



## *Facets of Command*

**A** COMMANDER, Marshall had long ago decided, must be many-sided. He must be fair and generous to those under him, yet ruthless if need be. Strict in his own conduct, he had to have a knack for public relations and master the art of winning the support of colleagues and subordinates. Keeping his commanders in line, working for congressional support, cultivating the men in charge of war production, gaining the backing of the press, and winning endorsement for his programs from the President, the Chief of Staff worked constantly to maintain his authority and to strengthen the position of the Army. Apart from occasional bitterness from those who could not accept his stern sense of justice, he kept the respect and often affection of most of those with whom he worked in the critical war years.

From the beginning of his tour of duty as Chief of Staff, Marshall demanded that his subordinates in Washington and in the field work harmoniously with members of the other services, and on the outbreak of war he extended that injunction to include their relationships with America's allies. Some well-publicized cases exemplify his ruthlessness when his wishes were ignored.

In 1942 Marshall had the disagreeable task of ordering home from Iran an old friend, Major General John N. Greely. Late in 1941 Greely had been selected to head a mission to assist with Lend-Lease shipments to the Soviet Union. Delayed in Iran while awaiting visas from Moscow, he spent several frustrating months as the status of his mission was being reviewed. Ultimately, as a result of poor coordination between the State and War departments and the reluctance of the Russians to admit the mission, the group was dissolved. Greely then proposed that he be made head of the Army Mission to Iran in the place of Brigadier General R. A. Wheeler, who had been sent to Stilwell's staff in India. He was again disappointed when Wheeler's second in command was selected to take his place.<sup>1</sup>

At the time of the dissolution of the mission the Iranian government was seeking an American officer to act as intendand general of its Army, and Greely was appointed. When the General was told to await further instructions, he radioed the War Department that if he remained in Iran, he expected to assume command of all U.S. personnel and activities there. Marshall promptly instructed Greely to take no such authority. Soon afterward the U.S. Minister to Iran complained to Secretary of State Cordell Hull that "Greely's activities have now departed from realm of harmless interference and entered field of international politics." Already under orders to return to Washington for consultation, Greely left Tehran August 2. Although War Department representatives discussed his return as head of a mission with State Department officials later in the month and won their agreement to accept him—if there was no one else available and provided he was carefully instructed as to the limitations on his functions—he did not go back. It seems likely that Marshall made the final decision. Of his recall the official Army historian, T. H. Vail Motter, has recorded: "His [Greely's] impatience in the face of what appeared to him to be indecision and fence-walking in time of national emergency disregarded the principle of due consultation with, and specific approval by, those whose business it was to view the war in global perspective. What Greely proposed to do in 1942 was judged by the policy-makers to be premature and impracticable under the co-operative conditions in existence in the Persian Corridor. Therefore, General Greely had to go, and events had to unroll more slowly." 2

The second episode, which also occurred in 1942, concerned an appointment that was canceled when Marshall became convinced that his prospective appointee would work poorly with officers of another nationality. The question arose during the summer, when General MacArthur suggested that the time had probably come to form an American corps headquarters in the Southwest Pacific. General Marshall agreed and suggested for its commander Major General Robert C. Richardson, Jr., a senior officer who had handled War Department press relations and was then on a trip to the Southwest Pacific. Richardson, noted for his firm opinions, soon balked at the suggestion that he serve under Australian General Thomas A. Blamey, MacArthur's Allied Land Forces commander. Richardson indicated that Blamey was not capable of handling such an assignment and hinted that the arrangement would be unacceptable to the American public once it became known. Marshall retorted that under the circumstances Richardson was not the proper man for the command. When the officer showed signs of reconsidering, Marshall declined to listen and instead suggested to MacArthur the name of Major General Robert L. Eichelberger. Although Richardson later complained that Marshall refused to hear his arguments, he fared better than Greely, getting the important Hawaiian Command.<sup>3</sup>

These and other reliefs or reprimands were balanced by advancement

and high praise for officers who worked well with other services and other nationalities. Taking to heart Marshall's insistence on cooperating closely with Allies, Eisenhower and Bradley were rewarded with new responsibilities and increased rank.

A third case history illustrates how Marshall kept his eye on those who demonstrated loyalty and capability. In 1941 Major General Daniel Van Voorhis, head of the Caribbean Defense Command, set up by General Marshall to provide greater unity in that area, irritated the Chief of Staff by his disagreements with the Air Forces commander, Major General Frank M. Andrews. Despite Marshall's earlier warning that coordination with the Army Air Forces was exceedingly important and required "very special treatment" and that he had sent Andrews so that "a very competent man" would be available for that purpose, Van Voorhis continued to differ with his colleague. When Andrews finally convinced the Chief of Staff that Van Voorhis was improperly handling air matters, Marshall shifted the Caribbean commander to the Fifth Corps Area and appointed Andrews as his successor.<sup>4</sup>

The death of General Andrews in May 1943 in an air crash near Iceland at a crucial period in the conflict was both a public and a personal tragedy for Marshall. When Marshall came to the War Department as Chief of War Plans, in the fall of 1938, Andrews was commander of General Headquarters Air Force, as a temporary major general. Marshall was deeply grateful to Andrews for his efforts to acquaint him with the role of airpower. On becoming Chief of Staff, in 1939, Marshall sent for Andrews, who had reverted to his permanent rank of colonel after completing his tour of duty at GHQ Air Force. He made Andrews a brigadier general and appointed him Chief of the G-3 Division. Andrews won Marshall's respect by his ability to work with ground-force officers. Following his tour in the Caribbean Defense Command, Andrews was sent, in turn, to the Middle East Command and then to the European Theater, where his death occurred.

In later years friends of Andrews speculated that Marshall, believing that the war in Europe would be largely fought in the air, had deliberately assigned the airman a number of difficult tasks with the aim of preparing him to lead the invasion of the Continent. But when asked in 1957 if he had been deliberately building Andrews up for the European command, Marshall denied that this had been his specific intention. Instead he had been testing him in many positions, promoting him as he showed that he could handle the responsibilities entrusted to him. "If he had not succeeded, he would not have advanced," the Chief of Staff declared.

Marshall's close personal interest in field commanders continued throughout the war. Although he relied heavily on Arnold, McNair, and Somervell for recommendations on commanders in their particular jurisdictions, he kept his own book on performances. In addition to officers such as Bradley, Patton, Stilwell, Collins, and Clark, with whose careers

he had been familiar over the years, he watched others whom he saw on maneuvers or at special inspections. After a number of officers had gained experience in the field in the Pacific and North Africa, he agreed with the theater commanders that their top officers should be men who had proved their mettle in combat. In time he directed that no man should lead a corps in action who had not had battle experience. By 1944 Marshall was insisting that at least 50 per cent of the vacancies in junior-officer ranks should be filled by direct commissioning of outstanding noncommissioned officers.

