

TAPE 17

Recorded February 20, 1957

150. *How valuable was USAFI, the program for giving correspondence work to soldiers?*

This never had a full development. We had made very large preparations for the correspondence work of the soldiers to be in Europe after the war when we moved so much of the army in Europe towards the Pacific. We made really tremendous preparations there, and it was not to be all correspondence. We hoped to really accomplish quite a fine educational effort and were selecting teachers from among the soldiers who had that experience in their civil occupations.

I think we had—as my recollection goes—almost three million books accumulated in Paris to be used in this work. Of course, the sudden surrender of Japan and the reversal of the army procedure blocked this and did away with the immediate necessity, and the new forces that accumulated in Europe after the war I do not believe got well started in it. But I had nothing to do with that as my tour as chief of staff had expired. I felt that we could accomplish a great deal and set up a very fine educational system, but it had to be backed very heavily by command, and I was prepared to see that that was done.

I might interject at this point—the remarkable upset of our arrangements which came about by the fortunate circumstance of the surrender of Japan following the atomic explosions. We were confronted by a situation where the need for a large army in Europe was dissipated by the surrender of the Nazi regime. On the other hand, certain troops had to be maintained there even though at that time we were still not clear as to the intensity of the Russian effort to dominate the whole procedure in Continental Europe.

In order to meet the situation of peace in Europe and war with Japan at the same time, which involved the demobilization of large forces and the continuance in service of large forces for the war in the Pacific, it was necessary to set up an elaborate regime in order to see that the right men were given the privilege of demobilization and the men with the longest service [*time to serve*] were continued in the service. Now this immediately involved a sorting out of troops in Europe, in the Pacific, and in the United States. And as I briefly recall, the main outline of the procedure was for the

men in Europe who had eighteen months yet to serve to be moved to the United States and on out to the Pacific. The men with a very short term of service were to be brought home for discharge. The men with in-between were to remain in Europe or to be taken to Europe as the case might be.

An elaborate point—I repeat—point system was set up which would determine whether a man was to be discharged or to be continued in the service and so on. This would involve a complete reorganization of the troops in Europe, which was a great task for the command over there when they had to undertake this reorganization in a field where it was essential that there be a workable organization for fighting if that should suddenly become necessary.

This also involved the transportation of a large force from Europe to the Pacific—those men with eighteen months yet to serve. There was also involved the necessity of giving these men an opportunity to visit their homes on a short leave before they went on to the Pacific. There was a requirement by Congress that ten days leave should be given under certain circumstances. There was the necessity for the immediate discharge of a certain number of men who had an accumulation of points which justified their discharge.

Well, all of these involved movement. In the first place, immediately following the surrender, I tried to reverse entirely the procedure which we had to follow in 1919 where the men had to be moved to the ports very slowly, and during one period could practically not move at all because of the complete lack of railroad transportation, as it was entirely involved by the French in their evacuation of troops from the devastated zone in France. Then, also, they were forced into the very undesirable situation of moving home on the ships then available the men who were closest to the ports, because it would be a long journey from the front to the port cities. That, of course, involved hard feelings because the men that had just gotten over there, while they might want to go home, at the same time wanted to stay long enough in France to see what it was like—which would involve movement toward the front and then movement back to the ports, and we did not have the available transportation.

It set up an extremely difficult situation for General Pershing to meet, and there also was the fact that winter was on us and for men to sit around idle would just breed violent dissatisfaction. So the only way out of that was to work those who were there very hard in military training, which was unpopular to the extreme and set up a very difficult reaction in the United States.

Now I was trying to avoid all this—lesson from the First World War—and if I do say it myself, we had developed a very fine plan for this exceedingly complicated situation. It worked a great lot of hard work on the staffs concerned, particularly in Europe where they practically had to

reorganize divisions and yet keep them in a condition where they could be employed. But the first thing that I was intent about was to see that the first movements of men home would come from the front and not at the tail, as was the necessary case in the First World War and which created such profound dissatisfaction and a great unpopularity for General Pershing. So the first move was to transport by air men with a certain number of points justifying discharge and men who had had very conspicuous service—had been recommended for this or that and all decorated men—and to move them by air from the front back to the United States, so that the men in rear who had not been on the front or in the fighting didn't get the first turn at demobilization. This part worked very well.

Then the men with eighteen months to serve moved home. Well, of course, that seemingly was just the reverse of what it should be, because the men with the longest service to do were naturally the men with the shortest service in the European Theater, and the men with the longest service were the ones that would want to get home. But we had to hold them there for the time being—the men with the longest service in the European Theater—while we moved these men with eighteen months service home *en route* to the Pacific. Then it was necessary to transfer them clear across the continent, but also to give them ten days leave at home because that was a congressional action, I believe, and I know we did it.

This involved a very great complication and how it was handled in the rough was when the men reached New York, they were sorted out by residence and those trains went right straight through to that vicinity, and if there were men in the division who belonged in the South in the same division who belonged in the North, they were separated from each other there and shipped on these special trains straight to their home region and from there distributed. For instance, Chicago was a distribution point and trains went out from Chicago with local arrangements for getting men to their home. Yet this was only for ten days. So it involved a very great difficulty.

Meanwhile, the headquarters of their division moved across the continent and was established on the West Coast. Now when these men finished their ten days at home, then they were collected again and carried in to a center like Chicago or San Antonio or Atlanta, or places like that, and put on trains and shipped out to the West Coast or wherever their division headquarters would be by that time. And there the division was reassembled and on its way to the Pacific with the men of the longest service [*time to serve*] in the ranks as should be.

This also involved, of course, a rearrangement in the Pacific where the war was going on with Japan. And that was more difficult. However, that was worked out pretty well, I thought, and the whole machine was begin-

ning to grind when Japan surrendered. This reversed everything. Everybody was now in the wrong place. The men with the longest service were in the United States having just been sent to their homes prior to going to the Pacific. The men with the shortest service were still in the theaters of operations in Europe and in the Pacific. Everybody was at the wrong spot. This could not have been avoided without a previous exact knowledge of just when the Japanese were going to surrender. And the atomic bomb was then an unknown factor until it actually went off.

We then found ourselves changed from what I thought was a remarkable arrangement. I think it would have won admiration from the press and everybody in close contact with it—the extent to which we had figured out in the War Department how to handle this partial demobilization of the army, this reassignment of the army from Europe to the Pacific, and this partial demobilization of the troops that would not be needed merely for the war with Japan.

Instead of that we found ourselves in the midst of the greatest muddle I have ever seen, and the most violent repercussions of the individuals concerned and the press generally. It was too complicated a situation to explain in full just why it occurred that way, but it resulted from the fortunate fact that Japan had surrendered. And I suppose that those Monday quarterbacks could have said right away that we should have foreseen that and had everybody arranged in preparation for that surrender. However, there were no indications that I saw or that the chiefs of staff saw, with all the information that was available, but which all the innumerable public writers could see instantly, which we were not able with our intellects to understand. However, it was very easy to understand it afterwards. So we had to get out of this mess or rearrangement which brought everybody in the wrong place.

Now there set up a tremendous pressure to discharge these men in the United States who were home on their ten days leave, and not try to transport them to the Pacific. However, there were the men with short terms of service in the Pacific that were due for discharge—not all of them, of course, but most of them. Then with the press behind and all the various criticisms and reports that are incidental to a democracy when it gets involved in a very huge enterprise such as this war, the men in the divisions yet to go to the Pacific were steamed up to oppose every move of any kind and were threatening what amounted actually to a form of mutiny. We received no help from the press [chuckles], as I recall, during this period, or from Congress. They were all responding to the immediate urge of the individual who was at home and was going to stay at home if he could possibly manage it.

We had quite an accumulation of air people in the United States who were on the way to the southwest Pacific. And now there was no immediate

need for them. Yet, on the other hand, there were these men with very long service in the Pacific, and also to a certain extent in Europe, who should be immediately discharged when we could get them home. But the men that were home who still had long service to do, now in a sense, you might say, verbally rebelled against not being discharged immediately, particularly when they were home. And when you tried to hold them until the men that were deserving of discharge could be gotten back to the United States, then we were confronted with the great difficulty of dealing with these men for whom there was no immediate problem of work. There was also a staff problem involved, because to accomplish a proper demobilization and not have so many of the mishaps that we had in the 1919 demobilization, it was necessary to build up a very large organization of trained staff. [Telephone rings at this point.]

We had to make a pause here, and I've forgotten exactly where I left off, but I think I've told enough of this complication to satisfy, except I do add that the airmen became so restless that we finally got enough trained staff to handle all these demobilization points scattered about the country, and got these air fellows—who were probably the most restless of all—discharged before they burst into flames, as it were.

