Features

Marshall and the Atomic Bomb

By Frank Settle, Ph.D

Marshall is best known today as the architect of Europe’s recovery in the aftermath of World War II—the Marshall Plan. He also earned acclaim as the master strategist of the Allied victory in World War II. He mobilized and equipped the Army and Air Force under a single command; served as the primary conduit for information between the Army and the Air Force and the president and secretary of war; developed a close working relationship with Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations; worked with Congress and leaders of industry on funding and producing resources for the war; and developed and implemented the successful strategy the Allies pursued in fighting the war. Last but not least of his responsibilities was the production of the atomic bomb.

George C. Marshall and the “Europe-First” Strategy, 1939–1951: A Study in Diplomatic as well as Military History

By Mark A. Stoler, Ph.D.

As Army chief of staff, secretary of state, and secretary of defense, George C. Marshall played a major role in creating, implementing, and defending the multilateral “Europe-First” global strategy that guided U.S. foreign and military policies through World War II and the Cold War. This lecture explores how and why he did so, emphasizing the decision to defeat Germany before Japan, the postwar European Recovery Program that bears Marshall’s name, and the relief of General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War for his refusal to accept this grand strategy. In the process it analyzes the complex relationship that exists between diplomatic and military history.

The Whole Man

By Mame Warren

George Catlett Marshall was 39 and Rose Page was all of eight years old in 1919 when she met the dashing colonel who had just moved into the apartment building where her family lived in Washington, DC. He became her godfather and she the daughter he never had. Their relationship that strengthened until his death 40 years later is richly documented in a collection of letters that provides insight into this hard-to-know, very private man.
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Membership information is available on our website. Your membership supports programs and activities during your membership year. By renewing your membership, you help us perpetuate the legacy of the man President Harry Truman called “the great one of the age.” As the keeper of the flame, the Marshall Foundation preserves and communicates the remarkable story of the life and times of George C. Marshall and his contemporaries. It has become a unique, national treasure worth protecting at all costs. That’s why your membership is so important.

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Front cover photo credit: George C. Marshall Research Library
It is a very great pleasure to welcome you to the inaugural edition of MARSHALL, the magazine of the George C. Marshall Foundation. Through this publication we intend to showcase the best new articles and research on the life and the legacy of one of the greatest Americans of the 20th century, George Catlett Marshall.

General Marshall’s career was long and his accomplishments legion. We live, daily, with the implications of those decisions and judgments. Despite this, Marshall is not well known today, unlike many of his peers. This is due, in part, to the fact that Marshall is a hard man to know. Marshall left no diary, published no autobiography and, unlike many of his contemporaries, consciously eschewed acts of self-aggrandizement. Marshall requires effort to understand and to appreciate. It is our task to bring Marshall to life for new generations and also more fully than we have done previously. The Marshall Foundation has sponsored scholarly endeavors for many years, and the publication of Volume VII of Marshall’s papers is the culmination of much of that effort. Our task now is to add more color to the portrayal of this fascinating and complex individual and connect his time to ours.

Though a giant by reputation and achievement, Marshall lived at a time when the world was seemingly replete with great leaders. Certainly the huge challenges to democracy and the crises of the first half of the 20th century brought forth substantial men, and women; leaders of stature commensurate with the scale of the tests they faced. The names of Roosevelt and Truman, Churchill and Eisenhower are well known, still, despite the passage of the years. Marshall, regrettably, though a peer of these men does not command the same recognition. When one thinks of a man like Churchill: larger than life and a force of nature in the private and public sphere, it is self-evident that he should remain a hero to so many. Who though, was a hero to Churchill? Who did he admire and why? For Churchill that man, during and after World War II, was George C. Marshall. The “true architect of victory” as he generously, but rightly termed him. These sentiments, privately and sincerely expressed, are to be found in correspondence between Marshall and Churchill in the archives here at the Marshall Foundation in Lexington. Marshall’s private papers are here too. They show the personal bond between the two men but also serve to indicate the real nature of Marshall’s stature, as measured by the stature of those who revered him.

This magazine, in tandem with our new Legacy Series and a host of other initiatives, will bring Marshall to life today substantially and in a fashion that does justice to the complexities of his life, character and career. We look forward to having you take that journey with us.

Sincerely,

Rob Havers, President
Marshall, as Army chief of staff, became responsible for the massive effort known as the Manhattan Project.
General George C. Marshall and the Atomic Bomb* provides the first full narrative describing General Marshall’s crucial role in the decades-long development of nuclear weapons that included the Manhattan Project and the use of the atomic bomb on Japan.

Marshall is best known today as the architect of Europe’s recovery in the aftermath of World War II—the Marshall Plan. He also earned acclaim as the master strategist of the Allied victory in World War II. He mobilized and equipped the Army and Air Force under a single command; served as the primary conduit for information between the Army and the Air Force and the president and secretary of war; developed a close working relationship with Admiral Earnest King, Chief of Naval Operations; worked with Congress and leaders of industry on funding and producing resources for the war; and developed and implemented the successful strategy the Allies pursued in fighting the war. Last but not least of his responsibilities was the production of the atomic bomb.

The Beginnings
An early morning phone call to U.S. Army General George C. Marshall and a letter to President Franklin Roosevelt led to Marshall’s little known, yet critical, role in the development and use of the atomic bomb. The call, received at 3:00 a.m., September 1, 1939, informed Marshall that German dive bombers had attacked Warsaw. The letter signed by noted physicist Albert Einstein and delivered a month later, informed Roosevelt of the possibility of producing an enormously powerful bomb using a nuclear chain reaction in uranium.

As Marshall hung up the phone, he told his drowsy wife, “Well, it’s come.” He dressed quickly and went to his office. Later that day he would be sworn in as Army chief of staff while German troops marched into Poland in a blitzkrieg that began World War II.

Nearly one year before, German scientists had observed that bombarding uranium atoms with neutrons caused them to split into smaller elements, releasing a tremendous amount of energy. This fission of a uranium atom also generates additional neutrons. These neutrons can then split other uranium atoms to produce a nuclear chain reaction. Their discovery triggered Einstein’s letter and started Marshall and the world on the path to the atomic bomb.
Physicists in many countries recognized this rapid chain reaction in uranium could produce a powerful atomic bomb. Among them was Hungarian physicist Leo Szilard, who realized that the Germans were in an excellent position to produce an atomic bomb. Szilard, like Albert Einstein, had immigrated to the U.S. to escape Nazi persecution. He believed the U.S. government should be alerted to this possibility. He reasoned that Einstein, a renowned scientist, would be in a position to gain the attention of the United States government. So on July 12, 1939, he visited Einstein at his home on Long Island to discuss the prospect of a U.S. atomic bomb. Szilard’s explanation of a nuclear chain reaction in uranium surprised Einstein, who had not followed recent developments in nuclear physics. Einstein pondered this new revelation and then slowly remarked, “I haven’t thought about that at all.” He realized that nuclear fission was the conversion of mass to energy, a demonstration of his famous 1905 E=mc^2 equation.