As he went through the lists he had solicited, his sharp eye caught names of men of whose past records he disapproved. On one occasion he overruled promotion for a colonel who had disclosed details of an approaching attack in a letter to his wife. The officer had made retribution certain by saying that he hoped his letter would not be checked by the censor or he would be in trouble. In another case Marshall wrote caustically to Eisenhower that a colonel he had proposed for brigadier-general rank had once been relieved from regimental command for maltreatment of his men. Later the same officer, when reproved for giving classified information to civilians, had replied flamboyantly, "The redundant phrases of the administrative reprimand may be a delight to War Department clerks but they choke with disgust a field soldier." For this he received a reprimand, about which Marshall wrote: "Incidentally, this last did not come to my attention or it would have been something other than a reprimand. Do you still feel that this man should be honored with high command?" In both cases the sponsoring commanders reiterated the request for promotion. The first was never approved; the second ultimately was.

Two letters, taken at random, show General Marshall's sympathies with officers and men who had received less than their due. He wrote Bedell Smith in the spring of 1943 of the brother of an old friend—with distinguished family connections—who had enlisted in the Canadian Army at the age of forty and then had transferred to the United States Army in 1942. He asked Smith to check on the case, adding: "I do this because it is a blessed relief to find a man of his years and background who is apparently cheerfully serving in a lowly status and not stirring up pressures to win for himself preferential treatment."<sup>5</sup>

A few days earlier he had written feelingly of Major General George Grunert, who, because he was filling a secret assignment in connection with mobilization planning, appeared to his friends to have been demoted. At the moment there was nothing Marshall could say publicly, but at least he could set the record straight: "Grunert has had some very hard knocks and has taken them all in a most soldierly fashion; his being superseded in the Philippines by MacArthur and his return to the States; his relief from an Army Corps because of age; his withdrawal from a Corps Area Command and its independence because . . . his services were more important here . . . and now, so far as his friends can see, he

is dropped out of a high level position into something else which he cannot even talk about." <sup>6</sup>

Critics sometimes charged that Marshall made snap judgments on officers who were lucky enough to impress him on one occasion and thereafter never measured up to his expectations. His personal files show that his views on subordinates were by no means static. One division commander whose rise was due to his adept handling of a particular situation that Marshall observed made the mistake of overpublicizing his activities. When he forwarded the third folder of unit newspapers devoted to his exploits, the Chief of Staff marked through a letter of congratulations drafted by his staff, grimly commenting that the man engaged in too much self-advertisement. The officer kept his command, but he never went higher. After learning that an officer whose advancement he had backed had been lobbying for promotion, Marshall curtly voiced his disenchantment: "Unfortunately after a time ambition set in and he became too much concerned with his own career." Still another drew disapproval because the man's wife had become demanding and dictatorial after her husband's promotion. "Unfortunately," he observed, "I had not seen her before I pushed him up and she caused a great deal of trouble with other wives."

In only a few cases did Marshall reject the recommendations of a theater commander. He queried Eisenhower when he listed Patton, Third Army commander, for an extra star ahead of the 6th Army Group commander, Devers. Marshall made clear that if this went through, he would have to relieve Devers since Patton's promotion under the circumstances would destroy the former's usefulness.

Roosevelt's personal dislike for certain officers sometimes embarrassed the War Department. Deeply angered by the strong isolationist campaign carried on before Pearl Harbor by Charles Lindbergh, a Reserve colonel in the Air Corps, the President opposed the flier's request to go on active duty after war was declared. General Arnold, head of the Army Air Forces, was convinced that he badly needed the airman's experience and advice, and with Marshall's knowledge he arranged to use Lindbergh as a consultant.

Indirectly tied to the Lindbergh episode was the case of Colonel Truman Smith. Smith, who had been an instructor under Marshall at Fort Benning, continued as military attaché in Berlin in the 1930s to keep in touch with the future Chief of Staff. He correctly forecast German preparations for war and German strength. But he fell afoul of the White House and American public opinion by arranging for Lindbergh to be received by German Air Marshal Hermann Goring and to inspect German airplane factories, on a visit culminating with the American flier's acceptance of a German decoration for his air exploits.<sup>7</sup>

Retired from active duty for health reasons not long before Pearl Harbor, Smith was called back by Marshall soon after the war began. Like

most of the G-2 officers who dealt with European matters, Smith was strongly impressed by German power. He and his colleagues doubted the staying qualities of the Soviet Union. At a point when it appeared that Britain might lose the Middle East and Russia might be defeated, Stimson directed the Intelligence Division to cease circulation of its pessimistic reports. Marshall hotly defended his experts and in time persuaded Stimson to help him support Smith at the White House. Despite these efforts Marshall concluded that it would be impossible to get approval for general-officer rank for Smith. Completely confident of the G-2 officer's ability, Marshall told him in the fall of 1943 that if he went to London, he wanted him there on his staff. He kept the colonel in his War Department billet until the war's end and saw that he was decorated for his work. Learning that Smith could not earn proper retirement credit unless he served until the following year, the Chief of Staff arranged for him to be held on active duty until 1946.

Aware of Roosevelt's deep antipathy for members of the America First movement, which until Pearl Harbor had fiercely opposed the administration's aid to Britain and the Soviet Union, General Marshall usually kept the White House informed when he made use of men who had been active isolationists. Thus, when Major General Robert E. Wood, head of Sears, Roebuck and a leading figure in the America First Committee, was called on to handle major supply problems, the Chief of Staff informed Roosevelt, adding that Wood was doing an excellent job. There is no record of a reply.

Although fully cognizant of the important role played by National Guard officers and willing to make use of those whose experience had prepared them for high-level command, Marshall and Stimson were averse to placing units in the field under any National Guardsmen whose chief service had been in politics. One of Marshall's tasks during the war lay in finding posts for such commanders where they could contribute to the war effort without running the risk of failure in combat. He agonized over some reliefs, recognizing the terrible blow they inflicted on the officers involved. To a former major general who lost his divisional command, he wrote: "I can thoroughly understand, I think, your feelings in the matter and I regretted throughout the period of hostilities that such action had to be taken from time to time in the public interest. War is terrible at best and the battle losses can never be recovered, but sometimes I think it is harder to bear your particular loss than any other." <sup>8</sup>

The Chief of Staff was not always sympathetic. One Regular Army officer relieved in Europe undertook a fight for reinstatement, even forwarding letters from civilians abroad testifying to his ability. Marshall dismissed his plea, saying later, "Can you imagine him asking for references from local French officials?" Although he was often caustic in regard to those who pressed too hard for vindication, he had a soft place in his heart for those who survived reprimands. When George Patton, who had come

near relief in the spring of 1944 for his ill-considered remarks at a meeting in Great Britain, drove forward to Bastogne near Christmas 1944, Marshall watched his progress with delight "Don't you love to see a man come rushing out of a doghouse?" he asked Colonel Oveta Culp Hobby<sup>9</sup>

In promoting and assigning officers Marshall usually had the sympathetic backing of the President. But occasionally, when personal or political factors were involved, both the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War felt the pressure of the White House