151. Did you ever get promotion policy organized to suit you?

I think towards the end we succeeded in getting the promotion problem pretty well straightened out. Though as I recall I have already recited, it was very difficult when we organized new units. There were all these vacancies, and the tendency of all the commanders was to fill all the vacancies and give promotion to all the men waiting. But it would have been just as satisfactory, and far better for the army, if they had been willing to have had an accumulation of lieutenants with troops, instead of putting them all in their appropriate grades before they themselves had had a chance to qualify for those grades.

And it was further complicated, as I believe I have said, by the fact that in Europe they were very strict with promotions, because they would only give them as a reward for real service where the man showed his qualifications in battle. Therefore, the men in Europe were far behind the men in the United States, and I had quite a difficult time straightening this out and restraining commanders from promoting everybody for whom there was an organizational vacancy, instead of keeping them in lower grades until they had a chance to qualify themselves. And, on the other hand, I had General Eisenhower's problem in Europe where he was doing exactly the right thing by promoting slowly after the men had had experience and been tested in battle.

I had an example of that in my own home with two stepsons, one in the United States and one in Africa. In Africa the promotion was very slow

and the boy there found so many of his associates in his grade—second lieutenant—had been in battle and many of them had been wounded and recovered, while back in the states his brother was stationed where they were promoting too rapidly, filling vacancies. So he was far ahead of his brother in Europe who had been in action and he had not.

It was quite difficult to get this straightened out. Commanders who were established—for instance, the commander that I put in Cairo at this time immediately promoted everybody on his staff to the grade which was permitted for that position. But it put them far ahead of their service—their actual service.

152. You made every effort possible to use decorations for the purpose of promoting morale. Unfortunately, in many cases, the way in which decorations were given led to dissatisfaction. Any comments on this?

As to the matter of decorations, I don't think we had any particular trouble with that except too quick decorations for merely service performance by members of the Air Corps where the development was going ahead with such tremendous expansions. I restrained that very much, but it had gotten started pretty well and awakened naval resentment, because their air corps were not getting the same rapid promotion, which stirred up comment in the press and all, which was unfavorable to the army air and it led to the joke—a favorite of the period—that a man entered the Pentagon's labyrinth a second lieutenant and by the time he found his way out he was a lieutenant colonel. There's some slight exaggeration in this. [Chuckles] (Sgt. Heffner: I remember that very well.)

153. One of your efforts to raise morale was your order to have pamphlets prepared on various actions which would be given to soldiers who were wounded in these actions. To a great extent the army historical program grew out of this. What other measures did you take?

The army historical program—if I know just what is meant by this—was a development to record the history of the war with as much talent to do the job as possible, and as promptly as possible, and not have it to take years as it did even in the First World War, and as it did, of course, in the Civil War.

When I first began answering this question 153, I had lost the point of the question which related to the development of descriptions in the hospitals to the wounded men of what was going on in the front, particularly where they had left it. You know, the movement of evacuation was so prompt, when we could make it such, that a man was entirely disassociated with his organization and with his theater. He might be flown clear back to the United States very quickly, or at least to the rear in the hospitals—Italy or France, or wherever it may happen to be. And I found that those men in

the hospital would get back to the Walter Reed, who were flown through—the White Sulphur Springs and places like that—didn't know at all what was really happening, particularly with their unit, and particularly in the theater of operations that they had recently served. So I started the business of trying to get out accounts of the fighting for the benefit of these men, because it was needed for their morale, though it was very difficult of arrangement and I don't recall now some of the procedures we followed. But I've a faint recollection that we had to try to get some of the data from the troop unit themselves and, of course, that was very hard to do, because they were so busy with today and tomorrow that they had very little time to think back to yesterday.

154. How much trouble did you have with the problem of the Negro soldier? Did you feel that integration would work during the war? What has been the main problem in connection with use of the Negro soldier? Did you approve of General Eisenhower's proposal to use Negro soldiers at the time of the Ardennes?

We had the usual difficulties of that day and development with the Negro soldier question. I have previously said that I thought one of my serious mistakes was in the mobilization of these Negro units. I didn't keep those in the north, didn't keep those men of the north in the organizations and station them in the north despite the difficulties of training and the cold winters and the tremendous expense in preparing camps which would be satisfactory in the severe winters of the north. As I said before, when we moved these men, or their units, into the south, we ran into things which were utterly beyond our control—that is, the local customs of the town, the laws regarding the street, bus services, all of the matters of that kind which we could not control, and yet which violently excited the Negroes from the north who were unaccustomed to such matters of segregation as they found in the south, particularly in the very small towns.

This was almost insoluble. Jack McCloy, the assistant secretary of war at that time, had this in his particular charge, and it was an unenviable charge because it was almost beggared of solution until the whole attitude would change. The character of the Negro in most of these southern towns, particularly in the states where they worked in the fields—particularly in states like Louisiana and Mississippi, to a certain extent in Alabama, in Florida, and to a certain extent in southern Georgia, and in parts of South Carolina—were in quite a different stage of development from those particularly in Virginia and places in the north where there was an accumulation of Negroes, such as in New York.

And they were all, of course, these various groups were all working to achieve a national correction, if we may call it that, of these various factors of a racial nature, using the war as an opportunity for that purpose. And, of course, you must say this—when you are calling on the man to risk his life

in the service of the country, he had every right, it would certainly seem, to demand the same rights of the other fellow who was risking his life. And there we had, as I say, an almost unsolvable question, because we couldn't do away with feelings and reactions and customs in the Deep South, and yet we had those men with us. Their degree of civilization, I will put it, was very marked, because where they were closely associated with the home, like what we would call in the earlier days the "house Negroes," we had a totally different problem than that dealing with the "field Negroes." That was particularly the condition in the rice growing or sugar growing and those crops of that nature in the Deep South.

Going back again to the decorations matter, I was very anxious that decorations could be given as close to the battlefield as possible. Men could work up all sorts of cases for themselves when they got away from the battlefield, but you couldn't do it there. Only the man that did, got, in the opinion of his fellow soldiers. So it was highly desirable to give decorations there, and I felt it highly desirable to allow the authority to be there and not have it sent far to the rear.

I think I spoke once before of the fact that in the First and Second Armies in the First World War, the matter of decorations at GHQ was in the hands of an officer who got about six months behind, and then when they began to get them, very frequently men who didn't deserve them got them, and those who got them long after the war, particularly like the DSM, built up cases for themselves. I found, because I was tied to it a little bit by appeals made to General Pershing which I had to handle, that the officer would go to the French authorities and try to crowd a decoration out of them, and then he would come to the American authorities and try to force the issue there, showing the French decoration as a justification for his American appeal. So when they were delayed it started to be given long afterwards, they were very frequently, in my opinion, were not justified. And, of course, as I listened to these men, they would explain that it was a very sensitive thing—it was only on account of their children they would do it—and they would never have thought of touching the matter personally. I knew at that time, because the French government had informed me, that they had haunted the French War Office to get their decorations over there.

Going back to 154 again and the question of the Negro soldier, I thought that General Eisenhower's procedure in using Negro soldiers in the fighting platoons at that time was excellent. However, you see, one great trouble was the other cases, situations, didn't offer the same opportunity for handling the matter in the excellent manner in which it was done with the European forces. There was another problem. The minute you moved them to the United States, then you had a brand new issue involved which related to home conditions. And if you had a unit, which

we had these men demobilized or moved into those regions which had not changed at all in respect to the segregation of the Negro from the white population, it was almost impossible to handle. In the fighting, though, with a certain percentage, I believe it was about 15 per cent of Negroes in the company, they put up a very splendid show.

All along it was quite evident that what they lacked was leadership. I know that was so clear in the Meuse-Argonne battle. And I had personally to deal with this, with the troops in their reorganization and their movement, of the colored units that were on the left of the First Army in that fighting. It was lack of leadership, lack of confidence of the men in their noncommissioned officers, and particularly in their officers that they had not developed that far. And I found the old noncommissioned officers of the Negro regiments in the Regular Army felt very much the same way I did.

One of the misfortunes of that period was that in the political repercussions, they were—these Negro groups in many cases—were rather violently attacking the noncommissioned officers of the old Negro Regular regiments, because they resented the fact that those men knew what a non-commissioned officer had to have and they knew what the white officer had to have, and what the necessities were and that didn't at all accord with the pressure that was being kicked up in New York, Kansas City, and places like that. But the great lack was leadership which involved the confidence of the men in their officers, and until they had that it was very, very difficult. And yet that was the demand.

It was a very trying thing to me, with the political pressures—the political attitude generally in regard to a question of this kind—and the very unfortunate statements on the other side of the question of men who should have known better than to talk as they did. We had very splendid men, of course, just as you have now, with Bunche and others, and I know the president at Tuskegee University [Frederick D. Patterson] was quite a friend of mine. And yet he was very much criticized by his own Negro folk—criticized because, in a sense, he was what I would call an evolutionist while they were revolutionists. And in order to give him status I would turn over my plane as chief of staff so that he could move from this place to that place in connection with his duties to help us in these matters, and to give him some prestige, as it were. But it was a very difficult thing to do and he probably was more criticized than almost any of the people concerned with this business. Yet he was the one that was supporting me in trying in every way to do what he could in the way that Booker T. Washington would have done.