In the letter, which was delivered October 4, 1939, Einstein warned the president that the Germans might be building such a game-changing bomb, and he raised the prospect that the United States might build a weapon of its own. Roosevelt immediately approved the establishment of a committee to investigate the feasibility of the United States producing such a weapon and Marshall’s remarkable career took a significant turn.

Marshall’s involvement with nuclear weapons came two years after the initial communications of 1939, when the president appointed him to the Top Policy Group which he had established to provide him with advice on atomic energy. Little did Marshall realize that the atomic bomb would hasten the end of the war, dramatically alter the future of warfare, and profoundly influence the post-war world. As a soldier who came of age in the era that saw both trench warfare and the implementation of new technologies on the battlefield, Marshall was skeptical but open to the possibilities this new weapon presented. Decades later, as secretary of state and secretary of defense, he confronted profound issues related to nuclear weapons.

As a member of the Top Policy Group, General Marshall was privy to the reports and plans for expanding the project. He facilitated the management of personnel and budget required for the successful completion of this mammoth undertaking. His oversight of the Army’s budget allowed him to divert funds necessary to initiate the project. Later his reputation and influence
were instrumental in securing approval for additional funding from congressmen who were told only that the project was important for winning the war. When the bomb emerged as a weapon that might end the war in the Pacific, he advised Secretary of War Henry Stimson and President Harry Truman regarding its use on Japan. This controversial and difficult decision shortened the war and unleashed the specter of nuclear holocaust on the world.

Expanding the size of the Army, training new draftees, reorganizing the command structure, and acquiring the necessary materials and equipment had required strong leadership within both the military and Congress. In guiding these efforts, Marshall had gained the confidence of the president, advisor Harry Hopkins, Stimson, and the Army officer corps. He also acquired the respect of congressmen during his numerous committee appearances in support of the funds requested for the mobilization. Thus, despite the demands of these critical assignments, it was not surprising the president appointed Marshall to the influential policy group for atomic power.

In 1943, when research indicated that the United States could produce a bomb, the Army assumed responsibility for its production. That meant Marshall, as Army chief of staff, became responsible for the massive effort known as the Manhattan Project, which built the atomic bombs that would be dropped on Japan.

The Manhattan Project
Marshall and Stimson oversaw the largest scientific project in history. By the summer of 1945 an estimated 485,000 people were involved in producing the bombs, only a few of whom knew the objective of the project. According to one estimate, the Manhattan project cost $2.2 billion ($29 billion in 2014 dollars) from 1942 to 1946.

The project encompassed a nationwide system of production plants and laboratories. The Clinton Engineering Works at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, used sequence thermal diffusion, electromagnetic separation, and gaseous diffusion methods to produce the uranium-235 required for the bomb. Nuclear reactors at Hanford, Washington, produced small amounts of plutonium-239, which were separated from spent reactor fuel by chemical means. These fissile materials were then sent to Los Alamos, New Mexico, where they were transformed into the critical components of the first atomic bombs. In addition to these major installations, many other industries and laboratories throughout the U.S. contributed to the Project.

In early June 1945, the uranium and plutonium were fashioned into components for the atomic bombs nicknamed “Little Boy” (the uranium-235 bomb) and “Fat Man” (the plutonium-239 weapon). Because there was only enough uranium for one “Little Boy” and its design was simpler than that of “Fat Man,” it was not tested. The weapons designers were confident in the
simple gun type mechanism to trigger the bomb. One of the two available “Fat Man” weapons was used to test the more complicated implosion method of detonation on July 16 at Alamogordo, New Mexico.

**Leslie Groves**

In one key move, Marshall had assigned Colonel Leslie Groves to manage the project and then provided him with the required resources to carry it through. The cooperation between the dynamic Groves and the reserved Marshall was critical in directing the largest scientific project in history, which produced the atomic bomb in less than three years.

Groves first met General Marshall when he reported with a group of officers for duty with the War Department General Staff in June 1939. Marshall appreciated Groves’ management skills and wanted to keep him at the War Department in Washington. Although Groves had little direct contact with Marshall, Marshall appreciated the fact that Groves had turned down a transfer from Washington to engineering duty.

Groves was given a free hand to create the organizational structure and lines of command for the project, which became an independent command, no longer accountable to the Corps of Engineers. He reported directly to Marshall and Stimson. This structure worked well due to the relationship between Groves and his superiors during the three-year project. That relationship of mutual trust, support, and respect is reflected in a post-war interview when Groves stated:

*One reason why we were so successful was non-interference from above. General Marshall never interfered with anything that was going on. He didn’t ask for regular reports; he saw me whenever I wanted to see him and his instructions were very clear. Never once did I have to talk about the approval for money appropriations.*

**Marshall’s Leadership**

Marshall’s leadership genius included the ability to foster collaboration among groups with disparate interests. As Army chief of staff, he worked with Allied military leaders and heads of state to implement strategies for defeating the Axis. This talent was critical to the success of the Manhattan Project. Marshall insured cooperation between the Army and the scientists, obtained funds from Congress while keeping their intended use a secret, and supported Groves’ forceful management style. Marshall and Stimson provided continuity for the atomic program during the transition of presidential leadership from Roosevelt to Truman.

Marshall’s influence on decisions leading to the use of the atomic bomb on Japan was as important as that of President Truman’s two top advisors, Stimson and Secretary of State James Byrnes. Marshall’s wise counsel influenced the views of Truman and his advisors as they weighed options for ending the war. Marshall provided valued advice on military issues including the impact of the Soviet Union’s entry into the Pacific war, the pros and cons of an invasion of the Japanese homeland, and the conditions for a Japanese surrender.
Uncertainty
As the war continued in the Pacific, Marshall and Stimson wrestled with the issues surrounding the use of the bomb on Japan and its implications for the post-war world. They often discussed the political and diplomatic issues associated with Japan's surrender and Russia's involvement in the Pacific theater. Stalin had agreed at the February 1945 Yalta Conference with Roosevelt and Churchill to enter the war against Japan within 90 days after Germany's surrender. Marshall recognized the major role of the Soviet army in defeating Germany and believed it would be valuable in the conquest of Japan. He thought Russian engagement of the Japanese on the Chinese mainland would keep Japan from moving troops to the home islands. He also noted that the Russians could invade Manchuria whenever they wished thus allowing them to benefit from the surrender terms.

