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

Luck & Resiliency in the Making of a General

The Daughters of Yalta

Information Hunters of World War II

Domestic Opposition to the Marshall Plan

WINTER 2020

photo credit: George C. Marshall Foundation

WINTER 2020

MARSHALL

The Role of Luck and Resiliency in the Making of a General 4
By Benjamin Runkle, Ph.D.

Shakespeare famously wrote that some men are born great, some achieve greatness, and some have greatness thrust upon them. In this article, Benjamin Runkle explores the role luck and resiliency played in George C. Marshall's army career.

The Daughters of Yalta: An Epic Summit and the Women Who Made History 12
By Catherine Grace Katz

Although the Yalta Conference is well known, the story of three intelligent and glamorous young women who accompanied their famous fathers—Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Averill Harriman—has never been told. Author Catherine Katz uses newly available archival sources to reveal the personal side of the summit that would shape the rest of the 20th century.

The Information Hunters of World War II 20
By Kathy Peiss, Ph.D.

During and immediately following World War II librarians and scholars found themselves in extraordinary situations, acquiring sources that would be useful in war zones and on the home front. Their activities furthered American military and political objectives, helped transform American research libraries into great international repositories, and spurred the development of information science.

Domestic Opposition to the Marshall Plan 28
By Andrew W. Pruden, Marshall Foundation Scholar
Introduction by David Hein, Ph.D.

Today the Marshall Plan is considered a triumph of American foreign policy. In its day, however, it encountered significant political opposition in the United States. Andrew Pruden examines the plan's principal opponents and the differing nature of their objections to it.

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Giving information is available on our website. Your financial support helps us perpetuate the legacy of the man President Harry Truman called "the great one of the age." As the keeper of the flame, the Marshall Foundation preserves and communicates the remarkable story of the life and times of George C. Marshall and his contemporaries. It has become a unique, national treasure worth protecting at all costs.

We gratefully acknowledge financial support from Clifford Miller Yonce and the Miller Foundation for underwriting the costs associated with production of this issue.

Contributors: Benjamin Runkle, Catherine Katz, Kathy Peiss, David Hein, Andrew Pruden, Paul Levengood, Cathy DeSilvey, Melissa Davis, Glen Carpenter, and John Wranek.

Front cover image: Secretary of State Marshall speaking in front of CBS microphone at Joint meeting Chicago Chamber on Foreign Relations and Chicago Chamber of Commerce, November 18, 1947

photo credit: George C. Marshall Foundation

welcome

In this issue you will find a representation of much of what the Marshall Foundation has been doing during the pandemic. The articles by Benjamin Runkle, Catherine Katz, and Kathy Peiss all originated as excellent Legacy Lectures delivered in an all-virtual format. Of course, this adaptation in our lecture program has been necessary for public health reasons, which is regrettable. However, I hope you will agree as you read this edition of *Marshall* that our speakers/authors remain of high quality and focus on fascinating topics in twentieth century history. And I invite you to watch the full-length lectures by these three on our YouTube channel—a perfect way to spend a cold winter evening.

The final article in this issue is further proof that we forge ahead with our mission regardless of the circumstances. Andrew William Pruden is a member of the VMI class of 2020 and was a Marshall Foundation Undergraduate Scholar in his time as a cadet. The article is a condensed version of his longer paper on domestic opposition to the Marshall Plan. Pruden's work is a reminder of the important role our library collection plays as a resource for scholarship, from undergraduates to seasoned academics and authors. That role continues during the pandemic as we find new ways to make our rich resources available beyond our four walls in Lexington.

And that is a good segue to the tenets of the Foundation's newly adopted strategic plan. It emphasizes this last point—sharing the lessons and example of George C. Marshall's life far and wide. We will do that in several ways. Building on our success as a research library, we will digitize the unique collection of nearly 400,000 letters, memoranda, and other documents in our Marshall Papers collection and make them available online. This will allow those unable to come to Lexington access to a national treasure. We will also launch a distance learning program to educate K-12 audiences on lessons of history, civics, government, and leadership using Gen. Marshall as our focal point. And along with our popular Legacy Lectures, we will offer a number of new programs for members that offer travel and lifelong learning opportunities. However, as we find new ways to fulfill our mission, we will be calling an end to our museum exhibition program, effective immediately (more details on page 34). It has served the Foundation well, but we must maximize our impact in an ever more challenging nonprofit environment and do our utmost to remain relevant and sustainable. And we promise as always to be responsible stewards of your support.

2021 should be an exciting year for the Marshall Foundation. I look forward to sharing more with you as our plans progress. Please stay safe and healthy.

Best,

Paul A. Levengood, *President*

photo credit: George C. Marshall Foundation

…had Marshall not had the resiliency to withstand slow advancement, personal tragedy, and professional setbacks, he would not have been in a position to build the forces that defeated fascism in World War II.

The Role of Luck & Resiliency in the Making of a General

BY BENJAMIN RUNKLE, PH.D.

It is difficult to overstate the esteem in which the men who led or served with George C. Marshall during World War II held the U.S. Army chief of staff. Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote that "our Army and people have never been so indebted to any soldier."

President Harry S. Truman famously said of Marshall's role as Army chief of staff during World War II: "Millions of Americans gave their country outstanding service.…George C. Marshall gave it victory." Similarly, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill would describe Marshall as "the Organizer of Victory."

photo credit: George C. Marshall Foundation

Left: AEF Gen. John J. Pershing and Col. George C. Marshall (*right*).

Opposite page: Capt. George C. Marshall as aide to General J. Franklin Bell. Governor's Island, 1917

Knowing what Marshall achieved in recruiting, training, and deploying an army more than twice as large as World War I's American Expeditionary Force, it is easy to look at photographs of then-Colonel George C. Marshall standing beside General John J. Pershing—whether returning from France in 1919 or during his years as Pershing's aide at the War Department—and perceive Marshall's rise as inevitable.

Yet while in retrospect history often appears to have unfolded in a straight line, reality is almost always more chaotic and uncertain. Indeed, Marshall's eventual triumphs were anything but predetermined, and two underappreciated factors were critical to Marshall's ascent to the position of Army chief of staff that made the Allied victory: luck and resiliency.

"Millions of Americans gave their country outstanding service.…George C. Marshall gave it victory."

It is understandable, perhaps, that Marshall's luck is overlooked, as the natural tendency upon hearing somebody described as having been "lucky" is to interpret this as a dismissal of their abilities. In military matters, however, there is greater appreciation for the role that "providence" or "fortune" plays in even the greatest commanders' careers. In *On War*, Clausewitz observed that "No other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up

This article is a summary of the author's lecture delivered in July 2020. You can watch Dr. Runkle's talk, as well as other Legacy Series lectures, on our YouTube channel. YouTube

with chance. And through the element chance, guesswork and luck come to play a great part in war." Napoleon may not have been the first to say that he preferred "lucky generals," but his underlying point about the importance of good fortune in creating opportunities for brilliant commanders to seize is generally accepted by military thinkers. And as legendary British general Sir Edmund Allenby once told a young George Patton, for every Napoleon and Alexander who made history, "there were several born. Only the lucky ones made it to the summit.…[Y]ou had to be at the right place at the right time—you had to be lucky."

Sir Edmund Allenby once told a young George Patton, for every Napoleon and Alexander who made history, "there were several born.…you had to be lucky."

Allenby's assessment is particularly relevant in Marshall's case. When Marshall matriculated at the Virginia Military Institute in 1897, his dream of obtaining an Army commission was far from guaranteed. At the time, VMI had fewer than a dozen graduates in the U.S. Army. Yet Marshall's timing was fortuitous, for as he graduated in 1901 the Regular Army was undergoing its first expansion since the Civil War, increasing from 25,000 to 100,000 men to deal with the Philippine Insurrection, and therefore required an additional 1,200 commissioned officers. By the time Marshall was allowed to go before an examining board, there were only 142 positions left for 10,000 applicants. Possessing the good fortune to graduate in 1901 rather than 1899 or 1903 put Marshall in the right place for his talent to earn a commission, as he achieved one of the highest scores on the three-day exam and received his commission as a second lieutenant on January 4, 1902.