I know when we started to set up the permanent ROTC units after the war, he had made a proposal for a rather large aviation affair down at Tuskegee University, and his son was in the Regular Army Air Corps and

was a squadron commander. I agreed to do it, but I told him I thought it was all wrong, that he would not be able to manage that. It was too much pressure against him at the time, and that while we would back him in the installations and financial requirements as far as the War Department could, I thought he was ill-advised. But he felt it was quite important. He went back to Tuskegee and two weeks later he telegraphed me that I was right, that it was not practical to do as he proposed.

155. *What was your opinion of General Hershey's handling of selective service?*

As to General Hershey and the selective service. As far as I knew, he did a very fine job. Of course, there were critics. But any good job has its critics. If it didn't have critics, I'd be suspicious.

155 (?) *Army band?*

Question with reference to the Inaugural parade and the Army Band. The Army Band was largely a development at my instigation, and I had it sent abroad in the hope of getting it going with a good background which the Marine Band had had for years and years. It had many difficulties about it, because we had no appropriations for music and things like that, where thousands were allowed for bands of longer service such as the Marine Band, of course, and the Naval Band, and later on the Air Band came in pretty well. But criticisms are very bad business, so I won't explain why I think the Army Band didn't develop as rapidly as it should have during these days of opportunity.

As to General Smith and his comments about the Army Band, I was pushing him. He was General Eisenhower's chief of staff abroad. I was pushing him to get more publicity for the Army Band, so I think, in effect, he was carrying out my request and having a very hard time in doing it.

156. *You may consider this an improper question, because you may think it requires an immodest answer on your part. However, it would make a valuable answer for your biographer. If you prefer, we could hold this for later and not record it. Wherein lay your greatest contribution to victory—coordinator, conciliator, administrator, idea man, strategist, etc?*

I cannot answer that question, as you anticipated.

157. *You mentioned recently that you once threatened to resign if Secretary Stimson insisted on his views relative to officer training. Was this the only time during the war you made such a threat?*

That was the only time, as I recall, that I threatened to resign and I didn't like to do it, because I thought that was a very bad business for a public official to come up with a resignation proposition just because the thing didn't go his way, which is so often the case with political appointees, and I didn't think an army officer had any business doing it unless it was a

matter of such great moment that he couldn't continue himself with the thing, with the affair, because of a violent difference in principle. However, I was trying to save the situation and that was the only way I could think of at the time. I regretted it afterwards, though it partly accomplished its purpose.

158. This is a picayunish question, but historians frequently dispute over such matters as where people had their offices. As a matter of fact, someone like Sherwood had you sitting in the Pentagon in 1940. Where did you have your offices in Washington from 1939-45? I know you were in the Munitions Building, but was there another before that?

My offices in Washington started when I came in 1938 to the office in the Winder Building across from the State, War and Navy Building, when I was head of the War Plans Division. I moved from there to the deputy chief of staff, I think in October of 1938. That office was in the next room to the chief of staff, again, in the State, War and Navy Building, in the traditional offices of the chief of staff for many years. When I became chief of staff, I moved into the chief of staff's office in the same building, which was virtually in the next room to the deputy chief of staff's office. That building then came to be vacated in favor of overflows, particularly from the White House committees and things of that sort, and we went to the Munitions Building. I don't know how to describe where that office was except that it was practically over one of the doors. (Sgt. Heffner: Over the main entrance?) It was over the main entrance. And I'm amused now to recall that I had quite a time getting the main entrance cleaned up because I thought it was filthy. But I found the army had no control over that—that was done by some general service in Washington. Well, I notified them if they didn't clean it up, I was going to do it. And we had quite a hard time about it.

From there we moved into the present offices of the chief of staff—no, moved into the present dining room of the secretary of defense in the Pentagon, and it remained there until after I left. As a matter of fact, I think it remained there until Louis Johnson became secretary of defense and the general unification, as they called it, of the army and air and navy and Marine Corps took place.

159. I have heard that you never had an aide before Colonel George, and that this was due to the fact that you felt your own career had been hampered by having served such a long period as an aide. Are either of these accurate?

I don't recall exact details in regard to an aide. I had one out at Vancouver who I merely took on my staff because he was ill. He had had a nervous breakdown and his wife had died, and I had known him as a young officer, and so I took him on as an aide without any idea of having him do any duty. And then he left me to go to the Letterman Hospital in San

Francisco. I don't recall having a formal aide—though I did have Captain Claude Adams in the office at the Munitions Building for a time, and after that I never had a detailed aide until Colonel George was made my aide.

I had several reasons for this. In the first place, I thought it important that I be in very close contact with the General Staff—with the staff organization and with the secretary of the General Staff, in particular—because he was the one that coordinated, in a sense, all the work of the General Staff and was in contact with all of the senior officers in the army staff. Therefore, I kept in close touch, in the closest possible touch, with him and I thought that an aide would, in a sense, rather get in the way. This was a little bit hard on Mrs. Marshall, because she had so many duties which involved the necessities of an aide.

But actually, the secretary of the General Staff, who was in effect my aide so far as I had an aide service. And I had a very unusual group of men who went through this service. I think the office of the secretary and assistant secretaries of the General Staff was a very good evidence of the system that I followed. In the first place, that appointment as the secretary of the General Staff usually went to one of the senior colonels of the army who was about to be made a brigadier and was considered the most influential appointment that you could get, unless you were a major general. I found that I gradually worked down from the upper age, older men, until I got down to the early thirties, and one of my last secretaries of the General Staff, I think was only about thirty-two when he was made. And yet he exercised a profound influence and became a great expert in organization.

In my earlier affairs with General Pershing I had tried to get into the General Staff organization—if not permanent members of the General Staff, at least workers on the General Staff—young officers that I thought were brilliant. I practically was not able to do this except in a very small way, and it took me over a year or year and a half to succeed in this, and it was not until the last moment before I left General Pershing, he, as a favor to me, insisted on the attachment to the General Staff of five of these young fellows. Well, within almost weeks, certainly months, they became the principal workers in their sections.

But the resistance to these young officers is hard to appreciate today. At the time I had started on this business of trying to get these young officers attached to the General Staff as workers, I tried to get the General Staff officers exchanged with the navy, and that was way back in the early days when I was with General Pershing. The navy didn't want to take any of them and didn't think they could be anything but liaison officers, and I wanted them real workers. But when we came to our staff—and the heads of the various sections of the General Staff were very warm friends of mine, all but about one of them—I couldn't get any of them to accept the men.

They said they wouldn't have enough experience.

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Well, it struck me as rather amusing after the war—during the war when we get an army of eight and a half million men and nine theaters of operations, I had a Reserve officer of thirty-one years as the secretary of the General Staff [Frank McCarthy], operating in the broadest way possible: being sent for by the president at midnight to sit with Churchill and himself in some of their discussions; going with me to the various theaters of operations; acting as the secretary of all the meetings and discussions at Algiers on occasion when the normal member from the United States chiefs of staff could not be present. And yet at this time I am talking about, when I was trying to get these younger men brought in as assistants if not General Staff officers themselves, I couldn't get anybody to agree with me about it.

However, I found after I became deputy chief of staff—before I became deputy chief of staff—I found there was an officer who I thought had rare attainments. I tried to have him brought into the staff, and I couldn't get anybody to take him because he didn't have this age, association, and experience, as they called it, he was supposed to have. Finally, the chief of one section took him as a personal favor to me. This particular officer that I am talking about became head of one of the largest sections in the General Staff, and became head of the whole management of various people—countries—that we were involved in, in connection with the gradual organization of their civil establishments; one of the most able officers on the staff. But their prejudices were so deep—not against using civilians, but on the grounds that they couldn't know this without years and years of experience, and yet when I ended up, I had the entire General Staff—head of the General Staff business—composed of very young officers, largely from the Reserve.

I was doing this purposely in order to release as many trained Regulars as I could for service abroad. However, I had to reverse the thing at the end and bring in, gradually, Regular officers to pick up the organization which had been developed in this section of the General Staff. Among the officers in the Office of the Secretary of the General Staff, in these early days when I first came into the business as chief of staff, were a notable collection: General Bradley was an assistant to the secretary of the General Staff; General Collins—afterwards chief of staff—was an assistant to the secretary of the General Staff; General Bedell Smith, of notable reputation, was an assistant to the secretary of the General Staff. There were any number of these men who became corps commanders and performed brilliantly, who started under me as secretaries of the General Staff. I moved them out as quickly as I could into other positions, but for the time being they were

there and rendered a very valuable service during this formative period entering into large operations.