In one instance—concerning the appointment of the Surgeon General of the Army—Marshall felt that President Roosevelt's physician, Rear Admiral Ross T. McIntire, was interfering "This I am determinedly opposed to," he wrote Pershing.<sup>10</sup> With Stimson's help Marshall was able to block the redetail of the officer favored by the White House

A fantastic, and protracted, tug-of-war resulted when Roosevelt proposed to commission Mayor Fiorello H. La Guardia of New York a general and send him to Eisenhower's headquarters as an expert in the field of military government. The episode provides an instructive study of the means by which Stimson and Marshall could occasionally outmaneuver the President on a proposal that they considered unwise

A member of the House of Representatives when World War I began, La Guardia had gone into the Aviation Service, finishing the conflict as a major in command of the small U.S. air force on the Italian front. Shortly after La Guardia returned to his seat in Congress and served there until his defeat in 1933. A year later he was elected mayor of New York, an office he filled with great energy and ability. A vigorous and vocal opponent of fascism, he served for a time as chairman of the U.S. Section of the Canada-U.S. Joint Board of Defense and then as director of the Office of Civilian Defense. In addition he was an effective antifascist propagandist, broadcasting numerous speeches to Italy. Once Eisenhower had gone into North Africa, the mayor made strenuous efforts to get an assignment to his headquarters.

There was no question of La Guardia's qualifications for a role in military government or psychological warfare. But the Army saw other factors to consider. His waspish tongue and hot temper had angered many. As one of the top political figures in the country, he could be difficult to hold in check in an Allied military command. In addition both Stimson and Marshall firmly opposed giving direct general-officer rank to civilians.

General Marshall was brought into the discussion late in 1942, when La Guardia proposed that he and a small staff be assigned to Eisenhower's headquarters to coordinate various groups currently engaged in propaganda and psychological warfare. Seeing La Guardia's point, the Chief of Staff suggested to Eisenhower that such a move "might be a decided asset to you and at the same time relieve other members of your staff of the annoyance, confusion and loss of time attendant upon the activities of a number of semi-independent civilian agencies now in your area or about

to descend upon you, such as FCC [Federal Communications Commission], OWI [Office of War Information], BEW [Bureau of Economic Warfare], Red Cross, etc." However, before acting, he asked for Eisenhower's reaction to La Guardia and to the principle that all U.S. civilian agencies in the area be put under one man.<sup>11</sup>

The Allied commander was less than enthusiastic about the proposal. He considered it inadvisable to complicate his staff problems by bringing in the New York mayor. No one could serve as head of his civil-affairs section who had not lived through "the hectic experiences of the past few weeks," he wrote Marshall. Also he thought that the role of the State Department's Robert Murphy in the preinvasion negotiations and the period immediately following the landing made it unjustifiable to relegate him to a subordinate position. At the same time Eisenhower saw considerable merit in organizing the various propaganda and psychological-warfare units in the United States under one man. "The idea of a single staff authority over the whole gang is eminently sound and I want them all to understand it before coming over."<sup>12</sup>

The matter was additionally complicated because of the disagreement between the British and the Americans over the nature of control of civil affairs in operations that might be directed against Italian-held territories after the completion of operations in Tunisia. Even the President was not certain how far he wanted to go in this matter. When, near Christmas, the New York mayor submitted a plan for control of propaganda and civil affairs in the next phase of Mediterranean operations, the President replied that he would delay any action on the proposal (and apparently on the appointment of La Guardia) for a long time.<sup>13</sup>

La Guardia continued to press his cause, appealing to Harry Hopkins for assistance with the President. On March 16, 1943, the mayor saw Roosevelt, who indicated that he would be commissioned in April and assigned to Eisenhower's staff. But there was still the matter of a physical examination and a possible waiver of any physical disabilities. Not wishing to bring up these details with Stimson or Marshall, the President's Army aide, Major General Edwin M. ("Pa") Watson, tried one of his occasional "end run plays." Apparently hoping to flatter one of Marshall's aides into evading the technicalities without going through channels, Watson confided to Colonel McCarthy, Marshall's Secretary General Staff, that the President had personally asked that he handle La Guardia's induction into the service. He said that the affair had already been arranged with Eisenhower but should be kept very quiet. "P.S. I told President you would handle it." But McCarthy had learned earlier that attempts to bypass Marshall merely led eventually to greater difficulties. He checked with Leahy in an effort to get a more specific directive from Roosevelt. When the Admiral said that he did not want to raise the matter again, McCarthy suggested to Marshall that they draft a letter for Stimson to send the President asking exactly what he had in mind.<sup>14</sup> The White

House's hopes for an easy solution of the problem were shattered. Stimson and Marshall were now directly involved.

Soon after his return to Washington on March 24 Stimson grumbled because the President, knowing the Secretary's opposition to commissioning men from political life, had taken advantage of his absence to sound out Eisenhower on the appointment. The General, who obviously did not want the mayor on his staff at that time, agreed to take him in uniform. Although displeased by the action, Stimson recorded on the twenty-seventh that he felt less depressed than some of his colleagues because the mayor, despite his terrible tongue and temper, was "a pretty efficient little man."<sup>15</sup>

The President told Marshall shortly afterward that he had "cleared" the La Guardia business with Eisenhower and that he wanted the mayor given a physical examination with a view to commissioning him. To make certain that Roosevelt was aware of Eisenhower's real attitude toward such an appointment, the Chief of Staff reviewed the correspondence for the President in December. "Churned up" over the transaction, General Marshall discussed it at the White House on the twenty-sixth at "the tail end of an overtime interview." Next day he wrote Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy some of his objections:

I felt that under present circumstances La Guardia would provide nothing but confusion to the situation in Africa. In the first place he cannot touch propaganda because that is definitely under OWI by a recent Executive Order. In the next place, we are in a discussion now with the British in which the President takes the stand that when we go into Sicily all matters of a civil nature will be handled by a Joint British-American group without chairmanship, but merely under Eisenhower. The British feel that this is, by the President's own proposal, a British sphere of influence, at least of military responsibility. The exception in the North African set-up was made for the purpose of reducing the probability of French resistance to the landing and to the establishment of control in Morocco and Algiers. In the forthcoming affair, there is no question involved of reducing resistance. The matter under discussion is the method of organization after we take over.<sup>16</sup>

Despite Roosevelt's wish to give La Guardia one-star rank, the Chief of Staff held firm to a colonelcy. The New York mayor, while vowing that the rank made no difference and that he was willing to go as a cook in a stevedore regiment, was soon "kicking like a steer" for general's rank, according to Stimson. At the month's end Marshall informed members of his staff that the President had approved a colonelcy for La Guardia, adding that he would go to the Military Government school at Charlottesville, Virginia, for six weeks. On being told of this decision, La Guardia asked how soon he could go to North Africa.<sup>17</sup> Clearly he saw no need for additional schooling. This reaction was to be expected of a man who had long headed one of the great cities of the world. It must have been apparent to Marshall and Stimson that if they made the school requirement

stick and offered nothing more than the colonelcy, he was likely to change his mind.