General John J. Pershing

photo credit: George C. Marshall Foundation

Marshall's luck continued during World War I, when fortune placed him in the same room as Pershing on October 3, 1917, when the AEF commander inspected Marshall's 1st Division at Gondrecourt. When Marshall had the integrity (and audacity) to publicly disagree with Pershing after the general excoriated the division's commander, he was lucky that Pershing was the rare general who valued the honesty, judgment, and moral courage Marshall had demonstrated. This led to Marshall's apprenticeship under Pershing both in France and Washington, D.C., during which he was exposed to mobilization and logistical issues, participated in an in-depth review of the Army's personnel procedures, and learned how to work with Congress and War Department leaders. This experience would reap enormous benefits when it came time to organize and build an army himself two decades later.

But for Marshall to even reach this point required another stroke of luck during the war. A half-hour before the armistice went into effect on November 11, 1918, a bomb from an American plane accidentally fell and exploded ten yards away from the mess where Marshall was eating breakfast. Marshall was thrown against a wall and stunned, but fortunately only gained a nasty bump on his head. As historian Stanley Weintraub observes: "Had the walls of the old house been less sturdy, a different chief of staff would have led the American armies against the Germans in the next war."

photo credit: George C. Marshall Foundation

Col. George C. Marshall in 1919

Although fortune smiled on Marshall at key moments, his strength of character, or resilience, was equally critical in his rise to become a general officer. Today we tend to place the Army's World War II commanders on pedestals as almost Olympian figures. Yet in reality, during the interwar years they endured numerous personal difficulties that would be recognizable today: divorce, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, professional stagnation, and financial troubles. Marshall was no exception, and endured trials that would have discouraged or even broken a lesser man.

For example, like many officers, Marshall had to endure the disconnect between his abilities and the Army's glacial promotion system. In the fifteen years after his commissioning, Marshall held nearly every significant staff job in the Army, to include graduating first in his class at the General Services and Staff School at Fort Leavenworth and being asked to serve as an instructor as a mere second lieutenant. Yet despite his reputation for brilliance, Marshall was not promoted to captain until the age of thirty-five—nine years after he became a first lieutenant. This lack of opportunity for advancement had Marshall considering leaving the Army, and in October 1915 he wrote to VMI's superintendent informing him of his "tentative plans for resigning as soon as business conditions improve" because "I do not feel it right to waste all my best years in the vain struggle against insurmountable difficulties." Fortunately, General E. W. Nichols convinced Marshall to stay in the Army, and over the next decade Marshall's resiliency paid off as he served with great distinction during the war, became Pershing's senior aide when the general became chief of staff, and served as executive officer of the prestigious 15th Infantry Regiment in Tientsin, China, from 1924 to 1927.

…despite his reputation for brilliance, Marshall was not promoted to captain until the age of thirty-five—nine years after he became a first lieutenant.

photo credit: George C. Marshall Foundation

Lily Marshall in the mid-1920s

Shortly after returning from China, however, Marshall encountered tragedy rather than good fortune. In 1927 Marshall became an instructor at the U.S. Army War College in Washington, D.C., an assignment he had previously turned down five times. Soon after he started teaching, his wife Lily died unexpectedly following a thyroid operation. Marshall was overcome with grief. "Twenty-six years of most intimate companionship, something I have known since I was a mere boy," he said in a letter to Pershing, "leaves me lost in my best efforts to adjust myself to future prospects in life." In the void left by Lily's death he suddenly found his situation unbearable. "At a War College desk," he confided to a friend, "I thought I would explode."

Fortunately, the army rallied to its own. Chief of Staff Charles F. Summerall, under whom Marshall had served in the closing days of World War I, offered him some options: he could remain where he was; he could transfer to Governor's Island, New York, to serve as chief of



George C. Marshall and instructors from Tactics and Weapons Sections, Infantry School. Ft. Benning, GA.

Marshall was Assistant Commandant from 1927–1932. *First row, left to right*: M.C. Stayer, J.W. Stilwell, Marshall, W.F. Freehoff, E. F. Harding. *Second row, left to right*: Howard Liston, Omar Bradley, Emil Leard, Freemont Hodson. (circa 1929)

photo credit: George C. Marshall Foundation

staff for a corps area; or he could become the assistant commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning. Marshall chose Benning and by early November was on his way to Georgia.

Marshall is commonly portrayed as a stoic, aloof figure. Yet shortly after Lily's death he confessed to his young friend Rose Page: "Rose, I'm so lonely, so lonely." Despite the presence of friends like Joseph Stilwell and Forrest Harding at Benning, Marshall remained mired in the grip of his personal tragedy. Under the strain of constant work and his loneliness during his first years at Benning, Marshall lost weight, and his lean, bony face became more drawn and plainer than ever.

Construction of the new quadrangle for the 29th Infantry Division at Fort Benning in 1928. Tents and practice fields for maneuvers are shown in the background

photo credit: George C. Marshall Foundation

Yet Marshall was resilient and plunged enthusiastically into his new assignment. In what became known as "The Benning Revolution," Marshall dramatically changed how infantry officers were taught—prohibiting canned lectures and increasing field problems to 80 percent of instruction—as well as what they were taught—emphasizing firepower, maneuver, and above all, creative thinking in place of formal orders and rigid adherence to doctrine. Historian Jorg Muth, who is extremely critical of professional military education and leadership development in the interwar Army, concludes: "The only highlight of the U.S. Army's educational system in the first decades of the twentieth century was the Infantry School and then only when George C. Marshall was the assistant commander."

In all, 150 future generals attended the Infantry School during Marshall's tenure there from 1927–32, and another fifty served on the faculty. One of those instructors was Omar Bradley,

who observed that: "Equally important was the imaginative training Marshall imparted to the countless hundreds of junior officers who passed through the school during his time and who would lead—often brilliantly—the regiments and battalions under the command of those generals." Bradley further stated in his memoirs that "no man had a greater influence on me personally or professionally" than Marshall. It is no exaggeration to say that Marshall's tragedy inadvertently proved fortuitous to the American effort in World War II because it provoked in him a spirit of tremendous resilience.

"'Equally important was the imaginative training Marshall imparted to the countless hundreds of junior officers who passed through he school during his time and who would lead—often brilliantly—the regiments and battalions under the command of those generals.'"

Another example of Marshall's extraordinary resilience came after his tenure at Fort Benning. In October 1933 Marshall received orders relieving him of command at Fort Moultrie and transferring him to Chicago to be senior instructor with the Illinois National Guard's 33rd Division, a significant setback to his career. Marshall vented to Pershing: "I have had the discouraging experience of seeing the man I relieved in France as G-3 of the army promoted years ago, and my assistant as G-3 of the army similarly advanced six years ago." Marshall's despair was so great that for the first time in his career he asked to have his posting changed. Unbeknownst to Marshall, the assignment was ordered by Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur, who still bore a grudge against Pershing's staff for perceived slights during World War I. MacArthur told the secretary of the General Staff, Robert Eichelberger, that Marshall "will never be a brigadier general as long as I am Chief of Staff," and refused Marshall's request for transfer.



photo credit: George C. Marshall Foundation

Col. George C. Marshall in the mid-1930s

Marshall wrote resignedly to Pershing: "I can but wait, grow older, and hope for a more favorable situation in Washington." His second wife, Katherine, remembered that during those first months of exile in Chicago, "George had a grey, drawn look which I had never seen before." His disappointment notwithstanding, Marshall continued mentoring his former subordinates. In October 1934 he advised a former Infantry School instructor not to allow rank and infrequent promotion to ruin his morale. "Keep your wits about you and your eyes open; keep on working hard; sooner or later the opportunity will present itself."

"'Keep your wits about you and your eyes open; keep on working hard; sooner or later the opportunity will present itself.'"