Still, Marshall kept his focus on military planning leaving Stimson to manage the politics and diplomacy associated with the bomb. As the end of the war in the Pacific drew closer, allied military actions were dependent on Japan's acceptance of the terms of surrender. Marshall saw a clear choice between obtaining Japan's unconditional surrender at a time when the nation's morale was at a low point and an invasion accompanied by Soviet intervention. He also saw the bomb as a means of shocking the nation into surrender.

Marshall was not certain that the strategic use of the bomb on a Japanese city would end the war and believed an invasion was a real possibility. If necessary he believed that additional atomic bombs could be used as tactical weapons to support the invasion. The low estimates of the explosive power of the bomb Marshall received from Groves as well as the wide range of estimates from the Project's scientists caused him to doubt its strategic value. Given this uncertainty, Marshall maintained his conviction that in the absence of a diplomatic solution, allied troops would have to occupy the Japanese home islands to insure the nation's complete capitulation. If an invasion became necessary, he believed Soviet entry into the war with Japan would be most helpful.

Military Options
With the future of the bomb still uncertain, Marshall, as operative head of the JCS, heard proposals from the Army Air Forces and Navy for forcing Japan to surrender. Naval planners felt that a tight blockade would starve the Japanese into capitulation while the Air Force leaders favored bombing them into submission. Marshall maintained that invasion of the home islands would be necessary given the resistance encountered on Saipan, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. Moreover the resilience of the Japanese to the intense bombing of their cities reinforced this position. He remained a conventional soldier who felt an invasion would be necessary to conquer an enemy. Nevertheless he viewed the atomic bomb as a possible means of ending the war that might avoid the liabilities of the other options.
Marshall supported a strategy to increase the pressure on Japan. It included an immediate increase in conventional bombing and a tightened naval blockade followed by Russian entry into the war in August and use of the atomic bomb when it became available. If these actions failed to produce surrender, Kyushu would be invaded on November 1 and Honshu in March 1946. Marshall left the decision to use the bomb to the president. He told Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy, “whether we should drop the bomb on Japan was a matter for the president to decide, not the chief of staff, since it was not a military question.”

Japan’s Surrender

By the end of July 1945, leaders in the United States and Japan remained deadlocked on the means of ending the war. The options for the U.S. were a costly invasion to force a quick surrender or the continuation of the bombing and blockade, which came with the risk of losing the American peoples’ support for the war. Japan’s choices were to seek terms of surrender that left the emperor on the throne or to offer fierce resistance in hopes that the American public would weary of the war and accept surrender terms favorable to Japan. The atomic bomb changed the options for both nations.

As a result of the successful Trinity test at Alamogordo in July, U.S. leaders activated plans for dropping the two existing atomic bombs on Japanese cities. At the Potsdam Conference, Groves informed Marshall about preparations for the bombing missions. MAGIC intercepts of Japanese diplomatic and military communications indicated that the Japanese leaders remained divided on the means of ending the war. On July 25, Marshall approved the missions for the atomic bombing of Japan.

While at dinner with his family at the Army-Navy Club on August 6, Groves received the first report that the mission to Hiroshima had left on schedule. He immediately returned to his office to await further developments. Around 11:15 pm Colonel Frank McCarthy, Marshall’s aide, called Groves to say that the general wanted to know if there was any news on the strike. Groves
responded there was none. Shortly after McCarthy’s call, Groves received the coded strike message from General Farrell on Tinian. The mission’s crew reported:

Results clear cut, successful in all respects. Visible effects greater than New Mexico tests. Conditions normal in airplane following the delivery.

As soon as the message was decoded, an excited Groves phoned McCarthy, who then gave Marshall the news and received Marshall’s tempered response, “Thank you very much for calling me.” Japan announced its surrender on August 15, 1945, six days after the dropping of a second bomb on Nagasaki.

Marshall’s Nuclear Legacy

After the war, Truman’s selection of Marshall first as secretary of state and then as secretary of defense reflected his confidence in Marshall’s judgment and leadership. In these positions, Marshall continued to confront issues involving nuclear weapons. He believed these weapons did not alleviate the need for a large conventional army and, while defending their use to end the war with Japan, he did not favor utilizing them in future wars. In an address to the United Nations assembly on September 17, 1948, he stated:

For the achievement of international security, and the well-being of the peoples of the world, it is necessary that the United Nations press forward on many fronts. Among these are the control of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction has perhaps the highest priority if we are to remove the specter of a war of annihilation.

As a conventional warrior, Marshall was skeptical of revolutionary technology in waging war. Marshall’s view changed with the successful deployment of the atomic bomb on Japan. Inherently distrustful of wonder weapons, he nevertheless supported the Manhattan Project. Unsure that the atomic bomb would negate the need for invading Japan, he was surprised when it shocked the Japanese into surrendering.

Frank A. Settle, professor emeritus of chemistry, Washington and Lee University and director of the ALSOS Digital Library for Nuclear Issues, was professor of chemistry at the Virginia Military Institute from 1964 to 1992. Before coming to W&L in 1998, he was a visiting professor at the U.S. Air Force Academy, a consultant at Los Alamos National Laboratory, and a program officer at the National Science Foundation. He is a co-author of Instrumental Methods of Analysis and the editor of The Handbook of Instrumental Analytical Techniques. He has published extensively in scientific, educational, and trade journals. At W&L he developed and taught courses on nuclear history, nuclear power, and weapons of mass destruction for liberal arts majors. This article contains excerpts from his new book, researched at the Marshall Library, General George C. Marshall and the Atomic Bomb to be published by Praeger in spring 2016. The Museum Shop will accept orders.
As Army chief of staff, secretary of state, and secretary of defense, George C. Marshall played a major role in creating, implementing, and defending the multilateral “Europe-First” global strategy that guided U.S. foreign and military policies through World War II and the Cold War. This lecture explores how and why he did so, emphasizing the decision to defeat Germany before Japan, the postwar European Recovery Program that bears Marshall’s name, and the relief of General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War for his refusal to accept this grand strategy. In the process it analyzes the complex relationship that exists between diplomatic and military history.