Then Stimson tackled La Guardia on April 6 and hurt the Mayor's feelings—an outcome that Stimson blamed on “the weakness and happy-go-luckiness of the President.” He told La Guardia that he could be a propagandist or a soldier but not both. He proposed that the New Yorker remain as mayor and continue to broadcast appeals to the Italians. When La Guardia insisted that Eisenhower had asked for him, Stimson told him that he was mistaken. He made clear that the matter of rank had been left up to the War Department and that Marshall had decided that the colonelcy was the top opening possible.<sup>18</sup>

Much upset over La Guardia's report of developments, the President called Marshall next day. A short time later he chided Stimson for being too hard on the “Little Flower.” Marshall felt they should hold firm on a colonelcy and a short stay at Charlottesville.

Despite Stimson's arguments La Guardia again approached the White House in mid-April, leading Hopkins to ask the President to consult Stimson and Marshall once more. Roosevelt must have concluded that he had been outmaneuvered and decided for the moment to let the matter drop. At least it did not reappear during the ensuing campaign in Sicily and southern Italy. But the idea of a commission was not permanently shelved. In early September 1944 the President—probably at La Guardia's urging—suggested that the mayor be sent, in Army or Navy uniform, to the Pacific as an expert on civil affairs. It is uncertain whether the matter had been cleared with MacArthur. Marshall passed the proposal on to Stimson with the observation, “I share your belief that we now have no firm ground on which to oppose Mayor La Guardia's entry into the Army.” He did suggest that it would make relations with Congress better if the mayor entered the service as an Army colonel or Navy captain rather than as brigadier general or admiral. Next day when the President suggested that a general's commission would be preferable, Stimson countered with a warning about the difficulties that might arise because of La Guardia's temper. Apparently Roosevelt gave up at this point; at least no commission was issued to the mayor. Months later he received an appointment dealing with civil affairs—but as director general of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.<sup>19</sup>

The question of rank was again raised when the well-known Broadway producer Billy Rose asked for an Army commission. He would have certainly been satisfied with a more modest rank than La Guardia wanted, but Marshall was less generous in his case. Writing General Osborn, the Chief of the Morale Branch, that Rose wanted major's rank, he said: “I directed he be given the commission of Captain . . . and I now understand that he has declined to accept that. . . . I have felt that with his talents he could . . . [help organize] entertainment. . . . If he places

rank as of such importance . . . I have no further interest in the matter." <sup>20</sup>

Another embarrassing situation arose when Associate Justice Frank Murphy of the Supreme Court requested temporary Reserve duty outside the United States during the recess of the court. General Marshall was quite willing to arrange an assignment for a high-ranking Reserve officer who had served as governor of Michigan, high commissioner of the Philippines, and attorney general of the United States before going on the Supreme Court. Assignment had been easier in 1942 when Murphy asked merely to go to maneuvers in the United States. In March 1943, however, he proposed that he go to the Pacific. Marshall suggested that Murphy consider Alaska, the Aleutians, or Hawaii but questioned a proposed assignment to Australia in view of "his feelings regarding MacArthur while he was High Commissioner." <sup>21</sup>

Marshall's reaction settled the question for several months, but Murphy renewed his request in September, saying that he would have "no inward peace until I am a soldier in action once more." Marshall expressed appreciation of the justice's feelings, but added: "One of the most difficult things I have had to do is to subordinate my personal desires to the impartial administration of the established War Department policies." <sup>22</sup>

In the spring of 1944 Murphy appealed again to the President and to Marshall. This time he suggested that he could be helpful in Mindanao in working with Philippine guerrillas. General Marshall objected to this since the MacArthur-Murphy relationship would still be involved, but he grounded his refusal on the basis of security. It would be impossible to keep the justice's presence a secret, he argued, and it would be unwise to focus Japanese attention on an area to which the United States did not wish to call attention.

At the same time Marshall turned down Murphy's alternative proposal for the Italian theater: "As a matter of protection to the theater commanders, who are actively engaged in combat with the enemy, I have firmly opposed the idea of high government officials, including one or two of the Secretary of War's assistants, making visits to the combat area. . . . Despite General Crittenger's desire to have you, I must be consistent in my policy and tell you that from the point of view of the War Department it would be embarrassing to us for you to go Italy at this time." This settled the matter, as Murphy in his final request had anticipated Marshall's reply by saying, "I know full well that military considerations must come first and personal hopes of an old soldier, like myself, must yield to them." <sup>23</sup>

Other political figures sought to go back into military service as Reserve officers but on a different basis from Murphy's. Senator Harry S. Truman, of Missouri, a field-artillery captain in France in World War I, who had kept his Reserve commission up to date, beseeched Marshall early in the

war to call him to active duty. President Truman later related with great delight that the Chief of Staff had told him that he was "too damned old." When Truman remonstrated that Marshall was several years older, the Chief of Staff insisted that the senator was of greater value to the Army in his post as chairman of the Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program. Rather than irritating Truman, the incident strengthened his admiration of Marshall.

In the case of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, also a Reserve officer, Marshall agreed early in 1942 that he might make a special tour of duty with a U.S. tank unit attached to British units in Libya. This arrangement, while not usual, required only a short absence from the Senate. Lodge's observations were helpful to the Army, and his experience proved valuable later in his dealings with Army measures in the upper house. Re-elected in November 1942, Lodge resigned his Senate seat in early 1944 and went on active duty. With his youthful schooling in France and his thorough knowledge of the French language, he performed invaluable services as the 6th Army Group's liaison officer with the First French Army.

Soon after the Selective Service Act came into effect, Dr. Douglas S. Freeman, editor of the *Richmond News Leader* and biographer of Lee, wrote Marshall "that if worse comes to worst, and if you need any one who could recall the experiences of the Union and Confederate Armies in planning or in administration, you have only to call on me." Marshall suggested in reply that he observe the reception of the first selectees at concentration centers and report his observations to the country in several radio addresses. Dr. Freeman did not show interest in the project, and nothing came of the proposal. However shortly after the war began, Freeman—then fifty-five—said that if Marshall ever needed him, "I will quit all my jobs at any time for military service in any capacity that I can be useful." Again officers in the War Department misunderstood, and it was suggested to Marshall that the famous biographer might be interested in helping the Historical Section of the Army "commence a current collation of source material on the present war" in order to avoid a repetition of the situation regarding World War I, on which that section was still compiling data! A commission of lieutenant colonel for Freeman was held out as a possibility. Marshall correctly foresaw that the writer might not find the prospect interesting.

It was not until the summer of 1943, however, that Marshall realized that the student of the campaigns of Lee and Jackson hoped for a staff position in a foreign theater of the war.<sup>24</sup> In August 1943 Freeman told him that he had been invited to London by the British and that he hoped while there to persuade General Devers to give him "a job in the Intelligence Office at General Headquarters, England," a proposal he asked Marshall to look on "leniently and favorably." The Chief of Staff was noncommittal although he promised to keep Freeman in mind if General

Devers needed him in the United Kingdom.<sup>25</sup> Perhaps Freeman knew that there was no chance of his getting a staff role in a combat theater. At all events he accepted Marshall's reaction graciously, saying only at the end of 1943, when Eisenhower's appointment as Supreme Commander was made known, that he had hoped that if Marshall took that command "you would find a place for me, over there."