Marshall took his own advice and turned the 33rd Division into one of the best National Guard outfits in the country. He approached his duty with his usual professionalism, and in the summer of 1934 federal inspectors found every unit of the 33rd at least satisfactory, the first time in years the division had passed muster. After observing Marshall for several months, the 33rd's commander, Brigadier General Roy Keehn, went to see MacArthur in Washington and told him that Marshall was too gifted to be wasted in a Guard position. Keehn insisted Marshall be promoted to brigadier general and given a challenge worthy of his talents.

photo credit: George C. Marshall Foundation

Military portrait of George C. Marshall, taken at Vancouver Barracks, Washington, June 1938

Finally, by 1936 Marshall was high enough on the seniority list—and MacArthur was no longer Chief of Staff—to receive what almost everyone realized was a long overdue promotion. Within a few days of pinning on his first star he received orders to take command of the 5th Infantry Brigade at Vancouver Barracks, Washington. And then in May 1938 Marshall was transferred to the War Plans Division in Washington, D.C., which Chief of Staff Malin Craig confided was only a temporary assignment to prepare him to become the next deputy chief of staff.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt subsequently elevated Marshall to the Army's top position in 1939, a promotion that surprised many given that Marshall had dared to openly disagree with the president over the issue of how to develop U.S. airpower—a confrontation that strongly echoed Marshall's previous clash with Pershing. Yet like Pershing, Roosevelt appreciated that Marshall "would tell him what was what, straight from the shoulder." Over the next two years, Marshall transformed the inadequately armed and equipped 170,000-man Army into a force of 1.6 million officers and men in 36 divisions and almost 200 air squadrons. He oversaw the passage of the first peacetime draft in American history, the federalization of the National Guard, the establishment of solid relations with the Navy and Congress, the distribution of war materiel to potential allies around the globe, and the creation of detailed manpower and industrial mobilization plans. As Russell Weigley concludes, during this period Marshall became "the principal military architect of the Western democracies' ultimate victories over the Axis powers."

Over the next two years, Marshall transformed the inadequately armed and equipped 170,000-man Army into a force of 1.6 million officers and men in 36 divisions and almost 200 air squadrons.

Yet for all of Marshall's intelligence and talent, this achievement was not preordained.

In *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Edward Gibbon observed: "The fortune of nations has often depended on accidents." A similar string of accidents and coincidences were vital to the Allied victory in World War II. Although success in war is the product of countless variables, seen and unseen, it can plausibly be argued that without Dwight Eisenhower, Bradley, Patton, "Lightning Joe" Collins, Matthew Ridgway, and other key army and corps commanders, America and its allies would not have been able to defeat Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. If so, then it could also be argued that since none of these men would have held their commands if not for George Marshall, either due to his direct intervention or because of

…Marshall became "'the principal military architect of the Western democracies' ultimate victories over the Axis powers.'"

photo credit: George C. Marshall Foundation

General George C. Marshall (*left*) and Franklin D. Roosevelt view Memorial Day Parade, May 1942

herculean efforts to expand, train, and equip the Army on the eve of World War II, victory would not have been possible.

It follows that victory in World War II would have been less likely had Marshall not been lucky at key moments nor demonstrated incredible resilience as he endured personal tragedy and professional setbacks. If he had graduated from VMI two years earlier or later, been on the wrong side of a stone wall the morning World War I ended, or not had the fortune to work for leaders who could appreciate intelligent dissent; or had Marshall not had the resiliency to withstand slow advancement, personal tragedy, and professional setbacks, he would not have been in a position to build the forces that defeated fascism in World War II.

Thankfully, he was.

Benjamin Runkle is the author of *Generals in the Making: How Marshall, Eisenhower, Patton, and Their Peers Became the Commanders Who Won World War II, 1919–1941* (Stackpole Books, 2019). He is a Senior Policy Fellow with Artis International, an Adjunct Lecturer with The Johns Hopkins University's Global Security Studies program, and a veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

photo credit: George C. Marshall Foundation

. . . even at the highest summits of geopolitics, the personal and the political are intimately, and inseparably, intertwined.

The Daughters of Yalta: An Epic Summit and the Women Who Made History

BY CATHERINE GRACE KATZ

There is an iconic photograph of the Yalta Conference that shows the Big Three—Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin—seated in the courtyard of Livadia Palace on February 9, 1945. Their military advisors, including General George C. Marshall, stand behind them. This is one of the most memorable images of World War II, not least because of the three Allied leaders' haggard expressions and the resigned yet determined set of each man's jaw.

photo credit: George C. Marshall Foundation

Opposite page: (*left to right*) Sarah Churchill Oliver, Anna Roosevelt Boettiger, and Kathleen Harriman together at the Yalta Conference

Left: The "Big Three" with their military advisors in the courtyard of Livadia Palace, February 9, 1945

By February 1945, they were understandably exhausted, not just by half a decade of war, but more immediately by the pressure of the conference itself. With the end of the war in Europe finally in sight and the race on to see whose army would be the first to liberate Berlin, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin had agreed that they must meet to lay the plans for peace in Europe. Among the myriad topics up for discussion, the most pressing issues in Europe surrounded the fate of two nations: Germany and Poland. First, given that Germany had sparked world wars twice in a quarter century, should the enemy nation be allowed to remain one, united country, or should it be broken up into a cluster of smaller, independent states in hopes of breaking the cycle of warfare in Europe? Second, Britain had gone to war in order to guarantee Polish sovereignty, but now, given the Soviet Union's stronghold in Eastern Europe, that postwar sovereignty was again in jeopardy. Stalin claimed he would honor the promise of free elections in Poland after the end of the war, but Churchill, having spent five years listening to the warning cries of the Polish government-in-exile in London, was not convinced that Stalin would keep his word.

Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin had agreed that they must meet to lay the plans for peace in Europe.

This article is a summary of the author's lecture delivered in October 2020. You can watch Ms. Katz's talk, as well as other Legacy Series lectures, on our YouTube channel. YouTube

photo credit: George C. Marshall Foundation

Roosevelt and his advisors—including George Marshall, Ambassador Averell Harriman, and Secretary of State Edward Stettinius—discuss the upcoming conference plenary sessions at Livadia Palace

photo credit: George C. Marshall Foundation

FDR consults Marshall aboard the *USS Quincy*, Valletta Harbor, Malta, February 2, 1945

Though the war in Europe was drawing to a close, the outcome of the war in the Pacific remained significantly less certain. In early 1945, there was no guarantee that the Manhattan Project's secret weapon—the atomic bomb—would work, so Roosevelt was looking at a potential ground invasion of the Japanese Home Islands that could lead to the deaths of 200,000 American soldiers. Desperate to minimize American casualties, Roosevelt hoped to draw the Soviet Union into the war in the Pacific in exchange for territorial concessions. But Roosevelt had further objectives when it came to the Soviet Union. The tripartite alliance had been successful because it had formed around a common enemy, but when that common enemy was vanquished, would that marriage of convenience survive? In Roosevelt's opinion, it was essential that the Soviet Union remain an engaged member of the international community. This engagement, he hoped, would come through his newly imagined international peacekeeping institution, the United Nations, the plans for which he had first presented the previous summer but to which the Soviet Union had not yet agreed. The establishment of the United Nations was also deeply personal. Roosevelt wanted to succeed where Woodrow Wilson had failed. It was not realistic to think anyone could secure eternal peace, but he did believe that it was possible to secure peace for fifty years, especially in Europe. This would be his lasting legacy.

photo credit: ©moscowbear/123RF.COM

Livadia Palace in the Crimea



photo credit: George C. Marshall Foundation

Left: The Livadia Palace ballroom where the conference plenary sessions took place

With such issues weighing heavily on the Allied leaders' shoulders, of course they appeared haggard and careworn. However, few people today realize just what an arduous and dangerous journey it was to Yalta and the physical toll of the experience on all those involved. Stalin was paranoid about leaving the safety of his security apparatus in the Soviet Union and refused to leave its borders. Recognizing the shifting balance of power between East and West, not least because of the Red Army's stronghold across Eastern Europe, Stalin knew that he held more cards than did Churchill and Roosevelt. If they wanted to meet in person, they would have to come to him. He claimed it was because his doctors advised that travel was bad for his health, a cruel irony given that Roosevelt was in fact gravely ill. Remarkably, Churchill and his staff agreed to fly from London, first to Malta, where they would rendezvous with Roosevelt, who had assented to a weeklong voyage across the Atlantic Ocean still filled with enemy U-Boats, and then fly an additional 1,400 miles over territory peppered with enemy aircraft units en route to the Crimea. After landing at a makeshift airfield, where the runways were dangerously short, they drove an additional six hours over battle scarred roads guarded by Soviet soldiers. Cold and bruised, they finally arrived at Yalta, the erstwhile Black Sea resort town beloved by the Romanovs and their aristocratic friends, where Livadia Palace, the tsar's summer retreat, would serve as the conference location and the Americans' home for the next ten days. (The British and Soviet delegations stayed just down the road at Vorontsov Palace and the Koriez Villa, respectively.)