“...George Marshall knows more about the techniques of arranging Allied commands than any man I know. He is nothing short of a genius.”
George C. Marshall and the “Europe-First” Strategy, 1939–1951: A Study in Diplomatic as well as Military History*

BY MARK A. STOLER, PH.D.

The completion this year of the seventh and final volume of The Papers of George Catlett Marshall makes this an appropriate time for a Marshall lecture that focuses on Marshall himself, specifically on the diplomatic as well as the military components of one of his fundamental strategic concepts. As a diplomatic as well as a military historian, I have in many if not most of my writings emphasized the fusion of these two fields of historical study, citing Clausewitz’s famous dictum that war is an instrument of policy as well as Churchill’s later statement that “It is not possible in a major war to divide military from political affairs. At the summit they are one.”

Ten years ago, I tried to explain to members of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) the relevance of military history to their work. Here I would like to try to explain to military historians the relevance of international relations history to their work. Consequently I have chosen in this lecture to analyze a specific aspect of Marshall’s career that illustrates the fusion of these two fields: his support and implementation of a global strategy for the United States—a grand strategy, or national security policy if you will—in which Europe and European allies were the top priority, be it by military or diplomatic means.

No such commitment to Europe and allies, in fact no U.S. global strategy whatsoever, existed when Marshall was sworn in as the new Army chief of staff on 1 September 1939, the day World War II began with Adolf Hitler’s invasion of Poland. Indeed, the U.S. armed forces as well as the country as a whole were deeply divided as to the proper course of action for the United States in this conflict. The different possibilities were obvious if one simply looked at the standard Mercator map of the world that was in common use at that time, one that placed the Western Hemisphere in the center (rather than to the far left as is more common today): (1) isolation and unilateral defense of North America if attacked by any or all three of the Axis Powers; (2) this combined with defense of U.S. interests in the Western Pacific (most notably defense of the Philippines); (3) unilateral defense of the entire Western Hemisphere as per the Monroe Doctrine; (4) alliance with Great Britain and France as in World War I and offensive operations with them against Germany and Italy while temporarily assuming a strategic defensive position against Berlin’s Japanese ally; (5) or alliance with and support of Britain and France against

* Dr. Stoler gave the George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association in January 2015.
Germany but projection of U.S. offensive power to the Pacific against Japan so as to protect U.S. Far Eastern as well as Pacific interests—most notably the Open Door in China along with the Philippines—while the British and French allies handled Germany on their own.

All five of these options had advocates within the armed forces and were to be explored in the five RAINBOW war plans that the Joint Army-Navy Board had ordered prepared in late 1938–early 1939. And by the spring of 1941, both the armed forces and President Franklin D. Roosevelt had agreed to adopt in RAINBOW 5 the fourth option, a “Germany-first” strategy in conjunction with European allies with a strategic defensive against Japan in the Pacific.

That agreement was not preordained. Indeed, neither Marshall and his staff nor the Navy supported this approach until late 1940. Instead the Navy had favored a “Pacific-first” strategy against Japan (the old War Plan ORANGE), while the Army had favored a unilateral defense of North America or the Western Hemisphere over aid to France and Britain. As the then Major Walter Bedell Smith informed Marshall (as well as Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau and presidential military aide Major General Edwin “Pa” Watson) on 11 June 1940, in regard to an Allied request to purchase 500 75 mm. guns and ammunition, “if we were required to mobilize after having released guns necessary for this mobilization and were found to be short in artillery materiel . . . everyone who was a party to the deal might hope to be found hanging from a lamp post.”

What apparently changed Marshall’s mind were three key events: presidential orders to sell the British military equipment, clear signs that Britain would survive at least through 1940, and finally an important strategic reassessment initiated by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold R. Stark in November of 1940. In that reassessment, commonly known as the “Plan Dog” memorandum, Stark called for an Atlantic/Europe-first national security policy in alliance with Great Britain designed to defeat Germany before Japan, “with mutually supporting diplomatic and military aspects,” should the United States find itself at war with all three Axis Powers. He had selected this approach (listed fourth as “D” or “Dog” in naval parlance) over three alternative approaches: A) hemispheric defense; B) a Pacific-first strategy against Japan; or C) maximum aid to allies in both theaters. These he rejected on the grounds that they were incapable of achieving what he asserted to be the most basic and important national policies: preservation of the “territorial, economic and ideological integrity” of the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere, which he openly linked for the first time to the European balance of power and with it British fortunes.

Marshall had simultaneously been emphasizing the importance of the Atlantic and with his staff concurred with the basic points in Stark’s assessment, which was then revised and forwarded to Roosevelt as a Joint Army-Navy Planning Committee document in December 1940, at which time it received informal presidential concurrence. Secret Anglo-American staff talks consequently ensued in Washington, culminating in the March ABC-1 agreement on a com-
bined “Germany-first” strategy in the event of U.S. entry into the war, and a revised RAINBOW plan in the following month—which went into effect once the United States officially joined the war in December 1941. As Louis Morton aptly concluded more than a half century ago, Plan Dog was “perhaps the most important single document in the development of World War II strategy.” It was also the first major armed forces statement to recognize the centrality of the European balance of power to American security.

Yet this Germany-first approach did not come out of the blue. It had a previous history that could be traced back, ironically, to the RED-ORANGE plan of the 1920s for war against a Great Britain still aligned with Japan that had called for a focus on defeating the British first, and to Army War College studies of the 1930s that called for concentration on defeating Germany before Japan in alliance with Britain in any war against all the Axis Powers.

In both cases, the focus was on the potential European adversary, be it Britain or Germany, for numerous reasons. First, each was much more powerful than Japan industrially (and thus in terms of what military planners labeled “munitioning capacity”) and therefore more of a threat. Second, the Atlantic was much narrower than the Pacific, making any European power a much closer threat than Japan. Furthermore, U.S. defense industries were at this time concentrated in the Northeastern states and thus vulnerable to a European attack. So was the Caribbean because of the political instability in a region that might be labeled our “soft underbelly.” In reaching his conclusions, Stark was also echoing David Lewis Einstein of the State Department (and to an extent Alfred Thayer Mahan and a few other early Realist thinkers) who had argued before the outbreak of World War I that a hegemonic Germany in Europe would be a serious threat to the United States because of its ensuing ability to harness Europe’s greater population and industry, and that U.S. security was thus dependent on the British fleet and British maintenance of the European balance of power. Without them but facing instead a hostile hegemonic power in Europe, the United States could survive only as a garrison state, if at all. Now in 1940 those conclusions were being echoed not only by the armed forces, but also by many others in light of the German conquest of Europe. And interestingly, they would be echoed again soon after World War II ended, this time against the Soviet Union rather than Germany, during the ensuing Cold War.

