On 8 November 1944, flags throughout the District of Columbia were flown at half-mast: a memorial service was being held at Washington Cathedral. The service was conducted by the Bishop of Washington; the lesson was read by the U.S. Army Chief of Staff. Afterwards, a motorized cortège proceeded along a route lined by thousands of troops to Arlington National Cemetery. The coffin, folded in a Union Jack, with an unsheathed sword and a Field Marshal’s cocked hat on top, was transferred to a gun carriage drawn by four grey horses. They were led slowly to the crossroads of Roosevelt and Grant Avenues. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) acted as honorary pall bearers. General Marshall, alone, stood at attention at one side of the grave. At the other was Admiral King. General Arnold faced a grieving widow; behind her, Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador. A simple service was held at the graveside. Salutes were fired, the Last Post and Reveille bugled. Dr. Foster Kennedy, President of the American Neurological Association, cousin, friend and physician, wrote afterwards: "I have never seen so many men so visibly shaken by sadness. Marshall’s face was truly stricken . . . It was a remarkable and noble affair." [2]

Six years later, some of the mourners returned to witness an equally powerful ceremony. An equestrian statue, "erected to a great soldier-statesman by his American friends and associates," was dedicated by the same Bishop. Speeches were made by Marshall, by Halifax’s successor Sir Oliver Franks, and by President Truman, unscathed after an assassination attempt at Blair House. Sir John Dill’s American apotheosis was complete. Throughout, it had been Marshall’s own conception. As he had written to Lady Dill, "I know that it is not necessary for me to tell you of my distress at this moment. Officially the United States has suffered a heavy loss, and I personally have lost a dear friend, unique in my lifetime, and never to be out of my mind . . ." [3]
Dill and Marshall first met at the Atlantic Conference in August 1941. There is some evidence to suggest that initially Dill, like [Field Marshall Sir Alan Brooke, later Lord] Alanbrooke, found Marshall wanting strategically; [4] but indisputably, the two men discovered an immediate and "un-English" empathy, perhaps as surprising to the protagonists as it was to observers. Additionally, a clear-eyed awareness of their respective national interests may well have been stronger at this early stage, before they had any real foundation for the implicit trust that was to be the hallmark of their Washington association. [5] Be that as it may, the day after Dill’s return to London, he wrote in most unusual terms to Marshall: "I sincerely hope that we shall meet again before long. In the meantime we must keep each other in touch in the frank manner upon which we agreed." A few days later, Marshall responded: "I feel greatly reassured by my conversations with you, and I propose writing to you personally and very frankly whenever any matters arise which I think merit such attention. I am depending on you to treat me with similar frankness, and I am quite sure you will do so."

This exchange inaugurated...
a regular correspondence, an important channel of the flourishing but still illicit common-law alliance. In October, Marshall invited Dill to maneuvers in the Carolinas and "a respite of rest for yourself as my guest." On learning of Dill’s remarriage, he offered "warmest congratulations." And, with characteristic formality, "Mrs. Marshall urges you to bring Mrs. Dill with you." The invitation was ruefully declining, owing to "pressure of work." In November, Dill appealed "for tanks to bolster British defences in face of a possible German attack through the Caucasus and Anatolia." Within twenty-four hours, Marshall agreed to supply the requested 350 medium tanks from his next three months’ production—a diversion representing, in the words of the US official historians, "virtually the entire remaining medium tank production earmarked for the US Armored Force." In thanking him, Dill offered some strategic speculation and a prescient question:

Any success which we may have in Libya in the next few months may well bring to the fore again the problem of French North Africa. . . . At the Atlantic Conference you were very interested in developments [there], and I often wonder whether, in the event of a request for assistance from General Weygand, the United States would be likely (provided the political situation permitted) to take part. [6]

That question apparently received no answer before they met again at the Arcadia Conference of December 1941–January 1942. Meanwhile, Dill’s "retirement" as Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) had been announced. It is one of the great ironies of Pearl Harbor that Dill celebrated 25 December 1941, his 60th birthday, and the rationale for his supersession—not in retirement in England, nor, contrary to Churchill’s bizarre promise, with "a bodyguard with lances" in Bombay, but at a lunch party given by Marshall in Washington—whose proceedings were much enlivened when Dill discovered that the symbolic flags on his birthday cake were made, inevitably, in Japan.) [7]. When the British contingent returned home, Dill remained, in an unprecedented if indeterminate position of enormous potential influence.