…few people today realize just what an arduous and dangerous journey it was to Yalta and the physical toll of the experience on all those involved.

At first glance, Livadia Palace appeared to be the sort of glamorous destination befitting a gathering of foreign dignitaries, but the elegant veneer masked its true state of disrepair. After the Russian Revolution, the Soviets had nationalized the palace, turning it into a rest home for worthy Soviet workers, only to be expelled themselves when the Nazis invaded the Crimea and turned Livadia into their regional headquarters. When the Soviets evicted the Nazis in turn, the Nazis stripped the palace of everything they could carry—down to the doorknobs—so that when the three Allied delegations finally settled on Yalta as the location for the conference in January 1945, the Soviets had a mere three weeks to return it to its former glory. To accomplish

this herculean task, they carted the contents of Moscow's luxurious hotels 1,000 miles south on train cars and requisitioned additional everyday items like ashtrays and coat hangers from Yalta's cold, hungry, and poor local families. However, certain invaders proved more difficult to evict than the Nazis. Bed bugs now called the Livadia and Vorontsov palaces home. Not even a draconian dose of DDT could persuade them to flee Winston Churchill's bed, where they bit his feet all night long.

Though the broad story of Yalta is one that is familiar to many avid readers of history, the passage of time can reveal new insights on the moments in the past we think we know so well. Sometimes it is because new sources become available, which impart new details or new perspectives on seemingly well-trodden paths. Other times it is because events in our own era can show the past in a different light, where things that have been under our noses the whole time are suddenly revealed.

While the photograph of the Big Three in the courtyard of Livadia Palace is one of the most recognizable photographs of World War II, there is another photograph of the very same scene shot from a slightly different perspective. The photographs, taken just moments apart, reveal something that puts the Yalta Conference in a new context. Off to the side are the blurred forms of two young women, Sarah Churchill and Kathleen Harriman, the daughters of Winston Churchill and the American ambassador to the Soviet Union, W. Averell Harriman. There were, in fact, three daughters present at Yalta. The third, who falls just outside the frame of this photograph but is captured on newsreel footage of the same scene, is Anna Roosevelt Boettiger, the eldest child and only daughter of Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt.

photo credit: George C. Marshall Foundation

photo credit: U.S. Army Signal Corps. Accessed from the Robert Hopkins Papers. Courtesy of Georgetown University.

Preparing for the official photo session, February 9, 1945. Peter Portal stands behind Churchill, who talks with Roosevelt, while Stalin appears isolated without his translator. Marshall and others stand behind them.

Sarah Churchill and Kathleen Harriman watch from under the colonnade.

As a history major and graduate student, I had studied Yalta on multiple occasions, but I had never realized these daughters had been at the conference. I was fascinated to learn that their fathers had selected them to serve as their aides-de-camp. Several questions leapt to the forefront of my mind. First, of all the individuals Churchill, Roosevelt, and Harriman could have chosen to serve as their aides at this conference, why did they choose to bring their daughters? What skills and experiences did they have that made them uniquely suited for the job? Second, their presence at Yalta indicated that there was something incredibly special about the relationship between these fathers and daughters that has for too long gone overlooked and unappreciated. And finally, though we put figures like Churchill, Roosevelt, and Harriman on pedestals such that they cease to be understood as mere mortals, for these three women, these men were just "Dad." What would it have been like to grow up as the daughter of one of these Great Men of History and to have not only witnessed, but also contributed to, one of the most important events in twentieth-century history?

…their presence at Yalta indicated that there was something incredibly special about the relationship between these fathers and daughters that has for too long gone overlooked and unappreciated.

photo credit National Portrait Gallery, London

Sarah Churchill

At thirty years old, Sarah Churchill arrived at Yalta with a unique combination of skill, experience, and instinct that made her the ideal choice to serve as her father's confidante and counselor. From the time she was a little girl, Sarah felt that she understood her father's mind better than anyone save for her mother, Clementine. During afternoons in the garden, where she spent many hours as her father's assistant in one of his favorite pastimes, bricklaying, she loved to watch his brain at work. Even if he did not speak, she felt she could "walk in silent step" with him, following his every thought. This instinctive understanding of human nature and emotion served her well, first as an actress, which had been her pre-war profession, and as part of her father's familial privy council, where her insights on domestic politics revealed that she had inherited the Churchillian gift for language and astute political understanding. When the war broke out, she set her career as an actress aside to enlist as an aerial reconnaissance intelligence analyst in the Women's Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF), the women's branch of the RAF. There, she trained her powers of observation on reconnaissance photographs to glean information about enemy activity in advance of major Allied operations, particularly in the Mediterranean. Sometimes she even knew aspects of these operations better than her father, much to his amusement and great pride. Winston first selected Sarah to serve as his aide at the Tehran Conference in December 1943, where the Big Three gathered together to for the first time to discuss the plans for opening the second front in Normandy the following spring. Sarah carried out her duties with aplomb. When it came time for Yalta, Winston did not hesitate to turn to Sarah once again.

…her insights on domestic politics revealed that she had inherited the Churchillian gift for language and astute political understanding.

Kathleen Harriman

photo credit: public domain

For Ambassador Averell Harriman, it made perfect sense to bring his twenty-seven-year-old daughter Kathleen to Yalta. Though they had not been close when Kathleen (or, Kathy, as she was called) was a child, they developed a unique bond when Kathy was a teenager. Bold and daring, father and daughter shared a love of sport and adventure. Averell Harriman was also ahead of his time compared to many fathers of his class and era in encouraging his daughters to be as involved in his professional endeavors as they wanted to be. As chairman of Union Pacific railroad, Averell Harriman opened the glamorous Sun Valley ski resort to give Americans a reason to travel west. It was during Kathy's school vacations in Sun Valley that Averell and Kathy established the foundations of a relationship more like colleagues or business partners than father and daughter. When the war broke out and Averell, a leader in FDR's New Deal administration, was appointed Lend-Lease envoy to London, he arranged for Kathy to move to London with him to work as a war reporter in the middle of the Blitz. And when he became Roosevelt's ambassador to the Soviet Union in October 1943, Kathy moved to Moscow with him, learned to speak Russian, and essentially became his assistant ambassador. During her time in Moscow, Kathleen Harriman had more access to and experience with Stalin's inner circle than any other American woman in history. With her Russian language skills, she was an invaluable partner for her father at Yalta. She served as a liaison between her father and the Soviet and American advance teams, working as his eyes and ears on the ground to prevent any logistical mishaps or cultural misunderstandings that could derail diplomatic progress.

Harriman was also ahead of his time compared to many fathers of his class and era in encouraging his daughters to be …involved in his political endeavors…

Anna Roosevelt Boettiger

photo credit: public domain

At thirty-eight, Anna Roosevelt was the oldest of the three daughters and the only mother. Before the war, Anna, her husband John, and her three children lived in Seattle, where Anna and John worked as editors of the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*. When John joined the Army and shipped out to the Mediterranean in late 1943, Anna moved her family to the White House. Soon, she noticed that something was not quite right about her father. Though their relationship had been more distant in recent years, especially since his paralysis from polio when Anna a teenager, she could see that something about him had changed subtly. Her mother, Eleanor, did not seem to notice, but Anna insisted that her father have a comprehensive medical examination. This examination revealed that the president was dying of congestive heart failure, for which there was no cure. Sworn to secrecy

Anna took it upon herself to become his gatekeeper, helping to mitigate his daily stress and anxiety as much as possible by taking on as many of his duties as she could…

about his diagnosis, Anna took it upon herself to become his gatekeeper, helping to mitigate his daily stress and anxiety as much as possible by taking on as many of his duties as she could or delegating them to others. Curiously, however, Roosevelt himself never once asked what was wrong with him. Though he did not know he was dying, he must have sensed that Anna was desperately protecting him. In January 1945, with the arrangements for Yalta underway, he cabled Winston Churchill to say that if he were to bring Sarah as his aide once again, Roosevelt would bring Anna. Churchill responded affirmatively, and with that, Anna's ticket to Yalta was secured.