Indeed, this concept was the basis of Stark’s conclusions in his Plan Dog memorandum. As he argued in that document, only a strategic focus on defeating Germany first in alliance with Britain could preserve the most important U.S. national policies. Preservation of the “territorial, economic and ideological integrity” of the United States and the rest of the hemisphere, he
maintained, had previously and still depended on a European balance of power and thus the British Navy and Empire to preclude invasion by a hostile continental power and keep open the “profitable foreign trade...particularly with Europe,” without which the U.S. economy could not support the heavy armaments needed for defense. The nation also had an interest in a Far Eastern balance of power, Stark admitted, and thus a “dimunition” in Japanese military power; but not its destruction. Restoration of a European balance of power, on the other hand, would require “the complete, or at least, the partial collapse of the German Reich”—something the British could not accomplish on their own. Stark therefore recommended acceptance of Plan D and the immediate initiation of detailed staff talks with the British, Canadians, and Dutch. Such reasoning was, quite obviously, anything but a “purely military” strategic assessment!

Marshall’s staff and advisers were by no means unified on this approach, as many previously had favored and continued to favor unilateral continental or hemispheric defense. But if Marshall himself maintained any doubts in 1940–41 about the wisdom of Stark’s recommended strategy, they were buried by his experiences after the United States became a full belligerent in December of 1941. Unlike many Americans both at the time and during the ensuing Cold War years, Marshall was well aware of the fact that the United States did not, indeed could not, defeat Germany alone and that its victory in 1945 had been a true coalition victory. He completely understood in this regard the importance of the British contribution and the creation during the war of a “special relationship” between the two nations, with the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) running their global strategy and the “unity of command” principle leaving a single commander in each theater directing the ground, naval, and air forces of both. He also understood the vital importance of the Soviet Union in both holding down and destroying the bulk of the German Army. Without the enormous Soviet war effort, the decision to create only ninety U.S. divisions while focusing on a massive expansion of American industrial production, and the ensuing ability by 1944 to pursue simultaneous major offensives against Germany and Japan while sending Lend-Lease supplies to America’s allies, would not have been possible. Marshall thus told the Overseas Press Club in this regard on 1 March 1945 that “the evident solidarity coming out of” the February Yalta Conference had been “a blow of tremendous magnitude to the Germans. They have always planned on a split of the Allies. They never for one moment

“Our greatest triumph lies in the fact that we achieved the impossible, Allied military unity of action.”
calculated that the Allies could continue to conduct combined operations with complete understanding and good faith.” In early April he told British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill that “Our greatest triumph lies in the fact that we achieved the impossible, Allied military unity of action.” And in his September 1945 biennial report to the nation, three of the seven key military events in the German defeat that he listed as perceived by captured members of the German High Command did not involve the United States in any way, while the other four involved British and Canadian as well as U.S. forces.

Marshall reiterated the importance of both the “special relationship” and the Soviet war effort in an address at Oxford on 11 November 1947: “never before in history have two great nations developed so successful and far reaching a mutual coordination of their total strength” as had the United States and Great Britain, he said.

Never before has there been such a complete fusion of the resources in men and materiel of two world powers. Considering deep national prejudices and pride, jealousies and different customs of procedure, the manner and success of the unification of our war efforts was the major contribution to the victory, aside, of course, from the courage and selfless sacrifice of the individual, and the great campaigns of the Soviet Union. It was a triumph of democracy at work, a lesson for the future.

And both the special U.S.-U.K. relationship and the Grand Alliance as a whole were in turn based upon the “Germany-first” strategy. It was the lowest common denominator linking its three major members, and no alliance could have existed without it.

The Europe-first approach with allies also built upon Marshall’s World War I experiences with the French—which were diplomatic as well as military in nature and which involved daily contact and negotiation. General Fox Conner, under whom Marshall had served in the G-3 section of General John J. Pershing’s American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) headquarters during the war, told his young protegé Dwight D. Eisenhower in Panama during the 1920s to get an assignment with Marshall if at all possible, for in the future “we will have to fight beside allies and George Marshall knows more about the techniques of arranging Allied commands than any man I know. He is nothing short of a genius.”

To read Dr. Stoler’s complete, annotated remarks, visit our web site at http://marshallfoundation.org/marshall/essays-interviews/

Mark A. Stoler is professor emeritus of history at the University of Vermont and editor of The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, with volume 6 published in 2013 and the final volume to be published soon. He is the author of Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II (2000), which won the 2002 Outstanding Book Award of the Society of Military History, as well as George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century. His remarks were presented as the George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association in January 2015.
George Marshall and Rose Page relax in the garden on 16th Street NW, Washington, DC, circa 1921.

"Everything you say and do is of interest to me."

Photo credit: George C. Marshall Research Library
The Whole Man

BY MAME WARREN, SENIOR ASSOCIATE EDITOR OF THE MARSHALL PAPERS

George Catlett Marshall was 39 and Rose Page was all of eight years old in 1919 when she met the dashing colonel who had just moved into the apartment building where her family lived in Washington, DC. He became her godfather and she the daughter he never had. Their relationship that strengthened until his death 40 years later is richly documented in a collection of letters that provides insight into this hard-to-know, very private man.

Page Wilson, Rose Page Wilson’s son (who was also Marshall’s godchild), presented a major trove of original Marshall correspondence—often in Marshall’s own hand—to the Marshall Foundation in June 2014. Many of the letters have never been seen by researchers since only letters generated by one of Marshall’s offices were among his official papers, and his goddaughter had provided just a selection of the handwritten letters to the Marshall Library in the past. Now, by merging the Page Wilson Collection correspondence with letters from Rose Page Wilson in the Marshall Papers and the Marshall-Winn Collection (donated two years ago by Marshall’s step-grandson and Foundation trustee Jim Winn), we can begin to see how strong the bond was between Marshall and his goddaughter and how their rapport matured into genuine friendship vital to each.

Rose Wilson recounted the relationship in detail in her memoir, General Marshall Remembered, published by Prentice Hall in 1968. She explained how as a child she became close friends with Marshall and his first wife Lily. Marshall frequently composed ditties for his young neighbor, including one from 1921:

A little girl I strive to please
Is very shy but likes to tease,
And tell all sorts of funny jokes
About all kinds of curious folks.
She likes to ride, and dance, and coast,
But better still to butter toast,
And smear it deep with honey sweet
And sit and eat, and eat, and eat.

