why they plucked me. But I think he gave me a choice and my choice was the Armored Force. I had studied this thing and had talked it over with Van Voorhis who had been what I call the grandfather of the Armored Force. They called Chaffee the father. I always called Van Voorhis who worked for Chaffee, really - was much senior to him - but he was the guy in the field when Chaffee was on the staff. And I had worked for Chaffee in writing text books as a part-time job in the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery when Chaffee was in the G-3 section. Now that's the contact; and I admired Chaffee greatly.

Q: But you think probably that Gen. Marshall picked you because of the job you'd done cleaning up Bragg.

A: I think so; or somebody must have recommended me. I really don't know why he did, except...

Q: It always helps me to know how he went about picking the people that he got to do his jobs.

A: Well, he might even go back to Gen. McCoy on this thing. I've got a suspicion that Gen. McCoy was pretty close to Gen Marshall. Now I don't know that.

Q: Well, He was under McCoy in Illinois later.

A: McCoy is a wonderful person. He had wonderful experiences, you know, in Nicaragua and he always was willing to talk to me as a younger man. That's where I gained a lot of information on how you try to be tactful and at the same time to get things done. So it may be that Gen. Marshall - McCoy might have been it. I don't know. I just know that it started with that board. First, I guess, Panama - something that I must have done in Panama that I thought was all wrong must have been right; or something that hit him. Anyhow, it worked out that way, and of course you know the history of the Armored Force hasn't been told either. It's all been told on one side. There was nothing down there, except...in fact there was just one man in the organization. There were a lot of fine officers down at Benning; Patton was down there, and Crittenger, and a group up at Knox, but there was a whole lot to be done and they didn't have any hardware. They were running around like cavalymen with a light tank, small gun. So that took a lot of doing: first to find out what ought to be done, what could be done, and then do it. And in that I frequently talked to Gen. Marshall; sometimes to Mr. Stimson. So, I suspect that Gen. Marshall talked to Mr. Stimson and suggested that he talk to me. Certain staff things went on. Now, what I'm saying now I wouldn't want published because they're surmises. But anyhow, Chief of Ordnance, new Chief Signal Officer, Bill Somervell had to come in there to clean up that job

and I certainly wouldn't say I had anything to do with getting Bill Somervell, but one of the first men that was called up to see Bill Somervell was Jake Devers. And Bill Somervell said in there, and he's a "can doer" and a man I admire greatly and gets things done - he leaves a little blood around once in a while [chuckling] - but he's there and I would never let anybody say anything about him. And he has one of these machines and all the time you are talking to him, and I said, "Well, Bill, what are you trying to do, get me in trouble?" He said, "No," he said, "I sent for you because I understand you have some ideas about this armored truck business." "Yes," I said, "I have; very definitely." "Well, what are they?" I said, "We've got to get the quartermaster and the ordnance - get rid of one of them. I don't care which one; give all this to one of them - ordnance or the quartermaster. Now it's your problem which one. That's number one." He said, "Which one would you give it to?" I said, "That's your problem." "Well," he says, "you be Bill Somervell." "All right; I'd give it to the ordnance. Next thing you've got to do is get it out of Aberdeen and the other place the quartermaster had it over there, and put it out in Detroit or Chicago - someplace where the people that are going to do this work can get to the man that's going to do it and don't have to come up to Washington, go back out, get no decisions and whatnot. Now that's the problem and I know it, because I'm struggling with it." Well as you know, Bill Somervell did just that and he did it quick, too, and from that time on we were able to get things done. I think the great thing there was that Gen. Marshall calls you on the phone; you call Somervell on the phone; you don't go through a lot of staff work. I point it up this way. One of the things or troubles they have in the Pentagon today, and the reason Gen. Marshall was a great and successful administrator, as well as a general, is the fact that he operated that way. He had a staff, yes. He listened to them, but he cut across their lines when necessary to get something done. And his directions to me were, "You're under me." He didn't put me under McNair or anybody else, thank goodness. I never would've gotten anything. Not that Lesly wouldn't have been alright - Lesly was a fine officer - but I'd have just had so many hurtles and I'd have run into Clark and a few more that would have been difficult. So, what I'd do when I'd come up to Washington for an administrative job that meant a lot to me - in the first place I never went up unless it did mean a whole lot to my command - I'd go to the staff first. I'm not going to give any names in this but they were pretty sticky and I said, "I'm not threatening. I don't want to be accused of it; but there's some way that I've got to tell you this. If you don't approve this normal staff procedure, and you've already turned it down once, then I'm going to go in to see Gen. Marshall and I am going to walk from here down there and it's going to take me 5 minutes and I'll walk in his office and he may talk to me in 5 minutes and he may talk to me in one; and you're going to get orders from Bedell Smith to do this very thing; and that's what's going to happen. So this isn't threatening. This is something that's going to happen." And they wouldn't hear. So I did it, and that's what happened, and I never had any more trouble. Of course, I think Bedell Smith was a fortunate choice for Gen. Marshall. He knew...I guess they knew each other pretty well. Bedell worked just the way Marshall wanted him to.

Q: And McNarney did, too.

A: And McNarney did, too.

Q: Somervell...all three of those...

A: All of them were that type of people. So from my viewpoint it worked fine.

Q: Now, was Gen. Handy less that way than the other three?

A: Well, Gen. Handy is a much more tactful, diplomatic fellow but just as forceful and much more sound than McNarney.

Q: Well McNarney could really leave the blood when he---

A: Oh, well he did it that way, you see, and he irritated everybody. McNarney was crude in lots of things he did. Now, he never crossed me up although he relieved me down in Italy; and I would say he just relieved me - that's it - I never heard any more from him until we came back together and I saw him. He is just cold-blooded, that's the way he operates; and he's a successful fellow, too, because he walks through it. He's got good judgment; I don't mean he's got bad judgment and he couldn't stay where he was.

Q: But he, apparently on a thing like reorganization, he was perfect to go through because you couldn't stop and say please and thank you or anything like that.

A: That's right. He made the decision - that was it. He made some mistakes, but all of us do that.

Q: But I gather that Gen. Marshall liked that about Somervell. He said, "It's a great pity you couldn't have talked to him because he knew so many of these answers." I gather the General, once he picked a man, didn't pay much more attention to it until there was something going wrong.

A: That's right. That's what he taught me. That's one of the things I always followed. I never took anything up to that office that I couldn't...if I could do it myself, I sure did. And I didn't ask the staff. And if they found it out afterwards... When you have a big command, and as you'll see he gave me plenty of responsibility, but he gave me the authority with it always. You'll find you've got to do that or you don't get anything done. And *only* do you go in if something has gone wrong; and then you go. If you're fighting and you've got a battalion that's got licked, you're up there where they're fighting to find out why they're not fighting and that's where you ought to be. There's no use to go where everything is running beautifully and find fault with somebody and stir them up. They're good; they're doing what you're doing, so they're busy. But if there's trouble and they need help, you go up and give them the help. Now that doesn't mean you go up and fire people. It means you go up and give them help and that's what Gen. Marshall always gave to me - help. I was sitting at Ft. Knox the same way I was at Ft. Bragg when the telephone rings about 11:00. I always used to say 11:00, and probably the 9th day of the month [chuckle], or something. And Gen. Marshall again says, "Is anybody listening on this phone?" I said, "No sir, if they are they're off." He says, "I want you to pack up. You're not going back to Ft. Knox. Come up to Washington immediately. Have you got a plane there?" I said, "No, my plane's in the west, General, but I can leave as soon as I can get a plane." He said, "You'll have a plane down tomorrow morning. You know Andrews was killed. I'm going to send you to England. That's all I can tell you over the phone." So, my wife has a good story about what happened then but, anyhow, I had to select two others to take with me and he says, "You can't say anything about this." My house was full of guests, and various things. I went down there; the Derby was just being run...

Q: I'm from Kentucky. I remember I was in Louisville when you were at Knox.

A: Yes, there's a wonderful story from my viewpoint. I still can go down to Louisville and I think it's the greatest thing.

Q: They remember you very pleasantly.

A: Oh, from that mayor on down, and [indistinct name], his assistant, the whole community down there turned out to help us, and they did. The relations are marvelous in Kentucky as far as I'm concerned - all over the state of Kentucky. They were in North Carolina. I had wonderful cooperation and help. Otherwise you never get these jobs done. You could go in to Wilson Wyatt, or call him on the phone, and he'd either come out and see you or you could go in there and you could get a decision from him like that. That's why I'd like to see that guy - he's politically minded - but I'd like to see him get in a job of responsibility.

Q: He's in the race for governor now and Broaddus is mayor.

A: Yes, Broaddus is mayor. Broaddus was the good, hard-working foot man that came out and smoothed things over, and then the Kentucky colonels had Ann Feldman. She's married now, told me, now, I guess. Anyhow, she did all the work and she liked to come out and help you with your social affairs and enter into this thing. So we just worked together - we do today. I hear from them. Anyhow he called me and I flew up to Washington. I had to decide who I was going to take with me and I called in my two aides. I had Earl Harmel, who was an air officer and had been flying me to and from Washington - a very fine young pilot, and I had an officer by the name of Shoemaker who was a Culver/Dartmouth boy - a young fellow - knew a lot of people from Louisville, and then I had Tristram Tupper. Now he may come into this story, in the Marshall family, and so I'd better say something about this. I was very, I was quite conscious public relations-wise and I could not get a good public relations man. Now when I went to Bragg I had a good one - I picked up one. He represented the Raleigh Courier Journal and he came into my office the first day I was there, and we had quite a talk, and I made a deal with him as I always do, if you want to call it that. Anyhow, I talked to him about how I'd like to operate. I said, "The post's yours. Of course I want you to give us the good side - anything you can; that'll be helpful to us and we'll progress faster. But if you get any dirty work around here, write your story, put it in the mail and then call me no matter what time and tell me what it is so that I can start cleaning it up before it breaks around my ears. Now is that a fair deal?" He said, "Certainly." I said, "If you'll work with us that way, I think that we can do a whole lot for the state of North Carolina, and certainly a whole lot for this command. And we've got many problems here, as you know, and we've got a lot of people coming down here nosing around, and all I want them to do is get the facts. I think we're going to do a good job. I think we've got the personnel to do it but it's going to take a lot of doing and we're going to make mistakes. Let's don't let the mistakes get too bad." Well, I took him with me out to Ft. Knox, and I'm not mentioning any names here again, and I then decided that I needed a man that knew a little bit more about this so I called Surles, who had been with me in the Armored Force, and I said, "I need a top-notch public relations man and I have nobody in mind that I know or can ask about it. Will you get me the best, young if possible but anyone, and send him out here?" He calls me back and he said, "I've got Tupper." He told me all about Tupper and he said, "Well the only thing about it is that he's a brother-in-law of Gen. Marshall's. I said, "Well that doesn't make any difference to me." I said it just that way and that quick. Well, Tris got his orders and then Gen. Marshall called me and he said, "Do you know who Tristram Tupper is?" And I said, "Well I was told that he was your, some relation to you, General, but that made, had no influence whatsoever in this assignment. I just want to know is a good enough man for this job and if he is, that's, I want him." So he came out there. He told me something about Tris, and Tris had a lot of

capabilities and stayed with me all up through the war and to the end of the war. And I saw him just before he died. He was a very fine, hard-working man.

Q: I was told that if you hadn't insisted that you knew him that he would never have gotten his star because the General was so determined that nobody would...

A: Well that's true. I had to fight like the devil to get him, to get Tris his star. As a matter of fact I think that thing hurt *me* to some extent. I used to say well doggone, Gen. Marshall's falling over backwards because of Tris Tupper. He had nothing to do with this. I, you sometimes felt that, gee whiz, poor old Tupper, he has a hard time here. He wasn't well then, but he was a thoroughly loyal, fine officer and he did everything that a public relations officer could do as far as I was concerned and certainly we got no favors because he was any relation to Gen. Marshall. That was just like throwing a red flag at somebody - you were through right quick.

Q: This just didn't happen. As a matter of fact, Gen. Haskell had him commissioned or brought him in; and the minute Gen. Marshall heard of it he said, "Now I want you to know about this, and I don't want you giving him anything because we are related." And Gen. Haskell said, "I don't see where you enter into this. This is the New York National Guard and we've got him because he's first-rate." But it must have been frustrating to be kin to him because the same thing happened with his, with her sons.

A: Well I had the same problem. See, I had both her sons.

Q: You had them, did you?

A: Yes. I can tell you about those. Maybe it's a good time to add it right in here; and that was an accident. The oldest son was in the 1st Armored Division, went through the school, took the course before I ever came to it. I didn't even know who he was. His name was Brown, so it wasn't Marshall. However, he went overseas with that outfit. He got into the fight and, as you know, they went into Anzio, and he was killed in Anzio. It was a very sad thing. He was killed in battle, doing his job and leading his platoon. The other boy had a foot infection. He was in the antiaircraft and this doctor, Clay Stayer that I'm talking about, knew all about him and had evidently been doctoring that foot down at Benning or something.

Q: Yes, he had an awful time with it.

A: And Clay Stayer told me about the younger boy being in one of my antiaircraft places down there and having some trouble with this foot and I said, "Is it a job that he can do?" And he said, "Yes, it's a job he can do and he's doing it well; and I'm just telling you this so you know that...something doesn't happen around here that oughtn't to happen. Now, I'm following this and I know all about him." So he went through the war and did a fine job.

Q: As a matter of fact he, this was one case where the General interfered. He wanted to go overseas and the General got him a waiver on the foot. Otherwise he wouldn't have gone over.

A: Well I guess that's the reason Clay Stayer came into this. Maybe that's the reason I got him, but I knew nothing about the details.

Q: The General said, "I don't mind intervening to get a man into his own combat when he wouldn't normally go, but I won't bring a man out..."

A: That's right.

Q: ... "because he's kin to me or anything else."

A: That was right, too. That's the way he operated. He was very strict about it even in our own organization. If a man took his son-in-law as an aide or general officer and he found it out – boy, I didn't believe in that either because it always created trouble. Gen. Marshall was thoroughly correct in that. He carried it a little too far, I think, sometimes, but he was thoroughly correct; it always caused trouble because when things went wrong you always had that family relationship - which was bad. And I wouldn't stand for it in my organization.

Q: It almost in some cases interfered with the normal promotion of the...

A: That's right; or suspicion of it; one or the other.

Q: And what Tupper got there was no more than - he was on your staff as theater commander, wasn't he, or...?

A: He was my public relations officer, and he was my head public relations officer. So I took Tristram Tupper with me. He was a bachelor. He'd been, he wasn't divorced at the time, or maybe he was. He had a son and a daughter visiting him down there. A very fine gentleman Tris was. And because he was free, I called him in. And so, those were the three men only that I took with me when I went up to Washington. And they flew up with me so that we could go over to England and start off. I needed a public relations officer. I had to build a complete, new staff in England and I go into Gen. Marshall's office. He....

Q: Now there are two questions right here. One is: were you ever given any information that he was trying to groom Andrews to lead the force which Eisenhower later on led. This has been suggested.

A: No.

Q: And two: did he give you any impression that he had you in mind for the job?

A: No. But I have this impression: that he had me in mind for the job before Andrews came up there. You see, I'd made a trip out there to inspect the 8th Army to get blooded [?] on tanks so I could talk with some authority, not just as a desk soldier. And I didn't tell you that story, so I might put that in here while I'm thinking about it. But in December, '42, I flew into Washington on the first day of December, went right into Gen. Marshall's office and said, "General, I've got this armored force pretty well running now, and at least for another two months there isn't much I can do and it's in good hands. I've got the staff formed and the training's going on and I want to go out and inspect the 8th Army." He says, "When can you take off?" He never let me finish to give the reason why I wanted to see it. "When can you take off?" I said, "Well I can't take off today but I can take off on the 15th of this month. I have a meeting with Barnes of Ordnance on some design work and I've got to meet with him and I want to, I can't, it won't be ready until the 10th. And, so, I would like to take off on the 15th." He says, "You go out there and get Sexton..."

Now there's a boy knows a lot, too and he's right there, and a smart one. He says, "You go out there and get Sexton and tell him to arrange it. So, he said, "Who are you going to take with you?" Well, I said, "I'm going to take an air officer and that's going to be my aide, Harmel, and I'm going to take Williston Palmer who's my artillery officer." He says, "Just a name to me. Why don't you take Ted Brooks." I said, "I'd like to take Ted Brooks." Ted Brooks had been the artillery officer, and I'd just made him a major general; and when I did, I had to, I gave him a division, you see. So that's the way Ted Brooks got on that trip, just like that. And...

Q: Excuse me, did you take Colonel Barker with you?

A: No, no. Barker was over there.

Q: He was already there.

A: He was already over there. I walk out and tell Sexton this. Sexton says, "I'm wondering, what are you up to?" And I says, "Oh, I'm up to something." And I told him what and he says, "Could you take me with you?" I said, "Yes, you write the report. I need a fellow like you to write a report and you also got the artillery background and you can look into the artillery side of this. Now these other two are on the armored side, so I'll get you on the other side; but you've got to get Gen. Marshall's permission." Well he got it. I let him get all of these details arranged and I went out, oh, about the 7th to meet in Detroit with Barnes of the Ordnance and - who was the Chief of Ordnance then? Leeb Campbell. He was another man came in was a great help to us, and changed what was needed in there, and did a great job - Leeb Campbell. And I'm, we're settling all these things there in that office and I said "I'm taking off to find out now something about these tanks out in the desert." I said, "I'm tired of being told that we don't know what we're talking about and they're fighting them. And they have the prestige, and they ought to they're fighting them - so I'm going to go out and I'm going to find out and I'm going to live with them," He said, "Can you take Barnes with you and send Leeb Campbell to me." I said, "Well yes. I can. I'd be glad to have Barnes. We need him because here we are fighting this design and where do we use machine guns and what caliber machine guns and you fellows are in this game. I think it would be a wonderful thing." Well he says, "You know, I tried to get Barnes over there and Marshall turned him down." I said, "All right, you go in and tell Gen. Marshall I'd like to have Barnes and give him these reasons. But you do it. Now don't have me carrying the ball." Which he did; and that's the way Barnes joined us. We took off on the 15th of August and went out there and inspected the 8th Army and Gen. Marshall gave me a great number of directions. Now, one of them was to, in Cairo to - Andrews was in Cairo - to talk to him about the Air Command. Of course I was going to see Alexander to talk to him about the relationship between the air and the ground and the theater. Then I was going up to the 8th Army and I was going to see Montgomery, and again I was to investigate this setup, and of course in that way I would see the air commander - I forget his name. Anyhow, those were some of my missions. Then I was to fly up and see Eisenhower. I told him I was going up to the front there to [?] He wanted - he gave me some little detail things there about armored divisions and so forth, which I was to talk to Ike about, and then I was going to inspect Patton's outfit back at Casablanca and then go to England and I was to look into the school system in England. And he also told me and evidently sent instructions over there - you may find that somewhere in his papers - that I was to meet certain people because I certainly met them. Now this was in January of '43, and in, at this time I had an idea that Gen. Marshall might've had me in mind to go to England.

Q: Of course he had in mind that he probably would command the...

A: Well, I'll tell you that story because I know it intimately - a side that you haven't got anywhere else because Stimson didn't write it either. And I can give you Stimson because this'll be something firsthand. That came later when I got to England. Anyhow, we crashed landed in Ireland. We got lost going from Gibraltar to England through stupidity of the navigator and finally we crash landed in Ireland with a B-17, and we sure ruined it...went through a stone wall but we all lived; and that's an interesting story but that's nothing to do with Marshall. Anyhow, the Irish let us escape to the north of Ireland and I got to England and London and then I made all these inspections and I came home, and during this time they were making these decisions. I think the reason they sent Andrews up there was because that was an air fight and Arnold was saying "You've got to have an air officer", and they sent Andrews there. Although I think he could have been selected for any one of these jobs. I think Frank Andrews, to me, was the outstanding airman of his day. He was a fine officer in every way, he was a hard worker, he had good balance, and I admired him greatly. I was just astounded when he flew into this mountain; but I told him when I saw him that that's what he was going to do - fly into a mountain - because he'd been, when he was down in Cairo he'd flow up to Tehran and gotten way up with no, had to go way above the...he was always flying instruments. He was one of the great instrument men and he had to go so high to get, go through the storms and whatnot that the - he didn't have oxygen - and he got in trouble there and got out of it; and I knew that story and I said, "You better take care." So he took off there, you know, and flew up there, when he shouldn't have. He was told not to do it. But he lost his staff, and so here I am going to England to build a staff. So I go in to see Gen. Marshall. First thing he does he invites me to dinner at his home at Ft. Myer that night. Second thing, he says, "Now who's your chief of staff? I think you ought to have an air officer." See, that's the reason I'm bringing this in. "Who do you want?" I said, "Well I don't know any air officers. I know [Straight?], someone I just know casually, but he'd be a good one." He said, "You take Idwal Edwards. He's my G-3, he's in London right now. You go out there and tell [pause] Sexton to call up his wife and tell her to pack his trunk locker and you take it on your plane, and to call up Idwal Edwards and tell him to stop right off there and get busy. He's going to be the new Chief of Staff." That suited me fine. I had met Idwal Edwards, too. And that's the way it happened. So we flew over there; we went by Iceland on the way out, to carry some mail. They hadn't had any mail so I flew in there in a snow storm, landed and got, and landed in England the next day. I had never met any kings and queens and prime ministers before in my life. Immediately I was looking for a British aide and there was one standing at my door that wanted the job. Name's Campbell - John Campbell, Scotchman, of the Grenadier Guards - and he'd been working over at the Embassy, was a colonel. So I said, "Fine, you know this protocol. You're going to keep me out of trouble?" "Yes sir." And he did. Well, I was introduced to that command in a hurry. Now Gen. Marshall, when we had dinner at Myer, briefed me in his way about everything that he could talk about. It was all new to me, what I was up against. But I got the general impression of what the strategy ought to be and how he felt about it, that he wasn't inflexible. He'd never been inflexible in dealing with me. He'd always been very flexible, strong and vigorous but if you came up with a reason, he'd shift. With the Armored Force that came up in the case, just one case that is very vivid to me, about a general officer. When I took over the Armored Force I inspected the few units I had. See, we expanded from two real divisions and two that were just forming to 16. Well one of these that was just forming was at Pine Camp, New York. It was the 4th Armored Division and I went up there to inspect it and I found there, in command of the infantry regiment of that division, John Leonard,

a very fine officer; and that regiment was just a new regiment, new recruits, and right on its toes. And John, I'd known John as a cadet. I said, "John, how come you aren't a general officer. From what I see here you ought to be a general officer; you oughtn't be a colonel commanding this regiment." He said, "I don't know; but I once had trouble with the Chief of Infantry." Well, I said, no more. And I go back, and for the next three months, every ... I sent in a recommendation for promotion John Leonard was at the head of that list, with a red line. So on the third time, as soon as I heard that, I was following it up now, this time, I hop in my plane and I fly up there and I walk straight into Gen. Marshall's office and I sit down, and he's very busy. He looks up and he says, "What do you want? You know you'd better know. Don't waste many words in there." I said, "I want to know why you won't make John Leonard a general officer." "John Leonard? Just a name to me. Why won't I?" "The only reason I can find in his record is that he once disagreed with the Chief of Infantry when he was on the board down at Benning." "Who was the Chief of Infantry?" "Lynch, General Lynch." I never saw a man push a button faster. Bedell comes running in there. "Get that list over at the White House; put John Leonard at the top of it." Now there's Gen. Marshall. This has happened with one or two others, but this is one that I personally had a lot to do with. That's the way he operated. Now let's see, where was I? I was in London, wasn't I? While I was in London I had one trouble with the staff in Washington. I had this conversation with Gen. Marshall. I knew about what he wanted, but I really didn't have any directive except that I was to get ready for a buildup, and we were...

Q: Oh, that's right; you said he'd given you some ideas at Myer.

A: Yes, and he talked a lot about MacArthur, about what he was doing out there. And he just presented a good, plain picture. They had formed this staff, which you're talking about, and Barker was there – he'd been left behind. Apparently Eisenhower didn't want him and Bedell didn't want him. He's a pretty good staff officer, but he wasn't too strong in character to my mind, but he fitted into the British picture and he also fitted into the ambassador's picture - Gil Winant. He was a peculiar fellow, that ambassador. Morgan, Lt. General, headed that committee. Now Morgan and I had many a conversation and Morgan was very frank with me. He didn't write it in the book the way I would have like him to have written it. Maybe he couldn't. Maybe he forgot it, but the British were always trying to put across their idea, which was different. And I had a frank talk on this business. I knew one thing that in my opinion had to be done, and I believe that's what Washington wanted. I said, "First place: this cross-channel operation has to take place. How soon can we take it?" So we got the weather. They were just starting to get weather people, but we really put the heat on them and they really built up a weather system to find out when the days were and what we were going to do. Now this was vivid, to me and to Ira Eaker, who was my air officer when I got there, because we were fighting the battle of the bombers; and we were doing daylight bombing. Eaker was a fine commander, but he didn't know me and he was very suspicious of me, but he came in there and we relieved all of that right the first day. These bombers we were sending out - we started with 300 bombers when I got there and we had built up to 8,000. And we are the ones, in that command, at that time, in '43, are the ones that really destroyed what went on in Germany and set them back in their air programs and everything else because we had a good, sound plan. We'd send these bombers out and they'd come back, 300 of them. Maybe we wouldn't get them all back. But what we did get back all had holes in them from flak, and we had no way of repairing those on the runways. We'd have to fly them to a factory somewhere and we couldn't fly them; they'd have one engine out, two engines out, holes in the mechanism that was very important. And

Arnold wanted to know why we hadn't, we had 300 bombers... "You've got 300 bombers and why do you only have 100 out there today?" We had to sell a bill of goods to Arnold and Arnold got kind of arbitrary with Eaker who was dealing more or less direct. Although I was the overall, the responsible man in there and Adm. Stark, although much senior to me, was the Naval man, and we briefed each other each day and got along wonderfully together. We had to know where the convoys were. I did anyhow, and so did Stark and decisions as to what we'd unload and where we'd unload all frequently came to my desk, generally on a Sunday morning. Because the tankers - we were short of fuel and we were trying to build up our fuel supply; and on top of the tankers we had the fighters. Well you can't, you have - when you come in, those convoys turn around very fast. Well you can't unload the fighters where you unload the tankers. So the question was: which do you unload, sometimes. This was frequent. This wasn't just once in a while, this was pret'near every Sunday. I used to say every Sunday morning or something - it bothered me a lot - and Stark would say, "What'll we do?" Well it was always "unload the tankers. We'll get the fighters off later", because we weren't ready for the fighters. We needed everything, but what we really needed was fuel and that's the way we got ahead of the fuel game. Well anyhow, that whole system of bombing, we demonstrated, but we had to know about weather - when we got 300 bombers up in the air on the target, fighters at different speeds that had to go out and meet them, to rendezvous to bring them home, save what they could, and tell us where the ones went down... many intricate problems which we all had a hand in and all worked to solve, and did, I think, to a great extent. So, we conceived the idea - and I don't know who conceived this, it certainly wasn't me but I was for it the minute somebody suggested it - of taking the British fighter, which was a very fast fighter, and putting extra fuel tanks on it, and in those days we had to put paper fuel... a lot of these fuel tanks were made of paper out on the wings, and we'd send one out to Iceland and one over Germany, way up - 10,000 in those days, 20,000, 50,000 feet - and they would hang along these fronts and tell us where they were coming and then we could make the decisions. Otherwise we might have lost our whole bomber force in one morning. It took us two hours and a half sometimes to make those formations overhead, so we were short 2 ½ hours' gas to start with, and they were the first ones up. All of that intricate planning went in. Well we had one over Germany. Now, Germany changed their code about every month. Somebody else can give you this more accurately, but this is the commanding, the overall commander's impression is, and remembers: their code would come in and we knew what the weather was. So I can say, with a great deal of authority, that we got more information from the German Air Force through their broadcasting in code than we got from anything else over there. See, we could break that code in 24 hours once we got on to it.

Q: But that wasn't very elaborate.

A: No, it wasn't very elaborate and they were careless, though, in using... the way they used it and it was very helpful to us. Well now, while we were there all this planning came up and we had this... and I had this problem with our staff - the Combined Chiefs of Staff met in Washington. Now, this is Gen. Marshall; I've never talked to him about it but I sure talked to Tom Handy and some of them about it. The next morning I would get a telephone call that the British Chiefs of Staff were meeting and that they would desire my presence and that they would send up a secretary for me. Well they had Portal, who I admire greatly, and Dickie Mountbatten - I admire him greatly, he was fine; the Chief of Staff was all right. He's a sound, conscientious man but he didn't have too much on the ball, the way I was thinking. They had their Deputy

Chief of Staff, Nye, a brilliant, young officer coming along. Their...Cunningham was their...the man that died...

Q: That was Pound.

A: Pound – and then Cunningham came up, who was much better. Pound was just asleep all the time. I guess that covered the field.

Q: The Chief of Staff was Alanbrooke.

A: Alanbrooke, yes.

Q: Who's been so critical of Marshall.

A: Well, I'll talk a little about Alanbrooke and his book, but... They'd put these questions to me and they'd have a complete report of what the Combined Chiefs of Staff did in Washington and I'd come in there cold. Well if it hadn't been for Portal and Dickie Mountbatten, who could see that I was embarrassed - I never ducked out of this thing - I'd just simply say, "No, I don't agree to that, but I'll have to get instructions." Well now, I wanted them to send me the same kind of a cable that their secretariat was sending to this secretariat so I could go down. Well, I couldn't get that. So, what I did, I went to the British secretariat and I said, "Look, you brilliant young fellows, you come up there, you're most courteous to me, you do everything to help me but you've got to help me another way; we're in this together. Will you come up an hour earlier than you would ordinarily and brief me on what's going to happen so that I don't look so stupid? Or don't you think I am entitled to that." By golly they agreed and did it, and got permission to do it. And that's the way I had to operate. We were always much slower on this business. We didn't have the trained officers the British did and the secretariat to give you the information. One of them is they wanted to take some of my bomber force and send it down to Africa and take my commander, Ira Eaker, with it. Well it'd take...that meant we'd lose the bomber force for three solid months at a critical time just moving down and, if we ever got it back. Of course I couldn't go with something like that. That was ridiculous.

Q: You mean the British wanted this?