In instances involving relatives of the President and General Pershing, the Chief of Staff was pleased that his advice against special favors was followed. When President Roosevelt proposed his son-in-law, John Boettiger, for a colonel's post in military government in Italy, Marshall suggested that he go in as a captain, the rank usually given to men of his age and background, and work his way up to the higher rank. Boettiger agreed and advanced in the Chief of Staff's estimation.

In contrast, in the summer of 1944 Marshall recoiled when Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz, commanding general of U.S. Air Forces, Europe, recommended Elliott Roosevelt for general-officer rank. Recalling the blast of criticism when the President's son was given a direct commission earlier in the war, Marshall declined to consider it "in view of the inevitable reactions on the eve of the presidential election." In mid-January 1945 the President personally made the request. Marshall sent the name forward to Stimson to place on the next promotion list, with a terse note: "His command justifies the rank."<sup>26</sup>

There was no problem concerning Warren Pershing, only son of the World War I American Expeditionary Force commander. Marshall had known Warren since 1919 when the boy of ten had joined his father in France at the end of the war. Marshall had kept in touch with Warren while serving as the elder Pershing's aide. In World War II, when Warren said that he wished to enter the Army, Marshall suggested that he enter under the volunteer program whereby married men could go into basic training and then to Officer Candidate School. He made clear that Warren, as son of the General of the Armies, could have a direct commission, but he was gratified to have the young man accept the course proposed. He offered to help Warren to get into an officers' school of his choice. That the younger Pershing chose the School of Combat Engineers, a branch equal to the infantry in toughness and in danger, strengthened the Chief of Staff's position in denying special favors to others.

At the beginning of Marshall's tour of duty, Army public-relations activities were still under the G-2 Division, as they had been since World War I. In July 1940 a Press Relations Bureau was set up under Major Ward Maris, who was directly responsible to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Major General William Bryden. This bureau controlled information for the War Department; information on units outside Washington still came under G-2. It became evident that something more elaborate than the old system was needed in the fall of 1940 when the passage

of the Selective Service Act aroused great opposition in the United States. Secretary Stimson and General Marshall became convinced of the need for supplying more information on Army activities to the nation's newspapers. Secretary Stimson concluded that he must have a War Department Bureau of Public Relations directly under his control. On February 11, 1941, he named Major General Robert C. Richardson, Jr., commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, to head the bureau and authorized him to set up sections to deal with the press, radio, magazines, movies and photographs, press analysis, and the like. Stimson himself inaugurated a regular weekly news conference, held each Thursday.<sup>27</sup>

Richardson, a forceful personality, sought advice from public-relations experts in New York and recruited a number of experienced newsmen for his new bureau. At the beginning of August 1941 he returned to a field command, as he had requested when first assigned to the bureau, and was succeeded by Brigadier General Alexander Surles, who served in the post until the war's end.<sup>28</sup>

While press relations came directly under the Secretary of War and most of the regular press conferences were held by him, Marshall helped draft many of Stimson's statements or furnished copious material for his use. In addition he kept Surles's in-box filled with suggestions on ways to present the Army's story more effectively. Some days he behaved like the publisher of a large daily, sending down crisp memos on achievements by a courageous individual or brilliant performances by a particular division.

Marshall also kept the theater commanders alert to publicity topics, particularly if he had a specific project in mind. Deciding midway in the war that the Marine and Navy bands had too long dominated the martial-music scene in Washington and the nation, he directed the organization of a first-rank Army band and asked that a special effort be made to get it recognized in the press. After a time he sent the band to Europe, charging Bedell Smith with the task of advertising it by getting engagements for it in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, and he complained to him periodically that no one seemed to know that the band was there.<sup>29</sup>

At one point during the war in North Africa, Marshall became seriously concerned over the strong anti-British sentiment he perceived in the Army and among civilians in the United States. Near the end of February 1943, in a gesture that revealed a depth of sympathy and sense of justice far outweighing his own occasional antagonistic reactions, he wrote his Public Relations chief:

There continues to be an insidious business of stirring up ill-feeling between the British and us. . . . I think we should take more positive measures to offset this. Merely disputing the justifications for this or that attack gets us nowhere because the poison spreads.

It occurred to me that if you could arrange to have a short article written on the subject of, say, "Courage and Sacrifice," along the following lines it might

make a profound impression to offset the littleness of irritations and jealousies which destroy teamwork between the two nations

A very brief summary of the British ordeal from Dunkirk through the Battle of Britain, the fall of Singapore and the disaster in Libya of last June

Follow this with a generalization on the sacrifices that have been made by the high, the middle, and the low, particularly the families of the dock workers who were subjected to terrific bombing in London

This work is a summary of the losses suffered by families in high places commencing with the Duke of Kent, elaborating on the case of Lord and Lady Halifax who had one son killed some time ago, another killed in the successful fighting on the Alamein line—where Lord Halifax had to appear at a dinner on the same day he received the news of the loss of his son and Lady Halifax also had to subject herself to official meetings within a few days of this tragic news. More recently a third son has lost both legs in an explosion of a mine during the pursuit of Rommel. Again you find Lord and Lady Halifax quietly doing their duty without a word. At the same time these attacks on Great Britain are in progress, and American soldiers in this country are being stirred to a contempt for the British

Air Marshal Tedder who has just been put in charge of the Mediterranean Air Force under Eisenhower has lost a son and within the last three months lost his wife in an air crash at Bengasi—she had flown there from Cairo to organize relief work.

I feel certain that the British could give you other examples of losses suffered by families in high places and the whole certainly would make a most impressive story without the necessity of any reference to the critical attitude in this country towards the British and their fighting capacities.<sup>30</sup>

Perhaps prompted by Surles—after Marshall had asked him why more publicity had not been gained for outstanding actions overseas—the Chief of Staff on several occasions pointedly demanded of General Eisenhower or General MacArthur why they had not given greater play in press reports to certain units. His dissatisfaction with coverage in the Pacific came to a head in the fall of 1944 after he had asked *Time* magazine to do a special story on the fighting along the northern coast of New Guinea. Feeling that this sector was being neglected in favor of operations on Guam and Saipan, he had proposed an article describing the nature of the New Guinea campaign—the great distances covered, the domination established over the Japanese, and the small number of casualties suffered. “I could not get an article of the character desired,” he declared to MacArthur. “All of which leads me to this suggestion, that your public relations people give us more names, otherwise you can expect much less of desirable credits for your command than would otherwise be the case.” He commented that he had found it necessary to take the same line with commanders in France and Italy, where “the results have been quite remarkable but the releases were not given over there until I pressed them in the interest of general morale of the troops themselves who follow the accounts so carefully.”<sup>31</sup>

Hand in hand with the selection and training of officers and men went the task of persuading Congress to pass legislation needed to get military

manpower, production of arms and materiel, military facilities, and the like. Marshall was his own best advocate in dealing with Congress. He already had an assured reputation for persuasive presentations before congressional committees, particularly in the period before Pearl Harbor. His efforts were reinforced by a brilliant Legislative and Liaison Division staff that had developed. When Stimson succeeded Harry H. Woodring as Secretary of War in 1940, General Marshall transferred to his own office Colonel Wilton B. Persons, who had handled congressional liaison for the Assistant Secretary of War and then for Woodring since 1934. An Alabamian, Persons had a diplomat's skill and the ability to lose himself in his superior's cause, which made him highly effective in working both for General Marshall and, subsequently, for General Eisenhower, as it had in his earlier service.