I think sometime along in Spring
She’ll eat so much of everything,
Her dresses all will spread and split,
And open out to make a fit.

And then perhaps she’ll look right thin
With strips of dress and streaks of skin.
I think she’ll look real odd like that
With nothing whole except her hat!

Wilson remembered Marshall’s “sense of fun” and reflected in her memoir that “without it, he would not have been the whole man that he was. His brilliance, decency, kindness; his continual efforts ‘to understand rather than be understood’; his strict adherence to honor in total disregard
of vicious criticism; his utterly selfless service to humanity; and all these virtues leavened by his humor—that was George C. Marshall, the whole man.”

“Tonight I read of your nomination to be Chief-of-Staff,” his goddaughter, who had married John Wilson in 1937, wrote to Marshall on April 27, 1939. “Some people, although I doubt if there are many, may be surprised that you were chosen over senior officers. I am not because you are the best officer in the Army. I have predicted this since I was a little girl.” (In her memoir, Wilson wrote that she and Lily Coles Marshall, who died in 1927, had often discussed with certainty that Marshall become chief of staff.) Marshall responded, “thank you, my dear, for the sweet things you said.”

Marshall often confided bits of his personal history to Rose to help her through her own minor crises. On June 4, 1941, after she had apparently written him about a medical issue, he disclosed, “I was on the verge of retirement in 1911 because of a bad foot—fallen arch, I was walking with a cane. I had another serious period in 1904, when I was threatened with T. B. from exposure to winter winds at drill following two years in the Philippines. Cod liver oil knocked this out and almost took me with it. So you see, everyone has his moments.” Describing the situation in the War Department shortly before the war, Marshall acknowledged, “The work here grows more and more pressing. I barely have time to think.”

Seeking a companion for his long recreational excursions on horseback, Marshall had taught his young goddaughter to ride and it became her passion, too. When, as an adult, she came to Washington, they would often visit on horse trails. “All my ridings has been alone since you and [his stepdaughter] Molly [Winn] left,” he lamented in a March 22, 1941, letter to Rose. A few days later when she wrote that she would soon be in Washington, he responded, “I will be delighted to have you ride with me. Bring your riding clothes.” After the United States entered World War II, there was little time for such adventures. In January 1942 Marshall told Rose, “now that the War Department runs all day, Saturday and Sunday also, even the week-end has its complications in arranging for rides.”

Just before her birthday in 1942 Marshall assured Rose that he had “not forgotten the importance of September 4th to the State of the Union and to my happiness. But I must confess I have recalled its significance somewhat intermittently, with the result that I failed to have made for you a proper silver pin. However, here is one of a pair I have worn. With it go my congratulations on your birthday and my prayers and hopes for your future happiness.” Wilson responded on September 4, “It is no hyperbole when I say I would a hundred times rather have your pin than a silver one made for me. I am proud to wear it and shall value it always.” She mentioned reading reports that Marshall might soon be commanding forces. “Certainly I am one of the many who have complete faith in your abilities and talents as a great leader—but I still think of you and love you as the Col. Marshall who has contributed so much to my happiness and whose advice and instruction have always helped to put me on the right track.”
Marshall often offered gentle guidance to Wilson in response to her letters. In October 1942 Wilson joined the war effort, taking a job at the Ford Instrument Company in New York. She wrote to Marshall on November 30 about the exhausting work, including on Thanksgiving Day, when most of her colleagues took advantage of the opportunity to leave early—at 5 p.m. Wilson told Marshall she was determined to continue working alone, telling her supervisor that she “didn’t hear about any armistice being signed this afternoon.” Marshall responded on December 21 that he was greatly interested in your experiences as a working girl, but I do hope that you are not initiating the procedure so aggressively that you will ruin your health.” He worried that she was like his stepson, Allen Brown, who was trying to “reform the world, politically and otherwise in the first twenty minutes of his career, and I see that you are headed for a similar reorganization of the conduct of labor. Be careful that your natural energy, and your impatience with sluggish brains, and your intense desire to get on with the war, do not defeat you in the long pull.”

After Wilson wrote on March 28, 1943, that she had left her job due to a broken arm and lingering bronchitis, Marshall replied on the 31st that he was “much distressed to learn of the difficult winter you have had.” He confessed that “My battle has always been to keep going and conserve my energies in every possible way. You apparently had great hard luck but I wonder if you did not overplay your hand at the start. However, that is a natural reaction of youthful ardent enthusiasms as compared to sluggish elderly philosophies such as mine.”

Wilson began a letter on May 12, 1945 by complimenting Marshall on his V-E Day speech, then revealed that she and her husband were expecting a baby in August. She finished and mailed the letter on June 6 after adding that she hoped that her godfather would be pleased “because you mean so much to me.” She credited him for helping to shape her character. “I’m a lot saner

“I still think of you and love you as the Col. Marshall who has contributed so much to my happiness and whose advice and instruction have always helped to put me on the right track.”
and smarter and better for having had your guidance and example to follow. I thank you again for all your advice and affection and even scolding and I thank the Lord for your sense of humor which fitted all these into a workable formula.” Marshall responded with delight that he was “greatly pleased” and assured her that he felt certain that having a child would “make a great change in your life for happiness and contentment.” Wilson had acknowledged that the war was not yet over. “There’s the Pacific war yet,” which “seems even more of a stinker than the European part.” Knowing how much Marshall loved to garden at his Dodona Manor home, she worried that finishing the war would be “such a long, hard row to hoe. I wish to goodness you could go down to Leesburg and fight a row of tomatoes instead.”

On August 7, 1945, the day after the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, Marshall wrote longhand to Wilson that he had been thinking about her and “wondering how you are getting along. At the same time I have been moving about so continually that I failed to write as I should have done.” He assured her that he had been “quite well, though very busy. My time at Potsdam was completely occupied by business, but I did get in two short trips to the Bavarian Alp region, one to Hitler’s hide out village and another to a fishing lodge with Gen. Bradley.”

Shortly before John Page Wilson was born on August 16, 1945, Marshall’s goddaughter had written to ask him to be godfather to her child. She also confided that she was torn about what faith the child should be christened in because she and Marshall were Episcopalians, while her husband was Catholic. Marshall wrote on August 21 to thank her for calling after the birth and told her he was reluctant to “submit my recommendation regarding your religious dilemma.” He admitted that he found “enough trouble in global warfare to keep me thoroughly busy and somewhat unhappy.”