Going back to 159—the question of an aide. I really had more direct aide service from a master sergeant, Powder, who as far as I know is about the only person in the army at the outbreak of the war who never got a promotion. He was a master sergeant at the start of the war and he was a master sergeant at the end. However, Powder declined to be a major, Provost Marshal. He preferred to stay where he was and he rendered me most valuable service.

He traveled with me and he was much admired by British officers of distinction. He was six feet four, I think, and the usual hash marks, as they call them, covered his sleeve for almost its entire length. I used him in a very independent role. I would often send him with officers, British officers of distinction, who came to this country. He would take them down the Shenandoah Valley—take them to Charlottesville. Then he would take them on down to Miami Beach, where we held a pentagon—that's what they call the thing on the roof, isn't it? (Sgt. Heffner: Yes, sir.)—held a pentagon [*penthouse*] open for such purposes and look after them while they were there.

I know Sir John Dill—he used to take him to the White Sulphur Springs, which was a hospital, at the time Dill was ill—and stay with him there. And it was rather amusing to hear Dill tell about it, because Powder controlled exactly what Dill did, because if the doctor said it, Dill had to do it, because Powder was on his back if he didn't do it. He always made quite an impression on these British officers, because he was a very fine cut of a soldier, but very able and very well liked. And, as I say, I was able to use him as a sort of guide and cicerone for very distinguished British officers coming to this country and others. And he made matters easier for me in traveling and things of that sort.

We had an amusing experience at Yalta. Before going over there, being a little bit trained in what happened—Colonel Frank McCarthy got a complete outlay of things from Murphy's store for both women and men, but particularly women—and had them packed in two small trunks—officers field lockers, I think. And when we got to Yalta where we were quartered in the summer home of the Tsar and Tsarina, the servants were all the most impoverished, slavey-like looking people. They had been taken from all these destroyed cities in Russia and moved down there because there was no one practically left there to look after us. Powder, in a sense, looked after me directly and saw that I got the proper attention from these people where it was needed.

When it came time to go, he started to distribute Murphy's store, in effect, among these women. Well, it was just like giving them diamonds. They hadn't been able—probably never in their lives had seen such

things—which over here had probably cost a quarter to a dollar—and in that day had nothing whatsoever and looked it. So very quickly it spread through the building that Powder was the man to get next to, and they all but kneeled in the aisles when they met him in the hallways. Then word came up from the president's delegation on the first floor that please supply them with the necessary tip procedure. Well, we had done this thing out of the experiences we had, and we had use for all these, and I must say I declined to favor them. We went ahead with our own distribution tips, as it were. And I would get back presents of sweet champagne so that Powder had my boots filled with this stuff which I couldn't drink myself at all.

Then there was another incident occurred at Yalta which always amused me, but it shows very well what the condition of affairs was. There was practically nothing to buy in the town, but Colonel Frank McCarthy, my secretary of the General Staff and now a most prominent man in the motion picture world, found a painting of a laughing Cossack, an old Cossack laughing—it was a very good painting as it developed, because I think it was evaluated for a considerable sum of money in this country. But the great question was to pay for the thing. Money seemed nothing because there was nothing the fellow could buy with the money.

So finally Frank hit on the scheme of buying the picture for a set of woolen underwear that he couldn't wear because it scratched. And after this was joyfully accepted by the owner of the painting, who needed the heavy under clothing more than anything else, it then developed that he had a partner in the enterprise. Well, we couldn't split up the underclothing because there was only one suit, and finally Frank found that he did have another pair of drawers. So that pair of drawers and the complete suit of underwear paid for the painting of the laughing Cossack, which was brought to this country and, as I say, was evaluated for a considerable sum of money.

Going further into the aide question, you suggest here that I felt that I wanted to avoid it because I had been afflicted with a great deal of service of this nature. As a matter of fact, I was, and the trouble was this, that I was behind a long block in promotions. As a matter of fact, I was a lieutenant fifteen years and I was a lieutenant colonel and a major, but mostly lieutenant colonel, for almost twelve years. I think the secretary of war tried to make me a brigadier general twelve or thirteen years before I could legally be made. I had been, previous to this time, a colonel and I had been recommended from Europe by General Pershing to be a brigadier general when I was in my middle thirties, and that had been approved by the secretary of war, but General March had not sent it to the Senate and then the end of the war came. I had been chief of operations of an army which had a million men in it, but yet I was now back to a captain when I first came home, and then later a major and a lieutenant colonel.

Now my lack of rank meant that I could not be put in charge of things, because I did not have enough rank to be senior—to be the chairman of this or the head of that. Well, they got around that by making me an aide, and in my position as aide I operated for the general.

For instance, I was a first lieutenant and I was aide to the commanding general in the Philippines. I was aide to him before he became commanding general and while he was the head of the training of the ground troops in the Philippines. Well, I did all the work for the training and I wrote the problems and I was really in charge of training in the Philippine Islands while I was first lieutenant, but only doing it through the name of my chief.

The same thing occurred in other places. And when I was with General Pershing after the war, I couldn't be given this or that because I didn't have the rank for it, though I had had the rank previously while the war was going on. Therefore, while I was not an aide at all in my younger days, it was not until I got well into my thirties that I became an aide and for the reasons I have just explained.

160. What were your views as to the German offer to surrender on one front in Germany in May, 1945?

All of this business about the Germans surrendering was a very involved—well, I don't know whether it was an involved question because the reason was very simple. The Germans were trying to surrender to the Americans and the British, being very much afraid to surrender to the Russians, because what they had done to the Russian people was something terrific and involved almost millions in their outrageous treatment and destruction of large numbers of the Russian population. So they were very fearful of any surrender to them. And we were very careful to operate with unity, that is, the British and the Americans and the Russians.

The Russians were very suspicious that we were combining with Great Britain and would be leaving them out of this and that. For that reason General Eisenhower had a very difficult time in handling this question and in keeping it a triumvirate, we might say, as well as the fighting was concerned. The Russians had had terrific losses in the last fighting and had carried a tremendous burden of the combat.

161. Did you feel that the Marine General Smith was accurate in his strong remarks about the army troops under him in the Pacific?

I do not wish to comment about General Smith. My opinion of the matter was too fixed to let me get involved in this thing here.

162. Was it your decision to bring German and Italian prisoners here during the war?

The matter of bringing German and Italian prisoners over here, I don't

recall. I've sort of a faint recollection, but it isn't clear enough to quote.

163. Do you care to make any comments on the controversy over the relocation of Japanese on the West Coast during the war?

The relocation of the Japanese on the West Coast. Internment camps I suppose this refers to. We were in very great difficulties there because there were large numbers of Japanese almost next door to the airplane factories, particularly in Los Angeles. Seems to me I have commented on this once before; however, I'll go again. And the people out there, notably in Los Angeles and wherever they were close to these great airplane factories, were just bitter in their feeling that the Japanese should not be allowed to stay there. They were suspicious at that time of everybody Japanese. Therefore, it reached such a point that it seemed to be the only thing we could do, short of a semi-riot or terrible occurrence out in California, to put these people in an internment camp. The details of that, I think, Jack McCloy of the Chase National Bank is more familiar with than I am. It was a very trying duty and a trying necessity.

164. Did we have any basic difficulties with the Australians in our joint campaigns against the Japanese in the Pacific?

As to difficulties with the Australians in our joint campaigns against the Japanese in the Pacific. Well, I would say we got along pretty well. General MacArthur got along pretty well, but there were difficulties and there were strong feelings. That's only natural. (Sgt. Heffner: We'll have to cut it, General.)

[Begin reel side 2]

165. Did you agree with navy proposals for seizing Martinique and other possessions held by the Vichy French during the war?

As to Martinique and the Vichy French during the war, I don't recall exactly with sufficient definitiveness just what the details of my attitude were at that time.

166. Did you share Mr. Roosevelt's anger over de Gaulle's seizure of Miquelon and St. Pierre in Canadian waters during the war?

I can't say that I did, because the action was taken more in a sense along the diplomatic line, and we were just getting in the war.

I might tell you an incident. I found that Lord Halifax, Lord Beaverbrook, the British chiefs of staff, who were here at the time, had no invitations for Christmas Day, so Mrs. Marshall and I invited them all to dinner at midday Christmas dinner at Fort Myer and had them with the family. It was the day of Field Marshal Dill's retirement, his birthday,

sixty-second I think, and when he ceased to be chief of staff and became the representative of the British chiefs of staff in Washington.