A: No, that came from - yes, no – Tooey Spaatz and Ike wanted it. That's where we had a battle; I won the battle finally. I don't think they liked it but I don't...it was a sound decision not to do it. Well now, during this period various people...one of them was Dr. Kaufman, Dr. Bush, and they came over because of the bomb sights we were uncovering. We didn't know what they were. I didn't know they were making an atomic bomb in Washington. They just told me enough to let me know that they were worried and we took pictures of those, we set up special staffs to study them, and the British - we worked together fine on it. We knew they were 25 miles from London; they were all pointed at London except 5 that were pointed at Bristol. And so we got a good many visitors of that type. And then, of course, Lovett came over, and finally, Mr. Stimson was coming. Well, Mr. Stimson was pretty smart, and pretty brilliant, and probably the greatest Secretary that we could've possibly had, in the morning. But he'd get tired right fast and then he was really difficult. I knew this; and I knew that he'd been to London before in the State Department and that he had lived in the outskirts in a villa, which had the country atmosphere, so I went after the same goal. I didn't get it but I got another one on the other side of the town with the cows on the fence and we set up a real staff to make him comfortable. And we used all

the means we had to find out what he wanted to see, and not to tire him. Now we had to fly him to do this, so I had this airfield that wasn't too far. I pleaded with the Air Force not to take him through all the underground area; take him in, show him some, then go. I said, "If you take him in there and walk him through, you get all that enthusiasm, which is good for your command, but you're going to wear him out and somebody's going to be in trouble, and it's going to be me." And, boy, I lost that one because they promised to do this but they didn't do it and I got the damndest bawling out I ever got. But we got Mr. Stimson back for lunch, a little late, and he slept in the afternoon, and I went there for dinner and he was his old self at night again. Now, during these conversations, as I remember, this command came up, and I said, "Well Mr. Stimson, there's only one man for this job. The British know how I feel and maybe that isn't so good. In the first place, we oughtn't to be where we are, on the right. We ought to be on the left, but we can't change that; that was fixed for us. Second, it's got to be an American commander. We've got the most troops involved in this. We've got the most Air Force involved in this. We're the only ones that really can make this cross-channel operation a success." Now, maybe this is egotistical, but this is the way I said it. Now I have two reasons for this. One of them is that there isn't a single British commander which you can select today - Army, Navy or Air Force - that wasn't at Dunkirk or at [?] and the Prime Minister, all they can see is that terrible English Channel and it can't be crossed. So if a man starts out with that attitude we are not going to get across it. We've got to believe, like I do, that you can go across that in a rowboat because we're pulling people out of France, I would say, at least five nights every month in a rowboat, almost, in a little motor boat. And so I know that daggone pond can be flat. I know also that it can be rough because I've seen it, and I've been in it, and I've been sick on it. And I said, "The only American commander that I think the British'll accept is Gen. Marshall, and he can do this job." And Stimson agreed. Now, from there on you know what happened. And I also said, at this time, "If it isn't Gen. Marshall, it'll have to be Eisenhower." Now I don't want anybody to think I was in this game, or in any way...these intimations are all guesses. But I know the truth of this matter and I'm very sincere about it, because the British...every time the British talked to me they would talk to me along lines like this: what do you know about fighting; you haven't been bloodied. But we have one man who's been bloodied and successfully bloodied. And Gen. Marshall had been bloodied, I felt; he'd been in the First World War. I had never gotten into the First World War; I was a young colonel on the way when the war was over. Andrews, I would have said, was in much the same fix although he could've gotten his battle experience by flying over in the bombers, which he would've done, sooner or later, because I had a hard time keeping Eaker out of there. That's just the way you create, and I think that's the story. Now I'll tell one more story about this thing - that has to do with this. Mr. Stimson was insistent that he go to Dover, see the White Cliffs of Dover. He'd been there before but he just wanted to go down and look across that place. So the Prime Minister takes his train, and takes us down there, and we leave there so we get there in the early morning. We have breakfast aboard the train. I'm sitting there with Mr. Churchill and Mr. Stimson, and they get into quite a discussion on the cross-channel operation, led by Mr. Stimson. He said, I can't repeat all of it, but it led up to this thing and it was quite a...and I'm listening because I'm never...I didn't open my mouth in any of this conversation, you know. I had nothing to do with it; I was just sitting there listening with my eyes big as saucers and my mouth wide open, I guess. Finally Mr. Stimson says, "Now that's all I wanted to know, Mr. Prime Minister." He says, "You have no intention of crossing the English Channel, have you?" Just like that. He hit the table - bing - the plates jumped. [laughter] Churchill, without missing a thing said, "No," he said, "I have no intention to cross the English

Channel if my military advisers tell me it can't be done. "But I've given my promise that we'll cross the English Channel; and we'll cross the English Channel, unless that one item comes up." That was it. Stimson went back, and all that furor came, and then the change was made.

Q: But you think he, that Churchill was really sincere. He wasn't just....

A: Oh, I think that Churchill was sincere. I think if you've read this book...what do they call it...Top Secret? In it they quote the Prime Minister as saying...I'd hate...I ought to have the book, but anyhow, the substance was that there'd be dead bodies floating by in the millions and I'm supposed to have slapped him on the back and said, no sir, Mr. Prime Minister, a rowboat can cross it? Well now, the fact of the matter is the Prime Minister did say what that book says. And I said what I said, but I never said it to the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister never said it to me. It's just one of those things that happen when you're talking off the record.

Q: Yes. And, well, Ingersoll's book's full of that sort of thing. Many times he'll have part of the facts but he'll get them all – he's a journalist. He likes dramatic effect and I've always felt he hurt his own case by the way he put some of it.

A: Well he did...that's certainly true. Of course I had a telegram from Churchill about that book and I said of course we didn't have such a conversation, but we might've said, on the side, something else. I know I said this to my staff many times because we are going to have to drive, said I, to cross this channel. Well then, of course, Christmas day I found out I was going to Africa and Ike was coming up there; and I took off and went down to Africa and inherited that feature of it.

Q: Well now, that was due in part to the fact that Eisenhower preferred Bradley, who he'd had under him.

A: I think so. I don't think Gen. Marshall...I think if Gen. Marshall had come I'd have stayed there.

Q: Well, I assume that was in the cards because he had written you his - I remember, once, seeing his list of the staff he wanted if he came over and commanded.

A: Yes, and I was building it up. Bradley got a good many of those, he accepted them. So I suspect that Gen. Marshall gave the same list to Bradley because we brought a good many to that staff - people I thought were fine and Gen. Marshall had given to me, and we were moving them in there, building them. You see I built Bradley's staff. I knew Bradley was coming back there and that was all right.

Q: You see Ingersoll, I thought, did you no service. In the book he says that you would've had it, but that Gen. Marshall felt you weren't getting along with the British and he removed you. Well, I found no evidence of any such thing.

A: Well I was getting along with the British but I was getting the wrong...I guess I'm the "nigger in the wood pile" on it because they had to do something with me and I would not give in on it, and they all knew it. Because I had made...no, that's one place where I was...I was just sure the only way we could win that war is for an American commander to command it. Now I didn't

know what Alanbrooke said in his book at that time, because if I had known that, I could have operated beautifully. That would have been a big revelation to me.

Q: Now what was this?

A: Well, let's get on Alanbrooke for a minute. Alanbrooke was a man who was very sincere. He took his job with a great deal of sincerity. Had a nice family. He had hobbies, which I approve of, for relaxation, but he never appeared to me to get down to the real business of the thing. He wasn't brilliant like I think Portal and Dickie Mountbatten were; they had imagination and things happen when you talk to them. The other - it was a slow process. Now I read his book and I've recommended that everybody read that book. First place, it was written in the emotion of battle in France when he was writing just what he was thinking, and I don't think he changed it, either. Knowing the man and the way he wrote it. The things that he experienced there are invaluable to young officers.

Q: That first part I think is very good.

A: Oh, it's wonderful. Now when he gets on Gen. Marshall, that's where he's been told something by his big boss and he's suddenly frustrated. You can read it in there, you see, so what he says about Eisenhower and Marshall - the part that he's critical of - I can see no evidence it's ever existed or is there. There's no doubt that the British wanted to do one thing and we wanted to do another thing, but we were right. I had the same problem in Africa when I was down there and Gen. Marshall came up, was briefed, and I had to butt into that conversation and make my stand definite so that Gen. Marshall didn't get the impression that I was with the British. That's a clever way of doing it, but I cleaned that up, I think. And I had the same thing with Tassigny, with the French Army, because he pulled a sharp one on me that really put me in hot water. But Gen. Marshall handled that one. And I'll tell that story, because these are the things you're up against when you're trying to do a job, and people are always going to accuse you of being ambitious, and wanting this, and you did this because you did that. That isn't always so. That's so, in many cases, but that isn't...never motivated me, knowingly. If I did something, it must have been stupid if I did it that way; and I don't say that I didn't do some of it, but I don't know of it.

Q: Now, while we're talking of the British, there's the question of Morgan and the other British. Morgan's book indicates that the British felt he was too pro-American whereas Ingersoll felt that this was a pose on Morgan's part, that Morgan was carrying water on both shoulders, that he was really to pretend to be more or less pro-American in his views while he was actually working always for the British.

A: Well, I think Morgan was trying to be fair. Now I'm giving you my impression as I had it then. Since I read his book, I don't know why he wrote that book, because I don't think he was, gave all the credit in that book he might have given to my side of the story on this. He hardly mentions...I don't think he mentions me in it.

Q: Not very much.

A: No, and that's always a sign to me just as Churchill, if you'll notice, ducks at mentioning me very often. I was always there pushing for what I believed right. And, Morgan did come in and tell me, now he said, "I have just told my chiefs that I have to tell you this because I can't work

with you and tell you or lead you to believe something that isn't true." So I think that Morgan did work with me and did tell me, and I still think that he told me everything I ought to know. If there was a disagreement and he couldn't tell me, he let me know there was a disagreement in a way that I could interpret. And so I would say that Morgan was fair. I said Morgan, I think I had a lot to do with it and I said Barker. I never admired Barker very much. I always felt that Barker was weak. I had to do the fighting. He would always be on the line. Now this is an impression. This wasn't that he was ambitious, but it's just the kind of a staff officer he was. Ike didn't take him. When they came back there they weren't going to take him again because Wyatt sent for me, and he was a Barker man, and he had a long conversation with me about Barker, and I said I would not recommend Barker for this staff. I'd send him back to the States. I don't want him, because I don't think he fits in, but he ought to be kept here just to know what went on in that plan and keep it straight. Now that's the Barker story as I know it. [indistinct comment] Also Morgan, too; now Morgan came back and apparently gave a fine briefing and gave it the way he said he was going to give it and it had quite an influence at Quebec, so I'm informed.

Q: Of course Gen. Marshall apparently at one time had picked Morgan to be his chief of staff in case he went over, because you know, he came back...

A: Well we fought for that. We asked the British and Morgan got the job only because Gen. Marshall...

(Tape ended. Side 2 of reel 1) *

A: Well those two men did an awful lot for me and...

Q: I didn't realize that Aly Khan was in on that.

A: Yes sir, he was under Cabot.

Q: I see.

A: Cabot can tell you a lot about Aly Khan.

Q: Well I thought I'd go back sometime and talk to Lodge. At the time I talked to him he was in the Senate and he was very careful what he said. He wouldn't let me quote him or anything. But he gave me a little...

A: I can tell you a lot about the 6th Army Group; that, I think's one of the reasons why I'm struggling with whether I should write some things. People are pushing me now and I...

Q: I think you should. Particularly, your memory is still remarkably good. You see, I've gone through the COSSAC papers and I remember very well your memo on whether we should be on the right or the left and, what you said about that, and you've got it right down the line. Whereas many men of your age will have it completely mixed up.

A: Oh, I'm pretty clear with these incidents and I had some incidents with Ike and Bradley, too.

Q: And what I've liked about your approach is that, while you've made clear what you feel about Alanbrooke and all that, you've not demeaned a single man you've talked about and so many people do. If they had difficulties, they just seem to tend to tear...

A: Well these men...after all, every man that ever worked, I had to work with, had some good in him and I always tried to find out what it was, because when you change and bring another man in there, unless he's disloyal - and I have two, I have two that I won't want to talk about very much and I'll warn you, one of them is Wayne Clark. He's a real controversial figure with me. [laughter] He's brilliant too, and he's...I can talk about a lot of good about him. Well now let's see, you were asking me some questions here.

Q: We were going back into this period before D-Day. You took over there what date, in England?

A: I think it's May 10th.

Q: May 10th, yes, '43. Up to that time Eisenhower had held both jobs, hadn't he? Worn both hats, both down in the Mediterranean and...

A: No, he had until Andrews was ordered there.

Q: Then Andrews' death brought you over there.

A: Brought me in, that's right.

Q: So, you were there for the whole of the COSSAC planning because Morgan was not picked.

A: He was picked there about the day I arrived or shortly thereafter. I wouldn't know if it was - one or two days either way, I'd say.

Q: So that your staff was going along with the American planning at the same time that this was going on.

A: That's right.

Q: Now, to what extent did Gen. Marshall keep in close touch with you there? Was his fight being fought mostly in Washington with [?] and others?

A: I would say it was being fought in Washington. I don't think Gen. Marshall ever gave me a directive - I may be a little vague about this because I haven't looked or read about it, but there's nothing that was outstanding in there that I couldn't handle because I had just the things I've been telling you about. We'd settled; we were where we were going to settle, so I knew that I had my buildup. I knew the next thing is: what do we need for this cross-channel operation? Well, we need bombers and we need airfields, and we were building 120 airfields. Some of them we inherited from the British, but every one of them we had to rebuild to lengthen them and take advantage of it - that was a terrific job. And in this buildup we had to know where we were going to put these airplanes; we had to know where we were going to put this personnel. The basic decision then: do you bring any troops. No, I had one division there. I had the 29th Infantry Division. I had to make a change in command...was already sort of written up for me by my predecessor - the change that ought to be made; so I made them.

Q: That was from Hartle to Gerow?

A: That's right and it was a very necessary change because those fellows, Hartle was just drinking too much and he also wasn't on the ball; and Gerow was there commanding the 29th and we put him up there to run the Corps and I brought Gerhardt, Charlie Gerhardt, for the 29th. I got a list from McNair. That's the way that Gerhardt came. He was on the list and I knew him as a...

Q: But you picked him.

A: I had a choice. I was given a choice.

Q: I didn't know whether Gerow was given it because he'd been there with Gen. Marshall and Gen. Marshall gave it to him.

A: No. Well, I would say that I recommended Gerow to command that Corps and it fitted into Gen. Marshall's picture accurately, but I didn't know it. I didn't know a lot about this China business until later. That dogged me a little bit later on. Not that Gen. Marshall, or any influence...but if Gen. Marshall knew those fellows who were out in China with him, like a man who was killed in Korea one night, and Ike was there, and all that crowd started in China.

Q: Yes, Walton Walker...

A: Walton Walker

Q: ... is, and, of course the Stilwell thing comes straight out of China.

A: Yup. And, also, Forrest Harding, a classmate of mine that got relieved down there; that's all China stuff that I learned afterward. I didn't...

Q: China and Benning, of course.

A: Benning, that's right.

Q: Benning had...Stilwell was there again. Of course he picked a lot of them to go on down there.

A: That's right.

Q: Well, Harding was down there.

A: Harding was down there, too. You see Harding ran the Infantry Journal for a long time. He had that, and I had Harding in the 9th Infantry Division, and when I left the 9th Infantry Division I recommended Hoyle to take the command and get the promotion. Harding was the infantry general. When I saw Gen. Marshall, he asked me about Harding, and he said, why shouldn't Harding have it? I said well, DeRussy Hoyle is a class, many classes ahead of me. He was the artillery commander down there. He's a very capable officer and he's been most loyal and helpful, and I couldn't possibly recommend Harding over DeRussy Hoyle. But, I said, if you want to know, if you're going to make a general officer, a major general, I think Harding can command a division. I'm not belittling him in any way. He also has done a fine job for me; he was a classmate. So that's the way that episode worked and that was it.

Q: Now Gerhardt Gen. Marshall had apparently picked up out on the west coast and pushed along.

A: Well now, Charlie Gerhardt was a cadet when I was back there running the baseball team and teaching math...was I teaching math, yes, I was teaching math. He was a fine basketball player - and I was running the basketball team, too - fast on his feet, an Army boy, quick, mind quick like that. Never had played any baseball, but Sammy Strangnickolin took him out there and put him on third base and told him to get in front of the ball, and he hit left handed. And, when the football team wasn't going so well I went to Charlie Daly, and I was a second lieutenant at the time, and I said why don't you use this guy you've got in column hall, Charlie Gerhardt, and put him in there at quarterback."Oh, they'll kill him." I said, "They won't kill that boy. He's too wiry; he knows when to quit and not run into people that're too big." So, I have my impression of Charlie Gerhardt was that here's a guy under pressure that always delivers, and he's the kind I want. Now Charlie Gerhardt went out to the cavalry and he was good - he was a good athlete, well coordinated, fast - but he was a cocky little scoundrel, so he made a lot of enemies on the ego side. And they put him in command of a division and the first thing he does, he makes all these officers swim across a thing and they all objected, and I guess that's where Gen. Marshall came into the picture. He rather admired that kind of a business and they were going to relieve him. Charlie told me this afterwards. Anyhow, I didn't know all this, that I'm telling you now, until later. But when I got this list from McNair, of course I sent into Marshall and McNair sent me the list, and Charlie Gerhardt's name was on it; it was at the top of the list. And I said, Charlie Gearhart, that's easy, I could take the top man. And to this day those infantry fellows don't know why I selected Charlie Gerhardt.

Q: Well you'd known him way back.

A: Oh, I know him, and he delivered, too. Now, they claim that he didn't do this. I gave him a mission with the 29th. I said, "You've got to please Nancy Astor. You've got to please the people down there in your area you're in and make friends with them. You've got to learn how to get into boats and get cross that English Channel. That's your mission. Go down and do it. And I know you'll do it, Charlie, like you've done everything else." And that's it. And he, I saw him later in the war. I put up a battle for him once, too, because he got into trouble later, you see. He let a woman get him into his skin; but he ended up all right.

Q: Didn't he get into difficulty, then, later in Brazil?

A: Yes, that's where he got into trouble, but he snapped out of that.

Q: But you were still in command then, weren't you?

A: I had the field forces and he came back as G-2 of the 2nd Army and ended up as brigadier general over here at - or a colonel I guess - they reduced him back to a colonel, but he went back to his 29th Division and plugged along, and...I don't know what...I know he's retired now, I haven't seen him, but he went back to his family.

Q: Was this his father that died just a short time ago?

A: Yes, I think so.

Q: At 95 or something like that. Well, on the...so then you had Gerow who had the 29th, but then went to 5th Corps. And, of course, Irwin didn't come up there until shortly before...

A: Well, now the next one we had to do, we had to do something about the 5th in Iceland; and it was under my command. So I decided that, at the right time, the next division that I would bring in there would be the 5th. And again we had to make a change, and Red Irwin brought it down. And then I said, we want no more troops over here until just the last minute. All we want over here are service troops. And of course the service troops I got were Negroes, a great many of them. And I had a Negro problem which we handled pretty well. If you look into the history of it, you'll find that it was much on our minds, but well done, I thought.

Q: You had just that one big problem; was it in early '44, or late '43? I don't know whether it was Shrivenham [?] or where it was...Bristol?...they had a sort of a riot between whites and blacks.

A: That was after I left. It must've been '44. I had no trouble while I was there. I had some trouble, but I always had people to troubleshoot and I generally went on it myself down there. I just simply went down and let it be known how it had to be handled. I had a rape case. Padry [?] came up to defend the darky when they were about to hang him, and I called in the JA and says, "I'm going to commute this to life sentence." He says, "You can't do it; you've already acted on it." I said, "I can't? Where in the hell's the paper I signed? I'll tear it up and you can do what you want. We're going to do it. I've been convinced by this man, that this Negro is... he makes no bones about it, he had sexual contact with this white girl, but maybe she had something to do with it. And he way he explained it to me it could've happened. Therefore there's reasonable doubt in my mind, and I want to give this time."

Q: Yes, you didn't have the same background in the line of women there, white women, that you would have in the South, for example.

A: No, as a matter of fact these white women were causing us our trouble. We had these fellows behind bars and guarded but they would be parading around there, and what's a Negro going to do? So, we had a good many of those kinds of problems. And that's another thing in England, you say my relations with the English - they were normal. I had lunch and dinner at times with Mr. Churchill and with Ismay, Pug Ismay. And I had a lot of contact with his deputy, who later became Prime Minister, Attlee, because of all of these social questions. On the administrative side, Attlee handled number 11 Downing Street and he is a very fine, definite man and quiet. He presents the problem to you and you come back at him and he'll come up with a solution very fast.

Q: He'd started his career as sort of a volunteer social worker. He had some money. He spent some years in one of those Settlement Houses back when he was a young man.

A: Is that so?

Q: So he would've been, this is why he would have been particularly good.

A: Well he was good, and I had no problem with him, and I always admired him. I understood why he did things and why it was there because the British had no sense of venereal disease; they had none. I had to prove they had. Their doctors were trying to get me to take the lead in their bailiwick on that - I said, "Huh-un, nothing doing. I'm just telling you fellows that you have it." Now, the other problem was that we spent too much money in England. I said, "I can prove that, legally, that that isn't so." I said, "Yes, we get more money, but we send more money

back to the States. So that if you'll take the number of troops I have, divide it into the amount of money that's actually paid in here, the salaries, the average salary is less than what the British soldier gets. But," I said, "I'm not talking about the 10 percent of these airmen who don't send one nickel back. And there's what's causing my trouble, and it's causing your trouble, and you're responsible." "Why?" said they. "Well," I said, "You move these women from little places all over England to these factory towns, and then you don't put any proper chaperones in there, and these boys go out and they go to a pub. Now they go out with good intentions." I said, "We were drinking your hot ale, but our people don't like it." I said, "Now, with a great battle we've gotten soft drinks in there." You see, that's a little dynasty belonged to each one of those ale manufacturers. It's a cubby hole; and we had to break through that. Well we did it by giving them the Coca-cola at cost, you see, and let them make the profit, but let our people drink soft drinks, and it worked. But I said, "If you get a boy and a girl that go in there, they get in a good argument. Our people like to talk and the girls like to dance and they also like these social gatherings, and something's going to happen. And they're going to have a big roll of bills – that's the group I've got to fight. But our overall picture is only 10%." Well, it helped then; then the social people got together. The women, really, of England were most helpful to me. So I thought we had that thing pretty well cleaned up when I left there. Ike, of course, has many more...

Q: Of course there was a tremendous influx of people afterwards which made it all over again.

A: Oh, it did; it just...what could you do?

Q: It's a zoo.

A: A zoo.

Q: Now, part of that story has been written up but never published. Letousa had a historical section under Herman Ganoe.

A: Yes, that's right.

Q: And, Wood Gray who's head of this department at George Washington and two or three other people started gathering material on that period. It's in the file over here in Alexandria. There's a big batch of files called the Devers correspondence file, too, in the case that you ever got to writing.

A: Where's that?

Q: It's in Alexandria.

A: It is.

Q: And I'm sure they...they recently let Gen. Wedemeyer go into his papers without any trouble; and if you ever got to writing I think that you would find it fairly compact.

A: That would help like the dickens. Get dates and names.

Q: And then ask them, if you get around to the time of doing it, call me and I can tell you who to ask for and what to ask for, because there was an administrative history that has been drawn on

by the official histories but it's never has been published as such because it was too long and it had a lot of this stuff in it that you people published at the time and may not publish for a while. But they went into problems like the race problem, and things of that sort, and showed what the headquarters had done to try to deal with it. I'm sure, on that side, that anyone who has written about your so-called anti-English attitude would have given you good marks on that. I think what they argued about is that you represented the viewpoint, certainly, that Gen. Marshall had held about the necessity of doing cross-channel.

A: That's right. I asked Wedemeyer why some of these things had happened. I said, "I'm not asking for anything; I never have asked for anything; I've never used any political influence, but", I said, "I wake up here and find out that a lot of people have been put on active-duty pay." I said, "That's cost me \$100,000 - taxes and everything, that's what it's cost me- and I should have been one of those fellows. Now why wasn't I?" I said, "I wouldn't have kicked if they had stopped with the five-star people, the ones who made [spots?], who hadn't done any more than I had; they made Adm. Spruines, and then they made the Marine, and then they made Bradley, and then I draw the line." I said, "I would just, I'd just like to know what was behind it. Who was, who was ag'in me?" He said "Oh, I don't think anybody was against you here. But," he said, "your problem is the British." He's the one that intimated to me that the British had some reservations about me. Now, I never saw that. My relationship, that you'll hear here, in a minute, with Jumbo Wilson, was probably as fine as I've had with any man. I admire him greatly, I know his problems, I know he's a disappointed man today. He oughtn't to be. They should have used him better. He was fine - but his chief of staff, Gambell, I wouldn't trust that fellow around the corner. He was always doing things...suspicious-like. He wouldn't let me keep my British aide up in France. I kept him a long time but he wouldn't let me keep...they finally got him away on the ground that he was telling me things I oughtn't to know. Those are little things, but they stick in the back of your craw...

Q: And you can't get them out.

A: And you can't get them out and you wonder: well now, what influenced this or what influenced that? I don't think it ever did me in any harm in any way, I mean, to even worry, because I knew what I was doing when I was doing it, and I was perfectly willing to take the consequences. I am today. I never bucked back on it.

Q: I wonder if this, though, will ever influence Gen. Eisenhower's thinking in regard to you because, after all, he paid a great deal of attention to the British people. I mean he liked British people to have the reputation of working well with him. And, of course that gets into the 6th Army Group thing. You always had a peculiar position there of being...

A: Oh, I was, I had, I took it all - every rap I took - and sometimes I had to fight for what I thought was right. And Ike, I think, has held something against me which somebody has printed in his mind. It isn't right; and someday I was hoping he'd give me a chance to clear it up, because I've been Ike's most loyal supporter, from the start. I've never had any qualms or, even in command, about it at all. I always felt that, and I said in my staff - and you can talk to any of them - I always said, "Well now look, Ike has made this decision. I've gone up and fought for it and he has some things, and a responsibility that I haven't, so all we got to do is carry out loyally what he's done." So, in the fighting days I was always extremely loyal to him, but I always got a little brush-off, or felt I was getting it. Now I may be wrong about that; you're sensitive about

these things. But when he was, started to run for president, I went out there, I had to go through that place, [Paris and the Casimere ?] affair several times, and in every case I had dinner with Ike; I know Mamie, I got to know Mamie. I never knew them, either, until the war. And it was always a pleasant conversation and I was always urging him to do this - run for this president's job - and I had the reason for it. And since he's been president, I've defended him in every way possible - I've made speeches about this because I believe in him. I think he's got the integrity and the things that count to make this go, but I don't think Ike thinks that way about me. It's just the little things. I once sent up to his office for an autographed photograph, and I got back the thing that's hurt me most - just a photograph with his name on it. Well now that means to me either he didn't get it, which is probably the case, that isn't what I thought at the time, or he's got something in his mind that's wrong about me, as I see it. And, well I've seen him...since he's been in there I've been in his office once. I was in there about a month, two months ago on a West Point matter and I was about to go back again when this dang thing broke over here which this had something to do with - not the thing but some of the individuals involved. And, of course he's surrounded with some very close, good friends of mine. Goodpaster was at West Point all of the time he was a cadet; I was an instructor. He's a top-notch man. And Jerry Persons I've been with all along. So they know my attitude pretty well on these things. But there is something there I feel. Either that or Bedell Smith, and I never had that indication from Bedell. Bedell was always straightforward. Of course if you get to the 6th Army Group with me, you'll hear me say some things that...that I was threatened with out there, that worried me a lot.

Q: I just remember running into one thing. He sent you a very sharp message in the fighting in the Colmar or that area. Otherwise it seemed 6th Army Group was just, sort of, off here on the side.

A: Yes, he sent me a sharp message and I went up to see him. And when we get to that - that's a complete story - I'll talk about it, because it's one of the things I think has to be told. He was wrong in all those decisions and he had to give in on them, and that always makes it hard for a man. He did, too; that's the reason I say he was flexible. That's the reason he was big, in my mind.

Q: Well, because this is all tied in with that business of his reconsideration in the decision to pull out of Strasburg.

A: That's right. And I can tell you that story. And you get Ted Brooks and young Charlie Palmer, who was his chief of staff, and have them tell the story as they remember it, because they were on the other end. They were getting a telephone message - do this, don't do this - and then I flew up there and told them personally. Patch is dead so you can't talk to him, but that story is something. And, also what I did down there; I did what I ought to do and I was proved to be right. But it was very tense time and, of course, Ike, sitting where he was always saw things much worse than I saw them up where it was fighting. But I can develop that problem.

Q: It's important that that be done, because, of course, 6th Army Group, like 7th Army, has never gotten its full share in this story.

A: It certainly hasn't.

Q: I know in writing about Eisenhower - the trouble is, the arguments over the decisions were between Monty and Bradley.

A: That's right.

Q: And so, the space is taken up with those decisions whereas down here there wasn't any argument.

A: No.

Q: And not a whole lot of supplies at times.

A: No, but we never worried them too much either. We solved our own problems. We had quite an argument.

Q: It was as if they were separate theaters.