"General Marshall's instructions to me were brief," General Persons recalled thirty years later. "I was to keep in mind that he was somewhat closed in by the four walls of his office and that he depended on me to bring directly to him everything of importance that occurred on Capitol Hill which might affect the Army." Persons was also expected to inform the Secretary of War and the Deputy Chief of Staff of matters that affected them. By reporting to Marshall each morning, unless a question had to go to him at once, Persons kept his chief thoroughly aware of the temper of Congress.<sup>32</sup> Careful biographical sheets were drawn up on key members of the two houses, and an analysis was made of their attitudes toward the Army, their pet projects, and their backgrounds. It was thus possible for Marshall and his staff to be aware of subtle undertones of opinion in approaching individual congressmen and committees.<sup>33</sup>

In obtaining appropriations the Chief of Staff was aided by a skilled Budget Division, headed throughout the war by Brigadier General George J. Richards, a classmate of Eisenhower and Bradley at West Point. Following General Marshall's practice of candor with members of Congress, Richards developed excellent relations with such key members of House and Senate appropriations committees as Clarence Cannon and George Mahon in the Lower House and Kenneth McKellar in the Senate.

Both the liaison and budget officers, while eager to satisfy the wishes of congressional leaders, did not sway with every political breeze. They were aware that General Marshall would not hand over secret documents on demand to powerful senators and that he would not reshape Army programs to suit the political pressures of leaders on the Hill. As a realist, Marshall was willing to bend to political requirements if the location of a camp was equally satisfactory in Arkansas or Tennessee, but he refused to shift an Army facility or a division simply because the move would aid a deserving Democrat over a Republican opponent. The War Department succeeded in this policy because it obviously refused to play politics and because members of Congress agreed with Marshall that the main objective was to win the war. In taking this determined stand, he nonetheless

satisfied most congressmen that the Army was attentive to the wishes of Congress as a whole and that it recognized civilian control. But once given the task of carrying out a certain policy, Marshall believed that he had his own obligations to the state.<sup>34</sup>

In speaking later of the General's influence with Congress, Speaker Sam Rayburn declared: "He has the presence of a great man. He doesn't dissemble. (If a man dissembles before the House of Representatives, he is ruined. The committees have no respect for that kind of man.) Marshall was simple, able, candid. He laid it on the line. He would tell the truth even if it hurt his cause. Congress always respected him. They would give him things they would give no one else."<sup>35</sup>

Representative Emanuel Celler voiced a typical congressional reaction late in 1943 after General Marshall had given one of his periodic briefings to members of Congress. Celler wrote: "I was indeed much impressed with your statement this morning. . . . I am sure that I and my colleagues will back you to the hilt." Thanking him for his gracious note, the Chief of Staff replied: "It is very reassuring to me. My experience has been that where the opportunity was presented for expressing matters to the Congress invariably I receive strong backing. The difficulty of the past, particularly before we entered the war, was the fact that much of what we knew, for several sound reasons, could not be declared, all of which proved a great embarrassment in getting forward with our program."<sup>36</sup> Marshall had hit the salient point with his emphasis on freedom to explain fully. It was there that he stood out among all his military colleagues. Harvey H. Bundy, one of Stimson's special assistants, expressed it this way: "I think he [Marshall] had great analytical powers. . . . I think he had great clarity of expression . . . . He was a great Army officer. He knew his stuff. I don't know how to explain it, but when Marshall spoke, when Marshall decided, I had a strong feeling that men around him said, 'That's it.' . . . I have heard him talk . . . and he was a very great advocate, I thought, largely because he just knew his stuff. As a human being he was a most disarming man."<sup>37</sup>

Another staff member, General Osborn, who watched Marshall in action during the war and later in the State Department, put it even more strongly:

I was at Princeton when Woodrow Wilson was President [there]. My family and I knew him quite well. And I knew Theodore Roosevelt, because he was a friend of the family since [I was] a small boy . . . . And I knew Franklin Roosevelt well, and I knew Grover Cleveland very well (his daughters were just my age and he had retired and lived in Princeton) . . . [but] I never had any such impression from any of them as I always had of General Marshall. I had always the sense that I was in the presence of a man who was altogether my superior [in character and intellect] . . . and in the clarity and lucidity of his mind and his tremendous control over himself, and his tremendous determination. When he came to the conclusion that something should be done, he said it with such a firmness and with such solidity that you just agreed with him.

You knew he was right. . . . There was something that gave you a tremendous sense of loyalty to his purposes and a desire to help him fulfill his purposes and also gave you a standard of conduct to aim at, just as Mr. Stimson did. . . . General Marshall had not only that standard of character but an ability to express it that Mr. Stimson lacked entirely. General Marshall was a very, very powerful and moving speaker. I heard Woodrow Wilson at his best. I heard William Jennings Bryan at almost his best, but none of them could hold a candle to General Marshall when he wanted to make people do things.<sup>38</sup>

In 1956, speaking of his experiences with Congress, General Marshall observed that between wars the military committees of Congress were often severe in their criticism of the Army, and War Department officials didn't protect their representatives. "I felt that the War Department didn't show any backbone at all. This is rather embarrassing for me because it seems immodest but I swore when I got up there that I wasn't going to have any of that damn business, and I carried the flag when we went before the committees of Congress and I just wouldn't swallow the stuff they were trying to put out. . . . There is bound to be deterioration [in the staff] where there is no active responsibility." He contrasted his position as Chief of Staff with that of his successors in the postwar period: "He [the Chief of Staff] has so many over him—I don't know how many assistant secretaries he's got, undersecretaries and secretaries, and his power is so reduced that he is kept busy explaining things. He just isn't able to stride into Congress and defend himself."<sup>39</sup>

Marshall's skill in dealing with Congress was matched by his ability to win the respect of leading industrialists. In one sense the forging of the relationship between the armed forces and industry that a later generation came to know as the "military-industrial complex" developed to a great degree in World War II. One of the prominent leaders in this development in the 1939-40 period was General Marshall.<sup>40</sup>

The cooperation of business and military leaders goes back, of course, to the beginning of modern technology. Since the Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War, the steel manufacturer, the railroad manager, and the purveyor of armaments and materiel have had to work together in wartime. Adequate food supplies, arms, and transportation helped make victory possible for the North in the Civil War. Although U.S. industry fell below hoped-for rates of production of arms for the Army's use in World War I, it was instrumental in equipping a large expeditionary force. In the period between the two world wars there was sufficient activity by American shipbuilders and manufacturers of ammunition and rifles for several to be condemned along with Krupp, Skoda, and others as "merchants of death."