Dill’s position in Washington is central to an understanding of his relationship with Marshall. It was regularized only after protracted Anglo-American negotiations about who exactly he should represent. The newly instituted Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) Committee met in Washington. Naturally, the British Chiefs of Staff (COS) could not be present in person. Each therefore had a permanent representative who headed his Service Delegation at the British Joint Staff Mission (JSM) in Washington and acted for him on the CCS. As Head of the JSM, Dill represented not a single Service but the collective British COS; as senior British member of the CCS, he acted as principal spokesman for the British side. Although he no longer formally sat with the COS, he, not they, dealt directly with the Americans from day to day and at the usually weekly CCS sessions. When the Chiefs did meet in person at Allied Conferences, he continued to sit with them. [8]

This constituted Dill’s official position. It was an open secret, however, that he also represented Churchill in his capacity as Minister of Defence. At first, Marshall felt that a "British representative . . . at a higher level than the CCS . . . was bad even if Field Marshal Dill happened to be the best possible type of person to deal with." Propitiating Marshall was always a prime consideration for Churchill; he too began to have qualms about "difficulties arising from Dill’s vaguely defined outside influence and special relationship with me." At this point, Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt’s frail Sancho Panza and already a firm friend of Dill, interceded with Churchill. Hopkins’s argument was couched in highly significant terms:

Dill is making his way here extremely well and I hate to see you change his status. If it were another type of personality I think that difficulties might arise . . . The important detail in Dill’s case is whether or not his presence can be useful.

To which Roosevelt added, " . . . to the Staff but also especially to me personally." "I am sure it can," concluded Hopkins. The importance of personality could not have been plainer. [9]

Dill is perhaps best seen as an amateur ambassador, complementing and to some extent supplanting Lord Halifax because of the extraordinary circumstances. His success in this role was achieved in the absence of what has always been considered essential for a British Ambassador in Washington: the confidence of the Prime Minister. Such an imperious incumbent as Churchill only serves to deepen the mystery. So far from enjoying that confidence, Dill had been superseded as CIGS precisely because he had forfeited it. [10] The paradox of Dill’s sojourn in Washington was that the tension between them became creative. To “official America,” above all to Marshall, Dill quickly came to be seen as a guarantor: a guarantor of the British, against their notorious and incorrigible duplicities; and, of especial concern to Marshall, a guarantor of Churchill himself against the "fatal lullaby" of his imperial pretensions and strategic prejudices. A fresh gloss was put on a function only too familiar to Dill. In his own splendid aphorism as CIGS: "I live a very hectic life. Most of it is spent trying to
prevent stupid things being done rather than in doing clever things! However, that is rather the normal life of a Chief of Staff."

In Washington he found himself doing the quintessential ambassadorial work of attempting to prevent Churchill "doing stupid things," whilst simultaneously attempting to persuade Marshall that he was, in fact, "doing clever things." Dill’s fear, shared by Alanbrooke in London, was that the itch to do *something* would prove too strong for Churchill, particularly if he achieved his insistent purpose of caballing with Roosevelt, of whose "wild ideas" Marshall was equally fearful. "I have so many battles to fight," he once told Dill in great confidence, "I am never quite sure whether I am fighting you, the President, or the Navy!" [11]

