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To General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower
August 2, 1946 Radio No. GOLD 1228. [Nanking, China]
With reference to my GOLD 12201 I have found two situations out here unsatisfactory. First, there have been too many separate agencies reporting on China which is bound to create confusion, may easily lead to unfortunate leaks and requires too much of my time to examine to see if erroneous impressions may be given. Therefore I thought Gillem’s G-2 business should be transferred with necessary personnel to Military Attache’s Department here, particularly as Gillem has no combat command and is solely engaged in liquidating his command and in logistical matters. The Seventh Fleet intelligence, military and naval attache intelligence, Embassy intelligence and SSU intelligence, supplemented by consular intelligence presents a heavy dose of intelligence at best without the product of Gillem’s [China Service Command] organization.
Secondly, and more important, I found a situation in Mukden almost exactly comparable with the deplorable situation that festered in Moscow prior to Harriman’s and Dean’s arrival out there,2 with which Handy is familiar. The military attache was antagonistic to the SSU senior, his side was accused of being pro-Soviet while the SSU was accused of being pro-Kuomintang. Both were criticising each other and declining to pool or cooperate. Also there was necessarily present the American member of the Executive Headquarters team that might happen to be in Mukden at the time. The American Consul General, a very fine fellow, was sitting in the middle of this unfortunate American muddle in the center of the most delicate region in the world, possibly, at this moment. As I have said, it almost exactly duplicates the mess in Moscow that defeated us for almost three years.3 I therefore directed that all United States intelligence agencies in Manchuria be coordinated by the Consul General. I anticipate that there may be objection from Vandenberg’s new agency, but while I recognize its independency from one point of view, I cannot accept its independence unless it goes completely under cover which will take time and the introduction of new personnel. I also anticipate some disagreement from your G-2, but again I cannot accept the responsibility for action out here with such fumbling and almost public muddling as inevitably goes on under divided control.
I am giving you the above as a basis for preventing Washington action antagonistic to my purpose.4
Document Copy Text Source: Records of the Department of State (RG 59), Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
Document Format: Typed radio message.
1. See Marshall to Commanding General, China Service Command, August 1, 1946, Papers of George Catlett Marshall, #5-515 [5: 640]. Copies of the message had been sent to Colonel Marshall Carter and the secretary of the General Staff.
2. On the staff problems at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in 1943 prior to the arrival of W. Averell Harriman as the new ambassador and Major General John R. Deane as head of the newly created military mission, see Marshall Memorandum to General Styer, September 22, 1943, Papers of George Catlett Marshall, #4-113 [4: 134-35].
3. Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg had become director of the Central Intelligence Group in June 1946. The group had been initiated in February 1946 “as a cooperative interdepartmental activity . . . [to] furnish strategic and national policy intelligence to the President” and various departments and agencies. (Michael Warner, ed., CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman [Washington: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1994], p. 35.)
4. Marshall was notified on August 5: “War Department approved transfer of personnel and activities of Director of Intelligence China Service Command to Office of Military Attache, transfer to be completed not later than 20 August.” On August 8, Deputy Chief of Staff Thomas T. Handy told his former boss: “G-2 of War Department will carry out the letter and spirit of your desires. Vandenberg is away but your directive was discussed by [Major General Lauris] Norstad [director of the Plans and Operations Division] with Vandenberg’s executive who gave assurances that no antagonistic action would result. Colonel Carter discussed same question with Acheson, Acting Secretary of State, who supports your action completely.” (Colonel J. Hart Caughey to Marshall, Radio No. GOLD 1256, August 5, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, Military Affairs, GOLD Messages]; Handy to Marshall, Radio No. WAR-96854, August 8, 1946, NA/RG 59 [Lot Files, Marshall Mission, War Department, Reporting].)
Recommended Citation: ThePapers of George Catlett Marshall, ed.Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens(Lexington, Va.: The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981- ). Electronic version based on The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 5, “The Finest Soldier,” January 1, 1945-January 7, 1947 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), pp. 642-643.