“I left for China hurriedly with only a minimum of preparation possible,” Marshall wrote his goddaughter from Chungking on January 11, 1946, after President Truman asked him to lead a doomed mission to attempt a settlement between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists. “I have naturally been intensely busy every hour from 9 to 5 or sometimes midnight. There is small prospect of a let up for some time to come.” This was not what Marshall had planned after he retired from the military on November 20, 1945. Instead, he found himself in China, lamenting to Wilson that he longed “for personal freedom and my own home and simple pleasures. My shooting trips were all arranged for the winter along with horseback rides on the lovely Pinehurst trails and a month in Florida at a luxurious cottage that had been placed at my disposal. But, here I am.” He regretted “the godfather delays, but if you still want me to serve I will be honored to do so.”
“We are leaving in about an hour for Boston where I am to receive a degree from Harvard initiated a year ago but finally to be resolved tomorrow,” Secretary of State Marshall advised Wilson on June 4, 1947, one day before delivering his Marshall Plan address. He apologized for the “long delay in administering” the rite of baptism to her son Page, but suggested that he would be in New York “in connection with a meeting of the Assembly of the United Nations,” and the ceremony could be performed then. After reading that Marshall would soon fly to London for yet another conference, Wilson wrote Marshall on November 13 to offer to provide a proxy for the christening. “It is unseemly to continue to heckle you about this affair,” she admitted, “so I shall abide by your reply” and told him how happy she was to have had lunch with Marshall “the big day of your U.N. speech!” Marshall replied on November 18 that he was “awfully sorry not to officiate personally, but I will not impose further delay.”

Wilson reported on June 28 about the christening, and asked for reassurance because she had read that Marshall was in the hospital. The columnist “Drew Pearson says you are really sick,” she wrote, “which reassured me somewhat because he is so unreliable.” Marshall declared on July 2 that after ten days in Walter Reed, “They did not find anything wrong with me, which I knew even before I went in since I feel in fine shape, but the doctors wanted to get a full medical history on me in case I ever get sick. Then they will at least know what I don’t have.” (In truth, Marshall had been told that one kidney was seriously diseased and needed to be removed but he refused surgery until December 7, shortly before he resigned as secretary of state.) By this time the Wilsons were living in a house on Long Island and Rose was frustrated with problems with her plants. “Your gardening difficulties are nothing compared to mine,” Marshall quipped. “I followed the old Indian custom of burying fish heads under the corn and every cat in Leesburg descended on me one weekend and practically dug up the foundations of the house.”

John Wilson became president of the Wright Machinery Company in Durham, North Carolina, in 1949, prompting Marshall to counsel “tolerance, humility, and recognition that the world cannot be changed in twenty minutes” to his goddaughter on May 16. “I write this having in mind your reform movements when you had that war-time job. You have all sorts of charm, so turn it on full force.” She promised to “remember his advice” and hoped “these new responsibilities will really sober me for good” in her July 27 response.

“I’m a lot saner and smarter and better for having had your guidance and example to follow. I thank you again for all your advice and affection and even scoldings and I thank the Lord for your sense of humor which fitted all these into a workable formula.”

The Marshall-Winn and Page Wilson Collections have added new dimensions not only to the holdings of the Marshall Research Library but also to the final volume of The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, covering the years 1949 to 1959, that will be submitted for publication to the Johns Hopkins University Press soon. The enduring value of the rich and growing primary source collections in the George C. Marshall Research Library assures that a grateful nation feels the same about General Marshall.

Mame Warren is senior associate editor of The Papers of George Catlett Marshall. Prior to joining the Marshall Papers project, she served as director, Hopkins History Enterprises, the Sheridan Libraries of The Johns Hopkins University.
MARTSHALL & THE COMIC BOOKS

By Cara Cook Sonnier

During World War II, American comic book publishers began to produce comics that focused on biographies of famous historical figures. These new subjects provided an alternative to the traditional superhero-type stories.

The series *It Really Happened* epitomizes this “ordinary hero” genre. Creator William Wise wanted to inspire children to strive for greatness in their own lives. *Picture News* also featured factual stories, but it concentrated on educating children about current events through entertainment.

In his lifetime, George C. Marshall appeared in five nonfiction-type comic books, all of which have been digitized by the Foundation. He was featured among other great historical figures such as John Paul Jones, Lewis and Clark and Jackie Robinson. Many aspects of Marshall’s childhood, education at the Virginia Military Institute and Army career are included in these issues.

*True Comics #4* discussed how despite Marshall’s awkwardness he achieved the highest rank among his classmates of first captain at the Virginia Military Institute. Marshall’s efficiency and logistical thinking earned him the respect of his fellow officers as well as a promotion to the highest office of the Army, Chief of Staff. It also discusses Marshall’s habits such as being an early riser and getting exercise.

*Picture News #3* presents a pictorial review of Marshall’s final report on World War II and his concerns about maintaining world peace and his ideas about universal military training.

*It Really Happened #7* shows the lifelong commitment Marshall made through his service, not only in the Army but also as a statesman trying to pave the way for peace in China.

Even after his death, Marshall’s legacy continued to influence traditional superhero comics. In 1983 in *The Infinity Syndrome!* (Volume 1, Issue 25 of DC Comics’ All Star Squadron), Marshall briefs members of the Justice Society of America that includes Batman, Wonder Woman and Green Lantern at the War Department about Ultra-Humanite’s plan to attack various defense plants across the United States.

The nonfiction comic books featuring Marshall are available for free download from iTunes.
SKYPE IN THE CLASSROOM
By Cara Cook Sonnier

Skype, the live video chat application, opens the door to several educational opportunities that teachers and students might have missed in the past.

The Library staff uses Skype to connect with middle and high school students and their teachers to show objects from the collection and talk about General Marshall, WWI, WWII and other topics related to his life and career.

Since beginning the program in December of 2014 we have discussed the life of George C. Marshall, visited the trenches of WWI through the diary of Homer Simpson, explored the Korean War and looked at artifacts about D-Day. Students also have the opportunity to ask questions about the topics.

Jessica Papandria, a high school social studies teacher, said,

My students really enjoyed seeing the artifacts, and were most talkative about the WWI helmet that belonged to Mr. Simpson. We have spent many weeks learning about the two wars, and seeing the artifacts and hearing about personal accounts makes it so much more interesting for the kids.

My colleague, Mr. Brown, loved it as well. He was impressed with how attentive our students were. Each class is known for being a little unruly at times, and to be honest, we were unsure how they would behave. But you had a captive audience! The students were talking about it into their lunch mods, and sharing the links with friends on their 1:1 devices.