As his intimacy with Marshall deepened, Dill virtually came to be defined as a guarantor in official American circles, as much for what he was, or was perceived to be, as for what he did. [12] So solicitous was Marshall of this relationship that by late 1943, a double paradox was obtained. Not only did the known tension between the Minister of Defence and his representative actually enhance Dill’s value in the US; it also provoked the Americans themselves to demonstrate that value to Churchill. Thus, the spate of honorary degrees awarded Dill in early 1944, with maximum attendant publicity, was inspired by Marshall as part of "a regular campaign . . . to have Dill honored in this country." American anxieties seem to have been quickened by the unusual spectacle of sharp public clashes between Dill and Churchill at the Cairo/Teheran Conferences of November-December 1943. Among other things, Churchill resented Marshall’s suggestion of Dill as Supreme Commander for OVERLORD (the landings in northwest Europe). Dill spoke "very bluntly" to him, saying (in Hopkins’s words) "he was free, white and 21 and was going to tell him what he thought whether he liked it or not." [13]
Marshall feared his recall. The recrudescence of the ANVIL controversy in June-July 1944 found Dill recuperating from a bout of the illness that was soon to kill him. A hard-pressed JSM wondered what to do. They consulted Marshall, in itself an interesting comment on their relationship, who at once said that "on no account should we worry the Field Marshal . . . as he thinks there is a big part played by the Prime Minister in the present affair and is most anxious that the Field Marshal should not become involved." Marshall must have relished a curious coda to Dill’s non-involvement in this affair. Ambassador Winant reported a conversation with the Foreign Secretary, Eden, at a 4 July lunch in London:

He told me he felt that the failure to have minds meet [over ANVIL] would have been avoided had Sir John Dill been well enough to come on here or be present at the later conferences in Washington. He said that, for the first time, he thought that the Prime Minister had come to appreciate the contribution that Sir John Dill had been making in his Washington assignment. [14]

Dill’s function as guarantor linked closely with that of educator. In this Marshall fully reciprocated. After the Quebec Agreement of August 1943, Dill acceded to membership of the Combined Policy Committee (CPC) of the atomic bomb project. The Deputy Director of the project on the British side remembered: "The whole atmosphere was changed . . . [Dill’s] contribution was of real value because of his standing and reputation in Washington and his connection with the "top brass" in the US Army. Here was a classic statement of the guarantor function. "His membership of the CPC would be a very acceptable sign that Churchill was serious in the terms of the Quebec Agreement." The project’s British directors had come to recognize the futility of attempting to influence their American opposite numbers at one remove, with scant reference to those who knew the "reefs and shoals" of Washington politics. In the first place, "we have not touched the Generals"--with whom it was rightly suspected immediate powers of direction lay. In the second place, private messages from Churchill to Roosevelt or Hopkins aroused characteristic suspicion that "once again . . . Mr. Roosevelt had been precipitated into a matter on which he was not fully informed." [15] It mattered little to artfully circumvented advisors whether wild ideas were the President’s own or whether he was suborned by "one whose powers of persuasion they are not disposed to underestimate," as Dill delicately phrased it.

Dill and his coadjutors were introduced to "square" Marshall and dispel such suspicions. The evidence, though mixed, suggests some success. [16] Dill brought to this task an approach to Anglo-American relations quite different from that of those he represented. Churchill tended to cling to secrecy and to his carefully cultivated personal relationship with Roosevelt, both increasing untenable positions, brutally dissected by James Gould Cozzens. "Except as a piece of politeness, he did not even sit as an equal. His real job was to palter." [17] It may be objected that Dill occupied an analogous and subordinate position. In brief moments of depression he himself seemed almost ready to acknowledge as much. "One trouble," he wrote to Wavell in November 1942 "is that we [the British] want everything from them [the Americans] from ships to razor blades and have nothing but services to give in return-and many of the services are past services." Yet, the Dill-Marshall relationship was both more infrangible and more equal than the Churchill-Roosevelt one; more infrangible because Dill’s subtle appreciation of increasing British dependency led him successfully to adopt mitigatory strategies; more equal because Marshall committed himself fully and unswervingly in a way that Roosevelt never did. [18] The character of the relationship made possible their reciprocally educative function, the most obvious manifestation of which was the quantum jump in information available to each side.