A: We just had one argument with Bradley and he came down, with Eisenhower, into my headquarters at Bittale [?] and stayed there over night, and we spent the entire after-dinner - we spent until about 2:00 in the morning. Now they came down for a specific purpose. They came down to get two divisions from me, to give them to Patton's Third Army on the Saar. Patton was crying for more troops. I was poised and going like a house-on-fire. I was poised across the Rhine. Eisenhower didn't know it and I wasn't telling anybody, but I was poised in the Haguenau Forest across the Rhine. I knew that Patton had 50,000 casualties - and he had them if you look at the history, and the trench foot, and going up against that bastion on the Saar River. He had been throwing artillery and ammunition all over the place. His roads were all out to pieces because of both artillery shells in front of him and the Germans, and also because of mud and water. I felt that if I crossed the Rhine and went up the other side, by quick movement, which I was sure I could do and I knew the Germans didn't know it because I had patrols across that river every night and sometimes all day long and there wasn't anybody over at the time. I would get in behind that bastion that held Patton up, that would loosen Patton's front and all you had to tell George was go, and he'd have gone. That was his great thing, and I didn't care - just so he got unloosened. That would take the danger away from me of getting cut off and everything going to pot. The other thing was that I knew that the Germans were concentrating troops up here at the 5th and 6th. They had just started to do this at this time. We knew they were doing it and where they were doing it. Now Gene Harrison was my G-2 - he's down here at Clearwater, Florida - and I probably had the best intelligence section of any outfit. I insisted that every division get prisoners every night. I was on their tail every day. I had a meeting with just a small staff of officers, with my G-2 and the Air force G-2, and commanding officer. And this group that prepared this stuff for me which was called my super-staff - one of them was a lawyer, one of them had come up through the State Department, and the other was an Italian businessman from Massachusetts - and they would have facts which they had collected and put on that map, and when they'd get through briefing me I'd say, "Now you've given me the facts; what conclusions do you draw?" I found pretty soon that they had much clearer minds than some of my people had and they put us back on the track and we came up with a very definite conclusion: that the Germans were going to jump us behind the mountains. Cut me off at Saarburg which was my rail bed - like Napoleon had once done come down, I think it's the Bleuse River [?] - and I would be in a fix because I only had one pass. I had the Colmar Pocket

cutting me off; I couldn't go down out of Belfort, so I didn't have any supplies out in that plain, except what I needed. I had most of my tanks and pret'near all my artillery back in the mountains waiting for those guys. And we sent information to Bradley that this wasn't a piece-meal business such as he was advocating - it was the real thing and we thought they were coming our way because that's the way we had to think. I didn't know where they were going. Well, that happened later, but at this particular time Ike said he wanted to take two divisions from me and the reason he came down there is because he was waiting to know where he was going to get those two divisions. So he was going to order me back, I guess, or something, to shorten my line, [the whole stuff?], and I said, "Well Ike, that don't make sense. The only way you can shorten my line is to pull back into the Vosges Mountains, and that's only on the map. So you don't shorten my line, you increase my line because I've no field of fire in the Vosges Mountains; whereas I have a field of fire up here on these fortified places; and it don't take as many troops to hold it." And I said, "Actually, I'm poised across the river and here's a way I can loosen that front and Patton won't need these." Bradley says, "You've got a lot of concrete pill boxes over there, and he was right up on edge. It was just like the hedgerows." I said, "Hedgerows? Ha; they're no hedgerows to me." "Why not?" says he. I said, "Well, because there's nobody in them. Now," I said, "a hedgerow with somebody behind it's one thing, and maybe a pill box with somebody in it is, but they haven't got the troops and I know they're not there." "How do you know it?" Well I said, "I just came from the edge of the river and I talked to some patrols." Now I said, "I just have one other thing, Ike, before you make a decision in this, and I feel very strongly about it as you can see - I'm really worked up about this. I've always been taught that you reinforce strength; you never reinforce weakness and I know the situation of Patton's Third Army. Now, it isn't anything against that Third Army. They've done a noble job and I am trying to help them because if they go I can go. If they can't go, I can't go. So this is a selfish reason too." And I compromised it. He compromised it the way I would have compromised it. He wouldn't let me cross the Rhine, but he didn't make me give those two divisions, and I'm always sorry he didn't do it because the...that he did it that way. But I think he was right, at the time. He had a hell of a difficult problem and I was taking a chance - there isn't any doubt about that.

Q: But now, you did give up two or three divisions to him once.

A: Yes, I did later.

Q: Later, yes - to make a reserve.

A: Yes, I had no reserve. Maybe you're talking about the ones I gave up just before this, too. I gave up two divisions. And then when I relieved...you see, when the Bulge took place, Patton was to go north. We were all assembled in Verdun. I don't know what story they tell, but I can tell the one that I know is so, from my viewpoint. The staff drew up a proper plan for that which would've given me a corps, one of the corps in Patton's army - I think it was Johnny Walker's corps - and given me all of Patton's front to take over, and let Patton go north and reinforce... well, it'd cut the corps, whatever corps they were going to leave. But when we got to Verdun, and this thing had been talked over 24 hours I guess, we were all examining the map there - Montgomery was there, Bradley was there and our staff officers were there, I was there, and of course Ike and his staff - Ike all of a sudden turns to me as the conversation was going on and says, "Jake, how soon can you take over Patton's front?" I said, "What with?" "With what you

have." "The whole front?" "Yes." "Well," I said, "it isn't a question of how soon I can take over his front, Ike, it's a question of how fast can George Patton get out of there so I can get in." And I said, "His front, you may know it, but it's a quagmire. There are no roads; he's going to have a hard time getting out of there. If I try to make a normal relief there, with what I have to do, we'll get bogged down and Patton won't get out and it's important that Patton get out. So if you'll get his time then I can tell you what I can do." And he turns to George, "How soon can you do it?" And George said, "48 hours." Which was a hell of a thing, but he did it. But he did it only because we worked together like nobody's business. They were going to leave one division behind. He was going to pull out with little patrols all along there. I was going to move back one division and take over the whole damn front of about four divisions. Well, you have no communications, you're vulnerable for quite a while 'til you can get straightened out and, but that's what we did. And Patton did get out of there and went north, and that had lot to do with that Bulge business, because George's movement up there was rapid and good. And he'd already started it - he had foresight. My movement in there was phenomenal. The 7th Army did a terrific job. The 103d Infantry Division came back over 100 miles through the passes and poised there in trucks to move in on that and they were spread from hell to breakfast. We had to sideswipe one division over the front. That is, tell it to swing to the left to shorten up that front because we couldn't have - one division couldn't begin to cover that acreage. That made us very weak in the Alsatian Plain but, and it made us weak later on, too, because we never did get together.

Q: The January attack helped [indistinct word] the weakness there.

A: It helped there and, oh, I was in trouble then. But then they took that one division away from me. And the one division they left behind, they relieved the division commander that morning, put another man in command. When I got it, I reversed that and put the commander back because - I didn't do it; it was recommended to me. I said, well what are we going to do up there with a new division commander and a guy coming off of the staff to the corps.

Q: What division was that?

A: It was Hughland's [?], Hughland, I think, was the division, and it was the seventy_? Well anyhow, they put the artillery officer who wasn't a very popular fellow - what's his name - a commander. Anyhow, we sent him back to Patton, to Eddy, and took the commander back and then sent the division north. And of course, then we had to straighten that thing out. Of course, I knew at the time, because of this G-2, that the Germans hadn't very much in front of me and what they did have in front of me was not, were the old, it wasn't a very...very good divisions. They were even, had taken their 17th SS Division, which was a good division at one time, and just stripped it to build up their 5th and 6th Armies and later they moved them up in there, too. So that was all helpful. But that's one of the incidents that I had down there. Then of course I always had a problem with the French. And of course, the sharp letter I got from Ike on the Colmar Pocket was answered very sharply by me too, I think, in which I said I took full blame for the Colmar Pocket, that I had made the decision, that I had flown down there to Patch's headquarters and picked Patch up at Saverne and flown him down to Ted Brooks' headquarters at Selestat, discussed the situation in the pocket, and everything was moving like a house-on-fire. The 15th Corps, which was Haislip, was moving north and I wanted to take Ted Brooks and turn him immediately north up along the Rhine and have him run. And I wanted to keep one division which I was going to turn over to the French - it would build up their morale and we'd

get the Colmar Pocket out. And they asked me whether I thought that could be done and I said it could. So I'm responsible, nobody else. What the French did, what the water did, what everybody else did - it's incidental. The decision wasn't a bad one either. We didn't succeed, and it caused a headache up at the top, and it became critical because the guys north of me had fallen down on their job. I only needed one good infantry division and I wouldn't have needed that. This is something I wouldn't want to put on the record, well I don't know that I wouldn't, but I'll state it here. I have stated it to other people. I had the 2nd French Armored Division and I sent them down and attached them...they were with the 15th Corps - Haislip - where they wanted to fight in the 7th Army. They wanted none of de Lattre. They made a brilliant dash through the pass at Saverne and captured Strasbourg, and immediately turned that into a turmoil for me which I had to clean up, but I wanted them to go on by Strasbourg to the south and cut off the Colmar Pocket with their army. I went down there personally. I've got to talk to Cabot Lodge about this because I think he was with me, but I know this: that I got a hold of LeClerc, I took him out there, I got his division started down there, temporarily, protesting all the time - no place to fight armor, all this stream, all this water, flat ground, it's an infantry division job. I said, I haven't got an infantry division, and it's not an infantry division's job, necessarily. If I had an infantry division, I would use them, yes, in prepping; but it's a self-propelled and that's what you are - that's what you tankers are - and you've got some infantry, so let's go. He starts, and I'm with him. We get to the old river which cuts in there toward Mulhouse, on that side of Strasbourg, and it's in flood but the bridges are still in and we're holding right there, and the Germans have, I don't know, maybe they had 15 self-propelled artillery. They'd run them up that road and shoot like hell and kill a few of these Frenchmen, then they'd rush down to Mulhouse and shoot the other direction. And that's all they had in there, but you couldn't convince him that. He just wouldn't move. And that's the reason I got the Colmar Pocket. We'd have closed it off in 24 hours if he'd gone down there and taken some casualties, sure, but not many. Once he crossed that river he would've gone, and I would've been able to close in with the 36th Division and with the other French division we'd have gotten across this high water. But anyhow, I had it; and I was really stuck with it. And then, at about that time, a newspaper man comes into my headquarters and (this is off the record but, jeez, these are the things that *really* put the heat on you) and he came from the 36th Infantry Division, and I'd just been in Dahlquist's headquarters and talked to him, and everything was fine...they were stuck in the mountains and they hadn't moved the way ahead, and he'd been detached and he was under the French. A letter comes in, brought by this newspaperman, which Dahlquist had written to the 7th Army and hadn't gotten to me yet, and which said there were 200 men in the 36th Infantry Division which had been in combat, oh, what'll I say...400 days, steady, and the division's morale was low because of this, and they hadn't been properly treated. Well now, the 36th Division I was watching like a hawk. The 36th Division got into trouble out in Italy and I brought Dahlquist out there; and Bolté, I gave Bolté the 34th and him the 36th. He trained it. It had some troubles getting going but it was a good division; all it needed was leadership and it was getting it. And here I get this damn thing thrust in my face when the whole damn world is watching the 36th Division, and I wasn't going to have anything like that. So I said, "Well if this is so, somebody's awful bad up there and there's going to be...I'll guarantee this to you, newspaper man, right now: you've evidently talked to these men, haven't you?" "Yes sir," he said. "Have you talked to the whole 200?" He said, "No, not the whole 200 but I'll bet I've talked to 150 of them." I said, "This is the truth?" "Yes." I said, "Well, those 200 will be on their way back to the States, if they want to go, within the next twelve hours." And I went up personally and went at this. I gave John Dahlquist hell for

writing a letter like that. Well they were there and they shouldn't have been there. Now the 3rd Infantry Division had people like that. They pulled them out of the front line and put them back in their communications and on their line of supply 'til they begin to cry to go back to the front. And that's the difference, you see, that you have in handling your administrative things – one, you do through the normal channels, you lose that touch. The 45th did the same damn way as the 3rd. That's the reason they were great infantry divisions. The 36th was just as good except it had these little sores that would get out of hand if you didn't get them in a hurry. Well, that's the way we solved that; and then I pulled the 36th Division out of action and put them in Strasbourg and took the 3rd, which had been resting because of the great work they had done. They'd had at least a, oh, maybe 20 days' rest. So I said they're resting and the 36th is going to stay, so I went up and married Dahlquist and Young [laughter], and Young never...and Mike Lodanjo was in the States.

Q: Oh.

A: And Young who was just retired – he'll never forget this - I told him that he was going to relieve the 36th Division over there and he was the assistant division commander. He said, "Gee, that was a shock." But they did it and later on when the Colmar Pocket was relieved they were the key...

Q: By the way, you might be able to tell me this: what connection did Dahlquist have with Gen. Marshall, because Gen. Bolté said I should talk to him.

A: Well, here's what he had: Bolté and Dahlquist, I guess, were both down at the War College together. Joe Collins was down there. Bolté I know was. I'm not sure about Dahlquist.

Q: Benning.

A: No, I mean down there at the War College. They were down there on a special staff working for McNair or Marshall; I don't know who. But anyhow, when they sent Chaney overseas, the two staff officers that went with him that I'm most familiar with is Bolte and Dahlquist. Now, they're in England working with Chaney in the early days when Marshall sends Eisenhower and Clark over there.

Q: Well, that's probably the story.

A: That's where the tie-in is because...well that's something you'll have to get from other people. I only know that by hearsay and, boy, I know how McNair felt about that thing, because Clark was a rat in this thing if anything, if you get the story right. But anyhow, when they went over there they relieved two people, Bolté and Dahlquist, and sent them home. And that's where Dahlquist comes into it. Now how he knew Gen. Marshall, where, I wouldn't know.

Q: He didn't tell me why; but he just wrote a note one day and he said, "Now you must see Jake Devers, and you must see Dahlquist."

A: Well, Dahlquist was in this episode that Bolté probably told you about, in London.

Q: I'd already written Hughes, but I had not...

A: Well, we happened to be rooming together out here at [?] when he told me that you were going to call me and I told him I'd be glad to talk to you.

Q: Sexton told me he'd been seeing you around. I didn't know whether you were retired and gone clear away from here.

A: No, I live here right in the city now. I'll be in Georgetown here in about another month, living on R Street.

Q: Gen. Sexton told me that you had a place over in Georgetown.

A: Yes, I own a house there that I'm fixing up now - putting a basement in it. It's the oldest house in Georgetown, so they say. But it's a nice house, and Mrs. Devers has always wanted to get it in order and we're doing it now, and I expect to be in there in October. It's all apart now; it's going back together.

Q: Incidentally, you come from an area rather close, or, is it rather close to the area Gen. Marshall came from?

A: Well, he's in western Pennsylvania and I'm from York. I'm in the central, just north of here and he's northwest.

Q: You're closer to Gettysburg.

A: Yes, I'm right at Gettysburg; 26, 22, 23 miles.

Q: Well now, didn't Gen. Arnold come from...

A: Gen. Arnold came from somewhere in Pennsylvania north of me. Spaatz came from Bucks County, over on the Delaware. McNarney comes from north of Pittsburgh. Lemnitzer comes from, in the northern part, north-central part of Pennsylvania.

Q: But you went back to your reception, to Philadelphia, didn't you?

A: No, I came back to Pittsburgh. I came back to Pittsburgh, Louisville, York, Fayetteville and my old friend, Peace, got me up to Charlotte. So I had a real trip.

Q: I remember seeing in Gen. Marshall's papers that Gen. Devers should go to Pennsylvania because...

A: And then Bradley had come back ahead of me and he'd gone to Philadelphia.

Q: And, because the General took a tremendous interest in that thing. He personally would mark down where a lot of people would go.

A: See, I was one of the last brought back; and, I didn't think I was going to be brought back. Then I got this...

Q: Did you act for a short time as theater commander?

A: Yes, well, I had all the army - I had the 6th and 12th Army groups.

Q: I thought so.

A: When Bradley came back - he came back for about 15 days - I had both of them and I was left behind and I didn't think I was coming back. Then we, very late in the deal when I thought all this show was over, Simpson and McNarney and I, and quite a few others, were brought back. And I got a cable from Marshall at Heidelberg which I had selected as my headquarters a long time before the war was over, and had it fixed up - and I said we'd would be there 100 years...I don't think it'll be 100, but we're going to be there a long time. It said, "You'd better plan not to return." So then I packed up everything I could take with me. Took my colored fellow who had the most points to get back, John Turnipseed from Atlanta, Georgia - quite a character - and we came back on those three big 84s, I guess, or 87s, and my first stop of course, after New York, was Pittsburgh, with McNarney. Then I went from there to my hometown of York. Then I came down to Fayetteville, Charlotte and then Louisville, Kentucky.

Q: Yes, I guess you were the only one that went there. Buckner would have come, but he was dead, of course. They brought him back there for the funeral - either to Frankfort, or somewhere. Was he around your time?

A: Buckner was a class ahead of me at the military academy - 1908 - a little older.

Q: Who were the other top general officers of your class?

A: Well, Patton, Eichelberger, Simpson, Courtney Hodges you can almost say - he was in my class but he was found, and came back. We always claimed him; he claimed the class ahead of us, really - '8. That's about it, I think. Of course we had a lot of major generals. We had Harding and Fuller; and Blair was a brigadier, an artilleryman.

Q: I thought that Patton was probably older than you.

A: He is. He's, George is at least three years older than I am.

Q: That's right. He went to VMI, for a while, before he went to West Point.

A: Yes. And he was found at West Point, and he was turned back to my class, yes. George was never very brilliant. He was a great soldier and a great student of, uh...but he did, uh...and he had a wonderful family; his wife was...too bad what's happened to that family. I knew them very well because I was at Myer with them. And also, when I took the armored force I had to beat George Patton if I was going to command that place; I had to let him know: either he was going to do it or I was going to do it. So, I did that; I did that in his own house down in the forest at Benning with Beebe [?] present until about 2:00 in the morning. Well, George is a soldier, and I just laid it down. I said, "I've listened to everything you've said, and everything that's been said around here, and here's the decision, George, and I want your loyal support from now on, because either you're going to command this force or I'm going to command it; and I'm commanding it, right now." He gets up and salutes; he says, "You're the boss." He always was that way. He'd fight, but he was a soldier, and I've often wondered what he said about me in that black book, because I sure as hell protected him three or four times. Marshall brought him up to Washington and he gets in trouble right away, which he always does; he has a capacity for this.

Q: And was shipped back out.

A: Well he was sent out to the desert, you see, back out there. So he calls me up, and he says, "I'm being canned." "No," I said, "you're not being canned; you're being sent where you ought to go." Well, he said, "I think you're just putting me on the shelf." I said, "Who, me?" I said, "I'm not putting you on the shelf but I have a lot to do with you going to the desert. If you're trying find out who the hell's sending you to the desert, I think Gen. Marshall is sending you to the desert. But I recommended you; and I recommend you because I think you're going to get the first opportunity to fight in the desert. All the cards point that way." And I said, "I want to send somebody out there that'll do a job." He says, "Can I fly my own plane?" I said, "Don't ask me those damn fool questions. Of course you can fly your own plane; but you'd better pay for the gas or something if you can afford it, and don't say anything to anybody. If you do, the answer'll be no." And he flew his own plane out there. Well, he did a great job in the desert. He built that up, and then he got worried that he wasn't going to get out of there, and they sent him up, and he gets into trouble with the papers because of his cursing and so forth, and I had to kill that the best I could. I talked to Gen, Marshall about not losing patience with George, that he had some qualities that we really needed on the battlefield. And I played polo with him, and I never trusted him to keep the door closed back there, throw end of the ball; but after the ball was on you could trust him anywhere. He'd do his best. Nobody in my class ever thought George Patton was brilliant, but he was certainly a fine looking soldier, and he certainly was a winner. He never liked to lose. He was about the poorest loser. Well that's a good thing. This business of being a poor loser doesn't always mean exactly what people think - anybody that says he's a poor loser... I want to know more about him; I'd rather admire that guy. I think I was a poor loser. I never liked to lose any battle. I didn't care if it was playing tiddlywinks. I play to win but if I lose, I can take it and I think George could. I don't think he liked it any, but he...

Q: I think maybe it would have been better if he hadn't kept his book, because he says things that I'm sure he didn't mean entirely, about a lot of people. He apparently was impulsive.

A: That's why I say this about him. I told these fellows that've read that book - Semmes is one of them, Harry Semmes. And I've told, I told his son, once or twice, I said, "Someday I want to read that - I want to know what the hell he says about Jake Devers. I know what he said about Bradley; I know what he said about Eisenhower at times." I said, "I read that book in Nancy when he was pretty well fed up with both of them and a couple weeks later I read it again and it's a totally different tone" So what you say is absolutely true. George [indistinct] wrote down. He was very arbitrary; he said things that he shouldn't have said, and it got him in trouble.

Q: Well now, probably if he'd sat down later and read them, he would have balanced it and said: Well, I said this when I was angry, and...

A: You see, another thing - when I took over the command in Africa it was pretty much of a mess. Now, Ike had done a job; he'd won a battle, but...it was a big battle and there was chaos all over the place. The cleanup is always bad. I arrived there one morning and I had the flu. But I'd get the mail in my bed, and I was having chills, and I wasn't, didn't want to see anybody. But I was reading my mail and, man, I get four letters from Gen. Marshall - every one of them written by a different staff officer telling me what's wrong with that theater as if I'd been in command of it. Well, I resented that to start with, but I went work. Now what was, really happened was that Eisenhower had relieved George Patton of command of the 7th Army on the island of Sicily, and he had put Clark in command of the 7th Army - why, I'll never know. So I

come along; I got no commander of the 7th Army – here’s Clark fighting the 5th Army and doing it very badly, I thought. So I fly up to Clark and I inspect the whole place, and I talk to him, and send all the help we can up there, and try to get that 5th Army moving because they were in the doldrums, too - standing there before all the mountains and the rivers and whatnot. Then I fly back, and that’s a long trip from Naples back to Algiers, and back and forth, and I couldn't get Jumbo Wilson to move his headquarters. I finally went over and had to get the whole setup, and tell them, “Now you *can* move.” And I can tell you something about that move. But anyhow, here’s George sitting down there and I have Thruston [? Everett] Hughes, who was a good friend of Ike's - but he was a bull in a china shop - but there’s no man of greater integrity than Hughes was. And he was commanding, he was the overall commander of the theater and he had as, another ordnance officer - he was an ordnance officer, but he had another ordnance officer - uh, was it York? Yes, I think York, who was his deputy. Well I ask Hughes - I find out they decorated, Roosevelt decorates Clark when it’d been turned down once, but somebody had to go into the files and pull out the things and I get all this danged stuff. And I said, "Well what’s George Patton doing over there?" “Well, he’s over there without a command.” Well then I looked into it to see what we could do about him. Could we use him? No. I was very definite about that. We had our hospitals full of people with two guns, saying they were nuts up here, and that the marines had only fought 30 days out in the Pacific; and all this stuff came in to me - when you get into this and dig down, that’s what you come up with. So I had a problem on my hands: what was I going to do with George Patton? About this time I sent a cable. The 7th Army was uppermost because they had planning to do; they were just a staff. I sent a cable back to Gen. Marshall requesting that...I don't know the order I had them, but I suspect I had them Hodges, Simpson...people that, generals that were in the States, to command the 7th Army. Back comes a cable from Marshall, one of his typical ones as I remember, "You’ve got to have an experienced Army commander. There are only two - Patton and Clark." So I have to sit down and think about this. I knew I wasn't going to give either one of them command of the 7th Army, if I had anything to do with it. And I was struggling...how in the devil are you going to get blooded. Devers isn't blooded so he can't go up and take command of this army, if he wanted to give up what he has. Just then somebody put a cable on my desk and I read it: 4th Corps Headquarters ordered to your theater; will arrive such and such a time. And I say, “Who’s in command of that 4th Corps?” And they say, “Sandy Patch.” “Ahh,” I said, "I got ‘em now." So back I go to Gen. Marshall: “Clark’s got all he can do commanding the 5th Army; he’s not doing it too well. Patton is of no use in this theater because of the episode which he has created himself. I recommend Patch to command the 7th Army; he’s had marvelous experience at Guadalcanal.” Now, I didn't know at this time that Sandy was in a little bad with, or always thought he was in bad, with Gen. Marshall. And I suspect that’s true, because from that time on - for six months - I tried to get Sandy Patch made a lieutenant general and I got turned down every doggone time until finally I got it across. And I never have known what was behind it, but it seems something happened to Sandy on his way out to the Guadalcanal or something, or some little thing at Benning - I'll never know.

Q: I think he had trouble with the Navy.

A: Is it? [laughs]

Q: There’s a reprimand in there somewhere.

A: Is there? Oh, I never saw it.

Q: But I'm not too clear; I was hoping that you knew the whole story of that. I was told that somebody to the north didn't - no, I've got that wrong - it was whether or not Patch would've had Collins.

A: He wouldn't have. I could tell you that right now.

Q: And I've run into that before.

A: I'll tell you right now. He told me all about Collins, what he was doing, and what he...and he had no use for him whatsoever; and I haven't got too much for Joe Collins and his attitude since then - what he has done and how he did it. Sandy thought a lot of this, uh, of various people. One that sticks in my mind is this National Guard officer from California that is now in Germany and was over here in the Pentagon for a long time with the National Guard; I guess he had reserves affairs. He always, he wanted me to get him over there in that theater right away. Well, he's turned out to be a top-notch general officer - major general. [indistinct] I forget his name....anyway. But Sandy had very definite opinions about Collins. Spoke to me all the time about him, because when Collins was ordered over there with - who was the other one that came with Collins from the Pacific due to Gen. Marshall?

Q: Corlett.

A: Corlett. They relieved Crittenberger. Well now, Crittenberger is a very conscientious, hard-working officer and a fine one, and he had done a terrific job in training, and he had the one command he wanted - an armored corps in England. And suddenly he's relieved for no reason. Maybe he knows...he's never told me, but he was certainly... I get a cable---can you use Crittenberger? And they got a prompt reply - yes, to command the 4th Corps. I was going to give him Patch's job and that's the way that happened. And at the same time, within days, a few days - and I don't know just what order they came in at the moment, I think I'm giving you proper order - I got a cable from Gen. Marshall: "Can you spare Patton to be sent to England?" That was a happy out. Whoever thought of that one, I'll always be grateful; I always gave Gen. Marshall credit for seeing through something here that I didn't know about. And of course, I think Mr. Stimson had something to do...I knew the Stimson connection here with Patton.

Q: There was a double connection there. Stimson was always helping out, but you know, to this good day, Gen. Eisenhower gets the credit for saving Patton there in the Spring of '44; but it's Marshall who keeps going to bat on it.

A: That's what I thought; and I think Stimson was behind it all.

Q: But Stimson wrote a very strong letter to Eisenhower saying, "I think you did a fine thing by saving this man." He had been Stimson's aide.

A: Aide, yes, up there on Cathedral Avenue in that big house Stimson used to live in when Stimson was Secretary of War, I guess, or State the first time. Patton was a young second lieutenant - had lots of money, lived close there, and they used to play handball and tennis.

Q: Of course he'd been close to Gen. Marshall - Patton had - and the General was sold on him.

A: He liked Terry Allen and that kind of a combat soldier. Terry's another one that I know about.

Q: He saved Terry and undoubtedly gave him that division.

A: Right. He gave him that division to start with. It all happened down at Benning on this...the time I was down there in that division road when Terry came galloping up through the woods with all these cavalry and captured the headquarters. I was standing right there behind a tree to keep from being run over. That's where it all started. From that time on Terry Allen was made and didn't know it.

Q: Somebody said that, actually, Allen got the division at a time that he thought he was going to be court-martialed or something.

A: Just about.

Q: I think he was having trouble with somebody else. I don't know whether it was McNair or what.

A: He was having troubles; he always did. Terry did, always had trouble because he's a very positive fellow. He happens to be a polo player and I play polo so I knew him well, and...

Q: Of course the Teddy Roosevelt connection with Gen. Marshall went back to WW I.

A: Yes, and that's something Terry always...said, "That's too much - to give me Roosevelt."

Q: Oh, I thought he wanted him.

A: No, he says not. You see they both had the same proclivities [laughter]

Q: You mean embarrassingly [?].

A: Yes. [more laughter] And I think that got Terry into some trouble, but not too severe.

Q: Well now, did you have anything to do with Truscott.

A: Yes sir. I think Truscott's the finest army combat commander in the battlefield today and next to him is Patch if they want to rate these fellows. I think they're all pretty good myself. I think Simpson is an outstanding one, but when you come down to a guy that really took it as a corps commander, Lucian Truscott and Ted Brooks are my bet.

Q: Truscott certainly is first class.

A: He's a top-notch fellow all the way through. And he, he - in Anzio he had the 3rd Infantry Division. I fly in there soon after they land. That's another story that maybe you can't - you'll have to verify it, but anyhow my impressions are what I'm about to tell you. They're crowded in a little old beachhead 14 miles deep, and the Germans are looking down your throat, and I go out there with all these things going over you, and you land on the airfield - they're going over you - and the poor guys that have to meet you run out with a jeep say, "For god's sake get in here, General," and you go across there like hell and the plane, I don't know where it goes, and you end up at the front somewhere and - all under fire all the time. That went on-24 hours a day, off

and on. And I visited all these division commanders, the British as well. We had Lucas there. And Lucas was in his dugout; and he never believed in the thing. He was trying to do the best he could when I first went in. I go up and talk to Lucian Truscott, I said, "Why, Lucian, why have you stopped here?" He said, "I wanted to go on, and they won't let me go." He said, "I could go all the way up to the foot of the mountains and then I'd be through this thing; but this is where we drew the line, and here's where they want me to stop." I said, "Who issued those orders?" And he said, "Well, it came from Clark - 5th Army. It was Lucas." Well, we discussed the light airplane and how the Germans were moving their air force in now, and they were going to come in on them, but Lucien said, "I'll get them. I'm going to send my light planes up for bait, and they're going to duck down in these trees and when they come over we've got the machine guns set up; we're just going to burn them so that they don't ever come back." And he did it while I was there. I saw him knock three out of five of those fighters, German fighters, coming in there - not getting them coming in but getting them going away. Well then Alexander went up. He followed me up, oh, maybe the same day, maybe the day before, I forget which. But anyhow, he went up twice. And I went up, oh, pret'near every day. And Alexander told Clark he had to relieve Lucas: that the British commanders up there were scared to death and they weren't very well dug in and Lucas wasn't doing the job. Well, I'd visited Lucas, and I defended Lucas for about seven days. And I think about the seventh day, I - somewhere there's a story on it, I guess - I came back and said: get Lucas out of there as fast as you can and put Truscott in command; and that's the way Truscott got that command. Now, Clark recommended him - let's put it that way. Clark picked Truscott, he says, "Well I'll put Truscott in there." I said, "Who do you want", because that's the way we did it, "And we'll give Mike O'Daniel that division." And I said, "That's fine." And that was of course a perfect solution. So it's really the man that selected him - I simply approved it - would be Clark.

Q: You certainly approved of it thoroughly.

A: Yes, and I did it later on.

Q: But you picked Truscott for the...

A: I picked Truscott to go in the 6th Corps; he had the 6th Corps. And we selected Truscott to go into the south of France; you're darn right. And we gave him the 36th Division - pulled it out and got it ready and rebuilt. But we also gave him the 3d and the 45th, which were the two best divisions - if there were two best divisions at the time - because of experience. And the 36th, of course had a lot of men...

Q: Well, you would've liked to have kept him in southern France, but they had to have somebody back there and...

A: Well he stayed with me in southern France up until we broke through the passes. In fact, no, he stayed with me 'til about November, I guess, before we broke through the passes; because Truscott had, has an ailment today in his throat, and he gets very tired, and he just takes it on the lam. And I, uh, he wanted to go back to the States, and I recommended that he go back. So, in the interval there when he was up, he'd moved up the...well he was in Lyon, as a matter of fact, and we were separating, and putting him over on the Lyon-Nancy side and switching the French along back. That was a problem I can talk about, too, which I settled in Patch's headquarters between de Lattre and Sandy Patch. It wasn't hard to settle because Sandy was agreeable with it,

but it was one of those things that threatened to cause us a lot of trouble. And on the way back I think he stopped in to see Bedell - he and Bedell were close friends. And, because, when he came...he was gone quite a while and I was told to select a new corps commander. And they came up there, and Bradley asked me whether Ted Brooks would suit me and I said, "Boy, if you asked me who I was going to select in your whole command, I'd take Ted Brooks." Well, that fitted in because Harmon was coming - he got the 2nd Armored - and Ted came down to me. Ted's a, was a top-notch fellow. I've worked with him before, as a gunner, and he's smart and quick - had a good staff. And Truscott then came back; he got the army back on the, the river's there, the Moselle. And then when they needed an army commander down in, they made the switch in Italy, they sent Lucien down there. And he did a terrific job down there. Bolté will tell you something about his leadership because Bolté and I often talk about Lucien Truscott; we really agree about that fellow.

