ONLINE CATALOG SEARCH
Memorandum for General McNair
January 26, 1944 [Washington, D.C.]
I noticed on page 14 of the Minutes of the General Council of January 24th, a report on the officer personnel handled by the Antiaircraft people. This does not impress me as businesslike, certainly not efficient. Is there any good explanation for this business to have continued the way it has without evident signs of correction?1
Document Copy Text Source: George C. Marshall Papers, Pentagon Office Collection, Selected Materials, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Virginia.
Document Format: Typed memorandum.
1. Inspector General Virgil L. Peterson reported that the Antiaircraft Artillery Command at Richmond, Virginia, was 106 percent officer overstrength and the Antiaircraft Artillery Training Center at Camp Davis, North Carolina, was 141 percent officer overstrength. “It appears that the Headquarters has not been as aggressive as it should have been to eliminate unqualified officers.” Peterson had discussed the officer overstrength problem with battalion commanders at Camp Davis, and “all indicated that the policy was to permit them to select out of the 90 officers, the 25 or 30 that they wished to have assigned to their unit. . . The attitude appeared to be that it was not necessary to reclassify officers as long as they could pass them on to someone else.” (Minutes, Meeting of the General Council, January 24, 1944, NA/ RG 407 [334.8, General Council Minutes].)
Recommended Citation: ThePapers of George Catlett Marshall, ed.Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens(Lexington, Va.: The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981- ). Electronic version based on The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 4, “Aggressive and Determined Leadership,” June 1, 1943-December 31, 1944 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 250-251.