The Great Depression and its accompanying development of antibusiness sentiment, the prolabor policy of the Roosevelt administration, and a general antiwar feeling in the late 1930s all made business extremely reluctant to go into large-scale production of materiel for the armed forces.

Fear by Roosevelt-haters that he would use a war situation to gain strong government control over factories and profits drove many businessmen into the powerful America First movement as Europe drifted toward war.

Despite this deep distrust among some business leaders many others in the late 1930s and early 1940s were prepared to work with the armed forces. The first step in the War Department was apparently taken by Assistant Secretary of War Louis A. Johnson, who approached Charles R. Hook, head of the Armco Steel Corporation, of Middletown, Ohio, and president of the National Association of Manufacturers, with the suggestion that he appoint a small committee to discuss defense needs with the service secretaries, General Marshall, Admiral Harold R. Stark, and other officials in Washington. Hook appointed two friends, Frederick V. Geier of the Cincinnati Milling Machine Company and James Francis, president of the Island Creek Coal Company, Charleston, West Virginia, to work with him.

Years after the first meeting of the committee in Washington, on the morning of November 2, 1939, Geier described the impact of the Chief of Staff's personality:

He had no work papers on the desk, his mind was apparently completely free and open to attack a new subject, completely uncluttered, unhurried, or unhastened, and he showed a very keen interest in the viewpoint that we expressed, that here was industry about to make itself available in whatever problems [were to come]. He took out of his desk some papers which showed on a large diagram . . . the forces of the Army on paper, and then by symbols and by colors it indicated the degree [to] which it was merely paper, or whether there was some skeleton staff organization, or some skeleton cadre of men, and in the same way it indicated the presence of or the lack of the basic weapons and supplies that would go with that kind of military unit.

I remember very clearly he said, "My problem is to bring home to others in government and to Congress from the standpoint of appropriations that a military organization on paper is one thing and entirely different from an organization that has all supplies, equipment, and the things that are needed for an active organization." He said, "The Navy has been much more successful than we have, because when they, in the past, have gotten appropriations for a battleship, it had all the guns that went with it and all the ammunition, and was a complete operating unit capable of going into action . . ." An authorization for a division didn't mean anything unless it was also accompanied by all the military equipment . . . required for it. He said in the past that had not been done . . . As I recall, we merely [indicated whom] we represented, what kind of industry, and that industry was anxious to help if they would only tell us where and how and what we could do.<sup>41</sup>

After talking with Marshall and Secretary of the Navy Charles Edison, the visitors returned for a second discussion with Louis Johnson. He suggested that Hook now pick a larger group of business representatives and indicate to them privately that there would soon be demands on them and that they should be ready. He thought that once the members of the group had been picked, it would be well to have Edward R. Stettinius,

Jr, then chairman of the board of the United States Steel Corporation, come before them and impress on them the importance of planning for large-scale production and the need for secrecy.

Hook followed up this discussion in the spring of 1940 at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Association of Manufacturers. A debate developed over efforts to place the association on record against increased aid to the Allies. Despite a strong isolationist fight led by General Wood of Sears, Roebuck, Hook managed to poll almost an equal vote for the other side and to win a motion to table the proposal.<sup>42</sup>

Once the United States entered the war, General Marshall's role in increasing armaments production diminished. Undersecretary of War Patterson and General Somervell assumed the chief responsibilities in this field.<sup>43</sup> However Marshall went regularly to meetings of the Commerce Department's Business Advisory Council to brief industrial leaders on defense needs and to spur them to greater cooperation with the government. Hook's opinion, based on his experiences as head of the National Association of Manufacturers, was that Marshall enjoyed the "great confidence" of leading businessmen. "Because," he recalled, "when you [talked] to the General, you realized that his whole heart and soul was in what was best for the United States and what we had to do to protect our interests and to build up our security." Geier stressed another point: "What impressed me about General Marshall was that his mind did not run along purely military lines. He had an immediate grasp of the industrial and preparedness problems, which were not understood by some other people in Washington. They didn't realize that you just can't go out and buy something and have it overnight. In some cases you had to design machines to build things, and you had to tune those machines up and you had a long cycle. [For example] take the cycle of the Garand rifle—I think it was something like seven years from the time it was started until it got into real production . . . General Marshall seemed to have a plastic mind where he could grasp some of those things that were completely foreign to the line of experience he had before."<sup>44</sup>

Both men recalled Marshall's total lack of arrogance. "He was a very humble sort of man. He was no stuffed shirt. He just treated us . . . in a very friendly and informal manner." After the end of the war he continued to attend the council's sessions. "He would go to a council meeting," one member said, marveling, "and he might sit down with anybody . . . for breakfast or lunch . . . or in the lobby or in the meetings just like any other member. He was a very approachable man." His accessibility and his ability to summarize the international situation impressed most who met him, and Geier spoke for other businessmen when he declared, "I was very much impressed by the fact that here is a man who has the capacity to take a complex problem and resolve it into its basic simple elements."

Years later, during the attack on his China Mission activities, Marshall

kept the confidence of most of the business leaders with whom he had worked during the war. Hook expressed the view of many of his associates when he summed up what he considered to be Marshall's chief characteristics:

First, of course, his supreme integrity. You couldn't know the man and talk with him without being impressed with the fact that what he said he believed was in the best interests of the country. . . . He had a personality that won confidence. He was so perfectly frank. You never felt that he was holding back. If there was some important secret military problem that he couldn't answer, he would say so frankly, but there were few occasions of that if he had confidence in the men he was talking to. He was a kindly man. You wouldn't think of him as a fellow who bulldozed his way through. In other words, I figured that he was a developer, that he encouraged, he gave leadership, and knew when to dispense authority and to delegate it. . . . There has never been any question in my mind [that] whatever move he made he had studied carefully first. He had gotten all the information he could, and then his decision was based on what was best for the country, irrespective of what it might do to him. I am absolutely confident in that respect. . . . In his meetings with the council and other groups that he briefed and talked to, he brought about an understanding of situations which couldn't be publicized, because you couldn't give the enemy the information. He was frank and he had confidence in those he had tried and tested, and with them there was no question. . . .

He came to meetings of the Business Advisory Council. . . . at great sacrifice of time. Here he was loaded with all this responsibility, but that to me meant that he recognized the need of keeping as many people [as possible] informed. It was part of his big job. . . .<sup>45</sup>

The task in Marshall's day was as clear-cut as it was difficult: to get sufficient arms and supplies to defeat the Axis. He did not expect or condone war profiteering, but he did not expect industry to produce its products at a loss. Like the business and labor leaders he met, he assumed that the end of the war would mean a tremendous reduction in contracts. Indeed his great concern in the summer and fall of 1944 would be that of persuading industry and labor to resist pressure for a return to "business as usual." It was not World War II, but the coming of the Korean war, the development of NATO, and the policy of containing Communism that were to consolidate the military-industrial-labor alliance that troubled President Eisenhower as he left office.