Q: Eisenhower listed him as one of the two men for the 15th Army [indistinct] but of course that army was never going to do anything, so he said, "I certainly won't stand in his way if they want to send him back down [indistinct]." Well, on the Mediterranean assignment; was it Gen. Marshall that picked you for that one?

A: I never can tell you. I was not disappointed, but I was hurt – if you want the sensitive side - because I was sleeping in the Dorchester Hotel, and I think it was Christmas eve, and the Times was stuck under my door – I'm not sure it wasn't Christmas morning, might've been the day before or the day after, but anyhow - and I saw up at the top: "Command Changes". So I immediately looked at the command changes and, gee, I find out I'm going to Africa - that's the first I knew about it. Now, actually, the cable had come in during the night and my staff blocked it and they brought it into me within an hour after I read it there and began to read what was going on. So that's the way I got my assignment to Africa. Now, I understand that Churchill is the man that made, got that assignment that way - I don't know how that happened. I was told that the British agreed. Now whether Marshall did it or...

Q: I haven't found it in his papers. I'd better talk to him about it.

A: You'll have to ask him about that because I think that was the last...must've been a decision that wasn't made very...although everybody knew this...as a matter of fact, one of the British officers told me – Weeks, who was a strong man we dealt with over there on the logistics side. He told me something about command changes the night before and I said, "Where am I going in this deal?" We all knew Eisenhower was coming up there. "Where am I going...what's going to happen to me?" He said, "Don't you know?" "No," I said, "I don't." He said, "I can't tell you." So I worried a little about that. I thought, well, I guess I'm canned. I was pretty sure that Bradley...

Q: Well he was already up there, wasn't he?

A: Yes, well he came back through there, on his way to the States, to talk to me about formation of a staff and who was available and who to get; and I had this list [indistinct], I guess it was a list that Gen. Marshall had sent me and I had collected, for my own staff, because I was planning to form a staff there. I knew; I'd formed seven staffs in this army and left most of the people behind, and the only one ever really caught up with me is Dave Barr; and he caught up because – well, Edwards wanted him as his deputy and he knew him; and I took Dave with me through the

rest of the war because he's a very fine officer and did a very fine job for me. And the only reason I left him behind is to keep the pieces together that you leave. So I worked with Bradley very closely, and then when he came back I was still there; and I set his headquarters up down at Bristol.

Q: Of course they didn't actually pick him to head the 12th Army Group for a good while.

A: No, I think, I think that's right. I think I had the 6th Army Group, and I think I was operational before they were in the 12th Army Group.

Q: I know Gen. Marshall asked Eisenhower if he would take him in the 6th Army Group and [indistinct] I don't know him, [indistinct] I like his record...and if you say so. I'll you who else found it out in the paper was Paget. He told me that it hurt him very much...

A: That's right. Paget was the other man. He was my...

Q: Blackmon heard it on the radio and came in and told him on Christmas day, because they announced Eisenhower's selection. Ike knew it on the 5th of December, I think, but it was kept quiet because Gen. Mar...no, he didn't know it! The decision was made at Cairo on the 5th. Gen. Marshall didn't come straight back and he assumed somebody had told Eisenhower. But what he did - somewhere along the way he took the little note which he had written out for Roosevelt to initial - a message to send Stalin saying that Eisenhower had been picked - and sent it to Eisenhower. Well, Eisenhower gets this about the 12th or 13th and it's the first knowledge that he knows, of what's happening; and the first word he got was that he was to come back to the United States, and since he knew that was in the wind, he assumed that's what it meant - that he was just to report back for a conference. Of course they kept that pretty close because of security. But I know Paget told me he was upset with that...

A: Well, Paget was, because I talked to Paget. You see he was my opposite number, really, on the command side and I saw a lot of him. He was excellent. He was all right...all of the maneuvers he and I worked together on.

Q: I'm not sure he'd have been as good a field commander as Monty, probably.

A: No, I think not. Monty had something that lots of people don't like to give him but I always have given him. He was a difficult fellow. I had an incident with him down in Africa when we were camped out there before the arch---what do they call it---the Yan [?] Bengazi on the way to Tripoli. I had an aide assigned to me, an Englishman with a monocle, a fellow that was very diffident to start with - very difficult - but after you got to know him, he was really a very fine, brilliant fellow. And I had a date to see Monty at 8:00 in his caravan; then I was going to go to the air officers' caravan which was right near, and I said to this aide, "Now I'd like to take Gen. Brooks with me. He's a major general and I'd like to have him here and meet Gen. Montgomery." "Oh," he said, "Don't do that, don't do that General, please don't do that," in his English way, and I said, "Why not?" "Well," he said, "my boss is a very peculiar man. If you do that he's liable to make you stand around for two hours before you go in there." Now, as a matter of fact, I didn't take Ted Brooks with me on that thing, but I didn't stand around - I went in there, I was in there 3 hours on that thing. We really talked things over, and...he's definite; he had opinions; he knew what the command ought to be; and I went over and talked to his air officer - I forget that name...

Q: Coningham.

A: Yes, that's right, Coningham. He had very definite ideas which didn't agree with Montgomery's, but he was carrying out Montgomery's ideas. [laughter]

Q: I talked to Coningham after the war and, I'll swear, for about an hour he did nothing but swear every time Montgomery's name was mentioned.

A: [laughter] Oh, boy. So there you were right in the desert fighting and here you have this support, but they were doing the job together. And of course a lot of credit should be given to the man that I - Alexander. Alexander's the guy...I slept in Alexander's caravan out there. He had two, and he set me up there and got me started on that. But he was the guy that was pushing the troops up there; he was pushing the logistics up there; he was checking Monty, and he's this way and that way and keeping things running smoothly. And they can say all they want to - it's Alexander. I think Alexander's probably the finest gentleman that you'll ever meet anywhere. I've met a lot of gentlemen just as fine, but he was quiet; I never heard him raise his voice; I heard him state his facts - if he was overruled you could almost see the flush on his face as you can with most Englishmen when they're cross, but never anything but the right, soldierly way to do it.

Q: Well now, someone told me that the big thing about Monty - he won the victory when they needed one desperately, and thereafter he wouldn't fight until he knew he could win it or until he had things ready. But I've heard British air people, other than Coningham, and many navy people say that they didn't like Monty, but he gave the British Army something they desperately needed - victory and confidence in themselves.

A: Well he certainly did. He was difficult. Nobody liked him. I don't know anybody who really liked Monty, but, doggone, he was successful, wasn't he? And he did it - he would wait. He was...I accused him of having that trouble with the hedgerows over there. And I talked to Monty in London before I left there...I said, "You've got the big job here. This command isn't set up the way I'd set it up. I'd have Eisenhower overall commander here, and you'd have the British side, and Bradley'd have the other side. That's the way I believe that command should've been set up; that's the way we built the dugouts." However, Monty got the overall command, I suppose, for political purposes - some good reason, I'm sure, for it. You've got to take this little three-letter word here - not Eden, but right across the channel. You've got to take it on schedule; and you've got to throw everything you've got in it. And if you don't you're going to be....hold it there and you may have trouble. Now, he didn't do that. They went in and got casualties and they did what the British always do - they stopped to relieve a division. That takes 48 hours and the Germans will lick you every time there. That's what caused that trouble there. What's the name of that...

Q: Caen.

A: Yah, C-a-e-n, Caen. That's what caused all that trouble. If he'd have drove in there the Germans would've had to give; and when they give, they pull back. They get logical and get out of the way. This way he did suck them in there and finally they broke through and caused a lot of damage to them, but...those are the things that I think count. That's the reason when I went into Anzio and here found them sitting on the line, I learned something. I said, "For criminee sake, why don't you go ahead?" Lucien says, "I want to go but they won't do it." I got after Clark

and Gruenther and they say, "We'll lose the corps - get licked." You see, we were supposed to make that a goal the next day. Now this is the background on it because we were going to...the 36th Division was going to cross the Gargliano, and they didn't. And there's a story there - why they didn't. I blame the British for that to some extent and Clark, too, and his leadership; but also, it was bad planning. However, Truscott gets command of this thing in Anzio. He goes right straight back to that CP; he takes it out in the open. He goes up and visits the two British division commanders and takes them up into the wadis, and shows them how they're going to defend those wadis and what they're going to be up against...makes them crawl up there on their bellies. He comes back to his CP. Alexander flies in there the next day; goes up there to see how his Britishers are feeling because they were really licked at the time, I would say. At least they were low - they didn't feel they had any leadership they needed. And, boy, when he came back he says, "Man, you selected the right man to command that outfit." He said, "These division commanders believe in Truscott absolutely and I don't think we're going to have too much trouble up there. We're going to have a lot of problems." There you are. That's the Truscott story as I saw it and believe it.

Q: Well, where did Clark have his main trouble? I noticed in a recent book on Cassino, written by Bruce Sheridan, he's very caustic about Clark at Anzio, and then...

A: Well, Clark had a very bad habit. First place, let's...Wayne Clark was over-ambitious. He was very young; he's brilliant in a way; he's lucky, awful lucky, and Marshall is the guy that made him. He's lucky in this way: he's up at Mariton Lake - G-3 - a very young G-3 on the staff. And Marshall comes in there, energetic, with a lot of old guys that're all going to be retired, and they have their first amphibious exercise. And Marshall flies down to Panama - that's the reason I know it - and he tells me we're...only had one amphibious exercise, and we're going to have to have more; and he says: the trouble is the commanders up there that have the know-how, and how this is going to be done, are all going to be retired; but there's one young fellow up there, Wayne Clark, who's got it all and we'll have to use him. Now the rest is hearsay to me, but Bill Dean - and he's right here in the city - I said Bill Dean, I mean Bill Morris, later commanded the 10th Armored Division, was G-1; and he takes a list of people in here to Marshall and on it is Wayne Clark going to Hawaii. And Marshall spots the name and all this...he hardly ever looked at those lists...he says - and Morris will tell you, but this is the way I heard it [chuckles] - he says, "You can't send that man out here. Order him down to the War College." He calls McNair and says you take Clark. Now, of all the people that McNair didn't want, he didn't want Clark. He didn't like Clark; he knew something about him. I get this from Lesley, and maybe the family, later. Lesly used to be my first lieutenant. But Clark tried to use everything in his bag. He didn't want to let me to go in to see McNair when I arrived there - although McNair was my buddy - 'til I got the proper thing. I walk through the door and tell Clark to go, too. [chuckles] It wasn't quite that bad. I'd go in there and change the papers in his basket and tell him I'm going to do it, because I wanted to get action when Les arrived. Well then, Clark knew that - and Clark told me this - Lesly was deaf so he didn't want to go up to Gen. Marshall's conferences. It was all right if he went and talked to Gen. Marshall alone, but when a crowd was in the room, he heard nothing. So he let Clark go up there - and the story, as I get it, and I get it pretty near from the horse's mouth - was the Clark began to take over. And when this thing to go abroad came up, he's the one that set the deal. And when they came back and made all these changes, they didn't tell McNair; that upset McNair. And I know a little bit about that, because I ran into that in Africa later on. And then I come through Algiers, and Clark is up there with Bedell; and he has

Clark as some kind of a command there - Ike leaned on him to do odd jobs. And he has Al Gruenther, who I think's probably one of the most brilliant young officers that I know of. He and Lemnitzer I class as the two who did the most good for me where I was. Well, I bring in these things and Bedell doesn't know much about it; so they send for Clark, and Clark doesn't know much about it; so they send for Al Gruenther, and he knows all about it. Now that same thing was in Spaatz's headquarters, if you want a little on the air force. I know Tooeey well, Doolittle. I go down and interview them. Vandenberg. Who do I get my information from? The guy that's commanding NATO now and they all, again, by far the outstanding man, and he's my other young guy that, to me, knew the stuff; knew the organization; knew what was going on; knew how it ought to be done; but they weren't getting the consideration. So when Al comes in, he verifies everything I say and we get something straightened out. Then I go up to Magis el Bad [?] where we're getting a licking, and getting shot at, and I'm under fire. I learn all about my tanks, and what they're thinking about, and why they have formed pretty definite opinions why they hadn't been as successful as they ought to have been. And I come back and the 5th Army's in being, and the chief of staff is Al Gruenther and the commanding is Wayne Clark. And that's the way that thing started. And they're sitting there back there in the mountains settin' up something new, and settin' people. Now, Clark was very much worried about his status; he said so to me. He was worried about Darlan. He thought he was...when they wanted to send him up to command the corps he didn't want to take that command because he thought the guy that got it was going to get canned. Again, I'm gossiping maybe, but you've probably heard this other places; and that's the way things go. And then his chief trouble after that, when he'd come down to command - Al Gruenther is the one who cleaned that place up, to me. Clark made the decision; there isn't any doubt about that; he's a strong character. But he damned the British every time he turned around. Jumbo Wilson once called me and says, "What's the matter with this man, Clark?" I said, "Well, Jumbo, there's nothing wrong with Clark, except that he just has to state what he thinks. He thinks he's god almighty; he thinks that it's got to be Clark's 5th Army, Clark this, Clark that, Clark everything else and," I said, "you just have to live with it. He doesn't mean everything he says; he's just damning some people and he'll get over it." I said, "He's a headache to me," I said, "If you want to know, I'd relieve him if I could, but I can't. Gen. Marshall wouldn't let me relieve him." I think that's the way I stated it.

Q: Well then, of course, Eisenhower was sold on him, I suppose.

A: Well, I don't know. Ike has never quite said that. He did do a job; he had that submarine. All you ever hear is Clark and his pants and \$50,000 or something. But Lemnitzer was in that. Adm. Wright was on that trip.

Q: Julius Holmes.

A: And Julius Holmes, all of whom were...

Q: And Murphy. [laughter]

A: And Murphy was on the shore. Well, you hear something of Murphy, but you never hear of the other three; never. And they really had more...as much to do with it as Clark did. Well, that's the point - now that's personality, and gets irritating after a while because...and I always suspected Clark of writing personal letters to Gen. Marshall. I never liked that and, I say I

suspect. I don't think it ever hurt me, but he certainly wrote personal letters back and what he said in those letters, I wouldn't know. Nobody will ever know I guess.

Q: I'm sure that kind of letter would be destroyed.

A: Yes. We had some problems there with Alexander, and with Randolph Churchill and a fellow by the name of McLain over in Yugoslavia, which was under our cognizance there, Marshal Wilson – Jumbo's command. And Jumbo knew these people; he knew everything about Syria - from Syria on up. He was an extremely capable commander in my book. But, damn it, those fellows had radios and they'd radio right straight in, in code, to Churchill; and Churchill was always interfering in our affairs. When he talks about that soft underbelly and all, there wasn't a British officer there - they might've said to him that, but they all knew they could never have gone up through those passes. The Germans would've knocked them off. They couldn't even get through the Italian part of it.

Q: Well now, did you get the impression that he actually thought they could go in through the Balkans, the pure [?] Balkans? Or whether he...he now says he didn't mean the Balkans; he was talking about the Adriatic.

A: Well he was talking about the Adriatic, but...

(End of reel # 1)

Q: Suppose, then, we start with just a little background on your knowledge of Stilwell and your estimate of him. Where did you first know him?

A: Well I first knew Joe Stilwell when I went back to West Point, when I went to West Point as a cadet. He was an instructor in Spanish and he was also coach of the basketball team. Well I was a basketball player. I played four years on the West Point team. And it was in the days when I was a plebe and a yearling that I had most of this close contact with Joe. Well, it was...I guess it was later than that. We had French two years there, and I took French first, and I wasn't so good in French. In fact I had a terrible time passing, getting through French; and you follow it with Spanish. Well I was in next to the last section, in Spanish, and Joe Stilwell was my instructor. And because he was also basketball coach, I guess, I must...I worked hard because I didn't want to be that low in a language again and I worried about all languages. I did about English. Well for some unknown reason, I went from the next-to-the-last section up to the second section. And I always gave Joe Stilwell credit for inspiring me in this language business. Now, on the basketball court he was just as sarcastic as he could be, but he, his sarcasm always brought out in me the things that made me do better, if such a thing was possible. For instance, I said when I was a yearling or a plebe - actually this was second classman or first classman; because when I was captain of the team, he used to come down and sit alongside of me and say, "What's worrying you? What's eatin' you?" And I remember distinctly this episode, with reference to him. I said, "Well, you're always talking to me about going into the infantry, and I know I want to go into field artillery; and I'm not going to make it unless I can stand higher, and I'm losing out in the mounted service. And I think Gen. Henry is giving me the works down there." [chuckle] I said, "Every time I go in there he gives me something that's different than anybody else, and I sort of think he's picked out on me and I'm a terrible failure." "Oh," he said, "don't worry about that." So I know he must've talked to Gen. Henry because, if anything, Gen.

Henry worked on me more, and I guess I didn't do too badly. But anyhow, I did make a pretty good mark in mounted service later on. And, again, he'd come down and sit alongside of me in a game...before one of our big games, and he'd say, "Jake, what're you worrying about?" I said, "I'm not worrying about anything. I just want to be right, for tomorrow." And he said, well - and he'd always, then, say something that would make me mad or make me do better; he never...and so I admired him greatly. And I knew his sarcasm; he really rides some people, and rides them straightforward-like. He had an old Ford car he'd crank, and broke his arm, and that was a stupid thing to do and he said it was a stupid thing. So I followed him all through the career. I almost went to the infantry and almost went to his regiment. But I did make the artillery so that didn't happen. And I know, later, when he was down at Benning, he was under Marshall and he was always against everything that Gen. Marshall was trying to put in there. Joe was leading the youngsters, you see. He was also one of these fellows that run these racers, you know. He was a – what do you call them? Distance racers...

Q: Pentathlon?

A: No, not the pentathlon...endurance races.

Q: Marathon.

A: Marathon. He was running them down there at Benning when he was 50 and more years old. That was crazy, I thought. I told him so. So I had the impression; well, Joe, you're just causing a lot of trouble down there. He had Marshall's Three section, as I remember, and then I told you the story about how I got on this ship and what Clay Stayer, this medical officer, said. He said, "Well I'll predict that Gen. Marshall, the first general officer he makes is Joe Stilwell." And, by golly, that's the way it turned out. Well then, later on I talked, I had a very short conversation with Gen. Marshall and Joe Stilwell's name came up, and I said, "Well, seems to me when you selected Joe Stilwell to go back to China, you selected the one man that knew China backward and forward." He spent most of his life out in the Bosky there; he knew the dialects; he was interested in the country, and he should have known the people well. Well, later on...I mentioned about my getting this "eyes only" from Gen. Marshall during the war - Joe Stilwell will arrive in your theater on such and such a date. I want him to meet the King and all of the British staff, particularly the Prime Minister. See that he gets royal treatment - and I was a little worried. I really was, because Joe had this reputation. But he played ball with me, and in our conversation with him he said the trouble – and, now, maybe this oughtn't to be in the record but I assume you'll handle it - he said, "The trouble with the British is that they haven't got anybody. There's only one man"... He had no use for the British commanders, and that included Alexander, and the only man that he had real confidence in was Slim. He said "They've got one man out there that'll save the day, and that's Slim." And that's all that I know about it. He told me about his troubles, some of his troubles out there and they were...that's about all I know about Joe. He came back, you know, and I was then commanding the field forces - a four-star general, senior to him - and he commanded the 6th Army where he died out there in San Francisco. And he was always perfectly wonderful with me.

Q: He first came to the War College, didn't he?

A: He came down to the War College. He had CONAR, you see, the field forces. He took it over from Ben Lear and didn't like a thing about it. In fact, I think he told - I don't know what

happened – but he said he couldn't live in that big house, he said he didn't have enough furniture; so Gen. Marshall fixed it up for him. I inherited the house pretty well fixed up, because I followed Joe Stilwell in that job and then, when he went out to command the 20th Army. But I never saw him in that interval. I only saw him when he came back because they wouldn't let him go to China.

Q: He left and went out and took Buckner's...

A: Buckner's Army, when Buckner was killed. That's right.

Q: The 10th.

A: 10th.

Q: Oh, and that's how the vacancy was there when you came back.

A: That's right.

Q: It wasn't a matter of pushing him out to make a place for you.

A: No, no, certainly not. No, there was a vacancy there. I don't know how Gen. Marshall decided to give me that job, but he evidently had something else on his mind at the time, because when I came back I thought that's what I was going to get. I was told that by one of the aides - who didn't know, I guess, enough but he'd heard conversation. But when I spoke to Gen. Marshall, I got the idea that I was to go on around this circuit which was going to take me pret'near a month, and I was going to get 10 days down in Miami, and I wasn't going to get back for 30 days, that there might not, I might not go to the field forces. So I was a little nervous about it. But when I came back he...that was it.

Q: You certainly had no impression this was a lack of confidence in you, did you?

A: No I didn't. [chuckle] No, I never gave him any cause to have a lack of confidence in me, really, I just happened to be lucky, I guess.

Q: I was just reading the other day - after I saw you, I went back and looked at this Top Secret book. And Ingersoll makes a point about the fact that you didn't know where you stood with Gen. Marshall - that you felt that he'd lost confidence in you and that this made your life very unpleasant in those months in the fall of 1943. Well I suppose everybody at some time gets to wondering: well, just where do I stand? Did you have that feeling that he...

A: Well I don't know how Ingersoll could've written a thing like that. In the first place, I never talked to Ingersoll more than 15 minutes when he was coming back to the States, and I don't know whether that was in that conversation. I told him what our problems were. He was brought over there by Dan Noce, who was my G-4 and is down here at Culpepper now, and I didn't know anything about Ingersoll. But he was going back to the States and I said, "Well, if you're going back you'd better go in and see Gen. Marshall and tell him what's the situation here. You've been listening in on these conferences; and just tell him what our problems are." I made one point about I'd like to be notified, but I never, I never worried about having lack of confidence in me with Gen. Marshall. In fact, I was sure that if Gen. Marshall had gotten that command, I'd

have been one of the commanders under him in that theater. Now that's the way I always have felt.

Q: He says, for example, that you kept writing letters back, and that...trying to figure out where the General, where you stood with the General, and the General wouldn't answer. Well, I don't find...

A: I can't find it anywhere – oh, I never wrote a letter to Gen. Marshall. You don't find many letters from me to Gen. Marshall. I doubt if you'd find any - personal letters.

Q: Well I think they're the usual reports.

A: Just the usual reports. I don't...I never wrote a personal letter to Gen. Marshall, I don't believe.

Q: Now he did encourage that with Eisenhower later, but you'll find 10 from Eisenhower to one from Gen. Marshall. I mean, he didn't undertake to answer them all.

A: No.

Q: He did, quite often, encourage this type of report-letter which was written as a personal letter so it didn't go through all the branches. But it was really a sort of report on what you'd found. But, I never found any great lot of it.

A: I don't think you'll find very much from me. If I ever did that, I don't know it.

Q: What I don't know is where Ingersoll gets all this stuff. He writes the same way about Gen. Bradley. And Gen. Bradley has told me of a dozen cases of where it's not true. Now I think at times, perhaps, some of the low men on the totem pole on the staff of people sometimes get more worked up about their boss, or get to guessing things, and they talk too much.

A: Well I never even...I don't remember meeting Ingersoll more than three times in my whole service. I just don't know how he gets those things. Now he was close to Noce, Dan Noce. And I don't know what their relationships were except he was with Dan Noce when Dan Noce was working on this amphibious business.

Q: He said that's how he came, got to be there – because of the amphibious thing.

A: And when I needed - Noce had been my engineer officer in the Armored Force, and he went up to Washington on this amphibious work. When I got to England I needed a G-4, so I said, well let's get Noce back here – he's an engineer and a top-notch man; and when he came he brought Ingersoll with him. I didn't know that Ingersoll was a writer and that he had - later on I read a lot about him. When Top Secret came out I learned a lot that I didn't know, but I wouldn't... A lot of the things that Ingersoll has in his book are true. It's the way he presents them. We did get Johnny-come-lately.

Q: He's a journalist.

A: Yes, a journalist. We were Johnny-come-lately. We did have a rough time in trying to organize our staff. I had a terrific time in organizing the staff over there because I had John C. H.

Lee – he’s a classmate of mine. I was briefed very thoroughly by Somervell before I went over about the whole thing.

Q: Was Somervell a classmate too?

A: No, Somervell wasn't. Somervell was two, three years after me.

Q: The reason I asked that - I had the impression that he and Lee had been roommates.

A: No, well not as cadets. No, John C.H. Lee was a, quite a brilliant, young fellow from Junction City, Kansas, and he had had some difficulties. He was a cheerleader, and he was a good one as a cadet, but he had his weaknesses. And I really went over there thinking I was going to have to ask for his relief. The only reason I didn't ask for his relief is that when I got over there he had toned up his command considerably. But he has a proclivity for getting in little troubles here and there. Why, I would never know. He tried to raise the Negro question for me and I just slapped him down on that. And then, when I organized my staff, I was trying to solve this logistic problem. Here’s Lee - has all the logistics. He’s got the big buildup; he’s got a big organization. Why shouldn't he be the G-4 for my staff? Why did I need a G-4 just to go over what he was doing? So I tried to eliminate that; but in doing it I insisted that he bring back a man by the name of Bobby Crawford, from Cairo, who I knew fairly well. And John C.H. Lee didn't want to do it. I said, “Well I want Crawford on your staff as your deputy.” Now, I was thinking about other things too - I was thinking about somebody to take his place. Well I got Crawford back there and my staff then began to complain. They’d say, "But General, you’re not getting a G-4 report in here from your staff that’s fair. It is always balanced in Lee's favor. He’s not...he’s got two hats here and the rest are suffering from this." Well, I saw the handwriting on the wall there, so I brought Crawford over and made him my G-4, but limited him in policy, to policy. And I said, "Now don't go trying to run Johnny Lee's organization. When it comes over here, don't try to rewrite what he’s doing; but keep me informed as to whether we ought to do this or do that and follow up on these bigger policy things; and if our policy isn't right, change it." Well, it worked pretty well but when I left there, Eisenhower didn't do that - he threw all that back on Lee, which gave Lee terrific power. I had to tell Lee that that train wasn't his train - that that train belonged to me and that he could use it. He got it from the Prime Minister, but we used it for all of our staff work. Well, to this day they don't know how to solve this staff problem on logistics; they haven't solved it yet. And I think it’s something you just have to camp on. Logistics is the biggest problem you have in fighting, as far as I’m concerned. You can't fight anymore with stones and things of that sort. You can get along without food, but you can't get along without real bullets; and you’ve got to have them; and if you haven't got them you’ve just got to get out of there until you get them.

Q: Fuel will get you down.

A: Fuel will get you down. All those things - transportation and mobility. And it takes quite an organization; and it’s going to take more in the future. So I think that the top commander ought to have a policy man and a real man running that other thing. Now Somervell did it over here for Marshall because Gen. Marshall had exactly the same problem; and he had a G-4 which he was operating later. He did this later, here, but it never seemed satisfactory to the people that were operating. [secretary interrupts the interview about an appointment]

Q: I talked to Crawford later on when I was working on the SHAEF story and I had the feeling that he felt that he was a little bit crowded out of the picture there by Lee's headquarters, and he never did get the proper say about what was happening. He apparently was in a less good position after Eisenhower took over than he was before.

A: Well I'm sure he was - that part of it. Well, of course, he wanted to build up a big staff over in my staff. Why should I duplicate Lee's staff over in my staff? Lee had Lord over there with him, a pretty brilliant, smart, ruthless young fellow that got things done; and I knew all about Lord because he had been at West Point ahead of me under Fleming as graduate manager of athletics, and he was his assistant, and Lord was the guy that built the skating rink, and did the work on the football stadium and the polo - some of the things up there - so I knew Lord as an operator. But Lord had to be watched; he'd violate policy and everything, and run right over you.

Q: Well it's odd - Lee later became suspicious of Lord. I was surprised about that but he didn't talk well about him at all.

A: Well Lord, I could talk to Lord. I knew him; I knew where he'd slip; and I knew that you had to watch him. That's true. But also on Stark's staff, Stark had a naval officer over there that was a brilliant fellow, had been divorced - oh, I never can think of his name - but he and Lord were like that; I think they're in business today; they're sharpies. But when you want something done, if you handle those two fellows right - and I thought I did - you really got something done and there wasn't any quibbling about it. They just told you: if you're willing to take this chance, sure we can do it; and they'd get it done. I had to operate that way because there were a lot of things to be done and you couldn't do them all yourself.

Q: Lee quite often got a bad press because of this business like the train. He made a big show of it.

A: Well, he was always running around. He got up early in the morning. He got there at very unusual hours. He got off and he demanded everything. This, and then he'd always bring in... he got on the religious side, over-bounced on the religious side sometimes, and he could sit here and sketch you and it would be you when you got through with it. He could sit down and create right here a new cheerlead yell, or he could write poetry. He had all those...he was quite a fabulous fellow, in his way. And he was, well, he had this puffed-up idea. And today he writes...I think he's crazy right at the moment. He writes these funny letters to us all, "Brother Jake" and all this business, and then what he's going to do should he...about his family and so forth. He's up in my hometown of York, in the St. Andrews Society. And, well I don't want to say anything more, but he has a hard time. I can't even get to see him when I go up there unless I make a special point because he's trying to play both ends against the middle. You can't do that - not in my hometown of York. That's really a religious town and you have to be aboveboard. You can't be on the fringes.

Q: But now, apparently, at certain points, various people were not quite sure that Lee ought to stay on there. I gather Gen. Eisenhower had his doubts about it, and Gen. Marshall did. Was it Somervell that kept saving him, or what?

A: No. When you went over there and took that thing over and read the magnitude of it, to make a real change on the job you'd wonder who you were going to put in there was better. He had a very difficult job. The British, I think, liked him. I think he got along well with the British. He just did these foolish things: like I think all those ships out there that Eisenhower let him have out there in the, in that landing. That was something that I wouldn't have thought of permitting because of the conditions which I was told all the time existed in that channel - and he didn't need to do that. He could've had those ships coming across the ocean with...so that he could figure out what he needed in supplies. He didn't have to have them anchored out there; and I guess they were dispersed. At least they couldn't find, they said at times, the fuel, and all the various troubles they had. Now they had a terrific job - maybe there wasn't any way to do it. We did it differently, but we had better weather too. We had weather in our favor.