Both Dill and Marshall took seriously their inaugural exhortations to frankness. Dill showed Marshall virtually all the COS telegrams he received, including those "for his own information;" many of the JSM and his personal FMD (Field Marshal Dill) series sent to London; and sundry private telegrams and letters from his regular correspondents, for example, Alanbrooke and Wavell. Churchill’s "hot ones" were immediately discussed à deux, and in Dill’s absence simply taken to Marshall’s office by the senior Secretary of the JSM, rather as if the US Chief of Staff were on the regular British distribution list. In this way Marshall was "kept au courant with what was going on." Mindful especially of Roosevelt’s proclivities, Marshall himself felt that he would not otherwise have received certain crucial information. Unarguably, he would not have received it so soon. Enclosing a private copy of a telegram from General Maitland Wilson to the COS, Dill explained: "The question dealt with in the attached is not ripe to put to you officially but I always like you to know the shape of possible things to come." Dill’s approach was designed to forestall disagreement by allowing Marshall the earliest
In no aspect of allied grand strategy was he more finely attuned to Marshall’s susceptibilities than in the war
Dill. Marshall was almost indecent haste on a “bridge” paper drafted initially by Air Marshal Slessor. The central figure in this agreement was
King continued to advance the Pacific alternative now, unlike the previous July, in order to rouse the British from their
habitual strategic torpor in the Far East and provoke them to commit definite resources to definite operations. The point of
King still evidently wrapped up in the war of the Pacific at
By 18 January, after four days of conferring, Alanbrooke recorded: “From 10:30 to 1 p.m. a very heated Combined Chiefs
A recapitulation of what Dill believed the British position to be served to clarify the American one—and vice versa. This was
particularly efficacious in the pressurized circumstance of the great Allied conferences. Dill attended each of these and
laboriously at “bringing the young things together,” as he put it. His function as broker in the Anglo-American
strategic market has been often applauded but never examined. The intractability of the written record is partly to blame.
Dill’s perspective is clear not only from his repeated warnings to Churchill and the COS (which could be construed as concurrence) but also from internal JSM documents and the evidence of Brigadier Vivian Dykes, British Secretary to the
CCS, whose close relationship with his opposite number General Bedell Smith paralleled and reinforced that of Dill and Marshall. Dykes fully endorsed Dill’s view; he too was impressed by the strength of American feeling that “Britain is going cold on BOLERO”—in other words, on the whole build-up for a direct cross-channel attack—and that "suggestions for sideshows [i.e., GYNMAST] are smoke screens to conceal this cooling off." The second point of departure for Dill was his realization that, politically, "there is a desperate need to get American soldiers and airmen into something big in the way of battles. The Americans feel that they cannot go on forming these large land and air forces and keep them unemployed.”
Dill’s reports on the crisis of strategy in July 1942 well illustrate his function as educator. For his part, Marshall disseminated the information he acquired with typical prudence. To Stilwell in China he relayed succulent morsels from Wavell’s dispatches, extensive summaries of Dill’s exegeses of British policy in the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater, and his own sage advice. Meanwhile, Dill did exactly the same for Wavell and the COS. That Wavell and Stilwell grew to have some appreciation of each other’s problems and perspectives—that they conferred at all—was in large measure due to intensive conciliatory efforts from Washington in the latter months of 1942.
Marshall regularly invoked Dill at JCS meetings. If he himself wished to broach or pursue an issue, Dill’s views might be quoted with approbation, even at some length; for example, the pressing needs of the Middle East in March 1942. If, on the other hand, he wished to quash or postpone an issue, the bald statement that Dill was "looking into it" might suffice; for example, the allocation of landing craft in March 1944.
A recapitulation of what Dill believed the British position to be served to clarify the American one—and vice versa. This was
particularly efficacious in the pressurized circumstance of the great Allied conferences. Dill attended each of these and
laboriously at “bringing the young things together,” as he put it. His function as broker in the Anglo-American
market has been often applauded but never examined. The intractability of the written record is partly to blame.
Not only are the CCS minutes proverbially anodyne; they are most wanting at precisely the times of greatest interest, when
only the CCS themselves sat in "closed" sessions. Further, from the evidence of the minutes, Dill might well have been absent altogether, for he almost never spoke at formal sessions. And yet, at SYMBOL [Casablanca, January 1943] the
most extravagant praise was heaped upon him, even as the conference proceeded, for his brokerage. It was sorely needed.
By 18 January, after four days of conferring, Alanbrooke recorded: "From 10:30 to 1 p.m. a very heated Combined Chiefs
of Staff meeting at which we seemed to be making no progress. King still evidently wrapped up in the war of the Pacific at
the expense of everything else." Marshall himself went so far as to say that "the whole concept of defeating Germany first
amounted, as Secretary Stimson thought, to "secret concurrence" is doubtful. Dill took the "Pacific alternative" seriously. This would appear to confirm that it was serious.
In return, Dill was privy to much of Marshall’s correspondence with the other members of the JCS; with the President and
Hopkins; and with commanders overseas, notably Eisenhower and Stilwell. He was similarly apprised in advance of, for
example, the notorious Marshall/King dénchére of July 1942. “My object,” Marshall wrote to the President, “is again to
force the British into acceptance of a concentrated effort against Germany, and if this proves impossible, to turn
immediately to the Pacific with strong forces for a decision against Japan.” It seems that Marshall himself drafted the
telegram in which Dill first alerted London to the likely consequences of rejecting SLEDGEHAMMER (a 1942 landing in northwest Europe) in favor of GYNMAST (a landing in North Africa). In itself such appraisal was unremarkable: Dill and Marshall frequently drafted or re-drafted each other’s telegrams, and occasionally colluded over a joint one. Whether it amounted, as Secretary Stimson thought, to "secret concurrence" is doubtful. Dill took the "Pacific alternative" seriously. This would appear to confirm that it was serious.
Field Marshal Dill (left) and General Marshall inspect a parachute infantry unit at Pope Field, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, May 1 or 2, 1942. Brig. Gen. William C. Lee of Airborne Command is in the center.