While we were at dinner—Mrs. Marshall was seated between Beaverbrook and Lord Halifax—word came to Halifax about these two islands, and he and Beaverbrook had a whispered consultation away from the table. Halifax then went to the phone and telephoned; they came back to the table and continued with the Christmas dinner. They were interrupted three times—had to leave the table three times—to telephone in regard to the matter of these islands and just what should be done about it. But it was Beaverbrook, I suppose, advising on the publicity end and Halifax, as the American ambassador, who were doing the talking and not the British chiefs of staff.

167. Several writers have described the army as being isolationist and the navy internationalist in the period 1920-37. They say that the army wished to withdraw from commitments in China and the Philippines, but that the navy insisted on keeping or expanding commitments. Any comment on these statements?

I wouldn't say that the army were isolationists in contrast to the navy being internationalists. The navy naturally were in sea touch with all these various countries. The trouble with the army was there wasn't any army. I think at one time they said you could seat all the noncommissioned officers of the American army in the Yankee Stadium in New York, which was about true. We had our largest number of troops in the Philippines, in Hawaii, and in Panama, but these were very small groups of troops. We were always fearful—from way back when I had nothing to do with Washington and the War Department up to the time I was in the War Plans Division and later actually there—that public opinion would force us into a move into the Philippines when we literally had no army to send. Considering the time it took us to organize and train a sizeable force, even a small force, the thought of such a move as that was contemplated by the navy planners at that time is hard to understand.

The navy wished to send an expedition to the southwest Pacific, notably to the Philippines, early in the struggle—in fact, in the early months of the struggle. It was to escort the army over there for a landing expedition, a reinforcement expedition, I guess you would put it, when actually there wasn't any army, and what little army we had in the United States would have to be taken completely to pieces in order to find the nucleus for this vast expansion which had to take place, because we were going from 176,000 troops up to eight and a half million; from an Air Force of 18,000 ground and air to some—I've forgotten, I think about 800,000. Therefore, there was just literally nothing to send to the Philippines, and we tried to give them what we could—to General MacArthur to bolster up his defense. We had to give him the only antiaircraft regiment

we had which was in any condition to go at all, merely from the viewpoint in equipment, which was a National Guard regiment from New Mexico. The Regular regiments had been completely taken apart and rarely had more than a battery of guns while they were trying to reform largely from recruits. Therefore, we were very much afraid that public opinion would force us into what we thought would be a great national calamity if we sent a force out to the Philippine Islands, because in a sense, there was no force. And any move like that requires tremendous numbers of troops and requires all sorts of equipment and supplies.

I remember a debate we had, argument we had, before the organization which preceded the chiefs of staff—Joint Army-Navy Board—and I had just become a member and I was in a discussion with one of the naval members, a junior member, though an admiral, about this matter, and he was insisting that the plan should go through. I think it was called the Rainbow Plan then. He said that was the national policy, and I disagreed with him entirely, because the national policy didn't even have an army, except the name army, which was used referring to the entire organization, office forces, and everything of the sort.

The navy never could quite understand the vast difference between their organized fleet and our little stations throughout the country, and divisions and army corps and armies in name only, and for a long time almost not in name. When I concentrated the troops the first time—I have forgotten just when that was, but it was before we got into the war—that I was putting them together at the beginnings of mobilization, my onetime division, the Third Division, would have a company in Oregon, in Vancouver, Washington, other troops other places and scattered all over the United States, and only about a fifth of those needed for a division. I concentrated five divisions and only two of them, as I recall, had at least 60 or 70 percent of their personnel.

That was the beginning and we mobilized, as I recall, 164 units and we were just filled with complications. For instance, they had the tentage. I found the limited number of tents we had were in one part of the country and the poles were in another. I found that the guns, 155s, were in one place and the sighting devices and things of that nature were somewhere else that they didn't know. And we would have the 155s concentrated from this one regiment in this one division at Fort Benning, which was the First Division, and they couldn't shoot because they didn't have these other appurtenances which were vital to shooting. You couldn't say that was first a state of unpreparedness. There just wasn't any army. And they didn't have any of these things, and you couldn't practically get any money to do with then.

I might tell a little incident that occurred during this mobilization of 164 units to get these five divisions into some kind of real form. It

pertained to Fort Benning down there where the First Division was assembled. They didn't have practically anything and they were going into the winter without the necessary shelter for the troops and things of that sort. So we tried to do what we could for them, and I went there myself two or three times in order to see at first hand just what the situation really was, and they were encamped on that very large reservation. They had gathered up all the loose material they could around there. We had a sawmill to help out and still they were terribly short. They appealed to me on one trip to give them enough money for a post office and enough money for a first-aid setup. Now these were not big buildings. This was canvas or frame lumber just knocked together to shelter these people. It was to be the contrast between being out in the open air and having a tent or something of that sort. They were down to the fact that there wasn't even any raw lumber left to fix up these people. So I directed, I think, the supply part of the War Department to supply these people right away, give them the authorization for this money to spend. It was a very trivial amount, but still you have to have it in order to get the thing.

I went back some weeks later—no, just after the Christmas holidays. I asked them if they had gotten fixed up in these things, and they hadn't. They had gone through—in the meantime they had had one of the coldest spells in the history of that country down there. Well, some of them almost froze up in the situation. Being an old Regular organization, they didn't make any reclamers to the press and nobody heard anything about it. But I was infuriated because I had directed this thing along about the tenth or fifteenth of December, and when I got back to Washington I found—I sent for the head supply fellow—and told him what this was within the hour after my arrival in the War Department. He went right back and then he reported later and he said we've got that all fixed up. You won't hear anything about it.

Well, I said, "I'm not talking about hearing anything about it. I want to know why you can't fix this up—why you didn't fix this up before Christmas when I told you about it." Why, these fellows had to go through the winter in that situation, or during the Christmas period in that situation. They had no place to open their mail—they had a big mail for the division. I wanted at least a couple of tents or things like that or some little board houses for it. They didn't even get that. There was nothing else left down there you can get unless you chop a tree down and build a log house and that takes time, particularly if you are not expert at the business. And I was quite outraged with the thing and I had them make the corrections then, within the hour, to get this thing straightened out.

Well, it all showed the results of the pinchpenny policy we would have to follow in the army. I don't know who would be said to be to blame. You might say the Congress because these men had gone before committees

and had to account for every dime, and they'd become so sensitive to the extreme criticism they incur before the committee if they tried to get a little money, that it seemed to me the main purpose of the War Department was to operate in a way that no congressman could possibly criticize for spending any money. Well, they hadn't spent any money. We didn't have anything. But the worst part of it was the officers had grown so in the habit of being forced into positions of advocating only extreme economy that they just were afraid to spend any money for anything.

Later on, out in Australia, when we were trying to succor MacArthur in the Philippines and I had been given this money, \$25 million, without asking for it—not for that purpose but for a general purpose—I radioed out, or however you do it, to the bank in Melbourne for \$10 million for any expenses that had to be incurred in this effort. Well, nothing was happening and General—Reserve General—he's from Santa Fe and has run for senator from New Mexico several times, and was a lawyer in Washington and was secretary of war at one time [Patrick J. Hurley]—he wanted to go out and I authorized his going and sent him almost within the hour. I wrote him a letter of authorization for this and that—he was always trying to get a similar letter later on—but I gave him broad authority to get at things out there because I could see something was all wrong.

There was almost nobody in Australia at that time and our military attaché was—no, our minister, no, I guess our military attaché was a Reserve officer who was sick—very prominent, a very fine man—but was in no condition to operate, and when my man got out there, he started in to try to whip up some business for General MacArthur, which meant you had to buy ships. You had to indemnify the owner. You have to look after the owner's family. You have to pay on the barrelhead there instantly this, that, and the other in order to get them to undertake this very hazardous voyage, none of which succeeded though we started quite a few.

He found that the officers wouldn't spend the money at their disposal. They had been so trained in economy that in this desperate situation, you couldn't get them to go down there and buy a ship without a lot of argument, and get it started for the Philippines at the earliest possible moment before we lost Java and Sumatra and those other islands near South Borneo. But it was a very interesting commentary on this affair.

I had started them to fly in money—the checks were no good up there. They wanted cash, they didn't want any checks. I sent this money out though—I remember it went through Jodhpur, not Jodhpur, but Bangalore in India, and then when the Japs got down so far as to take Java, they couldn't make the flight. The planes wouldn't go far enough to get in to come on down into Australia. And some poor lieutenant of the Air Corps out in Bangalore sent word back—I have gotten this far and I have \$500,000. What shall I do with it? He was stuck in Bangalore and he

couldn't go forward and the question was, could he go back? (Sgt. Heffner: That wasn't Senator Anderson, was it, of New Mexico?) No. Very well known, but I'm sorry I've forgotten. He was secretary of war.

168. Mr. Stimson, in his diary in August 1941, says that Mr. Roosevelt demanded that planes be sent at once to Russia. "Get 'em, even if it is necessary to take them from the Army." "This Russian munitions business thus far has shown the President at his worst. He has no system. He goes haphazard and he scatters responsibility among a lot of uncoordinated men and consequently things are never done." Did you share Mr. Stimson's view? Do you have any comments generally on the problems you faced because of these tendencies of the president?