In cooperating with industry, as in the forging of military strategy, Marshall always pursued the same basic aim of winning the war as quickly as possible. Although he looked upon an adequate defense force, backed with essential production to sustain it, as the proper responsibility of the military services and the nation, he could see neither the desirability nor the likelihood of prolonged military struggle on a large scale.

Although Marshall left many of the details of weapons production to members of his staff or to other officials of the War Department, he found it necessary to put the full power of his office behind many important developments in the ordnance field. Particularly in the early months of

his tour as Chief of Staff, he was appalled at how outdated the Army's inventories were. He recalled: "At this time it was dealing with a forty-year-old rifle . . . and had to be rearmed. . . . I was much criticized for continuing the 57- and 75-mm guns. I did that because we had no ammunition for the new 105 guns and we had very few of these and it would take a long time to get them. . . . So the only way was to use the 75s and the large accumulation of ammunition which was left over from the First War

"We had the 105; we had the new automatic rifle; and we had the new machine guns. The poorest product gotten out by Ordnance at this time . . . was the 37-mm cannon as an antitank gun. . . . This was archaic when it was issued to the troops. Yet it was the [latest] Ordnance product. We had had very great difficulty with Ordnance Department in the past, but I think that had been largely washed out by the operations of the General Staff [indicating] what models should be manufactured."

Shortly after he became Deputy Chief of Staff, Marshall had gone to the Chief of Ordnance and his principal assistants and asked them to list everything they needed. He found that "while the big industries retooled almost completely every three years or more, [Ordnance] had some machines in the arsenals that had been there fifty years, and there was no money to get any replacement of any kind. And . . . there was so much required that only a little bit could be apportioned to educational orders. It was a very fine thing to have educational orders . . . but by gosh, we had to have something . . . that we could use immediately."

It was in direct interventions of this type that Marshall judged he made his chief contribution to the arming of the ground forces. "It is inherent in the Army, a large organization with a control like that of the War Department—General Staff and the chiefs of branches—that it should be conservative and when a man comes up with a new idea, unless he handles himself very carefully, he merely stirs up opposition.

"In the first place a great many new things are proposed—a great many out of Congress, a great many by outsiders, and a great many by individual Army officers—[of which] only a few are practical propositions, and yet you have to clear the air of all the impractical ones, each one of which is somebody's favorite son. I tried to make it a point to see the proponents . . . of any of these [ideas]. I remember one in which an officer was in rather bad odor, it seemed, [because] of his feelings about the artillery . . . that was being mounted in the tanks. The feeling against him was rather strong. When I heard this, I sent for him and I had him lay out for me all of his thoughts on the subject . . . and I told him at the time about half his trouble was that his presentation wasn't a coordinated affair but was a highly prejudiced and almost semi-insulting procedure. I thought he had good ideas. . . . But he had successfully antagonized practically the whole staff by getting out of temper with them all. It re-

quired a little more subtlety than that, because they were in a firm position and he was not." 46

One program of which Marshall was especially proud was the adaptation of weapons for use in jungle warfare. When the American forces were fighting north of Guadalcanal above Russell Island, he decided "to see what I could do to increase the support of the ground troops and to lessen the casualty rates in the way of heavier gunfire" He called in Colonel William A. Borden of his staff and instructed him to determine what could be done with existing weapons. He did not want to hear about "something that took a year to produce," Marshall told him.

One of the principal requirements was to shave ammunition for the 80-mm anti-aircraft guns so that it could be used for a trench mortar then in service. This development permitted the ground forces to bring heavy artillery fire close to the front line. Once these and other ideas were acted upon, the General sent Borden and his assistants to the Pacific. "I had them bring in the principal officers and . . . the sergeants [who] could indicate what they wanted right there. He [Borden] would take the order and that would be shipped the next day from San Francisco. And we followed that up. . . . First, it was something that could be done quickly, just like shaving down the side of a shell, and the next was having it available so that the man looked at it and said, 'I will take that.' . . . [Later] we carried this to a great[er] extent in Italy. The high commanders there . . . came down to inspect and pick out what they thought might be usable." 47

Of all the developments in which he had a part, Marshall spoke most frequently of the way that the vehicle that eventually became known as the "jeep" was accepted. He attributed it to the intervention of a member of his staff, Major Bedell Smith. Smith himself was inclined to give great credit to the General's own farsightedness.

Early in 1940, as Smith recalled it, someone from Secretary of War Woodring's office reported that at a party the night before the Secretary had agreed to see an automobile salesman about a new vehicle he wanted to sell the Army. When he arrived, Woodring, being busy, asked Smith to talk with the visitor. Smith found that he was a representative of the Bantam Motor Car Co., then manufacturing an American equivalent of the British Austin. The company had developed "a small, low silhouette truck, light enough to be manhandled by its passengers, capable of carrying four or five men." However the importunate salesman had received no encouragement from the Motor Transport Division of the Quartermaster Department or from the G-4 Division because the Army had recently standardized the ton-and-a-half truck as its light transport vehicle. He asked only that someone from the War Department come to look at the models. Smith sometimes had his blind spots, but in this case his perception was alert. As an instructor at Fort Benning under General Mar-

shall, he had been interested in a carrier such as the one he was now asked to examine. Recognizing that authority was needed to overcome the opposition or indifference of the services concerned, he went at once to the man who could get action in the War Department.

Marshall subsequently described Smith's next move: "During a conference I was having [with] a number of generals, he [Smith] came into my office, which was his privilege, and interrupted to say that there was a man in his office who had just come in, who had invented a small vehicle that he [Smith] thought was excellent, but he had been unable to get any favorable observers. . . . Smith took about three minutes to state this, and I said, 'Well, what do you think of it?' He said, 'I think it is good.' 'Well,' I said, 'do it.' The conversation was about that long. 'Well,' he said, 'it isn't that simple. We couldn't get along unless we had several of them.' [Marshall said 15, Smith 40, and a member of the staff who checked said 72.] So I said, 'How much will it cost?' and he gave me the estimated cost "

The General approved the expenditure from his special contingency fund. Smith went out but returned a few minutes later. When Marshall asked what the trouble was, the major replied: "I should have said it before and I say it now—that's the first damn time we have been able to get anything for this [salesman] in this whole War Department, and I think it is worthy of special comment " <sup>48</sup>

Once the initial order had been filled and distributed to various branches for special tests, reaction was unanimous. The infantry and cavalry, already interested, were enthusiastic, and demands soon spread. A first order was issued for 1500; the second request was for several thousands. "All these people who had turned it down now all wanted some," recalled the Chief of Staff. As in so many other situations relating to weapons and equipment during the war, it was a member of his staff who had seen the possibilities of an invention or a proposal and brought it to him. It was not that Marshall took the initiative in these matters, but he encouraged his advisers to listen to new ideas and pass them on to him, secure in the knowledge that he would give careful consideration to their findings.