Dill and Marshall in tandem made the CCS system work. This was their inalienable achievement. Neither conception nor execution of a war-winning strategy could be immaculate; indeed, getting "mixed up together" promised sin of a most original kind. The indispensable mid-wife of victory was the CCS system. Both its novelty and its fragility have been rather underestimated. In early 1942, there was a real danger that it would be nullified. Influential figures on both sides proposed a Dill-Marshall-King inner council: in Eisenhower’s words, "the three individuals, the only three, who can really make effective progress towards integrating our war effort." The idea even found some passing favor with Dill himself. [29]

Others continued to have serious reservations about "combined" practice or precept. This was true of Alanbrooke and, notoriously, of elements in the US Navy Department, especially successive Planners, Admirals Turner and Cooke. Brigadier Dykes’s diary offers a trenchant commentary:

A spot of trouble over today’s meeting - the Combined Planners’ papers seem to have been bitched up by that bloody little man Cooke who doesn’t attend CSP [Combined Staff Planners] meetings and then throws his representative overboard.

Such behavior was often ascribed to the attitude of their Chief, the redoubtable Admiral King—"a man," Dykes once wrote in some exasperation, "of great strength of character with a very small brain." [30] Additionally, the professionals felt themselves beset by meddlesome and quixotic political masters, whose ready dispatch of "special representatives" threatened to supplant the CCS. [31] Later, there was the crucial imbalance of power. Dill maintained: "It is only by building up the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff that we can do anything to curb the tendency of the American Chiefs of Staff to take unilateral action." [32]

An excellent example of the way in which Dill and Marshall operated is provided by telegram FMD86 of 7 January 1944. [33] Ironically, this telegram was occasioned by the unilateral action of the British COS in recalling the LSTs in question from southeast Asia to the Mediterranean. The official record reveals only US disgruntlement and Dill’s handsome apology. "If it was the desire of the US Chiefs of Staff to revoke the decision to recall the three LSTs he would be happy to transmit this to the British Chiefs of Staff." The telegram shows very clearly how such an offer could be made with impunity: how an issue over which even Churchill favored British retraction could be resolved without, as the Prime Minister feared, "running into dangers much larger than those from which we are seeking to escape."