Now to go back to the matter of planes with Russia and President Roosevelt's attitude and reactions. In a sense there was no system at that time. Mr. Morgenthau was handling this for the president because he felt an unwillingness on the part of the War Department—Mr. Woodring in particular—and the War Department was so afraid, I believe—I wasn't in the War Department then—that—yes, I was, too—was so afraid that they would give away the secret of our precision bomb—the sighting device—which was really quite a thing at that time. [Norden Bombsight] And they were afraid that they would be given away to the French or the British and would then be picked up by the Japanese or the Nazis and would defeat our preeminence in this type of equipment for possible naval actions in the Pacific. So it was a very unsatisfactory period.

Mr. Roosevelt's demands for planes, in the light of all previous circumstances, were huge. But the trouble was nothing was said much about pilots, nothing was said about ammunition, and nothing was said about the Panama defenses (which were in a lamentable situation) and all these affairs which were equally, if not of more importance, than the matter of planes. Of course, Mr. Roosevelt was trying to get these planes to France. The collapse of France had not yet occurred, but was threatened, though no one anticipated the rapidity or degree with which it would develop.

So throughout the matter of the early part of the war planes were his principal consideration. And he had the habit of constantly increasing his demands. We will say he would demand five hundred thousand planes this year; two hundred thousand or whatever it was, and then a few months later he would up the number tremendously. Well, of course, all the plants that time, factories and other things, had been made for this first number; now he upped it to the second, larger number.

Well, that was his way of working it up, though it was devastating on any planning that you might do, particularly in manufacturing which has to have a long start in the production of these matters. His idea was to force a reluctant service, a reluctant people and all into war production. But he was doing it almost exclusively through the plane frames rather

than the plane engines and things of that sort, and not at all with the other requirements of warfare. And therefore we were concerned deeply with our complete lack of anything in the way of ammunition reserves of artillery and matters of that kind, while Mr. Roosevelt was interested, you might say, primarily in air frames. He was thinking first of building up France, which had seemingly lost its defense by reason of the efficiency of the Nazi air which accompanied the ground troops.

It really wasn't until Mr. Roosevelt got some confidence in us that we got sort of straightened out in this matter. I might explain one of the interludes in this development. (I may have done this, but I don't think so.)

Mr. Morgenthau was then in principal charge of airplane production rather than the War Department, and he certainly was in charge of the money. Mr. Roosevelt returned from a fishing trip in the Caribbean and landed on the unfortunate cruiser *Houston* at Tampa—not Tampa, but Miami. Word was sent that a previous budget approval of \$26 millions, which had been turned down by the committee in Congress, would be approved so far as \$18 million was concerned and not approved for the remainder. Well, these were small sums, but they were tremendous sums with us because we didn't have any money. The part that was turned down involved coast defense security preparations in detecting planes and things of that sort for the West Coast.

I was told to see Mr. Morgenthau and I went over to see him and found to my astonishment that it was not for the discussion of the part that had been turned down, but it was a discussion further whether we should get the \$18 millions. They were approaching the debt limit and things were very stiff in the way of handling money. And that's the situation.

Well, I told Mr. Morgenthau that this situation is tragic. And he was so involved that day that he asked if I could come over the next morning. And I did, and I explained the whole situation so nearly as I could in all its gravity. Well, he was terribly concerned and he made an appointment to see the president, which was a rather historic appointment. We—Morgenthau and I—had had lunch at his private dining room and nobody was to interrupt us at all. Those were the orders, and yet we were interrupted three times in connection with closing of the stock exchange. But we went over to the White House and—I feel very much as though I have talked about this before—anyway, we went over to the White House and saw the president. Mr. Morgenthau—Mr. Roosevelt did the talking, and of course, mostly Mr. Roosevelt. I always felt that he treated Mr. Morgenthau rather roughly, and I always thought it was for my benefit because they were close friends and neighbors.

The conversation started with Mr. Morgenthau explaining the necessity for having some civilian group to take over a lot of the work that was being—and expand the setup to handle a lot of the work which was then

being done by himself as secretary of the treasury, by Harry Hopkins as secretary of commerce, and by others in a similar, you might say, disorganized manner. Mr. Roosevelt was totally against this. Then Mr. Morgenthau, after this lengthy discussion, came to the question of the military preparations alone. And he started off by saying that he wanted to talk about this, but he thought it would be better if Mr. Roosevelt let General Marshall state the case. And the president said he didn't care to hear General Marshall. He already knew what he would have to say and unless Morgenthau had something new to throw on the case, there was no necessity of discussing it. That pretty much ended the affair, which had been a very lengthy one, though it had been largely between Morgenthau and the president and largely about this civilian group, or almost entirely about this civilian group.

Well, I felt that the situation was desperate, because if we didn't get something started right away, we were wholly lost. And I tried to figure out what to do. And the main conclusion in my mind was I had to do something. But just what it was was going to have to depend on the inspiration of the moment. Well, I had one conscious thought, was that you had the great advantage when you were standing up and talking down at a person. So when we got up to excuse ourselves—actually we were being dismissed—I went over and stood right over the president and I realized in the rapid thoughts of the moment that he was a very considerate man, very polite, and although he had just been pretty rough—and certainly rough regarding me—I didn't think that was inherent in his methods.

So I said to him, I said, "Mr. President, would you give me three minutes?" And he turned to me in the most gracious manner and said, "Of course, I will give you three minutes." And he started to say something else and I interrupted, because I knew if he started telling me, I never would get a chance to say anything. So I said I just had lunch with Mr. Morgenthau. He gave orders that he was not to be interrupted. He was interrupted three times regarding the closing of the stock exchange. I had things to talk to him about that I think can truly be said not only in the national interest, but in the most critical of national interests at the moment as to time in particular. And I would like to say that first, while the matter of his civilian committee was not my business in one way, in another way it was very much my business because on the military end I would have to depend on that committee to develop the means of producing the supplies and equipment and things that the army needed.

I said, "You said that Harry Hopkins was doing this and Mr. Morgenthau himself was doing that, and so and so was doing this other thing and that you yourself were handling the major matters." I said, "Mr. President, if you had a collection of Supermans here, you couldn't do it that way. The task is colossal and it will grow more colossal with every day and it's about

to burst on us in full force. And we have to do something and do it fast.” And I said, “I think the appointment of such a committee is *vital* and *immediate* and *tomorrow!*” I remember that pretty distinctly.

Then I turned to the military end of it. Now I said, “As to the military end of it, Mr. President, I have rather dimmed what I was going to say by the vehemence with which I just remarked on the civilian committee.” Well, I said, “We are in a situation now where it’s desperate. I am using the word very accurately, where it’s desperate. We have literally nothing, nothing, and unless something is done immediately, and even then it takes a long, long time to get any return of it, we are caught in a dreadful position of unpreparedness. And with everything being threatened the way it has been, I feel that I must tell you just as frankly and as vehemently as I can what our necessities are.”

And then I recited some of the barest facts that I thought would catch his attention and try to divert his thought, temporarily at least, from the sole question of planes.

[Begin cassette side 3]

I had some confidential information about the German artillery production at that time. Well, they already had their air and seemingly they had their artillery, and yet their production of ammunition, guns, and particularly ammunition over there in a week was something tremendous. That made quite a decided impression on him—if it was true, and he assumed, I think, that it was true.

Anyway, when I was finished, he asked me several questions and I expanded on those as much as I could in my hurried presentation of the plot, and we ended up—I don’t know whether at that moment—but anyway, out of this came a \$790 million appropriation or \$970 million. I’ve forgotten which it is, but the record will show that. He had a general meeting at which the navy was present and the attorney general’s people were present—I know they got quite a sum. I’ve forgotten, I think it was almost a \$100 million. But that was the beginning of the great army production.

It was followed three weeks later—the fall of France having occurred in the meantime and the eruption out of Holland into Belgium and France had all happened—with another appropriation of about a billion dollars. I know the president was very much upset over going to Congress in the first place, and I wrote a good part of the presentation for Congress, although he changed a lot of mine, a lot of what I had to say.

Then this—three weeks later came this colossal crash in the world history with the fall of France, and then the manufacturers expressed a willingness to bid on contracts for production of plane engines, which at that time we had not been able to get. They were all afraid to make fixed

bids because of their uncertainty as to how labor was going to be handled by the president, and labor was getting a great many things at that time that they had not had theretofore. So, contracts not being negotiable at that time, they were very much afraid to bid. But with this ominous occurrence in France and Belgium, they patriotically began to think more about the country and less about their stockholders and were willing to make the bids.