Q: That's right. You had your own supplies.

A: Yes, I came through Marseille, and that port was important, and we had to get that port in 30 days, and we got it in 30 days. But it only took a lot of driving from the top side. I was down there all the time and everything I could do to raise a row with those people was done. My staff all worked hard on it.

Q: Was Wilson your supply man?

A: Well Wilson, yes. He was the man I insisted with the advanced section. No, Tom Larkin.

Q: Oh, yes.

A: Tom Larkin, I think, is the finest that they had in either theater and he was doing nothing. I found him in Oran and put him in there, but he didn't like Wilson. But I said Wilson's got to have the advanced base, because I know Wilson and I can handle him up there and if you have trouble with him then you come to me about it. But I want Wilson up there because I need a guy like Wilson.

Q: He's an operator, too.

A: He's an operator. And I said: he'll operate for me and he'll keep out of trouble. He'll come in and I know just what he's going to say, but if we don't have a man like that we're going to be in trouble.

Q: Is he the man that Sutherland had thrown out of Australia?

A: Yes, yes. He had taken Vaughn over there - the President's aide. He took Harry Vaughn out of that office and he went over there and he was starting to operate too much, and I guess...

Q: Oh, Wilson took Vaughn?

A: Yes, he took Vaughn out there and he took, oh...another Wilson in the aircraft business with him.

Q: This is Arthur Wilson

A: Arthur Wilson's the one I'm talking about. He died here recently. I knew him quite well. He was an artilleryman and he was, he helped put the armored force into business in the very early days. He was one of the young artilleryman assigned to Van Voorhis down at Eustis. And he used to come up and talk to Chaffee; and he was on the G-4 side of it there, I believe. So I saw a lot of Arthur Wilson and knew a lot about him. And then I knew about his troubles, when he...Harrington brought him into WPA I think - I get those letters mixed up - but he did a yeoman's service there and that's where he contacted Gen. Marshall - up at [Amering?] Lake.

Q: Gen. Marshall was very strong for him.

A: Marshall said...I said to him: Arthur Wilson's the fellow to put on this. He said, "I know it. Everybody says he can, they send him out, he does it, but he sure does leave a trail of blood behind him you have to clean up." [chuckle] Which was true. But, the man, sometimes you have to do things to get them done when you're fighting; or anything - when you have to overcome all this resistance, you've simply got to do it. And if you can get a man that has that kind of courage, he's well worth using. Now you can't let him go out all hog-wild, and I thought he had good judgment, myself.

Q: Well, did the 6th Army Group ever come under Lee...

A: No.

Q: ...towards the end of the war?

A: No.

Q: You kept your own setup to the last.

A: Well, when I came under Eisenhower, Lee had nothing to do with me because we were running our own source of supply. So I never got anything from the 12th Army Group but trouble.

Q: SOLOC stayed in existence, then, until the end of the war.

A: Yes, as far as I know it - yes, I know it did. Tom Larkin; because they took Tom Larkin from me to put him up in Lee's job.

Q: Yes, I got the impression that he was a very outstanding man, Larkin.

A: Yes, Larkin was a top-notch fellow. I had...you see, the one thing about the 6th Army Group that a lot of people don't realize...it was organized, I think the first army group that was organized - Bradley was organizing one - but if you look at the dates I think you'll find we that were authorized, we were organized on the island of Corsica and I picked my chief of staff, Dave Barr, who had been with me, and I told him that he would pick the section chiefs that he wanted but that he had to come to see me about it. He had been talking to me day and day out; he knew who I thought was doing the job and who wasn't. But I would just like to look over them because I thought they were going to work more closely with him. And I said if we can agree on your deputy, Shepherd - who had been with the Third Infantry Division and had gotten some skin disease and the doctor said yes, you can use him but he can't go back into combat - I think we got a pretty good balanced start here. And I want this staff to be small; and I said,

"Dave, I mean small. If you make this big and get it overwhel...too big, it won't work; and I want it to carry out policy." Well now, that's the way we operated. We had the smallest staff, I think, that's ever done a job like that. We were absolutely organized on Leavenworth lines - the things we had been taught were sound then, and it's sound today. What they had north of us, I think, was most unsound and has caused most of their troubles. My G-4, Adcock, only laid down, uh, carried out policy. He told them what tonnage, he knew what tonnages he had and he distributed the tonnages at G-4. And he had a job, because he had the French Army and the 7th Army and the Air Force and the Navy, too, to some extent. Well I never had any trouble. Adcock just said, well, you'll get so much tonnage today; if you want to haul steel up there instead of provisions, that's your business; but this is all we can give you and the reason is: this is the strategy behind it, and this is the way it's got to go. And I never had any trouble. Adcock came back and went to work for Clay up there in the can company. Adcock retired he tells me; he's out in... I always ask about him, because there was one of my jobs. Now the supply end of it was Tom Larkin. Well, Tom Larkin and Adcock evidently got along fine together. I'm sure they did. But at the head of, at that point, getting supplies up in that 7th Army Group was Wilson. Now he had a lot of good men with him, too. I never can remember his name, but he ran for governor of Minnesota here...was his deputy. He was his balance wheel, was Wilson's balance wheel and I knew that. A great big fellow, he comes in here and sees me off. When Wilson got into trouble, it was - this is where my memory's bad, because I don't see those fellows very often, but you can check that name. And I think he deserves an awful lot of credit for the way that section ran, and particularly the advanced section, when we got...and they were up close to us all the time. Wilson would go down like a fellow running for election with a lot of cigars in his pocket. He had a caravan with a lot of new coats from the Air Force and things, and he'd go visit France. And he'd go in to Gen. de Lattre and have one of those coats on and de Lattre would say, "Where'd you get that?" And Wilson said, "Why? Do you want one of those?" "I sure do." He'd go out in his caravan and come in and give him one. [laughter] He'd go down, visit a corps commander, find out their troubles; and the real things he immediately did something about. But he always had this little touch that people didn't know about, and would've been afraid to do, because they'd have thought they'd have to sign a book for doggone coats. That's the way he did those things and the load that takes off, and the morale it builds up, is out of this world. Now you can talk all you want to anybody you want to, but it's these little things that I think help if you can get the right personality.

Q: That's right.

A: But if you've got a guy in there that every day somebody's complaining about, and you think he's a good man, don't stick with him all the time - kick him upstairs or to some job he can do, but, put a man in there that's still got that ability but can get along with people. Otherwise you create too much trouble for yourself and you can't sleep.

Q: It's all right to talk about delegating, but you've got to delegate to somebody that you...

A: That's right. And when you've got troubles or you know where it is, you've got to be there. You've got to go yourself. You don't need to go where things are going right. I think I was particularly lucky there, as I say, with Cabot Lodge and the section he set up for me and the way he operated; and he knew just what he could do. I would've had trouble with Bill Bullitt. I told that story, didn't I, about Bill Bullitt?

Q: No, you didn't mention him.

A: Well, maybe that's interesting. I'm commanding; I finally get – I say I - well anyhow, we finally get the British to move our headquarters to Caserta and that was done by my staff, and me personally. Eaker was over there. He went...I advised him to go direct from England down there, pick up his stuff and get over to Caserta. And he went over and built himself a nice headquarters and then started building one for me up in the, oh, the English forest we called it. And I'm entertaining up in my headquarters in that forest, in buildings that we've carried in there and built for the British and my staff, and Bill Bullitt comes in with the French.

Q: He was a major wasn't he?

A: He was...well he wasn't a major. He came in as a writer, I guess he came in as a writer for Life, Time and Fortune - that's the way he got into Naples. And I suspect he immediately went to the French headquarters. But when he was up there he sat down with Marshal Wilson, Jumbo, and myself and Ira Eaker, Alexander - I don't know who else was in there, but not very many more - and we began to discuss the Russians. And Bill Bullitt, "Boy," he said, "You can't depend on them; they'll let you down every time." He said, "They're going to be of no value to us whatsoever." And I said, "Good golly, Bill, if they don't do what they say they're going to do, we're in trouble. Now, I've got to believe in them." I said, "I think maybe they'll be like we were when we hadn't grown up. If we get the proper help, we can go somewhere." But Bill Bullitt's conversation that night, which I didn't want to agree with, and didn't agree with, was just as right and 100 % perfect as anything I ever listened to. Later on it proved so. And the next morning I wake up and he's a major in the French Army and on de Lattre's staff. Now de Lattre thought he could use him, you see, up in Eisenhower's headquarters because Bill Bullitt had been in Russia; he'd come back through Poland; he'd been in France. He has these capabilities. He's way up here one day on the peak of the world, and he's way down here on the next. And he began to work behind the scenes a little bit, which caused me some trouble with Gen.... But Cabot Lodge was too smart for him, [chuckle] and kept pretty much control on this thing and I told Cabot, I said, "Look, now this fellow is going to stir up trouble with me with Eisenhower. I have enough troubles and I want to keep out of trouble up there. We'll do our job, but I don't want to be having things go up there about the French. I want to handle the French because I believe in them, and I want my whole staff to believe in them, and I don't want to have "ifs" and any "ands" about it. We've got to depend on them. They've got a big part of this to do and they can do it." Well, that's the way it worked out. We had one episode - I don't know whether Gen. Marshall ever told you about it - his coming over there to visit me and my taking him over to de Lattre's headquarters and we have the gommies outside, and the drums the French always put on, you know, a nice little show. And we walk up into the briefing room, and Gen. de Lattre's briefing and talking along there, and then all of a sudden he stops and he lands into Sandy Patch, the 7th Army commander. He needed this and he needed that and he didn't get his share of this and he didn't get his share of that; and here I'm standing... And fortunately Gen. Marshall, in his big way, sensed, I guess...anyhow he did the right thing. He said, "Now wait a minute." And he took over. I was just making up my mind that I had to step in here because it was – I'm in trouble now. And he said, "I've heard a lot of this talk and what's going around here, and I want to hear no more about it." He said, "I feel that things have been done the best they can be done and you're being successful and let's get on with things that count." Well on the way back, de Lattre rode with Gen. Marshall. I rode with Tom Handy who was over there,

and I told Tom, I said, "Now that's an episode that's really going to cost me something. I don't know whether I'm a fool or whether I was weak or whether I did the right thing or what I should've done in here, but Gen. Marshall certainly brought the subject up and I want to tell you - because I am going to tell Gen. Marshall - but I want to tell you because you're a little closer to me than I am to Gen. Marshall, that Sandy Patch did everything, when we were advancing into France here, that he could for the French Army. And if there's anything that isn't, here, isn't right, it isn't Sandy Patch. I don't want Sandy Patch to be blamed for anything that's wrong here. Blame it on Devers. We did this, and we have reasons for what we did, and we think the French are doing fine. This is just a little thing that I think Bill Bullitt planted in this man's mind because he thought maybe it would work for something that I don't think has anything to do with this part of the theater. Well, it worked out all right. I don't know what Gen. Marshall thought. I never... I talked to him about it, I said, "I just want you to know that that was a very embarrassing situation for me - more so for you - and I don't know whether I should've stepped in sooner or not. But what you said was correct, and that's the way it'll be and I know what the policy is and that's what we're going to do." And that's the last I ever heard of it.

Q: He told me once that he had to straighten out de Lattre.

A: Well, he did it. He straightened him out just like nobody's business; and it was better that way. If I'd have butted it in, de Lattre would've always thought that I had taken the initiative away from the top man. I thought about this a lot afterwards: how would you handle that situation if you had to do it again?

Q: A very good point.

A: And I don't know that I would've handled it any different. Now if it hadn't been Gen. Marshall, I might've had to do something; but he did it, and he did it right. And those are the things I think you always remember.

Q: Well, while we're talking about de Lattre. Go into your relationship with him - I mean tell me, first of all - I've met him. But I'd like, first, your impression of him and then some of the problems you had with him.

A: Well, I guess I'm on record about Gen. de Lattre. I consider Gen. de Lattre a very ambitious man who had a great deal of ability - tremendous ability in a very difficult situation. We never liked him very much. He was hard to deal with, but I made a rule from the start that everything that I handled with de Lattre would be done with just Gen. de Lattre and myself with our two interpreters. We never would have the staff in there. We never would let an issue come up in the presence of anybody else but the four of us. Whether that was a wise decision or not, I think you can say it was because we had some very real conferences. De Lattre would come into my headquarters irate. We almost knew what he was going to do. We'd always get off together, and a conversation would start, and he would start talking. Now he paced the floor like MacArthur - up and down, up and down, up and down - talking with his hands more than MacArthur ever did, but talking. And Cabot Lodge was interpreting, always interpreting, behind me, and I was listening. Now DeSouci was the other man and DeSouci - we had his confidence completely. De Lattre was a very difficult man to work with. The French staff had trouble working with him, they didn't like what he did at times but they had to go with it, and they knew that I knew this because they talked very frankly to me when they had to come up and make certain reports,

which they did at times. They were loyal. There was no disloyalty ever in that thing and I never would permit anything like that if I knew about it. I remember distinctly one episode. There are many of them and when you talk to Cabot Lodge he'll tell you another. We had quite a difficult problem of getting ready to go through the passes. The French were all lined up. They were being re-equipped. It was getting toward winter so the Senegalese had to be pulled out. They couldn't work in winter, but we had to take their rifles from them. We couldn't take their clothing so we had to re-clothe the people that went in there some way. We had many problems on the French side - building up enough ammunition for them to go through the Belfort pass. And I remember the Belfort pass was something that in the First World War was, in their mind, it couldn't be done. It just couldn't be done - what they were going to have to do. And the 7th Army was posed up the Severne pass; they were to go through there. In between we have those Vosges Mountains and little roads and whatnot. But that's what we were going to do - drive right through to the Rhine; one to Mulhouse and the other to Strasbourg. And we worked hard on the intelligence of this thing. And we got de Lattre worked up to it. He was very doubtful about it. He always brought up what he needed and we couldn't give him everything he needed. I finally went down with Cabot Lodge and I had a very real talk - conversation with him in which I pointed out what was in front of him, from my G-2s, with my own estimate of the situation as I received it from both his man and my men, and everything we could get; and de Lattre insisted there was more there. Finally he decided that...he wouldn't give me that he'd jump off on - what was it - the fifteenth or the thirteenth of November, when the 7th Army was going to jump. And low and behold, about a week before this, de Gaulle was going to bring Churchill down there on the very day they were to jump off. Well that was a terrible thing, from my viewpoint. So I decided I had to be up with the 7th Army. So I decided to send Cabot Lodge down there to represent me with the Prime Minister and de Gaulle, since he spoke perfect French and I had perfect confidence in him. And my instructions were to him, "Cabot, go down there and represent me. When you're visiting these headquarters, work on this thing and try in every possible way to get those two people out of there and on their train and on their way home. Anything you can do to expedite that'll be fine. Then you get a hold of de Lattre, and don't let him go to sleep. Stay with him and tell him that I said I've got to have an answer. Is he going to jump off or isn't he going to jump off; and if he is going to jump off, what time is he going to jump off?" and I had a code. Well it snowed, so there was a good excuse for him not to jump off. They came in and slipped and slid like the French run you through those passes and mountains, and why they didn't get killed I don't know. But anyhow, they got up and they visited the corps and they had something to eat and they finally, they got them back; and along about midnight the train took off to go back to Paris or whichever way they were going back. And about 2:00 in the morning I got a telephone call from Lodge, and he gave me the time: he said he's going to jump off at noon tomorrow. Well, he jumped off at noon, on the time he said. And they had a tremendous artillery fire - that's the way the French always got started...I guess everybody does, but they more than anybody I know of. And low and behold they captured the corps commander and his aide - they killed the corps commander, captured his aide with his plans. I'll always remember that second Algerian division, when they got that information. They got that back to de Lattre and it was almost exactly what we said was in front of them. We didn't have all the numbers right but the amount was there. They just went through that pass like nobody's business and they were in Mulhouse before you could turn around; and they were so enthusiastic about it they didn't prepare themselves. So the Germans counter-attack and they go right through the middle of them and hit the Swiss border. They can't go any further so they have to come back.

And the congestion on those roads down there, my staff officers tell me... I sent my chief of staff, finally, down there. "Go down there with Lodge," I said, "and take hold of the traffic and clean it up because we can't have this happen." Well Béthouart was the corps commander, one of the corps commanders down there, and Monsabert [?] was the other, and Béthouart always talks about this because he was very chagrined that they didn't get across the river the way they should. But they did get Mulhouse and...

Q: They held it.

A: And they held it, yes. And they were just afraid that there was a - two or three corps of Germans in there and going to be counter-attacked like the First World War. Well, the Germans tried to put up a bluff about it; and they did stop us; and shield us down there. That's where we got - I forget how many miles we were outside of Mulhouse and we were back into the Vosges Mountains but of course we were very successful on the north and we had taken off the day before - 24 hours before that; well, a little more than 24 hours before - and had been very successful at Severne pass. And here the second French Armored Division, when they were finally turned loose, went into Strasbourg like nobody's business. I'll never know how they did it but they did it. They had good...and then they wouldn't go out - they wouldn't go south. If they'd have gone south along the river, as I wanted them - I went down and tried to get them to do...but I just could not get LeClerc to do it. He thought he'd get too many casualties. And he gave me the excuse that it was not an armored division's terrain; it was an infantry division's terrain. But I said: we haven't got an infantry division - we've got no reserves. And we don't want... What good do you do sitting here in Strasbourg? He made the move, but he didn't do anything about it. And that caused the Colmar Pocket.

Q: Was there a tendency, too, for him and the others to put on a certain amount of parading?

A: Well, in every city they went into - yes - any big city they took. And our policy down there and I had a frank talk with Patch about it. I said, "Let them take the big cities. They can do more about it; it builds up their prestige; and what do you want with them - they're just trouble. You've got to send people in that you haven't got, to speak French, and our people will go in there and work with them." And by the way, I had a real good military government section in this game. Now, Spaford had it down in...Chuck Spaford was with Bedell in Africa, you see, and so I got Chuck and this man who just died up here in...

Q: Parkman.

A: Parkman was his deputy. And when I went into the south of France, I called Spaford in and I said, "Now Spaford, I'd like to take you into the south of France, but it's your decision. It's either you or Sparkman. Now, if you want to go, I'd like to take you and then Sparkman will take over this job back here that you had. And if you want to stay here for reasons which you probably know better, well that's alright with me. But it has to be - that's the way we have to divide this up." And he said, well...he came back later on and said Sparkman would be the man who went in there. Well, Sparkman did a terrific job, I thought.

Q: Now he was Parkman, or was it Sparkman?

A: Parkman, yes.

Q: He was the 6th Army Group.

A: He was the 6th Army Group.

Q: G-5.

A: That's right, G-5. Spaford was the G-5 for me down in Africa, in the theater, under Wilson. I'm not sure that he didn't head up that section in Wilson's staff, because I think he was a holdover from Ike. I think he had it when Ike had it. And I don't think...my memory – I'd have to read about that, but we had very little trouble with military government with those two fellows.

Q: How long did you keep both hats as theater commander and 6th Army...

A: Well, too long. That was embarrassing. I had, I think McNarney...they finally decided to send McNarney out there to relieve me in November, just before we went through the pass - the early part of November or last part of October.

Q: It was about three months that you...

A: Yes, I had all of it. I flew back there once or twice.

Q: Well, I mean, three months after you landed you had those two hats.

A: I had the two hats. I commanded the 6th Army Group and I commanded the theater; I mean the American side of that theater under Jumbo. But I wasn't under Jumbo, except the part I had - I was under Jumbo 'til we arrived... 'til the 15th day of September. We landed on the 15th day of August and the 15th day of September I became operational. Officially, I came under Eisenhower, so that the part I had in Africa, I mean in France, wasn't under Wilson. You see, that's where the separation came and we handled that pretty well. You see we had a problem there; we worked very well with the British on that. The British had let me have their airborne brigade to supplement my airborne force that I brought in to the south of France under Frederick. That's the way I got that extra division to protect my right flank on the Italian Riviera - the French front - and I put Frederick under that. We organized that down there. And I got Ira Eaker; we found out that all the transport was in England...they weren't using them and we could certainly get a hold of them. And we had all these troops, which had been trained for this kind of work, up fighting with infantry and not being used at all as airborne troops. We had a lot of gliders, so Eaker and I started – oh, three or four months - to get this force together and get them going and when we took Rome, I called...Frederick was promoted a major general on the battlefield at Cassino in the breakout there, and we promoted him a major general; I brought him back from Rome with a special service force, and Williams came down from England - he was going to have the troop carrier force - and Eaker and I married them together in a little town there down toward the coast. I always remember that story because...that's a good story, too. I said, "You're brought here to form a division - an airborne division that's going to land in the south of France. Frederick, you're the commander. Williams has command of the troop carriers. This is a marriage." Then I turned to Frederick and I said, "Now, you can only take two men from your special service force. I've got eight men on my staff here that have this kind of training - they're being transferred to you and we're bringing ten from the States. They're on their way; they'll be in here." I said, "Your directive is that you're going to take off from

airfields in this vicinity, which Gen. Eaker has laid out to Williams, and all your training is going to be done in that, and you have..." (I think they just had about two months, maybe three, maybe less) "And," I said, "you're going to start from these fields (I put a pin in the map) and you're going on a straight line. Patch'll tell you where the other point is. You're not going by Corsica and up that way - you're going to go in a straight line and you're going to take off - and Patch'll tell you where the other point is and the time he wants you to land there, and give you...and you'll be under his direction." And Frederick looked at me and he says, "General," he said, "I think because you think that I've been in command of the special service force and organized it, that I'm a paratrooper and that I've jumped out of an airplane." "No," I said, "I didn't even check to see whether you had jumped out of an air plane, but you're sure as hell going to." [chuckling] He just looked at me, but he went to work on that and he did a terrific job. They did really, that was really a great feat that they pulled, and I think, the greatest airborne operation of any war because they landed on all the critical points - and they didn't intend to do all this, but the Lord had them in hand. They came down through clouds, they lost pret'near every glider they had, but they didn't have many casualties. We used the British 2nd Brigade, I think it was called, and I had an agreement that as soon as we got landed and set and we got that flank - they were to protect that right flank, too - that I would send that brigade back. Well, boy, the British were on my tail to get that brigade back. And we were glad to send them back because here we were from the Riviera all the way up to Switzerland, pret'near - in the mountains - and those young fellows were just raising hell. So we were glad to get rid of some of these hell-raiders so we could get straightened out. You know, it's disorganization. Every officer has to be on his job and he's on his own until you get straightened out - it takes you a little time. The people were fine. But when we had maquis all mixed in here, we had to feed them, they had to steal to feed them; they had no way of fixing up their returns and all that business. You get way behind. I bring up these points because I think the confidence that - and here I claim, my staff and I claim credit - these fellows went ahead and did things they wouldn't have done because they knew we were going to back them up. And we'd given them a policy and an objective, and that was it. And I think that's why we were so successful. I think if anybody in that chain there had hesitated and not done this, we would've created some little resistance, we'd have built up a thing that we couldn't have handled as well as we did. Now in this landing and this rapid advance up the Rhone Valley - many episodes have been written about it, some of them...all of them, I guess, are pretty accurate but some of the conclusions are far from what I believe. That was really a terrific thing. Wilson told me it couldn't be done - we were going up a corridor and we couldn't do it, and I said we could, and of course we did it so I feel pretty good about it. I guess I was gambling, but we did it. We did it because we used airplanes - we used everything - to get those supplies up there. We used the railroads, in between the rivers, by using ducks to get across the rivers and using nets and our equipment which we had. We built two pipelines - a four and a six inch line - all the way up that valley. All the way up to Saarburg and the Severne pass to get...

Q: Your bridge building was fantastic.

A: Well, you bet it was. That was because of Clay and...who's the big railroad man? He died here - oh, I ought to remember...

Q: Is it Gray?

A: Gray, yes. Gray was a football player, and he and I talked three-deep, and so forth. Oh, he was a...he's a guy that reacted, boy. Why was he successful? First place, because he was always a railroad man and had a good executive ability. He'd fought floods in the west. He knew every section boss in all the railroads and he took those section bosses - he had them with him down in Italy. He had them in Africa, first. That's the reason he was successful with Africa. He'd call one of those section bosses - and he knew just the one - and say, "Get your gang together." And that fellow knew who he had to get together as his gang. Now this is organization and leadership, if they want to talk about it. That's the way it's done. And, of course, Ike had sense enough to give him the job, and if he's successful, he didn't worry about it. I did the same thing. Now he was in Italy when I got into this trouble and they told me that I was going to be three months building a bridge across the Durance River and my supplies would be held up. He just got a TWX - what are you sitting on down there in Rome? You better come up here and get into Lyon tonight. And he was in there, Lyon, that night at my headquarters and after dinner we got down on our hands and knees with my staff officers and we laid out the entire railroad system and bridge- building system that we were going to use. We did it in less than two hours because he took a red pencil and he came up to things and he said, now here's this and that - I'm going to have trouble in Nancy. I said, "Don't worry about Nancy because it'll be turned over to us, but you go up and work with George Patton's engineer, if you need to be, or send somebody up there, make liaison because they're going to be awful glad to turn that mess over to us." And he said, "Well, that's fine, because I know just how to handle that." And I said, "How about that bridge at the Durance." He said, "Don't worry about that. I've a section chief on the way now with his gang and we'll have that up in less than 30 days." And that's what he did. Now we couldn't clean the canals. That was a year's job because they were all blocked - the locks and various things. So we couldn't use the waterways, but we sure as the devil used the railroads. And we used our airplanes.

Q: Talking about that advance up the Rhone. I saw a piece several years ago in a French newspaper [indistinct] in which either Juin or de Lattre; it probably was Juin - who did a lot of second-guessing - said that if the Americans had accepted the French advice and had gone in, it seems to me, quicker into Toulon or one of the places there, that they could have shortened that campaign considerably. What was the argument that the French had about that?

A: Well, we had no argument about Toulon or Marseille, except that they - this is something I claim credit for - they were given three months to capture those ports, and I said they had to be captured in 30 days. Well I landed almost...see, the French were very nervous about this landing. Our three divisions made the landing and then they were following in behind with boats that were sent back for them; there were some coming. But we also had to send a lot of our transport back to Naples to pick up some of their division. Well, the night de Lattre landed we were moving like a house-on-fire. We had this plan, that if we broke through this line we were going to set up, to keep going. We weren't going to stop. And Truscott knew what he was to do and he had a plan for it, and I checked it with him, and he had authority to do it. Well, I land in Patch's headquarters at St. Tropez, Patch is out at the front but his, White, his chief of staff's there, and he had his hands up. He said, "I've just had a most terrible time with Gen. de Lattre. He's in here...he doesn't like what's being done here. He says we're giving him all the belittling pieces of work here. He wants to...he doesn't want to follow up here on the right flank." Well, the reason we were sending him up the right flank was we wanted to keep him on the right flank. Now, this is the way the plan was drawn. Also, we were worried about our right flank. Well, I

said, "The special service...I mean the airborne force is in there, and if - what you do is tell Gen. de Lattre he has to send his 4th Mountain Regiment, uh, Division up there, up close to Switzerland to hold that pass line. He'll have to do that. But why don't you let de Lattre do what he wants to do here; this is a great opportunity." I said, "I'm going down and really give him hell, because I think he can take Toulon tomorrow night and Marseille a couple days later. But if you're going to sit back and wait 'til this comes ashore and that ashore and get afraid, we're going to be just like all our ports all the way up, and we won't get any of them. So I'm going down to do that, but if we could throw him a plum, let him go up here to Arles and cross the Rhone River and go up the other side and capture Lyon and Dijon; and then he won't be able to go any further. And we'll hold him there and we'll get him reequipped, then we'll bring him back and put him over where he's got to go. He knows he's to go in the Severne area and we'll tie him in back with these other divisions." And White says "I can't do anything." Well, I said "You find out where Patch is and I'll get a hold of Patch right now; and I'm going out now to check and see how far the French have gotten, and I want to get some information, and I'll be back in here." Well, I came back in and talked to Sandy and Sandy said, "Sure, that's alright." I said, "Let them capture those big cities. They like these big cities and they said, "Oh, they'll hold up three days." I said, "Let them have three days in the city. What do you care as long as Truscott can go up the other side. And if we run into problems then we'll handle this on our feet." Now, that's the way it worked out. Now, I'm going to tell you it did and, believe me, the French never said any more. But we had all these maquis - we had 56,000 maquis in there. And they were stealing and they were pulling arms off these people that they were laying for; and for two or three days in there the situation was really bad. Well, I was after de Lattre about that - that's later. But I caught de Lattre about 10:00 at night, and his CP. And he'd just had a staff meeting and he'd gone upstairs and he came down, he had to come downstairs to see me and I pulled out the map, I said, "Look, you're sitting still here - you can't sit still. Keep those Senegalese going. Get into Toulon tonight or tomorrow night. Then you can...you got Toulon - we got a port, we can start opening it up and we can go to work; and then go on to Marseille. And I think you'll take Marseille in the next two or three days. "Oh," he says, "You give me the impossible." See, I had him on the defensive now. "Oh, you give me the impossible; you demand the impossible." "Gen. de Lattre," I said, "I haven't demanded the impossible." I said, "You came in and asked for the impossible and we're giving you the impossible. You're now going up the left bank of the Rhone, where you want to go, and you're going to get these big cities, and take them, and I expect you to just sweep up there and do that and also take these doing it, because if you don't, you're not going to get very far. We need those ports for supplies." Well, he did it. They did it, by golly, they went in. I never knew there of any argument about...

Q: You see now he claims, or whoever was writing the piece claims, for him, of getting the plan changed to take those in.

A: Well, they certainly put pressure on us to do it, but we were flexible. We could've been arbitrary and talked all about this, the glory of France, and the god-given...oh, boy, poured it on. But we weren't. It was a reasonable request, and the way that things were breaking it was the thing to be done. If we'd have had a tight battle and got stopped on the line, we couldn't have made that kind of a maneuver. We planned it soundly and then we were ready for the emergencies. And when they came...

Q: I suspect that part of his argument is that earlier you may have, for planning purposes, spoken of taking 30 days, or something, for Toulon...

A: It's all in there. It's in the plan. It's just as plain as day. It was 30 days, because they didn't think they could do it in 30 days. I mean, not 30 days - 60 days or 90 days - because they're the ones that didn't want to move. They never found anything like that from my staff or from me. As a matter of fact, an episode came up that you may have in history. I don't know. But, see, the British admiral down there was Cunningham, wasn't it – was it Cunningham?

Q: [indistinct] by this time had gone north.

A: Well it's his brother, John; his brother.

Q: This is Alan Brown [?] and other one's John.