The Dill-Marshall relationship was dedicated precisely to avoiding such dangers. It demanded, and received, an unusual commitment from both sides. Both men would undoubtedly have endorsed the maxim of another exemplar of special Anglo-American relations: "What is left to be understood is misunderstood." In this the fundamental element was personality, the imperative requirement personal. It is no coincidence that Ambassador Franks, whose maxim this was, and Secretary
Acheson developed just such a personal commitment through their unfailing empathy and close friendship. [34] Dill and Marshall did exactly the same. The outcome was a very special relationship indeed.

APPENDIX A

FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN DILL (1881–1944)

<>

b. 25 Dec 1881 Lurgan, County Armagh, Ireland

Sep 1887 Methodist College of Belfast

Jan 1895 Cheltenham College

20 Aug 1900 Royal Military College Sandhurst

7 May 1901 Commissioned: 1st Battalion (100th of Foot), The Prince of Wales’s Leinster Regiment (Dover)

10 Sep 1901 Boer War (South Africa)

10 Nov 1902 Assistant Adjutant (Fermoy; Shorncliffe; Blackdown) (Lt)

15 Aug 1906 Adjutant (Blackdown; Devonport)

20 Feb 1907 m. Ada Maude le Mottée (d. 23 Dec 1940)

14 Aug 1909 Brigade Signal Officer (Devonport; Birr) (Capt)

22 Jan 1913 Student, Staff College (Camberley)

4 Aug 1914 General Staff Officer grade 3 (GS03) (E. Command)

5 Nov 1914 Brigade Major, 25th Infantry Brigade (France)

3 Jan 1916 GS02, 55th Division (Maj)

1 Nov 1916 GS02, Canadian Corps

5 Jan 1917 GS01, 37th Division (temp Lt Col)

29 Oct 1917 GS01 (Training), GHQ France
16 Dec 1917 GS01 (Operations), GHQ France

27 Mar 1918 Brigadier-General, General Staff (BGGS) (temp Brigadier) (Operations), GHQ France

1 Mar 1919 BGGS, Staff College (Col)

1 Sep 1922 Commander, Welsh Border (TA) Brigade

1 Nov 1923 Commander, 2nd Infantry Brigade (Aldershot)

1 Nov 1926 Army Instructor, Imperial Defence College (London)

19 Jan 1929 GSO, W. Command, India (Quetta) (Brigadier)

8 Jan 1931 Commandant, Staff College (Maj Gen)

22 Jan 1934 Director, Military Operations & Intelligence (DMO &I) (War Office)

8 Sep 1936 General Officer Commanding (GOC), Palestine & Trans-Jordan (Lt Gen)

12 Oct 1937 GOC-in-C, Home Command (Aldershot)

3 Sep 1939 Commander, 2st Corps, British Expeditionary Force (BEF) (Gen)

22 Apr 1940 Vice-Chief, Imperial General Staff (VCIGS)

27 May 1940 Chief, Imperial General Staff (CIGS)

8 Oct 1941 m. Nancy Charrington Furlong

19 Nov 1941 Retirement as CIGS announced; Governor-designate, Bombay

<>Jan 1942 Head, British Joint Staff Mission Washington, senior British member, Combined Chiefs of Staff (FM)

d. 4 Nov 1944 Washington D.C.

**APPENDIX B**

**THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF ORGANIZATION**
APPENDIX C

MOST SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM

IZ 146
TOO 072035Z
TOR 072206Z

MOST IMMEDIATE.