I know it probably takes a lot of effort and time from your schedules to plan and execute these lessons, but it is so appreciated! We teachers truly value this type of real-world lesson. It makes everything more ‘real’ for our students. So, THANK YOU!!

For more information about our Skype lesson, please see our page listing at Skype’s education website or contact the Digital Communications Librarian, Cara Cook Sonnier.

BEST NEW BOOKS ABOUT OR INCLUDING MARSHALL
American Warlords: How Roosevelt’s High Command Led America to Victory in World War II
(NAL Caliber, The Penguin Group) by Jonathan W. Jordan

The Road to Character
(Random House) by David Brooks

First Over There: The Attack on Cantigny, America’s First Battle of World War I
(St. Martin’s Press) by Matthew J. Davenport

God and Uncle Sam
(Boydell Press) by Michael Snape
The Marshall Legacy Series that opened with the widely popular subject of Codebreaking was followed by a thought-provoking “Weapons” of War sequence that concluded in September.

The Legacy Series will reveal interesting content and objects from our collections. It will create opportunity to discuss world events through the unifying context of Marshall’s prodigious career, and it will provide demonstrable membership benefits through a wide-ranging series of speakers, exhibitions and programs in a continual, ongoing and thorough revelation of the legacy of this great man. When portrayed in its entirety during the next three years, the breadth and depth of his legacy will create an appreciation for his vast leadership during the first half of the 20th century when America emerged as a world power.

The occasion to kick off the Legacy Series with Codebreaking was stimulated by the National Security Agency’s (NSA) release of the declassified official papers of William Friedman, the codebreaking genius of WWII, to the Foundation to augment the personal papers given to us by Friedman in 1969. As a result the Foundation now possesses the most complete and comprehensive set of Friedman materials as part of one of the most important private collections of cryptologic material worldwide. “The significance of this additional material, about 50,000 pages, cannot be overstated in terms of the vast amount of information that will be available to researchers and scholars on William Friedman, his wife Elizebeth, who was a stalwart codebreaker in her own right, and the early days of codebreaking beginning in World War I and continuing through World War II,” said Foundation President Rob Havers. “Our Friedman collections put us at the epicenter of cryptology research,” he added.

Through an analysis of Friedman’s career as the father of modern cryptography, we see an intersection between Marshall and Friedman when they served on General Pershing’s staff in France at the end of World War I. During World War II when Marshall received a demonstration of cryptographic tools, he was enthralled by their technical capacity. He had learned to trust those who knew more than he to do their jobs well. One of those was William Friedman. As head codebreaker for the U.S. War Department, Friedman led a team that broke the Japanese diplomatic code known as PURPLE in 1940. General Marshall later described the intelligence provided by Friedman and his cryptologists as “contributing greatly to the victory and tremendously to the saving of American lives…and…the early termination of the war.”

Likewise we have seen Marshall in the context of the “Weapons” of War sequence in a typical position as the behind-the-scenes facilitator along with Secretary of War Henry Stimson of the largest scientific project of all time, the Manhattan Project, that resulted in
the development of the atomic bomb. Marshall admitted he could barely grasp the theory of nuclear chain reactions so he relied on Oppenheimer and others to create and explain the new science. Army Chief of Staff Marshall secured Congressional funding to support his hand-picked project manager, LTG Leslie Groves, to run the secret project that in less than three years produced the first nuclear weapons. Marshall’s genius for picking the right people to accomplish difficult things was validated.

Much earlier as assistant commandant of the Army’s Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, Marshall accomplished two remarkable things that enabled the United States and its allies to prevail during World War II. He transformed the curriculum in anticipation of the next large war following World War I. Famously, he said, “Study the first six months of the next war.” He possessed a remarkable vision that helped him during his entire career to “see” what was around the corner. He used this gift to identify future Army leaders as well. Nearly 200 officers whom Marshall trained at Benning became the leaders (“Marshall’s Men”) during WWII. He relied on them to execute the tactics that would accomplish the strategies he set in place as chief of staff.

As WWII unfolded, Marshall anticipated U.S. entry into the European conflict. In 1940 Congress initiated at Marshall’s request an unusual peace-time draft to increase troop strength to about 1.4 million. One year later Marshall returned to Congress to request a year’s extension on new enlistments, fearing the U.S. would be undermanned should it be forced into the fight sooner than he expected. Before the end of that second year, Japan had bombed Pearl Harbor and U.S. entry into the war had become the reality Marshall had anticipated. Chief of Staff Marshall, the logistics genius who earned the nickname “The Wizard” in WWI once again was pressed to solve countless supply, training, housing, equipment and transportation problems for an Army that grew from about 190,000 soldiers in uniform when he became chief of staff in 1939 to more than 8,000,000 by war’s end in 1945.

Our still emerging picture of Marshall’s legacy includes his genius for selecting and enabling the right people to lead, his remarkable foresight that allowed him to anticipate reactions to national and world events with then-uncertain outcomes, and his talent for managing large, complex projects and organizations.
Writing to John C. Hagen in July 1958, Sir Winston Churchill offered his congratulations on the decision to commemorate General Marshall at VMI. Col. Hagen, a veteran of WWI and WWII and a VMI graduate, was the first president of the Marshall Foundation. Years before, Prime Minister Churchill had asked Field Marshal Wilson in 1945 to convey the following sentiments to Gen. Marshall.

“Pray further give him my warmest congratulations on the magnificent fighting and conduct of the American and Allied armies under Gen. Eisenhower, and say what a joy it must be to him to see how the armies he called into being by his genius have won immortal renown. He is the true ‘organizer of victory’.”
By renewing your membership, you help us perpetuate the legacy of the man President Harry Truman called “the great one of the age.” As the keeper of the flame, the Marshall Foundation preserves and communicates the remarkable story of the life and times of George C. Marshall and his contemporaries. It has become a unique, national treasure worth protecting at all costs. That’s why your membership is so important.

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**KEEP MARSHALL’S LEGACY ALIVE**

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Marshall received this Nobel Peace Prize in 1953. It’s on display in our museum.
INSIDE OUR FIRST ISSUE

This magazine, in tandem with our new Legacy Series and a host of other initiatives, will bring Marshall to life today substantially and in a fashion that does justice to the complexities of his life, character and career.

- Marshall’s Connection to Einstein
- Marshall’s Correspondent for Forty Years
- Marshall and the Europe-first Strategy
- Marshall Legacy Series