At the Yalta Conference, Sarah Churchill, Kathleen Harriman, and Anna Roosevelt served as "daughter diplomats." Though not delegates in the traditional sense of having the security clearance to engage in the daily negotiations and plenary sessions with Stalin, the three daughters occupied a quasi-official role that proved invaluable to their fathers. Though they did not speak on behalf of their governments, per se, as would someone from the State Department or Foreign Office, they could relay information with the weight of their fathers behind them, extend their fathers' reach and influence by venturing out beyond the grounds of Livadia Palace into the local Crimean community, and deliver or collect subtle, nuanced information that official delegates could not. Above all, in an environment where tension simmered, spies abounded, and it was difficult to know who to trust, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Harriman knew they could trust their daughters implicitly, which was perhaps the most valuable role of all.

…even at the highest summits of geopolitics, the personal and the political are intimately, and inseparably, intertwined.

photo credit: George C. Marshall Foundation

Situated on the precipice between World War and Cold War, *The Daughters of Yalta* tells the story not just of the Yalta Conference, but most importantly, of the relationships between these Great Men of History and their remarkable daughters, revealing that even at the highest summits of geopolitics, the personal and the political are intimately, and inseparably, intertwined.

Catherine Grace Katz is a writer and historian from Chicago. She graduated from Harvard in 2013 with a BA in History and received her MPhil in Modern European History from Christ's College, University of Cambridge in 2014, where she wrote her dissertation on the origins of modern counterintelligence practices. After graduating, Catherine worked in finance in New York City before a very fortuitous visit to the book store in the lobby of her office in Manhattan led her to return to history and writing. She is currently pursuing her JD at Harvard Law School. *The Daughters of Yalta* is her first book.

photo credit: National Archives Still Picture Branch

National security and intellectual leadership went hand in hand, and it required an expansive development of research libraries and international holdings.

The Information Hunters *of* World War II

BY KATHY PEISS, PH.D.

A little-known dimension of the World War II period is the unusual effort of American librarians, scholars, archivists, and collectors, whose war work was centered on books and documents. These information hunters gathered enemy publications in neutral cities like Stockholm and Lisbon, searched for records in Paris and Berlin, seized Nazi works from bookstores and schools, and rescued millions of books hidden in German caves and mineshafts. By improvising library techniques in wartime conditions, they contributed to Allied intelligence, safeguarded endangered collections, and restituted looted books—and at the same time, built up the international holdings of leading American libraries. Their remarkable story sheds light on the importance of books and information during World War II and after.

photo credit: National Archives Still Picture Branch

photo credit: Washington Press-Photo Bureau

Far left: Veteran William J. ("Wild Bill") Donovan, head of the Office of Strategic Services, (circa 1945)

Left: Archibald MacLeish, Librarian of Congress, (circa 1940)

The impetus for acquiring enemy publications came from two formidable leaders: decorated veteran, lawyer, and politico William J. Donovan and poet Archibald MacLeish, then the Librarian of Congress. Anticipating American intervention in the war, Donovan lobbied for a centralized intelligence agency, and in July 1941, President Roosevelt appointed him the Coordinator of Information, ultimately renamed the Office of Strategic Services. MacLeish too was an interventionist, convinced that libraries must be defenders of freedom, the LC foremost among them.

Ideas about information had circulated in the United States and Europe before the war, including calls for international cooperation and repositories of knowledge. By the 1930s, rising nationalism spurred the creation of the National Archives, and the Library of Congress embraced a larger role as a general center of information. Scholars and librarians began to use microfilm technology to increase access to materials, including rare books and scientific research.

Opposite page: Army Chaplain Samuel Blinder examines looted Torah scrolls in cellar of The Institute for the Study of the Jewish Question, Frankfurt, 1945

This article is a summary of the author's lecture delivered in June 2020. You can watch Dr. Peiss's talk, as well as other Legacy Series lectures, on our YouTube channel.

photo credit: public domain

Livraria Portugal, bookseller in Lisbon

These trends made it possible for MacLeish and Donovan to put into motion a plan to acquire enemy publications and open-source intelligence. With Donovan's urging, President Roosevelt authorized the Interdepartmental Committee for the Acquisition of Foreign Publications (IDC), an OSS-based mission to gather enemy newspapers, periodicals, technical reports, industrial directories, and other printed materials that might help intelligence analysts. To do so, they sent agents to neutral cities around the world.

photo credit: family of Adele Kibre

Adele Kibre, head of Anglo-American Microfilm Unit, Stockholm

Among them was Adele Kibre, who headed the operation in Stockholm. A scholar of medieval linguistics, she spent much of the 1930s in European libraries and archives, where she learned to take photographs of rare items with a small Leica camera. Working for the OSS, she went to Stockholm in 1942 to set up the Anglo-American Microfilm Unit. She worked with the British Ministry of Information to acquire newspapers, journals, and books, but she had her own contacts in the clandestine press and the Danish resistance. Kibre's group was highly successful, producing over 3,000 reels of microfilm during the war for war agencies in Washington and London.

The other large-scale European operation was in Lisbon, a hotbed of intelligence-gathering and espionage. The IDC sent Ralph Carruthers, a microfilm expert from the New York Public Library, and Reuben Peiss, a Harvard University librarian (and the author's uncle), on a mission similar to Kibre's. They frequented bookstores and newsstands, and developed relationships with sympathetic embassy officials, academics, and locals. Among them were the Andrade brothers, who owned a leading Lisbon bookstore, Livraria Portugal. Carlos de Andrade went to Spain on behalf of the Americans, who would have been targets of Franco's secret police. De Andrade beguiled a Madrid-based German bookseller into selling him numerous titles, ostensibly for his own bookshop but in fact for Allied intelligence. Microfilming these materials was essential, because of limited space and weight allocations on air transport. Housed in a room in the American consulate, the IDC's microfilm equipment ran day and night.

This mission was a vast undertaking. By the end of 1942, the IDC's first year of operation, 1.2 million pages had been duplicated and distributed to government agencies. The intelligence

value of this material is difficult to assess. At a minimum, it provided important contextual information about the enemy. Government officials certainly saw it as useful, except that it arrived in a form nearly impossible to access: the microfilm had been shot haphazardly and often arrived without a listing of contents. To make these materials usable, the IDC deployed methods of early information science: they disaggregated publications into bundles of information; classified and indexed these items; published a daily report distributed to government agencies; created abstracts of articles; and offered full-text translations in forty-two languages. Before there were computers to do much of this work, the IDC employed several hundred women and émigrés to do the job. In this way, the IDC's director Federick Kilgour explained, the organization shifted from a "library point of view" to "the point of view of the information in publications."

As the war progressed, enemy publications began to dry up in Stockholm, Lisbon, and other IDC outposts. However, different means of open-source acquisition became possible after D-Day. Document-gathering teams of OSS specialists and army personnel followed the troops into newly liberated Belgium and France and ultimately into Germany. Known as T-Forces (for target), they scoured government offices, archives, and other sites for documents and publications. They searched for information that might be helpful in fighting the final stages of the war, in postwar reconstruction, in prosecuting war crimes, and in relations with the Soviet Union. The IDC was well represented on these teams. For example, Smith College professor and modern composer Ross Lee Finney went on hunting expeditions throughout liberated Paris and the surrounding area. On his best day, he found thousands of patent abstracts. As he wrote his wife, he had to adopt "slightly different methods of acquiring foreign publications than I or anyone in Northampton [Massachusetts] would use."

They searched for information that might be helpful in fighting the final stages of the war, in postwar reconstruction, in prosecuting war crimes, and in relations with the Soviet Union.