A: Yes. Well John, of course, was Wilson's Navy man, and Hewitt was my Navy man but he was under Cunningham. But when we...I don't know how many days after we landed there... when I really moved into France. I was on Corsica anyhow, had been on Corsica for a month. But I moved my headquarters the first time I could get it into St. Tropez - as soon as the 7th Army moved north - and then I moved into Lyon. And somewhere in there, when I was at St. Tropez - I was always down here in these port areas, inspecting them - and I think a third or fourth day, maybe sooner - I think I've got a record of that somewhere because I always feel good about that - I sent a cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff – I think you'll find that - in which I said that...I gave the dates when we would have a port. See, we were unloading all of these liberty ships in St. Tropez harbor. And we were doing that in an efficient way with well-trained duck crews - battalions which we had trained at Oran and various places in the theater. And a good many of these men that drove these ducks were men who had come out of the hospital and couldn't go back into combat, but wanted to get into it. We had some very fine mechanics with that outfit. We planned to unload a liberty ship, and I forget how many we could handle in the harbor but that's a record – Hewitt's got that record, or the logistics people have. We'd run three ducks up on each side of a liberty ship and we had those that would just fit a duck. And they almost dropped those six loads in there at one time; it wasn't quite that, they just, one would come in and the other would move out. And they'd go ashore and hit the beach with the net in there, you see, and they'd run up to where these supplies were to go and that was well organized; the man that did that, and I wouldn't know who the individual was – but it was Larkin's, probably...Wilson's. And they'd just have another derrick there and they'd pick the damn thing up and drop it on the ground and they'd throw another net into the empty truck and it hardly stopped. It went right back into the water, out to the ship again. When we move so fast we didn't have to move a whole lot of extra supplies; we just kept the trucks going longer distances - even, in some cases, where we made them cross the river and drop it in cars on the other side of the river, because the German prisoners, which we had too many of to handle, were unloading those things. You see, we didn't have to take anybody out of combat for it and the people would help us, and stack that stuff. That's one of the most successful operations and one of the reasons we succeeded. Now I sent a cable; I said, we will unload the first liberty ship in Marseille on the 15th day of...we landed on the 15th of August, didn't we? Well, 30 days from that, which would be the 15th of September, we will unload the first liberty ship in Marseille. And I sent this to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and a copy back to my boss, or maybe I sent my boss with a copy to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Boy, I got one back said, "Cunningham says

you're misinforming the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. What you state is impossible." I just grabbed that damn thing and went out and got my pilots and got my plane and I flew right back to Naples. And I went in to see Jumbo and I said, "Look I don't like this because that isn't so. When I sent that in, I meant it and I'll...I stake my honor on it. We'll unload that ship on the dates we state there, almost exactly. We're a day, we may be a day short of it, but since I've stated the way it is, I can't be any longer." And Jumbo's a nice person. He took it in stride and smiled a little bit, because I was very earnest about this; and I hate to be accused of being, doing anything out of the...I was accused of something out there I had nothing to do with - publicity. I had nothing to do with any publicity. I wasn't seeking any of that thing. That thing annoyed me considerably and it started with Jumbo's Chief of Staff. Well, anyhow, those are little things; they didn't slow me up at all. But the fact of the matter is, and I think I told you this story about the tanker that was sunk across that harbor at Marseille - didn't I put that in the record?

Q: I'm not sure, Jake.

A: Well, that's an interesting story because it comes down into present-day economics. We would've unloaded in about 28 days, but we had this tanker that just stuck its nose out across the entrance of that daggone harbor, and we could not get that nose out. We had everything. We had diaries on everybody who was working because I let it be known that the British said we couldn't do this; and you never saw people work like they did down there. They worked night and day, particularly the bosses that were supervising, and they'd throw extra men in there. Well, finally we got that nose. I forget what they did to it to that tanker and get it out of the way. And on the thirtieth day, actually, a liberty ship was dragged in there and unloaded. And we really operated in the next 24 hours or 48 hours - we really rolled them ships in there. We had a mess to clean up after we got in, but we carried out what we said we'd do. Well, that tanker...I'm sitting up here at a General Motors luncheon - which they give once a year or used to give when they had a big show at the Waldorf - at a table with Eric Johnson, who was running the motion picture industry. And I said to him, "Eric, when I was in London you had about \$3 million worth of business going there with the Rand people. In Italy, France you had a lot of money. How do you... now I notice you, oh, [indistinct] you've ten times as much and maybe more in these countries... how do you get your money out of those countries? You don't need francs. You need dollars." "Oh," he says, "shenanigans." Well, I said, "Tell me a shenanigan." "Well," he said, "now I'll give you a good one." He said, "At the entrance to the harbor of Marseille there was a sunken tanker." I said, "Boy, go on. I'm interested in this one." Now, this is the way little things happen. And he said, "We had a lot of French francs. So we made a deal with the people that owned that tanker that the tanker belonged to us if we could raise it, on the grounds that after we got our money out of it that we'd turn it back to them for what it was worth." And he said, "So we took our francs, we raised that tanker, we cleaned it out, but we had to have a lot of things done with it, and we'd used up all our francs and we had a whole lot of lire down in Italy. So we loaded it - I forget what they loaded it with - but they loaded it with something that they could put in that hull and pulled it to Naples where they needed the stuff and had the people in the shipyards at Naples, which were hurting for work, put that tanker in first class shape and they spent up all the lire. As I remember it, they put olive oil in it there and sent it to Haiti [?] to put it on the run to carry fuel back to this country." And he tells me that inside of three months they had all their money out of it and a big profit and had turned the tanker back. Now that's a true story. You can check it out. [laughter]

Q: At any rate, your tanker came back to you.

A: Tanker came back.

Q: Well now, talking about the south of France thing, have you ever had any doubts in retrospect about the wisdom of that invasion of southern France?

A: Never a, never a single doubt. From the start I believed in it. I thought it was the only way that we could keep close enough together so we wouldn't be piecemealed to death and carry out - I could never see going up through the Adriatic. I could never see landing anywhere across that Adriatic, with the help that I knew we would get over there in that kind of terrain, with what we had. You must remember that we had the 8th British Army, and if you want to take in the 5th American Army, we had every nationality in the world in those Armies. We had a Canadian Corps. We had South Africans. We had three or four Indian Divisions. We had an Italian Brigade. We had a Polish Corps. We had the French. We had Indo-Chinaman in with those Frenchmen. In ours we had Indians and...

Q: Portuguese.

A: Portuguese.

Q: No, Brazilians, not Portuguese - Brazilians.

A: Brazilians, yes, we had the Brazilians – they came over and I put them into action. But we also had New Zealanders. And they all ate something different. Why, they had all they could do with what they were doing - keeping them supplied and replaced. And they were fighting in mountains in Italy. Oh, I think we wasted a whole lot of time in Italy. I think we should've thrown more behind the southern France invasion and come in that way. We wouldn't have had to make that terrible fight up there on the Po River where they stood for so long, before they got to the Po in the mountains.

Q: Is Clark's very strong feeling about that due to his desire to have a bigger show under his command?

A: Sure. I always felt it was; and also I felt that he - the one thing I criticize Clark about is the fact that he stopped up there when he should've driven into Genoa and gone through the mountains, instead of sitting down there on the beach with a red carpet in front of his tent. He should've been driving to break through, and gotten on the Po River before winter. When I went over there in August, I went to his headquarters and I said, "What're you stopping here for? Why don't you get going?" Well, he had a lot of reasons, but none of them good from my viewpoint. And, of course, he said that I'd taken his 8-inch artillery and he went to Gen. Marshall about his 8- inch howitzers, and I said, "Well send them back to him. I don't need them. I don't know who put them on my list to come into the south of France but if he thinks that 5th Army's going to be defeated because they don't have these 8- inch howitzers, we'll send them back." And so Gen. Marshall ordered us to send them back and back we sent them. There're a lot of stories about little things like that. He said when I was wearing two hats that I was favoring the people in the south of France – at least I got that - well that's just ridiculous. If anything, I fell over backwards for that outfit because we only took into the south of France the minimum number. And I can give a good example of a signal battalion. We needed a signal battalion for the 6th Army Group.

His Army was entitled to one. He had two signal battalions. I selected a young fellow from my headquarters by the name of Lemnitzer - he'd just retired - as a signal officer. He was under my command so I pulled him out, I called him in, I said, "You've got to organize the signal battalion for the 6th Army Group. Now what should we do?" Well, he said, "We should take the extra one that we have in the 5th Army." "Yes," I said, "But Clark's going to - he's already indicated that he's going to lose the war if he loses this signal battalion. So what we're going to do is go up, you and I are going up there and we'll get his signal officer in and here's what we're going to say: 'Clark, you've got two signal battalions for the 5th Army; you're only entitled to one; we need one for the 6th Army Group. We'd like to have either one you'll turn loose'; and hear what he has to say. And you let me carry the conversation; you just listen so you know what you've got to do." So Clark protested violently that he needed those - he was spread all over the place, and so forth. I said, "Alright, Wayne, that's alright. Now you recognize I've got to have, in the 6th Army Group, a signal battalion." "Yes." "Alright now," I said, "we're not going to take your number-one man or your number-two man, but we're going to take one of the three out of each one of these battalions to form ours, that is, to form a nucleus that we have some trained men behind. Now is that a fair deal?" And he had to say yes. And that's the way Lemnitzer organized my signal battalion - and we had the best signal battalion you ever saw because we got a lot of people that were just itching to go somewhere else. [laughter] Played right into your hand from a morale, and every other thing. And Lemnitzer was an unusually fine man, too, and he just retired as a major general. He's been a deputy chief signal officer up here this last month. I believe he's going to be on the staff at the University of Arizona in Tucson. When we got to the south of France, every signal battalion we got was colored - had to come through the 12th Army Group. Well, they were always in at me about that. Well I said, "Let's take those fellows; they're alright; they're transportation companies." Oh, they won't do this and they don't do... and I said, "Yes, they will. You watch. Now come on. Let's go." I think we got the work out of those colored boys that nobody else ever got out of them because we had a job to do, we had to go out and do it, and we did it. And I give Lemnitzer credit for pulling it together and tying it up. And I had no trouble with communications, either. But that's an example of the things that happen in these theaters that I think is invaluable to the future. We didn't do this by creating trouble. We were mad often. I won't say that we didn't have a little emotion expressed here and there but our solution to it was always something of that sort.

Q: Did you feel on that southern France thing that Jumbo Wilson was strongly opposed to it, or that was he merely just repeating the attitude of the Prime Minister?

A: He was not strongly opposed to it. Now, I wouldn't... Jumbo Wilson was a perfectly marvelous man and very honest with me and he was extremely loyal to his boss. I don't think his boss always was considerate of him. I told you his story of how he was way up here one day and down here, I mean he was way down here, coming back to be retired and he ends up taking Eisenhower's command in Africa. No, the British didn't want to go into the south of France and why, I'll never know. Just like they insisted that their armies go through the Ruhr, and they couldn't handle the Ruhr - I know that was so. It would've been much better from a logistics standpoint and everything, if we could've gotten all our things together and not had circles here, and circles here - like Bremen, for instance, up there in the British end. I think all those things would've moved smoother; but I'm not so sure that the French coming in, as we did, on the right of us afterward would've worked so well with the British. They just don't get along, that's all, and they said so. Whether they got along with us or not, I'm not...it's not for me to say, but we

were generally able to do something about it because I don't think we were as - well, at least I know Eisenhower never did, I know I never damned the British behind their backs. I used to say, well, they're stubborn about this, but we're going to have to stick. And I'm just stating my viewpoint. It isn't because they're British, it's because I think it's right. And today I recognize their... what their objectives - that always irritated me. I'm sure Churchill's objective was purely the Ruhr. If he'd gotten the Ruhr out of his mind and getting Berlin and Paris and these capitals - Rome - our campaigns would have been much simpler from a military viewpoint because I think we'd have bypassed them.

Q: There was, I suppose, something in the fact, though - the French had the same problem - there was a notion of restoring their prestige, I mean they had had their noses bloodied. The French, of course, were in a dreadful position that way.

A: Oh, terrible.

Q: And there was the feeling that unless they could retake something, that they might have a devil of a time after the war. In other words, so far as their colonies were concerned there was the problem of prestige. Of course that has to be figured in too, doesn't it?

A: Yes, it has to be, but I think it was quite evident to anybody with, centered around England for a year as I did, that the first time that any lull was made there, Churchill was not going to be elected. And I said so. I said he doesn't realize what's going on behind these hedges here. All these wealthy people are only about 2% of them - they're living on their capital. I spent weekends in some of those places. The servants aren't there anymore; they're all out fighting; they're not coming back - when you go down and talk with the troops, which I had great opportunity to do, all those guard divisions and everything. I've inspected pret'near every type of them and I talked to some of the men. And down in the desert I talked to a lot of men. Things were changing in England. And then my experience with Gil Winant and Morgenthau and this fellow, White, who came out to there to visit in England and indicated to me that the British had no backing in their dollars, either. I was just a listener in that thing, but Morgenthau wouldn't come to London. He insisted that we come up to Prescot [Prenweil?] and I went up in my special train and we drove around in a car and talked, well, I guess two nights and a day anyhow, and the question then was: if we don't support the dollar beyond any point they won't be worth fighting for. That was his attitude. I couldn't quite see that; I wasn't up to that - wasn't experienced enough to know. But you could certainly feel that the situation in England, it never would be - could hold on to their colonies and they would have trouble. I'm sure that they thought their prestige would be - if they could get the Ruhr that they could build a lot of prestige economically. But as you know, they weren't able to do it. We had to step in there, didn't we?

Q: Oh, yes, we...

A: We did that whole thing with...

Q: Of course they wanted to keep the 9th Army, under Monty, so they would've had the prestige of that; and we took it back. It was Eisenhower's two armies that cut it off, you see. But then Monty wanted to go to Berlin.

A: Well that's, again, a foolish thing. What the hell – Berlin. If they'd have done it right, we'd have had Berlin; we wouldn't have been stopped on the Elbe and we wouldn't have had these rules ahead of time. That was because you had to draw those boundary lines.

Q: And the funny thing was that those lines were suggested by the British, when they thought, of course, we wouldn't get that far.

A: Sure they were; they were. And the other thing is you can give a boundary line to the French...well, Gen. de Lattre - we were on Gen. de Lattre and got off a little bit. Gen. de Lattre was a very proud man. I had his complete confidence and he had mine. As I say, he'd march up and down this room and he would express himself pretty forcefully, and I would finally have to do the same thing and say: well now, here are the facts and I'm the boss and here's the way it's going to be done. Now are you going to do it or aren't you? He'd turn around, mad, and smoothe-walk to the end of the room. At the end of the room he'd turn around and salute and walk out that door, but he always carried it out. He was severe; he was a fighter. I'm going to tell you - he was a fighter, now. LeClerq didn't want to work under him, said he wouldn't work under him, and told me he wouldn't work under him. I tried to make LeClerq do that. That was a mistake. I never, if I commanded troops again where I had that resistance, I would never try to do that. I just don't think you can do it, you know...

Q: Is it truly a matter of personality, or what?

A: Ah, it something more than that. See, I never did know how Gen. de Lattre got that command. We wanted Juin. He was commanding the corps. I spent... Clark had come back to the States for, oh, 15 days or more, and I went up and commanded the, and Alexander was going, and I went up and commanded that group by direction of Wilson. Wilson always sent me up for any trouble. I always went up and handled the Poles or the French, or - in this case I went up and commanded the group. And I was up there with Lemnitzer, and Harding was the chief of staff. And I, of course, inspected all these units all, from one end to the other. And the French were getting their buildup and I spent quite a little time with Juin, and he had everything worked out and he knew exactly what the strategy ought to be when we opened that campaign; and he and Jeff Keys, who had one of our corps in the 5th Army, agreed. So I liked Juin. He played ball with us. Clark liked him. Everybody wanted Juin to have that command. We put in a pitch to Marshall to give Juin the command. We even got Marshall to decorate Juin out there and violate the rules and regulations, [laughs] and Gen. Marshall did. Well it was a wonderful thing to do. It really lifted him up. That caused me some trouble later because when we went to decorate Gen. De Lattre we couldn't give him the Distinguished Service Medal. We had to give him the Legion of Merit, the highest command, and, oh boy, he almost wasn't going to take it. He knew that Juin had the other and he let, through Lodge, let me know and I said, "Well I'm going to play this right through. If he turns this down, he'll have to...this is one place he's got to give, because my hands are tied; I can't do anything about this. I'd give it to him tomorrow – it'd solve my problem to get out of trouble. I'd be just that weak." But he took it; but he always resented it, always. However, when we crossed the Rhine, we didn't have enough bridges for the French. Now, Patton went across the Rhine ahead of us – north - with our help. We got a couple of bridges from Patton because when he went over there, he went so fast he didn't have time to pick them up. So I used those and we had our own to get the 7th Army across, and then I moved some from the 6th Corps down to help de Lattre. I had de Lattre march up and go across in their

area and then go back into the Black Forest down the Rhine toward Mulhouse. Well, of course, crossing the Rhine was Napoleonic - he was Napoleon and, boy, he was going to cross that Rhine as Napoleon did it, but he got across there too soon.

Q: Well, he says somewhere he slipped across. That you all were going to stop him and he just...

A: That isn't so. We gave him all the help and collected all the boats and everything we could to help him. Well, Clare Boothe Luce came out to Italy. She couldn't get into France. She was a congresswoman and Alexander invited her down to Italy and so she was down there. And she came into the south of France because the French invited her in there, you see. And I got warning that she was coming and I told Wilson, since that was down in his bailiwick, to see that she was taken care of with the French and, if she needed anything, to help her. And then I think I sent a - I may have talked to Ike on the phone. I said, "Clare Boothe Luce is landing in my theater. Now I don't want you to think that I'm behind any shenanigans, getting in. She's coming in, as I understand it, by invitation of the French. But I would like to say to you that unless you tell me otherwise, I'm going to take her over and see that she gets the proper treatment." I said, "I just can't see it this other way." And Ike said, "Well certainly; that's the only thing you can do." Now, I didn't want him to be suspicious that I was trying to cut in the back door on something that I wasn't. Well I... the French got a hold of her, and they took her across the Rhine and they took her up to Baden-Baden. And everywhere she went with de Lattre, inspect these...they'd have these little formalities, you see, and she was seeing all kind of maps and being briefed. [chuckle] Listen, he was being briefed, but she was listening. So then they come back at night, and they have an Algerian in each one of these pontoons on each side with a big torch, and de Lattre starts to walk across the bridge. And he, also, he delayed this 24 hours and built a forest over on the French side, the Alsatian side, of trees. So he crosses the Rhine backward and - Clare Boothe Luce will tell this story if you'll get her to do it because she's the one told me and I may exaggerate it, but this is the way she - Bullard was there; and de Lattre was out in front and these flares were out there and everybody was stiff and he was walking like Napoleon across that place, and Clare Boothe Luce didn't want to go that slow so she'd get ahead of him and Bullard would say, "You can't get ahead of him." And they get on the other side, they turn around, and then he looks back across the river Napoleonic style, so the story is, and Clare Boothe Luce goes up and sits on a rock. She's tired; her feet hurt. [laughter] Well that's the way he crossed the Rhine. Now when we made the break, and we were going like a house-on-fire on the [south?] and we'd been given an acute-angle turn, which we shouldn't have been - we should've been given the 3rd Army. Actually, what they should've done, and I'm sure the staff recommended up there because it was the only sound thing to have done, was to have given the 3rd Army to the 6th Army Group and given us a boundary line. They didn't do that. They draw my line short and keep the 3rd Army with the 12th Army Group and it was spread all over the devil. That made us make quite an acute-angle turn. Well we had took Nuremburg and Munich up there, and I had been to Patton and I said, "Now George, you've got this thing here. You've got a lot of...the rivers all flow this way, and we'll be down there in the valley on the Danube side of it, and you'll have pretty easy going up where you're going. All you've got to do is to push ahead and we'll protect your flank. Now we may be behind you a little bit because this turn's difficult." Well, we were moving very rapidly. We were running into resistance, some here - not too much. And de Lattre decided Ulm was another Napoleonic thing he had to take. Well, the first thing came up was the episode at Stuttgart. Now here I plead guilty to one thing. When we drew the boundary lines for the 7th French Army, we included Stuttgart in their area.

And my staff talked me into doing that after I said, "No, that isn't right, that ought to go to the French Army. The natural boundary here is where it ought to go." But they said, "You've got a mission to go into the Black Forest here and capture this – what do you call these ...reactors?"

Q: Well they were atomic things.

A: Atomic things in there. And I was told that was my mission - that I was to get it without anyone knowing anything about it. So I asked for two divisions, a corps, or two divisions so that I could make an area to do it if it had to be done this way. And I was turned down - do it with what you have. Well, I said, that thing's right in the French Army area. Well, they didn't answer. So I had this mission, and I had it on my mind, and they said, "You have to have Stuttgart for a take-off to do this." Well I said what kind of...what...doesn't make sense to me. I have a reason for why I want to do it, but I can't tell anybody about it, so I've got to look at this from another viewpoint. Well, they said, "You need it for a supply point." Well, that's the way I did it. Well, what happened of course, de Lattre issued orders for Monsabert's corps to go in and take Stuttgart and my 100th Division got in there first - the 7th Army got in there first. And there was a big to-do about - the French were raping everybody and had backed 1,000 people up in a cave somewhere. Well now, while this was happening, also, we were advancing very rapidly and he had issued to Monsabert that he was to take Ulm. Well Ulm wasn't in his area and should never have been in his area, and Monsabert didn't want to do it. I talked to Monsabert about this later on. So that night things were really happening in my headquarters. Patch was crying, and Ted Brook, who had the corps, was crying in there. The French were doing this, and I said, "Put roadblocks up and stop them. If you have to do it, do it, but don't let them come in there." I was after de Lattre and I really was rough. And then about midnight, into my headquarters walks a big, tall fellow said he was a Life reporter and he's just come from Stuttgart and that there was chaos down there. These two divisions were in there and they didn't seem to know what their job was, and that the French were raping all these people and so forth and so on. And I said, "Well, how do you know this?" He said, "Well I was in there." Well I said, "Well how did you get in there and get all this information so quick?" He said, "Well, for 13 years I was over here on an assignment and I know all those people, all those German people in Stuttgart." He said, "I know all about the battery factory." He said, "They're going in there and breaking up all of the batteries and destroying everything." He just piled it on the French. I said, "All right, you can go back to Stuttgart and I'll be in Stuttgart at 7:00 tomorrow morning and I'll straighten this whole thing out." So we were in there at 7:00. I took Cabot Lodge with me and I told him just exactly what we had to do and what he was to do while I was straightening this thing out. Well, I knew what I was going to do when I got down there. I'd already told Sandy Patch.

(Side 2 of 2nd reel)

Q: You and Lodge went in, then, the next morning.

A: We went in the next morning and I told Cabot I wanted him to investigate thoroughly the following charges: first - any rapes, that went on in that town. He should find out what did it and he should meet me at noon and I was going to move the 100th Division out of there, and that I want him then to go with me to the, to Guillaume's division which was the, I guess the 3rd Algerian Division. So I got a hold of Burgess who commanded the division and Murphy was one of his generals and Murphy, they were all worked up. They had all this problem, and so forth. I said, "Alright, have you received your orders from Patch?" "Yes," they said, "they just

came in." Well, I said, "Make that movement just as quiet and fast as you can. Just move out into your, across the river into the boundary where the 7th Army needs you anyhow, and we'll turn this area over, and the boundary line." They showed me what it was so I said, "That's the way it's going to be." This took quite a little time because I had this newspaper man there making his charges and hearing Murphy's side of it, and Burgesses. And along about noon I caught up with Lodge, and Lodge said he'd been in the hospital and he'd talked to everybody and that there'd been some rape going on, but that it didn't amount to very much, that there were very few people in the hospitals and apparently what had happened from what he could see in a hurry was that the French came in that city like they did any other city and anybody who came out in the streets was prey, but that they hadn't done too much damage in the factory that they talked about – some, yes, but all in all it was bad, but not as bad as they said. So I said, "All right, let's come on, we'll go over to see Guillaume." And I had an appointment with him; he met me with the usual flourishes and he had four dark-colored fellows there, which I recognized as gommies, in his headquarters - he always had them there. And I talked to Guillaume - now he's quite a fellow. He liked to work with the Americans because we'd helped him out at Strasbourg in a difficult situation; and any time he was in trouble we'd always helped him out and he was, he helped us out. But he was really irate when I told him, I said, "Well, look, I didn't come in here to accuse you or your troops of raping here. I didn't come in here to accuse you - I came in here to protect you." I said, "Do you want to have spread all over Life and Time and our big magazines in the United States tomorrow morning that the 3rd Algerian Division, this great and glorious division – which I agree is great and glorious - did all these things in this town of Stuttgart?" Well that sobered him up. I said, "What I want you to do is do what I think you're doing - clean it up. And you know what's wrong here. You know there have been some rapes. And that's it. And get order in this city. It's your city, so you've got no complications with the Americans." Now, see, I had to remove something there and the only one I could remove right quick was the one I should've removed anyhow, to be honest about it. Well, he did it. I understand he shot an officer and a couple of enlisted men quick, and that stopped all that foolishness. Now, along about...later - and I'll finish this story and carry it to a conclusion as I remember it; I don't think it's ever been written – Eastland, Senator Eastland comes over there and he meets Caffrey and Caffrey tells him this story about the Negroes and Stuttgart and the rapings that went on, and Eastman comes back and makes a speech here and Marshall's offices are directed for an investigation. I'm back in the States. Goes out there - Ike is still out there - he makes an investigation and comes back with a report, goes to North, who now runs this outfit [indistinct phrase in which de Lattre's name is mentioned]. And I happened to be in the Pentagon building. I had an office there and I am walking down there and North says, "I got that report on Stuttgart." I say, "You have? What report?" I said, "You let me read that." And I stood there in the hall and read it. I said, "Come on down in my office; this is the most ridiculous report I ever read. There's not one word of fact in this that anybody can get anywhere, and I want to kill this right now with facts." So, I went down and had that report rewritten and stated the facts. I said, "If you want anymore facts, go get Sen. Lodge because here's what I had Lodge do and he stayed three days in that city after I left. And I told him exactly this: I said, "Cabot, I want you to stay three days in this city. You and Guillaume are good friends. I want you to work, follow every clue down that's in the city, and write a report about it, so that you could go back and report to the U.S. Senate, because this is going to cause me trouble." And he did that; so we had a record, you see. So there you are.

Q: I didn't realize, I had forgotten, that Eastland was the man who made the big issue of it.

A: Yes, he came back and he tried...and this thing he said – Negroes did this. I said, “I don't think there was a Negro soldier in the town of Stuttgart at that time.

Q: Well, of course he meant the Senegalese.

A: But that's different. That isn't the... He thought the Senegalese were in there. Well I knew they weren't. And I couldn't remember ever seeing a Negro in that town dressed as soldiers.

Q: Well they were Algerians.

A: They were Algerians. The goumms are from those mountain tribes, you know.

Q: Of course, from his standpoint they're colored and so... They're African.

A: But there wasn't. Of course, Charlie Bull, my chief of staff, said when this discussion was going on and I was a little irate about it, said they'd been raping 1,000 women, back them up in a tunnel - we couldn't find any tunnel. He said they might have raped 50. He thinks that's a great joke.

Q: Now, when did Bolté become your chief of staff?

A: Well Bolté became my chief of staff when I came back and took CUNAR – after the war.

Q: Oh, I see. He wasn't your chief of staff over there. He had a division, didn't he?

A: He had a division, the 34th Division, all through the war. He came back on my staff as a G-3 first, I think, and then when Collins, they took Collins, I brought Collins from the West Coast in here, and Page wanted him up there on public relations. Hasbrook was the deputy and he had hypertension, he got nosebleeds and we'd sent him to the hospital. So then I pulled Bolté, yes, I think that's when I brought Bolté in there as my chief of staff and we went down [indistinct].

Q: Now you mentioned Guillaume, some of the other French. Of the various French generals, the various levels you worked with, who would you put highest as a military man?

A: Well, in taking combat and everything in it, I would put Juin and de Lattre at the top. They're different types. Juin's easier to work with, but Juin certainly commanded that corps in Italy and in wonderful shape for what he had and did.

Q: He had a fine record, didn't he?

A: He had a fine record up until just recently does anything ever occur that makes me wonder what they've been doing to Juin. De Lattre was a totally different thing and, I understand, had some habits that I didn't know about then; but he certainly could fight and he certainly had ability - there isn't any question about that. I don't think he had - Juin had the love of his troops - I wouldn't say that de Lattre had. Certainly he didn't have the love of his staff. They worked hard for him but they were scared to death. And he did fire, moved them out. The corps commanders were good corps commanders. De Larminat was put in there to command one of those corps, and trained in Italy - he came up through the free French. See there's where the friction came. It was de Gaulle...

Q: Juin hadn't been with the free French.

A: No he hadn't; that's where the trouble was, you see. And de Lattre apparently had because he was a de Gaulle man, and LeClerc, and de Larminat; and then the other corps commander was Béthouart. Now Monsabert had the 3rd Algerian, as a matter of fact, under de Larminat. The night I went into talk to de Lattre and sort of kick him along I said, "And, by the way, why did you fire your corps commander as soon as you're lying on the coast, here, at this critical stage? Is that corps going to stop or are you going to keep going in there and taking these things?" My conversation was very much like that. He said, "Well all he's doing down there is making political speeches." Well I said, "You're going to be in trouble aren't you, with him? What're you going to do?" "Oh," he says, "De Gaulle will take care of it." Well, I always liked de Larminat. I had de Larminat later commanding over on my Atlantic - he got that command; you see, de Gaulle gave him that command and he came under me and I always liked him. I visited him two or three times and he did a grand job over there.

Q: Of course. I suppose de Gaulle wanted to land in part because they were watching all of those underground resistance people in the central part of France, in the Massif Central, because de Gaulle didn't trust those people at all.

A: I know it. Well he had reason not to. We've got them in the Army - that 58,000 thing. Ike was always on my neck, or his staff, because I used up my reserve supplies to equip them and get them, and took everything we captured, every gun, we turned over to them - German - every bit of ammunition and put them down there on my Atlantic front under de Larminat and they said I was using up reserve supplies, and they raised Cain about it and I said, "Well, what're you going to do with these people? I've got to do something with them. I just can't just have them run loose in the countryside pulling people apart."

Q: They would become guerillas after a while.