Therefore, we instantly went back to the president with a new proposal which involved large numbers of planes and a great deal of war materiel. He was rather outraged at our coming back so soon for another difficult message to Congress. And I assured him that we had no choice in the matter—we had no choice whatever—we had to do it and do it right then. And I thought from what I had heard from various representatives in congress, who were friends of mine, that we could put the matter through with great ease because they were very restless that not enough was being done. And now I thought, I couldn't express myself very well politically, but that the criticism of the spending would drop from sight for the time being because of the necessities of the moment for the national defense. And, as I say, out of that came about a billion dollar appropriation only three weeks after the previous one, and that time I was allowed to write a good bit of the message.

169. Langer and Gleason in The Undeclared War say: "General Marshall and his staff were particularly disturbed by Mr. Churchill's plan to send additional troops and equipment from England to the Middle East." Since they felt that Hitler, once he had defeated Russia, would hit the British Isles, they wanted to stockpile supplies there. President Roosevelt was more inclined to back the Middle East. Is this accurate regarding your feelings in the summer of 1941?

I don't recall being very precise, or voluble I'll put it, on the question of Mr. Churchill's plan to send additional troops and equipment from England to the Middle East. I do recall, I think, that we were very much worried among ourselves, particularly, General—it was the man that was afterwards head of the special committee we had helping the chiefs of staff [Embick]—I will now go ahead. We were concerned about their cutting down their defenses in England and sending out to the Middle East where it didn't look, from the viewpoint of our staff planners, that they had much chance of building up except at great expense of their own position in England. Actually, events proved out that they were right and we were wrong. It was a great hazard, but it was a successful hazard. And it was one of the real things that Sir John Dill was in a great measure responsible for as prime minister.

In all of those matters the president was inclined to go along with these

various what we thought were dispersive moves, and we were very much afraid that he would become entangled in this matter. I repeat again that the British took the dare and succeeded—through various hazards as it eventually turned out, but nevertheless succeeded—and kept their grip in the Middle East. Of course, they felt more urgently than we did what a vital factor this Middle East was to them. But it could only be supplied then by a twelve thousand mile trip around South Africa, and it later became responsible for the decisions which involved the further clearance of Africa, the capture of Sicily and the lower boot of Italy.

170. Did you worry a good bit about the German danger to the bauxite mines in South America (Dutch Guiana in particular) during the fall of 1941?

Yes, I was much worried about the question of bauxite in Dutch Guiana, particularly at that time. I found out a rather curious thing about bauxite—or rather one that showed my ignorance of the conditions. We found out that the movement of bauxite from certain sources in Europe, where it came out through the Mediterranean and then through the St. Lawrence River and the Great Lakes down to Chicago and there was transferred to rail transportation, it cost more for the rail transportation for the short distances involved to the factories than it did for this entire voyage out of Europe—the voyage in the Mediterranean, across the Atlantic, the voyage down the St. Lawrence River and the Great Lakes—that was less expensive than the short rail shipments in the United States.

I might tell one incident that occurred as a result of this bauxite concern, and particularly the Dutch build-up at Aruba and the adjacent island there right off Venezuela where these largest refineries for oil were established and run by the Dutch government. We had been trying for some time before we got into the war to get the Dutch to agree to our setting up some defenses in these two islands just north of Venezuela for their defense against a raid from the sea—for example, by a submarine with a field piece on it. Such submarines were operating at that time, or by a raider. The Dutch Cabinet was in London. The Dutch queen was there or temporarily in the United States. I had to work through the State Department, particularly the president, in order to get the consent of that government to our setting up a minor defense of these batteries of 155 guns at Rubio [*Aruba*] and whatever the name of the other island is [*Curaçao*].

Well, I couldn't get it. We had gone through two or three months of bickering about the darn thing, and I was out at Leesburg at our home place there, and there was a tree that Mrs. Marshall wanted two or three limbs cut off of. You couldn't get any labor there at all. I was the only labor available. [Chuckles] Fortunately, I was in better shape than I am now and I like to do that sort of thing. So she took me out on this Sunday afternoon

and sicked me on this tree, and I climbed up there with a saw and started on the limbs of this tree. It was quite a climb for me and I'd gotten but a short way along when there came a telephone message from the War Department and from the chief of staff's office. And when I went to the phone—climbing laboriously out of the tree—I found out that they had word that there was a German raider in the Caribbean and they were afraid it was after these refineries there off Venezuela. Well, I immediately told the officer—I've forgotten his name now, but he was a high-ranking officer—to go immediately to Hyde Park, to fly up there to see the president and see if he would authorize this message to Queen Wilhelmina, requesting her immediate decision so that we could act that day to begin to move in some 155 guns.

I went back and climbed up the tree. Climbing up was the hardest thing for me and, as I recall, at first I didn't have on sneakers. Anyway, I got up in the tree and got the saw and started work again, and I was called out again by this same fellow that had just been talking and he had a couple of questions for meeting with the president which, of course, had him very much under a strain, and then he took off to see the president. I went back up the tree. I hadn't been up the tree but a fairly short time till I got a message from Mr. Roosevelt. I think we had sent word to him ahead of the officer that was coming, and he wanted to ask some questions, so I, of course, climbed down out of the tree and went back to the house and got on the telephone to the president and explained the situation and recommended the action I thought ought to be taken. And he had several things to say, but apparently was going to do it all right.

Then I left and went back to my peaceful occupation up the tree. That was either the third or fourth time. When I got up there again—I was getting sort of worn down—when the president thought of something else and sent word for me again and I had to come down out of the tree. That time I just gave up the whole business and changed my clothes and got into the car and drove back to Washington.

We finally did get the authority to go ahead with installing a battery of 155s there. And we got it installed the evening before a German submarine surfaced right near and opened fire on the refineries, which we were successful in driving off. But it was that close a squeak. And it was the greatest refinery, I believe, even greater than Abadan [Iran], in the world at that time.

I might add that I had occasion to tell this story to King George. I saw him frequently then. Mr. Churchill would very often have King George to dinner at 10 Downing Street in his cellar where he had his cozy little nest, and we would have his deputy chief of staff who was the Labor leader—who later became chief of staff of Great Britain—Attlee—who became quite a friend of mine. It would be Mr. Churchill and Attlee and King George and

myself, just the four of us as a rule, and on one of these occasions I had occasion to tell this description of my running up and down the tree which struck the King as very funny, and he made me tell it on two other occasions I know and it got rather worn down in the telling.

171. Do you have any statement about the skill with which Admiral Leahy handled his task as ambassador to Vichy France?

I have no answer to that.

172. Do you feel that the Liaison Board, consisting of Sumner Welles, Colonel Knox, Secretary Hull, Admiral Stark and yourself, functioned well? Would you record a paragraph or so about each of these men which I could use in the book and add any other comments you might not wish published?

In regard to the Liaison Board, it didn't do much, but it did serve to get things together, and I think its principal service was probably in bringing the conceptions of Sumner Welles as well as our own, but Sumner Welles in particular, in contact with the secretary of state. He and the secretary weren't together very much on these matters, and I don't know how much they talked together. And I think the president talked very much more to Sumner Welles than he did to the secretary of state. So in that respect they probably did some good, and a conversation with a group like that always did good. (My memory has gotten a little tricky here because my thoughts were largely that the meetings were between the secretary of state—Hull—Knox, Stimson, Stark, and myself.)

My trouble in going to these meetings I remember was—and I think maybe I have told this—was that Mr. Hull had a very warm office and they generally occurred in the afternoon, the meetings, and he talked in a rather drawling voice. Mr. Stimson talked in a rather drawling voice, except when he was mad, and Colonel Knox didn't talk so much. And we military end of it hardly talked at all. And one afternoon there was a very prolonged, drawn-out affair—I fell asleep. I just couldn't keep awake and right in the middle of that Mr. Hull spoke up for one of the first times and said, "General Marshall, what do you think about that?"

Well, that woke me up, and I had a second to think of what I should do and I finally decided I would be honest and I said, "To tell the truth, Mr. Hull, I was sound asleep." And he was very nice to me—he didn't get offended, and he might have well cherished that against me indefinitely.

173. What was your impression of Wendell Willkie? Did you feel that he played an important part in creating unity among Americans prior to World War II?

I don't know about Wendell Willkie producing unity among the Americans. I know that the president worked with him and he worked with the president. My trouble with Wendell Willkie was he reflected the re-

actions of the person right next to him and that got us into very difficult things out in China—difficult situations.

174. *Did you have any part in the destroyer-base deal?*

My only recollection that the destroyer-base deal occurred when we were arguing it out before Congress and when we were struggling with what we should build in each of these base areas we took over, and we had a considerable construction program in mind, or rather the planners did, and Mr. Roosevelt turned them all down and made us put up very temporary buildings, and he was exactly right and the War Department was wrong.