Ransbach mine filled with library books, 1946

Advancing into Germany, Allied troops and T-forces uncovered vast quantities of books and other publications stashed in surprising places. German state archives and library collections had been relocated from cities to caves, mines, and outlying castles, where they would be safe from bombing; hidden there were also the cultural treasures looted by the Nazis. The Ransbach salt-potash mine, for example, contained gold, valuable art works, and the costumes of the Berlin State Opera, along with

Journalists Louis Lochner and Frank Mason (with jeep driver), in Berlin 1945, on Hoover Library collecting mission

photo credit: Herbert Hoover Presidential Library

millions of volumes from the Prussian State Library. These discoveries in the U.S. Zone of Occupation posed an unexpected challenge for the American occupation government.

photo credit: Signal Corps photo, National Archives, Still Picture Branch

Soldier examines *Mein Kampf* and other forbidden German books, 1945

After VE Day, American librarians could hardly wait to return to Europe to obtain books and periodicals that had been unavailable during the war years. There was fierce competition among them, with librarians worried that another repository would get a jump sending agents into war zones and occupied territory. Indeed, one did outpace the others in the race to Europe: the Hoover Institution Library. Herbert Hoover's war collection dated to the end of World War I and grew in the interwar years. Now he called on his many contacts and supporters around the world to acquire materials of World War II. His influence as a former president and food relief leader opened doors. Two of his close contacts, journalist Louis Lochner and former NBC executive Frank E. Mason, gained access to Berlin as reporters, but surreptitiously collected archives and documents for the Hoover Library, often using CARE packages as a gift exchange for a valued diary or set of letters.

After VE Day, American librarians could hardly wait to return to Europe to obtain books and periodicals that had been unavailable during the war years.

The pressure from librarians, growing demand for acquisitions, and its own strong interest in building its international holdings led the Library of Congress to make an unusual proposal: it would send a mission to Europe, on behalf of American research libraries, to acquire books published in the war years. The new Librarian of Congress Luther Evans saw this as a matter of national interest, supporting American leadership in global affairs. The War and State Departments agreed to this proposal. As one official observed, they did not want multiple groups of librarians running around Europe. The military also believed the Library of Congress Mission (LCM) could help screen the piles of confiscated materials in Army documents centers and collecting points. Those without intelligence or military application could be released and sent to American libraries. Heading the LCM was Reuben Peiss, already in Germany and reassigned from the OSS. In January 1946, a group of librarians arrived from Washington to join the mission, including Harry Lydenberg, former director of the New York Public Library, and at seventy years of age, a dean of American librarianship.

The LCM's instructions were to purchase three copies of all books published in Germany, to deal with confiscated books, and to arrange shipment of a number of publications already purchased by American libraries that were stored in Leipzig. These were standing orders placed before the war. Leipzig, the center of the German book trade, had been heavily bombed during the war, but book stocks had been kept safe by their publishers. The Americans faced a daunting problem, however: Leipzig was in the Soviet zone of occupation. After a long and delicate negotiation, Soviet occupation authorities permitted the LCM to drive trucks from Berlin to Leipzig, pack them with the books, return to Berlin and travel on to headquarters in Frankfurt, where the books were shipped to Washington. With the Cold War rising, this operation was a noteworthy success.

photo credit: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs

Library of Congress Mission to Europe, 1946

At the same time, members of the Library of Congress Mission extended their collecting beyond publications. There were many tempting targets, including the large Rehse collection of Nazi materials, broken up and hidden in several places; LCM members spent considerable effort finding and salvaging it. A large collection of photographs was discovered in a café restroom, which prompted questions about whether the Americans should seize it. In this case, photos that reflected Nazi ideology were removed but the rest remained in Germany as part of its cultural patrimony.

photo credit: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs

Library of Congress Mission salvages Nazi collection (Rehse) in Bürgerbräu sub-basement, Munich, 1946

photo credit: National Archives Still Picture Branch

Seymour Pomrenze, director of the Offenbach Archival Depot, 1946

Books that contained Nazi and militaristic content posed a particular problem for the American occupation. Following the principle of denazification, these books were removed from bookstores, publishing houses, libraries, and schools, or sequestered in locked rooms. Over time, the Allies took a harder line. In May 1946, they issued Order No. 4, which expanded the definition of objectionable works and required they be confiscated and destroyed, including books in public libraries. When the order became public, the American press, librarians, and civil libertarians expressed outrage at a measure that seemed so much like Nazi book burning. Although General Lucius Clay, the occupation governor, insisted they were not burning books but pulping them for much-needed paper stock, few perceived a significant distinction. To avoid a public relations disaster, the LCM took on the task of screening these books and preserving up to 150 copies of each one for research libraries. Nearly 600,000 volumes arrived in the U.S., allocated to over 100 research libraries and the Library of Congress in a cooperative acquisition arrangement.

The occupation government also confronted the challenge presented by millions of looted books discovered in the American Zone. These had been confiscated chiefly from Jewish libraries, but also from Masonic orders, the Catholic Church, and socialist and labor organizations. In Frankfurt, soldiers discovered 150,000 volumes and Torah scrolls in the cellar of the Institute for the Study of the Jewish Question, created by Nazi ideologist Alfred Rosenberg. In a small town nearby, they found two million looted books stashed in a tax office, a church, and a brickyard, damaged and in disarray. It was the Monuments Fine Arts and Archives unit—the Monuments Men—who were tasked with identifying and restituting these books. This was an overwhelming job for the limited staff working in Frankfurt. By early 1946, the looted books had been relocated to a large warehouse, known as the Offenbach Archival Depot, and Seymour Pomrenze, a military officer, archivist, and commanding presence, was put in charge. He was followed by Isaac Bencowitz, a veteran of both world wars. They were Jewish Americans who cared deeply about the fate of the books. Bencowitz devised an ingenious way of identifying the looted items, published in many languages. The book stamps and ex libris plates were photographed and put in albums with numbers; German workers at the depot would memorize a small number of images, and if they found one, placed the book in a numbered bin. In this way, thousands of books were sorted and identified in only a few months and returned to their country of origin.

German workers at the depot would… place the book in a numbered bin. In this way, thousands of books were sorted and identified in only a few months and returned to their country of origin.

Nevertheless, there were more than 300,000 unidentified or orphaned books, without book stamps or signatures. Who would handle them, and in what way, was a thorny political and ethical matter. Jewish Cultural Reconstruction, Inc., an American organization with an international membership, successfully argued that it should be the "successor agency" to preserve and distribute these volumes, in order to restore Jewish culture and community. They sent 43

photo credit: National Archives Still Picture Branch

Sorting books at the Offenbach Archival Depot, 1946

percent off to Israel, 38 percent to the United States, and a smaller number to Great Britain, South Africa, Latin American countries, and Germany. Political philosopher Hannah Arendt was the executive director of the organization; she compiled lists of Jewish cultural treasures in Axis-occupied countries and searched for hidden libraries, in addition to overseeing the distribution process.

Although little known today, this effort of librarians and scholars during World War II had an impact on the postwar period. Librarians began to reimagine the scale and scope of their collections, seeing them not only in terms of research materials and cultural heritage, but also as a part of the postwar world order. National security and intellectual leadership went hand in hand, and it required an expansive development of research libraries and international holdings. The wartime intelligence work of librarians also shaped postwar information science. The IDC director Frederick Kilgour was inspired by his war work to develop the technology to improve information access. He founded OCLC, an early effort to link library catalogues via computers and modems, which led ultimately to the creation of WorldCat, the largest international bibliographic database. Pioneering information science, the rescue and restitution of books, and the leadership of American libraries within the international world of scholarship: these wartime legacies continue to the present day.

Kathy Peiss is the author of *Information Hunters: When Librarians, Soldiers, and Spies Banded Together in World War II Europe* (Oxford University Press, 2020), among other books. She teaches at the University of Pennsylvania, where she is the Roy F. and Jeannette P. Nichols Professor of American History.

MARSHALL Scholars

THE MARSHALL FOUNDATION UNDERGRADUATE SCHOLARS PROGRAM

by David Hein, Ph.D.

David Hein (PhD, Virginia) is a senior fellow at the Marshall Foundation. His most recent book is *Archbishop Fisher, 1945–1961: Church, State, and World* (Routledge).

We are delighted to offer here the second splendid article based on a much longer paper produced by a student in our reborn Marshall Foundation Undergraduate Scholars Program. Even in this brief excerpt, Andrew Pruden is able to take his readers beyond the usual characters to introduce us to Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska, for example, and to the concerns held by European Recovery Program opponents, some of whom came around in support, backing prudence over perfection, and some of whom did not.