A: They never wanted to let me help out the extra divisions that de Lattre was trying to build up. They always were suspicious up there, maybe with some cause that was unknown to me - said, "What good are they going to do you? It's going to take you six months to train them." "Oh, no," I said, "it's not going to take me six months to train these people; these fellows can already shoot. All I've to do is get them officers and if I can get these French officers that have been sitting around here and doing nothing, and the maquis'll accept it, and the French can react to this in a hurry and they can do a lot, help us a lot" - which they did. I think that's the way we got control of them. We knew what was going on and we had some strong mayors. We had some real strong mayor in Lyon; he handled that difficult situation firmly. And we had a strong one in Toulon and Marseille. Those fellows really got together. You see, we had all the food up around Lyon and we had nothing in Marseille. Now, my trucks were coming up, full of ammunition and things, and food for the armies - French and Americans - and they would go back empty sometimes. Well I wanted them to be loaded up. I said stop by and pick up that food and take it down to Marseille because we can't use the railroads that way. That would slow us up too much. We have to haul to the railroads and then they have to haul away. But this way, if they go to the...it's right on the road - they can pick this stuff up and haul it into Marseille, and you have a distributing point and just have a lot of people so you can unload it. It probably wouldn't take one hour at each end, extra, and it would be good for the people; it would be fine for everybody. "Well, you run into political stuff." I said, "Well do it and don't say anything to anybody. You don't have to account for this. Tell them to put a man on your truck, and if they don't see it, they

don't see it. We aren't wasting gasoline. You aren't using enough gasoline to amount to anything." The same way with [indistinct], with cleaning up these maquis and people in that area, which is a pretty big area when you stop to think about it. We picked up a terrific number of Poles that'd been coming the other way. Well I was close to the Poles. So I made a deal with them to send over their staff and we turned these people over to them. Well, they started to try to do this a normal way and the French didn't want to do it. The British were anxious to get these Poles back to help this Polish corps in there, in Italy.

Q: You'd known Anders...

A: Oh, I knew him quite well. In fact I knew...I'd been up there with him up there for training in...

Q: In England.

A: No, no, not in England. I met Anders when he first came up from Cairo to Naples, and I was in on all the conversations, then, when we were only going to let him have a division, and finally he fought for a corps. You see, we said you just have enough troops for one division and you have no replacements unless you do it this way. "Well," he said, "Don't worry about my replacements. I'll get them from the other the other side. As long as they know I'm in the line I'll get plenty of Polish soldiers from the German army." Well, when we went into the south of France, his staff had talked to me - the ones that spoke English - and they said, "We've got a lot Poles we'd like to get back here." I said, "Alright, you work on the British to put blankets on, send blankets over on our supply ships that're coming in. They don't take up much room. With some of your people on it, we'll deliver these people to you at these ports, and you put them back on those boats when they go back, and you'll have your Poles - just take care of them. It takes them off our hands, but don't let's get involved with too much politics; and my G-5 section here will work with you." Now, we had a pretty good underground working, too, and I don't know how many thousands of Poles we sent back, but we sent back quite a few. They came up and decorated me - the Polish people did - because of this one episode alone.

Q: This is a phase of war, though, you'd never been prepared for at Leavenworth, had you?

A: No sir, I hadn't. I knew little about it, really. But I had been taught something at Leavenworth - when you don't know anything about it, go get an expert. You don't have to take his advice if you don't want to, but make him think you're taking it most of the time. There are a lot of them around, and if you'll just listen to those fellows - most of the time you're just glad to get one, so go out and do it. You've got too many things crying, and if you can remember long enough or make a note of it so you can give it to your staff before the night is over, it doesn't cause too much interruption. They can fit it into their schemes very well.

Q: Were you still in command of the 6th Army Group when that business occurred down there along the Italian border after the war ended?

A: Yes, yes. Well I'm - you might say I'm the guilty party, in a way. Ryon, uh, what was his name? I had a very fine commander in that, when we turned that - you see, we turned that whole front over to the French command, finally. I had it down on the Riviera; I kept it under American command in the hotel area, but later on, I think I turned the whole thing, as I remember. Ryon was a French officer - pretty old - he was older than I was, but he'd been an

Alpine soldier; he knew that area quite well. He was a commander; and I used to go up and visit with him quite a lot at Grenoble - that was his headquarters - to I would help him out. He had a supply problem. He had these little mountain peaks; they were always being captured and recaptured. And his mission...I gave him authority to push on if anything happened there - just to go as far as he could 'til he met up with the others, and then he'd stop. Well now, here's the story, as I know it [indistinct]. And I don't think I ever wrote anything; I just stayed out of this, and protected him, and de Gaulle handled the thing because it was a French problem. I certainly didn't authorize him to do certain things he did, but I guess, in a way, I'm responsible. What happened was: one of his groups captured a mountain peak - I forget the name of it - and knocked the Germans off of it. And then the Germans counter-attacked and knocked them off. And this happened two or three times; and finally, this French outfit captured the mountain, gathered the people, and started marching toward Milan on the main road there, in that valley - Elba is it? Anyhow, there's quite a beautiful little valley in there, and the minute they walked in with Ryon - the wind was right behind him - people started changing names of streets and putting up things; they always do. They did this in Strasbourg, and I certainly didn't authorize that, but I said "Gee whiz, if they can get a little pleasure out of it, what harm does it do 'til we can straighten it out?" Well, Crittenberger had the corps in the other army coming up through there, and next thing I know, Ryon - that isn't his name exactly, I can't think of his name, but it was something like that - he said that they were putting up roadblocks, cutting him off. So, I flew down there and I said, "Now look," - he came back to Grenoble - I said, "you go get...I've sent a message to Gen. Crittenberger - he commands that corps - and I've asked him to ask you for lunch. Now you go down to lunch and tell him what you're doing down there and pull back. You have no business down there. Pull back and be reasonable about this. Can't you handle that?" "Yes sir," he said, "I can do that." Well, I said, "Now you do this and in the meantime Alexander's got to work it out." And he began to send back these cables - and I suppose his staff, I doubt if Alexander knew too much about this - and what happened I don't even know, back in headquarters, because when those things came back to me, I said, "being corrected". That's all I sent back - "Being corrected." I didn't think there was any great international episode taking place across the boundary line. This fellow was going to march on Milan and capture the city before Crit got in there [laughs]. He didn't do that because he got captured, and then some Italian maquis recaptured him and got him loose. That was just a little episode - maybe 15, 20 men involved.

Q: But it got to be an ugly thing, though, because...

A: Yes, they went too far.

Q: Somewhere along the line they...in one of the messages - I don't know whether it was de Lattre, or who it was - gave the impression they might shoot at our people and that's when Truman got rough with them.

A: Well I didn't know about that.

Q: See, he cut off their gasoline for two days. And then Juin - this, of course, was handled all at Eisenhower's headquarters - Juin comes in and says to Bedell, "I have come to settle this thing. What shall we do?" It got very ugly for a couple of days.

A: It sure bypassed me, and if they cut off gasoline down there for two days...

Q: At least it was ordered. Whether it was ever put into effect, I don't know.

A: Well, it'd take more than two days to put an order like that into effect. But at that time we were rolling, and Alexander got all worked up and finally one of these cables reached me. It seems to be that Bedell's staff didn't handle that properly. I think they tried to handle that direct through my commander down on the Riviera, because they'd been visiting down there in those hotels and at that time I had a National Guard brigadier general - just died here recently. I had Frederick down there for a long time, but I brought him up and gave him the 45th Division. I gave this National Guard, from Connecticut or New York State - a good man - and I guess he just handled it...oh, I guess maybe he sent that up to my staff. Anyhow, we were in the field moving like the devil.

Q: Well now this episode, though, I'm talking about, actually occurs after May, after the war had ended.

A: Yes, that's right. That's when it was happening.

Q: And, but I know Crittenberger was in on the thing, and the 6th Corps.

A: That's right, the 6th.

Q: But Truman writes about it at some length in his book.

A: Well I'll have to read that. I haven't read Truman's book.

Q: And, I remember going into a lot of it and I know, though, that the big complaint was coming out of Alexander's headquarters.

A: Alexander was worked up about nothing - they weren't shooting anybody down in that place. They were doing exactly what...actually, we made them - I went up there and made them go down there and change those signs back. Juin came up - as a matter of fact, Juin came up.

Q: The main fear was that they were going to try to annex that whole corner of Italy.

A: That's right.

Q: They were starting, handing out leaflets and everything about its belonging to France.

A: "Well what the hell, why can't you have a little fun?" was my attitude about that. [chuckling]

Q: Of course, at the same time you had the more serious problem of the Yugoslavs over on the other corner...

A: Sure.

Q: ...because they were moving into Annecy/St. Julien. And so...

A: Well, you see, those are little episodes that occur, and they're isolated, and you don't realize the implications that follow, really. To me it was an episode. Why shouldn't we? We'd been fighting up there, losing men, getting them killed. Why shouldn't the Frenchmen go on in there and take over that territory, and stop all that foolish...but then they go too far. Then you've got to

go in and clean them up. And Juin came up and cleaned it up overnight. I was present when he went up there and I went up with him. It wasn't any trouble. Juin was a very fine gentleman. He wasn't killing anybody. He just thought that the prestige of his troops deserved something. Why should he be stopped, when he'd made all this effort?

Q: The French had a notion, and I suppose all people do - there were mountain passes that Mussolini had threatened, and they owned.

A: Well that's a rich little valley and there were a lot of French people, part-French people that lived there, as a matter of fact.

Q: They've got all of those little enclaves of odd populations all over Europe.

A: And there isn't any question they wanted to take it for France, on that level; but I don't know that Juin and up on that level had any idea of doing a thing like that. Maybe they did.

Q: Of course, you had nearly identical propositions with your boundaries between the 7th and 3rd Army, didn't you? I remember on a couple of occasions you had to fly forward and work them out because Patton was trying to outrace them, and getting over into the...

A: Well, we had...as a matter of fact, I'd say that we had an unwritten law. Patch and Patton were pretty good friends and they liked to criticize the old man, at least this... have their joke. But we made the deal, on two occasions, that the way we were attacking we couldn't possibly separate those troops once we turned them loose and if they did what we told them to do. George Patton and I agreed. So I said, "What we've got to do, George, is go through there and bust this thing, and when we get to the Rhine River, that's going to stop us. I'll trade you the 6th Armored Division for the 10th Armored Division, and they'll straighten their own thing out, and you and I won't have to write about it and worry." And I think we trained two infantry divisions the same way in one of those episodes.

Q: Well, the worst part came down there in Bavaria.

A: Yes, right in that Lorraine plain.

Q: He was cutting across your front.

A: That's right, in the Lorraine plain. [interruption] So, but that didn't cause us any trouble. I didn't know anybody even knew about it or wrote it up.

Q: Yes, this shows up in some sort of report back to Eisenhower that there were problems down there. But I know at certain points you sent back word that you had agreed that Patton and Patch would work it out between themselves.

A: We no problem...

Q: It would go straight - not come through your headquarters at all.

A: That's right. That's what we agreed to do and I went up there to see it was done; and they did it. I had no problem like that. See, Ike was always worrying about something up at his headquarters. He used to get information before I got it from these little groups I guess they had

up there, and they were more annoying, and I answered all these letters: well it's always worse back where you are than where I am and I'm right up here on the front line. Now who are you going to believe in this? We had our problems and all troops work that way. The corps commander complains about the army commander. You've got to take some of these things with a grain of salt - they're under awful pressure, great responsibility. A little battalion can ruin you if you're not on the job. All I know is that you've got to get up there yourself and find out what the problem is and then straighten it out on the ground. I don't think you have to write a letter for history or somebody like that. I never had time to. But it's worrying me now - I'll tell you that frankly - it's worrying me. If I had the background that I have now, I'd be a Churchill. I'd keep a doggone diary, and I'd begin to practice like Churchill, and I'd write something that's worth reading; and he's done it.

Q: Well his story's in history and it's quoted on both sides. The Americans have nothing as good, so they quote him.

A: Oh, it's going to be. He did a superb job. And I don't know where, some of those things, how they let him get away with it. You see, he ignores anybody that's been right and he's been wrong - he ignores them. I don't think you'll find me in there very much in any of his books.

Q: He doesn't mistake, I don't believe...

A: He doesn't mistake fact.

Q: I think he's usually accurate but, it's not all there.

A: That's right, he leaves it out. Now I had Nye, not four years ago - well, maybe longer - but he was the viceroy out in India. He'd taken over there as ambassador after India was independent. And we got discussing some of these things, "Yes," he said, "look what he did to me down in Cairo. He goes down to Cairo; and then I read what he says there, in his book." And he says, "That isn't what happened at all in Cairo." He says, "What he has there, yes, but he's left out two important letters that change the whole thing." That's what he did, you see. And that's what he did with me.

Q: But he learned in the First War that not only must you do things in history, you must see that your story's told.

A: That is right. He's right about it.

Q: He's generous quite often and all that, but, oh, his story's right down there and you have to go into it. I really think, and I've said this to Gen. Marshall several times, it's a pity he didn't keep some sort of a record at times.

A: Well it is, and I think Gen. Marshall - dates, for instance, and all those things. Now, I guess I can go find them, but they bother me; I never paid much attention to dates. I'm just...my brain's just big enough to handle what's happening at the moment. And I can't...I guess I do more things than I think I do, but I have to...I generally have one objective and I drive through - I always have a first priority in everything I'm trying to do. I learned that a long time ago. If I want to get money, I have first priority and I keep it until I get the money for that. Then I take whatever I can get below it. And I tell these fellows, "You're never going to get anywhere.

You've got you...you're dissipating your effort." And, so I've never been a piecemealer - I think you've got to go in and drive to do it, and then go on to the next. But I do, I agree that the thing to do is to do the way Churchill did. See, he used Pug Ismay for all these things to fill in, and Pug Ismay was a pretty good fellow. He was a good secretary; and all those fine officers they trained - the British. If anything I admire about the British command is their secretariat. Every one of them's gotten to high command - Harding - well practically all those fellows.

Q: Hollis, Hollis was one.

A: Hollis; Jacob's another. Well, those fellows'd sit back there and listen to the most awful conversation for hours and hours and then come out with a mimeograph that had some sense in it and say this is what happened - and they'd be making the decisions. Not much - they'd have what went on out there and you had the right to change it within an hour. You had an hour to read that daggone thing and come in and say this isn't right. Then they'd just cross it out, wouldn't put it in; and they'd take it up the next day. Well I approve of that method. I think that's alright.

Q: Otherwise, if they'd put down exactly what was said, it wouldn't have been anything.

A: We wouldn't have been able to read it.

Q: Ismay was awfully good, wasn't he?

A: I thought he was. I thought he was a good mixer. He's a clever fellow. He's pretty honest with you. You could always tell when he wasn't telling you everything, but that's the kind of loyalty that I appreciate. I always felt that they were all pretty honest with me. Where I had direct contact, any conversation, I never felt that they were anything but trying to tell me a story or warn me if it was something that was unusual, or they didn't approach it, and I took it that way and it paid off.

Q: Did you have any talks with the Prime Minister?

A: Yes, I went out - not alone. I don't think I was ever in there alone with him, but I went out to Checkers, had lunch out there and he'd talk to, with Gil Winant. I guess on two different occasions he was trying to put across tanks with me and a few other things, where I was on the wrong side of the fence, again. I just couldn't say very much, but, I didn't agree and I had to say it.

Q: How was his method with someone at your level? Did he try to cajole you and get you in a good mood, or did he try to sort of bulldoze you?

A: I wouldn't say that he did any of the things of that sort. He worked through the staff when he wanted to get something done; and in my case, I was always very definite. Wasn't any reason...I never sat on the fence, I just simply said I can't make that decision; I'll carry on from here. But I never, I don't think anybody ever had the impression of me - or I hope they never did - that I had some ulterior motive or I was working toward certain things that I, that didn't really bear on the problem. I felt that I was trying to do a job the best I knew how and I gave a reason - I just came out with it even if it hurt them or it hurt me. And I think that probably was a mistake if you're...it

hurts you all right - you pay for it for a long time - but it may also hurt your problem when you don't want it to. However, I don't regret anything I did.

Q: Now, the other day you mentioned, in passing, something that gave me the impression that Winant contributed somewhat to your problems. Is this because he tended to be pro-British in his viewpoints, or what was the trouble?

A: Well, Gil Winant was a very peculiar man. He lived over there on 1 Grosvenor Square. I sat many a night with him and his open fire, holding his hand because he was worried that he was going to lose his job. That was too much on his mind. He would read in the Times: Harry Hopkins is going to be sent, soon, to be ambassador to England. Well, he had said in my presence, "I can't give Roosevelt any votes." And I don't know what this means. Those things worried him. His wife wasn't there very much with him. Then that son arrived and immediately went out on a bombing mission and never came back, and that got on his nerves. In fact, I think his wife had to go home because of a nervous breakdown. We couldn't find out where the boy was; we didn't know whether he was killed or not - never did know for months. He finally came back alright. He had this social problem always in his, he - well, the Negro problem [indistinct] - but that was a thing, and he always wanted to overdo that, in my opinion. I don't think that the Prime Minister - now this is an opinion - used him any way but when he had to. I think the man over there who did the work and did it well was Averell Harriman. When the Prime Minister sent for him, and he used to at 2:00 and 3:00 in the morning, it was Averell Harriman that always had to take over. Averell Harriman was a hard worker; I'd known him before. I'd played polo with Harriman when I was at West Point with him, which was a fortunate thing. So I knew a lot about Averell Harriman. He had Reed from General Electric as his deputy in that Lend-Lease game, and two more capable men I don't think you could find; and I say both were hard workers.

Q: Winant had trouble making himself understood, didn't he? He was quite incoherent at times.

A: That's right. He was very indefinite [?]. He had long...he looked it, too, he looked the part. He'd made...I never could really find out how he made his money. I knew he'd been a governor in New Hampshire, I guess.

Q: Vermont.

A: Vermont. And he'd gone out west somewhere in the mining business. He was supposed to be a mining, have some mining knowledge. But he was always peculiar to me. He used to send for me so I felt I got along fine with him. He had a man over there in his staff---Wally Carroll - he's here with the New York Times. He's Reston's deputy, who I consider him a very capable fellow - had been to Russia: had written a book. I got to know Wally Carroll quite well, and he had his feet on the ground...quiet, dignified. Those were the only contacts I had in London and I didn't know those fellows well 'til I got there.

Q: You weren't surprised, particularly, when Winant killed himself.

A: No, I wasn't. I said that was what was going to happen to him one of these days. He was very loyal to Roosevelt. Roosevelt never had a more loyal supporter than Winant, but he was always not sure of his position - ever.

Q: Well, It was difficult for all of these people to have Hopkins running in and out, but without Hopkins I don't know whether they would've gotten a lot of things done that were done.

A: Well I don't know much about Hopkins because I didn't ever have a contact with him that I know of. But I know that he was working to win this war and, just from little things that I heard, he was very helpful to Gen. Marshall. He used to try to get Gen. Marshall to go over there and see the President because he felt that King was getting in there too often and maybe not giving the complete picture that should've been given. And it was Hopkins that would notice those things that weren't balanced up and try to pull them together. So I always felt that Harry Hopkins was a pretty valuable assistant to have around from, where I sat. Now that's all hearsay - I don't think I ever had a conversation with Harry Hopkins.

Q: This squares with nearly everything else I've found out about him. Of course he's been attacked, brutally, but on political grounds in this country. And a lot of people say he was terribly pro-Russian. But, of course, he took the view that if we were going to work with the Russians, we should try to keep them in the war. Now we don't know about [indistinct].

A: Well, you take Harriman - when Harriman was finally...knew he was going to Russia. Bradley happened to be in London. He sent for me and asked me to bring Bradley with him. We went over and sat in Harriman's office and we discussed Russia and where we sat. Now my attitude at that time - and I don't know that Bradley differed, but I'm not going to quote Bradley - was the Russians...if you go in there and don't ask them for anything but help them wherever you can; they're just like our people were when they landed up here on the rock - they're bound to want to play ball. And I think that's the way to start on this thing. And he asked us about the staff. He was going to take Deane out there. He was going to clean up the staff. He was going to move in there and see what could be done about it. And he went out there with that attitude. He wasn't there very long before he wrote and said it isn't going to work that way. Harriman was one of the first, as Bullitt was, who'd been out there with that close contact, to come up with the answers that were right. And I, of course, had to change my attitude right away. As I say, I owe the Russians something because when they said they'd attack on the western front in this war after the Bulge, they did it on the very day.

Q: They kept their word on nearly all of those things.

A: And that pulled a whole German corps off of my front and that's the last the Germans had of anything. They had us really in a pickle down there because I wasn't getting any help from anybody. I had to either pull back, or give up ground, or get annihilated, and I was really worrying. It was down to almost 24 hours and that thing came through; that day they started moving their troops we attacked and we never stopped. That's when Patton got loosed-up. He was loosening up, but that's when he got his pitch. And we're the ones that gave it to him because we pulled those fellows out. We really ruined that German army down there from that time on.

Q: Well, after a while they took Himmel [?] out and sent him over on the other flank.

A: Yes.

Q: Now, the question of stopping on the Elbe line didn't arise in your case because the Third Army was crossing...

A: That's right. I had nothing to do with that. They stopped me, you see, they pinched me out.

Q: Yes, they cut across your front.

A: Well, they gave Patton's...yes, they went right down the Danube and cut across there which was ridiculous in a good many ways. We could've gone all the way to Bulgaria and through Bulgaria. And if they'd have let me use that German, uh, that Russian corps down there which was fighting with the Germans, I could've taken them and turned them around and fought them against the Russians. All I had to do was supply them, and the commander wanted to do that, but Ike had his orders that we weren't to do that - they were to come in as prisoners and finally they had to do...come in. They didn't fight us anymore, but we didn't use the potential that had there. There are a lot of little things like that, from where I sat, could've been handled if they'd had a little more confidence, maybe, and I could've been wrong, too, but we were full of pep and vinegar.

Q: Everybody wanted to move, I guess.

A: We wanted to move and we accomplished our thing. We cut into Italy ahead of the 5th Army. We were down in their pass. We went way down into Italy with the 6th Corps just to show...the Sixth Corps had come the other way, you see.

Q: You went to Innsbruck, didn't you?

A: We went beyond Innsbruck - down in the pass. We could've gone all the way down, as a matter of fact, but we were just doing that because we were waving flags and kidding each other. Also we were trying to keep the French from coming in and taking too much of that territory 'til they settled the boundary lines. I wanted to keep the French in hand.

Q: Now had you been told that Gen. Bradley had started getting divisions ready to send to Japan, as soon as the war ended?

A: Yes.

Q: See, Bradley didn't want to push too much beyond the Elbe because - his corps people did, but he didn't - because he knew that he'd have to have divisions to send back.

A: Well, we'd been told that but we...you see, well our front was getting pretty...would've been pretty narrow down there. We wouldn't have had much trouble. And I wasn't worrying about divisions to handle the country; I knew they had to go. I think we had orders on certain divisions to ready them - there was a priority. I forget that story, although at that time I went up and took the 12th Army Group as well as my own.

Q: But you see, Gen. Patton in his book wrote a lot about the fact that if they hadn't held him in he'd have gone right on - I mean he was anxious to go to Prague.

A: Sure; he could have, too.

Q: And I didn't know whether in your headquarters there was any particular...

A: I didn't hold anybody back except boundary lines. They held me back with their boundary lines.

Q: But I mean, you weren't straining at the leash to go anywhere in particular.

A: No, I wasn't straining. We were cleaning up, but we wanted to get the war over and have it settled. And when that was done, why, we were...

Q: I think Patton would've liked to have had Prague, because he felt he'd been gypped out of a couple of capital cities, like Paris.

A: Yes, that's right.

Q: He wanted to take Berlin, of course. Now, at the time, there was a great controversy over that end of August/first of September affair. Of course you were still coming up the Rhone at that time. You were tied up with the - what was the date that you were tied up with the 3rd Army?

A: Well, it was pretty close to the...it was sometime before the 15th of September, or just around the 15th of September.

Q: But you didn't have the question that he did near the end of August when, of course, he felt they should stop Monty and let him go on his...

A: Well, he couldn't have gone. I know a little about that because we were worrying about these gaps. I think Patton would have gotten into real trouble; I think in that case Bradley was right about what he did. He would've been out there alone; he wouldn't have had any supplies; he was trying to live off of the country; and the Germans can react awful fast and they did react fast at times. George Patton doesn't tell about this battalion he sent out to get these prisoners. I won't tell the whole story on that one, but they lost that whole battalion - the whole doggone...

Q: He says that's the only mistake he made in the war.

A: Mistake in the war? That's what he was doing. That's just a small example of what he'd have done with his whole army. He lost a division or so here because the Germans really cut him off; and I don't think that we could've helped him any from where we were. We were too far away, and I don't know what - Bradley had a lot of troops up there but they were all messing around, too.

Q: They were strung out all the way back...

A: And they weren't...their communications were pretty meager.

Q: They were badly stretched.

A: Badly stretched. If it hadn't been for airplanes, I doubt if they'd have know where a lot of their troops were at that time. Now two/three/four/five days after you get settled, that's something else.

Q: His theory was: if he could've gone through the Siegfried Line, which he might have been able to do in four more days of steady pushing, that this shock would've brought the German

Government down, probably, or it would've so disorganized the Germans they never could attack anymore.

A: Well, I felt the same way. I was through all these lines with the 103rd Infantry Division. I had to come back because of the Bulge. There're a lot of ifs and ands. We didn't have to fight much to get them later on, because we didn't have any troops to really hold them with and also the resistance in the German Army was gone. We knew it was gone early in the game because, as soon you knocked off a few officers and non-commissioned officers, the Germans surrendered.

Q: But unless you could knock out this group entirely, and then you just pushed out there, you knew you were going to be in bad shape, weren't you?

A: That's right; and they could really react fast. That's the great thing about the German Army - it could react fast. So I feel that George would've been in trouble, real trouble. And I think that maybe they didn't support him as soon as they might've, with what they had - if they could've done that, that's something else. But down where I was, we would've caught up with him, and we could've protected his flank, I think, without too much trouble because the Germans would've had to really concentrate to do, to cause him trouble. So, he could've been right, too; he could've been right. They might've decided to block me or somebody else, you see.

Q: But there were grounds for caution on the part of...

A: Yes, sir.

Q: ...of Bradley and of Eisenhower.

A: They proved that he didn't have any supplies. Look, they had to... look, even afterward he could hardly get enough supplies up there for George.

Q: Well, of course he says that's because they gave it all to Monty, but then, after all, you can't have Monty in a mess up there. That Channel coast was fairly important, you know.

A: It's important and it's difficult. It's got lots of water up there.

Q: After all, they wanted Antwerp and they also wanted to get rid of those B-Bomb sites.

A: See, you've got to remember that the Germans could have piecemealed them and knocked one off here and one off there, which is what they tried to do. You've got to, you can't just be running around the country, galloping. That's alright, that has, that's a wonderful thing that mobility and that drive, at certain points, but somebody has to throw the caution. That's, I think Bradley was right about that part of it.

Q: The thing I want to...I put down several points I wanted to pull out and talk about. You mentioned a while ago talking to Morgenthau and White. Of course this would have been in '43, wouldn't it?

A: Yes sir.

Q: So he wasn't talking any, then, about the Morgenthau Plan of dividing up Germany.

A: No sir. I don't know how that got to be a Morgenthau Plan, because if Morgenthau had any brains, it didn't show up in those two. White's the one that knew all about the finances. I learned a lot about the finances, but White's the one that had to answer all the questions. It wasn't Morgenthau.

Q: Well, later on, you know, in these committees they tried to make out that White had ties with the communists and that the whole notion of dividing Germany was communist-inspired, but I don't know whether that's true or not. It may have been, but you can find other reasons for this type of plan, can't you, other than communist?

A: Yes, I would've been opposed to the plan called the Morgenthau Plan. It was, I would've been violently opposed to it because it'd cause all kind of trouble.

Q: I can't believe that McCloy backed it, either.

A: I don't believe he could've. I certainly know that White understood the economics of the Treasury Department. He really knew the values and the dollars and came up to these intricate things. It was White that did the talking to Winant. I never understood why they wanted to do it – of course Morgenthau - or why they wanted to come over there. Morgenthau says, "If I go down there they'll entertain me; and every man I send over here – they'll go down there and entertain him and take his shirt away from him." That's what he said. [chuckling]

Q: Well, let's go back a little bit to the time when you went to England first. I don't know that we talked the other day much about what Gen. Marshall told you you were to do when you went over, what he wanted you to do in particular, or how he wanted you to operate. Is there anything you wanted to say on that period?

A: Well, I don't think he gave me very definite instructions except the general policy that we did want to cross the English Channel, eventually, that we were going to build up supplies, that the situation as it was in Africa at the time had to be cleaned up first, that I had to form a staff, and that he'd be in further touch with me; that's all.

Q: Well did he warn you that the British were trying to wiggle out, from previous commitments?

A: No, he made no indication to me of such a thing. He explained everything that had happened up to that time and that the British were not in favor, very much in favor of this cross-Channel operation, but that he - if I remember properly - he thought it'd all been decided but could be changed. No, I don't feel that...I always thought Gen. Marshall was very clear that he wanted to cross the channel and that's what was going to be eventually done, but I don't think he gave me any directions. But, if I'd have come back and recommended no, we'd better not do it, or something like that, I don't think I had any - if that's what you mean - I don't think I had any blocks on me at all when I was sent over there. I think I was sent over there with pretty much freedom, as a matter of fact.

Q: You were looking toward '44 by this time. That had been settled.

A: Yes, we were looking toward '44 and they were just setting up the staff. They hadn't fixed any real dates, but I know the first thing I did when I got over there. I happened to know that they were stopping manufacture of tank transport on the Ohio River. And there were also ducks

- they weren't going to make as many ducks. And one of the first things I did when I got there was to send back a cable to get busy on them - we were going to need thousands of these things - because that was going to take time. With my experience with the armored force I knew that it was going to take time and as I remember, from a staff level, that was something that I got my teeth into right away. Now they were just setting up this staff and I was rebuilding a staff. I had a chief of staff Idwal Edwards was there and I had a deputy, Inglis, who Gen. Marshall took away from me within about two weeks to make chief signal officer of the Army. He was the only one left of Andrews' staff at the top side. And so I had to get a G-1 in there. I had to get a G-2. I sent for him right away and he got into trouble with a woman and I had to send him back, and by that time Eddie Sibert came over, was coming over for Bradley and I think he took over, as I remember or I may have had him over there and he was - that's right, I guess I had him and my G-3 was Dave Barr which we...Idwal Edwards wanted. I said, "Who do you want in here as G-3?" He said, "Your former chief of staff of the armored force would suit me fine." I said, "Let's get him. He'll want to come." And, G-4 I told you about, how we did about that. So that's the way we started building that staff.

Q: Your 4 was Noce?

A: Noce - let's see, yes. I brought Dan Noce over as deputy G-3 under Barr, to start with, and then he went down...

Q: Noce seems to have made a number of people angry. Was he just a rather plain-spoken person?