175. *I have been told that General Embick was called in on a number of White House conferences in the 1940–41 period because he had been commander of army troops near Warm Springs and was the general officer best known to President Roosevelt in that period. Any comment on this?*

General Embick was the name I was searching for before when I couldn't give it, and he was never in command at Warm Springs. He was deputy chief of staff and came into intimate contact with the president in discussing some of these things as deputy chief of staff. He was a Coast Artilleryman. He was best known at that time for his designs for the defenses on Corregidor. But he was a very able, analytical man, and Mr. Roosevelt had great confidence in his opinions. I used him afterwards as the chairman of the special committee which the chiefs of staff could turn over to study various things and to report to us what in their opinions was the right action to take.

176. *I was told recently of a statement by two businessmen that President Roosevelt deliberately kept the nation unarmed prior to 1940 in the hope that we would be attacked and then the country would have to reelect him. Do you have any comment on this?*

The question of Mr. Roosevelt deliberately leaving the nation unarmed in the hope that it would be attacked is too silly for me to comment on. His struggle was to get the country in a state of mind where they would support the Congress in appropriations which were necessary to any of the necessities of military preparations. And it was a long battle before he could get enough support to feel in a position that he dared ask for large appropriations. I felt here that I got a vision of the political necessities that had to be considered in what he did. And it took a long time to work up a backing for Congress, and they had to have the backing to do the things that were necessary in the way of getting vast appropriations. I think I have already made my comment on this remark. To me it was just silly.

I might say in connection with the reliability of the people concerned, I heard comments quoted to me by very prominent citizens of Boston

about Mr. Stimson. They were worse than silly. They were almost criminal. So you can't take that. Maybe the man was all right when he was talking about banking, but he was completely, teetotally, and outrageously wrong when he was talking about a man of the high honor and experience of Mr. Stimson.

177. Do you know of any action by President Roosevelt or by any military or political leader during the 1939-42 period which for the purpose of gaining political advantage deliberately exposed this country to attack?

No!

178. You have told me that the period 1939-41 was the hardest part of the war for you. What do you consider was the most trying time for the Allied cause generally? (a) Just after the fall of France? (b) At the end of 1940? (c) Shortly before the invasion of Russia? (d) In the fall of 1941 when the Germans were sweeping through Russia? (e) In the period between Pearl Harbor and Midway?

The most trying time for the Allies was getting through the period—I am speaking of the Allies assuming that you mean while we were one of the Allies—was getting through the period 1942 when we were deficient in everything, and when the pressures were greatest, and when the necessity of our going on the offensive was most imperative. If you will recollect, I think the Guadalcanal action was the first offensive operation in the Pacific, and the Africa operation was the first offensive operation on the European side, when we moved into North Africa. In all these things we had to do them on a shoestring. We were short of literally everything. And then we were in great tribulations afterwards to support the position that we had moved into. We knew this would be the case. We had to accept it. And we were forced continually to sit and listen without explaining it, because we couldn't give that to the Nazi information services.

Of course, there was a moment after the fall of France and Dunkirk when it looked like the end was pretty near on us, but we were not even in the war then. I remember going to see the British ambassador—he died later. I have forgotten his name [Lord Lothian] but he asked me to come over to see him. And I came into the Embassy which has those life-sized paintings of Queen Alexandra and the King—Edward. And looking at all that splendid setting, which was purposely splendid for the purpose of the British Empire, and realizing that it looked almost like the die was cast with the crash of the British Empire, when that remarkable escape from Dunkirk was carried out by the spirit of the people.

Of course, the period between Pearl Harbor and Midway was the most critical in the Pacific. And there, by a very fortunate series of events, and by very superb action by the navy and its air—its ships were pretty much crippled at the time—the dominance of the Pacific was recaptured by the navy. We had army air in it, but they were very small numbers. There was

some Marine air in it, some army air in the defense of Midway. But those were super-critical moments. Then there was another period when it looked like, in the naval actions around Guadalcanal, that the American navy had been critically defeated, but when daylight came and matters straightened out, the Japanese had been critically defeated. Those were very, very trying moments all the way through.

When the Russians [*Germans*] moved down and were in the position that the British chief of staff felt threatened Abadan—there again was a very critical period. And, of course, the—I think that's enough of that.

179. Comments on personalities. In a number of your answers you have made clear your feeling and judgment about several commanders or public figures. I wonder, however, if you would record on the following people a paragraph or so in which you make clear what you feel their contribution was. In some cases you may want to add other material which you do not want printed.

In the case of American officers, I would be pleased if, among other things, you would indicate where you first met the officer, and if you selected him for the post he had during the war or appointed him at someone else's suggestion.

What is your opinion of the contribution to American victory of the following officers? In what did they excel? Where do you feel they might have done better (this may not be applicable to most)?

Eichelberger, Krueger, Buckner, Hodges, Simpson, Mark Clark, Patch, Truscott, Devers, Spaatz, Eaker, Doolittle, Collins, Ridgway, Eddy, Maxwell Taylor, Bedell Smith, Halifax, Attlee, King George.

In the list you give me of American leaders beginning with Eichelberger and Krueger, Buckner, Hodges, and so on—I would not wish to comment unless I decide later on that I care to dignify two or three as being the outstanding men, and I don't know as I would do that. But I certainly don't intend to characterize each one of these because your book would be searched for that, and the contentions and discussions and debates and criticisms would be entirely involved in that rather than in the contents of the book. Of course, Mountbatten and Wavell and Alexander interest me greatly, and I could say one or two interesting things about General Antonov, the Russian—the principal one being we had to work together quite a bit, or try to get together—but when I was in Moscow and they had a reception for us, that is for myself and the British foreign secretary and the French foreign secretary, Antonov did not dare even to come up and speak to me, though he was at the reception.

You asked several questions in your letter of February 18. I will undertake to answer them now.

1. I still can't answer you about the Russian base in the Far East that was under discussion at Potsdam. It's the largest city in that section—you might say the extension of the railroad down to, no, I should get the map and look at it, but it's the large city up there. It does not have an open port,

I don't think, in the winter, although it may have. I got involved with the word Petrograd and that tied me up. But it begins with a P. I might say that this put the Russians on this peninsula that sticks out to the city only a short distance across the water from Northern Japan—Sakhalin Islands in there—and I was very much interested when I made a secret visit to . . . (Sgt. Heffner: Come in. Keep talking.) Come in, come in, come in. Pardon me for not getting up. I'll tell Katherine you're here, and I'll finish just a sentence or two and then I'm done. I've been talking for about an hour and a half. Will you see about Mrs. Marshall and turn that off?

I've lost track of what I was just saying, so I will start again. Vladivostok was the name of the place that I've been searching for and a caller, a lady, just came in and provided me what I didn't know myself. I was interested when I went on that rather secret visit to Korea while I was secretary of defense and nobody knew I was going to be there until I was actually on the ground. We picked up in the cryptographic interceptions the Russian commander's reaction to my visit to Korea and he moved seven divisions in the vicinity of Vladivostok. Four were mechanized divisions and three were infantry divisions. And I thought that was rather complimentary if I could stir up that large a troop movement by just taking a visit out to see the place. But this was Vladivostok. (And the other day when I was searching for the name of a place where the navy wished to get a small group stationed in, it was Vladivostok.) And that, of course, was very important to us because the peninsula there is just across the straits from Japan, closer almost than the British Channel separates them from France.

Your statement regarding Wickersham is correct. He was the man I was referring to. (See p. 452.)

The Bell for Adano was the book I was referring to in relation to Patton and Sicily. (See p. 455.)

I think this covers all the immediate questions.

I got your comments in which you seem to agree with me that I should not comment in an evaluation of these various commanders, British and American and so on, and some of the civil officials. I think I can comment more on some of the civil officials, provided they aren't Americans, than I could about the others. But I'm quite convinced that if I get with this, the book or whatever part these come into will be studied by the critics largely in various dissensions regarding my view on this officer and that officer, rather than on what the records of the main affair is, so I am going to keep out of it until I manage to center on one or two that I want particularly to admire.

We haven't got any questions up there, have we? (Sgt. Heffner: No, sir, we haven't.) I'm going to start very shortly, in my moments when I am not tied up in your questions, with discussions about some of my prewar

activities and experiences clear back into my home and schooling and things of that matter which I haven't touched at all yet. I've been struggling with the business, not knowing what to go into. The thing could be immensely elaborate. I only wanted to be very brief. The great question is—it's like the very simple lady's dress is always the most expensive. This is the hardest decision to make. Until I have a rough idea in my mind of those matters, I'm going to have some trouble in getting started on it. Once I get started, I think I can go very quickly on that. But I think we've got to be careful that we don't become involved in this matter very largely in things of this kind, because it involves too much of a book—too much of reading and nobody will ever go through it unless they consider it merely as a book of reference.

That is all that I've got right now.