Pruden also rightly highlights the appointment of Studebaker's Paul Hoffman, whose background in the private sector rather than in the federal bureaucracy must have been reassuring to potential Plan opponents. And the author points toward the importance for some of seeing how matters worked out during this program's actual implementation. Concerns about socialism were undoubtedly in the minds of Plan administrators in Western Europe who sought to curb political extremes and foster the growth of centrist parties.

Foundation members will note that this paper is our second in a row from a Virginia Military Institute cadet, but do not be deceived. Representatives of the Marshall Foundation have traveled to colleges and universities from southwest Virginia (Emory and Henry) to Pennsylvania (Gettysburg) in order to bring a wonderful range of academic institutions into this initiative. Some of our faculty liaisons, such as Professor Michael Birkner at Gettysburg, are old friends of this program. Others, such as Professor Henry Nau at George Washington University, are new connections.

We now have a network of about 25 institutions, including such prominent universities as Virginia Tech, Johns Hopkins, and the University of Virginia. But we have emphasized the smaller colleges too, such as Sweet Briar and Hollins, because students there do not always have the opportunities for research that their peers at universities have.

We are excited about preserving and passing along the Marshall legacy to rising generations of gifted undergraduates. Education is at the very heart of our strategic plan going forward.

And even as we seek to expand this program, we remain grateful to our longstanding partners at VMI—especially COL Brad Coleman, a former Marshall Foundation Scholar—for their continuing and vital support.

Domestic Opposition *to the* Marshall Plan

BY ANDREW W. PRUDEN

When President Truman signed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 into law on April 3, 1948, he officially instituted the Marshall Plan, which would go on to rebuild western Europe over the next four years with an influx of approximately $13 billion in American aid ($140 billion in 2020 dollars). In the previous month, the Senate passed the bill by a vote of 69-17 and the House by 329-74. While it is easy to focus on the overwhelming support the legislation enjoyed, it is equally important to consider those who opposed it and the reasoning behind their votes. Although the years after World War II saw The United States as the preeminent global power and a transition away from the nation's traditionally non-interventionist policies, advocates of isolationism maintained their struggle against this tide. An understanding of the figures and arguments employed against the Marshall Plan, along with the methods by which the Truman administration—Secretary of State George C. Marshall in particular—managed to overcome this isolationism, helps to explain the larger shift in American foreign policy at the onset of the Cold War.

photo credit: George C. Marshall Foundation

President Truman signs the Foreign Assistance Act on April 3, 1948, surrounded by Act supporters

President Truman's support for the Marshall Plan should not imply that all Republicans immediately opposed it, or that Democrats unanimously rallied behind their party's leader. Resistance to European aid came from influential figures in both chambers and parties and incorporated a wide range of reasons. Four of the more influential opponents, by virtue of either their national prominence or positions within Congress, were senators Robert Taft (R-Ohio), Harry Byrd Sr. (D-Virginia), Kenneth Wherry (R-Nebraska), and former president Herbert Hoover. What reasoning did these four well-respected public servants have to oppose a program that historian David Roll later called "arguably the most significant initiative in American diplomacy since the Louisiana Purchase"?

Secretary of State Marshall speaking in front of CBS microphone at Joint meeting Chicago Chamber on Foreign Relations and Chicago Chamber of Commerce, November 18, 1947

photo credit: George C. Marshall Foundation

Robert Taft held the distinction of being one of the two most influential Republicans senators in the 80th Congress. While his colleague Arthur Vandenberg, president pro tempore of the Senate and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, was the main party spokesman on matters of foreign affairs, Taft was preeminent on domestic policy. As the two realized in 1947 and 1948, however, the line between domestic and foreign policy is a thin one. Taft's perspective on foreign policy was rooted in his concerns for the health of the domestic economy. Speaking to the John Marshall Club in St. Louis, Missouri, a state known for its isolationist tendencies, Taft described the impact on average Americans whose incomes had not increased to deal with the 65 percent increase in living costs in recent years. Explaining how American exports worth $18 billion in 1947 outweighed the $8 billion in imports, he argued the Marshall Plan would only further tip the scales and create additional scarcities and increase inflation. His argument was not without merit. Even some supporters of the plan acknowledged that every product and raw good delivered to Europe would come from American shelves and pantries. Also, the increased demand for American goods would in turn increase the demand for the dollar, thereby leading to inflation. However, the inflation created by the Marshall Plan would pale in comparison to that already endured by the American public in the years 1946 and 1947 after the end of rationing. Throughout the plan's four years American farmers proved more capable than expected at producing sufficient quantities of food to sustain both domestic and Europeans needs.

Senator Taft, though constantly working to stop the Marshall Plan, never seriously believed it would not come to fruition in some form. As a result, he strove to include amendments to the legislation to water down its impact on the domestic economy. Calls to reduce the initial financial commitment, of which Taft was a prominent voice, resulted in Senator Vandenberg adjusting the first round of aid from $6.8 billion for fifteen months to $5.3 billion for twelve months. Taft's final attempt to weaken the bill came on March 12, 1948, the day before the Senate vote, when his amendment to reduce the first twelve months even further to $4 billion, supported by roughly 30 fellow senators, was stopped by Vandenberg. While Taft never fully accepted the assurances from the Truman administration that the nation could handle the possible inflation, he ultimately voted yes out of a sense of moral necessity. Emergency aid approved for Europe during a special session of Congress in December 1947 convinced Taft that neither he nor the United States could in good conscience reject large scale aid after already providing western Europe with short-term assistance.

Taft's fellow Senate Republican Kenneth Wherry held no such moral reservations and additionally disapproved of the Marshall Plan for fear it would encourage socialism in western Europe. He also thought the aid commitment was too open and should instead be used only for specific production projects. As the majority whip in the Senate, responsible for keeping track of support and opposition to bills, Wherry held the best position to create a coordinated opposition to the plan. In January 1948 Wherry formed a loose organization of approximately twenty-eight senators, many of whom also worried over the degree to which the Marshall Plan would stoke socialist tendencies already present in both western Europe and parts of the United States. Vandenberg did heed the group's call to do away with a single American commitment for a total sum of $17 billion, in favor of an acknowledgment that funds would be decided on a year-by-year basis, thereby providing an out if the aid failed to make a noticeable impact in the early months.

photo credit: George C. Marshall Foundation

Marshall addresses Governors Conference, Salt Lake City July 1947

In contrast to Taft, who eventually voted in favor of the plan despite his reservations, Wherry never came around to it. His personal ideological antagonism to the plan, along with political realities of representing Nebraska (one of the most isolationist states during the Cold War), prevented any change in his thinking. Even after the evident successes of the plan and the initial rejuvenation of the European economy in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Wherry continued to reject the merits of the plan until his death in 1951.

On the other side of the political aisle from Taft and Wherry was a handful of Democratic senators who rejected Truman and Marshall's arguments in favor of the plan. Harry Byrd, Sr., chairman of the Joint Committee on the Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures, rejected the plan on fiscal and foreign policy grounds. Doubting the efficacy of aid to Europe, Byrd argued that The Marshall Plan would weaken the American economy, which in turn would simply strengthen the Soviet position, in Europe and in all regions with vital American interests. On the Senate floor Byrd told his colleagues "Russia does not fear American economic efforts against communism in Europe, but she does fear American dollars rolling to the manufacture of atomic bombs." A focus on increased military expenditures to directly counteract the Soviet threat appeared to Byrd as the more efficient use of finite U. S. resources. Like Wherry, Byrd's opposition to the bill continued throughout the congressional debate, and he was among only four Democratic senators to vote against the bill in March 1948. His refusal to support the Marshall Plan was just one example of the fiscal prudence he showed throughout his tenure in

Secretary of State Marshall at the annual dinner of the Pittsburgh Chamber of Commerce, 1948

photo credit: George C. Marshall Foundation

the Senate. By the end of his Senate career in the 1960s, he represented the "Old Guard frugality…[and] had elevated reduction of government spending into a crusade," as historian Doris Kearns Goodwin describes it.