To: — War Cabinet Offices, London

F.M.D. 86 [*1] 7th January, 1944

Following Private for Chiefs of Staff from Field Marshal Dill.

Hope you will approve action taken as described in J.S.M. 1402. [*2] I saw Marshall this morning before C.C.S. meeting [*3] and he assured me that he would see that any offer to turn back the L.S.T’s [*4] would not be accepted by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. We had in fact to rig the meeting a bit in more ways than one before it took place. King was the only stumbling block and his request was indeed that Mountbatten [*5] should be asked if it was in fact the sailing of the L.S.T’s which induced him to abandon PIGSTICK [*6] but the other Chiefs of Staff modified the request somewhat. Needless to say, U.S. Chiefs of Staff were disappointed at having to abandon PIGSTICK and their feelings were hurt but, thanks to Marshall, not seriously damaged.
NOTES TO THE ESSAY

[1]. The author read this essay at the tenth annual meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) at George Washington University, Washington, D.C., 2–4 August 1984, as a contribution to the session "Anglo-American Relations: The Personal Equation" on 2 August. A longer version was read to the War Studies Discussion Group of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst on 23 July 1984. I am grateful to the 1984 SHAFR Program Committee and Dr. Paddy Griffith respectively for these invitations; and to those present on each occasion for their comments. [Some minor technical changes have been made for this Web version.] [Return to note 1.]

[2]. Dr. Foster Kennedy [FK] to Ben Wiesel and Charlie Patterson, 14 and 29 Nov. 1944, FK Papers, kindly made available by Katherine, Marchesa de Montoro (formerly Mrs. FK). The British Army Staff Officer organizing the funeral wrote of the honorary pall bearers: "As with all very senior officers they dithered like children, and just before the service I could have been seen drilling them all like a squad of recruits. I told them they were pretty poor, and much less intelligent than most recruits—which caused considerable merriment." "The Last Post and Reveille," he added, with effortless cultural superiority, "fairly harrowed the Americans who are a very sentimental people." Maj. Gen. A. W. Lee to family, 9 Nov. 1944, Lee Papers, 78/13/1, Imperial War Museum [IWM]. Order of Service. H. L. Stimson diary, 8, 9 Nov. 1944, Stimson Papers (microfilm), Cambridge University Library [CUL]. [Return to note 2.]


[7]. Together, 77–78. Dill to FK, 26 Dec. 1941, FK Papers. [Return to note 7.]


[11]. "When we got an opinion from Sir John, we knew it was Sir John’s not the Prime Minister’s." Gen. T. T. Handy (US Army Asst. Chief of Staff) quoted L. Mosley, Marshall 19 Sep. 1941, MM Papers, 160/19b, KCL; to Alanbrooke, 18 May 1942, 12 Sep. 1943, Alanbrooke Papers, 14/38/F, P, KCL; to Portal, 30 June 1942, Portal Papers, Box A, File III, No. 8, Christ Church, Oxford. "The fatal lullaby of a majestic style:" Philip Guedalla on Churchill’s historical writing. [Return to note 11.]

[12]. J. J. McCloy (Asst. Sec. for War) makes a similar general point about Dill’s importance in a short unpublished memoir (1974). Dill family papers, kindly made available by Ms. Rosanne Dill. [Return to note 12.]

[13]. Dill was awarded the prestigious Howland Memorial Prize by Yale (Feb.) and honorary degrees by the College of William & Mary and Princeton (Apr.). He also addressed the American Academy of Political Science. Marshall to Winant, loc. cit. Stimson diary, 16 Feb. 1944. H. H. Bundy oral history [OH], Columbia OH Collection, New York City; W. P.