A: He's a very plain-spoken fellow and a very honest farmer boy, like I am. He's down here farming now at Culpepper and Dan Noce is a pretty sound citizen but maybe he's a little stubborn at times; I wouldn't... I always felt when I wanted some real sharp advice, I could get Dan Noce and he'd do it. Now he was handicapped because - I guess we made him the G-3 and we made Dave Barr the deputy to the chief of staff. He was just a brigadier general and we had conference after conference with the British on amphibious warfare and all these other things, and we'd always assemble somewhere up in the country, and I'd have a hard time getting Noce in there because these were top-level stuff. I was a lieutenant general, but I was the only one; the rest were brigadier generals. I believe Idwal Edwards was a major general. But I had a hard time getting these people promoted and the British were sticky as the devil. I'd have to almost take Noce through the door with me when I went in, because he was important. Now these secretariat reports - I read things pretty hurriedly and I comment on it and want to know whether the contents there are interpreted. Dan Noce, however, would read that very carefully and he'd come in and say, "You better not sign this. Do you realize that this comma, that this means so and so and so and so and so?" Well, they use good English; I guess they use it, you might say they're trying to do that stuff and in that way he was invaluable to me. He was a good check for me, because we saved ourself a lot of trouble. I never knew that he caused any great trouble, but he was pretty hostile.

Q: I don't know now who it was, but two or three times I've run into people that said - I gathered they'd had some difficulties with him.

A: He was kind of a watchdog down there on the British staff. See, he ended up down there on the British staff, in the G-3. I said G-4, but G-3 is what he had. Adcock was the G-4 and I took him.

Q: Well I don't think it's the British that I ever heard complain about him. They, of course they always tend to complain about Patton. But Patton has already said more about them than they can possibly say about him. [chuckle] There wasn't much they can do to him there. Of course by the time you went there they had pretty well taken out the Eisenhower staff in the Mediterranean.

A: They took the whole...they took everybody they wanted to take. They left behind only the people they didn't want.

Q: Nearly all the troops were gone and nearly all the buildups.

A: Yes, everything was gone except a big pile of stuff that was sent over for them to go to Africa with, and they couldn't separate it so they reordered it and had it reshipped so they didn't have to unship it again. And we were cleaning that mess up.

Q: So in a sense it was starting all over again.

A: Starting all over to rebuild and re-set the whole scheme up. Littlejohn was the quartermaster and he had a terrific job. When he had too many people I started cutting him back on staff. I thought we had too many people in this chain and I got it back, but Eisenhower more than doubled him when he came in there because John said he needed them. I always felt these fellows just caused trouble. Why couldn't these people make decisions and get this thing set up. Why did you have to have 200 when 100 ought to be able to do the job; it was almost that bad. I didn't dwell on it too much, but I spent Sundays with my staff, with these tables of organization trying to get them down to reasonableness; and, of course, Littlejohn's a very efficient, driving sort of a fellow but he's difficult. He's very difficult and I knew him well so I could get along with him. Now he and Dan Noce used to tie it up a little bit, but. But the signal officer and the ordnance officer were all people that Ike had left behind and they had their jobs pretty well worked up and were working and going along on it. We had to improve all that, just as the Air Force - Eaker had a lot of older men in command there and they were beginning to think about their men more than they were about the fight. And we weren't making...Arnold had the pressure on us, so naturally the pressure was on me, too. And I had to go out and look into this thing. And so I had to take action there to get those fellows sent back to the States for training and give us some new blood; and that's where these younger men came in like Anderson - took the bomber command - and Curt Lemay came in as one of his commanders and we revamped that whole setup, including the fighter command.

Q: Of course that was the only offensive part of your activity.

A: That's the only offensive part but we did that purely to get us all based. Not that these men were inefficient in any sense of the word, but they were slowing up. They were losing men and it was a difficult job but somebody had to have drive and keep going and have imagination that these things could be done. Otherwise we wouldn't, we'd have been in trouble. And we were improving all the time - getting more of everything.

Q: Now you didn't come back to the States during the time...

A: I never came back one day.

Q: And the General didn't come, Gen. Marshall didn't come over during that period, did he?

A: Over to England? Yes, he was over there. Let's see...did he come to England? I don't believe that he came...I don't know whether he came to England in '43, but it seems to me he did. He came down in Italy.

Q: He came twice in 1942 and he was in Italy in '43. I couldn't remember whether he was in England in '44; I don't remember whether he came to England or not. He was in Casablanca in January. He went around the world.

A: I flew back with him when he came back from Casablanca. I got stuck with an airplane - an engine out and he found it out and he had me join him at Dakar. So I flew back with him, on that trip. He divided our two groups up and I was on my way back from the inspection of the 8th Army.

Q: Oh, that was that trip. That's right. He didn't - I got mixed up - I was thinking he went on around the world from Casablanca but it wasn't that trip

A: No, he did that later.

Q: He did that later on. But now, he didn't make any stop in England on that round.

A: He didn't - I don't remember Gen. Marshall in England in '43.

Q: I was just trying to pick up any points in which he was in contact with you, or if there were particular problems that you all talked over together.

A: He came down to Africa just before we went into the south of France - or Italy, I mean. And at the staff meeting there, I know, an episode took place in which they brought up that they might not do this thing in the south of France and I thought it'd all been settled - staff and everything - everything cleaned up. And I had to get up and say, "Look, now wait a minute. You were all given a table when they sprung this thing." I said, "Gen. Marshall, I think you better come back and get this straight, because we have decided that we're going into the south of France, as I understand it, and that there's no, there isn't any doubt about this thing anymore." And he said, "Yes, that's what I understand," as I remember that story. But, as you know, even at the very last they tried to switch it.

Q: Churchill tried to switch it, with only two or three days left. Even Jumbo said it's just too late - these ships have started moving.

A: Couldn't possibly do it. It was easy to play that game with them and let them roll with the punches. That was absurd, what they wanted to do. We were worried enough - why bring in a thing like that? We were worried enough. What that really did - put the onus on those of us who were very positive of what we were going to do, and if something went wrong we were butchered or something. Well I flew the whole day before we landed in the south of France in a P-51 - piggyback - and flew practically the whole Mediterranean on two different trips checking

our convoys and everything; and then on the day of the battle I flew with Eaker surrounded by... covering over the whole landing beaches. So I saw the whole landing on that morning and I gave all the general officers of the Air Force a chance to watch what was going off, too, so they were up on my wings and whatnot. It was rather an exciting episode.

Q: Well now, were you with the fleet that morning?

A: No, on the morning when we landed? No, I flew out from Corsica.

Q: How did Churchill get in on it? Did he go along with the British admiral, or what was it? He was on one of the ships, wasn't he?

A: He was there, yes. He was with Cunningham, somewhere.

Q: I didn't know whether he was with you or not.

A: I know, he... Of course, I went out on a destroyer later the same day, and he'd been there. They were...he was a nuisance because they had to protect him, you see, just like Wild Bill Donovan. He came out and wanted to do this and do that and I said, "No, Bill, you can't do it." He said all right. I said, "Well now, I'm taking a positive stand because I have to put a lot of people out here to guard you - take ships off of this and ships off of that - so I'm not going to be responsible." And he just... "All right." But, he has a captain in the navy all subsidized. He goes out on the destroyer. That's his own responsibility. He didn't have my - having to take special precautions...if something happened to that ship, he went down, it was his business. And I wasn't going to...I told him, just "frank out", I said, "You're just a damn nuisance. What are you going to accomplish? You haven't got any secret agents over there and you don't need to kid me about that. If you have them, you're getting your reports here - you're not going to get them aboard that ship, I'll tell you that."

Q: He just wanted to go along.

A: He just wanted to make a landing on every beach and he did it. Scoundrel. [chuckling]

Q: Well you did get a certain amount of information, though, didn't you, from French units?

A: Oh yes, we got a terrific amount from the maquis.

Q: And they controlled three or four of those departments down there, didn't they, in the south and over toward the Alps?

A: Well I thought they controlled the whole area, myself, except the cities. They'd just, they'd come out of the woods and say don't go up here. The Germans are up there in the woods and they've got this outflanked; if you do this, you'll - so forth. In that way it made it very simple to go faster. You didn't have to stop so long to think. You just took their word for it and they went with you and away you went. You cleaned out all those holes and that got everybody rolling and when you got those divisions rolling back into the mountains on that side, particularly, and back across toward the Rhone on the other end. Our strategy worked, too; the Germans were afraid to put the one armored division they had on our side of the Rhone. They put them on the other side because they thought that we would probably land at Sète and we let them believe that, too. So,

they never could get that division back across the river and when they did, we piecemealed it with our bombers.

Q: They did pretty well, though, in spite of rear guard action, didn't they?

A: They did alright 'til we cut them off, up in the pass, then they lost an awful lot of people. You see, they had us out-numbered, and if they could've stood and been coordinated and pulled together, they could've given us a bad time. But when we broke them up and got those divisions rolling, they went as fast as they could up those mountain roads on that one border and we couldn't follow too fast. The maquis had kicked a lot of those people off.

Q: As a matter of fact they had held that armor down there because of the maquis.

A: That's right.

Q: They had been sending them up to Ike's front earlier.

A: That's right. See, we cut those people off at Montelimar and I think there was twenty miles of dead animals and broken down trucks. Oh, they had to go along and shoot the horses. They had a lot horse artillery down there and horse transport. And we cut them off by sending the Butler force up the old Napoleon road and cutting over there and then telling Butler to stick. And that got Dahlquist all in trouble with Truscott - two pretty tough characters, and Truscott was dominating the situation, got what he wanted and did it; that's all - he wasn't taking any... But that was a mess; I never saw such a mess. The horses we killed in this war...it's just out of this world. And there's nothing you can do with them. You can't bury them. You just got to set them afire. You got to pull them together, put gasoline on them and start a big fire.

Q: Yes, they were left that way all across northern France, too.

A: Oh! When you catch those artillery transports, particularly. They're still pulling a lot of their guns with horses in the passes. And one plane, you know, can knock them all and then we'd catch them with one of these artillery concentrations and they were through.

Q: It's difficult to believe that the Germans were looked upon as very fast, completely motorized outfits early in the war when they depended to the very end on this horse-drawn stuff.

A: It was practically all they had.

Q: And yet, because they were partially mechanized, they were looked upon - or were 'til we got started - as being extremely motorized and mechanized. Well now, in that '43 period in England, what were the things in particular then that Gen. Marshall hammered on in his messages to you, in sending people to you?

A: Well, I think he was pretty well satisfied with what we were doing there. We kept him pretty well informed with what was going on, and in the staff, and they were so busy with Ike in Africa and [Magis el bad?] and their troubles down there and also with Montgomery coming the other direction, and we had just a pure buildup, that I don't remember anything except scientists were coming over there because of these bomb sites that later turned out to be A-bomb sites. We never demanded anything that just didn't fit in. We didn't disagree with the way the buildup was. I did bring that outfit out of Iceland because I thought we needed another division down there

for an emergency and we used them to train - we wanted to train some amphibious divisions, you see, and we were setting up a school. And that would be the 5th Division and the 29th. And we were getting experts. The 4th came over early to take that training, but the 1st and 9th came in from Africa to take it. The 9th was alright, but the 1st needed some training - they really weren't so good when they started. But Hughner had taken over and he was getting them in order, so they...and I say Stark and Eaker and I worked very closely together. We had no disagreements. We met every day. They needed help and I gave it to them, particularly Eaker. He needed it then because we were building that up. Our supply ships were rolling in there. Stark was taking...we didn't lose any transports. We solved that one. Now, there was the thing that Stimson came over to - he, Stimson took hold of that, you see, and he got that coastal patrol - who was the commander of that...lame fellow later got to be chief of the Air Force...wrote a big, thick book on air force matters...went down to Italy with us, too.

Q: You mean the Britisher?

A: Yes, he had the coastal command and he wasn't getting any support from anybody, including the British. Stimson came in and put our Air Force to work and that made the Navy take over the job later on and do something about it, and the result was the breaking the code, which we'd been able to do...

Q: Slessor, wasn't it?

A: Slessor. And he was a brilliant fellow. He could write, too. Boy, he was a real fine secretary at one time. Well Slessor got this whole thing organized so we really began to sink German submarines right and left and that's the way we never lost a tanker or a loaded ship. We lost one or two going back empty, but none going over from May the 10th, when I got there, 'til I left. So our shipping was in good shape. Now we, of course we were running the queens [?], zigzagging across there without convoy and they were hauling people - principally service personnel. Our buildup with these supplies that were coming off these ships, we were building airports - 120 of them - or taking over the ones the British gave us and increasing them and that took a lot of doing with labor and engineers and people of that sort, and we were getting mobile machine shops to our airfields as they were being completed, and the bombers were coming in faster almost than we could handle them. We put 15 bombers on a field, then we increased it to 30, and finally we put 60 on a field. So you can see how crowded we got to be before we could spread out. We had problems because, in our factories there because we had pilot lines with civilians on one side and soldiers or airmen on the other, mechanics drawing different pay. Well that's a problem we had to straighten, but that wasn't Marshall's problem really. We got that straightened out through the Air Force.

Q: He left that more or less as he did the COSSAC business while they were doing that planning. He didn't enter in on that much.

A: No.

Q: Now just how - I've never had it completely clear in my mind how you fitted in with the COSSAC setup.

A: Well I really had nothing to do with the COSSAC setup, except as the American adviser in that theater. We had this – you named him a while ago. I never had too much confidence in him, but we...

Q: Barker.

A: Barker. We assisted Barker in every possible way and in that way we were fully informed as to what went on and when things got out of line, I did step in.

Q: You didn't have a member of your own staff sitting in the meetings.

A: No sir, Barker was the only man we had over there. If it was something important, however, Barker always had a member of my staff there because he had to get an awful lot from us. We did build up his staff. I forget who he had over there but we had good men on that staff. Of course, one of the big problems were the logistics and a lot of that went through Lee's staff, which I also had them watch, but I never had to protest to Marshall about what they were doing because they were more or less doing the best that could be done at the time. And then when the time came, and things were beginning to firm up, then I suggested that they go back to the States – Barger go back himself...not Barger, but Morgan and Barker'd go with him. And in that case, we didn't step in and do anything about it. I had informed Gen. Marshall; I think you'll find a pretty complete report on what I thought about that thing, but there was nothing major that I thought needed to be made quite a point of. We couldn't change our boundary lines; they were fixed. So why argue about it? Let's go out and do the best we could. The British had agreed to the schools I wanted over there for the training. They brought me down, though, and made me take the responsibility and I had to go down there and talk to the people on the coast and fix up their cemeteries and their churches and assure them that we weren't doing this ruthlessly. I had to make my decision that we would train where we did. The British chief of staff, except Dickie Mountbatten, wanted us to train up in Scotland where he was training; and I stood my ground on the other because I thought this out with Stark and Eaker and the grounds were there, and it was the right place because that's the kind of tides we were going to meet. They were 20-foot tides and we were going to get some people killed. We knew that. And Dickie Mountbatten wrote back after this very awful conference I had; I felt like I was alone in a deep sea - struggling. And he said, "I want to ride back with you." And on the way back to my headquarters he says, "You stick to your stand. You're right." He said, "This business that they say they can't train but a few days a month is bunk. That's what you're going to have to do anyhow. Up where I am, I can't either. I have just as bad weather in Scotland. The only thing I would...the reason I rode back is: if I were you, (he pulled out a map) I think you can put this thing across if you'll just cut this area down a little bit." And that's what I did. I just took his advice and cut the area down and it worked.

Q: That's down in the Slapton Sands area.

A: That's right.

Q: Not only were the tides right, but the topography was a lot like the beach...

A: Very much.

Q: They all came out of the same geological formation.

A: That's right. That's the reason it was selected; and also, there were some facilities down there we could use. We could shoot the way we wanted to. And Nye, who was very reasonable and logical, approved the plan. I talked it over with him when it got to be a real discussion and it looked like they were going to take it too far up.

Q: Well this was civilian opposition rather than military, anyway.

A: Well, it was civilian opposition and, of course, that...Churchill then took that side and then his staff took that side, except Dickie Mountbatten and Portal. Portal always sided, generally sided with us, too, on these things; but we didn't have any real major problems outside of that. The command was settled for us. Whenever that popped up I'd say, well listen, there's only one way that can be done. So I was pretty positive about that.

Q: Those things came up after Overlord itself had been accepted at Quebec, didn't it? The question of whether or not...

A: Well, who was going to be the commander - but I kept plugging away that it had to be an American. If anybody made me say, I'd say well it has to be Marshall.

Q: Well, at one point, they also accepted the notion that it would be an American on D-Day, in charge of D-Day forces until they expanded the beaches and there had to be two Armies in on it. But somewhere there in October or November they were talking about an American even commanding D-Day.

A: Well the American had to be the man who was going to come up there - had to be either Marshall or Eisenhower. The CP was built, too, and the American side was going to be commanded by an American and the British side was going to be commanded by a British. Now we didn't know who they were. I was hoping that maybe I'd get that command down there. But I felt whoever the overall commander was going to be that he ought to control that because there's no question in the mind of any of us that we had to be pretty lucky on hitting a day when that sea wasn't too rough - weather was a big thing and I take my hat off to Ike Eisenhower. Never did a man ever have to make a decision under more adverse circumstances than Ike Eisenhower had to make on that day. If I'd have had...where he was - I know, because we had started and that was one of my driving ideas I wouldn't give up on, is: we've got to get weather, weather, weather. We've got to know more about this weather. How do we do it? Well I think we got them started in the States. They sent people up and they put stations everywhere. They took it over and put in a man knew man about weather and he did something about it; and it helped. But the decision that he, the things he had to tell Ike didn't help Ike much because it was there - do you or don't you? When you start, how far can you go before you can come back? Now it takes a real person to make that decision and Ike took it. He made it. There isn't any question who made it.

Q: And Leigh-Mallory was saying it's going to be a...

A: Well Leigh-Mallory, he was a distinct drawback to us, all the time. None of us wanted Leigh-Mallory. I think I would have always selected Slessor, myself, because I liked the way he handled the costal command. I didn't know him very well. Leigh-Mallory was a very fine gentleman but he was always finding reasons why you can't do this and why you can't do that. Also, he had problems with the bomber command, who was always in our hair and was a close friend of Gil Winant and was using Gil Winant all the time.

Q: Do you mean Harris Personlee[?] ?

A: Harris Personlee[?]. He had the Prime Minister's right and left ears, both. Now I'm going to tell you that – that's one thing. Now, the day that they were going to bomb out the lakes up there and those dams, Winant got me invited over to this place where we all collected. Tommy Hitchcock was over there. Now Tommy Hitch...you see, Gil Winant and Tommy Hitchcock and the president of Eastern Airlines, Rickenbacker, and the commander of our fighters were all in the Lafayette Escadrille or one of those squadrons. They're all buddies. That's where Gil Winant came in on this thing; and he had Tommy Hitchcock over there, in the air side, who was all right. Tommy worked hard but he was an airman first and last and he finally got killed because he thought he was young enough to fly those things and he wasn't. We told him so. But those fellows were always in there and they were all good, smart go-getters. I played polo – I know that Tommy Hitchcock was one of the greatest polo players ever lived. And he was wonderful on the polo field. So I knew about him more than I knew him. And all those things worked in there. Well Harris was a good mixer; he mixed with them. So he was...the bomber command always had the upper hand here. Leigh-Mallory had an awful time with his fighters. He had the fighter command and the question was who was going to command so Leigh-Mallory was really the compromise in this deal. They didn't want Harris in there. Now, whether Tooe Spatz had to switch that, or - I know Ira Eaker and I thought about it. Harris is all right. He's a nice fellow. You could talk to him but, boy, he just went down the alley. If he didn't get what he wanted, he got to see Churchill and he had it. [chuckling] That's our impression, see, from where we sit.

Q: Well, I didn't know why Leigh-Mallory was in there because it was always argued that he took a defensive attitude because as a fighter command he had naturally fought a defensive battle.

A: And, also, he was in there as a compromise; again we thought we had to watch that plan pretty carefully because we - look at the planes we had in that thing. They were all American planes. The British had a big part in it but a small part was particularly on the fighter side, and their bombers - hell, I guess we were up to 5 or 6,000 bombers and I don't believe they had a 1,000, did they, in that?

Q: I doubt if they did.

A: And they were doing this night bombing and it was certainly haphazard. I never could find out whether they've ever bombed exactly what they said they were going to bomb because with one plane at a time you never knew whether that fellow went where he was supposed to go and the weather wasn't always good. Whereas, our formations...we had pictures. Now they tried to make them take pictures; we can't take pictures at night but in daylight we had a picture and if they didn't have a picture, boy, they were in trouble. And we know that our fellows quit sometimes and went into Switzerland or did some things. We knew a whole lot they didn't know, but that's war. Most of the time they'd go in on their target and stick 'til they got their bombs where they wanted them and that cost them a lot, because the flak...Really, those squadrons used to come in and when they hit that field, the men there, they couldn't come off the runway 'til they had them checked. We briefed them and brought them into a room where they couldn't talk to anybody. We got their first impressions, pulled the wounded out of that and, sometimes, the killed out of those planes. I'll tell you, that was a real - the Air Force did a real job in '43. That's when the German Air Force was defeated; and it was brutal because we were

learning at the same time with inexperienced personnel. You might say all of us from the top down didn't know too much about this. And we learned the hard way.

Q: Did Arnold stay right on the top of that situation?

A: Well, he stayed on top of it with cables over there. Giving us hell all the time for not doing something that was...he didn't know anything about. He had to change his whole policy if he ever wrote it properly. He had to get his shops to put them on the airfields so we could repair the airplanes on the airfields that they landed on. They didn't always come back to home base. They'd come in and they'd get the first field they could get in on. We had to increase our personnel. We couldn't have just one crew to one plane. We had to have, we had it all worked out - I think it took two pilots to every plane and a co-pilot and so many bombardiers. This was all worked out because these fellows would crack up - we had to give them a rest somehow. If their system went out, hell, they'd come out of those planes sometime and you could knock the end of their fingers off. They were black because they froze up there. All those things were seen and known about on every airfield in there in '43, while I was there. It wasn't as bad, I don't think, maybe, afterwards as it was then because the Germans certainly ganged up on us. We thought we had them tricked and they'd out-trick us. And I take my hat off to the Air Force, the operations, the way they learned and what they accomplished.

Q: Now that matter of the boundary - you mentioned the other day that you had some discussion with the COSSAC people on whether we would have the right side or the left side. What was the point at issue there?

A: Well, the point at issue there was purely an academic issue at the time. We knew we had to use the ports in the Baltic eventually. Therefore we ought to have been on the north. There wasn't any reason why we shouldn't have been on the north. It took a little shifting. We did have our camps laid out the other way because...I don't know how they got there, but I think Clark and Eisenhower in their initial planning, when they thought they were going to cross the Channel and they found they couldn't because of the dates and whatnot, they finally selected Africa. So they set those camps up and those were all being - well, they were occupied and we were on the south side there. So the switching of them was some problem. But behind it all, I felt it was because of the Ruhr. The Ruhr had to be in the British boundary; and if we went there, it would have been in our boundary. Maybe I was wrong about that but that's the impression I carry now and that's the impression I had then. And it meant when we drew those lines, we had to draw a circle around Berlin. That always annoyed me - I wanted to put that in a boundary and get it over with. And then we had to put Bremerhaven in a circle so we had a place to supply us once we got in there. And I don't know that we thought as much about the French or the part they would exert on this at that time or not.

Q: Well now Roosevelt always wanted that same flank.

A: The north side.

Q: He wanted no part of the French.

A: That's right. But we finally came up from our end and recommended we stay the way we were because of the way we were set up then, and I don't know that we gave the French too much consideration. It's only when I got down to Africa and Italy that the French began to

bother me a lot and we went to extremes. I had no trouble with Giraud; I got to know him fairly well. I had to use an interpreter; but we had, I had real affection for him. He had problems. He felt that he was being shelved. His family was in Germany - all of them, children and everything. [indistinct] He just, I felt sorry for him in lots of ways. And we had to train those troops; and I had never run into that kind before. They were all colonial troops with French officers. We had Lucas; and I notice this book of history that just came out is a pretty good account of the training of the French Army. I give Lucas a lot of credit. He has taught French here and he worked well with those people, understood them. He got them fully equipped. When they got talking too much [indistinct] France, somebody came up with the idea maybe it was LeClerc himself because he didn't want to be down there under De Lattre. We sent them up to England with all their equipment and training - we did the training for them. But they got there - come in from France...from England; that would give them prestige and as you know they were in Bradley's hair. He couldn't do a thing with them. They went into Paris and they didn't want to get out so Bradley was just glad to hand them over, package and all to me. Well it was a good division - don't make any mistake about it. And they had prestige - don't think they didn't.

Q: The French all wanted to join that one.

A: Yes, that's the only one that didn't have any colonial troops in it. They were all real French in that division. He stole - well, I guess I oughtn't use that word - but anyhow, he had all the equipment he wanted - more jeeps and more ammunition. He had, instead of a full load, he had three days' more than anybody else.

Q: That was the problem with your other French troops. They never did have enough supplies did they?

A: Well, they had enough supply, but they didn't have as much as they wanted. They had as much as we had. We didn't shortchange them one single bit. In fact we increased their ration; they had a very bad ration, we felt. And we were being fed much better than they were...Well, why? We finally got the French to up that and I don't know how Larkins solved it finally, but I said: can't you give them some way to equalize this so that they feel like they're getting more food? If they're fed better, they'll be better soldiers. Of course a lot of it had to come from Africa because they had to eat certain things, those gommus. They were invaluable when you're fighting in the woods and you can turn those babies loose and they really go to town. Now, I don't want to know what they did, but they'll clean it out and they're pretty amenable when you get them back under command again. And the Senegalese - they do a pretty good job as long as the weather's warm. In cold weather they can't fight. They just can't do it.

Q: So you didn't have them a good part of the time, did you?

A: Oh, we used them in the back areas; and when we got them cleaned up with our delicing machines and things of that sort - which was a difficult problem, too, at first - that helped a lot. That really built prestige. All of those little things that make you more comfortable count in the long run. I felt that the French were pretty well officered. They were short on officers because we couldn't use the ones we wanted to because of the maquis. I'll tell you they had problems and they licked them. Ike, I know, used to discount them to some extent but they weren't as bad as he thought.

Q: Well, it's something from SHAEF headquarters that made me say what I did about supply. The feeling was, apparently in SHAEF G-4, that the French were always wanting to create new divisions but paid no attention to the supply part.

A: Well that's right. SHAEF never wanted to meet the logistics support of these new divisions. You see, you had Bilotte [?], who was, father was a famous general, and Bilotte is a famous politician today. He was then and he was with de Gaulle. He was a political general you might say. Well, he was a little more than that. His father was killed in the retreat back to the Channel and is very highly written up, I think, in one of the books I read recently; but this is the son, and he wanted to organize a 10th Division. Well, he did organize the 10th Division. I told him to go ahead and organize it - don't ask anybody. Get it organized. Take all these uniforms that are in all these cities that the Germans have left behind - dye them green or something else. They were green; I guess you could dye them blue or something. Anyhow they did. Shoes - we'll try to pick them up for you. We have whole warehouses full of repaired shoes which they can wear. Food - you've got plenty of food here in this Rhone Valley; all you've got to do is distribute it, and that's your problem. Well I think they solved that problem, but I think SHAEF worried too much about it. Of course they wanted ammunition. They wanted guns. We gave them all the German rifles with their ammunition. We had plenty of rifle ammunition; it was artillery ammunition which we were short. And those logistic problems are difficult. And also, SHAEF always was figuring: well, we've got to fight - this stuff's got to go to Japan, here, pretty soon and we haven't got it. They always were worrying about that part of it. Now to me, I wanted to look at it the other way: let's clean this job, make it work, get these people trained and they can take over and we can go home, which is what happened really. You see we came into France with - let's see, we had five divisions and then we got the 2nd back which was six, and then I guess we got two more. I think we had ten divisions before we got through.

Q: Yes, it was ten. Of course the French wanted more, but they were looking beyond the war - de Gaulle's role as President. Did you have any contact with de Gaulle?

A: A little bit---not much.

Q: The French Committee. Did you deal with that?

A: No, I didn't deal with it very much.

Q: Giraud was your man, and Juin.[indistinct] Of course Eisenhower had that more and by the time you go over there...

A: That's right. He had, you see he had it in Africa and Jumbo had it, really, and I only came in when Jumbo wanted to use me, and he used me with the French a lot.

Q: Of course, by the time you went to the Mediterranean, de Gaulle had come back to London.

A: That's right. And he was then with Ike, and that was Ike's problem, or it was particularly after we joined.

Q: But your main problem with the French came actually with the control of the troops in the field.

A: That's right, and their supply.

Q: And getting them to fight when you want them to.

A: That's right, which wasn't easy. They had their...as I say, I think we got the most out of that.

Q: Well, I don't know whether we've got any more space on this or not.

A: We're right down to 1:00 again, aren't we?

Q: Yes.

(Tape shuts off.)

(This part of interview taken from Harding tape no. 13. Reel 2)

Q: Well, Gen. Devers from your long time knowledge of Gen. Marshall and the various experiences you had - trouble shooting certain jobs for the General or handling various jobs through the years - it would be interesting to have sort of an estimate from you of some of Gen. Marshall's outstanding characteristics as a commander, and what you feel was his major contribution to the war.

A: Gen. Marshall is one of the finest men that I have come in contact with in the military service in that he knew how to handle me at least. He was always a man of great integrity, straight to the point; he knew what he wanted. He told you what he wanted and then he turned you loose. If you needed any guidance you could always walk in his door and get it. I think we were extremely lucky to have a man of his background and experience as chief of staff of the Army at the time of this war. He undoubtedly was the leader of all those in Washington and pulled together the organization which finally won the war, and he certainly didn't have a very good organization to start with. I know of no man who could work longer hours effectively to accomplish an objective than Gen. Marshall. He was fair. He was ruthless at times, but necessarily so. He backed up those he gave authority to and if he didn't feel that they were coming through, he simply relieved them, which is the only way to do. I feel I was very fortunate to come to his notice because he gave me many things to think about, some guidance, but there wasn't any question as to who had the responsibility and what was desired.

Q: Would you say that this business of picking out people and delegating authority to them was one of his...

A: I think that was one of his greatest strengths and it wasn't easy for him to do it at all times because he had to remove men he thought a lot of; but he had the courage to do it, and it takes courage. He also had the courage to make a compromise when the compromise was necessary to get the job done and I think that is greatness. He certainly had pretty well fixed in his mind what the strategy of this war should be and I think it was proven to be absolutely sound in his thoughts and the methods he used to carry - to bring to a successful conclusion the objectives which had been decided upon. I don't know that there is any more to say except this: I don't want anyone to say anything against Gen. Marshall in my presence. I'll defend him to the last ditch.

Q: Thank you very much.