Former President Herbert Hoover held a position in 1948 different than the previous three figures. While still a prominent public figure and a leader of the Republican Party, he did not have to worry about appeasing an electorate or explaining his viewpoints to any voting constituency. His opposition, first acknowledged in a letter to Senator Vandenberg on January 18, 1948, invigorated the congressional resistance. Hoover provided a figure to rally behind. As Joe and Stewart Alsop explained it, Hoover's opposition furnished Republicans a level of "prestige to weigh against Marshall's and Vandenberg's. It has thrown over them a cloak of respectability and given them immeasurably greater boldness and confidence." In his letter to Vandenberg, Hoover took issue with the volume of exports, growing inflation levels, and excessive taxation, all of which the Marshall Plan would further exacerbate. Calling for only $4 billion for the first fifteen months of the program and the elimination of any promise of a four-year commitment, he wanted the United States to freely end its aid whenever it chose, without fear of recrimination. According to the *New York Times*, Hoover's letter to Vandenberg forced "supporters of the Administration's more extensive undertaking [to concede]…the Marshall Plan approach had been dealt a severe setback…[and] might provide a rallying point for presently scattered opposition."

Unlike the previous three opponents, however, Hoover eventually made the transition from skeptic to genuine ally of the Marshall Plan. Efforts by Marshall, Vandenberg, and House Foreign Affairs Chairman Charles Eaton ultimately helped to placate Hoover. The creation of a nonpartisan board of citizens to help oversee the program, in addition to a cut in the initial appropriation period from fifteen to twelve months, helped change Hoover's mind. In a letter to Speaker of the House Joseph Martin on March 24, Hoover argued that "if well devised and under a capable Administrator, [the plan] stands a good chance of success. I believe it is worth taking the chance." The letter to Martin had a corresponding effect on Congress as a whole, leading to confusion within the opposition and large-scale defections to Vandenberg and Marshall.

photo credit: George C. Marshall Foundation

(*Left to Right*) President Truman; Secretary of State Marshall; Paul Hoffman, head of the U.S. Economic Cooperative Administration; and Averell Harriman, special U.S. representative in Europe; meet on Nov. 29, 1948.

Secretary of State Marshall, Senator Vandenberg, and their allies did not remain on the sidelines while opponents like Wherry or Byrd argued against the plan. Vandenberg insisted on a business-focused administration of the aid. Paul Hoffman, the chief executive officer of Studebaker and a well-respected businessman, was appointed as the head of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), which helped ensure a degree of efficiency and financial insight that a career State Department official would have been unable to realize. The competency exhibited by leaders within the ECA, such as Hoffman and Averell Harriman, would also serve to undercut the charges of waste and inefficiency made by Byrd and others. Throughout late 1947 and early 1948 Marshall undertook a cross-country speaking tour to drum up public support and put pressure on representatives to vote for the plan. Going so far as to talk to the Congressional Women's Club the day before the Senate vote, Marshall strove to explain the importance of the plan to legislators via their constituents and spouses.

While the opposition to the Marshall Plan incorporated well-known public figures, the disparity between their reasons for dissent and their inability to coalesce behind a single strategy and message ultimately doomed their endeavor. In conjunction with this failure lay an honest effort by Vandenberg and Marshall to consider and incorporate the smaller issues opponents voiced in an effort for conciliation and compromise. Whether it be the reduction in the initial funds, a shift to year-to-year commitments, or steps to create a business-friendly environment removed from the bureaucratic inertia of the State Department, supporters of the plan listened and responded to legitimate issues raised by its opponents. This effort, spearheaded by such respected public servants as Senator Vandenberg, Secretary Marshall, and public citizens like former Secretary of War Henry Stimson, helped convince skeptical members of Congress and the public to support the effort for European recovery. Nevertheless, the continued oversight by men like Wherry and Byrd during the Marshall Plan's implementation ultimately helped ensure the program's success and its status today as a model for large-scale foreign aid.

Andrew W. Pruden, from Raleigh, NC, graduated from VMI in 2020 with history honors. Besides a history major, an international studies minor was his academic focus. He is now proud to serve his country as a second lieutenant in the U.S. Army, specializing in military intelligence. And we are proud of him.

New Strategic Direction *for the* Marshall Foundation

"The Foundation exists to promote the values of selfless service, dedicated effort and strength of character exemplified by Marshall's life and leadership in war and peace and to inspire new generations to follow his example as they face the challenges of the future."

photo credit: VMI AA Micalyn Miller 2019

In an age of limited resources, all non-profits must carefully consider how they deliver on their missions. Ours is: *The George C. Marshall Foundation exists to promote the values of selfless service, dedicated effort and strength of character exemplified by Marshall's life and leadership in war and peace and to inspire new generations to follow his example as they face the challenges of the future.*

To fulfill this commitment, the George C. Marshall Foundation has decided to focus on several core existing strengths and build its capacity in other areas. We are committed to remaining one of the nation's premiere small research libraries by expanding access to our collections through an ambitious plan to digitize our nearly 400,000 documents written by and to George C. Marshall and his family. We will continue to offer our stimulating Legacy Lecture Series, both in person, when pandemic conditions allow, and online. We have already launched new digital video and other initiatives that bring the lessons of Marshall's life to audiences everywhere. We will introduce a new array of member programs to learn more about General Marshall and the

era he so influenced. And to "inspire new generations to follow his example," we are developing distance learning programs for students that highlight civics, government, leadership, and ethics, all embodied by George C. Marshall.

To achieve these ambitious plans and steward our resources wisely in these uncertain times, we have made the difficult decision to cease our museum exhibition program, effective immediately. We will create a small, permanent display of some of our most significant artifacts that highlight General Marshall's character and leadership and further our goals to serve scholarship and support education. Our intention is to make access to this collection available periodically to our members, for special tours, and for certain events.

The Marshall Foundation believes that by tightly focusing our resources in areas of promoting scholarly research, providing enriching educational opportunities, and offering stimulating public programs, we can ensure that the life and principles of George C. Marshall are made relevant and better understood by a growing audience, both in our nation and abroad. We have never needed his example more.

We appreciate the support of our many friends and look forward to sharing more of our plans with you as we move forward.

photo credit: Micalyn Miller

Above: VMI cadet and summer intern Whitney Edwards-Roberson digitizing Army Signal Corps photos.

Above left: Researcher John Bolton, currently in the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies doctoral program visited our Library in September.



NEW BOOKS ABOUT OR INCLUDING MARSHALL

Generals in the Making: How Marshall, Eisenhower, Patton, and Their Peers Became the Commanders Who Won World War II
By **Benjamin Runkle** (Stackpole Books, 2019)

The Daughters of Yalta: The Churchills, Roosevelts, and Harrimans: A Story of Love and War
By **Catherine Grace Katz** (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2020)

Information Hunters: When Librarians, Soldiers, and Spies Banded Together in World War II Europe
By **Kathy Peiss** (Oxford University Press, 2020)

A General's Last Call: George C. Marshall as Secretary of Defense, 1950–51
By **Wayne C Thompson** (Mariner Publishing Company, 2020)

the last word



photo credit: George C. Marshall Foundation

Army Chief of Staff Gen. George C. Marshall, 1942.

"Remember this: the truly great leader overcomes all difficulties….The lack of equipment, the lack of food, the lack of this or that are only excuses; the real leader displays this quality in his triumphs over adversity, however great it may be."

— George C. Marshall
Speech to the first graduating class of the Army Candidate School, September 27, 1941

KEEP MARSHALL'S LEGACY ALIVE

Through your financial support, you help us perpetuate the legacy of the man President Harry Truman called "the great one of the age." As the keeper of the flame, the Marshall Foundation preserves and communicates the remarkable story of the life and times of George C. Marshall and his contemporaries. It has become a unique, national treasure worth protecting at all costs. That's why your contribution is so important.

Marshall received this Nobel Peace Prize in 1953.

GCMF THE GEORGE C. MARSHALL FOUNDATION

P.O. Box 1600, Lexington, VA 24450

INSIDE THIS ISSUE

This magazine, in tandem with our Marshall Legacy Series and other initiatives, brings Marshall to life substantially and in a fashion that does justice to the complexities of his life, character, and career.

The Role of Luck & Resiliency in the Making of a General

Daughters of Yalta

Information Hunters of World War II

Opposition to the Marshall Plan