[14]. Tels. OZ 2133, Churchill to Dill, 22 Apr. 1944, CAB 120/1; FMD 194, Dill to Churchill, 24 Apr. 1944, CAB 120/1; draft, Churchill to Dill, 25 Apr. 1944, PREM 3/271/7. All PRO. LETOD 151, Redman to Hollis, 28 June 1944, Marshall Papers, 61/43, MRL. No. 921, Winant to Roosevelt, 4 July 1944, Roosevelt MR Papers, BOX 11, "President–Winant 1944" folder, FDRL; shown to JCS by Leahy. Cf. memo, Gailey to Handy, 4 July 1944, Item 71, OPD Exec. 10, RG 165, NA. [Return to note 14.]


[18]. Dill to Wavell, 10 Nov. 1942, Wavell family papers, kindly made available by Lady Humphrys (Pamela Wavell); to Montgomery–Massingberd, 3 Sep. 1942, MM Papers, 160–21b, KCL. Dill took an increasingly jaundiced view of Roosevelt. "The President is as cheerful and as charming as ever. He has not got a tidy mind, and he does not like facing facts that are ugly." (To Churchill, 7 Mar. 1942, PREM 3/478/6, PRO.) "The better I get to know that man the more superficial and selfish I find him." (To Alanbrooke, 9 Feb. 1944, Alanbrooke Papers, 14/39/B, KCL.) Perhaps Marshall too partook of such a view, even more circumspectly. Marshall to Halifax, Halifax secret diary, 21, 31 May 1944, Halifax Papers, BIHR; interviews with Dr. Pogue, e.g., 5 Oct., 13 Nov. 1956, 11 Feb. 1957. I am grateful to Dr. Pogue for making available parts of the transcripts of these interviews and discussing them with me. [Return to note 18.]


The importance of the relationship has been grossly underestimated. Dykes was killed in a plane crash after the Casablanca Conference (Jan. 1943), honoured with a DSM, but historiographically ignored. Bedell Smith is only remembered for what he left Washington (Sep. 1942) to be—Chief of Staff to Eisenhower in Europe and later Ambassador in Moscow. Dykes diary, 1942 passim, Dykes Papers, Ministry of Defence (Army Historical Branch) [MOD (AHB)]; letters to Col. W. Stirling, 11 June, 23 Sep. 1942, CAB 122/1582, PRO. Bedell Smith to Mrs. Dykes, 30 Jan. 1943, Dykes family papers, kindly made available by Mrs. Evelyn Armitstead (Dykes’s daughter). Interview, N. H. West, 5 Feb. 1982; Joan Mainprice, 9 June 1982; Lt Gen. Sir Ian Jacob, 12 Aug. 1981; Lord Broughshane (Maj. P. Davison), 19 Oct. 1981; Coleridge, 7 Nov. 1981. [Return to note 21.]


Like Prime Minister Attlee until very recently, Dill has suffered posthumously because his self-effacing personality found expression in a "reticent and impenetrable archival legacy." K. O. Morgan, Labour in Power (Oxford, 1984), 6, 47. In addition certain key documents (his British Embassy file) have been destroyed. H. D. Hall, North American Supply (London, 1955), 353; and unpublished source notes, 596 n. 37, CAB 102/21, PRO. [Return to note 26.]


Alanbrooke, a former protégé, was devoted to Dill. Notes 3/A/VI, 426, 3/A/VIII/700, 3/A IX/768, 3/B/XIII/36, 3/B/XIV/10, Alanbrooke Papers, KCL. [Return to note 28.]


[31]. In Apr. 1942 Roosevelt sent Hopkins with Marshall to London; in July, Hopkins, Marshall and King. The personal and secret Hopkins-Roosevelt correspondence, sent not through the Service Departments but via Ambassador Winant through the State Department, demonstrates how intimately Hopkins knew Roosevelt’s mind; and how, as a consequence, he could initiate as well as enunciate Presidential policy. See Hopkins to Roosevelt, 23 July 1942, Roosevelt MR Papers, Box 167, "Naval Aide’s Files: London War Council July 1942," FDRL; 26 July 1942, and related correspondence, FO 954/18B, PRO. [Return to note 30.]

